THE WHITE HOUSENATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 334
June 1, 1965
The Secretary of StateThe President has noted the request for nuclear weapons dispersal authorization for FY 1965/1966 contained in the Department of Defense memorandum dated May 24, 1965, and has taken the following actions in connection therewith:
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
1. The Atomic Energy Commission is authorized to:
a. Transfer to the Department of Defense, on call by the Secretary of Defense or his designee, sufficient numbers of separable nuclear components and complete atomic weapons to provide in Department of Defense custody as of June 30, 1966, up to a [number not declassified] nuclear elements. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] which are planned to be dispersed until end FY 1966 and which do not appear in the approved stockpile for FY 1966.2. The Department of Defense is authorized to:
b. Transfer additional weapons to the Department of Defense custody on a one-for-one basis, but not to exceed [number not declassified] weapons, to replace weapons recalled by the Atomic Energy Commission to support modernization, quality assurance and retirement programs;
c. Replace, on a one-for-one basis to the extent practicable, any nuclear components, complete atomic weapons, or non-nuclear components in the Department of Defense custody which become irretrievably lost or damaged beyond repair.
a. Obtain custody of up to a total of [number not declassified] elements; b. Disperse atomic weapons in the United States without limit providing the total number of nuclear components and complete atomic weapons in Department of Defense custody does not exceed that authorized in paragraph 2a above;3. It is understood that the currently authorized area level of nuclear warheads to be stored in Europe is adequate in numbers and megatonnage to meet requirements now recognized for use by U.S. or non-U.S. NATO forces. There will necessarily be changes required in the stockpile due to such things as modernization, redistribution among users, and possible changes in force dispositions. It is expected that the next and succeeding dispersal plans focus principally on changes of this sort as far as Europe is concerned, and that any recommendation for significant net increases in the European stockpile beyond the level authorized by this NSAM will be made only on the basis of new circumstances.
c. Disperse nuclear weapons to areas outside the United States in the numbers indicated in the last column of Appendix A hereto of the representative FY 1966 dispersal plan with the provisos that: (1) The total in each area may be exceeded by 10% in the event of unforeseen contingencies, (2) weapons for which dispersal in support of non-U.S. NATO forces is authorized for planning purposes only will be dispersed in support of U.S. forces in the areas pending additional and specific dispersal authorizations on a case-by-case basis and (3) the grand total of weapons outside the US (areas under foreign sovereignty and areas under U.S. control other than U.S.) will not [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Such dispersals will be subject to the yield restriction outlined in NSAM 143 and the policy with regard to PAL devices contained in NSAM 160. To the maximum extent possible, weapons earmarked for ultimate use in support of forecast allied nuclear capabilities will be dispersed and made available for U.S. forces, pending attainment of a capability by the allies.
d. Continue to disperse nuclear weapons and provide nuclear weapon support to non-U.S. forces in accordance with the current authorizations for dispersal as tabulated in the column "Non-US Forces--Authorized FY 1964" (Column C) of Appendix B hereto.
Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Action Memoranda, NSAM 334, Box 7. Top Secret; Restricted Data.