Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers


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China/Japan/Korea: Gerrit Gong, Selig Harrison, Robert Manning and David Wright April 2, 1998 On April 2, 1998, SPC hosted a roundtable discussion for the Rumsfeld Commission to discuss the ballistic missile threat to the United States from the nations of East Asia. The panel participants included, Dr. Robert Manning from the Council on Foreign Relations; David C. Wright, from the Union of Concerned Scientists & MIT's Security Studies Program; CSIS's Gerrit Gong; and Selig S. Harrison from the Woodrow Wilson Center. This paper summarizes the roundtable's key points, and highlights areas of consensus and agreement. China Robert Manning was the only roundtable participant to directly address China's ballistic missile capabilities. In recent years, China has attempted to qualitatively improve its strategic rocket forces in terms of distance and accuracy. Manning argued that China currently has between 12-18 operational nuclear armed ICBM's, but that it is developing the DF-31 and DF-41 ballistic missiles that could be deployed within the next 8-10 years. The DF -31 is reported to have a range of approximately 5000 miles, while the DF-41 could have a range of up to 8000 miles, thus being able to strike parts of the United States. In addition, China is attempting to develop MIRV technology for its ballistic missiles. China has attempted to obtain Russian SS-18 missile technology which could enhance MIRV capabilities and provide more sophisticated guidance systems. Although China has not revealed any intention to increase its nuclear warheads beyond the 400-450 level, technology improvements could enhance the missile threat to the United States by China. In addition to improving its intercontinental forces, China has upgraded its longer range IRBM's, replacing the CSS-2 with CSS-5 launchers that have a longer range of about 1300 miles. Manning also stated that there are indications that Russian and Israeli assistance could help China develop and deploy cruise missiles before 2010. Manning contends that such a capability could counter U.S. naval power in the region around the Taiwan Straits. Japan Selig Harrison's presentation provided the most in-depth analysis on Japan's ballistic missile and space launch capabilities. He concluded that Japan has developed space launch rockets in its civilian space program that can quickly be converted into ICBM's rivaling those of the United States. If converted into an ICBM, Japan's M-5 would give Japan a capability similar to that of the U.S. MX Peacekeeper with a range of 7,400 miles. Conversion Japan's J-1 would give the nation an ICBM that can outperform the Minuteman 3's 8,000 mile range. Harrison concluded that Japan has the technological capability to modify its SLVs into ICBM's if it wished. Harrison also argued that Japan's missile capabilities must be assessed in the context of its civilian nuclear power program. Japan currently uses breeder reactors for civilian nuclear power purposes, and because of this, has compiled large stocks of weapons-usable plutonium. Some have reported that Japan will have 11 to 25 tons of surplus plutonium in five years, and perhaps as much as 50 tons by 2010. Harrison concluded that if Japan decides to convert its SLV into MIRV capable delivery vehicles, each plutonium warhead would weigh about 350 kg, thus allowing the missile to carry between five and ten warheads, depending on its range. Since Japan is currently developing guidance and re-entry technology in its space efforts that can be applied to a missile program, Japan could develop re-entry technology for its missile force in a matter of months. South Korea Both Harrison and Manning assessed South Korea's present and future ballistic missile capabilities in their presentations. Over the past two years, South Korea has actively lobbied the United States to re-negotiate a long-standing Memorandum of Understanding that sets a limit on the range of any South Korean missile to 180 km, well below the 300 km range of the MTCR. Although Seoul has attempted to gain MTCR membership on a number of occasions, the United States has formally rejected this request each time. Both men concluded that the United States should remain firm on this issue, and should avoid transferring any technology to Seoul in support of its rudimentary space launch program in order to ensure that such technology is not used to enhance South Korea's missile capabilities. In addition, all of the participants concurred that Korean unification could help post unification Korea's ballistic missile and WMD capabilities. South Korea could well unify its state of the art industrial base with North Korea's nuclear, chemical, and biological programs, as well as its intermediate range missile programs. North Korea David Wright provided the most in depth analysis of North Korea's ballistic missile programs of the roundtable participants. He provided the following conclusions about North Korea's ballistic missile capabilities: Short-Range Scud-type missiles North Korea reverse engineered a Soviet Scud B Missile and began producing its own version of the missile that could carry a 1000 kg payload 300 km. In the late 1980's the DPRK developed the longer range Scud Mod-C with a 700 kg warhead and 500 km range. According to reports, this missile has been sold to both Iran and Syria. No Dong In the late 1980's, the DPRK began development on the No Dong I, a missile with a range of 1000-1300 km, and a payload of 1000 kg. Wright noted that the missile is based on Scud technology, and that it is powered by a cluster of four Scud engines. The missile probably has a detachable warhead, and has a CEP of 2000-4000 meters, although engine clustering would reduce its accuracy. The only test flight of the No Dong has taken place to a range of 500 km, many analysts agree that it may be used in an act of desperation during a crisis. The U.S., however, would almost certainly not consider this missile operational without one full range test. Wright concludes that the missile has faced serious technical problems. In his view, the lack of Nodong test flights since 1993 creates a window of opportunity for the United States to reach a deal with the DPRK before the missile experiences additional test flights and is sold abroad. Taepo Dong I and II The Taepo Dong I has an estimated range/payload of 1500-2000 km/1000 kg and looks like a Scud second stage and a Nodong first stage. The Taepo Dong II is reported to have a longer range of 3,500 to 6,000 km. Wright believes that the missile has a Nodong for a second stage on top of a large first-stage booster which has the same dimensions as a Chinese DF-3. He believes that North Korea will face a number of serious technical hurdles in developing a missile with the range of the Taepo Dong II. First, the Nodong missile is so heavy that using it as the second stage would limit the missile's range. Second, using the Nodong as the second stage would give the Taepo Dong II a large length to diameter ratio, which could create structural problems during the boost phase. Third, since the Nodong has four engines, it would be less reliable than the single-engine Scud Mod C or a single engine stage based on the engine used for the first stage. Wright concludes that if the DPRK is developing the Taepo Dong version that has been identified as the missile mockup, the missile does not make technical sense. This raises serious questions about the technical competence of North Korean missile engineers, and would suggest that the program is not as advanced as previously thought. Wright asserted that North Korea may not have a credible Taepo Dong II program. Wright also argued that the international community may have considerably more leverage over North Korea than previously assumed in encouraging it to make a deal regarding its missile programs. The United States may have the ability to: force North Korea to end its missile sales to other countries; encourage it to eliminate its missile program altogether; and, force it to halt its missile sales, cap its missile program and stop future missile development, but retain its existing missile capabilities. In addition, the United States may be able to negotiate a ban on missile test flights in order to impede development of the DPRK's ballistic missile programs. Although he did not provide a technical analysis of North Korea's ballistic missile programs, Selig Harrison asserted that the missile threat from North Korea has been overblown. He asserted that the economic and political complications in North Korea have handicapped the development and production of the Taepo Dong. Harrison also concluded that North Korea would be willing to bargain away its ballistic missile program in much the same manner that it gave up its nuclear weapons program, for the right price. Robert Manning did not provide an analysis of North Korea's ballistic missile programs. He did, however, assert that North Korea's proliferation behavior has been extremely problematic for international nonproliferation efforts, especially in the Middle East. He stated that there is evidence of a symbolic relationship in which cooperation with Middle Eastern nations has facilitated the development of North Korean missile technology, as well as missile-production capabilities in Syria and Iran.


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