PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-66

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO
THE UNITED NATIONS
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
POLICY
DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: U.S. Nuclear Posture and Policy on Further
Reductions in Nuclear Forces in START III (U)

I. PURPOSE

This Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) establishes
principles and objectives for nuclear arms control with Russia
and provides guidance for the negotiation of further reductions
in strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces in or related to
START III. (U)

II. BACKGROUND

In Presidential Decision Directives 3, 11, 15, 17, 20, 30, 37,
47 and 60, I directed changes in U.S. nuclear posture and
policies commensurate with a diminished threat of nuclear war
and established a policy to build a new relationship with Russia
that includes adapting the nuclear forces of both sides to the
changed international security environment. (U)
In the March 21, 1997 Helsinki Joint Statement (HJS) on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces, President Yeltsin and I agreed on the basic components of START III, including: establishment of aggregate levels of 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads; measures relating to the transparency and destruction of strategic nuclear warheads; the goal of making START I and II unlimited in duration; and early deactivation of systems to be eliminated under START II. President Yeltsin and I also agreed in the HJS that, in the context of START III negotiations, experts will explore, as separate issues, possible measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems, to include appropriate confidence-building measures, and to consider issues related to transparency in nuclear materials.

(U)

III. U.S. NUCLEAR POSTURE AND POLICY ON FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR FORCES

A. U.S. Nuclear Posture

Although nuclear weapons play a smaller role today in our national security and defense policy and posture than at any point during the second half of the 20th century, nuclear weapons will remain an integral part of the international security picture for the foreseeable future. In my 1997 National Security Strategy, I set forth how nuclear forces serve U.S. objectives:

"...Our nuclear deterrent is one of the most visible and important examples of how U.S. military capabilities can be used effectively to deter aggression and coercion. Nuclear weapons serve as a hedge against an uncertain future, a guarantee of our security commitments to allies and a disincentive to those who would contemplate developing or otherwise acquiring their own nuclear weapons. In this context, the United States must continue to maintain a robust triad of strategic forces sufficient to deter any hostile foreign leadership with access to nuclear forces and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile."

(U)

In PDD-60, I further stated that:

"...U.S. nuclear forces protect both the U.S. and our allies by deterring massive and limited nuclear attacks, and by
contributing to deterring major conventional aggression and attacks employing chemical and biological weapons.”

In this context, and consistent with the HJS, the United States is committed to seeking further reductions in and constraints on both strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces, consistent with the principles and objective established below. The United States will not, however, begin formal negotiations on START III until START II is ratified in Russia, although experts consultations will be conducted to continue our dialogue on nuclear issues and prepare for prompt negotiations. Furthermore, the United States will remain essentially at START I levels until the START II Treaty enters into force. (U)

B. Principles to Guide Reductions

Building on the principles I established in PDD-37, the following principles will guide further reductions in nuclear forces:

1. Deterrence. The United States will maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size, survivability and capability to support broad U.S. foreign policy objectives including Alliance needs and fully implement U.S. nuclear weapons employment policies.

2. Stability. Arms control commitments should preserve and, if possible, enhance the crisis stability that will be achieved at the end of the START II draw-down period and seek greater predictability through transparency measures and appropriate constraints.

3. Equivalence. Mindful of the sides' differing practices and national security needs, large disparities in force capability and infrastructure that represent an imbalance between U.S. and Russian capabilities must be addressed, as they could tempt a potential aggressor. We cannot allow our nuclear capabilities to be perceived as inadequate or inferior.

4. Verification. We must preserve and, if necessary, enhance key verification measures from START I and II and achieve agreement on measures for monitoring key new obligations with confidence sufficient for the United States to achieve its national security objectives.

5. Safety, Security and Proliferation. Russia's large nuclear arsenal and fissile material stockpiles pose a significant risk of weapons or material slipping out of Russian control.
into third party hands. Our best safeguard against this is to seek deep reductions in that arsenal and a further consolidation of their storage sites. We must also work with Russia to ensure that material, technology and expertise do not fall into third party hands. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program's Weapons Protection, Control and Accountability project has a major role to play in helping Russia upgrade the security and accountability of both the residual storage sites and fissile material.

IV. U.S. OBJECTIVES AND IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES

Under reductions below START II levels, the United States will require greater understanding of, and constraints on, Russia's capabilities to rapidly reconstitute its nuclear forces (strategic and non-strategic) and thereby achieve a significant military imbalance. The United States will therefore seek to make rapid and substantive progress in all elements of the framework in the HJS. While the HJS will serve as the basis to begin the negotiations, the outcome in each of these areas must be consistent with the principles in Section III above and with the following U.S. objectives and guidelines. (U)

A. START III Warhead Ceiling

START III will produce further stabilizing and verifiable reductions in strategic nuclear forces. Based on a May 1998 Department of Defense comprehensive review of strategic force requirements and U.S. nuclear weapons employment policies, the United States will pursue the limit on deployed strategic nuclear warheads of 2,000-2,500 agreed at Helsinki. (C)

B. Extension of START I and II

Both START I/II will be made unlimited in duration in START III, as agreed at Helsinki. (C)

