

APPENDIX B

List of Findings and Recommendations

PART ONE: Looking Back

Chapter 1: Iraq

Iraq Findings

Overall Commission Finding: The Intelligence Community's performance in assessing Iraq's pre-war weapons of mass destruction programs was a major intelligence failure. The failure was not merely that the Intelligence Community's assessments were wrong. There were also serious shortcomings in the way these assessments were made and communicated to policymakers.

Nuclear Weapons Summary Finding: The Intelligence Community seriously misjudged the status of Iraq's alleged nuclear weapons program in the 2002 NIE and other pre-Iraq war intelligence products. This misjudgment stemmed chiefly from the Community's failure to analyze correctly Iraq's reasons for attempting to procure high-strength aluminum tubes.

1. The Intelligence Community's judgment about Iraq's nuclear program hinged chiefly on an assessment about Iraq's intended use for high-strength aluminum tubes it was seeking to procure. Most of the agencies in the Intelligence Community erroneously concluded these tubes were intended for use in centrifuges in a nuclear program rather than in conventional rockets. This error was, at the bottom, the result of poor analytical tradecraft—namely, the failure to do proper technical analysis informed by thorough knowledge of the relevant weapons technology and practices.
2. In addition to citing the aluminum tubes, the NIE's judgment that Iraq was attempting to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program also referred to additional streams of intelligence. These other streams, however, were very thin, and the limited value of that supporting intelligence was inadequately conveyed in the October 2002 NIE and in other Intelligence Community products.
3. The other indications of reconstitution—aside from the aluminum tubes—did not themselves amount to a persuasive case for a reconsti-

tuted Iraqi nuclear program. In light of the tenuousness of this other information, DOE's argument that the aluminum tubes were not for centrifuges but that Iraq was, based on these other streams of information, reconstituting its nuclear program was a flawed analytical position.

4. The Intelligence Community failed to authenticate in a timely fashion transparently forged documents purporting to show that Iraq had attempted to procure uranium from Niger.

Biological Warfare Summary Finding: The Intelligence Community seriously misjudged the status of Iraq's biological weapons program in the 2002 NIE and other pre-war intelligence products. The primary reason for this misjudgment was the Intelligence Community's heavy reliance on a human source—codenamed "Curveball"—whose information later proved to be unreliable.

1. The DIA's Defense HUMINT Service's failure even to attempt to validate Curveball's reporting was a major failure in operational tradecraft.

2. Indications of possible problems with Curveball began to emerge well before the 2002 NIE. These early indications of problems—which suggested unstable behavior more than a lack of credibility—were discounted by the analysts working the Iraq WMD account. But given these warning signs, analysts should have viewed Curveball's information with greater skepticism and should have conveyed this skepticism in the NIE. The analysts' resistance to any information that could undermine Curveball's reliability suggests that the analysts were unduly wedded to a source that supported their assumptions about Iraq's BW programs.

3. The October 2002 NIE failed to communicate adequately to policymakers both the Community's near-total reliance on Curveball for its BW judgments, and the serious problems that characterized Curveball as a source.

4. Beginning in late 2002, some operations officers within the regional division of the CIA's Directorate of Operations that was responsible for relations with the liaison service handling Curveball expressed serious concerns about Curveball's reliability to senior officials at the CIA, but these views were either (1) not thought to outweigh analytic assessments

that Curveball's information was reliable or (2) disregarded because of managers' assessments that those views were not sufficiently convincing to warrant further elevation.

5. CIA management stood by Curveball's reporting long after post-war investigators in Iraq had established that he was lying about crucial issues.

6. In addition to the problems with Curveball, the Intelligence Community—and, particularly, the Defense HUMINT Service—failed to keep reporting from a known fabricator out of finished intelligence on Iraq's BW program in 2002 and 2003.

Chemical Warfare Summary Finding: The Intelligence Community erred in its 2002 NIE assessment of Iraq's alleged chemical warfare program. The Community's substantial overestimation of Iraq's chemical warfare program was due chiefly to flaws in analysis and the paucity of quality information collected.

