CHAPTER TWO
CASE STUDY: LIBYA

Summary & Findings

In accordance with our mandate, we compared the Intelligence Community’s judgments concerning Libya’s weapons programs before Tripoli’s decision to open them to international scrutiny with current assessments, thereby providing a rare “before” and “after” study of the U.S. Intelligence Community’s performance. We believe that the collection and analytic efforts on Libya’s weapons represent, for the most part, an Intelligence Community success story. The Community collected good intelligence on Libya’s nuclear and missile programs, and it used this intelligence to enter into well-managed discussions with the Libyans, which eventually led to on-site inspections, and, ultimately, Libyan disavowal of weapons of mass destruction. We found that:

- The Intelligence Community accurately assessed what nuclear equipment Libya possessed, but it was less successful in judging how Libya could exploit the material;
- The Intelligence Community’s judgment that Libya possessed chemical weapons agents and chemical weapons bombs was correct, but Libya’s actual chemical weapons stockpile proved to be smaller than estimated;
- The Intelligence Community’s assessments of Libya’s missile programs appear to have been generally accurate, but it is not yet possible to evaluate them fully because of limited Libyan disclosures;
- The Intelligence Community’s penetration of the A.Q. Khan proliferation network provided invaluable intelligence on Libya’s nuclear efforts;
- The contribution of technical intelligence to assessments of Libya’s chemical, biological, and nuclear programs was limited; it provided some valuable information on Libya’s missile programs;
- Analysts generally showed a commendable willingness to question and reconsider their assessments in light of new information;
- Analysts tracking proliferation program developments sometimes inappropriately equated procurement activity with technical capabilities; and
- Shifting priorities and the dominance of current intelligence production leave little time for considering important unanswered questions on Libya.
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INTRODUCTION

On December 19, 2003, the Libyan government announced that it would halt all efforts to produce or acquire chemical or nuclear weapons, and pledged to eliminate any existing stockpiles of such weapons or materials. To ensure compliance, Libya agreed to formally “declare” the existence of all relevant weapons, materials, and facilities, and to permit a series of inspections in Libya, commencing in January 2004. As a result of these declarations and visits, inspectors were able to speedily remove key materials related to missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—including centrifuges, an entire uranium conversion facility, nuclear weapons designs, uranium hexafluoride, and guidance packages for the Scud-C missile—and ensconce them safely in the United States. By March 2004, inspectors confirmed that Libya had destroyed its unfilled chemical munitions and secured its chemical weapons stockpile of approximately 24 metric tons of mustard gas for eventual destruction. This unprecedented disarmament effort resulted in significant steps toward the normalization of U.S.-Libyan relations, including the lifting of most economic sanctions on Libya and the unfreezing of its assets in the United States.

As directed by the Executive Order establishing this Commission, we have compared the Intelligence Community’s judgments concerning Libya’s weapons programs before Tripoli’s decision to open them to international scrutiny with current assessments, thereby providing a rare “before” and “after” study of U.S. intelligence assessments. In so doing, we interviewed policy officials as well as intelligence analysts and collectors. We also consulted finished intelligence production, the written “collection requirements” sent to intelligence agencies, and other intelligence documents.

We conclude that collection and analytic efforts with regard to Libya’s weapons programs and in support of the U.S./U.K.-led efforts represent, for the most part, an Intelligence Community success story. The Community collected significant intelligence on Libya’s nuclear and missile programs, providing a vital lever used by policymakers to pressure Tripoli to openly declare its nuclear and chemical materials and disavow its WMD and long-range missile programs.

Some discrepancies did exist between analysts’ judgments prior to 2003 and the realities found in Libya; for example, analysts overestimated certain capabilities.
and developmental timelines relating to Libya’s nuclear program and underestimated some elements of Libya’s missile program. And no evidence of an expected small-scale Libyan biological weapons program has been uncovered. However, the Community’s key pre-December 2003 intelligence and assessments as to Libyan nuclear procurement and chemical production appear to have been largely confirmed by the facts on the ground.

While the discrepancies that were found did not affect the general accuracy of the judgments that Libya was actively pursuing development of a nuclear weapon and possessed chemical weapons, they do point to some weaknesses in collection and analysis. It is apparent to us that the Community is not well-postured to replicate such successes.

