IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division[October 23, 2001]
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) CRIMINAL NO. ) v. ) Count 1: Attempted Espionage ) 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) BRIAN PATRICK REGAN, ) ) Defendant )INDICTMENT THE GRAND JURY CHARGES THAT:October 2001 Term - At Alexandria
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS At all times material to this indictment:1. The defendant BRIAN PATRICK REGAN was born October 23, 1962, in Queens, New York. He enlisted in the United States Air Force (USAF) in August 1980, and served continuously until August 31, 2000, when he retired at the rank of E-7 (MSGT). His primary specialty in the USAF was signals intelligence analysis.
2. From 1991 to 1994, REGAN was assigned to the Air Force Intelligence Support Group at the Pentagon, first as a Communications Denial Analyst specializing in targeting the communications systems of military adversaries of the United States, and then as an Air Defense Analyst. His 1992 performance evaluation noted he was a "recognized expert on air defense systems in the Middle East and former Soviet Union." From mid-1994 to mid-1995, he was assigned to the Joint Military Intelligence College, as a student.
3. From in or about July 1995 until on or about August 31, 2000, REGAN was detailed to the headquarters of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), in the Eastern District of Virginia. The NRO is an agency of the United States Department of Defense responsible for building and operating the nation's reconnaissance satellites, and is part of the United States Intelligence Community. At the NRO, Regan was assigned to an office named the Signals Intelligence Applications Integration Office, which is responsible for focusing signals intelligence support for tactically deployed military units.
4. In or about October 2000, REGAN became employed by TRW Incorporated (TRW), in the Eastern District of Virginia, to serve as a contractor employee to the NRO, in generally the same capacity as he had served while detailed from the USAF to the NRO.
5. On or about July 30, 2001, REGAN began his TRW assignment at the NRO, at a facility in the Eastern District of Virginia.
Oath of Office and Security Acknowledgments
6. Upon enlisting in the USAF, REGAN signed an oath of office in which he swore that: "I . . . do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God."
7. Executive Order 12958 and its predecessor orders establish that information in any form that (1) is owned by, produced by or for, or under the control of the United States Government, and (2) falls within any of the categories set forth in Section 1.5 of the order (including intelligence sources or methods; cryptology; military plans; and vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects or plans relating to the national security), may be classified by an original classification authority who determines that the unauthorized disclosure of such information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security. Where such damage would be "serious", the information may be classified as SECRET. Where such damage would be "exceptionally grave", the information may be classified as TOP SECRET. Access to classified information at any level may be further restricted through compartmentation in SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (SCI) categories. Dissemination of classified information at any level may also be restricted through caveats such as NOFORN (Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals).
8. REGAN held TOP SECRET clearances continuously from the time he joined the USAF in 1980 until on or about August 23, 2001, and was indoctrinated for access to a variety of SCI programs. Specifically:
a. on or about November 25, 1991, REGAN signed aClassified Information Nondisclosure Agreement in which heacknowledged that:
Regan's 1999-2000 Intelink searches...2. I hereby acknowledge that I have received a security indoctrination concerning the nature and protection of classified information, including the procedures to be followed in ascertaining whether other persons to whom I contemplate disclosing this information have been approved for access to it, and that I understand these procedures.
b. During the course of his USAF service, REGAN was granted access to SCI information, and in that connection signed nondisclosure forms acknowledging his responsibilities regarding such information. For example, on or about July 31, 1995, he signed an SCI Nondisclosure Agreement, in which he acknowledged that he had received security indoctrinations and understood, among other things, that he had been advised that the direct or indirect unauthorized disclosure by him of SCI information "could cause irreparable injury to the United States, and be used to advantage by a foreign nation," and pledged that "I will never divulge such information, in any form or any manner, to anyone who is not authorized to receive it, without prior written authorization from an appropriate official of the United States Government." He also acknowledged that he had been advised that such unauthorized disclosure could constitute violations of criminal laws including Title 18, United States Code, Section 794.3. I have been advised that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of classified information by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I hereby agree that I will never divulge classified information to anyone unless: (a) I have officially verified that the recipient has been properly authorized by the United States Government to receive it; or (b) I have been given prior written notice of authorization from the United States Government Department or Agency . . . responsible for the classification of the information or last granting me a security clearance that such disclosure is permitted. I understand that if I am uncertain about the classification status of information, I am required to confirm from an authorized official that the information is unclassified before I may disclose it, except to a person as provided in (a) or (b), above. I further understand that I am obligated to comply withlaws and regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
4. 1 have been advised that . . . any unauthorized disclosure of classified information by me may constitute a violation, or violations, of United States criminal laws, including the provisions of Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952, Title 18, United States Code,...
