Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers
Kenneth Katzman 1 : "Iran's Long Range Missile Capabilities"
Iran's long range ballistic missile program has apparently overcome some
key bottlenecks over the past year, due primarily to assistance from
Russian entities, possibly with the tacit approval of the Russian
government itself. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet told the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on January 28, 1998 that Iran will
likely have missiles able to target Israel and Saudi Arabia much sooner
than the ten years he predicted in testimony one year earlier. Tenet
attributed the new assessment not only to Russian assistance, but also to
indigenous Iranian advances.
Current U.S. attention focuses on two Iranian missile programs. The Shahab
(Meteor) 3 has an 800-930 mile range, and can carry a payload of 1,650 lbs.
The Shahab 4 reportedly has a 1,240 mile range and can carry a somewhat
smaller payload of 2,200 lbs. There appears to be a consensus in press
reports, quoting U.S. and Israeli intelligence sources, that Iran could be
within about one year of fielding the Shahab 3. According to press reports,
Iran has conducted successful tests of an engine, presumably for the Shahab
3, although more are needed, and it may conduct a test launch of the
missile this year or next.
Russian assistance appears to have benefited Iran not only by supplying
components and equipment Iran could not acquire elsewhere, but by imparting
to Iranian technicians the needed skills and methodology they previously
lacked. Iran has generally been deficient in systems integration and
project management, which is why its indigenous missile programs previously
met with failure. The Russian training could, in the long run, be the key
factor in making Iran self-sufficient in missile production.
Some analysts remain cautious about Iran's prospects. Although Iran is
making progress, they note that Iran has repeatedly failed in its
indigenous missile production capabilities. Iran's entire inventory is
composed of foreign-supplied missiles, except for some assembled in Iran
from North Korean-supplied kits. There is no evidence that it has been able
to produce a single guided missile of indigenous design. In addition, some
Israeli experts believe Iran is still some ways away from being able to
indigenously integrate a chemical, biological, or nuclear warhead with the
missiles under development. Iran's ability to produce sophisticated
guidance systems is not known.
There has been much speculation as to whether or not the accession of
Iran's moderate new President, Mohammad Khatemi, would lead to a curb or
slowdown of Iran's missile or other WMD programs. Thus far, there are no
indications that this is the case. Nor have U.S. sanctions on Iran, or
threatened sanctions against Russia for supplying Iran, yet slowed Iran's
long range missile programs.
Background to Iran's Missile Programs 2
Analysts date Iran's ballistic missile production program to 1987, when it
initiated efforts to produce Scud missiles. Iran had begun acquiring the
Scud-B in 1985 from Libya and in 1986 from Syria, and used some of them
against Iraq as early as 1985. Despite attaching high priority to
indigenous Scud production, and technical talent on par with North Korea,
Iran's initial efforts to produce the Scud-B indigenously failed, and Iran
turned to North Korea for technical assistance and resupply. It bought
200-300 Scud B's from North Korea between 1987 and 1992. 3
At the same time Iran was purchasing the Scud-B from North Korea, it also
began investing in North Korean ballistic missile development. The "Scud
Mod-B," a missile with a range of about 200 miles, was North Korea's first
indigenously-produced missile. Iran reportedly took delivery of 100 Scud
Mod-B's in 1987, according to Jane's Intelligence Review. North Korea then
helped Iran set up a Scud Mod B plant in Iran, which became operational by
the spring of 1988, the height of the War of the Cities with Iraq. However,
that plant, according to the Jane's 1995 special report, never produced
significant quantities of that missile, apparently due to Iranian
Iran may have abandoned the Scud Mod B program for another program it was
funding in North Korea, the Scud Mod C. According to the Jane's special
report, the Scud Mod-C had a smaller warhead than the Scud Mod-B, and a
longer range (over 300 miles). It also had an upgraded inertial guidance
system which improved its accuracy. North Korea reportedly began producing
the missile in 1989, and began shipping them to Iran in January 1991, the
time of the Gulf war between Iraq and the U.S.-led coalition. A live firing
test was carried out in Iran in May 1991. By 1994, Iran was reported to
