

September 2001

U.N. PEACEKEEPING

Executive Branch Consultations With Congress Did Not Fully Meet Expectations in 1999-2000



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United States General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548

September 10, 2001

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde
Chairman, Committee on International Relations

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
Chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives

From mid-1999 to early 2000, the United States voted eight times in the U.N. Security Council to authorize or expand multilateral operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The ongoing U.N. operations in these three locations are estimated to cost \$1.4 billion in 2001.¹ You asked us to examine whether U.S. decisions to vote for these operations were consistent with executive branch policies for supporting such operations and consulting with the Congress about the decisions.

Presidential Decision Directive 25,² which established executive branch policy about supporting U.N. and multilateral operations, stated that U.S. involvement in peacekeeping must be selective and effective. Toward this end, the directive established specific factors that U.S. officials were required to consider before deciding whether to support proposed operations, including whether the operations advanced U.S. interests, had realistic criteria for ending the operations, and had appropriate forces and financing to accomplish their missions. The directive established these factors as an aid for executive branch decision-making and not as criteria for supporting particular operations. However, Directive 25 was based on experience from past peacekeeping operations, such as the U.N. operation

¹ This cost estimate is for the U.N. peacekeeping fiscal year ending June 30, 2001. See *United Nations: Cost of Peacekeeping Is Likely to Exceed Current Estimate* (GAO/NSIAD-00-228BR, Aug. 31, 2000).

² Presidential Decision Directive 25, the *Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, was issued in May 1994 as a classified document. An unclassified summary was issued at the same time, and all references to Directive 25 in this report are based on that summary. According to National Security Council and other executive branch officials in the Bush administration, Directive 25 is still being used but some aspects of the decision-making process have been changed. Directive 25 may be revised later.

in Somalia, and reflected a judgment that operations lacking these factors might be at risk.³

Presidential Decision Directive 25 also established general expectations for executive branch consultations with the Congress. The directive, for example, stated that the “Congress must...be actively involved in the continuing implementation of U.S. policy on peacekeeping.” It also stated that the executive branch would solicit the involvement of the Congress on matters related to peacekeeping and the Clinton administration was “committed to working with the Congress to improve and regularize communication and consultation on [peacekeeping] issues.”

The United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended, imposes certain consultation requirements on the president regarding ongoing and new U.N. peacekeeping operations.⁴ Thus, the president currently is required to (1) consult each month with the Congress on the status of these operations and (2) in conjunction with this consultation requirement, provide certain information to the Congress at least 15 days before the U.N. Security Council is expected to vote on resolutions authorizing new and expanded operations.⁵ Within the executive branch, the Department of State generally has the lead responsibility for consulting with the Congress on peacekeeping issues. Appendix I provides additional information about U.S. policies and laws regarding peacekeeping decisions and consultation.

You requested that we assess how executive branch officials used Presidential Decision Directive 25 in deciding to support the authorization or expansion of peacekeeping operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and how the officials consulted

³ See *U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions* (GAO/NSIAD-94-9, Dec. 29, 1993) and *U.N. Peacekeeping: Observations on Mandates and Operational Capability* (GAO/T-NSIAD-93-15, June 9, 1993).

⁴ See 22 U.S.C. section 287b. For consultation purposes, 22 U.S.C. section 287b(e)(4) defines *new operations* to include *ongoing operations* (1) where force strength is to be expanded, (2) that are authorized to operate in a different country, or (3) where the mandate is significantly changed. For clarity, this report refers to new or expanded operations.

⁵ For six of the eight decisions in our study, the president was required to report to the Congress 5 days before voting in the U.N. Security Council. See Public Law 103-236, section 407(a)(4), 108 Stat. 449. For the last two decisions, the requirement was 15 days. This new requirement took effect on November 29, 1999. See Public Law-106-113, section 724(a), 113 Stat. 1501A-465.

with the Congress about the decisions. Specifically, we assessed (1) whether executive branch officials considered all applicable Directive 25 factors before making their decisions and identified shortfalls⁶ in any of these factors at the time the decisions were made and (2) how executive branch officials consulted with the Congress during the decision-making process, including the content and timing of the information provided.

