(U) **Selected Supplemental Intelligence Service Information**

(U) **Russian Federation**

(U) Russia has the ability to use IMINT and MASINT to supplement its other intelligence-collection methodologies and develop all-source intelligence products for Russian political leaders, military planners, and industrial concerns.

(U) **IMINT**

(U) **Satellite imagery systems are Russia's primary source of IMINT.** The first Soviet reconnaissance satellite was launched in 1962. During the next 30 years, the Soviets launched over 850 photoreconnaissance satellites. On average, the Soviets, and now the Russians, have been able to maintain two photoreconnaissance satellites in orbit each year, with an average of 780 mission-days per year. It is believed that Russian imagery systems are able to obtain resolutions of better than one-third of a meter. The Russians currently use three types of imagery satellites, depending on the imagery requirement.

(U) The third-generation photoreconnaissance satellite is a medium resolution system (1 to 3 meters) used for wide area surveillance missions. The satellite flies in low earth orbits at altitudes ranging from 235 to 245 kilometers. It is designed for a mission of 2- to 3-week duration and requires that the satellite be deorbited for return of film canisters. During Operation Desert Storm, the former Soviet Union launched three of these spacecraft to fly repetitive ground tracks over the Persian Gulf region. The capability to quickly launch and recover these satellites allowed the Soviets to respond to the intelligence requirements of Soviet political and military leaders by doubling the coverage of that area. The Russians appear to be phasing the 3rd-generation satellite out of operation in favor of follow-on systems.
(U) The 4th-generation photoreconnaissance satellite provides the Russians with increased operational capabilities. The spacecraft flies elliptical orbits at altitudes of 170 kilometers, which improves resolution. The principal improvements in the systems are the ability to return film canisters without deorbiting the spacecraft and, consequently, the extension of orbital lifetime. The productive lifetime of the 4th-generation satellite now averages 60 days per mission. During the last 5 years, the Russians have launched 6 high-resolution satellites and 1 topographic mapper annually. During the Persian Gulf War, the former Soviets launched 4 fourth-generation satellites in a period of less than 90 days, illustrating the ability of the Russians to surge reconnaissance systems in times of crisis or international tension. The ground track of these satellites was aligned with the Persian Gulf region to provide additional coverage during daylight hours.

The Russians have been able to maintain a constellation of 160 satellites in simultaneous orbits, the same level as during the existence of the Soviet Union, despite a 35 percent reduction in launches.

(U) The 5th-generation satellite is an EO imaging system that provides the Russians with near real-time imagery. The 5th-generation imagery satellite greatly improves the reconnaissance capabilities of the Russian Federation. It provides quicker return of intelligence data and ends the restrictions posed by the limited amount of film that can be carried by a photoreconnaissance satellite. In general, the 5th-generation satellite is used for global reconnaissance and the 3rd- and 4th-generation satellites are used for coverage of particularly sensitive areas.

(U) Overall, the Russians have continued to maintain a robust space reconnaissance program, despite predictions that the program would wane after the demise of the Soviet Union. The Russians have been able to maintain a constellation of 160 satellites in simultaneous orbits, the same level as during the existence of the Soviet Union, despite a 35 percent reduction in launches. The one major problem faced by the Russians is the lack of an all-weather, day-night imaging system. Both EO and photographic systems require daylight and clear weather in order to get an image of an area. In the 1980s, the Soviets attempted to develop a SAR system to provide all-weather and night coverage. This program failed to develop a militarily acceptable product, and the resulting Almaz spacecraft was converted into a commercial mapping system. No comparable SAR system is currently known to be under development.

(U) **MASINT**

(U) The Russians have programs that can provide MASINT data, such as the Prognoz satellite program that has infrared detection capabilities similar to those provided by the United States Defense Support Program (DSP) satellite system. The Prognoz can be used to conduct a variety of missions in support of Infrared Intelligence. Other MASINT-related systems include a wide variety of sophisticated radar systems that
can be used for Radar Intelligence, a well-developed Acoustic Intelligence program for antisubmarine warfare, and a highly developed Nuclear Intelligence program that collects samples from nuclear testing.¹⁹⁰

(U) **Peoples Republic of China**

(U) **Ministry of State Security**

(U) The MSS is divided into several different subsections or divisions. Each division relates to one of two specific types of skills: regional or organizational. Regional divisions are responsible for conducting operations in their specific geographic locale. Organizational divisions are responsible for the bureaucratic functions of the MSS, such as accounting or training.