**COMPARING INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS WITH U.S. FINDINGS IN LIBYA**

**Nuclear Weapons**

**Finding 1**

The Intelligence Community accurately assessed what nuclear-related equipment and material had been obtained by Libya, but it was less successful in judging how well Libya was able to exploit what it possessed.

Prior to December 2003, the strength of clandestine reporting on Libya’s procurement activity provided the Intelligence Community with a fairly accurate view of what nuclear-related equipment and material Libya possessed. Intelligence suggesting that Libya was receiving nuclear equipment via the A.Q. Khan network, and reporting from the 1980s indicating that Libya had acquired yellowcake from Niger in 1978 were later validated by inspections. Intelligence that Libya had received uranium hexafluoride feed material for its gas centrifuge program was also confirmed. In addition, it appears that the Community correctly identified key personnel in the nuclear program. Libya’s declarations did reveal some surprises that are discussed in the classified report.

The Community was less successful in judging how well Libya was able to exploit what it possessed. CIA and DIA had assessed that Libya could pro-
duce enough weapons grade uranium for a nuclear warhead as early as 2007. However, as noted in a 2004 National Intelligence Estimate, the 2007 date was shown by the declarations and inspections to be unrealistic, and this assessment did not take into account the developmental difficulties the Libyans actually faced. Indeed, the lack of sufficient progress on developing a nuclear weapon is one of the factors that may have prompted Qadafi to abandon and disclose Libya’s nuclear program.

**Chemical Weapons**

Analysts based their estimates of Libya’s chemical weapons capabilities on assessments of chemical production capabilities and access to precursors. Analysts judged that Libya had produced, at most, roughly 100 metric tons of mustard agent. They also believed that Libya had produced small quantities of sarin, but assessed that this would have been of very low quality and therefore would have degraded quickly. Analysts generally did not believe that Libya had chemical warheads for missile delivery, but they assessed that Libya could probably weaponize existing chemical agents in some fashion. They further concluded that Libya had produced approximately 1,000 250-kg aerial chemical weapons bombs.

Prior to December 2003, the Intelligence Community continued to judge that Libya was pursuing a limited chemical weapons program through small-scale research efforts. The CIA also assessed that Libya wanted to start development of new nerve agents. Moreover, CIA analysts noted that “several hundred” Iraqi chemical and biological weapons experts had been in Libya during the decade preceding the disclosures.

Although a 2004 National Intelligence Estimate correctly stated that Libya possessed chemical weapons agents and aerial bombs, Libya’s actual chemical stockpile proved to be smaller in quantity than the Intelligence Community estimated. Libya declared in March 2004 to the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that it possessed about 24 metric tons of sulfur mustard agent—considerably less than the Intelligence Community had predicted. On the other hand, Libya declared to OPCW that it had produced more than 3,500 unfilled aerial munitions, including 250-kg bombs.\textsuperscript{18}

\textbf{Biological Weapons}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Finding 3}
The Intelligence Community’s assessment that Libya maintained the desire for an offensive biological weapons program, and was pursuing at least a small-scale research and development effort, remains unconfirmed.
\end{center}

In the early 1990s, analysts had strong evidence that Libya was developing a biological weapons program, and policymakers worked closely with the international community to thwart Libya’s efforts in this area—including instituting sanctions that prohibited the purchase of even dual-use items.\textsuperscript{19} Throughout that period, analysts judged that Libya maintained the desire for an offensive biological weapons program, and most assessed that Libya was pursuing at least a small-scale research and development effort.\textsuperscript{20}

These assumptions persisted through the late 1990s and the early part of this decade. During this period, analysts observed signs of reorganization and revitalization of the program, including purchases of dual-use equipment. This pre-declaration intelligence remains unconfirmed.\textsuperscript{21}

Libyan declarations have failed to shed light on Tripoli’s plans and intentions for its biological program. In addition, the suspect facilities inspectors have visited all have legitimate civilian biotechnology uses.\textsuperscript{22} One Libyan official stated that while Libya intended to build an offensive biological weapons program, it never went beyond the planning stage, and that Qadafi considered the biological program too dangerous and ordered its termination sometime prior to 1993.\textsuperscript{23} A senior Libyan official, who has remained a key interlocutor on Libya’s WMD programs, initially referred inspectors to another senior official who ostensibly knew the details of the biological warfare (BW) program.\textsuperscript{24} According to intelligence, this senior official also “would not discuss any intent, offensive or defensive, for the Libyan BW program.”\textsuperscript{25} Lower-level officials have not only denied working on an offensive program, but some
have also denied that Libya had even a defensive program. This group of lower-level officials, comprising the bulk of biological weapons officials with whom the inspectors have met, claims to have stopped working in the program in the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{26} None of them admit to knowing about the possible revitalization of the program early this decade.

