Los Angeles Olympic Games

Counterintelligence and Security Precautions

Issue

The Olympic Games, to be held in Los Angeles this summer, present a number of unique counterintelligence and security concerns. This Directive delineates the counterintelligence and security precautions the United States Government will take with regard to Soviet Aeroflot charter flights for the Soviet "Olympic Family" (i.e., those Soviets, including a reasonable number of spectators, directly involved in the Games) and the port visit of the Soviet vessel GRUZIA at Long Beach Harbor for the duration of the Games.

Objectives

The United States desires the complete success of the 1984 Summer Olympic Games and seeks to ensure the full and equitable participation of all accredited members of the Olympic Family in accordance with Olympic rules and applicable laws of the United States. We will also ensure the safe passage of Soviet Aeroflot flights to and from our country and the visit of the Soviet vessel GRUZIA to the Long Beach Harbor area. In hosting the Games in this manner, it is the United States policy to ensure the establishment of all possible measures to prevent intelligence losses and reduce the vulnerability of national security activities to the hostile intelligence threat resulting from the Soviet flights or ship visit. It is of the utmost importance that US military and national security related facilities; sensitive contractor and industrial activities; weapons systems; and vessels be provided maximum protection against possible Soviet exploitation.

Agencies should take the following measures and all other appropriate actions to fulfill these policy objectives:

Overflight Security

(1) Charter flights by Soviet Aeroflot commercial aircraft for the Games will be subject to procedures established under the provisions of NSDD-107.
(2) Specific routings of the aircraft will be the responsibility of the Federal Aviation Administration under guidance from the Overflight Security Committee.

(3) These aircraft will be subject to boarding for Customs and other inspections as a condition for entry to the United States.

(4) US Escort crews for each Aeroflot flight will be provided in accordance with existing arrangements and procedures. These crews will ensure Soviet compliance with all US routing procedures.

Port Security

(1) The Port Security Committee will ensure the implementation of all actions required to carry out the policies set forth in this NSDD.

(2) The GRUZIA will be treated as a commercial, Soviet Special Interest Vessel and not as a public vessel. The vessel will be subject to boarding and searches at such times as necessary by the Coast Guard or other authorities.

(3) Waterside security will be the responsibility of the Coast Guard.

(4) Shoreside security will be provided for the vessel while it is in port.

(5) Radio Transmissions from the GRUZIA while it is berthed in Long Beach Harbor will not be permitted.

(6) The Department of Defense, in coordination with the Port Security Committee, will provide contractors and military installations in the vicinity of Long Beach with threat assessments concerning the GRUZIA and provide recommendations to ensure the security (i.e., secure operations, testing, etc.), of these activities.
(3) All military commands and agencies shall consider the intelligence threat posed by the visit of the Soviet ship in planning for and conducting military exercises and weapons systems tests in California, New Mexico, and Nevada during the period of the Soviet ship visit, including the possibility of modification or delay, and shall take appropriate countermeasures. (8)

Coordination

The Secretary of State, through the Counselor of the Department of State, in coordination with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is responsible for the administration of this NSDD. As appropriate, the Counselor should conduct meetings with those charged with fulfilling specific provisions of this NSDD. (8)

Note

As appropriate, the attached note, "comments concerning the 'Memorandum of discussions between the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee and representatives of the USSR National Olympic Committee'" which has been transmitted from the White House to the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, should be considered in conjunction with the terms of this NSDD in fulfilling the stated policy objectives in this document. (C)

Attachment

[Signature]