BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Significant progress has been made during the past six years in strengthening the position of the United States in world affairs. The constancy of purpose we have demonstrated in defending U.S. global interests and pursuing our policy objectives has strengthened global security. Yet, important changes have evolved in international affairs that must be considered as we further develop our strategy of peace for the future.

This directive supersedes NSDD-32 and its supporting documents as the primary source of U.S. national security strategy. It shall serve as the starting point for further development of policy and strategy where appropriate. Policy guidance now in effect is being reviewed to ensure its consistency with this document. Supplemental directives will be structured to ensure conformance with this guidance.

Broad Purposes of U.S. National Security Policy

The primary objective of U.S. foreign and security policy is to protect the integrity of our democratic institutions and promote a peaceful global environment in which they can thrive. The national security policy of the United States shall serve the following broad purposes:

-- To preserve the political identity, framework and institutions of the United States as embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.

-- To protect the United States -- its national territory, citizenry, military forces, and assets abroad -- from military, paramilitary, or terrorist attack.

-- To foster the economic well-being of the United States, in particular, by maintaining and strengthening the nation's industrial, agricultural and technological base and by ensuring access to foreign markets and resources.
To foster an international order supportive of the vital interests of the United States by maintaining and strengthening constructive, cooperative relationships and alliances, and by encouraging and reinforcing wherever possible and practicable, freedom, the rule of law, economic development and national independence throughout the world.

Grand Strategy

The grand strategy of the United States is to avoid nuclear war while preventing a single hostile power or coalition of powers from dominating the Eurasian land-mass or other strategic regions from which threats to U.S. interests might arise. The success of this strategy is dependent on the maintenance of a strong nuclear deterrent, dynamic alliances, and a Western-oriented world economy. It is also dependent on the U.S. ability to wage successfully a competition for influence among less developed countries, the ability to influence events beyond our direct control, and ultimately, the ability to project military power abroad in defense of U.S. interests. The strength of this grand strategy is founded upon the convergence of interests between the U.S. and the community of nations as a whole. The national independence and individual freedoms we seek to uphold are in harmony with the general desires and ideals common to all mankind. The U.S. must therefore remain the natural enemy of any country threatening the independence of others, and the proponent of free trade, commerce, and economic stability.

This grand strategy requires the development and integration of a set of strategies to achieve our national objectives, including political, diplomatic, military, informational, economic, intelligence, and arms control components. These strategies are necessarily shaped by our values and our vision of the future; the national and international policy objectives we have set for ourselves; by dynamic trends in the global economy and the military balance; and by the demands of our geographical position. Such strategies must also take into account the capabilities and intentions of those hostile countries or coalitions which threaten to undermine the achievement of U.S. policy objectives.

Threats to U.S. National Security

The primary threats to U.S. national security in the years ahead will continue to be posed by the armed forces of the Soviet Union and Soviet exploitation of regional instabilities.
The geopolitical objectives of the Soviet Union include the dissolution of Western alliances in Europe and Asia, the erosion of China's ties to the West, and the attainment of strategic position in all key regions of the world. The U.S. faces potential military threats to its interests across the entire spectrum of potential conflict from multiple sources in widely separated parts of the world. It also faces a concerted effort by the Soviet Union and its surrogates to diminish U.S. influence through diplomacy, propaganda, selective commercial activity and subversion.

The most severe threat to the United States is the offensive and defensive nuclear capability of the Soviet Union. While the probability of a nuclear war appears low, and can be influenced by the overall conduct of our relations, the ongoing Soviet attempt to achieve nuclear superiority over the U.S. threatens to undermine the credibility of our nuclear deterrent which provides the basis for Western security policy. The Soviet Union seeks nuclear superiority for the broad political purpose of deterring the U.S. from threatening the use of nuclear weapons in defense of Western interests; to increase the effectiveness of its conventional military advantages; and to increase the probability of a successful outcome, in relative terms, if nuclear war should occur. The continued Soviet modernization of their larger conventional forces, and the growth of Soviet power projection capabilities, also challenge the ability of the U.S. and its allies to maintain an adequate and stable military balance.