As a result, it is not possible to measure with certainty the accuracy of the Intelligence Community’s assessments of Libya’s biological weapons program, and we cannot address further reasons why uncertainty continues in this unclassified report.

**Delivery Systems**

**Finding 4**

The Intelligence Community’s assessments of Libya’s missile programs appear to have been generally accurate, but it is not yet possible to evaluate them fully because of limited Libyan disclosures.

Declarations and inspections appear to confirm analysts’ skepticism about Libya’s indigenous missile program. Libyan declarations confirm that the Intelligence Community had a comprehensive understanding of Libya’s programs, its designs, and its success rate.\textsuperscript{27} The Intelligence Community’s predictive record on Libya’s cooperative efforts with foreign nations is more mixed, but the Intelligence Community’s forecasts were nevertheless generally accurate. The Community—despite possibly erring in assessing the scale and developmental timeline—correctly identified ongoing efforts to extend the range of Libya’s Scud missiles.\textsuperscript{28}

It is not yet possible to fully evaluate the accuracy of the Intelligence Community’s pre-disclosure assessments. However, what we know at this point suggests that the Community’s predictions about Libya’s missile programs were generally accurate.
THE UNDERPINNINGS OF SUCCESS

This section examines the contribution of the collection and analytical disciplines to achieving the success described above. While it appears the Community was able to achieve more with regard to Libya’s nuclear and missile programs than its chemical and biological programs, the Community’s overall record illustrates multiple examples of ways in which intelligence can succeed. These include: seamless partnerships between analysts and collectors; the availability of a variety of reporting from human and technical collectors; and the ability of analysts to be flexible in their judgments while tracking and monitoring programs over time. These kinds of successes may be among the best the current intelligence system can offer.

**Nuclear Program**

**Finding 5**

The Intelligence Community’s penetration of the A.Q. Khan proliferation network provided invaluable intelligence on Libya’s nuclear efforts.

Intelligence Community analysts agree that the information obtained as a result of penetrating the Khan network was critical to their understanding Libya’s nuclear efforts.

The Khan network provided “one-stop shopping” for a state seeking to develop a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment program, to procure nuclear weapons information, or to gain access to supplier contacts.29 By 2000, information was uncovered that revealed shipments of centrifuge technology from the Khan network were destined for Libya.30 The Intelligence Community then learned through what former DCI George Tenet correctly described as “operational daring”31 that the Khan network was the source of Libya’s procurement of a nuclear weapons design.32 Further information about the details of these efforts is classified and cannot be discussed in an unclassified setting.

The Intelligence Community’s dramatic successes with regard to Libya are further exemplified by events surrounding the seizure of the BBC China, a ship bound for Libya carrying centrifuge technology.33 The Intelligence Com-
Community’s detection of the vessel and its cargo was based on a variety of innovative collection efforts which also cannot be discussed in detail here. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the outcome of these operations—which facilitated interdiction of materials providing definitive proof that Libya was working on a clandestine uranium enrichment program—served as a critical factor in Tripoli’s decision to open up its weapons programs to international scrutiny.34

Chemical and Biological Warfare Programs

Finding 6

The Intelligence Community’s performance with regard to Libya’s chemical and biological programs was more modest, due in part to the limited effectiveness of technical collection techniques against these targets.

As discussed above, the Intelligence Community possessed some limited information suggesting that Libya was continuing work on limited chemical and biological programs. The overall paucity of intelligence on these programs, however, may be attributed in no small measure to the general ineffectiveness of technical collection efforts.

That being said, it should be noted that there are few distinguishing characteristics that enable the identification of chemical or biological facilities through imagery or other technical means. Moreover, much of the technology and expertise required for chemical and biological programs is dual-use, making it easier to acquire and more difficult for the Community to track. It is also apparent that, at least with regard to biological weapons, the relatively low volume of information could be attributed to the fact that Libya may not have actually had an active biological warfare program.
Delivery Systems

Finding 7
The Intelligence Community gathered valuable information on Libya’s missile programs.