Our review covered eight executive branch decisions made between May 1999 and February 2000 to vote in the U.N. Security Council to authorize new or expanded operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We analyzed more than 200 executive branch records directly related to these decisions, such as decision memorandums and summaries of decision meetings. We supplemented this analysis by reviewing hundreds of other records, such as related intelligence assessments, and discussing the eight decisions with agency officials. To examine consultation with the Congress, we reviewed statements by executive branch officials at congressional hearings, a log of executive branch congressional contact memorandums, notification letters required by U.S. law, and transcripts of monthly briefings on peacekeeping for the Congress. We also attended most of these monthly briefings. However, we were denied full access to some records related to the eight decisions in our study, on the basis of the executive branch's concern about protecting its deliberative process.⁷ This denial of full access prevented us from assessing how Directive 25 factors and the risks associated with shortfalls were weighed by executive branch officials and how an interagency position was reached. As a result, we limited the scope of our study to whether Directive 25 factors were considered, whether the factors were judged to be present or absent in an operation, and how the Congress was consulted about the decisions—questions for which we had sufficient information to reach independent findings and

⁶ We define “shortfall” as a Directive 25 factor that executive branch officials judged to be absent in a proposed operation, such as an operation not having realistic criteria for ending the operation. A State Department paper about the application of Directive 25 stated that consideration of the directive’s factors helped executive branch officials “identify [proposed peacekeeping operations] basic political, military, and resource shortfalls.”

⁷ See *U.N. Peacekeeping: GAO’s Access to Records on Executive Branch Decision-making* (GAO-01-440R, Mar. 6, 2001); *Preliminary Observations About the U.S. Process for Deciding to Support U.N. Peace Operations* (GAO-01-100T, Oct. 4, 2000); and *U.N. Peacekeeping: Access to Records Concerning the U.S. Decision-making Process* (GAO-01-180T, Nov. 1, 2000).

conclusions. Appendix II further describes our study's scope and methodology.

Results in Brief

Executive branch officials thoroughly considered all Presidential Decision Directive 25 factors before deciding to support the authorization or expansion of peacekeeping operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. At the time the decisions were made, executive branch assessments identified at least one Directive 25 shortfall in all of the proposed operations and several shortfalls in six of them. Executive branch officials nevertheless decided to support the operations because they believed that these shortfalls were outweighed by the presence of other Directive 25 factors and various other factors, including U.S. interests in the operations. For example, executive branch assessments concluded that a proposed peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone lacked a clear mandate, appropriate forces, and realistic exit criteria. Despite the risks posed by these shortfalls, the administration decided in October 1999 that the United States would support the authorization of this operation, in part, because of U.S. interests in ending the violence against innocent civilians and in supporting U.S. allies in this regional peacemaking effort. Moreover, as part of the decision-making process, executive branch officials attempted to remedy some shortfalls before the U.N. Security Council voted to authorize the operations or developed plans to reduce the risks posed by the shortfalls after the authorization.

Executive officials also provided the Congress with considerable information about the conflicts that the proposed operations were intended to address. However, we found no evidence that the Congress was informed about most Directive 25 shortfalls identified in executive branch assessments of the proposed operations in East Timor and Sierra Leone or about U.S. plans to address the risks posed by these shortfalls. For example, we found no evidence that the Congress was informed about the previously discussed shortfalls in the Sierra Leone operation approved in October 1999. Although neither Directive 25 nor the U.N. Participation Act⁸ requires consultation about shortfalls, they create an expectation that the executive branch consultations should provide the Congress with "U.S. policy-makers' views on the shortfalls, challenges, and risks associated

⁸ The legislative history accompanying the act does not address the issue of the executive branch's consulting with the Congress about shortfalls in U.N. peacekeeping operations.

with successfully undertaking [peacekeeping operations].”⁹ In the spirit of consultation called for by Directive 25 and the U.N. Participation Act, the Congress was informed about most shortfalls identified in executive branch assessments of the proposed U.N. operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Congressional staff told us that these candid discussions helped the Congress to develop a more informed opinion about these operations and support for these operations.