The Soviet Union remains aware of the potential consequences of initiating military action directly against the United States or its allies. For this reason, a war with a Soviet client arising from regional tensions or attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities is more likely than a war involving U.S. and Soviet forces in direct combat. In a conflict with a Soviet client, however, the risk of direct confrontation with the Soviet Union remains.

The Gorbachev leadership is more vigorous and dynamic than its predecessors since the late Brezhnev period. The potential now exists for more creative and energized Soviet foreign policies inimical to U.S. interests. Moscow will continue to try politically to isolate and undermine the efforts of Western governments to resist Soviet blandishments in those areas of arms control and economic cooperation that are detrimental to Western security interests. The USSR will seek to capitalize on any changes in Western governments that portend lesser resistance to Soviet interests and increased friction with the United States.

The intelligence services of the Soviet Union and its surrogates will continue to present a strategic threat to U.S. national security. This threat includes espionage, hostile
SIGINT against U.S. telecommunications and automated information systems, and the illegal diversion and acquisition of sensitive U.S. technology. The Soviets will continue to attempt to penetrate our most sensitive secrets in order to undermine our political integrity and reduce the costs of their military buildup. (c)

The Soviet leadership also will persist in its efforts to consolidate previous Third World gains and will try to take advantage of new opportunities which may arise. Unstable governments, weak political institutions, inefficient economies, and local conflicts will continue to create opportunities for Soviet expansion in many parts of the developing world. Economic uncertainty, terrorism, the trafficking of illicit drugs, the dangers of nuclear proliferation, reticence on the part of a number of Western countries, and the assertiveness of Soviet foreign policy, all threaten Western interests. (c)

One of the most challenging issues confronting the United States and its allies is the dedicated effort of the Soviet Union and others to subvert democratic processes and interests by whatever means. Western interests on all continents are threatened by direct and indirect actions on the part of the Soviet Union and its allies to undermine and take over other governments. They undertake this through destabilization and subversion, support of insurgencies, coups, infiltration and domination of local security and military services, use of propaganda and agents of influence, and other methods. (c)

Instability is not always the product of Soviet design nor always harmful to U.S. interests. Historical and other forces also shape the evolution of regional affairs. Nevertheless, the Soviets share mutual interests with several radical and ambitious Third World states, and use arms transfers and both direct and indirect military support as catalysts through which such states can upset regional military balances and threaten U.S. and other allied interests. While the possibility of nuclear confrontation or a major conventional conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union cannot be ruled out, the continuing and prolonged challenge at this lower end of the spectrum of potential conflict (including regional instability and organized terrorism sponsored by radical states and hostile coalitions), exploited by the Soviet Union, constitutes the most likely threat we face in the years ahead. (c)

The underlying competition between the United States and the Soviet Union is in the realm of ideas and values, and in our contrasting visions of the future and the conditions for peace. Our way of life, founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual, depends on a stable and pluralistic world order within which freedom and democratic institutions can thrive. Yet, the greatest threat to the Soviet system, in which the
State controls the destiny of the individual, is the concept of freedom itself. The survival of the Soviet system depends to a significant extent upon the persistent and exaggerated representation of foreign threats, through which it seeks to justify both the subjugation of its own people and the expansion of Soviet military capabilities well beyond those required for self-defense.

The Soviet system challenges not just our values, but the stable political environment in which they flourish. Few value systems are as irreconcilable with our own, and no other has the support of a great and growing center of military power capable of threatening our national survival. While we will seek and experience periods of cooperation with Soviet leadership, there will be no change in the fundamentally competitive nature of our relationship unless and until a change occurs in the nature of the Soviet system.

Global Objectives

In support of our grand strategy, and in response to the threats we face, the national security policy of the United States shall be guided by the following global objectives:

- To deter military attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S., its allies, and other important countries across the spectrum of conflict; and to defeat such attack should deterrence fail.

