The activities of Soviet and Soviet Bloc intelligence services remain a serious and continuing threat to US national security interests at home and abroad. A key national security goal of this Administration has been to improve our government-wide capabilities to detect, analyze, counter and protect our vital secrets and values from the hostile intelligence threat. We have made progress in this area, but the recent uncovering of a number of serious espionage cases and other activities of the Soviet intelligence services suggest that further improvement and attention are necessary. In response, we have initiated a number of actions to limit and control the hostile intelligence presence within this country and to improve our security and countermeasures capabilities. (U)

The recent events surrounding the apparent defection of KGB officer Vitaly Yurchenko and the revelation of espionage by former CIA officer Edward Lee Howard have raised a number of questions about the adequacy of our efforts to meet the challenges posed by the hostile intelligence threat. Because the hostile intelligence threat is so serious and because of the gravity and sensitivity of the issues involved, it is necessary that these matters be reviewed in a systematic way by an outside body. I, therefore, am directing that, consistent with the provisions of Executive Order 12537, my Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board undertake a review of the performance of the intelligence community in the Yurchenko and Howard cases and report the Board's findings and recommendations to me. In addition to a review of the adequacy of US counterintelligence capabilities in these cases and the implication of these cases for improving US capabilities to counter the hostile intelligence threat, the Board should:
- Review the damage to intelligence sources and methods resulting from the Howard espionage case.

- Review the potential damage caused by Yurchenko's redefection to intelligence sources and methods.

- Review the management and structure of the intelligence defector program.

- Review the adequacy of intelligence personnel recruitment, training, and security procedures as they relate to the Howard case. (TS)

Because of the extreme sensitivity of the information involved in these issues, the Chairman of the PFIAB is directed to give particular attention to the need for absolute security on all aspects of this project, including full adherence to strict need-to-know requirements and the appropriate use of compartmentation and other security procedures. (TS)

The Director of Central Intelligence is directed to provide the Chairman of PFIAB such information and support as are required to carry out this Directive. (U)