Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers


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Russia/Ukraine: Bruce Blair, Stephen Blank, Daniel Gouré and Nadia Schadlow April 1, 1998 On April 1, 1998, System Planning Corporation hosted an unclassified roundtable discussion on Russia for the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. SPC assembled four prominent experts on the Russian and Ukrainian ballistic missile capabilities: Dr. Bruce Blair, Dr. Stephan J. Blank, Dr. Daniel Gouré, and Ms. Nadia Schadlow. This paper summarizes their findings and notes key areas of consensus and dissent. Russia The three presenters on Russia agreed that Moscow relies on the defense policy of deterrence and a strategy of preemptive first strike. With this defense policy, Russia maintains its international position as a nuclear power. The reliance on nuclear capabilities enables a delay in military reform and reduces the reliance on conventional forces. Stephan Blank explained that nuclear weapons provide an inexpensive alternative to a fully equipped army during economic hardships. Current Threat Bruce Blair termed the Russian situation as unstable due to deteriorating strategic force capabilities, weak nuclear control and weakened C3 capabilities. He stated that the deterioration of C3 capabilities poses the most serious threat to US interests. Early warning systems, in particular the satellite (earth observation) capability, are deteriorating; this encourages the reliance on a launch-on-warning policy. Daniel Gouré took a more optimistic approach to the Russian situation and stated that what appears to be weakness, actually represents progress on a rational course towards a smaller, controlled, and modernized military structure. Russia maintains two deterrence policies; one policy focuses on deterring China, while the other policy addresses the threat from NATO and the United States. Russia does not distinguish between conventional and nuclear weapons and will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons if Russia, the CIS, or its vital interests are threatened. Daniel Gouré explained that Russia, in effect, advocates use of nuclear weapons in response to nuclear or conventional aggression. Capabilities Consensus among the presenters focused on the view that Russia does not have the economic resources to maintain the current number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal. They agreed that Russia must downsize, but maintain a capability of at least 1000 warheads. Currently, fifty weapons depots exist where tens of thousands of strategic weapons are stored. Today there are 3000-4000 strategic weapons in storage for combat use and between 19,000 and 15,000 tactical weapons in the process of being dismantled. Daniel Gouré suggested that the Russian seek to stabilize their strategic forces at 2,000-2,500 warheads. Blair stated that by 2003 Russia will not have more than several hundred warheads in inventory and the current inventory will be obsolete. The future of the arsenal depends on funding, arms control, East-West relations, and economics. Topol (SS-27) provides the missile centerpiece for Russia. The Boray (SSBN) program is in question and the naval nuclear forces are declining due to the lack of political backing and expense. Russia must maintain the Boray or a follow-on system to be within the START parameters. The Topol has political backing from high ranking officials and provides a link between the space applications and nuclear capabilities. Daniel Gouré addressed the selective modernization plan, which focuses on the Topol, Boray, and SSN-28 (with the DS5). He projected that this modernization will aid the Russian's ability to respond flexibly both to conventional and nuclear first use capabilities, counter a ballistic missile attack, and aid flexibility. Cost savings through the reduction of redundancy and downsizing will provide the funding for select system upgrades and result in better control mechanisms. Blair countered this assertion and suggests that these savings are already spent on select projects such as the Topol. C3I The presenters described operational safety, export, and theft as the three main risks to Russian nuclear command and control. Accidental launch risks are likely to increase under the short response time and a deteriorating early warning system. They used the Norway weather rocket example, which triggered Russian launch mechanisms, to illustrate the risk of accidental launch. Further, the export control policy is incoherent. The potential for theft due to corrupt officials and the dependency on an unstable control structure. Today, control of the missile launch capability remains Moscow-centric. The 1994 de-targeting agreement between the U.S. and the Russians had no effect on the risk of launch and the potential of negligence in the military (due to low morale). Blair considered the old Soviet architecture that maintained rigid accountability preferable over the current Russian system that lacks a clearly defined warning and control structure. In the future, launch mistakes may not be aborted due to weak institutions, a coup, or warring military