WHOSE IS THE RESPONSIBILITY; WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE JUDGEMENT?
(Op-ed by Shlomo Gazit, "Ma'ariv", Feb 16, 1998, p.B5)
The reasons for the operational failure in the Masha'al affair are found
in the answers to the headline's questions. The failure itself and the
authority of the prime minister to order the operation were not in dispute
even before the Ciechanover Committee.
What has been published, or more accurately, been leaked from the
Ciechanover Report, does not help us to understand what happened in Amman
and why, or what are the chances that a similar incident will recur.
First, by focusing on the operational failure, it does not say anything
new. The operational failure is the only thing not in dispute. Second,
this may be the area that the public is curious about, but the public does
not expect to learn the intimate details regarding correcting faults
necessary to reduce to the absolute minimum the danger that a foul-up of
this kind could be repeated in the future. However -- and this may be the
most significant conclusion on the operational level -- even if the faults
are corrected, there is no way to guarantee 100% success in 100% of all
operations. On the contrary, the person responsible for weighing and
authorizing operations of this kind, must always consider, especially, the
consequences of failure.
But this is not what public commissions are appointed for. The government,
and the man who heads it, must rely on the head of the Mossad (and thus
acted in all known operational "foul-ups" in the security forces) to know
to investigate what happened, to reach conclusions and to correct what is
necessary, especially at the personal level.
The public interest in entirely located in the area of judgement and
decision. And again, those satisfied with the conclusion that it was
within the prime minister's full authority to order and authorize the
operation, have not said anything new. There is no argument or appeal to
this. But worrying questions remain on two levels:
1. The judgement of the prime minister, the cabinet, the head of the
Mossad and the rest of the security forces (under what conditions and
restrictions are assassination decisions adopted); the judgement on
choosing Khaled Masha'al as a worthwhile target of assassination (who
marked Masha'al as a target and decided his importance); the judgement on
authorizing an operation in the heart of Amman, on the political and
public ramifications of such an act.
2. The decision making process: Who decided on the policy of
assassination; who participated in the consultation and decision; who, if
anyone, will, or should be, a participant in the consultation towards
authorizing such operations in the future; what was the degree of ability
and professional authority (not formal) of the prime minister to involve
himself in choosing an operational plan and authorizing it.
The real reasons for the failure are to be found in the answers to these
questions. I am numbered among the supporters, for many years now, of the
establishment and operation of an advisory apparatus to the cabinet and
its leader on matters of national security. In this framework, a function
of intelligence "advisor" should be established as well. However, I do not
expect that the organizational solution by itself will bring about
miracles. Its success depends upon goodwill, or at least on the
willingness of the prime minister and the entire government to really
utilize such an intellectual, planning and advisory apparatus; it also
depends on the agreement of the security and intelligence forces to
cooperate and to be open to such a body (which will no doubt limit their
status and authority), and it depends on appropriate appointments.
A recommendation along these lines has once again come up, after the
passing of 35 years. It was not realized because of the resistance of the
two factors noted above (the third never came up). It is doubtful if
different and more appropriate conditions have now been created to allow
for its realization. Even if the Knesset were to try to force it upon the
government through legislation (and there are precedents), this would not
guarantee its success.
Under these conditions, I fear that the main recommendation of the
Ciechanover Committee report will not be see much success.
.
From owner-israel-mideast@PANKOW.INTER.NET.IL Tue Feb 17 09:51:08 1998
Subject: Whose is the Responsibility - "Ma'ariv", Feb 16, 1998
Status: O
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