MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
ADMINISTRATOR, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT’S INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
DIRECTOR, WHITE HOUSE MILITARY OFFICE

SUBJECT: Security Awareness and Reporting of Foreign Contacts

While world events during the past several years have diminished the threat to our national security from traditional Cold War era foreign intelligence services, foreign intelligence services
continue to pursue the unauthorized acquisition of classified or otherwise sensitive U.S. Government information and the recruitment of personnel with access to such information. In response, the U.S. Government must continue to protect information and technology, which is considered to be in our national interest, from illegal or unauthorized acquisition.

Responsibility for Security

Each department or agency of the U.S. Government shall:

-- Maintain a formal security and/or counterintelligence awareness program designed to ensure a high level of awareness among its employees of the potential threat to its classified, sensitive and proprietary information from foreign sources, as well as from inadvertent or deliberate disclosures from cleared personnel. This program must include a periodic briefing, or briefing prior to foreign travel, of the threat posed by foreign intelligence services.

-- Provide for the reporting of employee contacts with foreign nationals as hereafter specified.

The nature and extent of this program shall be commensurate with the potential for foreign interest in the classified, sensitive, or technological holdings of the department or agency which are deemed vital to national security interests. The program should be tailored to meet the particular functions of the agency or department and the vulnerability of certain categories of employees who, through either their job function or access to classified or sensitive information or technology, could be the target of exploitation by foreign intelligence services. The program should be designed to ensure that the privacy of employees and their freedom of association are not intruded upon.

Reporting Contacts With Foreign Nationals

Each department or agency shall establish procedures, in consultation with the Department of Justice, which require its employees to report all contacts with individuals of any nationality, either within or outside the scope of the employee's official activities, in which:

-- Illegal or unauthorized access is sought to classified or otherwise sensitive information.

-- The employee is concerned that he/she may be the target of actual or attempted exploitation by a foreign entity.
In implementing this procedure, the security officer or designated official of the department or agency shall review and evaluate the reported information. Any facts or circumstances of a reported contact with a foreign national which appear to:

-- Indicate an attempt, intention, or reasonable potential to obtain unauthorized access to classified, sensitive, or proprietary information or technology, or

-- Indicate the possibility of continued contact with the foreign national for such purposes,

shall be promptly reported by the responsible department or agency to the FBI in the case of employees located in the United States and through the Department of State to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the case of employees located at diplomatic or official establishments abroad. The CIA shall advise the FBI in accordance with existing Memoranda of Agreement governing such matters.

**Diplomatic Establishments, Foreign Affairs and Intelligence Community Agencies**

Nothing in this directive is intended to restrict or modify the Secretary of State’s authority under Section 103 of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 to provide for the security of all U.S. Government operations and personnel abroad falling under the authority of the Chief of Mission. It is also not the intent of this directive to restrict or modify policies established by the Department of State in consultation with other agencies through the Overseas Security Policy Group (OSPG) process.

**Other Intelligence or Investigative Interests**

Nothing in this directive is intended to modify the authority and responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence or the Central Intelligence Agency for counterintelligence abroad, nor does it in any way change existing procedures or agreements between CIA and the Department of State and other U.S. agencies regarding the reporting of foreign contacts outside the U.S. Neither does this directive preclude interagency agreements or directives affecting the relationship between the FBI and other intelligence or investigative agencies regarding their responsibility for personnel, physical, or information security or their territorial jurisdiction.
Revision of NSDD-197

Effective the date of this document, NSDD-197 is hereby rescinded and is superseded by this directive.

William J. Clinton