factions. Additionally, military sites in the Far East and the Pacific may splinter from Moscow and seek to export military articles for profit. Stephan Blank and Bruce Blair agreed that primary threats include internal corruption and economic threats to stability. They agreed that the resources are not available to maintain the 2500 warheads that Daniel Gouré suggested. Exports Russia exports defense-related goods to both China and the Middle East. Stephan Blank asserted that the Middle East, because of its geographic proximity, is a source of interest for Russia. He specifically noted that Russian exports to Iran exemplifies Moscow's interest in the region, especially in gaining geostrategic influence over the U.S. with respect to WMD exports. The participants concurred that Russia sees technology and equipment exports for civil, dual-use, and military use as integral to its foreign policy. On the one hand, this policy is based on Russia's need for capital to keep its defense industries functioning. On the other hand, privatization, corruption, and political leverage to potentially hostile states fuel arms sales. Blank, for instance, stated that there have been exports in missile guidance technology in addition to export of chemical, nuclear and biological technologies and components, which have been in violation of Russia's arms control commitments. Conclusions All of the presenters speculated that the economy may recover in 10-12 years, but whether Russia can achieve stability in that time frame, is unclear. Ultimately, military and economic reforms are crucial. Although Blair advocates a "lean mean" nuclear arsenal, he sees this scenario as unlikely due to the Russian government and C3 weaknesses and the lack of economic resources, which are unable to sustain the political, military and economic pressures. The crux of the argument: the reality of defense capabilities must be maintained within the available economic resources. Ukraine Actors in Ballistic Missile Proliferation Two primary actors drive Ukrainian ballistic missile proliferation policy: the government leadership and the regional enterprises. The leaders of the Ukrainian state are preoccupied by state reform, a weak government, impending elections in 1999, and unsteady bilateral relations with Russia and the United States. Risks of Exports and Technology Transfer Continue Ukraine's inability to pursue meaningful economic reforms increases the potential for nuclear exports or technology sharing. During 1994-1996, Ukraine pursued multiple questionable export activities with Libya, China, and Russia. After export activity to Libya was uncovered, the Ukrainian government levied sanctions, removed export licenses, and shared information about end-uses and end-users with the United States. Further, the Ukrainian government established an Export-Technical Commission to review all missile technology-related sales. Two main economic incentives pose risks for the export control objectives. The first risk results from potential export of missile technology and related defense articles. The majority of former Soviet defense production was located in Russia. Ukraine, however, retained important design and fabrication enterprises for missile production. Under the current economic hardships, the likelihood that firms will export civil and military technologies to China and other nations increase. Another economic risk results from the Russian control in the energy sector. The Ukrainian energy sector relies heavily on Russia trades in debt for equity, which increases Russian control over Ukrainian strategic interests. De-nuclearization and Non-proliferation Efforts Between 1992 and 1997, Ukraine transferred approximately 2650 to 4500 nuclear missiles to Russia. The nuclear transfers allowed Ukraine to obtain much-needed fuel rods from Russia. Further actions by Ukraine to support non-proliferation include: membership in the NPT; signing the Ukraine-NATO Charter; and destroying the SS-24 missiles instead of using the missiles in a space launch capacity. Most recently, Ukraine joined the MTCR, which limits missile production to a range of less than 300 km. In March of 1998, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the United States and Ukraine. This agreement resulted in the following: creating an export control regime; confirming MTCR membership; dismissing modernization plans for Ukraine's Scud missiles; and withdrawing the commitment to construct turbines for Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant. In return, the US announced an economic aid and investment program. In particular, the space sector will be aided by joint projects and research and development programs. Conclusions and Future Challenges In future, the West must encourage Ukraine to strengthen government institutions and export controls. Economic and political pressures continue to influence export policies and create incentives for regional enterprises to engage in efforts contrary to the MTCR. At the same time, a weak government in need of economic support may risk overlooking questionable export practices for economic gains.


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