have 150-200 of the Scud Mod-C's. As it did in the case of the Scud Mod-B,
North Korea reportedly helped Iran convert a missile maintenance plant into
an assembly facility for the Scud Mod-C. Iranian military personnel also
reportedly traveled to North Korea to receive training in the manufacture
and operation of the missile. 4 According to the Defense Department
proliferation report issued in November 1997, Iran is "now able to produce
the [Scud] missile itself. This has been accomplished with considerable
equipment and technical help from North Korea." 5
Some reports suggest that Iran and Syria agreed to cooperate in the
production of the Scud Mod C. Iran reportedly financed the construction of
a missile factory in Syria built by North Korea. This cooperation
apparently began in the fall of 1991, after the Persian Gulf war. The
following year, U.S. intelligence tracked a North Korean cargo ship
reportedly carrying Scud Mod C missiles. The missiles apparently were
off-loaded in Iran and some of them were subsequently flown to Syria. 6 The
United States did not attempt to intercept the ship before it docked in
Iran because it lacked the international legal authority to prevent the
The Nodong Program
By 1993, analysts were closely watching Iranian interest in a potentially
more significant North Korean missile program. The North Korean Nodong-1
missile, with an estimated range of 600 miles, was first test fired across
the Sea of Japan in 1993, although not to its full range. 7 Iran reportedly
had helped fund the development of the Nodong missile, making its payments
primarily in oil shipments. Iran also was apparently interested in
acquiring the even longer range Nodong 2, which is made out of lighter
materials than the Nodong 1 and would put Israel within Iran's striking
range. Iranian officials observed tests of the Nodong 1 in North Korea and
some reports suggested North Korea wanted to test the Nodong 1 in Iran's
The United States, taking advantage of North Korea's economic vulnerability
and the crisis over North Korea's nuclear program, pressured North Korea
not to make the Nodong available to Iran. In April 1996, the United States
and North Korea began talks on missile sales to the Middle East, as an
adjunct to the October 1994 agreement on North Korea's nuclear program. No
Nodong missiles are known to have been shipped to Iran, although the Nodong
1 apparently has been tested successfully by North Korea and could be
Another North Korean missile program has attracted Iranian attention,
although it is likely the United States would apply as much pressure as
possible to prevent its export to Iran. The Taepo-Dong 2 is said to have a
maximum range of 6,200 miles if a relatively small warhead is adapted to
it, according to DIA. At that range, the Taepo Dong would be considered an
intercontinental ballistic missile. The CIA believes the Taepo Dong would
have a range of about 1860 miles, however. 8 The DoD proliferation report
issued November 1997 puts the range of the Taepo Dong 1 at about 930 miles
and the Taepo Dong 2 at 2500-3750 miles. 9
Iran Turns to China
Iran apparently sought to hedge its best and not become too reliant on any
one supplier. In 1989, with its supply of North Korean Scud Mod B's nearly
exhausted from firings during the Iran-Iraq war, Iran signed a contract
with China for 200 CSS-8 missiles. These are SA-2 (Chinese version, HQ-2)
surface-to-air solid fuel missiles modified for use against ground targets.
However, the CSS-8 (referred to in Iran as the 8610) had a short range (93
miles) and could not therefore reach too deeply into Iraq. The missile also
reportedly had a limited payload and was not too accurate. 10
The M Series Missiles
The limitations of the CSS-8 led Iran to seek from China the M-9 and M-11
missile. The M-9 and the M-11 are single-stage, solid-fuel, road-mobile
missiles. The M-9 has a reported range of 375 miles, a warhead of 1100-1300
lbs., and a CEP of 1000 ft. The M-11 has a range about half that of the
M-9, with a payload as high as 1750 lbs., and a CEP of almost 2000 ft. In
March 1989, China was reported to be helping build a facility in Iran to
manufacture with a range (500 miles) somewhat greater than the M-9. A
launch range and test facilities were built for the program. Subsequent
reports indicate that, shortly after the 1991 Persian Gulf war, Iran tested
ballistic missiles with ranges of about 425 and 625 miles. Later (1992)
reports indicated that the China-Iran projects were producing a version of
the M-11, 11 with a range of 625 miles. Bermudez and other reports
suggested this ballistic missile program could be Tondar-68, but an Iranian
announcement in 1996 suggested that the Tondar was an anti-ship missile
based on the Chinese C-801 or C-802 cruise missile 12 (see below).