This report recommends that the State Department provide the Congress with more information about the shortfalls of proposed operations as part of the executive branch’s commitment to improve consultation with the Congress. We provided a draft of this report to the National Security Council, the State Department, and the Department of Defense for comment. The National Security Council and the State Department provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendixes V and VI. The Defense Department did not provide written comments but told us that it concurred with State’s comments. We discuss these comments at the end of this letter. The State and Defense Departments also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into this report as appropriate.

Background

Between January 1999 and May 2000, the U.N. Security Council adopted 10 resolutions authorizing new peacekeeping operations or significantly expanding existing ones, including 8 resolutions for operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.¹⁰ Table 1 lists the eight decisions and the dates respectively of the executive branch decisions to support the operations, the letters informing the Congress of these decisions, and the U.N. Security Council votes.

⁹ *Information Paper: Application of U.S. Peacekeeping Policy Under PDD-25* [Presidential Decision Directive 25] (Department of State, May 15, 2000). The State Department prepared this paper—which was approved by the National Security Council—in response to our questions about the application of Directive 25.

¹⁰ During this period, the U.N. Security Council also authorized the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and restructured the U.N. Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Other U.N. Security Council votes on U.N. peacekeeping during this period were to extend the mandates of ongoing operations without significant restructuring or expansion.

Table 1: Eight Decisions on U.N. and Multilateral Operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mid-1999 Through Early 2000

Description of decision	Date of executive branch decision	Date of letter informing Congress of decision	Date of U.N. Security Council vote (resolution number)
East Timor			
Authorized the U.N. Mission in East Timor to organize and conduct a secret ballot to determine the future status of the territory	5/27/99	5/27/99	6/11/99 (S/RES/1246)
Authorized the International Force in East Timor to restore peace and security in East Timor, protect and support the U.N. Mission in East Timor, and facilitate humanitarian assistance operations	9/11/99	No letter sent ^a	9/15/99 (S/RES/1264)
Authorized the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor to administer East Timor during its transition to independence	9/29/99	10/8/99	10/25/99 (S/RES/1272)
Sierra Leone			
Expanded the U.N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone to monitor implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement ^b	8/4/99	8/5/99	8/20/99 (S/RES/1260)
Authorized the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone to help implement the Lomé Peace Agreement	10/4/99	10/8/99	10/22/99 (S/RES/1270)
Expanded the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone to help implement the Lomé Peace Agreement	1/24/00	1/24/00	2/7/00 (S/RES/1289)
Democratic Republic of the Congo			
Authorized the U.N. Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo ^c to help implement the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement ^d	7/23/99	7/23/99	8/6/99 (S/RES/1258)
Expanded the U.N. Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Phase II) to monitor compliance with, and help implement, the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement	1/28/00	2/7/00	2/24/00 (S/RES/1291)

^aThis operation was a U.N.-authorized multilateral force led by Australia. The State Department did not inform the Congress in writing of the executive branch's decision to support its authorization, asserting that the law requires written notification only for U.N.-led peacekeeping operations.

^bThe Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone signed the Lomé Peace Agreement (S/1999/777) on July 7, 1999.

^cU.N. Security Council resolution 1279 (1999), adopted on November 11, 1999, formally constituted the U.N. preliminary deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as the U.N. Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

^dThe Democratic Republic of the Congo and five regional states signed the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement (S/1999/815) on July 10, 1999.

Source: GAO analysis of State Department and U.N. records.

