[Presidential Decision Directives - PDD]
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release May 5, 1994
PRESS BRIEFING BY
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TONY LAKE
AND DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY GENERAL WESLEY CLARK
The Briefing Room
3:12 P.M. EDT
MS. MYERS: One quick announcement. At 4:00 p.m. we'll
do a backgrounder on the Roosevelt Room on the subpoena which you are
all aware of. We'll make arrangements for that when this is over.
First, we will hear from Tony Lake, whom you all know as
the National Security Advisor; and Lieutenant General Wesley Clark,
who is the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. They will make opening statements, which will be
for sound and camera, and then five minutes of questions for sound
and camera. Then, the cameras will be shut off, but the entire
briefing will be ON THE RECORD.
MR. LAKE: Thank you, Dee Dee. This week, President
Clinton signed the first comprehensive U.S. policy on multilateral
peace operations suited to the post-Cold War era. This policy has
the full support of the entire administration. It benefited very
greatly from the work that had been done in the previous
administration on this issue and from very detailed consultations in
the Congress with dozens of key legislators. In fact, in drafting
the final policy, we incorporated many very useful contributions by
members of Congress.
The central conclusion of the study is that properly
conceived and well-executed, peacekeeping can be a very important and
useful tool of American foreign policy. Our purpose is to use
peacekeeping selectively and more effectively than has been done in
The post-Cold War era is, as we see every day, a very
dangerous time. Its defining characteristic is that conflicts in
this era take place now more within societies within nations than
among them. And this makes it a particularly difficult time, both
conceptually and practically, for us all in the international
community to come to grips with questions of when and how and where
will use force.
Some of these internal conflicts challenge our
interests, and some of them do not. But the cumulative effect of all
of these internal conflicts around the world is significant. We have
all, over the last year, you and I and the others in the
administration, spent a great deal of time working on various
conflicts of this kind, whether in Somalia, or Rwanda, or Haiti, or
Bosnia or elsewhere.
The further problem here is that these kinds of
conflicts are particularly hard to come to grips with and to have an
effect on from outside because, basically, of course, their origins
are in political turmoil within these nations. And that political
turmoil may not be susceptible to the efforts of the international
community. So, neither we nor the international community have
either the mandate, nor the resources, nor the possibility of
resolving every conflict of this kind.
When I wake up every morning and look at the headlines
and the stories and the images on television of these conflicts, I
want to work to end every conflict. I want to work to save every
child out there. And I know the President does, and I know the
American people do.
But neither we nor the international community have the
resources nor the mandate to do so. So we have to make distinctions.
We have to ask hard questions about where and when we can intervene.
And the reality is that we cannot often solve other people's
problems; we can never build their nations for them.
So the policy review is intended to help us make those
hard choices about where and when the international community can get
involved; where and when we can take part with the international
community in getting involved; and where and when we can make, thus,
a positive difference.
Let me emphasize again that, even when we do take
action, the primary responsibility for peace rests with the people
and the parties to the conflict. What the international community
can do is to offer a kind of a breathing space for the people
involved to make and preserve their own peace.
That's the principle, for example, that we have employed
in recent months in Somalia. And we continue to urge the Somali
people to take advantage of the breathing space that we helped
provide for them, and to seize this opportunity to resolve their
differences peacefully. While we are hopeful, and there are hopeful
signs that they can do so, there are also disturbing signs in Somalia
in recent weeks, and we do not know what the outcome will be. But we
did our job, we believe, in providing that breathing space, and we
believe that the more than 15,000 U.N. personnel there are doing
So we must be selective, as I have just said, and we
must also be more effective. The U.S. is committed to strengthening
U.N. peacekeeping capabilities, because effective peacekeeping serves
both American and the world's collective interests. It can produce
conflict resolution and prevention, as on the Golan or in El
Salvador; it can promote democracy as it has in Namibia and in
Cambodia and, again, in El Salvador; and it can serve our economic
interests as well, as for example in the Persian Gulf.
And peacekeeping is burden-sharing, which is certainly
in our interests. We pay less than one-third of the costs of the
U.N. troops and U.N. operations, and less than one percent of U.N.
troops in the field are, in fact, American.
While there are limits to peacekeeping, and even set-
backs, as we have seen in Rwanda in recent days, we have to be
careful never to overlook the impressive successes and the personal
courage that has been shown and is being shown today by U.N.
peacekeepers around the world.
