NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 256

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH NST NEGOTIATING ROUND (S)

The attached instructions provide guidance for the seventh round of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) which begins on January 15, 1987, in Geneva. They provide guidance for the Negotiating Group to use in building on the proposals made during my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland. (S)

Attachments
1. Overall Instructions (S)
2. START Instructions (S)
3. INF Instructions (S)
4. Defense and Space Instructions (S)
E.O. 12356:

TAGS:

SUBJECT: {S} OVERALL INSTRUCTIONS FOR ROUND VII OF US/SOVIET NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

REF: {A} PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO US NEGOTIATORS FOR DECEMBER 2-5 MEETING WITH SOVIET COUNCIL OF MINISTERS; {B} STATE 336325; {C} STATE 330271; {D} STATE 291634

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR US DELEGATION FOR THE SEVENTH ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION BEGINNING ON JANUARY 15, 1987. GUIDANCE FROM PREVIOUS ROUNDS AND SPECIAL DECEMBER MEETING REMAIN IN EFFECT EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW. SPECIFIC GUIDANCE FOR EACH OF THE THREE NEGOTIATING GROUPS IS BEING PROVIDED SEPERATELY.

3. PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES FOR ROUND VII INCLUDE:

   - CONTINUE TO FEE PROMPT AND FORTHRIGHT SOVIET RESPONSES TO NEEDS PROPOSALS AS SUPPORTED IN APPLICABLE INSTRUCTIONS FOR US DELEGATION AND EACH OF THE NEGOTIATING GROUPS AS PRESENTED IN ROUND VI AND AT
DECEMBER LIMITED COMPOSITION MEETINGS: US DELEGATION SHOULD EMPHASIZE, AS APPROPRIATE, THAT OUR PROPOSALS REPRESENT US EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY AREAS OF CONVERGENCE AND REACH AGREEMENT BASED ON REYKJAVIK, TO RESPOND TO EXPRESSED SOVIET CONCERNS, TO LAY OUT OUR ULTIMATE GOAL AND TO IDENTIFY PRACTICAL SHORT-TERM STEPS TO ACHIEVE THOSE OBJECTIVES.

--CONTINUE TO SEEK AGREEMENT TO THE TEXT OF DOCUMENTS REFLECTED IN THE SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO THE THREE NEGOTIATING GROUPS FOR ROUND VII.

--REJECT SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO HOLD PROGRESS IN ONE NEGOTIATING FORUM HOSTAGE TO PROGRESS IN ANOTHER, WHILE, AT THE SAME TIME, MAKING CLEAR THOSE AREAS WHERE, IN THE US VIEW, SUBSTANTIVE INTERRELATIONSHIPS EXIST. IN PARTICULAR, DELEGATION SHOULD CONTINUE TO REBUT SOVIET EFFORTS TO MISCHARACTERIZE THE UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED AT REYKJAVIK, TO LINK PROGRESS IN INF TO PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS, OR TO PORTRAY IT AS AN OBLIGATION TO ARMS CONTROL.

--IN COUNTERING POSSIBLE SOVIET ALLEGIATIONS THAT THE US AGREED TO ELIMINATE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN TEN YEARS AND SOVIET RESISTANCE ON REDUCTION OF THIS ISSUE AS A THRESHOLD MATTER, POINT OUT THAT ACHIEVING 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN START AND SIGNIFICANT INF REDUCTIONS AS AGREED IN REYKJAVIK ARE VITAL FIRST STEPS IN A PROCESS LEADING TO THE ELIMINATION OF OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES AND ARE AREAS WHERE CONSIDERABLE COMMON GROUND EXISTS. THUS, SHOULD BE FOCUS OF CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS.

4. IN ELABORATING ON US PROPOSALS, DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT MEASURES FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION CONFORMING TO THE THREE PRINCIPLES AGREED AT REYKJAVIK MUST BE ADDRESSED AND AGREED CONCURRENTLY WITH NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS.

