22 June 1999
(Accountability, responsibility, authority key for reform) (2310) Washington -- The overarching principle directing efforts to improve the Department of Energy's security procedures is that the Secretary of Energy "must be accountable, responsible, and must have full authority," Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson said in June 22 testimony before a joint hearing of the Senate Select Intelligence, Armed Services, and Governmental Affairs and Natural Resources Committees. Richardson outlined four guidelines for current reform efforts: -- one, ensuring that there is a clear chain of command and accountability for implementing national security policy; -- two, raising the profile and authority of the nuclear weapons program to overcome the systemic and long-lived security problems identified by both the Cox and Advisory Board reports; -- three, ensuring that Security and Counterintelligence programs have a senior Departmental advocate, with no conflicts of interest; and -- four, ensuring that "Stockpile Stewardship" doesn't lose its link to cutting edge science. Richardson expressed strong concerns about a proposal by former Senator Warren Rudman and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) to create a semi-autonomous agency within the Department of Energy to oversee nuclear security. "From my experience, the Department needs more engagement from the Secretary of Energy and his or her office in the nuclear weapons program. I am concerned that fencing-off the nation's nuclear weapons program would blur the cabinet secretary's role," he said. Richardson added that "our ability to ensure the safety and reliability of the nuclear deterrent depends upon cutting-edge science. An autonomous agency would partition the laboratory system and ultimately undermine the science on which our national security depends." "A bureaucratic 'Berlin Wall' between the weapons labs and the science labs would hamper the joint research they perform and weaken the quality of basic science at the weapons labs. The nuclear weapons program depends on unclassified, cutting-edge science; requires active engagement with the other national laboratories and contact with the international community; and needs overall scientific excellence to recruit and retain the best and brightest scientific minds for the weapons program," he said. Following is the text of Richardson's testimony, as prepared for delivery: (begin text) PREPARED WRITTEN STATEMENT OF SECRETARY BILL RICHARDSON U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE JUNE 22, 1999 Thank you, Mr. Chairmen and Members of the Committees, for the opportunity to discuss how to improve security and counterintelligence at the Department of Energy. No mission is more important to me than taking the actions necessary to ensure that America's nuclear secrets are well guarded. We've made considerable progress, but I won't admit perfection. And I'm looking forward to working with the Congress and Senator Rudman on ways to make things better. PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD REPORT Senator Rudman and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board have prepared a thorough, hard-hitting report that identifies the root causes of the long-standing security and counterintelligence problems at the Department of Energy. A confusing organizational structure. Lack of accountability. Unclear roles and responsibilities. And a lack of attention to security. I want to thank Chairman Rudman and his Panel for recognizing the aggressive steps we've already taken to address serious and systemic security problems at the Department's labs; and for making additional recommendations that can help address the critical nature of the problems. Chairman Rudman identifies a list of attributes that must characterize meaningful reform. I agree with virtually all of the attributes -- such as the need for leadership, clarity of mission, and streamlined field operations. The Presidential Decision Directive and the reforms I've undertaken are based on some of the same basic principles -- about what is needed to address the underlying problems. After several months of wrestling with the problems at the Department, I think it is essential that any reform of Departmental organization ensure that certain criteria are met: PRINCIPLES The overarching principle is that the Secretary of Energy must be accountable, responsible, and must have full authority. First: We must ensure that there is a clear chain of command and accountability for implementing national security policy. I have already undertaken a major reorganization of the headquarters-to-field relationship, which clarifies reporting lines and responsibilities across the complex. In my plan, the chain of command is clear and accountability is established for the nuclear weapons program -- the three weapons laboratories and all of our nuclear weapons sites and facilities throughout the complex report to the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs. Second: We must raise, not lower, the profile and authority of the nuclear weapons program to overcome the systemic and long-lived security problems identified by both the Cox and Advisory Board reports. From my experience, the Department needs more engagement from the Secretary of Energy and his or her office in the nuclear weapons program. I am concerned that fencing-off the nation's nuclear weapons program would blur the cabinet secretary's role. Third: We must ensure that Security and Counterintelligence programs have a senior Departmental advocate, with no conflicts of interest. The only way to assure that is to have a separation between the office responsible for the nuclear weapons program and the office responsible for establishing and monitoring security and counterintelligence policies. That's the only way you can assure that security decisions aren't shortchanged and that they are not competing for the time and attention of senior management, as well as budgetary resources. And Fourth: We must ensure that Stockpile Stewardship doesn't lose its link to cutting edge science. Our ability to ensure the safety and reliability of the nuclear deterrent depends upon cutting-edge science. An autonomous agency would partition the laboratory system and ultimately undermine the science on which our national security depends. A bureaucratic "Berlin Wall" between the weapons labs and the science labs would hamper the joint research they perform and weaken the quality of basic science at the weapons labs. The nuclear weapons program depends on unclassified, cutting-edge science; requires active engagement with the other national laboratories and contact with the international community; and needs overall scientific excellence to recruit and retain the best and brightest scientific minds for the weapons program. REFORMS When I went through all the recommendations that the PFIAB proposes -- 43 in number -- I found that my new security plan embraces 38 of them. That's almost 90 percent. That's a lot of common ground on which we can work. Let me quickly run through some of the reforms we've already put in place. 