(U) **Domestic Bureau.** The Domestic Bureau, also known as the First Bureau, recruits people with overseas connections to work for the Ministry of State Security. The Domestic Bureau can expedite exit document application procedures for travelers. The Bureau is also responsible for receiving Chinese secret agents from abroad who return to China every few years for holidays, or meetings. To conceal the identity of its agents, the Domestic Bureau may require its agents to enter China through a third country. The MSS has special guesthouses in the suburbs of Beijing to provide accommodation for returning agents. These guesthouses have many small compounds, and offer substantial privacy and security.¹⁹¹

(U) **Overseas Bureau.** The Overseas Bureau, also known as the Second Bureau, is responsible for operations abroad. It provides tasking, and receives, analyzes and reports to higher levels intelligence collected by its operatives and agents. The Overseas Bureau is responsible for sending clandestine agents abroad using covers such as cadres posted to foreign trade companies, banks, insurance companies, ocean shipping companies, etc. The Overseas Bureau also recruits agents abroad. Some of these agents have worked for the Bureau for decades, while others are long-time hidden agents who are not normally assigned duties and are only activated as needed.¹⁹²

(U) **Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan Bureau.** The Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan Bureau, also known as the Third Bureau, has geographical intelligence responsibility for operations in these areas. The main activities of the Bureau include agent operations and recruitment of PRC nationals with Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan connections. The Bureau receives agents when they return to the mainland for reporting, tasking or holidays. Only a small number of the postings are permanent, and most agents are replaced once every few years. The Ministry of State Security increased its
activities in Hong Kong following the reversion of the territory in 1997, where it can now operate without foreign interference against pro-democracy elements in the territory.\textsuperscript{193}

(U) Technical Bureau. The Technical Bureau, also known as the Fourth Bureau, studies and develops intelligence gathering and counterintelligence tradecraft. This includes surveillance, wiretapping, photography, recording, communications, and intelligence transmission gadgetry. Due to the technical nature of this field, postgraduates in virtually every discipline have been recruited to the work of the Bureau.\textsuperscript{194}

(U) Local Intelligence Bureau. The MSS Fifth Bureau, the Local Intelligence Bureau, is responsible for directing and coordinating the work of local departments and bureaus of the Ministry at the provincial and municipal levels.\textsuperscript{195}

(U) Counterintelligence Bureau. The Sixth Bureau is the MSS’s Counterintelligence Bureau. The primary task of Chinese counterintelligence activity is to work against overseas Chinese prodemocracy organizations. Its investigative priorities have included Western consortia investing in China, which were suspected of involvement in attempts to bring about “peaceful evolution” to democracy in China. Overseas Chinese prodemocracy organizations also have been investigated under suspicions that they were sending “investors” to China who were actually engaged in anti-communist activities. Much of the Counterintelligence Bureau’s work is focused on surveillance of individuals of interest and on conducting security awareness education briefings for local authorities to encourage them to report suspicious people and activities.\textsuperscript{196}

(U) Reports Bureau. Also known as the Seventh Bureau, the Reports Bureau checks, verifies, prepares, and writes intelligence reports and special classified reports based on all-source intelligence. Ordinary reports are prepared for other government departments, while the special reports go to the top Chinese hierarchy. Work at the Seventh Bureau is the most boring and difficult of all the MSS units, and low morale is a continuing problem.\textsuperscript{197}

(U) Institute of Contemporary International Relations (ICIR). The Eighth Bureau of the MSS has no operational intelligence function. Instead, it is one of the world’s largest institutes for research on international relations, with a staff that at one time numbered over 500 research fellows. The Bureau is divided into 10 research offices, specializing in general international relations, global economy, the United States, Russia, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the Middle East, Japan, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. One of its main objectives is to collect open-source information. The institute is also responsible for providing every foreign affairs secretary of each
Political Bureau Standing Committee member with subscriptions to major English-
language newspapers as well as major Hong Kong and Taiwan newspapers and
magazines. Another mission of the institute is the preparation of publications for
units at the provincial, army, and ministerial levels. ICIR’s recurring publications
include:

- (U) **Studies in International Relations** (guoji guanxi yanjiu), published every 10 days, on world political and economic
trends and events, and policies toward China.

- (U) **Summaries of Books and Newspapers** (shubao jianxun), a
news bulletin published every three to four days with excerpts of works by the world’s public figures, documents issued by
other governments, editorials from major papers, and articles by noted reporters.

