27 February 1998
(Denies decertification hurts Colombia's anti-drug fight) (4950) Washington -- A State Department official disputes a report issued by the General Accounting Office (GAO) that says decertification of Colombia for the last two years has harmed that country's efforts to fight narcotics trafficking. "We disagree that the decertification process has harmed Colombia," said Randy Beers, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Matters, at a State Department press briefing February 26. The subject of the briefing was the release of the annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). The INCSR, produced by the State Department, provides the factual basis for the presidential narcotics certification determinations. U.S. law requires that each year the President "certify" to Congress countries where drug are produced or trafficked which are making "adequate progress" toward achieving the goals of the UN convention on the control of narcotic and psychotropic substances. He must also identify, or "decertify," those countries he determines do not meet that standard. This year, President Clinton certified 22 countries. Four received conditional certification, and four others were decertified. "Decertification" results in substantial restriction of most types of U.S. assistance to these countries. Although Colombia was decertified for the last two years, this year the United States granted Colombia a conditional certification based on "vital national interests" in Colombia. According to the INCSR, Colombia remains the world's leading producer and distributor of cocaine and is an important supplier of heroin to the United States. Although the Colombian government made progress on several levels against narcotrafficking, problems persist, the INCSR says, because of narcotics-related corruption, an underfunded and inadequate judicial system and a lack of adequate political will on some issues in both the executive and legislative branches. However, Beers said, even though Colombia was decertified, the United States attempted to aid the Colombian government's fight against narcotics producers and traffickers. "One of the general charges which people make," Beers said, "is that we have decreased assistance to Colombia as a result of the decertification. In fact, our calculations indicate that that is not the case; the opposite is true." He pointed out that U.S. counter-narcotics assistance to Colombia has steadily risen -- from $28.85 million in 1995 to $62.93 million in 1996 and $95.95 million in 1997. U.S. counter-narcotics assistance for 1998 will be comparable to or greater than the 1997 figures, Beers predicted. U.S. decisions to decertify Colombia in the preceding two years were not related to the record of the Colombian National Police, "who have performed admirably and courageously," Beers said. Beers noted that he has recently visited Colombia "because it was my own personal view that Colombia was at a critical turning point...." He said he met with the leadership in the Ministry of Defense, as well as the National Police and other government officials and traveled around the country to see counter-narcotics efforts. "I came back very encouraged that the prospects for cooperation in the future are significant and that the government is prepared to move in that direction, particularly under the leadership of General Serrano," Beers said. Following is the State Department transcript: (begin transcript) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of the Spokesman February 26, 1998 ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT MATTERS, RANDY BEERS ON RELEASE OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (INCSR) Washington, D.C. MR. RUBIN: Thank you very much. Randy Beers will now come to the podium and take all your specific questions. ASSISTANT SECRETARY BEERS: Well, thank you all the Secretary, General McCaffrey, the Attorney General. They've covered most of the major points on the certification issue, and I'll take questions. But first, let me make sure that everybody has available or is aware of what is available in the way of information that we are providing. You should all have your green copies of the INCSR, the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. You should have a red package, which contains in it a description of the process; the law; the '88 UN Convention. After questions, there should be available at the exits the fact sheets on eight countries Belize, Colombia, Mexico, Pakistan, Iran, Paraguay and Syria and Lebanon as well as well as the 30 statements of explanation for the 30 major countries which were certified today. So you'll have available all of that information. I believe also Director McCaffrey's remarks will be available at the exits, as well. The Secretary's remarks will probably be available later in the day. Let me take questions now. Q: Mr. Beers, did you inform Congress beforehand about the waiver for Colombia? And did you get any reaction from their members? BEERS: The procedure is that as soon as the President has signed and informed the Secretary of State that the document has been signed, Members of Congress are called by members of the Administration. They are called directly. I attempted to speak to five members of Congress. I didn't get through to any of them, but the calling attempt is made. Those calls began about 11:00 o'clock. this morning. So did anyone get through? I'm sure someone got through to somebody. The attempt is made, in the spirit of the law. Q: Did you get any reaction? BEERS: No, not that I'm aware of. Q: Senator Coverdell has said that he wants to know why Mexico didn't also get just a waiver, and is scheduling hearings this afternoon on it. BEERS: There are some hearings this afternoon, that's correct. I think that the Secretary and