In contrast to the chemical and biological programs, the Community was well-postured to support the efforts of policymakers with regard to Libya’s missiles. The Community had intelligence on facility locations, personnel involved in the programs, and Libya’s cooperative efforts with other nations. This broad understanding contributed significantly to the success of the U.S./U.K. inspections.

Analysis

Finding 8
Analysts generally demonstrated a commendable willingness to question and reconsider their assessments in light of new information.

Prior to 1999, analysts were skeptical about Libya’s ability to implement functioning WMD programs. While a great deal of attention was focused on Libya’s chemical weapons development efforts, analysts generally viewed Libya as an inept bungler, the court jester among the band of nations seeking biological or nuclear capabilities. This skepticism was based on Libya’s lack of a high-technology industrial base, the absence of a trained cadre of sophisticated scientists, and the success of international sanctions, which hampered Libya’s efforts to purchase complete or partially complete WMD systems.  

When new information began to emerge in 1999 and 2000 suggesting that Libya was reinvigorating its nuclear, missile, and biological programs, analysts immediately began to re-examine their past assumptions and launched formal efforts to explore alternative scenarios. For example, in 2001 and 2002, CIA analysts organized simulation workshops to examine the implications of suspected changes in Libya’s nuclear and missile programs. These efforts, however, received only limited management support, and analysts told
us that the focus on current production meant that they had little time and few resources for this analytic endeavor.\textsuperscript{37}

The new information led technical analysts to change their views dramatically about the Libyans’ abilities to integrate technologies into weapons. Analysts shifted to what amounted to a “worst case” analysis, judging in a 2001 National Intelligence Estimate that Qadafi could have a nuclear weapon as early as 2007 (down from 2015 in an Estimate two years earlier), given foreign assistance.\textsuperscript{38} The intelligence that led to this change was from classified intelligence reporting that cannot be discussed in this unclassified report.\textsuperscript{39}

Meanwhile, in the months leading up to this new information, the Community’s political analysts observed that, given Qadafi’s efforts to normalize relations with the West, renunciation of Libya’s WMD programs would be a natural next step.\textsuperscript{40} However, because good evidence showed that Tripoli was still acquiring components for weapons programs, analysts believed that they could not conclusively assess that Qadafi would open the programs for inspection. Nonetheless, analysts wanted to alert policymakers to what they saw as a likely and exploitable possibility. Analysts subsequently asked the DCI’s red cell team—an office responsible for testing alternative hypotheses—to consider the theory, and the team published a paper considering this scenario.\textsuperscript{41}

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\textbf{Finding 9}
Analysts tracking proliferation program developments sometimes inappropriately equated procurement activity with technical capabilities, and many analysts did not receive the necessary training to avoid such failings.
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The analysts who tracked Libya’s proliferation program saw intelligence on Libyan attempts to procure chemical, biological, and nuclear components and technologies, but lacked detailed information on Libya’s ability to produce workable weapons systems from these acquired items. Unfortunately, analysts often equated procurement activity with weapons system capability.\textsuperscript{42} As our Iraq case study previously noted, this equation of procurement with capability is a fundamental analytical error—simply because a state can buy the parts does not mean it can put them together and make them work. In our judgment, based upon our discussions with senior analytic experts, this error was caused
by multiple factors, including a lack of experience or training among technical analysts in how to incorporate the systems integration capabilities of a would-be nuclear power into their assessments. In addition, many technical analysts have a weak understanding of the scientific, academic, industrial, and economic base a country requires in order to develop and actually produce weapons.

In the case of Libya (and Iraq, as we described earlier), the propensity to equate procurement with capability was partially the result of collectors gathering a disproportionately large volume of procurement-related intelligence, which may have, in turn, led analysts to overemphasize its importance. To avoid such traps, we believe that analysts—who all too often are rewarded based upon the production of current intelligence reporting—need stronger incentives to invest the substantial time necessary to develop expertise in foreign research, development, and acquisition capabilities.