- (U) **Contemporary International Relations** (xiandai guoji
guanxi), a journal issued quarterly.\(^{198}\)

(U) **Counterespionage Bureau.** The Counterespionage Bureau, also known as the
Ninth Bureau, is responsible for countering efforts by foreign intelligence services to
recruit personnel of the MSS and among cadres of other Chinese institutions abroad.
It also counters surveillance, wiretapping and infiltration by foreign intelligence serv-
ces against Chinese embassies and consulates. The Counterespionage Bureau
includes an overseas students section, which specializes in “anti-defection” work
among Chinese students abroad, including both preventing their recruitment by for-
eign intelligence services as well as investigating student participation in overseas
Chinese pro-democracy organizations.\(^{199}\)

(U) **Science and Technology Bureau.** Also
known as the Tenth Bureau, the MSS’s
Science and Technology Bureau is charged
with collecting economic, scientific and
technological intelligence. This represents a
significant shift in emphasis from work under the former Central Investigation
Department, which was mainly concerned with political intelligence. There have
been few reported instances of successful covert collection by this bureau, howev-
er.\(^{200}\)

(U) **Computer Support Bureau.** The Eleventh Bureau, the Computer Support Bureau,
is responsible for analyzing intelligence gathered with electronic computers, and also
operating the computer network of the Ministry of State Security. It also collects infor-
mation on advanced electronic systems from the West and protects the information
systems of Chinese intelligence services from attacks by foreign intelligence agen-
cies.\(^{201}\)
(U) **Military Intelligence Department**

(U) The Military Intelligence Department (MID), often referred to as the Second Department, is responsible for the collection and dissemination of the intelligence required to support the military command structure. The MID’s realm of activities includes tactical, strategic, and technical intelligence operations. The MID reports directly to the General Staff Department (GSD) of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

(U) The MID is organized into numerous divisions and bureaus, including military-based collection and analysis groups. These groups exist within the PLA’s Navy and Air Force, its ground army. Each division of the MID is responsible for determining its own intelligence requirements and conducting operations within its own Military Region. In addition to the individual service intelligence divisions within the MID, there are a number of functional bureaus responsible for collection, analysis, science and technology, records and archives, classified materials, general resource management, and OPSEC.

(U) **The First Bureau** is primarily engaged in the collection of military intelligence and has these responsibilities divided into regional sections. In the regions that share a border with another state, the regional offices collect information on that state. However, the Nanjing region of the MID is responsible for collecting information about the United States.

**Two of the bureau’s favorite sources of information are Congressional reports and RAND Corporation documents.**

(U) **The Western Nations Analysis Bureau, or Fifth Bureau,** primarily relies on OSINT collection, focusing on the United States. Two of the bureau’s favorite sources of information are congressional reports and RAND Corporation documents.

(U) **The Bureau of Science and Technology, or Seventh Bureau,** controls two electronics factories, the Sea Gull Electrical Equipment Factory and the Beijing Electronic Factory; two computer centers, the Science and Technology Bureau Computer Center and the Northern Transportation University Computer Center; and two research institutes, the No. 57 and No. 58 Institutes. The Seventh Bureau is completely independent from its civilian counterparts in the MSS.

(U) **The Beijing Institute for International Studies** is not openly associated with the MID, despite the fact that almost all of the institute’s faculty are current or former PLA officers. It is suspected that the institute is not officially associated with the intelligence community, out of a fear that such an association would limit professional and academic contacts of the institute’s members, hurting them both professionally and operationally.

(U) **The PLA Institute for International Studies,** formerly known as the Nanjing Foreign Affairs Institute, is responsible for teaching MID personnel specialized techniques and methodology used in intelligence operations.
(U) **The 8341 Unit.** The Beijing-based Central Security Regiment, also known as the 8341 Unit, was an important PLA law enforcement element. It was responsible over the years for the personal security of Mao Zedong and other party and state leaders. More than a bodyguard force, it also operated a nationwide intelligence network to uncover plots against Mao or any incipient threat to the leadership. The unit reportedly was deeply involved in undercover activities, discovering electronic listening devices in Mao’s office and performing surveillance of his rivals. The 8341 Unit participated in the late 1976 arrest of the leadership of the ultra-left wing of the Chinese Communist Party, marking the official end of the Cultural Revolution; but the unit reportedly was deactivated soon after that event.209