General McCaffrey both spoke quite eloquently on the basis of the decision. But let me simply repeat again what they had already said. Mexico, in the course of the past year, has implemented a broad-based strategy to address the serious drug problems that exist in Mexico, that they acknowledge. They have passed new legislation to control the diversion of chemicals. They have released new regulations to strengthen the money-laundering control regime. They have increased cocaine seizures and crop eradication. They have initiated meaningful institutional reforms in the criminal justice system. And the Mexican Government has worked closely with the United States to build an effective partnership, as indicated by the bi-national strategy which Director McCaffrey and Foreign Secretary Green announced last week. So I think that we have the basis of a solid cooperative arrangement, relationship between ourselves and Mexico. And Mexico is fully certified based on the facts. Q: There is a new GAO report released today GAO report that was released this morning on the fact that supposedly the decertification of Colombia last year could have been detrimental to the drug fight directly in Colombia. I don't know if you're familiar with the report, if you could comment on it. And also, I wanted to ask you if your recent visit to Colombia helped in any way in the decision this year. BEERS: Let me talk briefly about the GAO report, which I have not had an opportunity to read but have some familiarity with. With respect to the central charge which you make in your statement, we disagree that the decertification process has harmed Colombia. One of the general charges which people make is that we have decreased assistance to Colombia as a result of the decertification. In fact, our calculations indicate that that is not the case; the opposite is true. In '95, we provided approximately $28.85 million; in '96, we provided approximately $62.93 million; in '97, we provided $95.95 million. And we expect that the total this year will be comparable or greater. So if one measures it simply in terms of assistance, we do not regard that to be the case. If one looks at other statistics, in the case of the performance of the Colombian National Police, I think it will also be clear that those statistics have risen over this same time frame, which is why we continue to say, in every instance, that the decisions to decertify Colombia in the preceding two years were not related to the performance of the Colombian National Police, who have performed admirably and courageously. With respect to my own trip to Colombia and this decision, as I came to this job from elsewhere, but with some experience in the counter-narcotics world, I came with the expressed desire on my own part to move immediately to understand the situation in Colombia, because it was my own personal view that Colombia was at a critical turning point and that we needed to recognize that and do something about it. My trip to Colombia allowed me to familiarize myself again with the situation on the ground. And General Serrano and the minister of defense took me around the country and showed me what their forces were doing; and I spoke to the leadership in the Ministry of Defense, as well as the National Police and other government officials. And I came back very encouraged that the prospects for cooperation in the future are significant and that the government is prepared to move in that direction, particularly under the leadership of General Serrano. Q: Yes. Thank you. It is reported today that the and has been said by the Secretary, that there will be a multinational certification force or group. Will this process be run out of the Organization of American States, as is being reported? Is that what's going to happen to the certification process -- that the responsibility is going to be spread out? BEERS: I think that it's premature to talk about precisely where this process is going to end up, but I can talk very briefly about what we're doing now. In association with the Santiago Summit, which is coming up, and in part of our general effort to increase the awareness and attention of countries in the hemisphere to the drug problem, we have begun, in that context, to discuss the concept of a multinational cooperative effort against drugs. This represents a logical progression from earlier drug summits at Cartagena and San Antonio, in previous Administrations, and the Summit of Americas earlier in this Administration, in which we looked seriously at expanding our drug cooperation within the hemisphere to an increasingly stronger effort. This, then, forms the initial basis, followed by a general concept of each nation developing its own national strategy and its own objectives and measures of effectiveness. At the end of that process, it may be that we will come to decide that we want, then, to look at one another's individual efforts, both to see how we can fit them together more effectively, in order that we deal with what is a trans-national issue in an international fashion. And then we can also look at whether or not the effectiveness of those programs accords with the effectiveness of other countries' programs. So that it could be, at the end of that process, that nations will look at and make judgments on one another's own national strategies and effectiveness. But that is a very long-term goal, and I wouldn't want to say how that's going to end up or who's going to run it or exactly how it will be run. But that's the general framework that we're talking about. Q: So the U.S. may continue to do certification? BEERS: The U.S. is required by law to do certification. Until Congress changes that law, we will continue to obey the law. Q: Can you tell us any more about the progress that you say you see in Iran? And do you plan any