Finally, we note that some of the analysis produced prior to Libya’s renunciation of WMD provided intelligence consumers with limited useful warning. For example, National Intelligence Estimates on Libya’s nuclear program only included assessments of when Libya “could” complete a nuclear warhead, without a corresponding judgment about when such an event was likely or the probability of such an event. Equally problematic, the use of WMD-specific Estimates isolated analysis of the WMD question from discussions of the political and economic forces that could lead to significant advances or delays in a national WMD program. One of the Libya Estimates even noted this explicitly, stating that its estimates were based on the success and pace of the missile programs, international technology transfers, political motives, military incentives, and economic resources, and did not take into account the possibility of significant political and economic change. This weakness is similar to that found in our Iraq case study, which found that the Intelligence Community failed to examine seriously the possibility that domestic or regional political pressures (or some other factors) might have prompted Sad-
dam Hussein to destroy his stockpiles and to forswear active development of WMD after the first Gulf War.\textsuperscript{44}

\textbf{LOOKING AHEAD}

The Intelligence Community’s efforts are currently focused on supporting U.S. government efforts to assess Libyan compliance with the terms of its agreements to dismantle its chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile programs. With the establishment of an official presence in Tripoli, the United States has had, since January 2004, a standing presence in-country that will provide continuous assessment of Libya’s compliance with its dismantlement commitments.\textsuperscript{45} In addition, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Libya have established a standing trilateral mechanism called the Steering and Coordinating Committee to address future weapons-related issues.\textsuperscript{46} As a result, many in the policy and intelligence communities believe there is an “extremely low probability of things going wrong” with regard to the Libyan agreements.\textsuperscript{47}

These positive developments aside, the Intelligence Community bears a significant and ongoing burden relating to Libya. The Community must continue to assist in verifying Libyan disclosures.

Moreover, it is clear that Libya has been considerably less forthcoming about the details of its chemical and biological weapons efforts than about its nuclear and missile programs. The analysts we interviewed agreed that if Libya maintained any biological or chemical programs, they would be small-scale.\textsuperscript{48} And whatever may be said about the current state of the Libyan programs and the veracity of Tripoli’s disclosures, it remains true that the mercurial regime may suddenly shift its plans and intentions, leading to a covert resuscitation of these programs that the Intelligence Community will be expected to detect.

There are, moreover, other significant ongoing intelligence challenges concerning the Libya target. For instance, the policy community will look to the Intelligence Community to answer questions surrounding Libyan compliance with its pledge to renounce and cease the use of terrorism.\textsuperscript{49} For the reasons discussed below, we have some doubts about whether the Intelligence Community is well postured to confront these challenges.
Reduced Emphasis on the Target

Finding 11
Shifting priorities and the dominance of current intelligence production leave little time for considering important unanswered questions on Libya, or for working small problems that might prove to have an impact on reducing surprise over the long term.

There is growing concern within the Intelligence Community that thinking “Libya is done” may leave collectors and analysts without the resources needed to track and monitor future change. Competing priorities have reduced the focus on Libya since the 2003 declarations, and Libya may again become a low priority for collectors. Some analysts say they have already begun to feel the effects of the shift in priorities.

There is little doubt that important questions remain about Libya’s WMD programs. Yet given competing demands on technical analysts (tracking Libyan missile developments, for example, is only a part of the responsibilities of a single analyst at CIA), it is difficult to see how the Community will work these issues as policy priorities fluctuate.

Finding 12
This finding is classified.

CONCLUSION

The Intelligence Community should be commended for its contributions to forcing Tripoli to openly declare its nuclear and chemical materials and abandon development efforts, as well as hand over parts of its missile force and cancel its long-range missile projects. Such renunciation is, we believe, the real measure of a WMD-related intelligence success. At the same time, the Intelligence Community should recognize the ways in which it can improve its collection and analysis efforts, and how the shift of resources and emphasis away from Libya may—in the future—create difficulties.
ENDNOTES


2 Interview with senior administration officials (Sept. 22, 2004). The teams did not uncover any evidence of a current biological weapons program, nor has Libya admitted the existence of biological weapons materials or facilities as part of the disclosures made under its agreement with the United States and United Kingdom. DIA, Title Classified (Feb. 24, 2004).

3 Executive Order No. 13357 (Sept. 22, 2004) (terminating the national emergency with respect to Libya, which led to the effective end of that sanctions regime). Libya continues to be designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, however, and sanctions based on that designation remain in place.