Since 1948, over 650,000 men and women from all over the
world have served in U.N. missions, and over 1,000 have given their
lives. For example, some 200 in Southern Lebanon, over 70 in Bosnia,
100 in Somalia, over 150 in Cyprus. In Cambodia, Bulgarians and
Japanese and Chinese and Bangladeshis and others were victims of the
Khmer Rouge when they attacked the U.N. peacekeepers trying to
oversee the elections there and make them possible. There were
stories that I'm sure some of you recall of villagers stuffing
messages into the ballot boxes in Cambodia, thanking the U.N.
peacekeepers for what they were doing and imploring them to stay on.
In the Bosnian town of Bakovici, some of you may
remember that there were 100 patients in a mental hospital that were
trapped there without heat or electricity over the winter, and U.N.
peacekeepers were going in, back and forth, bringing in supplies to
the mental hospital across the lines and getting fired at from both
My point is that it is easy for all of us, when there is
a setback, to dismiss the U.N. and the peackeepers as a whole, and we
must not do it because it does a disservice to the courage that they
are showing today and to the sacrifices they have made in the past.
Even so, because the needs for peacekeeping have outrun the resources
for peacekeeping, it's important that we ask the tough questions
about when and where we will support or participate in such
operations. And we are the first government, I believe, and this is
the first time in the history of the U.S. government, I believe, that
we have cared and dared enough to do so and to ask those questions.
Peacekeeping is a part of our national security policy,
but it is not the centerpiece. The primary purpose of our military
forces is to fight and win wars. As in our bottom-up review, to
fight and win two major regional contingencies nearly simultaneously,
and to do so unilaterally when necessary.
If peacekeeping operations ever conflicted with our
ability to carry out those operations, we would pull out of the peace
operations to serve our primary military purposes. But we will, as
the President has said many times, seek collective rather than
unilateral solutions to regional and intrastate conflicts that don't
touch our core national interests. And we'll choose between
unilateral and collective approaches between the U.N. or other
coalitions depending on what works best and what best serves American
The policy review address six major issues. First,
ensuring that we support the right operations; second, that we reduce
the cost of peacekeeping operations; third, that we improve U.N.
peacekeeping capabilities; fourth, that we ensure effective command
and control of American forces; fifth, that we improve the way the
American government manages the issue of peacekeeping; and, sixth, to
enhance the cooperation between the Congress and the Executive
Let me say just a word about each. First, ensuring that
we support or participate only in the right types of peacekeeping
operations. Not all such operations obviously make sense. We, as I
said, I believe, are the first nation to ask the tough questions now
at the U.N. before committing to costly new peacekeeping operations.
The President said that we would do so in his General Assembly speech
last fall, and we are, indeed, doing just that.
We've developed two sets of questions in the study to
determine when the United States first should vote for such
operations, and, secondly, when we should participate in them. In
the unclassified document we've handed out, we have a complete list
of those questions. They include such questions as: Does the
mission advance American interests? Is there a threat to
international peace and security? Does it have a very clear mandate?
does it have clear objectives? and, Are the forces and the funds
actually available for such an operation?
Secondly, we believe that we have to reduce the
peacekeeping costs both to the United States and for the United
Nations. Peacekeeping simply costs too much right now. It can be a
very good investment for us, but it can be an even better investment
if it were less costly. So, first, we are working to reduce the
American costs here. As the President has said, we are committed to
reducing our peacekeeping assessment to 25 percent by January, 1996,
and we believe that other newly rich countries should pay their fair
And, secondly, we all save when the costs of U.N.
peacekeeping operations are reduced generally. And we proposed in
the study, have proposed already in a number of cases, numerous
finance and budget management reforms to make U.N. peacekeeping
operations more efficient and cost-effective. For example, we would
like to see a unified U.N. peacekeeping budget, we would like to see
better procurement procedures, and as a top priority and something we
are working on right now, we would like to see a wholly independent
office of an inspector general with oversight over peacekeeping.
Third, we think we have to improve the U.N.'s
peacekeeping capabilities, and we are committed to doing this. So
we're going to work with the U.N. and member states on steps to
improve the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and its field
missions. For example, enhancing planning, logistics, procurement,
command and control, public affairs, intelligence, civilian police
capabilities. And we will lead an effort in the U.N. to try to
redeploy resources within the U.N. system to fund these reforms.
Fourth -- and this is tremendously important -- we have
to ensure that there is effective command and control of American
forces when they are engaged in peacekeeping operations. And I will
ask General Wes Clark to address this for a moment.
