This directive defines U.S. policy toward Malta in light of Malta's move to enhance ties to Libya and the Soviet bloc, accompanied by an increasingly authoritarian style of government. The situation warrants close U.S. monitoring, consultation with our Allies, and a modest expansion of U.S. resources designed to help keep Malta nonaligned and free from foreign exploitation or domination. The United States will maintain businesslike relations with the present regime, but will not extend extraordinary support (e.g., economic assistance or high-level visits) as long as the Maltese government's erratic behavior jeopardizes Western interests and Malta's democratic institutions. [8]

OBJECTIVES

- Deny the Soviet Union and Libya use of Malta for military purposes. [8]
  -- Persuade Malta to fulfill its declared policy of neutrality and nonalignment. [8]
- Prevent Malta from serving as a base for or providing indirect support for international terrorism. [8]
- Maintain Malta's traditional Western orientation and democratic system. [C]
  -- Nurture Malta's economic links to the West. [C]
  -- Encourage the government to permit free elections, due by 1987. [C]
  -- Discourage the government's assault on democratic institutions. [C]
  -- Encourage support for the Nationalist Party (NP) and any democratically inclined members of the Maltese Labor Party (MLP). [C]
- Weaken political, economic and military links between Malta and Libya, and reduce Maltese support for Libya in international fora. (C)

**ACTION**

To promote the above objectives, the United States will take the following actions:

- **Political/Diplomatic**
  
  -- Increase consultations with the PRC (which has a substantial presence in Malta), the Holy See, and our NATO allies (especially Italy, the FRG, and the UK, whose interests are most directly affected). (S)
  
  -- Instruct our ambassador to Malta to take every opportunity to:
    
    a) express publicly and privately our support and sympathy for the democratic process in Malta and the maintenance of human rights;
    
    b) reiterate our expectation that Malta will remain true to its avowed policy of neutrality and nonalignment;
    
    c) make clear to the Government and people of Malta that the U.S. and its Allies would consider the granting by Malta of military access to Libya, North Korea or to the Soviet Union and its allies as an unfriendly act and respond accordingly. (S)
    
    -- Impress upon the Maltese that it is up to them to establish an attractive investment climate. (C)
    
    -- Cease responding to requests for assistance on items that do not warrant action (e.g., Malta’s request to become an East-West financial center). (C)
    
    -- Withhold extraordinary support from the present Labor Party regime while the opposition retains some chance of returning to power in 1987. (S)
    
    -- Maintain frequent contact with Maltese officials, demonstrating that we take them seriously and will consider any reasonable proposal for political or economic cooperation. (C)
    
    -- Turn aside Maltese requests for meetings with the President or other senior officials above the Under Secretary level, but consider more frequent visits by officials at an appropriate level. (C)
-- Enhance contact with Nationalist Party leaders and any MLP leaders who show willingness to preserve democratic norms. (C)

-- Promote contact with the NP through the international Christian Democratic movement. (C)

-- Utilize Project Democracy to encourage the democratic process through contacts with nonpolitical, democratically inclined organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce. (C)

Public Diplomacy Efforts

-- Seek Congressional approval to boost the USIS information effort and staff in order to:

a) give the Maltese a clearer picture of U.S. policies; and

b) better expose and counter Soviet propaganda and disinformation.

c) give the Maltese a clearer understanding of Libyan intentions involving Malta. (C)

-- Increase leader grants and other exchanges. (C)

To enhance cooperation with Malta, the USG will be prepared to offer the following incentives to Malta on an incremental basis, depending upon the actions of the Maltese government toward basic US national security objectives:

Economic Efforts

-- Continue the AID Excess Property program, including the promised, one-time "lift of opportunity" by U.S. naval vessels to Naples. (C)

-- Call attention of U.S. firms to trade and investment opportunities in Malta. (C)

-- Have OPIC and Commerce sponsor a series of trade and investment missions to Malta. (C)

-- Encourage U.S. firms to consider Malta as a transshipment point for grain. (C)

Military/Security Programs

-- Offer $25,000 to $50,000 in FY 1986 or FY 1987 for International Military Education and Training (IMET). (S)
Cooperate with the GOM in such intelligence/security areas as counterterrorism, when such cooperation advances U.S. interests. (§)

Intelligence

-- Include Malta among those countries requiring close and continuous monitoring by the U.S. intelligence community. Particular attention should be directed toward growing Libyan political, military and economic ties with and influence in Malta. (§)

-- The intelligence community should initiate on an urgent basis a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) designed to examine the entire scope of Libyan interaction with Malta. The focus of the study should be on assessing the impact of Malta's military cooperation with Libya and its significance for Western security interests in the Mediterranean. (§)

FOLLOW-UP

The Department of State will be responsible for the overall implementation of this directive and coordination with other USG agencies. State will conduct an interagency review of Maltese-U.S. relations by 1 December 1986 with particular attention to the impact of the policy initiatives outlined in this directive. State will report to the NSC by 1 January 1987 with respect to further steps that should be taken. (§)