1. The Intelligence Community relied too heavily on ambiguous imagery indicators identified at suspect Iraqi facilities for its broad judgment about Iraq's chemical warfare program. In particular, analysts leaned too much on the judgment that the presence of "Samarra-type" trucks (and related activity) indicated that Iraq had resumed its chemical weapons program.

2. Analysts failed to understand, and collectors did not adequately communicate, the limitations of imagery collection. Specifically, analysts did not realize that the observed increase in activity at suspected Iraqi chemical facilities may have been the result of increased imagery collection rather than an increase in Iraqi activity.

3. Human intelligence collection against Iraq's chemical activities was paltry, and much has subsequently proved problematic.

4. Signals intelligence collection against Iraq's chemical activities was minimal, and much was of questionable value.

Delivery Summary Finding 1: The Intelligence Community incorrectly assessed that Iraq was developing unmanned aerial vehicles for the purpose of delivering biological weapons strikes against U.S. interests.

Delivery Summary Finding 2: The Intelligence Community correctly judged that Iraq was developing ballistic missile systems that violated United Nations strictures, but was incorrect in assessing that Iraq had preserved its Scud missile force.

1. The Intelligence Community made too much of an inferential leap, based on very little hard evidence, in judging that Iraq's unmanned aerial vehicles were being designed for use as biological warfare delivery vehicles and that they might be used against the U.S. homeland.
2. The Intelligence Community failed to communicate adequately to policymakers the weak foundations upon which its conclusions were based.
3. The Intelligence Community failed to give adequate consideration to other possible uses for Iraq's UAVs or to give due credence to countervailing evidence.
4. The Intelligence Community was generally correct in assessing that Iraq was continuing ballistic missile work that violated United Nations restrictions, but erred in many of the specifics.

Regime Decisionmaking Summary Finding: The Intelligence Community, because of a lack of analytical imagination, failed even to consider the possibility that Saddam Hussein would decide to destroy his chemical and biological weapons and to halt work on his nuclear program after the first Gulf War.

Iraq Conclusions

1. Saddam Hussein's Iraq was a hard target for human intelligence, but it will not be the last that we face. When faced with such targets in the future, the United States needs to supplement its traditional methodologies with more innovative approaches.
2. Rewarding CIA and DIA case officers based on how many assets they recruit impedes the recruitment of *quality* assets.

3. The CIA, and even more so the DIA, must do a better job of testing the veracity of crucial human sources.
4. Iraq's denial and deception efforts successfully hampered U.S. intelligence collection.
5. In the case of Iraq, collectors of intelligence absorbed the prevailing analytic consensus and tended to reject or ignore contrary information. The result was "tunnel vision" focusing on the Intelligence Community's existing assumptions.
6. Intercepted communications identified some procurement efforts, but such intelligence was of only marginal utility because most procurements were of dual-use materials.
7. Signals intelligence against Iraq was seriously hampered by technical barriers.
8. Other difficulties relating to the security and counterintelligence methods of the Iraqi regime hampered NSA collection.
9. Traditional imagery intelligence has limited utility in assessing chemical and biological weapons programs.
10. Measurements and signatures intelligence (MASINT) collection was severely hampered by problems similar to those faced by other intelligence methods. Analysts' lack of familiarity with MASINT also reduced its role in analysts' assessments of Iraq's WMD programs.
11. Recognizing that it was having problems collecting quality intelligence against Iraq, the Intelligence Community launched an effort to study ways to improve its collection performance. This process was hampered by haphazard follow-up by some agencies; in particular, NSA failed to follow-up promptly on the Intelligence Community's recommendations.
12. Analysts skewed the analytical process by requiring proof that Iraq did not have WMD.