- To strengthen the influence of the U.S. throughout the world by strengthening existing alliances, by improving relations with other nations, by forming and supporting coalitions of states friendly to U.S. interests, by promoting democracy, and by a full range of diplomatic, political, economic, and information efforts.

- To contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world, and to increase the costs to the Soviet Union and other countries that support proxy, terrorist, and subversive forces.

- To neutralize the efforts of the USSR to increase its influence through its use of diplomacy, arms transfers, economic pressure, political action, propaganda, and disinformation; weaken the links between the Soviet Union and its client states in the Third World; and isolate the radical regimes with whom the Soviets share mutual interests.
- To foster, if possible in concert with our allies, restraint in Soviet military spending, discourage Soviet adventurism, and weaken the Soviet alliance system by forcing the USSR to bear the brunt of its economic shortcomings, and to encourage long-term liberalizing and nationalist tendencies within the Soviet Union and allied countries.

- To reduce over the long term our reliance on nuclear weapons and nuclear retaliation, by strengthening our conventional forces, by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements and insisting on compliance with such agreements, and in particular, by pursuing technologies for strategic defense.

- To limit Soviet military capabilities by strengthening the U.S. military, by using both strategy and technology to force the Soviets to redirect assets for defensive rather than offensive purposes, and by preventing the flow of militarily significant technologies and resources to the Soviet Union, and others where appropriate.

- To prevent the reinstitution of a Moscow-Beijing axis of strategic cooperation in international security affairs.

- To improve our intelligence collection capabilities so as to provide maximum information in peacetime and continuing information in times of crisis and war.

- To identify, counter, and reduce the hostile intelligence threat to U.S. national interests.

- To discourage the further proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

- To ensure U.S. access to foreign markets, and to ensure the U.S. and its allies and friends access to foreign energy and mineral resources.

- To ensure U.S. access to space and the oceans.

- To encourage and strongly support aid, trade, and investment programs that promote economic development and the growth of humane social and political orders in the Third World.

- To promote a well functioning international economic system with minimal distortions to trade and investment, stable currencies, and broadly agreed and respected rules for managing and resolving differences.

- To combat threats to the stability of friendly governments and institutions from the international trafficking of illicit drugs.
Requirements for Military Forces

The United States requires military forces that are organized, manned, trained, and equipped to deter aggression across the entire spectrum of potential conflict. Our grand strategy, global objectives, and the nature of the threat require that we defend our interests as far from North America as possible. In coalition with our allies we will continue to maintain in peacetime major forward deployments for land, naval, and air forces in both Europe and the Pacific, and other deployments in the Western Hemisphere and the Indian Ocean. The overall size and composition of the armed forces must be planned accordingly.

The challenge we face is dynamic and complex. Overall, there remains a significant imbalance of forces which would favor the Soviet Union in several important contingencies. In addition, Third World states are increasingly armed with modern and sophisticated military equipment.

Comprehensive and imaginative integration of U.S. and allied military capabilities is required to reduce future risks to our national security. Since our political and social heritage militates against our raising and supporting large forces in peacetime, this impels us to seek security in America's national genius for technological innovation, industrial efficiency, and alliance cooperation. The U.S. must pursue strategies for competition which emphasize our comparative advantages in these areas.

The full range of U.S. military capabilities must be appropriately balanced among combat and support elements, and mixed within active duty and reserve components. The U.S. must have specialized forces for nuclear deterrence and anti-terrorism; and must also have general purpose forces both capable of sustaining high intensity conflict, and trained and equipped for lesser contingencies and special operations.

U.S. military forces must also be supported by plans and doctrine which provide for their effective integration and employment. While the possible use of nuclear weapons must remain an element in our overall military strategy, nuclear forces will not be viewed as a lower-cost alternative to conventional forces. U.S. forces must be capable of rapid deployment to deter wider crises or conflicts, and capable of expanding the scope and intensity of conflict as appropriate should deterrence fail. We must also have the capability to exploit U.S. technological advantages across the entire spectrum of conflict. The U.S. must maintain effective and robust reserve forces, trained and equipped at levels...
commensurate with their wartime missions, as well as Coast Guard and other capabilities which support the national security establishment. The U.S. must also continue to enhance its capabilities to surge or mobilize manpower and key industrial resources, planning for the effective use of available warning in the event of crisis or war.