5. IF SOVIETS RAISE OTHER, NON-INF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, DELEGATION SHOULD REJECT THAT THESE ISSUES SHOULD BE PURSUED IN THE APPROPRIATE FORA, NOT AT INF. IF SOVIETS SPECIFICALLY LINK NUCLEAR TESTING AGAINST INF, DELEGATION SHOULD RESPOND IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF REC.
b. The delegation should continue to emphasize the need for compliance with existing arms control agreements, noting obstacles placed in the path of achieving arms reductions by some noncompliance. The Soviets raise the matter of U.S. exceeding SALT limits. Delegation should underscore that U.S. policy decisions on the SALT I interim agreement and SALT II in large part resulted from Soviet noncompliance with these agreements. The delegation should stress that these agreements are behind us, both as a matter of legal obligation and as a matter of policy commitment. The U.S. has made a standing offer of establishment of a new interim framework of mutual restraint for strategic offensive weapons. Our focus, however, should be on progress in negotiations toward early agreement on radical and stabilizing reductions in the offensive nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union.
SUBJECT: {S} INSTRUCTIONS FOR START NEGOTIATING GROUP

REFERENCES: {A} 86 STATE 33024; {B} 86 STATE 25830; {C} 86 STATE 138816; {D} 86 STATE 60973; {E} 86 STATE 2554; {F} 85 STATE 288129; {G} 86 STATE 162424; {H} 85 STATE 72604

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT

2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR ROUND VII. EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW, PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS REMAIN UNCHANGED.

3. OVERALL OBJECTIVE. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP'S OBJECTIVE REMAINS AN EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE, AND STABILIZING AGREEMENT DEEPLY REDUCING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP'S CHIEF OBJECTIVE FOR ROUND VII IS TO SEEK AGREEMENT TO A BASIC FRAMEWORK, INCLUDING NUMERICAL SUBLIMITS. TO AID THAT PROCESS, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD SEEK SOVIET AGREEMENT IN ROUND VII TO KEY ELEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT FOR REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AS DETAILED BELOW, BASED ON THE AREAS MUTUALLY AGREED TO DURING THE REYKJAVIK MEETING AND THE ADDITIONAL U.S. ELEMENTS TABLED DURING ROUND VI.
4. KEY ELEMENTS OF AGREEMENT. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP IS AUTHORIZED TO TABLE EARLIER IN ROUND II THE FOLLOWING U.S. PROPOSAL FOR KEY ELEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT:

BEGIN TEXT OF KEY ELEMENTS:

KEY ELEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT FOR REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

REDUCTIONS

THE SIDES SHALL REDUCE THEIR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS FOLLOWS:

1600 SNDVs/COMPOSITION OF FORCES

-- THE SIDES SHALL REDUCE THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF DEPLOYED ICBMS, DEPLOYED SHS AND HEAVY BOMBERS TO A LEVEL NOT TO EXCEED 1600. THERE SHALL BE CONSTRAINTS ON NON-DEPLOYED ICBMS AND ICBM.

6000 WARHEADS

-- THE SIDES SHALL REDUCE THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON DEPLOYED ICBMS, DEPLOYED SHS, AND HEAVY BOMBERS TO A LEVEL NOT TO EXCEED 6000. FOR THE PURPOSES OF COUNTING WARHEADS PURSuant TO THIS LIMIT, EACH HEAVY BOMBER CARRYING GRAVITY BOMBS OR SHORT-RANGE ATTACK MISSILES SHALL COUNT AS ONE WARHEAD AND EACH LONG-RANGE ALCM CARRIED BY A HEAVY BOMBER SHALL COUNT AS ONE WARHEAD.

SUBLIMITS

-- THERE SHALL BE SUBLIMITS NOT TO EXCEED 4800 BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS, 3300 ICBM WARHEADS, AND 1650 WARHEADS ON PERMITTED ICBMS, EXCEPT THOSE ON SILO-BASED LIGHT AND MEDIUM ICBMS WITH SIX OR FEWER WARHEADS.

MOBILE ICBMS

-- MOBILE ICBMS SHALL BE BANNED.