GENERAL CLARK: There has been a great deal of
discussion on the issue of command and control, and so let me begin
by laying out the definitions that are relevant here. First of all,
by command what we're speaking of is the constitutional authority to
establish and deploy forces: issue orders, separate and move units,
resupply, provide medical support, discipline. The President will
never relinquish command of United States forces; that is inviolable.
Operational control is a subset of command. Operational
control can be given for a specific time frame, for a specific
mission in a particular location. Operational control may be the
assignment of tasks to already-deployed forces led by U.S. officers.
We may place the U.S. forces under the operational control of foreign
commanders. That's the distinction that's in this peace operations
Now the involvement with foreign commanders, I would
tell you is nothing new. In fact, that's the news of this document,
is that from the perspective of command and control, there is nothing
new. In World War I, World War II, throughout our experience with
NATO, in operation Desert Storm, we've always had the ability to task
organize and place some U.S. units under foreign operational control,
if it was advantageous to do so.
This PDD policy preserves our option to do that. We
will be able to place U.S. forces under foreign op con when it's
prudent or tactically advantageous. I would tell you that as we look
at it, the greater the U.S. military role, the more likely that the
operations involved entail combat, then the less likely we are to
place those forces under foreign operational control.
Even were we to do so, fundamental elements would still
apply. The chain of command will be inviolate. All of our
commanders will have the capability to report to higher U.S.
authority. They'll report illegal orders or orders outside the
mandate that they've been authorized to perform to higher U.S.
authority if they can't work those out with the foreign commander on
Of course, the President retains the authority to
terminate participation at any time to protect our forces. There's
no intent in this language to subvert an operational chain of
command. What we're trying to do is achieve the best balance between
cohesive, trained, well established U.S. chains of command, and unity
of command in an operation involving foreign forces in a coalition or
some other grouping.
So that's the intent behind this. And as I say, it is
no change from the way we've operated in the past. I would also tell
you that our military has played a major role in defining the command
and control aspects of this PDD. It's been thoroughly vetted in the
Joint Chiefs of Staff system. It's been reviewed and approved by the
Chiefs of Staff of our services, and by the commanders and chiefs of
our forces overseas.
MR. LAKE: Not done. More to come. I have not bored
you into submission yet. (Laughter.)
We've done four, we have two to go.
Also, we think it is important that we improve the
American government's management of peacekeeping. We think that
because peacekeeping -- as we have seen, is both important and
complex and dangerous -- that the perspective of our military and
defense leaders should be brought more to bear in it. So we
concluded that the Department of Defense should join State in the
State Department in assuming both policy and financial responsibility
for appropriate peace operations -- what we call shared
You will not be surprised to know that each was more
anxious for the policy responsibility than the financial
responsibility, but it has been worked out, we think, very well.
The State Department will both manage and pay for
traditional, non-combat peacekeeping operations, i.e., under Chapter
Six of the charter -- when there are not American combat units
involved, and this represents, by far, the greatest number of such
The Defense Department will manage and pay for all peace
enforcement operations under Chapter Seven of the charter. For
example, in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Kuwait now, and those
traditional peacekeeping operations under Chapter Six in which there
are American combat units.
We believe that this shared responsibility will not only
mean better management, but will help us to solve the long-term
funding problem that we face in peacekeeping. We still have an
immediate arrears problem in our peacekeeping debts, and without new
funding, the American arrearage will be over $1 billion by the end of
this fiscal year, the end of September. And the President is very
committed to paying off this debt, and he and we are working very
closely with the Congress now to devise means for doing so.
And, finally, in the study, we have worked to recognize
the need to improve the relationships and the consultations between
the Executive Branch and the Congress on peacekeeping operations.
And we're going to take a number of steps to improve the information
flow between the administration and the Congress on these issues.
In short, the policy is designed to impose more
discipline on the U.N. and on ourselves so that peacekeeping will be
a more effective collective security tool for American foreign
policy. This is a new era, we are all learning how to come to grips
with the new problems that it presents to us. But there is no doubt
in my mind that peacekeeping offers a very important way of making
sure that today's problems don't become tomorrow's crises, because
those crises will cost us a lot more in the long run than the
peacekeeping does right now.
This is an important -- not the most important, but an
important part of our national security policy, and it is very, very
important that the United Nations and that we get it right, and
that's what this study is about.