The U.N. and multilateral operations in these three locations were undertaken to help resolve long-standing internal conflicts. The estimated cost of the ongoing U.N. operations in these locations represented over half of the \$2.7 billion estimated cost of U.N. peacekeeping operations in 2001.¹¹ Although peace agreements or cease-fires had been reached or were imminent in these three locations, violence continued and the political accords appeared tenuous. The following paragraphs briefly describe the situations in these three locations to provide some context for the eight executive branch decisions. Appendix III provides additional information about key events related to these decisions.

East Timor

Since 1975, when Indonesia forcibly incorporated East Timor, the United States had supported some form of self-determination for the former Portuguese colony with a population of about 800,000 people. In 1983, Portugal and Indonesia began regular talks aimed at resolving East Timor's status; in June 1998, Indonesia agreed to enter U.N.-mediated talks about autonomy for East Timor. In January 1999, Indonesia's President announced his support for offering the people of East Timor a choice between autonomy within Indonesia or independence. On May 5, 1999, Indonesia and Portugal concluded a general agreement that, among other things, called for the establishment of a U.N. operation to conduct a free and fair vote¹² for the people of East Timor to choose the territory's future status—either autonomy within Indonesia or independence.¹³ Despite this agreement, pro-autonomy factions, supported by local militia and the Indonesian military, attempted to use violence to intimidate pro-independence factions and influence the outcome of the vote. There also was uncertainty about the Indonesian security forces' willingness to allow a free and fair vote.

¹¹ This cost estimate is for the U.N. peacekeeping fiscal year ending June 30, 2001. See [GAO/NSIAD-00-228BR](#).

¹² Under the agreement, the vote was formally termed a "popular consultation."

¹³ Under the agreement, the people of East Timor could choose to accept or reject autonomy. However, a vote to reject autonomy, coupled with the Indonesian President's promise to seek to have Indonesia's Supreme People's Consultative Assembly reverse the territory's annexation in the event of such an outcome, was essentially a vote for independence. The agreement stipulated that, if the people of East Timor rejected autonomy, the United Nations would administer East Timor until it assumed full independence.

Sierra Leone

The conflict in Sierra Leone began in 1991, when rebel forces (the Revolutionary United Front) began attacking government forces near the Liberian border. Sierra Leone's army at first tried to defend the government with the support of military forces provided by the Economic Community of West African States, but the army itself overthrew the government in 1992. Despite the change of power, the rebel forces continued their attacks. The army relinquished power in 1996 after parliamentary and presidential elections. Rebel forces, however, did not participate in the elections and did not recognize the results. A November 1996 peace agreement between the government and the rebels (the Abidjan Accord) was derailed by another military coup d'état in May 1997. This time the army joined forces with the rebels to form a ruling junta and the elected government was forced into exile in Guinea. In February 1998, the West African military forces launched an attack that led to the collapse of the junta and the restoration of the elected government. In July 1998, the U.N. Security Council established the U.N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone to monitor the situation and help the combatants reach an overall peace agreement. In July 1999, the combatants signed the Lomé Peace Agreement, under which U.N. and West African peacekeeping forces would share in helping to provide security and disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate the combatants. During the 8 years of fighting, an estimated 500,000 Sierra Leone citizens were forced to flee to neighboring Guinea, Liberia, Gambia, and other locations. Of the estimated 6 million people remaining in Sierra Leone, 2.6 million could not be reached by humanitarian agencies and 370,000 were internally displaced.¹⁴ These populations suffered severe human rights abuses, including mutilations, amputations, summary executions, torture, and sexual abuse.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Congo conflict grew out of the instability that followed the Rwandan crisis of 1994 and eventually involved the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and five regional states, several Congolese rebel groups, and groups responsible for the Rwandan genocide. According to a U.N. report, this conflict was “characterized by appalling, widespread and systematic human rights violations, including mass killings, ethnic cleansing, rape and destruction of property” and its effects had “spread

¹⁴ Internally displaced persons are persons or groups who have been forced to flee their homes or places of residence—in particular by armed conflict, general violence, human rights violations, or natural or human disasters—and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.

beyond the subregion to afflict the continent of Africa as a whole.”¹⁵ In August 1998, the Southern Africa Development Community and the Organization for African Unity announced the start of a regional initiative to negotiate an end to the Congo conflict. On July 10, 1999, six states signed the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement and 5 days later, on July 15, the U.N. Secretary General proposed establishing a U.N. operation to help monitor implementation of the cease-fire agreement.