7. I understand that all classified information to which I have access or may obtain access by signing this Agreement is now and will remain the property of, or under the control of, the United States Government, unless and until otherwise determined by an authorized official or final-ruling of a court of law. . . .
c. On or about August 30, 2000, in connection with his retirement from the USAF, REGAN signed a Security Debriefing Acknowledgment in which he stated that he had been reminded of his continuing obligation to comply with the terms of the Agreement he had signed on or about, July 31, 1995.
d. Also on or about August 30, 2000, REGAN signed a Security Termination Statement in which he acknowledged that he understood that "any unauthorized disclosure of information affecting the national defense is prohibited and punishable by law" and agreed that: "I shall not knowingly or wilfully divulge, reveal, or transmit classified information orally or in writing or by any other means, to any unauthorized person or agency."
e. On or about July 30, 2001, REGAN signed another SCI Nondisclosure Agreement, in order for his access to SCI to be reinstated.
9. Intelink is the United States Intelligence Community's classified version of the Internet, and can be accessed only by persons holding appropriate security clearances.
10. During at least mid-1999 until his retirement from the USAF, REGAN, from his NRO office, used Intelink to access classified United States intelligence information related to the military preparedness of Iran, Iraq, Libya, and the People's Republic of China, which information was unrelated to his official duties.
Regan's June-July 2001 activities
11. On or about the evening of Wednesday, June 13, 2001, REGAN accessed the Internet using a public-access computer at the Crofton Public Library in Crofton, Maryland, which is located near his residence. He conducted a series of Internet searches and viewed files including those bearing the following names:
"Embassies of the Arab World"
In addition, he accessed a web site containing the addresses and telephone numbers of Embassies of Arab countries located in Washington, D.C., as well as web sites using the following links, among others:"Embassies: Laos thru Luxembourg Embassy Resource"
"Foreign Embassies in Paris"
"Foreign Embassies in Switzerland"
"Libyian Embassies and Consulates of Libya @ Embassy World"
"People's Bureau of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya"
"Iraq"
12. On or about Sunday, June 24, 2001, REGAN accessed the Internet using a public-access computer at the Crofton Public Library, and conducted a series of Internet searches using the following terms:"Aljamahiriya Arabe Libyenne Populaire Socialiste"
"Libyan Arab Jamahiriya"
"Saudi Arabia"
"Sweden/Suede"
"iraqi embassy"
He printed out a number of the pages he viewed, and took handwritten notes of information he viewed."iraqi embassy swiss"
"embassies in Switzerland"
"Foreign Embassies in france"
"Foreign Embassies in germany"
"Foreign Embassies in germany of iraq"
"Foreign Embassies in germany of libya"
"swiss hostels".
13. On or about Tuesday, June 26, 2001, REGAN boarded a Lufthansa Airlines plane at Dulles International Airport, in the Eastern District of Virginia, and flew to Berlin, Germany. According to the Lufthansa Airlines itinerary, he was due to then fly on to Munich, Germany. On or about Tuesday, July 3, 2001, he flew back from Berlin to Dulles International Airport. This travel was not in connection with any official duties.
14. A suitcase that REGAN checked at Dulles International Airport, for his June 26, 2001, flight to Germany, contained glue and packing tape.
15. On or about Monday, July 30, 2001, REGAN began his TRW assignment at NRO, working at an NRO facility in the Eastern District of Virginia. His initial duties were limited to taking several months of NRO computer-based training necessary for recertification to the position he was to occupy. This training did not require REGAN to access Intelink.
Regan's August 2001 activities
16. At approximately 8:00 am on or about Wednesday, August 1, 2001, REGAN received access to the NRO computer system for purposes of his TRW training and assignment. Beginning at approximately 8:40 am, REGAN, in his NRO office, accessed Intelink through the NRO computer system, and opened and viewed several Intelink files containing classified information relating to a particular Libyan missile test range.
17. On or about Thursday, August 2, 2001, REGAN volunteered for a temporary duty assignment to Europe from mid- to late-August 2001, but was rejected.18. On every weekday from Monday, August 6, 2001, through Thursday, August 23, 2001 -- except for five weekdays when he was in training -- REGAN accessed Intelink and viewed classified information relating to military facilities in Iraq, Iran, Libya, and the People's Republic of China, as well as classified documents relating to current United States intelligence collection capabilities against those countries. The classified documents and information were not related to REGAN's official duties or training.
19. On or about Saturday, August 11, 2001, REGAN purchased an airline ticket for travel from Dulles International Airport,in the Eastern District of Virginia, on Thursday, August 23, 2001, to Zurich, Switzerland, via Frankfurt, Germany, returning by the same route on August 30, 2001. This travel was unrelated to the official duties of Regan.
20. On or about Wednesday, August 15, 2001, REGAN, in his NRO office, accessed Intelink and viewed two classified images. One was a recent view of a Surface-to-Air Missile launch facility in Country A. The other was a recent view of a Surface-to-Surface Missile facility in Country B. Each classified image bore the geocoordinates for the facility depicted. A torn piece of paper, which was recovered from the burn bag in REGAN's NRO office on or about Friday, August 17, 2001, bore handwritten notations of those geocoordinates and other words and numbers that appeared on the classified images.