APPENDIX B

13. Analysts did not question the hypotheses underlying their conclusions, and tended to discount evidence that cut against those hypotheses.
14. The Community made serious mistakes in its technical analysis of Iraq's unconventional weapons program. The National Ground Intelligence Center in particular displayed a disturbing lack of diligence and technical expertise.
15. Analysis of Iraqi weapons programs was also flawed by "layering," with one individual assessment forming the basis for additional, broader assessments that did not carry forward the uncertainties underlying each "layer."
16. Analysis of Iraq's weapons programs took little account of Iraq's political and social context. While such a consideration would probably not have changed the Community's judgments about Iraq's WMD, the failure even to *consider* whether Saddam Hussein had elected to abandon his banned weapons programs precluded that possibility.
17. The Community did not adequately communicate uncertainties about either its sources or its analytic judgments to policymakers.
18. The Community failed to explain adequately to consumers the fundamental assumptions and premises of its analytic judgments.
19. Relevant information known to intelligence collectors was not provided to Community analysts.
20. Relevant information known to intelligence analysts was not provided to Community collectors.
21. Inability to obtain information from foreign liaison services hampered the Community's ability to assess the credibility of crucial information.
22. The President's Daily Brief (PDB) likely conveyed a greater sense of certainty about analytic judgments than warranted.

23. The National Intelligence Estimate process is subject to flaws as well, and the Iraq NIE displays some of them. The length of the NIE encourages policymakers to rely on the less caveated Key Judgments. And the language of consensus (“most agencies believe”) may obscure situations in which the dissenting agency has more expertise than the majority.

24. The Iraq NIE was produced to meet a very short deadline. The time pressure was unfortunate and perhaps avoidable, but it did not substantially affect the judgments reached in the NIE.

25. The shortened NIE coordination process did not unfairly suppress the National Ground Intelligence Center’s slightly more cautious estimates of Iraq’s CW stockpile.

26. The Intelligence Community did not make or change any analytic judgments in response to political pressure to reach a particular conclusion, but the pervasive conventional wisdom that Saddam retained WMD affected the analytic process.

27. The CIA took too long to admit error in Iraq, and its Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center actively discouraged analysts from investigating errors.

Iraq Recommendation

The Director of National Intelligence should hold accountable the organizations that contributed to the flawed assessments of Iraq’s WMD programs.

Chapter 2: Libya Findings

1. The Intelligence Community accurately assessed what nuclear-related equipment and material had been obtained by Libya, but it was less successful in judging how well Libya was able to exploit what it possessed.

2. The Intelligence Community’s central judgment that Libya possessed chemical weapons agents and chemical weapons aerial bombs was correct, but Libya’s actual chemical agent stockpile proved to be smaller in quantity than the Intelligence Community estimated.

APPENDIX B

3. The Intelligence Community's assessment that Libya maintained the desire for an offensive biological weapons program, and was pursuing at least a small-scale research and development effort, remains unconfirmed.
4. The Intelligence Community's assessments of Libya's missile programs appear to have been generally accurate, but it is not yet possible to evaluate them fully because of limited Libyan disclosures.
5. The Intelligence Community's penetration of the A.Q. Khan proliferation network provided invaluable intelligence on Libya's nuclear efforts.
6. The Intelligence Community's performance with regard to Libya's chemical and biological programs was more modest, due in part to the limited effectiveness of technical collection techniques against these targets.
7. The Intelligence Community gathered valuable information on Libya's missile program.
8. Analysts generally demonstrated a commendable willingness to question and reconsider their assessments in light of new information.
9. Analysts tracking proliferation program developments sometimes inappropriately equated procurement activity with technical capabilities, and many analysts did not receive the necessary training to avoid such failings.
10. Analytic products sometimes provided limited effective warning to intelligence consumers, and tended to separate WMD issues from broader discussions of political and economic forces.
11. Shifting priorities and the dominance of current intelligence production leave little time for considering important unanswered questions on Libya, or for working small problems that might prove to have an impact on reducing surprise over the long term.