Strategic Forces

Deterrence of nuclear attack constitutes the cornerstone of U.S. national security and that of its allies. Maintaining that deterrence requires that Soviet war planners be assured that any direct conventional attack, or an attack involving the use of nuclear weapons, would result in an outcome unfavorable to the Soviet Union. In strengthening deterrence, U.S. strategic forces must be effective, survivable, and enduring. Such forces must be able to respond flexibly against an array of targets under a variety of possible contingencies.

The U.S. will retain a capable, credible, and diversified strategic Triad of land-based ballistic missiles, manned bombers, and submarine launched ballistic missiles. While each leg of this Triad should be as survivable as possible, the existence of all three precludes the destruction of more than one by surprise attack and guards against technological surprise which could similarly undermine the effectiveness of a single leg.

In addition to maintaining and strengthening deterrence in the near term, the U.S. must now also take steps to provide future options for ensuring deterrence and reducing the risk of nuclear attack over the long term. We must do so in a way that allows us both to negate the destabilizing growth of Soviet offensive forces, and to channel longstanding Soviet propensities for defenses toward more stabilizing and mutually beneficial ends. The Strategic Defense Initiative is specifically aimed toward these goals. Research through the Strategic Defense Initiative will investigate the possibility of making deterrence stronger and more stable by reducing the role of ballistic missiles and placing greater reliance on defenses which threaten no one.

The United States will enhance its strategic nuclear deterrent by completing its five-part Strategic Modernization Program, which includes the Strategic Defense Initiative, in accordance with guidance provided in NSDD-178, except as may be modified by new decisions concerning the basing mode for the second 50 Peacekeeper missiles. This Program will be complemented by related programs to provide for the continuity of government and civil defense. Strategic objectives and concepts will be developed for future strategic offensive and defensive forces to meet U.S. security needs early in the next century.
General Purpose Forces

General purpose forces support U.S. national security policy in peacetime by deterring aggression, by demonstrating U.S. interests, concern, and commitment, by assisting the forces of other friendly nations, and by providing a basis to move rapidly from peace to war. In wartime, these forces would be employed to achieve our political objectives and to secure early war termination on terms favorable to the U.S. and allies, preferably without the use of nuclear weapons. U.S. general purpose forces must, however, be prepared for both prolonged conflict and the use of nuclear weapons if required.

The U.S. shall maintain a global posture and shall strive to increase its influence worldwide through the maintenance and improvement of forward deployed forces and rapidly deployable U.S.-based forces, together with periodic exercises, security assistance, and special operations. U.S. general purpose forces must provide the flexibility to deal quickly, decisively and discriminately with low-level conflict contingencies requiring U.S. military involvement. The U.S. will further enhance its capabilities for global mobility, including appropriate protection and support for points of embarkation and debarkation. The United States will continue to improve its conventional warfare capabilities and to improve its ability to deter chemical attack through the production of binary chemical munitions.

Resource Priorities

In order to reduce the risk that we may not be able to execute wartime strategy, the U.S. must undertake a sustained and balanced force development program. This program must complement our diplomatic, economic, and security assistance strategies, and should be guided by periodic net assessments of U.S. and Soviet nuclear and conventional capabilities. We must consider the capabilities for which there would be immediate, high-level, and sustained demand in the event of general war; capabilities which cannot be provided by allies, and which cannot be mobilized or produced within a short period of time. We must consider our own capability for technological innovation, which represents one of our most significant military advantages vis-a-vis the Soviets, and consider how most effectively to exploit it to affect the military balance in ways that are favorable to the U.S. At the same time, we must balance expenditures among the vital needs of readiness, sustainability, modernization and force expansion. The relative priority of these four pillars is not the same in all mission areas.
The following general guidance applies:

-- In the overall context of Western security, it is the responsibility of the United States to maintain a nuclear balance with the Soviet Union. Thus, the strategic modernization program (including SDI), and particularly strategic command, control, communications and intelligence, has the highest overall priority.

