News

12 March 1998

TRANSCRIPT: STATE DEPARTMENT NOON BRIEFING, MARCH 11




DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING INDEX
Wednesday, March 11, 1998
Briefer:  James P. Rubin




IRAQ


15-17 Initial judicial finding that 6 Iraqis are ineligible for
immigration relief in the U.S./Evacuation of Iraqi Kurds and
opposition members in 1996/USG relationship with the Iraqi opposition



...............


Q: Jamie, there apparently has been a court ruling that will result in
the deportation of six members of the Iraqi National Congress or the
Iraqi opposition, where generally -- first of all, what can you tell
us that you know about the details of this, and what does that do to
the Administration's efforts to work better with the Iraqi opposition,
as stated some weeks ago?


RUBIN: Let me give you a little background for people to understand it
properly. It's a very complex issue. After Saddam Hussein brutally
struck into northern Iraq in September 1996, a large number of Iraqis,
most of whom had close connections to the United States, sought our
protection. With the help of the government of Turkey, the United
States Government evacuated over 6,500 Iraqis, mostly Kurds, from Iraq
to Guam and then to the United States. These were mostly Iraqis who
were associated with humanitarian programs in northern Iraq.


This was an honorable and humanitarian effort to protect Iraqis who
would otherwise have been harmed by Saddam's troops. We were aware at
the time that Saddam had many infiltrators in northern Iraq, and to
the extent we could, we would quickly review the backgrounds of these
individuals prior to the evacuation. But because of the urgent
circumstances surrounding the evacuation, we deferred complete
background checks. Once the individuals arrived in Guam, further
background investigations were completed and 25 individuals were
identified as persons we believe to pose threats to our national
security. The INS placed these individuals into exclusion proceedings
on the grounds that they could pose a threat to the national security.
They were brought to California for hearings before immigration
judges. These cases are in various stages of the immigration process.


Yesterday, a judge found that six of these individuals were ineligible
for immigration relief based on classified information developed by
the US Government indicating that these individuals posed a danger to
our national security. No final decisions have been made about what
the US Government will do if the exclusion orders in these cases
become final. Further questions about the disposition of these six
need to be directed at the Justice Department.


With respect to how this will affect the prospect of working with
opposition groups, let me say that we have no doubt that the people of
Iraq and the rest of the world would be better off with a new
government in Baghdad, but such an effort is a long-term process and
involves many costs and risks. We have worked with the Iraqi
opposition in the past and we are actively considering ways to do so
more effectively in the future. The Senate, as you know, has put
forward some ideas. Some of those are very interesting to us and we
are carefully reviewing them. For example, Radio Free Iraq is an
interesting idea that we are examining.


With regard to humanitarian assistance, this is complicated by the
fact that we have just increased the quota for northern Iraq to $682
million in humanitarian assistance, and before providing any
humanitarian assistance to such an area, we would want to make sure we
were using the money wisely.


With regard to war crimes, we have supported the calls for an
investigation into the Iraqi regime's war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and possible genocide. In short, there are a lot of ideas
out there. We are exploring them and I don't think the disposition of
these cases has any impact on our ability to work more effectively
with the Iraqi opposition that has been -- it's been difficult to work
with in the past.


Q: I'm sorry, if I may follow up. You started off with 25 and then six
had sort of reached this level. Do you know what happened to the
balance?


RUBIN:  You'll have to check with the Department of Justice on that.



Q: Do you think that these six necessarily face retaliation or that
their lives may be in danger?


RUBIN: Again, the Department of Justice, in coordination with other
agencies, will obviously be deciding what to do with them. And when
those decisions are made -- no final decisions have been made -- we'll
be in a position to judge or to explain why we took whatever actions
we decide to take.


Q: You're saying then that these six people were identified as
infiltrators, Iraqi agents?


RUBIN:  I didn't say that.



Q: No, you said that we were aware at the time that Saddam had many
infiltrators in northern Iraq, then you described 25 people who were
identified as such and singled out.


RUBIN: No, I didn't say that. Sid, if you're going to read real
carefully and try to catch me, then you should really listen more
carefully. I said that we were aware that Saddam had infiltrators in
the north and we wanted to review people's backgrounds. We didn't have
a chance. When I got to a description of why 25 were isolated, I did
not say that they were isolated because they were, you know,
infiltrated by Saddam Hussein. I said that we believe they posed a
threat to our national security.


Q: So are you saying they were not -- you're just not commenting on
that?


RUBIN:  Correct.



Q:  Do we have the Korea briefing coming right after this?



RUBIN:  Yes.  In the back, yes.



Q: Jamie, among the ideas that the Administration is considering in
terms of supporting Iraqi opposition -- of people in the Iraqi
opposition, would supplying arms be one of them?


RUBIN:  I'm sorry.  Please repeat the question.



Q: You listed several ideas like Radio Free Iraq that the
Administration is looking at and possibly considering for support to
help the Iraqi opposition. Would supporting -- or giving weapons to
the opposition also be one of those efforts?


RUBIN: The question of how we would implement any decision to more
effectively support the opposition is something that is under
discussion. I wouldn't be in a position to describe what tactics we
might pursue.


.......


(end transcript)