Although it is clear China was helping Iran produce a ballistic missile,
China apparently did not ship any complete M series missiles to Iran. In
1992, China agreed to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime,
which would bar shipments of either M series missile to Iran, or any other
country outside the MTCR. In 1993 China was sanctioned by the United States
for shipping M-11 missile parts to Pakistan; those sanctions expired in
1994 after China pledged to end the transfers.
In mid-1995, new reports surfaced that China was providing ballistic
missile technology to Iran. In June 1995, Defense News published
information it said was contained in a classified May 1995 CIA report
entitled "China-Iran Missile Technology Cooperation: A Time-Line Approach."
13 The Defense News report indicated that unspecified ballistic missile
technology had recently been transferred to Iran. Separate press reports
said the transfers included guidance system components, computerized
machine tools, and rocket propellant ingredients. 14 A November 21, 1996
Washington Times report quoted an October 1996 CIA report as saying China
agreed to sell Iran guidance technology and components to test ballistic
missiles. 15 The guidance technology reportedly included gyroscopes,
accelerometers, and test equipment produced by the China Precision
Engineering Institute. However, the report referred to an agreement to sell
the technology, and did not indicate whether or not the components had
indeed been transferred.
It is not clear from these press reports whether the technology transferred
was for a renewed attempt to develop Iranian versions of the M-9 and M-11,
to improve upon indigenous Scud programs developed in Iran with North
Korean help, or to assist Iran's Shahab (Meteor) ballistic missile program.
Analysts have differed on the degree of coordination between China and
North Korea in their assistance to Iran's ballistic missile programs. There
apparently has been some level of coordination, but the two countries seem
to be working in Iran independently. Another possibility is that the
Chinese technology transfers are supplementing ballistic missile technology
being provided, as of late 1996, by Russia (see below).
In response to these reports, the Clinton Administration has maintained
that China has not violated its 1992 pledge to adhere to the Missile
Technology Control Regime. However, in March 1998, the Administration was
reported to be developing a package of incentives to persuade China to
formally join the MTCR and end all missile technology transfers (ballistic,
cruise, short-range) to Iran. 16 This reported offer suggests that the
Administration might have been downplaying intelligence information
indicating that China had violated any commitments to adhere to the MTCR.
Chinese Assistance to Iran's Short-Range Missile Programs
One year later, another Washington Times report indicated that China was
helping Iran on one or more shorter range ballistic missile programs. 17
According to the report, Chinese technicians traveled to Iran in May 1997
to monitor a ground test of a rocket for a 105-mile range solid-fuel
missile called the NP-110. The report added that Iran was using Chinese
X-ray equipment in the program, which is used to study missile casings and
to check whether the solid fuel is in proper condition. According to the
DoD proliferation report of November 1997, other Iranian short-range
solid-fuel ballistic missile programs, which might have been developed with
Chinese help, include the Nazeat-10, with a range of 93 miles and the
unguided Zelzal (Earthquake), which has a range of about 125 miles. The
Nazeat is referred to in some literature as the Iran-130. It has a 330 lb.
warhead, but reportedly performed poorly during the Iran-Iraq war. 18 The
DoD report does not mention the NP-110 or another program described by some
analysts, the Mushak. It is possible that these are all variations of the
same program, as they all use solid-fuel and have similar ranges.
During the Iran-Iraq war, China supplied Iran with a Type 83 artillery
rocket, which Iran copied and called the Oghab (Eagle). The Oghab has a
range of only about 25 miles, a 650 lb. warhead and, because it is
unguided, it has a CEP of about .6 miles even at that small range. Launched
from trucks, Iran fired about 300 during the war against Iraq, suggesting
that Iran manufactured about 250 of them, the others being supplied by
China. It was intended to be primarily a battlefield weapon, although a
number of Iraqi cities lied within that range. This enabled Iran to use the
weapon strategically, as well as tactically. However, press accounts
suggest that the Oghab was not particularly effective.