THROW-WEIGHT REDUCTIONS

-- STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT SHALL BE REDUCED BY 50 PERCENT FROM THE HIGHEST OF THE TWO SIDES'
LEVELS. THIS THROW-WEIGHT REDUCTION SHALL BE CODIFIED THROUGH DIRECT OR INDIRECT LIMITS.

VERIFICATION

--- THE SIDES IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATING A TREATY TO CODIFY THE ABOVE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS SHALL CONCURRENTLY NEGOTIATE MEASURES WHICH PERMIT EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED. SPECIFIC VERIFICATION MEASURES SHALL INCLUDE, INTER ALIA:

{1} AN EXCHANGE OF COMPREHENSIVE AND ACCURATE DATA, BOTH PRIOR TO REDUCTIONS AND THEREAFTER;
{2} ON-SITE OBSERVATION OF ELIMINATION DOWN TO AGREED LEVELS;
{3} EFFECTIVE MONITORING OF THE REMAINING INVENTORIES AND ASSOCIATED FACILITIES, INCLUDING ON-SITE INSPECTION, AND;
{4} NON-INTERFERENCE WITH LOCAL AND OTHER AGREED MEASURES.

SCHEDULE OF REDUCTIONS

--- THESE REDUCTIONS WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN A PHASED MANNER AND COMPLETED BY THE END OF 1986.

SLCMS

--- THE SIDES SHALL FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF LIMITING THE DEPLOYMENT OF LONG-RANGE, NUCLEAR-ARMED SLCMS. WHEN SUCH A SOLUTION IS FOUND, IT WILL NOT INVOLVE COUNTERING LONG-RANGE, NUCLEAR-ARMED SLCMS WITHIN THE 6000 WARHEAD AND 1600 SNDV LIMITS.

END TEXT OF KEY ELEMENTS.

NEGOTIATOR SHOULD THUS POSTPONE DEFERRING A DECISION ON THE U.S. SUBLIMITS UNTIL THE UNITED STATES AGREE TO ACCEPT THE U.S. SUBLIMITS, WHICH TOGETHER WITH 1,500 NSWS AND 3,000 WARHEADS, WOULD GIVE A NUMERICAL FRAMEWORK ON WHICH A FINAL AGREEMENT SHOULD BE REACHED.


THUS, THE U.S. PROPOSALS SHOULD BE VIGOROUSLY REJECTED AND THE SOVIET PROPOSALS SHOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED.

THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A 50-PERCENT REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF SUBLIMTS DOES NOT ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF TOTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE AND ICBM WARHEADS. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR 1650 SUBLIMTS, HOWEVER, IT DOES NOT ADDRESS THE U.S. CONCERNS REPRESENTED IN THE THIRD U.S. PROPOSED SUBLIMTS.

THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A 50-PERCENT REDUCTION IN HEAVY ICBMS THEREFORE CANNOT SUBSTITUTE FOR THE THREE U.S. PROPOSED SUBLIMTS.

HEAVY ICBMS MODERNIZATION TESTS AND DEPLOYMENTS OF HEAVY ICBMS AS WELL AS TESTS OF HEAVY ICBMS ARE WELCOME AND COULD BE USED TO IMPLEMENT THE U.S. PROPOSAL.
8. STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS IN SECOND FIVE YEARS. IF 
THE SOVIETS RAISE THIS ISSUE, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP 
SHOULD STATE THAT THE START GROUP SHOULD GIVE THE HIGHEST 
PRIORITY TO THE ELIMINATION OF ALL OFFENSIVE 
BALLISTIC MISSILES BY 1986. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD 
STATE THAT THE START GROUP SHOULD GIVE THE HIGHEST 
PRIORITY TO THE ELIMINATION OF OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES -- THAT 
IS, THE REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO 6000 
WARHEADS ON 3600 SMDVs IN THE FIRST FIVE YEARS WHICH IS 
an area where considerable common ground exists.