Chapter 3: Al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan Findings

1. Information obtained through the war in Afghanistan and in its aftermath indicated that al-Qa'ida's biological weapons program was further along than analysts had previously assessed.
2. Analytic judgments regarding al-Qa'ida's chemical weapons capabilities did not change significantly as a result of the war.
3. The war in Afghanistan brought to light detailed and revealing information about the direction and progress of al-Qa'ida's radiological and nuclear ambitions.
4. Intelligence gaps prior to the war in Afghanistan prevented the Intelligence Community from being able to assess with much certainty the extent of al-Qa'ida's weapons of mass destruction capabilities.
5. Analysis on al-Qa'ida's potential weapons of mass destruction development in Afghanistan did not benefit from leveraging different analytic disciplines.
6. Analysts writing on al-Qa'ida's potential weapons of mass destruction efforts in Afghanistan did not adequately state the basis for or the assumptions underlying their most critical judgments. This analytic shortcoming is one that we have seen in our other studies as well, such as Iraq, and it points to the need to develop routine analytic practices for quantifying uncertainty and managing limited collection.

Chapter 4: Terrorism Findings

1. Although terrorism information sharing has improved significantly since September 11, major change is still required to institute effective information sharing across the Intelligence Community and with state, local, and tribal governments.
2. Ambiguities in the respective roles and authorities of the NCTC and CTC have not been resolved, and the two agencies continue to fight bureaucratic battles to define their place in the war on terror. The result has been unnecessary duplication of effort and the promotion of unproductive competition between the two organizations.

3. Persisting ambiguities and conflicts in the roles, missions, and authorities of counterterrorism organizations hamper effective warning.
4. Persistent ambiguities and conflicts in the roles, missions, and authorities of counterterrorism organizations with regard to analysis and warning have led to redundant efforts across the Community and inefficient use of limited resources.
5. The failure to manage counterterrorism resources from a Community perspective has limited the Intelligence Community's ability to understand and warn against terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction.

Chapter 5: Iran and North Korea

The eleven findings in this chapter are classified.

PART TWO: Looking Forward The Recommendations

Chapter 6: Leadership and Management

1. We recommend that the DNI bring a mission focus to the management of Community resources for high-priority intelligence issues by creating a group of "Mission Managers" on the DNI staff, responsible for all aspects of the intelligence process relating to those issues.
2. We recommend that the DNI create a management structure that effectively coordinates Community target development. This new target development process would be supported by an integrated, end-to-end "collection enterprise."
3. We recommend that the new DNI overhaul the Community's information management system to facilitate real and effective information sharing.
4. We recommend that the DNI use his human resources authorities to: establish a central human resources authority for the Intelligence Community; create a uniform system for performance evaluations and compensation; develop a more comprehensive and creative set of performance incentives; direct a "joint" personnel rotation system; and establish a National Intelligence University.

5. We recommend that the DNI take an active role in equipping the Intelligence Community to develop new technologies.
6. We recommend that the President establish a National Counter Proliferation Center (NCPC) that is relatively small (*i.e.*, fewer than 100 people) and that manages and coordinates analysis and collection on nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons across the Intelligence Community. Although government-wide “strategic operational planning” is clearly required to confront proliferation threats, we advise that such planning *not* be directed by the NCPC.
7. We recommend that the Executive Branch improve its mechanisms for watching over the Intelligence Community in order to ensure that intelligence reform does not falter. To this end, we suggest that the Joint Intelligence Community Council serve as a standing Intelligence Community “customer council” and that a strengthened President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board assume a more vigorous role in keeping watch over the progress of reform in the Community.
8. We recommend that the President suggest that Congress take steps to improve its structure for intelligence oversight.
9. The Intelligence Community should improve its internal processes for self-examination, including increasing the use of formal “lessons learned” studies.

Chapter 7: Collection

1. The DNI should create a new management structure within the Office of the DNI that manages collection as an “integrated collection enterprise.” Such an integrated approach should include coordinated target development, collection management, data management, strategic planning and investment, and the development of new collection techniques.
2. Target Development Boards, which would be chaired by the Mission Managers, should develop collection requirements and strategies and evaluate collectors’ responsiveness to these needs.
3. Strengthen the CIA’s authority to manage and coordinate overseas human intelligence operations across the Intelligence Community by

creating a Human Intelligence Directorate outside the Directorate of Operations.