4 Reporting may have slightly understated the quantity of yellowcake. NIC, Title Classified (NIE 2004-05HJ) (May 2004) at p. 48.


6 NIC, Title Classified (May 2004) (NIE 2004-05HJ).

7 Id. at p. 48.

8 The CIA caveated this assessment, noting that Libya would “face significant technical challenges” to its nuclear program “that could lengthen the time needed to begin producing nuclear warheads.” CIA, Title Classified (SPWR 021602-5) (Feb. 16, 2002). Moreover, an NIE cautioned that the judgments were based on the assumption that Libya would receive “foreign assistance in its fissile material production and weapon development efforts.” NIC, Title Classified (NIE 2001 19HJ-I) (Dec. 2001) at p. E-37.

9 NIC, Title Classified (NIE 2004-05HJ) (May 2004).

10 Id. at p. 49.

11 Id.

12 Interview with CIA analysts (Sept. 10, 2004).

13 NIC, Title Classified (NIE 2004-05HJ) (May 2004).

14 Id. at p. 49.

15 Interview with State Department/INR analysts (Sept. 8, 2004).

16 CIA, Title Classified (SPWR 021602-5) (Feb. 16, 2002).

17 CIA, Title Classified (SPWR 012203-02) (Jan. 22, 2003); Interview with CIA analysts (Sept. 10, 2004).

18 NIC, Title Classified (NIE 2004-05HJ) (May 2004) at p. 49.

19 Interview with State Department/INR analysts (Sept. 8, 2004).

20 NIC, Title Classified (NIE 2004-05HJ) (May 2004) at p. 50; Interview with State Department/INR analysts (Sept. 8, 2004).

21 CIA, Title Classified (SEIB011104-02) (Jan. 12, 2004) at p. 3.
22 Interview with senior administration officials (Sept. 22, 2004).
23 CIA, Title Classified (SEIB011104-02) (Jan. 12, 2004) at p. 3.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Interview with CIA analysts (Sept. 10, 2004).
27 Id.
28 NIC, Title Classified (NIE 2004-05HJ) (May 2004).
30 Interview with CIA officials (Sept. 14, 2004).
32 Interview with CIA officials (Sept. 14, 2004).
33 CIA, Title Classified (WINPAC IA 2004-003HCX) (Feb. 12, 2004) at p. 6.
34 Interview with CIA officials (Sept. 14, 2004).
35 Id.
36 Interview with CIA analysts (Sept. 10, 2004); see also, e.g., Senior Panel Review, Mediterranean WMD Implications Game II (Dec. 12, 2002).
37 Interview with CIA analysts (Sept. 10, 2004).
39 Interview with CIA officials (Sept. 14, 2004); CIA, Submission to the Commission (March 9, 2005).
40 Interview with CIA analysts (Sept. 11, 2004).
41 CIA, Title Classified (July 18, 2003). Similarly, since the disclosures, analysts have asked the red cell to examine the possibility that Qadafi’s agreement to abandon these programs is merely temporary. Interview with CIA ballistic missile analysts (Sept. 10, 2004). See, e.g., Senior Panel Review, Mediterranean WMD Implications Game II (Dec. 12, 2002). Analysts have also worked closely with collectors to reassess existing sources and information in light of the revelations.
42 Interview with CIA analyst (Nov. 14, 2004).
44 Chapter One (Iraq).
45 Interview with State Department/INR analysts (Sept. 8, 2004); Interview with State Department official (Sept. 24, 2004).
46 Interview with senior administration officials (Sept. 22, 2004); Interview with State Department/INR analysts (Sept. 8, 2004).
47 Interview with State Department/INR analysts (Sept. 8, 2004)
48 Interview with NGA analysts (Sept. 9, 2004); Interview with CIA analysts (Sept. 10, 2004).
49 Policymakers are also concerned with Libyan progress on human rights, domestic political and economic modernization, and regional political developments; the Intelligence Com-
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munity will be expected to provide key support on these more traditional intelligence issues. Interview with State Department official (Sept. 24, 2004).

50 See, e.g., Interview with CIA officials (Sept. 14, 2004) (noting that the priority for new sources will be to verify Libya’s past disclosures).

51 Interview with CIA analysts (Sept. 10, 2004).