9. MOBILE ICBMS. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD AVOID 
DISCUSSING RECENT U.S. DECISIONS CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF 
THE U.S. LAND-BASED MISSILE FORCES EXCEPT TO STATE THAT 
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT STILL PROPOSES A BAN ON MOBILE ICBMS 
DUE TO VERIFICATION DIFFICULTIES AND THE MILITARY 
IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH DIFFICULTIES. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP 
SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS OUR WILLINGNESS TO 
LISTEN TO THEIR PROPOSALS ON MOBILE ICBM VERIFICATION 
WHILE NOTING THAT THEIR PROPOSALS TO DATE HAVE BEEN 
INADEQUATE. UNTIL AGREEMENT ON OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS IS 
REACHED AND IMPLEMENTED, THE U.S. IS FREE TO DEVELOP AND 
DEPLOY ICBMS IN MOBILE BASED MODES.

10. START VERIFICATION REGIME. THE U.S. NEGOTIATOR 
MAY, AT HIS DISCRETION, ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF THE START 
VERIFICATION REGIME. RECALLING THE VERIFICATION 
PRINCIPLES AGREED AT RYJIKOV, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP 
SHOULD NOTE THAT THESE ELEMENTS ARE ALSO RELEVANT TO 
START AND PRESENT AS ELEMENTS OF A 
VERIFICATION REGIME FOR START (FYI: THESE ELEMENTS ARE 
NOT NECESSARILY INCLUSIVE OF ALL VERIFICATION PROVISIONS 
A START AGREEMENT WOULD REQUIRE):

   -- AN EXCHANGE OF COMPREHENSIVE AND ACCURATE DATA BOTH 
     PRIOR TO REDUCTIONS AND THEREAFTER;
   -- ON-SITE OBSERVATION OF ELIMINATION DOWN TO AGREED 
     LEVELS (NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD PROBE FOR RATIONALE FOR 
     THE EXCLUSION OF THIS ELEMENT FROM THE SOVIET NOVEMBER 7 
     PROPOSALS);
   -- EFFECTIVE MONITORING OF REMAINING INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
     ASSOCIATED FACILITIES, INCLUDING MULTIPLE INSPECTION;
   -- INTERFERENCE WITH AGREED MEASURES OR WITH NATIONAL 
     TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION WILL BE PROHIBITED, AS 
     WILL CONCEALMENT MEANS WHICH IMPED COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT;
-- THE ENCRYPTION OF TELEMETRY ON SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO THE
PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT WILL BE INOFTEN; AND,
-- ON BOARD ENGINEERING TEST MEASUREMENTS SHALL BE MADE
AND ALL SUCH MEASUREMENTS SHALL BE BROADCAST USING
UNENCRYPTED TELEMETRY. DURING EACH TEST FLIGHT OR
TRAINING FLIGHT OF AN ICBM OR SLBM. YY
SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE INF NEGOTIATING GROUP,
ROUND VII

REF: (A) 86 STATE 331883, (B) 86 STATE 336325, (C) 86
STATE 290224, (D) 86 STATE 138683, (E) 86 STATE 054775,
(F) 86 STATE 012553, (G) 86 STATE 059027, (H) 86 NST
GENEVA 10560 (INF 954), (I) PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE LIMITED COMPOSITION MEETINGS 2-5 DEC
1986.

1. SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THERE FOLLOWS GUIDANCE TO THE INF NEGOTIATING GROUP
FOR ROUND VII OF THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS. PREVIOUS

Declassified/Released on 3/22/96
under provisions of E.O. 12358
by J. Saunders, National Security Council

ATTACHMENT 3
UNCLASSIFIED

GUIDANCE ON INF REMAINS UNCHANGED EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BY THESE INSTRUCTIONS.

3. AS BEGUN DURING THE LIMITED COMPOSITION MEETINGS IN DECEMBER 1985, THE DELEGATION SHOULD ATTACH THIS DOCUMENT JOINTLY WITH THE SIDE AREAS OF CONCERN TO THE GROUND BASED ON THE REYKJAVIK OCTOBER 11-12 MEETING AND THE RESULTING GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN REF 12, 13, AND 14. THE DELEGATION SHOULD ALSO IDENTIFY CURRENT AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT INCLUDING BOTH LONG-STANDING ISSUES AND AREAS WHERE SOVIET POSITION NOW VARIES FROM WHAT WE UNDERSTOOD HAD BEEN AGREED IN REYKJAVIK. THE GOAL OF THIS EFFORT SHOULD BE TO IDENTIFY CLEARLY THOSE ELEMENTS OF A FUTURE INF AGREEMENT ON WHICH THERE IS CONVERGENCE BETWEEN THE SIDES AND THOSE REMAINING UNSOLVED ISSUES REQUIRING FURTHER CONSIDERATION.