Q Is there a big difference now between the policy
you've enunciated and one we've been following? How does it apply to
Bosnia and Haiti?
MR. LAKE: The essence of the policy is what we have
been following since approximately I say last fall, late last summer
when we began to ask the harder questions at the U.N. and to try to
work more closely with the Congress, et cetera. And many of the
reforms that we're talking about at the U.N. in fact are already
underway, as in their having established a situation center which
allows now the U.N. for 24 hours a day to be in touch with its
peacekeeping operations, which is not the case before.
So many of these things we've been doing before. This
pulls it all together, lays it out in more detail, and I think
expresses also a philosophy of doing this that we have been talking
about, but not in as coherent, I think, a fashion before.
Q How would this apply to Haiti vs. Rwanda, let's
say? How do your principles apply in practice? And can you respond
to Bob Dole who made a speech about a half-hour ago, arguing very
forcefully against U.S. military action in Haiti?
MR. LAKE: The question of American military action in
Haiti remains a hypothetical one, and I would prefer not to turn this
into a discussion of that. Let me, though, use Haiti as an example
of one distinction here, because I think there's been some confusion
When the effort was made last fall to send in a training
mission into Haiti, it was not a peace enforcement operation. It was
not an effort to fight our way into Haiti in order to bring peace to
Haiti, it was a U.N. peacekeeping operation designed to train the
Haitian military, which required the consent and, in fact, it had the
request of the Haitian military to go in. And then when they changed
their mind, it was not an invasion for a -- fight its way ashore.
Today we read in the papers of two different kinds, now,
of possibilities before us. One is that same U.N. mission, perhaps
reconfigured in ways to make it relevant to what Haiti could look
like after we make progress towards a political settlement, and the
other to what Haiti could look like after we make progress towards a
political settlement. And the other would be a military action of
some kind to bring about the change in Haiti that would allow then
such a U.N. mission to get on board.
And, as I said, the -- both of them right now are
hypothetical and certainly the option of a forceful move into Haiti
has not been ruled out by the President. But equally, he has not
made a decision to do so.
Q But the question was how does this policy help you
to distinguish between Haiti and Rwanda in terms of U.S. interests?
MR. LAKE: Well, the policy cannot tell you what
American interests are in every situation around the world, or this
would be the Manhattan telephone book. What the policy can do is to
tell you very clearly the kinds of questions -- questions, not the
answers necessarily -- but the questions that we should be asking
ourselves as we consider whether to take part in a U.N. operation, or
indeed, in many ways, whether to act unilaterally. And those
questions are laid out for you in the document that we have handed
out, and they are questions that we are asking ourselves as we think
about the issue, and I have no doubt they are questions that you will
Q How does this help you to draw a distinction
between the command and operational control in a situation such as
you have in Bosnia where a U.N. official on the ground stops the U.N.
and NATO from acting when they wanted bombing support and couldn't
get it? I'd like to have this on camera.
MR. LAKE: Want to try again?
Q Just answer. I'm not worried about the question.
MR. LAKE: What this document refers to is the question
of command and operational control of American forces when they are
under the operational control of a non-American commander. And that
is not the case in Bosnia --
Q We've got NATO forces working for the U.N. --
MR. LAKE: No, the NATO forces do not work for the U.N.,
The NATO forces are acting pursuant to U.N. authorities, but the
chain of both operational control and command of the American forces
involved -- which are our air forces -- are under NATO command, not
U.N. command -- or under NATO operational control and under American
command, and as it happens, the NATO commanders who exercise that
operational control are, for most of the chain of command, Americans.
So that is not a case that applies, in answering your question about
U.N. operational control over American commanders.
Q The U.N. frustrates the use of force in that
MR. LAKE: The U.N.?
Q Frustrated the use force in that situation.
MR. LAKE: Well, we believe that the procedures within
the U.N. in this peacekeeping operation have improved over the last
few months. And I think if you compare the requests for close air
support that were made last February and March, it took a lot longer
for the U.N. to decide than it has recently.
There was a case in Gorazde, and there have been some
tactical cases -- one or two since -- in which NATO said, we are
prepared to act, and the U.N. said, the local U.N. officials said for
their own reasons, and they could be good or bad -- we disagreed in
one case -- that it would better not to use the NATO air strikes now.
As you will recall, then Boutros-Ghali, Secretary
General Boutros-Ghali made a statement saying that if the Bosnian
Serbs were to violate in significant ways the Gorazde or other U.N.
zones, that he would call for the air strikes. And you may also
recall that if there is a disagreement now at the local level, then
that disagreement can be kicked up the chain of command until higher
authorities can resolve it.
