U.S. Drug Policy Director McCafffey Speaks on Colombia

Remarks of Barry R. McCaffrey
Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy
to The Atlantic Council of the United States

November 28, 2000

Regional Implications of Plan Colombia

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. It is a pleasure for me to be here
with you. Thank you for the opportunity to share the views of the
United States regarding Plan Colombia and our support for Colombia's
democracy and counterdrug efforts. We continue to believe strongly
that drug production, trafficking and abuse are problems that affect
every nation in the hemisphere, and indeed, nearly every country in
the world. For that reason, we must all work together to make our
societies safe and our nations strong.

In the last two decades, the countries of Latin America have
successfully surmounted a wide range of difficult challenges, from
political turmoil and economic recessions to population shifts and
natural disasters. During that time period, longstanding internal
conflicts and border disputes were resolved, economic transformations
were initiated, and democracy spread to encompass 34 of the region's
35 countries. While these accomplishments have created a framework for
continued advances in upcoming years, several potential obstacles
remain active within Latin America. Severe income distribution
inequalities persist, and poverty remains a way of life for roughly
one-third of the region's populace. Corruption blocks socio-economic
progress and undermines public faith in government institutions and
authorities. Violence and crime exact staggering tolls upon society,
in terms of both human costs and government resource allocation
requirements. These tenacious problems critically challenge the
institutional capabilities of Latin America's many democracies, both
nascent and long-standing.

While there may be several conditions that have conspired to
perpetuate these difficulties, perhaps none has been more detrimental
than the unique threat of the growing illicit drug trade. The easing
of political and trade barriers and the globalization of international
commerce, finance, and information technologies have made every
country in the region vulnerable to becoming a transit or market
country for illicit drugs. This increased vulnerability to the illicit
drug trade also heightens the risk of corruptive influences, amplified
criminality, and extended health and social problems that can pressure
and potentially undermine democratic foundations. As the Government of
Colombia endeavors to resolve the threat to its national security and
wellbeing, it has assistance from the U.S., many European nations, and
Japan, as well as the stated support of its regional neighbors. At the
same time, Colombia's neighbors are concerned about the possibility of
increased violence, refugee flows, and drug production as a result of
Colombian action against drug traffickers and the illegal armed groups
associated with drug trafficking. President Clinton has said that the
U.S. is prepared to assist Colombia's neighbors as they confront the
regional threat posed by drug trafficking and illegal armed groups.

The National Security Strategy of the United States recognizes
transnational threats, such as those posed by drug trafficking and
international crime as serious threats to the security of the United
States. It also identifies the threat of failed states and
environmental destruction as growing challenges to U.S. interests.
Drug trafficking increases a state's risk of entering into failed
state status and the ruin of its environment. Drug trafficking
undermines the democratic institutions of a country, distorts its
economy, increases corruption and fosters a complete disregard for
human rights. It is in the U.S. interest to ensure that these dire
effects do not emerge within Colombia's neighbors as Plan Colombia
takes effect. A long-term commitment is required to support efforts in
countries throughout the region to strengthen democratic institutions,
stimulate economic development, promote the rule of law and eliminate
illicit drug production and trafficking.

US Assistance for Colombia and the Region

The U.S. role in Colombia is limited but important. In February, 2000,
President Clinton presented an urgently-needed, two-year funding
package to Congress to assist Colombia in vital counter-drug efforts
aimed at keeping illegal drugs off U.S. streets and to help Colombia
promote peace, prosperity, and the continued growth of democracy.
President Clinton signed the supplemental package on July 13, 2000. It
stands as one of the largest and most comprehensive efforts ever by
the United States to assist an ally in Latin America with a national
emergency. And make no mistake - this was a grave national emergency
for Colombia, as evidenced by the drug-fueled deaths of 22,957
Colombian citizens in 1999.

Colombia's drug elimination plan has a high potential for success in
the first phase because drug production is concentrated in the south
and vulnerable to eradication. In the long term, Plan Colombia will
succeed because it works at the village and farm cooperative level to
introduce programs to support the evolution away from a drug economy.
These programs include infrastructure development for marketing
legitimate crops and technical assistance for the grass-roots
organizations that contract for a program of verified voluntary coca
reduction. This approach was successful in Peru and Bolivia once those
countries could provide basic security for the civilian programs and
there was a reasonable threat of eradication without compensation for
organizations that fail to keep their promises to eliminate drug
crops.

Security is one of Colombia's greatest challenges, especially
considering the profits to be made by the illegal armed groups that
control the drug producing areas. It is the main reason why U.S.
assistance has a strong military component. The current fighting
between guerrillas and AUC in the south has brought a halt to
counterdrug operations in the region, including the vital alternative
economic development programs. Assisting the Colombian government with
training and equipment to regain lawful control of the drug producing
regions will enable it to protect and serve its citizens as well as
reduce illegal drug production.