attempt at direct cooperation with the Iranians on candid narcotics strategy? BEERS: As the Secretary indicated, there have been reports which are uncorroborated that suggest that Iran is in fact making progress in the counter-narcotics area. Over the course of the next year, we will seek in a variety of ways to corroborate those reports so that we can make a determination based on confirmable evidence. I'm not at this time in a position to tell you exactly how we're going to go about confirming that information. So I wouldn't want to mislead you one way or the other. Q: Yes, I would like to know exactly what are the differences in the Colombian position right now and the difference between the two years before, when we get the certification. BEERS: I think that the best way to look at this year's decision is to consider the general situation in Colombia today. Over the course of the last year, ironically as a result of the success of the air interdiction effort in Peru and the drastic reduction in cultivation of coca in Peru, the traffickers have begun to increase in a very significant fashion the amount of coca cultivated in Colombia. We saw an initial indication of that last year. It has mushroomed this year. So we are seriously concerned that the traffickers, as a result of their efforts to consolidate their own enterprise in the area of Colombia which is least controlled by the central government the south and east have presented us with a new trafficking situation. In addition to that, we have noticed that the guerrillas and the para-militaries have also both moved in a more significant way into trafficking enterprise for the express purpose of obtaining additional revenue. That makes them more vibrant forces against the central government, and we are concerned about the deteriorating security situation in Colombia, as well. Therefore, despite the great efforts by the Colombian national police, we have come to the conclusion that there is a requirement on the part of ourselves and the government of Colombia for a more robust counter-narcotics program in Colombia. And as a result of the decertification process, our ability to affect such a program is circumscribed by the law. So for the purpose of entering into this more robust program, we have made the determination to put forward a national interest waiver with respect to Colombia, in order to position ourselves for deeper and broader counter-narcotics cooperation with Colombia with the full flexibility and the kinds of broad- based support that we will need to conduct this campaign. It is a campaign for the future, a campaign for democracy in Colombia and the rule of law. That's the basis of this year's decision, which we believe is different in situation from last year. Q: So in effect, Colombia has made no progress; it's just in the U.S. interest to be able to funnel some kinds of aid and counter-narcotics efforts toward Colombia, so the waiver was granted. BEERS: The decision not to certify Colombia fully is an indication that the United States is not prepared to make a judgment in that regard. So Colombian progress was not judged to be fully cooperative with the United States, or to have conducted on their own those measures that the 1988 UN Vienna Convention requires. The law gives us the opportunity to make a waiver. I don't mean, however, to say that there was nothing that the Government of Colombia did. As I have repeated, the Colombian national police and other counter-narcotics forces in Colombia have performed admirably. Seizures are up; arrests are up; eradication, despite the growth of coca is the largest single amount of eradication by any country in any year. It's remarkable. But the traffickers moved more significantly than we were able to move in the eradication area, even though in the area of targeting, there was a 25 percent decrease. They were growing elsewhere. Q: For Colombia, what's the difference? They what do they get now that they would not already before with the full the certification? BEERS: Certification as an instrument affects two general areas. Firstly, it prohibits the giving of assistance, except for counter-narcotics assistance and specialized kinds of humanitarian assistance, which means that the U.S. does not have full flexibility to provide assistance to Colombia. Secondly, it means that the United States is required, in the international development banks, to vote against funding for assistance to Colombia. It is in those areas that we now wish to retain full flexibility to provide assistance to Colombia so that our broad-based counter-narcotics cooperation is not hindered by the effect of the decertification decision. Q: For the past three years, your government labeled President Samper as a corrupt Colombian official. In this year's report, his name is barely mentioned. Does that mean that your government now trusts Samper? BEERS: The decision not to certify Colombia was a decision that there was not full cooperation by the government of Colombia. The three principal areas of concern, with respect to Colombia, were the failure on the part of the Colombian Government to pass a full-scope extradition amendment; the continued corruption which exists in the Colombian Government; and the failure on the part of the Colombian Government to fully implement the very adequate counter-narcotics legislation that it has on the books, in areas such as money-laundering or asset forfeiture. That's the basis for the decision not to certify Colombia. I've explained the basis of the decision to provide a national interest waiver. Q: And I guess, on Mexico, what do you expect the reaction in Congress will be? Do you anticipate a battle, like last year, over this issue? BEERS: I have not heard any indications yet from the Congress that lead me to believe that we will have a