4. The CIA should develop and manage a range of new overt and covert human intelligence capabilities. In particular, a “Human Intelligence Innovation Center,” independent of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations, should be established to facilitate the development of new and innovative mechanisms for collecting human intelligence.

5. The CIA should take the lead in systematizing and standardizing the Intelligence Community’s asset validation procedures, and integrating them with all information gathering activities across the human intelligence spectrum.

6. The Intelligence Community should train more human intelligence operators and collectors, and its training programs should be modified to support the full spectrum of human intelligence collection methods.

7. The President should seek to have the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act amended to extend the duration of electronic surveillance and “pen registers” in cases involving agents of foreign powers who are *not* U.S. persons.

8. The DNI should appoint an authority responsible for managing and overseeing innovative technologies, including the use of technologies often referred to as “MASINT.”

9. The DNI should create an Open Source Directorate in the CIA to use the Internet and modern information processing tools to greatly enhance the availability of open source information to analysts, collectors, and users of intelligence.

10. Efforts should be taken to significantly reduce damaging losses in collection capability that result from *authorized* disclosures of classified information related to protection of sources and methods.

11. The DNI should ensure that all Inspectors General in the Intelligence Community are prepared to conduct leak investigations for their agencies; this responsibility can be coordinated by a Commu-

nity-wide Inspector General in the Office of the DNI, if such an office is established.

Chapter 8: Analysis

1. Mission Managers should be the DNI's designees for ensuring that the analytic community adequately addresses key intelligence needs on high priority topics.
2. The DNI should create a small cadre of all-source analysts—perhaps 50—who would be experts in finding and using unclassified, open source information.
3. The DNI should establish a program office within the CIA's Open Source Directorate to acquire, or develop when necessary, information technologies to permit prioritization and exploitation of large volumes of textual data without the need for prior human translation or transcription.
4. The Intelligence Community should expand its contacts with those outside the realm of intelligence by creating at least one not-for-profit "sponsored research institute."
5. The Community must develop and integrate into regular use new tools that can assist analysts in filtering and correlating the vast quantities of information that threaten to overwhelm the analytic process. Moreover, data from all sources of information should be processed and correlated Community-wide *before* being conveyed to analysts.
6. A new long-term research and analysis unit, under the mantle of the National Intelligence Council, should wall off all-source analysts from the press of daily demands and serve as the lead organization for inter-agency projects involving in-depth analysis.
7. The DNI should encourage diverse and independent analysis throughout the Intelligence Community by encouraging alternative hypothesis generation as part of the analytic process and by forming offices dedicated to independent analysis.

APPENDIX B

8. The Intelligence Community must develop a Community program for training analysts, and both analysts and managers must prioritize this career-long training.

9. The Intelligence Community must develop a Community program for training managers, both when they first assume managerial positions and throughout their careers.

10. Finished intelligence should include careful sourcing for all analytic assessments and conclusions, and these materials should—whenever possible in light of legitimate security concerns—be made easily available to intelligence customers.

11. The analytic community should create and store sourced copies of all analytic pieces to allow readers to locate and review the intelligence upon which analysis is based, and to allow for easy identification of analysis that is based on intelligence reports that are later modified.

12. The DNI should develop and implement strategies for improving the Intelligence Community's science and technology and weapons analysis capabilities.

13. The DNI should explore ways to make finished intelligence available to customers in a way that enables them—to the extent they desire—to more easily find pieces of interest, link to related materials, and communicate with analysts.

14. The President's Daily Brief should be restructured. The DNI should oversee the process and ensure a fair representation of divergent views. Reporting on terrorism intelligence should be combined and coordinated by the DNI to eliminate redundancies and material that does not merit Presidential action.

15. The Intelligence Community should expand the use of non-monetary incentives that remind analysts of the importance of their work and the value of their contributions to national security.

16. Examinations of finished intelligence should be routine and ongoing, and the lessons learned from the “post mortems” should be incorporated into the intelligence education and training program.