Chinese Assistance with Cruise Missiles
China also has provided vital assistance to Iran in the field of anti-ship
cruise missile technology. These weapons do not necessary contribute to
Iran's ability to develop a long-range ballistic missiles, but most
analysts believe that Iran's experience with cruise missiles contributes to
its overall missile technology base of expertise. During the latter stages
of the Iran-Iraq war, China provided to Iran a number of Hai Ying-2 (HY-2)
"Silkworm" missiles, a derivative of the old Soviet "Styx" anti-ship
missile. The maximum effective range of the missile is 25 miles and a
minimum effective range of about half that. The cruise missile, which has a
shaped-charge warhead ideal for piercing warship armor was well suited to
Iran's coastal defense needs during the war, and Iran fired a number of
them against U.S. reflagged tankers and other targets in Kuwait during the
Iran-Iraq war. China reportedly built a facility near Iran's Bandar Abbas
port in 1987 where it helped the Revolutionary Guard boost the range of the
Silkworm. 19 China itself was believed to have been able to extend the
range of the Silkworm to 125 miles.
Of even more concern to the U.S. Navy than the Silkworm has been Iran's
acquisition since 1995 of about 100 Chinese-supplied C-802 (surface and
ship-launched) and C-801K (air launched) anti-ship cruise missiles. The C
series turbo-jet powered anti-ship cruise missiles, first unveiled in 1989,
have a maximum range of about 75 miles (C-802) and 25 miles (C-801). Iran
tested the C-802 in early 1996, and the C-801K in June 1997, prompting
Secretary of Defense Cohen to assert that Iran now poses a "360-degree
threat" to U.S. forces in the Gulf. This threat will increase if Iran
acquires an over-the-horizon targeting capability f or the missile,
according to U.S. military officials.
The C series missiles are considered superior to the Silkworm because the C
series missiles are capable of engaging a target at closer range (7 miles)
than the Silkworm (12 miles). 20 This gives it a big advantage over the
Silkworm in a narrow body of water such as the Strait of Hormuz. The C
missiles also cruise at a lower altitude than the Silkworm, reducing
warning time to the potential adversary. In addition, a C-802 coastal
battery can fire 12 missiles before reloading, whereas a Silkworm battery
can only fire four missiles in succession. The C-802 can also be steered in
flight to a greater degree than can the Silkworm. However, the C series
warhead is considered less effective against warships than the Silkworm,
although the C series missiles can easily pierce commercial shipping hulls.
In advance of the October 1997 U.S.-China summit, the Clinton
Administration apparently succeeded in obtaining from China a pledge not to
enter into any new contracts with Iran for anti-ship cruise missiles.
During naval exercises in May 1996, Iran claimed to have fired a new type
of long-range missile called the Tondar (see above). Although some analysts
believed the Tondar might be a ballistic missile, the announcement in
connection with a naval exercise suggests Tondar is an anti-ship missile
fired from coastal batteries. 21 If this is the case, it is likely that the
Tondar program could represent an attempt to extend the range of the C
series missiles. Iran reportedly has been seeking to extend the range of
their C series missiles since it began acquiring them. 22 Another press
report indicates that China helped Iran develop an indigenously-produced
version of the C series missiles, called the Karus,, as well as a
medium-range anti-ship missile known as the FL-10. The FL-10 is believed to
be a copy of China's FL-2 (31 mile range) or supersonic FL-7 missile (19
mile range). Chinese advisers are said to be in Iran helping with these
Russia Enters the Picture
As demonstrated above, North Korea and China imparted to Iran a substantial
body of missile technology and training that should have made Iran
self-sufficient in ballistic missile production. However, there has been no
evidence to suggest that Iran produced any guided missiles of indigenous
design 24 , or that it was able, on its own, to improve upon what was
supplied by other countries. Iran was not even able to indigenously produce
the Scud, which is based on relatively simple 1940's technology, until
assembly lines were constructed for it by North Korea. According to Carus,
Iran's lackluster progress in the ballistic missile field demonstrates
difficulty in systems integration.
Apparently realizing that its indigenous ballistic missile capabilities
were lagging, and certainly suffered in comparison to that achieved by Iraq
before the 1991 Gulf war, Iran sought help from Russia. Since 1989, Russia
has been an eager supplier of conventional arms to Iran, including three
Kilo class submarines. In January 1995, Russia agreed to complete a 1000
Megawatt nuclear power plant at Bushehr that had been started by German
firms during the Shah's reign. Some analysts considered it inevitable that
Russia would cooperate with Iran on ballistic missile technology if Iran
wanted such assistance.