-- To preserve a credible conventional deterrent, we will establish and maintain an appropriate level of combat readiness and sustainability, and ensure the maintenance of a robust logistics infrastructure.

- We must ensure that compensation, unit integrity, and quality leadership are all maintained at a level sufficiently high to recruit and retain our most capable service men and women. In this regard, we must emphasize individual and unit training in the active forces and early deploying reserves through specific training programs and major exercises.

- In achieving an appropriate level of sustainability, preferential attention shall be given to meeting inventory objectives for precision munitions and other advanced guidance weapons systems which can multiply force effectiveness, particularly in the critical early days of conflict, and help alleviate the effects of numerical imbalances between U.S. and Soviet forces.

-- To support the U.S. strategy of forward deployment and rapid reinforcement, we must build and maintain adequate strategic airlift, sealift, and tanker support to transport and sustain our forces abroad.

-- Force structure expansion of U.S. maritime, air, and ground forces shall be prioritized in accordance with the national military strategy. This strategy recognizes that we must continue to build and modernize national forces sufficient to retain maritime superiority.

-- U.S. military systems which particularly stress Soviet defenses, or require a disproportionate expenditure of Soviet resources to counter, represent an especially attractive investment relative to competing systems, provided their cost and military effectiveness otherwise warrant the systems' procurement.

-- In keeping with this approach, for general purpose forces, modernization shall seek to exploit opportunities created by the application of high-leverage advanced technology. Particular attention should be paid to those areas with
the potential for near-to-mid-term payoff in significantly enhanced combat capabilities. These include low observable technologies; improved surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting capabilities; new generations of "smart" and "brilliant" weapons; and systems which extend the effective strike range and survivability of conventional forces. Tactical ground and air forces will have sufficient priority for modernization to regain and maintain U.S. qualitative advantages to offset the Soviets' quantitative superiority.

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Special attention should be given to the continued development and acquisition of capabilities which enhance the effectiveness of joint or combined operations.

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Special operations forces shall be expanded and forces specifically designed for counter-terrorism shall give priority to near-term readiness, deployability and command, control, communications and intelligence improvements.

Priorities and Objectives in Peacetime

U.S. grand strategy is fundamentally a coalition strategy. Its success depends upon robust and dynamic alliances based on shared interests. The development of these shared interests is built upon political and economic strengths of the industrial democracies, a common perception of the potential threats, and the continued importance of Third World resources. We not only seek to strengthen our traditional bilateral and multilateral alliance relationships, but to fundamentally broaden our base of support abroad, influencing to the extent possible the pace and direction of political change. The U.S. will assist democratic and nationalist movements where possible in the struggle against totalitarian regimes and will seek the cooperation of allies and others in providing material support to such movements. We will also pursue broader cooperation among all governments in the fight against terrorism and the international trafficking of illicit drugs.

In peacetime, the achievement of our regional objectives will be based on political, diplomatic and economic strategies which promote the peaceful resolution of disputes, regional stability, unrestricted trade and economic growth, financial stability, and the further development of democratic institutions. Such strategies will complement U.S. regional military objectives.

The international economic policy of the United States is built upon the principle that economic growth is one of the free world's greatest strengths. It is vital not only for our standard of living but also for our political cooperation and
mutual defense. The source of economic growth is individual creativity expressed through the marketplace. The U.S. seeks to foster an environment in which growth can occur through domestic economic policies that minimize government interference in markets, by ensuring stable exchange rates through international cooperation, and by negotiating the elimination of barriers to trade and investment flows. The U.S. also must encourage cooperation among its Allies in preventing the transfer to Soviet bloc and other countries of goods and technologies that are critical to the military balance.