Chapter 9: Information Sharing

1. The confused lines of authority over information sharing created by the intelligence reform act should be resolved. In particular:

- The Information Sharing Environment should be expanded to encompass all intelligence information, not just terrorism intelligence;
- The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center should report to the DNI on all matters relating to information sharing; and
- The overlapping authorities of the DNI and the Program Manager should be reconciled and coordinated—a result most likely to be achieved by requiring the Program Manager to report to the DNI.

2. The DNI should give responsibility for information *sharing*, information *technology*, and information *security* within the Intelligence Community to an office reporting directly to the DNI or to the Principal Deputy DNI.

3. In designing an Information Sharing Environment, the DNI should, to the extent possible, learn from and build on the capabilities of existing Intelligence Community networks. These lessons include:

- The limitations of “need to know” in a networked environment;
- The importance of developing mechanisms that can protect sources and methods in new ways;
- Biometrics and other user authentication (identification) methods, along with user activity auditing tools, can promote accountability and enhance counterintelligence capabilities;

- System-wide encryption of data can greatly reduce the risks of network penetration by outsiders; and
 - Where sensitive information is restricted to a limited group of users, the Information Sharing Environment should ensure that others searching for such information are aware of its existence and provided with a point of contact who can decide quickly whether to grant access.
4. Primary institutional responsibility within the Intelligence Community for establishing clear and consistent “U.S. persons” rules should be shifted from individual collection agencies to the Director of National Intelligence. These rules would continue to be subject to the Attorney General’s review and approval. To the extent possible, the same rules should apply across the Intelligence Community.
 5. The DNI should set uniform information management policies, practices, and procedures for all members of the Intelligence Community.
 6. All users of the Information Sharing Environment should be registered in a directory that identifies skills, clearances, and assigned responsibilities of each individual (using aliases rather than true names when necessary). The environment should enable users to make a “call for assistance” that assembles a virtual community of specialists to address a particular task, and all data should be catalogued within the Information Sharing Environment in a way that enables the underlying network to compare user privileges with data sensitivity.
 7. The DNI should propose standards to simplify and modernize the information classification system with particular attention to implementation in a network-centric Information Sharing Environment.
 8. We recommend several parallel efforts to keep the Information Sharing Environment on track:
 - **Collection of metrics.** The chief information management officer should introduce performance metrics for the Information Sharing Environment and automate their collection. These metrics should include the number and origination of postings

to the shared environment, data on how often and by whom each item was accessed, and statistics on the use of collaborative tools and communications channels, among others. Such performance data can help to define milestones and to determine rewards and penalties.

- **Self-enforcing milestones.** Milestones should include specific and quantifiable performance criteria for the sharing environment, as well as rewards and penalties for succeeding or failing to meet them. The DNI should empower the chief information management officer to use the DNI's budget, mission-assignment, and personnel authorities to penalize poor agency performance.
- **Incentives.** The DNI should ensure that collectors and analysts receive honors or monetary prizes for intelligence products that receive widespread use or acclaim. Users should post comments or rate the value of individual reports or analytic products, and periodic user surveys can serve as peer review mechanisms.
- **Training.** The DNI should promote the training of all users in the Information Sharing Environment, with extended training for analysts, managers, and other users of the environment.

Chapter 10: Intelligence at Home

1. To ensure that the FBI's *intelligence elements* are responsive to the Director of National Intelligence, and to capitalize on the FBI's progress, we recommend the creation of a new National Security Service within the FBI under a single Executive Assistant Director. This service would include the Bureau's Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Divisions and the Directorate of Intelligence. The service would be subject to the coordination and budget authorities of the DNI as well as to the same Attorney General authorities that apply to other Bureau divisions.

2. The DNI should ensure that there are effective mechanisms for preventing conflicts and encouraging coordination among intelligence agencies in the United States.

APPENDIX B

3. The Department of Justice's primary national security elements—the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, and the Counterterrorism and Counterespionage sections—should be placed under a new Assistant Attorney General for National Security.
4. The Secretary of Homeland Security should rescind Treasury Order 113-01 as it applies to Department of Homeland Security elements.