21. On or about Thursday, August 23, 2001, at approximately 8:03 am, REGAN, in his NRO office, accessed Intelink and viewed a file containing classified text and a related classified image, dated "21 August 01", pertaining to current launch preparations of a particular Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile in Country B. While he was viewing the classified image, REGAN made handwritten notations in a small spiral notebook that he had removed from his front trousers pocket. At the time he made these notations, the notebook was turned sideways.
22. On Thursday, August 23, 2001, beginning at approximately 10:49 am, REGAN left his NRO office and traveled to Dulles International Airport, in the Eastern District of Virginia, where he checked a suitcase onto his flight to Europe. He then returned to his NRO office. At approximately 3:55 pm, REGAN again left his NRO office, and returned to Dulles International Airport, where he passed through security and boarded a shuttle vehicle bound for the international departure area terminal from which his flight to Europe was to depart. At approximately 5:05 pm, while on the shuttle, he was approached by special agents of the FBI, and subsequently placed under arrest.
23. At the time of his arrest, REGAN carried in his front right trousers pocket a small 3-by-5-inch spiral-bound notebook containing various handwritten notations. Only one page of the notebook contains notations written sideways. These notations consist of the term "21 Month" followed by a series of apparently unrelated innocuous words that in fact constitute a personal system of code representing the geocoordinates of the classified image viewed by REGAN that morning, as described in paragraph 21 above.
24. At the time of his arrest, REGAN carried in his wallet a piece of paper bearing handwritten notations of a series of apparently unrelated innocuous words that in fact are a personal system of code representing the geocoordinates, and other identifying information, of the two classified images REGAN had viewed in his office on August 15, 2001, as described in paragraph 20 above. Also carried by REGAN in his wallet was a piece of paper bearing the street addresses and international telephone numbers for the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Bern, Switzerland, the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Vienna, Austria, the Embassy of Iraq in Vienna, Austria, and the Iraqi Interests Section in Paris, France.
25. At the time of his arrest, REGAN carried an accordion folder containing:
a. Four rubber finger-tip protectors.
26. At the time of his arrest, REGAN was carrying a blue canvas bag containing a pocket-sized battery-operated Garmin GPS III Plus global positioning system (GPS) receiver, and six batteries.b. One inner folder containing:
i. three copies of four pages bearing a series of handwritten three-digit number groups, each page bearing the handwritten title of "LETTER" followed by an alphanumeric;
c. A second inner folder containing a sheet of paper bearing unclassified descriptions of classified technical training courses and materials which were part of REGAN's NRO training curriculum. The descriptions demonstrated the classification level and type of classified United States information to which REGAN had access.ii. two copies of a page bearing a series of typed alphanumeric groupings;
iii. two copies of a typed page bearing fifteen lines of numbers grouped in series of three;
iv. four blank business-sized envelopes;
v. white adhesive labels; and
vi. Lufthansa/United Airlines tickets issued to Brian Regan; and
27. Also in the blue canvas bag that REGAN was carrying at the time of his arrest were three latex gloves, a roll of Scotch tape, a roll of Scotch mailing tape, and a current United States tourist passport issued to Brian Patrick Regan.
28. At the time of his arrest, REGAN carried a folded piece of paper concealed in his right shoe, between the innersole and a removable sole. On the piece of paper were handwritten the street addresses of the Embassies of the People's Republic of China in Bern, Switzerland, and Paris, France, the PRC Consulate in Paris, France, the Embassy of Iraq in The Hague, Netherlands, and the Iraqi Interests Section in Paris, France.
29. The bag checked by REGAN at Dulles international Airport on or about August 23, 2001, contained, among other things, a plastic box, with lid, measuring approximately 14 inches long by 12 inches wide by 6 inches deep, as well as six unused white plastic garbage bags, a roll of Scotch packing tape, and a bottle of Elmer's glue.
30. On or about Thursday, August 23, 2001, a computer diskette located in REGAN's residence contained a letter, dated August 31, 2000, addressed to an individual in the Canary Islands, Spain, and stating "I am interested in offshore IBC and bank accounts/credit cards" and requesting information.
COUNT ONE THE GRAND JURY FURTHER CHARGES THAT:(18 U.S.C. § 794(a))
(Attempted Espionage)1. The Grand Jury realleges and incorporates by reference the GENERAL ALLEGATIONS of this Indictment.
2. Between on or about June 1, 2001, until on or about August 23, 2001, in the Eastern District of Virginia and elsewhere, BRIAN PATRICK REGAN, with the intent and reason to believe that they were to be used to the injury of the United States and to the advantage of a foreign government, did knowingly and unlawfully attempt to communicate, deliver, and transmit, to a foreign government, and to representatives, officers, agents, and employees thereof, directly and indirectly, documents and information relating to the national defense of the United States, which documents and information were classified SECRET.
(In violation of Title 18, United States Code, § 794(a).)
PAUL J. MCNULTY
A TRUE BILL:
F 0 R E P E R S 0 N
United States Attorneyby: Justin W. Williams
Patricia M. Haynes
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division
Assistant United States AttorneyJohn T. Morton
Assistant United States AttorneyRonald R. Roos
Internal Security Section
Criminal Division
United States Department of Justice