1. Counterintelligence In February 1998, President Clinton ordered that the Department of Energy improve its security dramatically, and implement an innovative, comprehensive counterintelligence and cyber-security plan. By November of last year, I approved a far-reaching, aggressive new plan, improving background checks on visitors; document controls; use of polygraphs; and increases in our counterintelligence budget -- which has grown by a factor of 15 since 1996. In March, we took additional steps for counterintelligence upgrades, security training, and threat awareness, and focused an additional $8 million dollars on further securing classified and unclassified computer networks. And when I was informed of the serious computer transfer issue at Los Alamos, I ordered a complete stand-down of the classified computer systems at our three weapons laboratories -- Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia -- to accelerate computer security measures already underway. The systems only went back on-line only when I was convinced that significant progress had been made. As of today, we have implemented 85 percent of the key recommendations in our Counterintelligence Action plan. 2. Security I came to the Department of Energy after having served about 12 years on the House Energy and Commerce Committee, where I came to understand the magnitude of the security management problems facing the Department. You see, Chairman Dingell had held a few hearings on this subject. One of the first steps I undertook was figure out how to untangle the maze of illogical reporting relationships between the labs, the field offices and headquarters to clarify chain of command and establish accountability. That reorganization was completed April 21st. Then on May 11th, I took the next step needed to bring about accountability and put some teeth into the security operation with the farthest-reaching security reorganization in the Department of Energy's history. We established a new, high-level Office of Security and Emergency Operations -- gathering all Departmental security functions in one place and answering directly to me. Last Thursday, retired four star general Gene Habiger accepted the position as the Department's first Director of the Office of Security and Emergency Operations. General Habiger brings to this job his experience as the Commander in Chief of Strategic Command where he was in charge of the U.S. nuclear forces. As Security Czar, General Habiger will rebuild the entire Department's security, cyber-security and counterterrorism apparatus, as well as our emergency response operations. He will be the single focal point for security policy and ensuring that security is rigorously implemented across the Department complex. We all know that any organizational structure is only as good as its people. We should all thank General Habiger for being willing to serve his country once more. This is itself an endorsement that the Office of Security and Emergency Operations will succeed. These are some of the measures that we've already undertaken. I believe that these changes embody the attributes that the PFIAB identifies as critical to meaningful reform and have already had a dramatic impact on the security of the labs. But clearly more needs to be done. And I am looking carefully at the recommendations in the PFIAB report; I've been meeting with Senators and Congressmen as we try to sort out what additional steps are needed, and which of these changes or measures we should codify to ensure that the changes are institutionalized and last beyond the tenure of any one Secretary of Energy or Committee Chairman. There is much common ground. I think we can work from that common ground to build on what has already been accomplished and make even more-sweeping Department reforms than the Advisory Board recommends. But I do have concerns about the creation of the autonomous or semi-autonomous entity -- especially if we're trying to solve the security and counterintelligence problems at the Department. Security and counterintelligence problems cut across all of the Department's missions, and are not limited to the weapons labs and production sites. We need to improve security at all sites -- and fencing off the weapons complex is not the answer. Plutonium located at our environmental management sites demands the same level of security as plutonium at Los Alamos. And classified research at Argonne National Laboratory must be as secure from espionage as classified nuclear information at Livermore National Laboratory. That's why we need oversight organizations -- in Counterintelligence, Health and Safety, and Security -- that make policy to cover the entire Department and that are separate from the office implementing security. This is the only -- let me emphasize: the only -- effective way for senior Department managers and Congress to get independent information about what is going on within the Department. This is also the exact model that NSA, NRO, DOD, CIA, and others use. The problems we have had in the past have been directly related to the fact that there have not been strong independent organizations whose sole mission is counterintelligence or security. Security and counterintelligence competed against requirements of the stockpile stewardship program for resources and the time and attention of senior managers. Security and counterintelligence did not have the clout to effect change. We've taken action to correct this situation with the creation of an independent offices of Counterintelligence, Security and Oversight reporting directly to me. It would be a step backward to put these functions under the thumb of the director whose operations they are supposed to be evaluating. Let me illustrate this with one example. Chairman Thompson's Senate Governmental Affairs Committee is one of the most active oversight committees in Congress. Imagine how Department of Energy oversight would be hurt if Chairman Thompson and Ranking member Lieberman were my employees. I would think that was great -- no hearings, no interviews, no document requests that I didn't support. But it wouldn't make for good oversight. Let me conclude by saying that organizational changes alone are not sufficient. The Rudman report states that "even if every aspect of the ongoing structural reforms is fully implemented, the most powerful guarantor of security at the nation's weapons laboratories will not be laws, regulations, or management charts. It will be the attitudes and behavior of the men and women who are responsible for the operation of the labs each day. These will not change overnight, and they are likely to change only in a different cultural environment -- one that values security as a vital and integral part of day-to-day activities and believes it can coexist with great science." And this is an extremely important point: I think the Rudman report should be required reading for every employee at the Department of Energy and its national labs. I think it's a wake-up call. Last week, after reading the report, I ordered all managers and employees at three nuclear defense national laboratories -- Los Alamos, Livermore, and Sandia -- to undergo a full-scale security immersion program. For two days -- yesterday and today -- the labs are focusing on training so that each and every employee knows their security responsibilities. Change will not occur overnight, and our goal here today should be to focus on how we can ensure that the changes we undertake are indeed lasting changes. There is a large patch of common ground here. Let's work together to find the best way to institutionalize changes that will ensure that this department provides science and security at its best. (end text)