4. ADDITIONALLY, THE DELEGATION SHOULD PRESS FOR SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON IMPORTANT OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN INF NEGOTIATIONS INCLUDING LINKAGE AND THE U.S. RIGHT TO GLOBAL EQUALITY IN SRINF MISSILES IN ADDITION, THE DELEGATION SHOULD PRESS THE SOVIETS TO LEND APPARENT NEW AREAS OF DIFFERENCE RAISED IN THE SOVIET PRESENTATION OF THEIR PROPOSAL ON NOVEMBER 7 AND ELABORATION OF IT DURING THE LIMITED COMPOSITION MEETINGS AND HIS TO ACCEPT, CONSISTENT WITH THE RESULTS AT REYKJAVIK, A SINGLE AGREEMENT FOR THE LIMITATION OF U.S. AND SOVIET SRINF MISSILES IN EUROPE AND THE SIMULTANEOUS REDUCTION TO 100 U.S. AND SOVIET SRINF MISSILE WARHEADS OUTSIDE OF EUROPE; GLOBAL VICE EUROPEAN ONLY CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF MISSILES; AND THE NEED FOR A VERIFICATION SYSTEM WHICH INCLUDES ON-SITE OBSERVATION OF THE PROCESS OF DISMANTLEMENT, DESTRUCTION AND CONVERSION WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT INCLUDED IN THEIR REVIEW OF AGREED VERIFICATION ELEMENTS. WHEN PRESSING THE SOVIETS ON THESE ISSUES, THE DELEGATION SHOULD NOTE THE MOVEMENT FROM PREVIOUS ACCEPTABLE POSITIONS ON WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT EXPECT FOR CONCESSIONS FOR RETURNING.

5. IN SUPPORT OF THE BASIC APPROACH AND OBJECTIVES DESCRIBED IN REF A, A GUIDANCE, "WASHINGTON IS PREPARING A DRAFT INF TREATY SCRIPT WHICH HAS COMPLETED AND APPROVED, SHOULD BE TAILED WHEN THE DELEGATION DEEMS IT APPROPRIATE.

6. ON THE SRINF QUESTION POSED BY THE DELEGATION IN REF H, THE DELEGATION SHOULD TAKEN CURRENT APPROACH ON SRINF, THAT

7. ON SCHEDULE OF REDUCTION, DELEGATION SHOULD PROPOSE THAT REDUCTIONS BE DIVIDED INTO THREE PERIODS THE EXACT TIMING OF WHICH CAN BE AGREED CLOSER TO THE DATE OF TREATY SIGNATURE. DELEGATION SHOULD PROPOSE THAT PERMITTED LEVEL OF U.S. AND SOVIET SRINF MISSILE WARHEADS BE EQUAL AT THE END OF EACH PERIOD OF REDUCTIONS.

8. IN PRESENTING THE ABOVE APPROACH, DELEGATION SHOULD

-- PROTECT THE U.S. RIGHT TO REDUCE SRINF SYSTEMS IN EXCESS OF EUROPEAN LIMITS BY RELOCATION TO THE U.S.

-- PROTECT U.S. RIGHT TO CONVERT PERSHING II MISSILES REDUCED UNDER THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT TO PERSHING I MISSILES.

-- INSIST ON THE U.S. RIGHT TO CEILINGS EQUAL TO SOVIET SHORTER RANGE INF MISSILES ON A GLOBAL BASIS.

-- STATE THAT AN INITIAL INF AGREEMENT SHOULD REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL SUPERSEDED BY A LATER AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR FURTHER REDUCTIONS TOWARD THE AGREED GOAL OF THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF SRINF MISSILES.