situation similar to last year. But let's simply go back, just for a moment, in time, and remember last year. If you will recall, on the week in which the certification announcement was made, President Zedillo took a very courageous act -- but an act which left him vulnerable -- and that was the disclosure that his drug czar, General Gutierrez Rebollo, was, in fact, under indictment for charges of narco-corruption. We don't have that situation this year. That's a fundamental difference and I think at least one basis for concluding that the decision this year will not necessarily meet with the same heated response by some members of Congress. Q: Secretary Albright and you have praised Peru's efforts in terms of combating drug traffic. The Peruvian Government sees its own efforts as based on what they call desarrollo alternativo, alternative development, in order to combat this, we should not generate another social problem by displacing the campesinos, the people who grow the coca leaves. How is the U.S. government looking at this strategy of desarrollo alternativo, alternative development? And what plans do you have in order to support, financially or otherwise, this strategy by the Peruvian Government, which appears to be working? BEERS: The United States Government fully supports this strategy by President Fujimori. And we have, as part of our effort, assistance that will go toward their alternative development programs in Peru, in addition to which we will also be supportive of the Peruvian Government at a pledging conference that will take place later this year, in which other countries will be asked to provide the same kind of alternative development assistance. We think it makes sense, and we're prepared to support the government of Peru. Q: OK. The pledging conference will take place in the second semester of the year? BEERS: I can't tell you the exact date. Q: Are you participating in the organization of this conference? BEERS: The conference will take place later this year; I don't know the date. And we will be full participants in it, yes. Q: The report to Congress mentions that Mexico, during 1995, had mixed results in terms of fighting drugs. I would like to ask you, where would you like or where would the State Department like to see better results? BEERS: In Mexico? Q: Yes. BEERS: In the case of the certification process, as in the case of our own judgment of ourselves, no one performs at 100 percent or we wouldn't have a drug problem today. We want to work with the Government of Colombia in the areas that we set out in the national strategy. There are 16 points in that strategy. Q: You mean the government of Mexico. BEERS: The government of Mexico, I'm sorry. And those are an indication of areas that we want to work together. There is room for improvement, and it's across the board. Let me just read you the first four points of the 16: reduced demand through information, education, and rehabilitation that's for both of us; reduced production and distribution of drugs that's for both of us; focused law enforcement efforts against criminal organizations that's for both of us; and strengthened law enforcement cooperation, policy coordination, and ensure the safety of all of the individuals involved in this process. Those are four examples of areas that we want to work together. And when I say work together, as General McCaffrey said, this is a joint, this is a binational effort. So it's not a question of the United States simply asking the government of Mexico to do A, B and C; but it is the two countries asking themselves together to do 16 different tasks, as outlined in the binational strategy. Q: Yes. Secretary Albright and Control Policy Director Barry McCaffrey both praised Mexico's efforts for certification. But according to statistics here, the total arrests are down, total seizures for well, marijuana is the same, but heroin and methamphetamines are also down. I'm sure Members of Congress are going to be seeing this, and they are going to ask the same question that I'm asking right now -- why are they being certified when, out of the seven elements that are used to judge it, three of them are lower and one of them, marijuana, is basically the same? BEERS: I hope we're looking at the same statistics, but my indications are that eradication of opium is up, and total crop is down; that eradication of cannabis, while smaller than last year, still left a smaller overall crop; that seizures of opium are up; heroin is down; cocaine is up significantly; marijuana is roughly the same; and that methamphetamines are down somewhat. Arrests of nationals are down less than 10 percent, more like five percent. And the total number of labs destroyed is down somewhat. That's a record, we believe, that indicates that the government of Mexico, across the board, when you put everything together, is making a quite reasonable and, in fact, we think important move against drug trafficking. So, I mean, we can each quote from our statistics, but I find that a basis, on those figures alone, for saying that, in that statistical area, that we believe that Mexico is moving forward. Q: Because some of the countries on the list were objected to by Members of Congress, do you expect any sort of backlash, budgetary-wise, since this is the budget cycle now, that some countries are on the list that shouldn't be, according to Members of the Congress and otherwise? BEERS: As I said earlier, we haven't really had much in the way of a direct congressional reaction to these decisions, because they weren't known before today. But I would simply say that with respect to the issue of counter-narcotics assistance, one of the reactions on the part of Congress can reasonably be to increase counter-narcotics assistance in order to do a better job, if they think that the job that's