A viable peace process will ultimately be Colombia's best hope to
achieve peace and stop the bloodshed that has marked the country for
forty years. We firmly believe that our assistance package supports
such a process and makes it possible to achieve a just peace in
Colombia. An end to the instability in Colombia would, in and of
itself, be a great boon to the neighboring countries, which all suffer
to one degree or another, from the instability and violence on their
borders.

Regional Implications

The effects of a de facto unification of drug traffickers and illegal
armed groups that control vast territory for drug cultivation and
production reach far beyond the boundaries of Colombia. The drug money
that fuels Colombia's internal conflict is also causing instability
throughout the Andean Region. For example, the violence associated
with this ongoing conflict has contributed to Colombian nationals
crossing temporarily into neighboring countries such as Venezuela,
Ecuador, and Panama. In the United States, illegal drugs cost the US
52,000 lives and $110 billion in accidents, lost productivity, and
property damage each year. Approximately 90 percent of the cocaine
coming into the United States originates in or passes through
Colombia, and two-thirds of the heroin seized in the United States
comes from Colombia as well. By assisting Colombia with its response
to its emergency situation, the United States aids its own domestic
circumstance; by extending support throughout the affected region, we
seek to bolster our own opportunities for continued success and
security.

The primary focus of this supplemental effort is to provide support
for Colombia's intensifying counterdrug effort. As a matter of
Administration policy, the United States will not support Colombian
counterinsurgency efforts. The United States will, however, provide
support to the Government of Colombia for force protection and for
security directly related to counterdrug efforts, regardless of the
source of the threat. Overall, US support to Plan Colombia reflects
both Colombian and regional concerns, and is based on linked
initiatives to: (1) provide counterdrug assistance to help the
Colombian police and military combat drug production and trafficking
in the extensive coca growing regions in southern Colombia; (2)
supplement major increases in Colombian alternative economic
development programs; (3) strengthen governing capacity and develop
better programs to enhance the rule of law and to support respect for
human rights; (4) support Colombia's economic recovery; (5) promote
progress in Colombia's peace process; (6) enhance regional capacity
for the interdiction of illicit drugs and related precursor chemicals;
and (7) support alternative development programs that build on
successful efforts in Peru and Bolivia while initiating programs in
Ecuador."

Complementary Regional Support

The United States recognizes that the massive effort to restore the
rule of law in Colombia will have implications throughout the region.
In fact, the language of the act of law containing the assistance
package highlights this need by noting that "this effort requires a
greater regional emphasis so that the problems associated with the
cultivation, processing and trafficking of illegal narcotics are not
simply relocated elsewhere in the region." The assistance package,
though focused on Colombia, contains $180 million to support
counterdrug efforts in other countries in the region and to counter
any attempts by the traffickers to relocate their illicit enterprises.

The United States and its allies in the region have a unique
opportunity to make a longterm impact on drug cultivation and
trafficking in Latin America now that the majority of coca cultivation
and cocaine production is centralized in one country. To accomplish
this goal, however, our collective planning must reflect the surest
lesson of the many years of counterdrug efforts - the illicit drug
traffickers will try to adapt to changes in their environment, such as
those projected in Plan Colombia. If the price of coca continues to
climb, Peru and Bolivia could backslide into increased coca growth in
recently eradicated regions; as the processing infrastructure in
Colombia is disassembled, similar capabilities could emerge in Brazil,
Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela. It is therefore imperative that the
United States and its allies prepare policies and programs to address
the related threats that may emerge or expand throughout the region.

The illegal drug producers already appear to be shifting their
operations within Colombia. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) are
fighting each other over the existing coca plantations in the Putumayo
department. This interaction is displacing individuals from that
region to other parts of Colombia and causing refugees to seek
temporary safety in Ecuador. Illicit drug producers are also moving
both north and further east within Colombia and may be planning for
possible relocations to Venezuela and Brazil, although the easiest
moves would be to go elsewhere in Colombia.

In Peru, traffickers have adjusted routes and methods to reduce the
effectiveness of law enforcement and interdiction operations. Peruvian
coca prices have been rising since March 1998, making alternative
development and eradication more difficult. Farmers are returning to
abandoned fields and the central growing areas are being rejuvenated.
Clearly, rebounding cultivation in Peru would be a setback to regional
counterdrug efforts. Moreover, the current political instability may
hinder continued eradication in the Upper Huallaga Valley and expanded
alternative crop development.

In Bolivia, the Banzer administration continues to achieve dramatic
reductions in illicit coca cultivation, but there is cause for long-
term concern. The infrastructure of the cocaine industry is largely
still intact and prices are climbing. Tragically, desperate coca
farmers have instigated many acts of violence (as recently as last
month) resulting in the deaths of several Bolivian citizens. In
addition, the demand for alternative development assistance in Bolivia
now substantially outstrips supply. Progress continues to depend upon
the will of the Banzer Administration to incur considerable political
risk as it attempts to reduce coca cultivation while increasing licit
income alternatives. Increased support to address the alternative
development issue and to facilitate justice sector and institutional
reform will be necessary to ensure that the gains are not reversed.