According to early press reports (early 1997) discussing Israeli
information and concerns, Russia has transferred components and technology
associated with Russia's SS-4 medium range ballistic missile. The SS-4 was
developed in the 1950's and has been phased out of the Soviet/Russian
inventory in accordance with the INF Treaty with the United States. Later
reports suggest that the Russian technology could be intended to develop a
version of the North Korean Nodong, which was intended to be but was not
transferred to Iran (see above). The two are not mutually exclusive; the
Nodong is based on Russian Scud technology, and Russian SS-4 technology
presumably can be adapted to a Nodong-type program.
Whatever the derivation, the Iranian liquid-fuel missile programs in
question are called the Shahab (Meteor)-3 and the Shahab-4. 25 The Shahab-3
has a range of 800-950 miles, and a reported payload of 1,654 lbs.; the
Shahab-4 has a range of 1,250 miles and a payload of 2,200 lbs. 26 The
Shahab-4 would be capable of hitting targets as far away as Germany and
western China, if launched from Iran. Israeli sources have also told the
United States that Iran, presumably with Russian assistance, is working on
two other unnamed long-range ballistic missiles, one of which would have an
intercontinental range of about 6,000 miles. If Iran were to produce a
missile of that range, it would be able to strike the east coast of the
United States. 27
According to press reports, Russia has provided a broad range of assistance
to the Iranian Shahab program. Equipment provided reportedly includes
specialty steels and alloys, as well as foil used specifically to shield
missile guidance systems, 28 tungsten coated graphite, wind tunnel
facilities, gyroscopes and guidance technology, rocket engine and fuel
technology, materials for building reentry vehicles, laser equipment,
machine tools, and maintenance manuals. In October 1997, Russia admitted
that Iranians are being trained in missile construction at two universities
in Russia. 29
Several different Russian establishments have been reported to be
contributing to the Shahab program, according to various press reports. 30
* An entity formerly known as NPO Trud has helped Iran build program
* Polyus (North Star) Research has supplied guidance equipment.
* Tsagi has conducted wind tunnel tests.
* Russian Scientific and Production Center at Inor has agreed to provide
special metal alloys.
* Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute has helped construct a wind tunnel.
Other contributing institutions include the Bauman Institute, Baltic State
Technical University, and NPO Energy Mash. The Baltic State Technical
University reportedly has set up a joint missile center with Iran known as
Persepolis, with facilities in Iran and Russia.
A major element of controversy has been whether or not the Russian
government is tacitly or directly supporting the missile assistance to
Iran. Some press reports indicate that the state arms exporting agency,
Rosvoorouzhenie, and the Russian Space Agency have provided assistance.
There have also been suggestions that the Russian Federal Security Service
has coordinated visits to Russian institutes by Iranian missile
technicians. 31 The Russian government denies it is involved, it has made
some arrests of persons it said were illegally involved in the assistance,
and it has reportedly pledged to the United States that it will crack down
on private entity involvement in the Shahab program.
Assessments of the progress of the Russian-assisted Shahab program differ,
in part because information about the Russian connection remains sketchy
amid Russian denials and U.S. pressure on Russia to crack down on entities
and persons assisting Iran. When information about the assistance first
came to light in early 1997, Israeli officials believed Iran might be six
months away from fielding the Shahab-3. The Shahab-4 was believed to be at
least three years out. However, as more information has become available,
the assessments of Iranian progress have been reduced somewhat. As of early
1998, Israel, apparently with the concurrence of their U.S. counterparts,
have been assessing the time frame for the Shahab-3 as "at least one year"
away. 32 Iran is believed to have done at least seven static engine tests
for the Shahab program, but Iran would need at least ten such tests to
develop an operational engine capability. This alone could easily take at
least one year. 33
Also in question is Iran's progress in developing an adequate guidance
capability. Two press reports, quoting U.S. intelligence, say that the
Chinese guidance technology assistance, discussed above, is for the Shahab
program. 34 If true, this could suggest a degree of cooperation between
Russia and China in assisting Iran not previously noted.