So we believe that this will not be a major problem in
the future, even when there may be a tactical disagreement.
Q Could you please tell me, as you mentioned only one
percent of --
MR. LAKE: Did you have anything else?
Q No, I think that's all.
Q in general as well, only one percent of
Americans now serve as peacekeepers.
MR. LAKE: Well, one percent of peacekeepers that are
Q peacekeepers are now Americans. Is that likely
to increase as a result of the PDD?
MR. LAKE: Let me first make another distinction,
because, in fact, if you look not at the U.N. peacekeeping operations
per se, but at a range of operations around the world that are
pursuant to U.N. resolutions, then you have some 65,000,
I believe --is that right -- 69,000 -- okay. They've got uniforms.
Anyway, between 65,000 and 69,000 Americans serving in such
operations and provide comfort or -- around the world.
So there's already a significant number of -- in
Korea -- Americans doing this. As a result of the study, I can
honestly not give you an answer to that, because I think it depends
on the operations, on frankly how we do financially in gaining the
resources from the Congress for such operations, which the President
feels very strongly about, and in whether the kinds of conflicts we
look at over the coming years fit or do not fit the kind of criteria
that we lay out here.
This study is not a crystal ball, it is a roadmap. It
tells you how to think about these issues so that you know how we, as
we release this now, are thinking and what the criteria are that
we'll be using, and I think that's a significant contribution.
Q If, indeed, you have laid out these new criteria
for when the United States will approve the peacekeeping operations,
could you just tell us of the 18 existing peacekeeping operations
which, if any of them, would currently qualify under this new U.S.
MR. LAKE: I think that most of them certainly do. One
of the -- and I don't want to decide from here which do and which
Q Please do, because it's very germane.
MR. LAKE: What we have been doing -- what we have been
doing is to say that -- this is not the intellectual climate -- what
we have been doing is to say that in new peacekeeping operations or
when existing peacekeeping operations are rolled over that we want to
see some sort of sunset provisions in them. What we are saying is
that we want to have either terminal points or --
Q What have you done? (Laughter.)
MR. LAKE: -- listen, we'll do anything to keep you
alert -- (laughter) -- terminal points or clear criteria for how to
decide in the terms of that mention when its end point has been
reached. And in terms of taking a hard look at them, there are a
number of cases already, for example, in which a hard look has led to
a change in how the operation will be continued, for example, in
Mozambique when we said, okay, if you want to increase the police
component in the Mozambique peacekeeping operation, then to keep in
the same general financial parameters you have to reduce the military
So I think it'll tend to be specific to each operation.
The important thing is that in the terms of each operation in
reflecting these questions that we have before we go in or before we
sign up for an extension, that we know when it will end or how we
will know that it has ended. And we could go over each one and
discuss those different ones.
Q I wanted to ask about the financial aspect of it.
You talked about moving the budgeting under both departments. Is
there some thought that you'll have an easier time getting money if
it's called Defense money than State Department money? Is that what
MR. LAKE: No, this was not designed to find easier ways
on the Hill, because both kinds of money are pretty hard to come by
now. It is designed to have a more rational system, both of managing
and funding these operations. It's going to take hard work on the
Hill, and one of the reasons why the President called in
congressional leadership a couple of weeks ago was to talk
specifically about the importance to American foreign policy,
providing the resources not only for the defense budget generally in
which he has fought hard, but on peacekeeping specifically.
Q Do you have any figures on how much of a shift is
involved here? How much additional money would the Defense
Department need into their budget to carry out peacekeeping
operations that they do not now have to carry out?
MR. LAKE: Probably run on the order of more than $500
million a year.
Q What's your response to Republicans who, in fact,
say that you're using the Defense Department as -- you're reducing
defense spending to shift what amounts to State Department spending
into the defense budget -- this is a charge being made by Dole,
Gingrich, others, that this is a suspicious ploy by the White House
to make it look like you really have a decent defense budget when
you're gutting true defense to put in mushy peacekeeping --
MR. LAKE: Not exactly the way I was putting it. Well,
I think he's wrong. What this will do in the out years is to have up
front the creation of a so-called "CIPA," for the Defense Department
into which peacekeeping money will go. Everybody will know what it
is, it will be appropriated by the Congress. In fact, it will be a
better way of not slipping money around.