In addition to its increasing significance as a transshipment site for
the cocaine industry, Ecuador's proximity and terrain could make it an
ideal relocation option for narcotraffickers in southern Colombia. In
the past, Ecuador has been able to deter coca cultivators from
establishing a foothold there by maintaining a credible government
presence in the region Ecuador's will to continue that strong
deterrence is unquestionable. Nonetheless the challenge is made more
difficult because it comes at a time when Ecuador is being stressed by
a variety of factors. The U.S. and its allies need to seek the means
to increase support to create a significant positive impact in the
areas of justice sector and institutional reform, interdiction
capabilities, alternative development, and environmental programs in
Ecuador.

Panama is already being tested by violent incursions into the Darien
and San Bias regions by Colombian guerrillas and paramilitaries, where
Panama's inadequately trained and equipped police forces are no match
for the insurgents. The country's overall counterdrug effort is
further complicated by expansive money laundering in its off-shore
banking system and the inability of their law enforcement institutions
to properly detect and prosecute these violations. As the Government
of Colombia increases the pressure on the guerrillas and
paramilitaries, these groups can be expected to increase the frequency
of their incursions into Panama.

Venezuela is a significant transit route for illegal drugs destined
for the U.S. and Europe, with over 100 metric tons of cocaine
transiting Venezuela annually by some estimates. Air and maritime
smuggling are both conducted through Venezuela, due to a transit
volume that greatly surpasses the capabilities of their interdiction
forces. Furthermore, some processing operations have recently
relocated from Colombia, making Venezuela a secondary source country,
with the potential for additional growth as Colombian traffickers seek
to shift their production base. Recent counter-drug successes in
Venezuela, such as the 8.8 metric tons of cocaine seized in August
2000 by the international law enforcement operation "Orinoco,"
indicate that at the operational level there are opportunities to make
an impact through cooperative efforts.

Due to its proximity to Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Venezuela, Brazil
is becoming a major transit country for illegal drugs destined for
Europe. Until now, Brazil's remote and sparsely populated border has
experienced limited spillover from the Colombia conflict. Due to
concerns over recent confrontations between Colombian security forces
and the FARC in the border region, Brazil has taken additional steps
to defend its sovereignty. Brazil will soon install a nation-wide air
traffic surveillance network that could help in the struggle against
narcotraffickers, but most illegal drugs transiting Brazil today are
believed to be travelling via land or river systems. The Amazon Basin
is another logical area for the illicit drug traffickers to target for
infrastructure development as they search for additional territories
that pose difficulties for effective law enforcement.

Regionally, the United States is also committed to initiatives that
increase cooperation between countries and supplement our ability to
provide direct support to the counterdrug efforts of our partner
nations. We will continue the development of the U.S. Forward
Operating Location (FOL) infrastructure, enabling more effective
regional counterdrug operations in both source and transit countries.
We will also expand our programs for regional justice sector training,
demand reduction, alternative development, and humanitarian assistance
for refugees. Non-programmatic efforts to support the Colombian peace
process, to share information regarding the intent and impact of Plan
Colombia (particularly with non-governmental organizations), and to
encourage greater cooperation on regional border security and law
enforcement issues will also be important factors in the overall
success of our regional programs.

The crisis in the Andean Region has precipitated a need for a major
U.S. effort to protect its national interests in stemming the flow of
illegal drugs, supporting democracy and human rights, and encouraging
free economic development by supporting the counterdrug efforts of our
regional allies. There is strong political will in Colombia, Peru, and
Bolivia to attack the drug trade, root out corruption, end violence,
and establish peace and security within the framework of democracy and
respect for human rights. There is also strong will in the governments
of Ecuador, Panama, Venezuela, and Brazil to counter the negative
impact of the illicit drug trade in their own territories. While there
will undoubtedly be some impact to neighboring countries as the
Government of Colombia moves in to restore the rule of law in its drug
producing regions, the impact of increased criminal activity, internal
conflict, and instability would have far greater consequences for all
of us. We will continue to work with all the nations in the region to
ameliorate any negative consequences that may occur as a result of
increased counterdrug efforts in Colombia.

President Pastrana is on the right track. With international
solidarity and support for Colombia's broad-based long-term strategy,
drug traffickers and terrorist groups can be deprived of their income,
drug production will be crippled, and Colombia's long-suffering people
might secure their basic right to earn a legitimate income without
fearing for their lives. Plan Colombia will work. It will not be a
quick or easy process, but it is a process that will lead to economic
recovery, internal security and respect for human rights, a stronger
commitment to democracy and the rule of law, and increased stability
in the region. We will all be benefit from Plan Colombia's success.