The revelations about Russian involvement in the Shahab program have
clearly had an effect on U.S. intelligence estimates of Iran's long-range
ballistic missile capabilities. In December 1993, a Washington Times report
quoting a CIA study said Iran had the technical capability to indigenously
produce an ICBM capable of carrying a chemical or biological weapon within
ten to fifteen years from the time a decision is made to begin development.
35 In January 1997, acting Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet
testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that it would
likely take Iran ten years to develop a medium-range ballistic missile. In
testimony before the same Committee one year later, in January 1998, Tenet
said that "Iran's success in gaining technology and materials from Russian
companies, combined with recent indigenous Iranian advances, means that it
could have a medium-range missile much sooner [than the ten years he
predicted the previous year]." Tenet did not specifically address the
possibility of Iran's developing an ICBM, however.
Shortly after Tenet's testimony, Air Force Lt. Gen. Lester Lyles, Director
of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, confirmed in testimony
before the Senate Armed Services Committee (March 24, 1998) that Iran was
working on missiles called the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4. In conjunction with
that testimony, officials told Washington Times reporter Bill Gertz that
the Shahab-3 could be deployed within two years and that a medium range
missile, presumably referring to the Shahab-4, could be deployed "in the
first half of the next decade." 36 These assessments will likely be
included in a new report on worldwide ballistic missiles produced by the
Air Force's National Air Intelligence Center. That report will be released
some time in April 1998. 37
Chemical and Biological Warheads
In its discussion of the proliferation threat from Iran, the November 1997
DoD proliferation report (p.8 of the Middle East section) discusses the
potential for anti-ship cruise missiles to be outfitted with chemical or
biological warheads. The report does not specifically assert that Iran is
capable of outfitting the Silkworm, C series, or any other cruise missile
with such warheads. However, most analysts believe that chemical warhead
technology (converting a Scud warhead, for example) is not too complicated
for Iran to master and assume that Iran will, if it does not already, have
such a warhead capability. Because fusing for an effective biological
warhead is more difficult technologically, Iran is probably a few years
away from developing this capability.
Iran is believed to possess ten to fifteen mobile launchers for its missile
force. In May 1995, the Senate Intelligence Committee released CIA
information that Iran had received at least four
transporter-erector-launchers from North Korea capable of launching Scud
Implications and Conclusions
Statements from U.S. and Israeli officials and a wide range of outside
experts credit the recent Russian ballistic missile technology assistance
to Iran as a providing a potential qualitative leap in Iran's capability.
Israeli anxiety about the assistance centers on the possibility that
Russia's help will enable Iran to become fully self-sufficient in ballistic
missile technology. Up until now, Iran has repeatedly had to turn to China,
North Korea, and now Russia to help it overcome its technological
weaknesses. Carus points out that Russia might be imparting to Iran the
type of skills in systems integration and project management that has
accounted for deficiencies in Iran's missile programs to date.
Although Iran appears to be making significant progress, it is useful to
approach its ballistic missile capabilities with caution. In contrast to
Iraq, Iran appears to have become so dependent on outside assistance that
it is difficult to imagine its ballistic missile programs proceeding
successfully if that assistance were ended. U.S. pressure on North Korea,
China, and Russia have made these countries more cautious in their
assistance, to the point where China, for example, never delivered to Iran
a complete M-9 or M-11 missile. North Korea did not deliver the Nodong,
even though that was the clear intention of both North Korea and Iran.
Some might argue that the caution of outside suppliers has caused Iran to
try to become more independent and to become more reliant on its own
indigenous capabilities. However, all the evidence available indicates that
the outside suppliers are "spoon-feeding" Iran's missile programs, and that
these programs would swiftly deteriorate if the outside experts departed
and technology transfers dried up. One anecdotal but relevant analogy can
be found in the Iranian contract with Russia to complete the 1000 megawatt
nuclear power reactor at Bushehr. Under the 1995 contract, Iran is to
construct the support facilities for the reactor, while Russia builds the
reactor itself. During a late February 1998 visit to the site--three years
after the contract was signed--Russian atomic energy chief Viktor Mikhailov
39 found that Iran's portion of the work was lagging well behind an the
contract had to be amended so that Russia could take over from Iran the
supporting work required.