Chapter 11: Counterintelligence

1. The National Counterintelligence Executive should become the DNI's Mission Manager for counterintelligence, providing strategic direction for the whole range of counterintelligence activities across the government.
2. The National Counterintelligence Executive should work closely with agencies responsible for protecting U.S. information infrastructure in order to enhance the United States' technical counterintelligence capabilities.
3. The CIA should create a new capability dedicated to mounting offensive counterintelligence activities abroad.
4. The Department of Defense's Counterintelligence Field Activity should have operational and investigative authority to coordinate and conduct counterintelligence activities throughout the Defense Department.
5. The FBI should create a National Security Service that includes the Bureau's Counterintelligence Division, Counterterrorism Division, and the Directorate of Intelligence. A single Executive Assistant Director would lead the Service subject to the coordination and budget authorities of the DNI.

Chapter 12: Covert Action

The four recommendations in this chapter are classified.

Chapter 13: The Changing Proliferation Threat and the Intelligence Response

1. The DNI should create a Community-wide National Biodefense Initiative to include a Biological Science Advisory Group, a government service program for biologists and health professionals, a post-doctoral fellowship program in biodefense and intelligence, and a scholarship program for graduate students in biological weapons-relevant fields.
2. The DNI should use the Joint Intelligence Community Council to form a Biological Weapons Working Group. This Working Group would serve as the principal coordination venue for the Intelligence Community and biodefense agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security's National Biodefense and Countermeasures Center, NIH, CDC, the Department of Agriculture, and USAMRIID.
3. The DNI should create a deputy within the National Counter Proliferation Center that is specifically responsible for biological weapons; this deputy would be responsible to the Proliferation Mission Manager to ensure the implementation of a comprehensive biological weapons targeting strategy and direct new collection initiatives.
4. The National Security Council should form a Joint Interagency Task Force to develop a counter-biological weapons plan within 90 days that draws upon all elements of national power, including law enforcement and the regulatory capabilities of the Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Commerce, and State.
5. The State Department should aggressively support foreign criminalization of biological weapons development and the establishment of biosafety and biosecurity regulations under the framework of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies should jointly sponsor biological weapons information sharing events with foreign police forces.
6. The United States should remain actively engaged in designing and implementing both international and regulatory inspection regimes. It should consider extending its existing biosecurity and biosafety regulations to foreign institutions with commercial ties to the United States, using the possibility of increased liability, reduced patent protection, or

APPENDIX B

more burdensome and costly inspections to encourage compliance with appropriate safeguards.

7. The President should establish a Counterproliferation Joint Interagency Task Force to conduct counterproliferation interdiction operations; to detect, monitor, and handoff suspected proliferation targets; and to coordinate interagency and partner nations' counterproliferation activities.

8. The DNI should designate the National Counter Proliferation Center as the Intelligence Community's leader for interdiction-related issues and direct the Center to support the all-source intelligence needs of the Counterproliferation Joint Interagency Task Force, the National Security Council, and other customers.

9. The President should establish, probably through a National Security Presidential Directive, a real-time, interagency decisionmaking process for counterproliferation interdiction operations, borrowing from Presidential Directive 27, the interagency decisionmaking process that supports counternarcotics interdictions.

10. The State Department should enter into additional bilateral shipboarding agreements that also help to meet the tagging, tracking, and locating requirements of the Intelligence Community and its users.

11. The DNI should ensure that Customs and Border Protection has the most up-to-date terrorism and proliferation intelligence. In turn, Customs and Border Protection should ensure that the National Counterterrorism Center and National Counter Proliferation Center have real-time access to its databases.

12. The DNI and Secretary of Homeland Security should undertake a research and development program to develop better sensors capable of detecting nuclear-related materials. The effort should be part of a larger border defense initiative to foster greater intelligence support to law enforcement at our nation's borders.

13. *This recommendation is classified.*

14. *This recommendation is classified.*

15. The President should expand the scope of Executive Order 13224 beyond terrorism to enable the Department of the Treasury to block the assets of persons and entities who provide financial support to proliferation.

16. The President should seek to have Congress amend Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act in order to give the Department of the Treasury the authority to designate foreign business entities involved in proliferation as “primary money laundering concerns.”