C. Non-strategic Nuclear Forces

It is estimated Russia will have to eliminate some 3,200 - 7,200 warheads by the year 2000 to meet its 1991/1992 "Presidential Nuclear Initiatives" (PNI) pledges. Even with the full implementation of the 1991/1992 PNI commitments, Russia's residual NSNF stockpile will greatly exceed U.S. NSNF levels and Russia's legitimate defense needs. The importance of this disparity will grow as strategic nuclear forces are further reduced. Moreover, concerns exist regarding the safety and
security of Russian NSNF. To promote greater transparency of Russia’s NSNF warhead stockpile; reduce the probability of diversion, accident or unauthorized use of Russian NSNF; and reduce the numerical disparity between U.S. and Russian NSNF, the United States will seek to reach an agreement that includes the following basic elements:

- **Codification of PNI.** Reaffirmation of the Bush/Gorbachev/Yeltsin 1991/92 pledges relating to NSNF in a politically binding agreement. The agreement would call for these commitments to be implemented by a date certain.

- **Commitment to reduce NSNF disparities.** Political commitment to eliminate over a reasonable time period the imbalance between the respective U.S. and Russian NSNF postures.

- **Data and transparency.** Each side would be required to include NSNF warheads in a regime requiring a comprehensive data exchange with confirmatory inspections as described in Section IV(D); moreover, NSNF warheads that were eliminated under the “freedom to mix” provision described in Section IV(D) would be subject to the same procedures for monitored dismantlement and storage as those for strategic warheads.

**D. Warheads and Related Fissile Material**

Substantial disparities exist between U.S. and Russian total warhead and fissile material stockpiles and their associated production infrastructure, exacerbated by large uncertainties in these areas. To reduce our uncertainties regarding the size and composition of Russian nuclear forces and asymmetries between Russian nuclear warhead production and the size of its reduced nuclear forces; encourage tighter control on the location and handling of excess nuclear weapons and material; and make progress towards the goal of promoting “irreversibility” by validating concepts for monitored warhead dismantlement and storage that might be used in future arms control treaties, the United States will seek to reach an agreement that includes the following basic elements:

- **Data and transparency.** This will include a comprehensive data exchange and the right to conduct a limited number of confirmatory inspections at any location where nuclear warheads are stored or produced adequate to reduce the uncertainty about the size and composition of Russian nuclear

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*Note: The text is slightly altered to maintain readability and coherence.*
forces. The regime need not require excessively intrusive elements such as Perimeter Portal Continuous Monitoring.

- Monitored dismantlement and storage. Elimination of a significant number of warheads (in the range of 500-1,000) with a "freedom to mix" provision (i.e., with respect to warheads subject to monitored dismantlement, each side will be free to choose any strategic or non-strategic warhead from its stockpile, from deployed or non-deployed delivery vehicles, or from storage sites). Excess fissile material components (not those designated for the strategic reserve) from dismantled warheads will be placed in storage and monitored until pits are handed off to a bilateral or multilateral fissile material control regime and the highly enriched uranium components are transferred for disposition or for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons components. The intrusiveness and impact of the monitoring regime at DOE facilities will need to be minimized so that there is no adverse impact on the annual certification of the stockpile.

- Infrastructure reductions. The United States will vigorously pursue the "Nuclear Cities Initiative" launched during GCC-10 designed to directly address the challenges faced in the Russian nuclear cities and reinforce Russian interest in adjusting the size of their nuclear complex. Building on this initiative, the United States will seek a commitment from Russia to shut down (i.e., close or convert) two or three of the four known MINATOM warhead assembly/disassembly plants by the year 2000.

- No increase commitment. The United States will seek a political commitment not to increase aggregate nuclear stockpiles above declared levels.

- Net New Production. The regime described above should provide increased confidence that net new production is not taking place and that stockpile sizes are decreasing. Assessments relating to net new production and stockpile sizes will be enhanced through the provision of data and confirmatory measures envisioned by this regime.

E. START II Deactivation

Once START II is ratified in Russia, the United States will proceed immediately with negotiations with Russia on a method for completing the deactivation four years early of those strategic nuclear delivery vehicles that will be eliminated
under START II. Conclusion of this agreement will not be linked to START III. In the context of our agreement to extend the deadline for START II eliminations, we will continue to argue for warhead removal as the preferred method for deactivation of systems to be eliminated under START II, as it remains the most verifiable and irreversible method.

V. APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS

- **Negotiations within Strategic Stability Group (SSG) on Arms Control.** Immediately after START II is ratified in Russia, the United States will propose to begin formal negotiations on START III. Initial discussions with the Russians will take place within a small, senior-level group chaired at either the Deputy Secretary or Under Secretary level and reporting directly to the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister.

- **Ad Hoc Group.** As required, the SSG on Arms Control will delegate to an Ad Hoc Group (AHG) issues for study, as well as the negotiation of detailed text. At this point, I do not envision a set-piece negotiation, chartered in Geneva, similar to the Reagan-Bush era Nuclear and Space Talks (though I do not rule it out); rather, the AHG will meet on an “as needed” basis to explore issues and negotiate text.

- **Arms Control IWG.** The Arms Control IWG will continue to review U.S. proposals in these areas based on Russian responses and be prepared to recommend, if necessary, changes in the U.S. position, consistent with the principles and objectives outlined in Section III.