In peacetime, we will seek to deter military attack against the U.S. and its forces, allies and friends; to contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet influence worldwide; to isolate radical regimes hostile to U.S. interests; and promote regional stability and the capabilities of allies and friends for self-defense. In drawing upon the cooperation of allies and others to support and protect our mutual interests, the growth of Soviet power projection capabilities and indigenous regional threats require stronger and more effective collective defense arrangements between the U.S. and its allies. We will continue to consider the status of these arrangements in military planning concerning the size, composition, and disposition of U.S. forces.

Western Hemisphere

The defense of North America is our primary security concern. In this context the U.S. must continue to build on interests shared with Canada. We must modernize the strategic air defense system for North America, to include development of true strategic defenses against both ballistic missiles, through the SDI, and against air-breathing threats. In Central America we must reverse the success of the Soviet bloc in developing Nicaragua into a hostile base on the American mainland. In El Salvador we will support the government's effort to defeat an insurgency which poses the threat of another Soviet client state. The U.S. must also continue to promote the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the trend towards democracy throughout the Caribbean and Latin America. We must achieve greater cooperation from Mexico and other governments in the region to establish effective control over our southern borders, and to reduce the threat to friendly governments and to our own well-being from the trafficking of illicit drugs. The U.S. must strengthen military-to-military contacts and further develop the capabilities of Caribbean and Central American countries, and their mutual cooperation, for territorial defense. And we will seek to maintain and acquire as necessary base and facilities access, logistical support, and operating, transit, and overflight rights which would support U.S. military objectives in crisis or war.
Western Europe and NATO

The security of Europe remains vital to the defense of the United States, and a strong and unified NATO indispensable to protecting Western interests. The U.S. will maintain its commitment to forward deployment and early reinforcement. While encouraging all NATO allies to maintain and increase their contributions in Europe, the U.S. should specifically encourage those Allies who can contribute outside Europe to allocate their marginal defense resources preferentially to capabilities which could support both out-of-area and European missions. We will work within the alliance framework to achieve improvements in the modernization of NATO's nuclear, chemical, and conventional deterrent, including the further development of innovative operational concepts. The U.S. will also seek additional bilateral arrangements for host nation support and facilities access which enhance the effectiveness of both U.S. and allied forces. In addition to supporting the achievement of approved force goals within NATO, we will promote as priorities the resolution of the Aegean dispute, the modernization of the armed forces of Turkey, and the full integration of Spain into the alliance.

East Asia

In the Far East and the Pacific basin, the foremost U.S. peacetime objective, in conjunction with allies and other friends in the region, is to prevent the Soviet Union and its allies from expanding their influence in the region. Most important to this strategy is a close alliance relationship with Japan, encouraging its development of military capabilities more commensurate with its economic status. We will seek a Japan more capable of sharing U.S. military and naval burdens in the region as well as contributing on its own to regional defense and deterrence. We will continue to develop our relationship with China in ways which enhance the durability of Sino-U.S. ties, and further lay the foundation for closer cooperation in the future as appropriate. The U.S. will also seek the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from neighboring states in Indochina. Within the United Nations context, we will maintain sufficient U.S. and allied strength on the Korean Peninsula to deter aggression. While continuing to strengthen longstanding relationships in this region, the U.S. will continue to promote economic and political development, and to assist regional states in a manner that will reduce our vulnerability to Soviet exploitation of potential instabilities. We must continue to maintain and further develop access to forward bases, and other logistical infrastructure, essential to the efficient forward deployment of U.S. forces in the Pacific Basin.
Near East/Southwest Asia

The primary U.S. objective in this pivotal region is to prevent the Soviet Union or its client states from extending their influence in the region in a manner that would threaten the security of our allies and U.S. interests in Europe and Asia. To accomplish this objective in peacetime, the U.S. must rely on regional states to contribute to the extent possible to their own defense. To deter direct Soviet involvement we will continue to improve U.S. global capabilities to deploy and sustain military forces in the region. The U.S. must enhance its support for the development of balanced and self-contained friendly regional forces, especially in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and will increase peacetime planning with friendly states for wartime contingencies, including host nation support, prepositioning, and combat roles for indigenous forces. The U.S. will continue to actively oppose radical and terrorist elements in the region, support moderate states against external aggression and subversion, and maintain Israel's qualitative military advantage.