(U) **Technical Department**

(U) The Technical Department (TD), also called the Third Department, is responsible for Chinese SIGINT operations. The TD was founded in the 1950s with equipment supplied by the Soviet Union, originally under the guise of being a meteorological bureau. Although the TD currently maintains the most extensive SIGINT capability in the Asia-Pacific region, only fragmentary information concerning its organization and activities have become public knowledge.210

(U) The Technical Department provides the PRC with a wide range of SIGINT capabilities. The Chinese maintain, by far, the most extensive SIGINT capability of any nation in the Asia-Pacific region. The Chinese operate several dozen SIGINT ground stations deployed throughout China. There they monitor signals from Russia, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, India, and Southeast Asia. Signals from U.S. military units located in the region are of significant interest to these monitoring stations, and a large SIGINT facility at Hainan Island is principally concerned with monitoring U.S. naval activities in the South China Sea. Additionally, the Chinese have developed a series of SIGINT collection vessels that monitor U.S. military operations and exercises in the Asia-Pacific region.211

The Chinese actively monitor international communications satellites from SATCOM intercept facilities on Hainan Island and outside Beijing.

(U) The Chinese also actively monitor international communications satellites from SATCOM intercept facilities on Hainan Island and outside Beijing. The Hainan SIGINT complex was significantly upgraded in 1995.212

(U) The PRC has been conducting space-based imaging of the earth since 1975, when it became the third country in the world to retrieve high-resolution photographs of the planet shot from space. The Chinese currently have a limited spaceborne photoreconnaissance capability that focuses on collecting imagery over the Russian border. They also use a variety of fixed-wing aircraft to collect photographic imagery.
None of these systems present a substantial intelligence collection threat to U.S. forces in the region. By mid-1999 a total of 17 FSW-class spacecraft had been orbited, with 15 successful recoveries. The FSW-1 model was introduced in September 1987. FSW-1 satellites have carried imaging payloads with high-resolution (10-15 m) cameras for film development on Earth and with 50-m resolution camera systems for near-real-time images. Unlike Russian photo reconnaissance satellites, FSW-1 spacecraft do not perform orbital maneuvers to adjust their groundtracks for prolonged observations over areas of high interest. FSW satellites are normally flown only once each year and usually in the August-October period.²¹³

(U) The Chinese appear to be developing a spaceborne ELINT system that is mounted on their photoreconnaissance and communications satellites. There is no indication at this point that this capability presents a significant threat to U.S. forces in the region.²¹⁴

(U) **New China News Agency (NCSA)**

(U) The NCNA was founded in 1931 as the Red China News Agency. It is currently China’s primary source of foreign and domestic news and deploys hundreds of journalists who are assigned to collect and disseminate foreign news, publish documents, and disseminate information throughout the PRC. However, the NCNA primarily engages in open-source collection. It has a staff of more than 5,000 employees operating out of over 90 bureaus and 300 offices in China and abroad; monitoring newspapers, magazines, and broadcasts from around the world; and conducting open-source analysis for the Chinese leadership. Given its global network and journalistic credentials, it often provides cover to Chinese intelligence operatives from other agencies. In the past, only People’s Daily and NCNA were used to provide journalist cover for MSS intelligence officers. However, this practice has recently extended to most major newspapers, including Guangming Daily, Economic Daily, China Youth News, and Workers' Daily, which have correspondents in the United States, Japan, Europe and other countries.²¹⁵

(U) **Cuba**

(U) The principal intelligence collection arms of the Cuban government are the Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI) of Ministry of the Interior and the Military Counterintelligence Department of the Ministry of Revolutionary Armed Forces. Both have been closely associated with the Soviet and Russian intelligence services. Based upon the military cooperation agreement between Russia and Cuba of June 1993, the relationship between these services is likely to continue.²¹⁶
(U) **Military Counterintelligence Department**

(U) The Military Counterintelligence Department is responsible for conducting counterintelligence, SIGINT, and electronic warfare activities against the United States.\(^{218}\)

(U) **Directorate of General Intelligence**

(U) The DGI is responsible for Cuba’s foreign intelligence collection and has six divisions divided into two categories of roughly equal size: the operational divisions and the support divisions.