1. Dr. Ken Katzman currently analyzes U.S. policy and legislation on the
Persian Gulf region for members of Congress and their staffs. Served in
government and the private sector as an analyst in Persian Gulf Affairs
with special emphasis on Iran and Iraq.
2. This paper incorporates observations, comments, and papers presented by
Kenneth Timmerman, Michael Eisenstadt, and Seth Carus at the Commission's
March 23, 1998 roundtable on the ballistic missile threat from Iran and
3. "Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction." Jane's Intelligence Review.
Special Report No. 6, 1995. Pp. 19-22.
4. Bermudez, Joseph. "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World - Iran's
Medium-Range Missiles." Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1992.
5. The Middle East and North Africa section. Department of Defense
Proliferation Report. November 26, 1997. P.2.
6. Tyler, Patrick. "North Korea Arms Ship Eludes U.S. for Iran Port." New
York Times, March 11, 1992. P.A6.
7. Sieff, Martin. "N. Korean Missiles May Be Tested in Iran This Year."
Washington Times, June 16, 1994.
8. Gertz, Bill. "N. Korean Missile Could Reach U.S., Intelligence Warns."
Washington Times, September 29, 1995. P.A3.
9. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response,
November 1997. Middle East and North Africa, p.7.
10. Eisenstadt, Michael. "Iranian Military Power: Capabilities and
Intentions." Policy Paper Number 42. Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, 1996. P.29.
11. Bermudez, Joseph. "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World - Iran's
Medium Range Missiles." Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1992.
12. Bruce, James. "Iran's Long-Range Tondar Causes Concern in West." Jane's
Defense Weekly, May 22, 1996.
13. Opall, Barbara. "U.S. Queries China On Iran." Defense News, June 19-25,
14. "Chinese Shipments Violate Controls." Jane's Defense Weekly, July 1,
1995. P.3. .
15. Gertz, Bill. "China Sold Iran Missile Technology." Washington Times,
November 21, 1996. P.1.
16. Gertz, Bill. "U.S. May Help China on Missiles". Washington Times, March
18, 1998. P.1.
17. Gertz, Bill. "China Joins Forces With Iran on Short-Range Missile."
Washington Times, June 17, 1997. P.3.
18. "Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction." Jane's Intelligence Review,
Special Report No. 6, 1995.
19. Ibid. P.22.
20. A useful comparison of the Silkworm and the C series missiles can be
found in Hough, Harold. "Iran Targets The Arabian Peninsula." Jane's
Intelligence Review, October 1996, pp. 458-461.
21. Bruce, James. "Iran's Long Range Tondar Causes Concern in West." Jane's
Defense Weekly, May 22, 1996. P.17.
23. "China Helping Iranian Missile Developments." Jane's Defense Weekly.
July 17, 1996, p.13.
24. Carus, Seth. "Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications and
Responses." Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol.2,
Number 1, March 1998.
25. Eisenstadt's interpretation is that the Shahab-3 is based on the North
Korean Nodong and the Shahab-4 is based on the Soviet SS-4, according to
his paper distributed at the March 23 roundtable.
26. Gertz, Bill. "Russia, China Aid Iran's Missile Program." Washington
Times, September 10, 1997. P.1.
27. Rodan, Steve. "Secret Israeli Data Reveals Iran Can Make Missile in
Year." Defense News, October 6-12, 1997. P.4.
28. Gertz, Bill. "Russia Sells Iran Missile Metals." Washington Times,
October 20, 1997.
29. Gertz, Bill. "Russians Admit to Training Iranian Missile Technicians."
October 3, 1997. P.A17.
30. Defense News, October 6-12, 1997, p.4; Washington Times, October 2,
1997, p.A1, and October 20, 1997, p.A1, and February 24, 1998, p.3; and
Washington Post, December 31, 1997.
31. Gertz, Bill. "Panel Chairmen See Russian Firms Inviting Sanctions."
Washington Times, February 24, 1998. P.3.
32. Finnegan, Philip and Rodan, Steve. "Israelis Scale Back Iran Missile
Estimate." Defense News, February 2-8, 1998.
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39. Mikhailov was replaced within days of the visit, reportedly for