The United States also remains committed to securing Western access to oil resources and maintaining freedom of commerce in the Persian Gulf. We will maintain a strong naval presence in the region, and seek to develop a land presence to the extent regional sensitivities and local political constraints will permit.

Africa

U.S. peacetime objectives in Africa, in concert with our allies, are to preempt and defeat foreign aggression, subversion, and terrorism sponsored by Libya or other forces hostile to U.S. interests; to secure the withdrawal of Soviet and proxy forces from the continent; to ensure U.S. and allied access to oil and mineral resources; to prevent the Soviets from attaining strategic advantage; to support accelerated reform in African economic policies so as to promote stability, pluralism and the role of market forces and reduce possibilities for hostile destabilization; and to promote peaceful reform in South Africa while maintaining U.S. influence. We will assist friendly countries that are the targets of subversion, and we will seek to create, and respond to, opportunities to weaken the ties between the Soviet Union and regional governments.
Foreign and Security Assistance Programs

Resources for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, including security assistance, economic aid, and public information programs are vital parts of our peacetime national security strategy.

In meeting U.S. security objectives abroad, security assistance is a cost-effective and essential complement to our own force structure. Security assistance will develop indigenous forces for local and regional defense, enhance interoperability between U.S. and other forces, and promote the broader objectives of our coalition strategy. Where local forces play a key role in the success of our regional or coalition strategy, or can significantly reduce our own military requirements, resources for security assistance may share the same importance as those resources devoted to U.S. forces. U.S. security assistance objectives should be structured to give priority to the requirements of countries with whom we are joined in formal mutual security agreements, so-called frontline states which confront direct threats from the Soviet Union or its clients, and access states which enhance the global mobility of U.S. forces. We must also help meet the needs of other states where a prudent investment of resources can prevent subversion or other broader regional problems.

Economic assistance programs should support economic growth in Third World countries through market-oriented policies that will increase political stability. Public diplomacy programs will also enhance U.S. objectives by promoting the development of democratic institutions abroad.

The U.S. foreign and security assistance program should undergo periodic review to identify emerging requirements and priorities. In addition, we will work with non-governmental and commercial enterprises, and with other friends and allies, to develop creative and flexible alternatives to direct U.S. funding.

Priorities and Objectives in War

Deterrence can best be achieved if our defense posture makes the assessment of war outcomes by the Soviets or any other adversary so dangerous and uncertain, under any contingency, as to remove any incentive for initiating conflict. Deterrence depends both on nuclear and conventional capabilities and on evidence of a collective will to defend our interests. If deterrence fails, we must have the capability to counter aggression, to control escalation, and to prevail.
In a conflict not involving the Soviet Union, the United States will rely primarily on indigenous forces to protect their own interests. Commitment of U.S. combat forces will be made only when other means are not considered viable. Such commitment is appropriate only if political objectives are established, our political will is clear, and appropriate military capabilities are available. If U.S. combat forces are committed, the United States will seek to limit the scope of the conflict, avoid involvement of the Soviet Union, and ensure that U.S. objectives are met as quickly as possible.
In global war our overall objectives are to limit damage to the United States and its allies, control the scope and intensity of the conflict, and terminate hostilities on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. This requires defeating the geopolitical objectives of our enemies, preserving the territorial integrity and political independence of our allies, and emerging from the conflict with a global political orientation favorable to the United States and in which the long term threat from the Soviet Union is reduced and the prospects for lasting peace enhanced. In implementing these objectives, we will seek to prosecute the war as far forward and as close as possible to the sources of greatest threat. The following regional objectives apply: \( \text{(TS)} \)
Supplemental Guidance

Warfighting strategy and contingency planning concerning the potential employment of U.S. forces will continue to be developed through operational plans which are prepared by Combatant Commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and reviewed and approved by the Secretary of Defense and the President. (RE)

Further development of policy and strategy, in both regional and functional areas, should continue to emphasize the need for coordination to ensure consistency with overall policy objectives and maintain the interlocking character of supporting strategies. (C)