(U) The DGI’s operational divisions include the Political/Economic Intelligence Division, the External Counterintelligence Division, and the Military Intelligence Division. The Political/Economic Intelligence Division consists of four sections: Eastern Europe, North America, Western Europe, and Africa-Asia-Latin America. The External Counterintelligence Division is responsible for penetrating foreign intelligence services and the surveillance of exiles. The Military Intelligence Department focuses on collecting information on the United States Armed Forces and coordinating SIGINT operations with the Russians at Lourdes.\(^{219}\)

(U) The support divisions include the Technical Support Division, the Information Division, and the Preparation Division. The Technical Support Division is responsible for production of false documents, communications systems supporting clandestine operations, and development of clandestine message capabilities. The Information and Preparation Divisions are responsible for intelligence analysis functions.\(^{220}\)

(U) Despite the economic failure of the Castro regime, Cuban intelligence—in particular, the DGI—remains a viable threat to the United States. The Cuban mission to the UN is the third largest UN delegation, and it has been alleged that almost half the personnel assigned to the mission are DGI officers. The DGI actively recruits HUMINT agents within the Cuban émigré community and has used refugee flows into the United States to place agents in this country.\(^{221}\)

(U) In February 2000, FBI agents arrested Mariano Faget, a Cuban-born supervisor in the Miami office of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service for spying for the Cuban government. Faget was accused of handing over U.S. secrets to a Cuban citizen and lying about contacts with Cuban government officials.\(^{222}\) At his trial, prosecutors revealed that FBI agents were wiretapping Faget as he told a business acquaintance with ties to Cuban intelligence that a Cuban security officer who had been based in Washington was going to defect to the United States. The information was false and had been fed to Faget to see what he would do with it. A jury convicted Faget of disclosing classified information and other offenses, but in June 2001 the trial judge sentenced him to only five years’ imprisonment, citing his “exemplary work record” and the failure of the prosecution to demonstrate that the information Faget had compromised to Cuba damaged U.S. interests.\(^{223}\)
(U) The DGI collects political, economic, and military information within the United States. The DGI also conducts operations to collect information about technologies needed to improve the Cuban economy. The United States considers Cuba to be a sponsor of international terrorism, one that has worked closely with Puerto Rican separatist and Latin American terrorist groups. Much of this activity is handled through the DGI.

(U) **America Department**

(U) Some analysts say that a third intelligence component, the America Department (DA), is the most powerful branch of Cuba’s security apparatus. The DA has control over covert Cuban activities for supporting national liberation movements and the efforts of regimes such as those of Nicaragua and Grenada. The DA may be responsible for planning and coordinating Cuba’s secret guerrilla and terrorist train-

(U) In September 2001, Ana Belen Montes, the Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA’s) senior analyst for Cuban matters, was arrested for spying for Cuba. Montes, single and 44 years old, had begun working for DIA in 1985 and become a Cuban analyst in 1992. At about the same time, she began spying for Cuba because she believed it was not being treated fairly by the United States. She provided information about U.S. intelligence-gathering programs concerning Cuba and also the identities of some U.S. officers working undercover against the Cubans.

(U) Montes would receive coded radio transmissions from the Cubans, decode them with a program on her home computer, and then go to a public telephone to use prepaid telephone cards provided to her by the Cubans to call telephone pager numbers also provided to her. She would leave a message on the pager by entering digits that corresponded to a special list of messages she had been given on special water-soluble paper, so that it could be erased quickly in an emergency. U.S. authorities were able to recover details of her activities over a number of years by recovering files she had deleted on a laptop computer she purchased. Other than reimbursement for some travel expenses, Montes did not accept money for her espionage activities.

(U) After pleading guilty to espionage in October 2002, Montes addressed the court: “I engaged in the activity that brought me before you because I obeyed my conscience rather than the law. I believe our government’s policy towards Cuba is cruel and unfair... My way of responding to our Cuba policy may have been morally wrong... I can only say that I did what I thought right to counter a grave injustice.” Ana Belen Montes was sentenced to 25 years in prison.
ing camps, networks for the covert movement of personnel and material from Cuba, and a propaganda apparatus. DA personnel regard themselves as the elite of the various Cuban security agencies. Covers used by DA staff include diplomatic posts; Cuba's Prensa Latina news agency; Cubana Airlines, the Institute for Friendship With the People (ICAP); and Cuban front companies. In 1983, the DA had between 200 and 300 members.\textsuperscript{227}

(U) **North Korea**

(U) HUMINT is North Korea's primary source of intelligence collection against South Korea and other intelligence targets. Additionally, North Korea continues to expand its SIGINT capabilities and currently possesses the capability of monitoring many South Korean and U.S. communications in the region. The North Koreans have a limited HUMINT capability in the United States, and what they have is primarily directed at acquiring nuclear weapons technology. The primary threat posed by North Korean intelligence operations is directed against U.S. forces stationed in South Korea.