Let me state to you absolutely, clearly, that the
President of the United States has said that one of his top
priorities as he fights for no further cuts in the defense budget is
to preserve the readiness of our forces. And we will not repeat the
mistakes of the 1970s and do anything that will lead to a hollow
army. That would be a tremendous mistake.
Let me recall for you what I said in my statement, which
is that the central mission of our Armed Forces is to be prepared and
able to fight and win wars, and to fight them and win them
unilaterally when our direct interests are challenged and that is
required; and we are not going to do anything to change that.
Q Were you saying in response to Bill's question that
the latest directive really doesn't apply in the case of Bosnia, that
-- because of the altered chain of command?
MR. LAKE: No, no, I was saying not at all that it
doesn't apply to Bosnia, of course it does. It applies to all
current and potential peacekeeping operations. What I was saying was
that it didn't give an answer to the specific question of the command
relationship or the relationship between NATO and the U.N. in Bosnia,
which is a much larger question than the one addressed here of
whether Americans participate or we support these things.
Q Given that, and given what I suppose you might
argue, but the limited success of the peacekeeping operation in
Bosnia, would you ask for changes?
MR. LAKE: In their command and control structures,
Q In the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia in general,
to reflect the new directive.
MR. LAKE: Well, we have been pleased, for example,
because Bosnia was one of the cases, Somalia was another, where it
bothered us that before they had the 24-hour situation center, that
there were literally times when the local people could not reach the
U.N. in New York because nobody was answering the phone.
Now, the phones are answered. We think that has been an
improvement. If you look at the -- and it was a serious problem
because they needed the authorities from New York often to act. If
you look at the behavior of UNPROFOR forces on the ground now, you
will see, I believe, a more vigorous pattern of action than we --
we're seeing if you compare it, for example, with a year ago. A
Danish unit was attacked by Bosnian Serb gunners a few days ago, and
the Danish tanks responded very vigorously, inflicted casualties on
the Bosnian Serbs, acquitted themselves well, and protected
themselves. And they -- all U.N. peacekeepers, whether under Chapter
6 or Chapter 7, have the right of self-defense, and they exercised
Q Could I please follow? Are you saying, then, that
the limited effectiveness of the operation in Bosnia should be judged
as changing now because of the actions of past few days or weeks,
MR. LAKE: I'm sorry, I don't understand.
Q The Serbs have run amok in that country. Are you
saying that now we should judge it on the basis of the Danish
peacekeepers having fought back over the past few days or weeks?
MR. LAKE: I'll make this brief, because you've heard me
on this subject before. I would ask you to compare the situation on
the ground in Bosnia today and the situation on the ground in Bosnia
five months ago. And if you look at the situation around Sarajevo,
around Mostar, around Tuzla, around Maglaj, it is far better than it
was then. That is a fact. There are, as the President said the
other day, there are people alive today in Sarajevo, in Mostar, in
Maglaj and elsewhere, who would not be alive today if the situation
had not improved. And it improved because the President and the
United States pushed and led NATO into taking actions that it had not
previously taken, never before in its history, to push for those
Is it all the improvements that we would like? No. But
it is progress. And that progress on the ground, we hope, in a very
-- still a very uncertain, unsettled and dangerous situation. But
that progress on the ground, we hope, can then lead to progress in
diplomacy, which can finally bring a settlement to this terrible
Q Can I ask you a question about the case in
Singapore? The President said on three separate occasions that he
didn't want to see that kid caned. And, yet, when Singapore went
ahead and did it, the response from the State Department was to
express disappointment. Why the lack of a more robust response to
what amounts to a rebuff to the President, or is another shoe going
to fall here?
MR. LAKE: I'll work hard on the connection to
peacekeeping here but -- in any case, I think the State Department
addressed that. They went, I believe, beyond the issuance of a
Q Can you tell me the circumstances under which
American troops would be under this plan in combat under foreign
MR. LAKE: Never under foreign commanders. I can
foresee possibilities, certainly, into which they are under foreign
operational control. That may sound like a shocking statement, but
in fact that has happened repeatedly in Desert Storm, in Korea, World
War II, World War I; and indeed, I'm told, that at Yorktown,
Americans were under the operational control of French commanders;
and right now in Macedonia with the Nordics, so --
MS. MYERS: We have to go, so thank you.
MR. LAKE: Thanks very much.
THE PRESS: Thank you.
END3:55 P.M. EDT