Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers


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India/Pakistan: Daniel Gouré, Michael Krepon and David Tanks April 3, 1998 On April 3, 1998, System Planning Corporation hosted a roundtable discussion with CSIS' Dr. Daniel Gouré; Henry L. Stimson Center President Michael Krepon; and David Tanks from the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. The participants each provided an analysis of India and Pakistan's ballistic missile capabilities. This paper summarizes their positions, and highlights areas of consensus and disagreement. India All three of the roundtable participants agreed that India has developed a ballistic missile production capability. While David Tanks asserted that India's missile program has benefited from both direct and indirect assistance from nations like France, Germany, Russia and the United States, Gouré concluded that India has placed high priority in creating an independent military missile program which will ultimately make India self-sufficient in the design and production of a full range of missiles, from anti-tank and surface to air missiles, and perhaps even through IRBM's. Furthermore, Gouré also stated that India has talented scientists and researchers working in its military industrial complex, many of which have been educated in the United States and have worked at U.S. facilities, such as Wright Patterson Air Force Base All of the participants agreed that India has developed SRBMs and IRBMs not only to deter a potential nuclear strike from Pakistan, but also to counterbalance the nuclear threat from China. They agreed that India has attempted to improve both the range and accuracy of its IRBM's in order to bring large Chinese population centers into range. The nation has used its commercial space launch program to develop the skills and infrastructure needed to support a ballistic missile program. The following is a summary of India's current ballistic missile and space launch vehicle programs, and provides an assessment of the missiles that the nation could be developing. Prithvi The Prithvi I is a liquid fueled missile with a range of 150 km that is currently deployed with army units. India has claimed that the missile is equipped only with conventional warheads. India has recently completed development of the Prithvi II, a 250 km version of the Prithvi I, and has begun production of the missile. David Tanks asserted that this missile is not a true ballistic missile insofar as it can maneuver in flight and follow one of six different preprogrammed trajectories. India has also allegedly planned the development of the Prithvi III, a 350 km boosted liquid fuel system. Agni In 1994, the United States persuaded India to suspend testing of the 2500 km Agni missile after three test flights. The missile used an Indian SLV-3 booster for its first stage, and the liquid fueled Prithvi for its second stage. Tanks mentioned that the recent Indian articles have suggested that India has proposed the development of the 5000 km Agni II, a missile that is allegedly in development. This missile will have a solid-fueled second stage. Tanks also argued that although India has claimed that this missile will be used only to carry a conventional warhead, the cost of the warhead cannot be justified unless used as a nuclear delivery vehicle. PSLV The PSLV served as India's main space launch vehicle for a number of years. It comprises a 9.2 ft. diameter booster with six strap-ons, has a liquid fueled second stage, a solid fueled third stage and a liquid fueled fourth stage. This rocket has launched a 1200 kg satellite into an 800 km high orbit. On its next launch, this missile will place a reconnaissance satellite and a piggy-backed light-weight satellite into orbit. This launch will be conducted to demonstrate the missile's value to the commercial space-launch market. In addition, the participants agreed that critical technologies associated with the PSLV have been used for ballistic missile applications, particularly for the Agni. GSLV India is reportedly concluding development of the GSLV, a three stage missile that will allegedly be able to place a 2500 kg payload into geo-transfer orbit. The missile will use the PSLVs first two stages, but will use a single cryogenic stage for its third and fourth stages. The rocket will also use four liquid fueled strap-ons that have been adapted from the PSLVs second stage. According to Indian reports, the missile will be launched in 1998-1999. Suraya India could be developing a missile with a range of 8,000-12,000 km, that could strike targets in the continental United States. The Suraya is an unconfirmed program that has been mentioned in the Indian press. According to the Indian media, development of the program started in 1994, and the missile is modeled on the PSLV. None of the participants, however, were able to confirm that such a program exists, or that it could be used against the United States. Nevertheless, Tanks concluded that it is likely that India will possess a limited number of ICBM's within the next ten years. Indian WMD Capabilities The participants agreed that India is a de facto nuclear power, and that it possesses both the material and know-how to assemble deliverable nuclear explosive devices. They also agreed that India currently possesses an extensive civilian nuclear power program, and that it plans to construct breeder reactors and thorium 232 reactors, both of which will produce significant amounts of fissile material, in the future. David Tanks concluded that India has the capability to become an "overt" nuclear power in the future if it is willing to take on the hardships of international sanctions. Tanks asserted that most reports claim that India has enough fissile material to produce between 85-100 nuclear devices, although some reports have put the number as high as 200. Unlike Tanks, however, Daniel Gouré stated that India is believed to have approximately 60 nuclear weapons. A Contradictory Assessment Although Tanks and Gouré both asserted that India has the ability to produce advanced ballistic missiles through its advanced military infrastructure, Michael Krepon argued that past assessments have been exaggerated, and that India will not possess the ability to develop a ballistic missile capable of striking the United States by 2015. Krepon stated that India's military and defense establishment suffers from budgetary shortfalls that will ultimately impede its ability to develop an advanced ballistic missile capability. Krepon insisted that India's missile programs have been designed to send political messages, and are not as advanced as previous assessments have suggested. India is obsessed with gaining international recognition, and perhaps even a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. If India does develop an intercontinental missile capable of hitting the United States, the missile will not be designed for strategic use against the United States. It will be used for symbolic reasons, not military purposes. This assessment contradicts Tanks' assessment which concludes that the only reason for India to field an ICBM is to intimidate the United States in order to pursue its own national interests. Pakistan There was a consensus among the participants that Pakistan has attempted to obtain nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems. There was also a consensus that Pakistan has attempted to obtain these capabilities almost exclusively to deter India. Pakistan is inferior military to India militarily in virtually every way and thus feels the need to develop a nuclear capability to demonstrate its technical prowess, its status as a threshold state, and its government's commitment to national security. Since the early 1980's, Pakistan has attempted to indigenously develop ballistic missiles. The following is a summary of Pakistan's ballistic missile capabilities: Hatf I Although the Haft I program was believed to have been halted after three unsuccessful test flights, some of the technology associated with this 80 km missile was used in the development of the Haft II program. Hatf II It is also believed that the Haft II program has been halted due to technical problems. The Pakistani's allegedly shelved this 300 km system because of directional problems. M-11 Pakistan began to obtain M-11 missiles from China in the early 1990's. In late 1996, it was also revealed that China may have helped Pakistan construct an M-11 production facility. The M-11 has a 300 km range, and can carry a 500-800 kg. warhead, therefore suggesting that the transfer of this missile is in violation of the MTCR. The missile has a separating warhead and an additional payload capacity, thus making it desirable as a nuclear-weapons delivery system. Pakistan is believed to have between 30 and 84 M-11's, although Tanks concluded that the upper end of the range is more likely. Hatf III (M-9 or Modified M-11) Pakistan allegedly test-fired an 800 km missile. Indian sources asserted that it was a Chinese M-9. U.S. analysts, however, concluded that the missile is most likely an improved M-11. None of the participants were able to provide any additional information on this alleged launch. Ghauri In December 1997, a number of sources noted that Pakistan had allegedly developed a 1500 - 2000 km ballistic missile using indigenous resources. Reports have also revealed that Pakistan is planning to test the missile in the coming months. None of the participants were able to elaborate on this missile's capabilities. According to Gouré, there are also reports that Pakistan has acquired longer-range missiles from North Korea. Although the M-11 can not strike targets deep inside of India due to its limited range, a 1,300 km No Dong I would be able to strike virtually any population center in India. Neither Tanks nor Krepon commented on North Korean involvement in Pakistan's ballistic missile program. WMD Capabilities The participants agreed that Pakistan has a nuclear weapons program and that it probably has enough fissile material to construct between 6 - 20 nuclear explosive devices. Pakistan's weapons designs are probably based on an uranium implosion design supplied to them by China in the early 1980's. The three men also agreed that Pakistan has attempted to miniaturize and package their nuclear device designs so that it can be delivered by ballistic missile. if Pakistan is able to construct a more light-weight plutonium fueled device, Pakistan may soon be able to produce smaller and lighter warhead. If this occurs, Pakistan's missile delivery capabilities will improve. A Pakistani ICBM? There was consensus among the three participants that Pakistan will almost certainly be unable to construct an ICBM capable of hitting the United States by 2015. Although Pakistan's missile program, as Michael Krepon put it, "has become a national obsession," it does not have the finances, production base and technical know-how to construct an ICBM capable of striking the United States. Pakistan's motives for obtaining nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems are designed exclusively to deter India.


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