(U) The North Korean intelligence community is in a dynamic environment. It changes structure and organization as power shifts within the Communist Party of the Peoples Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK). At present, the majority of DPRK intelligence agencies are within the Cabinet General Intelligence Bureau (CGIB) of the Korean Worker's Party (KWP) Central Committee and are directly responsible to the president of the country. The CGIB is primarily responsible for coordinating and implementing the intelligence directives among five departments actively involved in intelligence collection operations.\textsuperscript{228}

(U) **Liaison Department**

(U) The oldest of these departments is the Liaison Department. The Liaison Department was founded in the late 1940s and, until the early 1980s, was the premier intelligence agency in North Korea. The Liaison Department was initially responsible for the collection of intelligence on South Korea, but this evolved into the role of conducting collection and covert operations overseas, especially in Japan.\textsuperscript{229}
(U) **Reconnaissance Bureau**

(U) The Reconnaissance Bureau is responsible for collecting strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence for the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces. It also exercises operational control over agents engaged in collecting military intelligence and in the training and dispatch of unconventional warfare teams to South Korea. The primary methods of infiltration have been through tunnels under the Demilitarized Zone and seaborne operations involving submarine and high-speed patrol boats as insertion vehicles. In the 1970s, in support of overland insertion, North Korea began clandestine tunneling operations along the entire DMZ, with two tunnels per forward division. By 1990, four tunnels dug on historical invasion routes from the north had been discovered by South Korean and United States tunnel neutralization teams: 3 in the mid-1970s and the 4th in March 1990. The South Koreans suspect there were as many as 25 tunnels in the early 1990s, but the level of ongoing tunneling is unknown.\(^{230}\)

(U) **State Security Department**

(U) Since 1973, the State Security Department has been responsible for North Korea's defensive and offensive counterintelligence programs. It carries out a wide range of counterintelligence and internal security functions normally associated with "secret police." It is charged with searching out anti-state criminals—a general category that includes those accused of antigovernment and dissident activities, economic crimes, and slander of the political leadership. Camps for political prisoners are under its jurisdiction. To support its counterintelligence responsibilities at home and abroad, the Security Department runs overseas intelligence collection operations. It also monitors political attitudes and maintains surveillance of returnees.\(^{231}\)

(U) **Ministry of Public Security**

(U) The Ministry of Public Security, responsible for internal security, social control, and basic police functions, is one of the most powerful organizations in North Korea and controls an estimated 144,000 public security personnel. It maintains law and order; investigates common criminal cases; manages the criminal prison system and traffic control; monitors citizens' political attitudes; conducts background investigations, census, and civil registrations; controls individual travel; manages the government's classified documents; protects government and party officials; and patrols government buildings and some government and party construction activities. Ministry of Public Security personnel escort high-ranking officials traveling abroad. The Ministry also guards national borders and monitors international entry points. The Border Guards are the paramilitary force of the Ministry of Public Security. They are primarily concerned with monitoring the border and with internal security. The latter activities include physical protection of government buildings and facilities. During a conflict, they would probably be used in border and rear area security missions.\(^{232}\)
(U) **The Chosen Soren**

(U) Chosen Soren (the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan—Zainichi Chosenjin Sorengokai), is North Korea's de facto diplomatic presence in Japan. The association currently has 200,000 members. Nearly one-third of the Japanese pachinko [pinball] industry is controlled by Chosen affiliates or supporters.\(^{233}\) Chosen members each year remit an estimated $100-$600 million in hard currency to Pyongyang for family members in North Korea. A wing of the Chosen Soren supports intelligence operations in Japan, assists in the infiltration of agents into South Korea, collects open source information, and diverts advanced technology for use by North Korea.\(^{224}\)

(U) In February 2003, Los Angeles Korean-American businessman John Younghoon Yai was arrested by the FBI for failing to register as a foreign agent for North Korea and not disclosing that he had received at least $18,000 from North Korean officials for a variety of low-level intelligence services over a seven-year period. In late 2003, Yai entered a guilty plea to the charge and was expected to be sentenced to up to two years' imprisonment.\(^{235}\)