-- CONTINUE TO CALL FOR CALL-ON-NEGOTIATING FOR REDUCTIONS IN SRINF MISSILES TO BEGIN ON A HIGH PRIORITY BASIS, AT LEAST WITHIN SIX MONTHS

AFTER AN INITIAL INF AGREEMENT IS REACHED. SHOULD THE SOVIETS RAISE QUESTIONS ON NEGOTIATING FORUM FOR SHORTER RANGE INF MISSILES IN THIS REGARD, DELEGATION SHOULD NOTE THAT AT THIS TIME IT IS THE U.S. OPINION THAT THE INF NEGOTIATING GROUP MAY PROVIDE THE MOST LOGICAL FORUM.

-- CONTINUE TO PRESS THE FULL VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT CONTAINED IN REF G AND SUBSEQUENT GUIDANCE.
SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP FOR ROUND VII

REFERENCES: {A} 85 STATE 2686 {B} 85 STATE 362423 {C} 85 STATE 288125 {D} 86 STATE 012552 {E} 86 STATE 138817
{F} 86 STATE 291909 {G} 86 STATE 293378 {H} 86 STATE 293566 {I} 86 STATE 305735 {J} 86 STATE 315021 {K} 86 STATE 320131 {L} 86 STATE 330272 {M} 86 STATE 336324 {N} NSC MEMO TO THE US NEGOTIATORS TO THE NST, SUBJ: DECEMBER MEETING WITH SOVIET COUNTERPARTS, DIRECTIVE ON DEFENSE AND SPACE ARMS, 28 NOV 86

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT

2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR THE U.S. DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP TO THE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS FOR ROUND VII, BEGINNING JANUARY 15, 1987. EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW, GUIDANCE FOR THE DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUPS (REFTELS) REMAINS IN EFFECT.


ATTACHMENT 4
3. OVERALL OBJECTIVE AND APPROACH. BOTH SIDES HAVE AGREED TO ACCELERATE ST NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. ACCORDINGLY, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD REVIEW WITH THE SOVIETS THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. APPROACH TO DEFENSE AND SPACE ISSUES, WITH THE PURPOSES OF REALIZING U.S. OBJECTIVES AND DENYING ANY CONFLICTING SOVIET GOALS. PRIMARY U.S. OBJECTIVES FOR THE DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP IN ROUND VI ARE:

-- TO CONTINUE TO REVIEW AND DISCUSS WITH THE SOVIETS, AS APPROPRIATE, THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S JULY DEFENSE AND SPACE PROPOSAL AND THE ELEMENTS FOR AN AGREEMENT WHICH WE PROPOSED IN REYKJAVIK AS AN ALTERNATIVE, BOTH OF WHICH REMAIN ON THE TABLE.

-- TO CONTINUE TO FOCUS THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE U.S. PROPOSALS AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. AGENDA (E.G., THE HIGHEST U.S. PRIORITIES ARE: TO ACHIEVE RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSE FORCES, TO AVOID CONSTRAINTS BEYOND THOSE EXISTING UNDER THE ABM TREATY, TO STOP SOVIET EROSION OF THE ABM TREATY REGIME, TO DISCUSS HOW TO IMPROVE STABILITY THROUGH A POSSIBLE JOINTLY MANAGED TRANSITION TO GREATER RELIANCE ON STRATEGIC DEFENSES IN COMBINATION WITH FURTHER RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND TO FACILITATE DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC DEFENSES AT SOME FUTURE TIME).

-- WHILE MAINTAINING THE PRINCIPAL FOCUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE U.S. PROPOSALS AND U.S. AGENDA, TO RESPOND TO SOVIET PURSUIT OF THEIR PROPOSALS, AS THEY RELATE TO THE WORK OF THE DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP AND ITS INTERRELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER AREAS, BY CONTINUING TO CRITICIZE, QUESTION, AND PROBE THEM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GUIDANCE BELOW AND PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS, AND BY POINTING TO WAYS IN WHICH THE U.S. PROPOSALS RESPOND TO SOVIET CONCERNS.