being done is inadequate. Q: President Samper of Colombia is expected to claim vindication with this decision. Should he? BEERS: As I indicated earlier, the national interest waiver is a national interest waiver for the future. Q: Can you elaborate? BEERS: Over here, please. Q: What are the U.S. vital interests in Cambodia, Pakistan and Paraguay? BEERS: With respect to Cambodia, the national interest of the United States, which we used as the basis for making the determination is the United States' support for democracy. We want to be in position, should the parties come together in the course of the time ahead leading up to elections. If they come together and if we see reasonable progress, we want to be in a situation in which we can provide electoral and other assistance for the future. So the basic, the core decision is support for democracy. The same is true in Paraguay, with respect to the impending elections there. This is an important election for Paraguay. They are an emerging democracy. And even though they were troubled by the political difficulties surrounding that electoral process over the course of the last year, we don't want our decision to in any way affect that progress for democracy. And we want to be in a position to support them fully. With respect to Pakistan, the decision is more complex. While Pakistan was not fully certified this year, we have a policy of high-level engagement across a number of areas, including narcotics, Afghanistan, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism and Indo-Pak relations that we wanted to be in a position to maintain as well as our support for the improvement of the economy in Pakistan. For those reasons, we felt that it was important not to shut down our assistance or to in any way undercut that high-level dialogue. So we found it in our national interest to waive decertification for Pakistan. Q: One of the concerns of Members of Congress along the Mexican border is the inability of US DEA agents to carry guns into Mexico. What kind of progress are you seeing in negotiations with them to be able to do that? BEERS: The discussions with the Mexican Government have gone on over the course of the last year, and they continue. I cannot point today to an announcement which would say that this issue has been entirely resolved. But I can report to you that even up into the last week, we continue with high-level discussions between our two governments, looking toward possible arrangements which will affect the current and future security of our agents operating in Mexico. But let me just say, I'm not going to comment specifically on any of the specific security measures that are already in place. Q: Members of Congress held up some of the counter-narcotics equipment for Mexico in the last year helicopters and things like that because of human rights concerns. Could you describe for us a little bit what are the safeguards that you have in place to ensure that equipment and personnel trained by the U.S. are not involved in human rights abuses in countries such as Mexico? BEERS: We have a procedure which is called end-use monitoring, which we discuss and work out with each of the countries that we provide such assistance to. We have a similar arrangement with the Government of Mexico. Q: Personnel in Mexico, then, that are among BEERS: Excuse me? Q: Personnel in Mexico, then, that are monitoring the use of this equipment? BEERS: These personnel are U.S. Embassy officials, and they work out these arrangements with each government, including the Government of Mexico. And we have a regular reporting process. Q: That would apply to the people who are being trained, as well the military people? BEERS: That would apply to the people who are being trained, as well; that's correct. Q: I'm just a bit confused about what you've said on the fact that giving the waiver to Colombia would allow for a more robust program on counter-narcotics, which will make you believe or lead you to believe that the past two years when Colombia was decertified that it did not allow for a robust program on anti-drugs in Colombia, which in many ways would agree with the GAO report, wouldn't it? BEERS: You can choose to interpret the events that way. More means more than before. That's all it means, and that's all I'm saying. We want to do more next year, and we believe that in order to do more, we needed to put this national interest waiver. In the preceding year, we judged the amount of assistance that we were providing to be adequate to the task; but we've judged that the situation has changed, and now we want to do more. Q: Just to elaborate a little bit on the last question about monitoring, the end-use monitoring. Is that something that you do unilaterally in any given country, including Mexico, or is this something that the country itself accepts? BEERS: It would be impossible to do it unilaterally. Q: So it involves the -- BEERS: We wouldn't be following people around and looking over their shoulders, and checking checks on clipboards. Q: Does it involve the acceptance there's explicit acceptance -- BEERS: It has to involve the cooperation of the government involved. Q: In this case, Mexico. I'm talking just specifically about Mexico. BEERS: In this case, Mexico; that's correct. Q: Just one more quick one. Mexico has declared the Mexican president has declared that drugs are a national security hazard. Why isn't it that way in this country? Why isn't the United States' national security threatened by the drug trade in the Western Hemisphere? BEERS: The United States has declared drug trafficking a national security threat since the middle '80s, and it has been repeated by every Administration since then. It is part of every presidential decision document on this subject. Q: Thank you. BEERS: Thank you all. (end transcript)