4. SPECIFIC APPROACH. NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD CONTINUE TO EXPLAIN THE MERITS OF SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSALS TABLED BY THE UNITED STATES, ESPECIALLY THOSE IN ROUND VI. AT THE SAME TIME, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD SEEK TO CLARIFY AND MITIGATE AS APPROPRIATE THE SOVIET PROPOSALS TABLED IN ROUND VI.
-- THE NEGOTIATING GROUP IS AUTHORIZED TO DRAW FROM PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS, ADDITIONAL NSC INTELLIGENCE AND APPROVED DEFENSE AND SPACE PAPERS, TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN THE U.S. POSITION AND PROPOSALS AND IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET QUESTIONS.

-- IN PARTICULAR, IN ELABORATING THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR ELIMINATION OF ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES AS A CONDITION FOR MEETING THE SOVIET DEMAND FOR A COMMITMENT NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM TREATY THROUGH 1996, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP IS AUTHORIZED TO DRAW FROM REFERENCE N AS MODIFIED BELOW:

{1}. THE SIDES SHALL UNDERTAKE THROUGH 1996 {1} NOT TO EXERCISE THEIR EXISTING RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY, WHICH IS OF UNLIMITED DURATION {THE DESIRE OR INTENT OF A PARTY TO DEVELOP, TEST, OR DEPLOY ADVANCED STRATEGIC DEFENSES SHALL NOT IN AND OF ITSELF CONSTITUTE A BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL}, AND {2} TO REDUCE OFFENSIVE ARMS ACCORDING TO THE SCHEDULE REDUCTIONS OUTLINED BELOW. THIS UNDERTAKING AND THE PROVISIONS BELOW WOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO A DEFENSE AND SPACE AGREEMENT RECORDED IN A NEW TREATY.

{2}. DURING THE PERIOD THROUGH 1996, THE SIDE SHALL STRICTLY OBSERVE ALL PROVISIONS OF THE ABM TREATY WHILE CONTINUING RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING, WHICH ARE PERMITTED BY THE TREATY.

{3}. THE SCHEDULE OF REDUCTIONS TO BE COMPLETED DURING THE PERIOD THROUGH 1996 IS AS FOLLOWS:


{4}. THE U.S. OUGHT TO EXERCISE ITS EXISTING RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM TREATY DOES NOT EXPIRE FOR A TEN-YEAR PERIOD BEGINNING WHEN AN AGREEMENT TAKES EFFECT; RATHER THE OFFER EXTENDS THROUGH 1996. AT THE END OF 1996, EITHER SIDE SHALL BE FREE TO DEPLOY ADVANCED STRATEGIC DEFENSES IF IT SO CHOOSES, UNLESS THE SIDES AGREE OTHERWISE.
5. THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TREATY, IN WHICH THE UNDERTAKINGS WILL BE Records WILL TERMINATE UNLESS OTHERWISE AGREED BY THE PARTIES, IN EITHER PARTY:

- A. DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AGREED FOR THE PERIOD THROUGH 1991 ACHIEVING FIFTY PERCENT REDUCTIONS AS SPECIFIED IN A SEPARATE START AGREEMENT.

- B. DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE AGREED PROVISIONS FOR REDUCTIONS LEADING TO THE TOTAL ELIMINATION BY THE END OF 1996 OF ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES.

6. THE CONDITIONS SPECIFIED IN PARAGRAPH 5 WOULD BE IN ADDITION TO THE STANDARD RIGHTS OF A PARTY TO WITHDRAW FROM AN AGREEMENT SUCH AS IN THE EVENT OF MATERIAL BREACH OF THE AGREEMENT BY THE OTHER PARTY OR SHOULD THE PARTY JUDGE ITS SUPREME NATIONAL INTERESTS TO BE JEOPARDIZED.

7. THE SIDES IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATING A D&S TREATY SHALL CONCURRENTLY NEGOTIATE MEASURES WHICH PERMIT EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED. SPECIFIC VERIFICATION MEASURES SHALL INCLUDE NONINTERFERENCE WITH AND OTHER AGREED MEANS OF VERIFICATION, INCLUDING EFFECTIVE MONITORING OF INVENTORIES AND ASSOCIATED FACILITIES, INCLUDING ON-SITE INSPECTION, COMPREHENSIVE AND ACCURATE DATA EXCHANGE.

8. WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ABOVE, THE SIDES SHALL NEGOTIATE OTHER APPROPRIATE RESTRAINTS.

5. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD ATTEMPT TO CLARIFY THE AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT. IN SEEKING SUCH CLARIFICATION, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THAT, AS NOTED IN REFERENCE F, ... "IT IS NOT IN THE U.S. INTEREST TO ACCEPT ANY CHANGES IN THE UNDERSTANDING OF KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ABM TREATY WHICH ALTER THE WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN NEGOTIATED AND AGREED." THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD COUNTER AND REJECT SOVIET ATTEMPTS INCREASINGLY TO AMEND THE ABM TREATY AND TO NARROW THAT WHICH IS PERMITTED BY THE TREATY. IN RESPONDING TO SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO PROMOTE THEIR PROPOSED PROVISIONS, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE KEY DEFINITIONS WERE UNDERSTOOD BY THE ABM TREATY NEGOTIATORS IN 1972. THE
NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT ACCEPT ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING BEYOND THOSE ESTABLISHED BY THE TREATY.

6. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE SOVIETS TO SIMPLIFY THEIR APPROACH AND TO ACCEPT INSTEAD AN APPROACH THAT WOULD ONLY ENTAIL LIMITATIONS, UNDER THE CONDITIONS THE U.S. HAS PROPOSED, ON DEPLOYMENT RATHER THAN ADDITIONAL LIMITATIONS ON RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND TESTING.

7. FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND REFERENCE, FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF REF N: BEGIN TEXT "DIRECTIVE ON DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS."

"{1} THE SIDES SHALL UNDERTAKE FOR TEN YEARS {1} NOT TO EXERCISE THEIR EXISTING RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY, WHICH IS OF UNLIMITED DURATION, AND {2} TO REDUCE OFFENSIVE ARMS ACCORDING TO THE SCHEDULE OF REDUCTIONS OUTLINED BELOW. THIS UNDERTAKING AND THE PROVISIONS BELOW WOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO A DEFENSE AND SPACE AGREEMENT RECORDED IN A NEW TREATY.

{2} DURING THE TEN YEAR PERIOD THE SIDES SHALL STRICTLY OBSERVE ALL PROVISIONS OF THE ABM TREATY WHILE CONTINUING RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING, WHICH ARE PERMITTED BY THE TREATY.

{3} THE SCHEDULE OF REDUCTIONS TO BE COMPLETED DURING THE TEN YEAR PERIOD IS AS FOLLOWS:


- C. THUS, AT THE END OF 1996, ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISILEs OF THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE BEEN ALL ELIMINATED.
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4. At the end of this ten year period, either side shall be free to deploy advanced strategic defenses if it so chooses, unless the sides agree otherwise.

5. The defense and space treaty, in which the undertakings will be recorded will terminate, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, if either party:

- A. does not comply with the agreement providing for reductions in strategic offensive arms agreed for the period through 1991, achieving fifty percent reductions by the end of 1991; or

- B. does not comply with the agreed provisions for reductions leading to the total elimination by the end of 1996 of all offensive ballistic missiles.

6. The conditions specified in paragraph 5 would be in addition to the standard rights of a party to withdraw from an agreement such as in the event of material breach of the agreement by the other party or should the party judge its supreme national interests to be jeopardized. The desire or intent of a party to develop, test, or deploy advanced systems of strategic defense shall now constitute an extraordinary event jeopardizing its supreme national interest.

7. The sides in the course of negotiating a treaty to codify the above reductions and limitations shall concurrently negotiate measures which permit effective verification of compliance with the obligations assumed. Specific verification measures shall include:

- {A} a comprehensive and accurate exchange of data, both prior to reductions and thereafter;

- {B} on-site observation of elimination down to agreed levels; and

- {C} effective monitoring of the remaining inventories and associated facilities, including on-site inspection.

8. Within the context of the reductions and limitations above, the sides shall negotiate other appropriate provisions.