**Presidential Decision
Directive 25 and Other
Guidance for
Peacekeeping Decision-
making**

Directive 25 stated that U.S. and U.N. involvement in peacekeeping must be both selective and effective. This principle was underscored by the 1996 U.S. National Security Strategy Report, which stated that “the United States must make highly disciplined choices about when and under what circumstances to support” peacekeeping operations and directed officials to “undertake a rigorous assessment of requirements before voting to support [such] operations.”¹⁶ To this end, Directive 25 required executive branch decision-makers to consider specific factors in deciding whether to support a proposed operation. These factors included questions about a proposed operation’s (1) political context, such as whether it advanced U.S. interests and the consequences of inaction were judged unacceptable, and (2) feasibility, such as whether it had appropriate forces, financing, and mandate to accomplish its mission and its anticipated duration was tied to clear objectives and realistic exit criteria. Directive 25 established these factors to help executive branch officials identify proposed operations’ basic political, military, and resource shortfalls but did not require that all or any particular factors be present in a proposed operation before it was approved. The directive stated that decisions would be based on the cumulative weight of the factors, with no single factor being an absolute determinant. However, the directive also stated that the United States generally would support only well-defined peace operations linked to concrete political solutions.

¹⁵ *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Preliminary Deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/1999/790, July 15, 1999).*

¹⁶ *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (The White House, Feb. 1996).*

Executive Branch Judged That U.S. Interests Outweighed Directive 25 Shortfalls

Executive branch officials extensively considered all Directive 25 factors before deciding to support the authorization or expansion of the U.N. operations. Executive branch assessments of proposed operations identified concerns about some directive factors and shortfalls in others. Executive branch officials decided to support the operations because most factors were present and, in their judgment, U.S. interests were advanced by supporting regional allies, creating or maintaining regional stability, or addressing humanitarian disasters. Following interagency deliberations, senior executive branch officials directed State and Defense officials to strengthen the proposed operations before the U.N. Security Council voted or to develop plans to address the risks that the shortfalls posed.


Process Ensured Extensive Consideration of All Directive 25 Factors

For the eight decisions, we found that the executive branch used a systematic process that resulted in a full consideration of all Directive 25 factors. The process for making these decisions involved the consideration of Directive 25 at the following three levels:

- *Individual agencies.* The State and Defense Departments and the National Security Council were the primary agencies that assessed the proposed operations. Individual agency deliberations included relevant regional, functional, legal, and legislative affairs experts.
- *Peacekeeping Core Group.* This interagency working group, chaired by the National Security Council's Senior Director for Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs, was comprised of assistant and deputy assistant secretaries of State, Defense, and other U.S. departments and agencies. The core group brought together the individual agency assessments and developed consensus recommendations for senior decision-makers for each of the eight decisions.
- *Deputies Committee.* This interagency decision-making group, chaired by the Deputy Adviser to the President for National Security Affairs or his designee, was typically comprised of the undersecretaries of State and Defense and similar officials from other agencies. For these eight decisions, the Deputies Committee made the final decision to vote for the proposed operation.

Interactions between these three levels were iterative and supported by extensive intelligence reporting. Figure 1 illustrates the process used to make these eight decisions.

Figure 1: Executive Branch Decision-making Process for Peacekeeping Operations, 1999 to Early 2000



Source: GAO analysis of executive branch records.

For the eight decisions we reviewed, we found that executive officials prepared and reviewed hundreds of records considering all applicable Directive 25 factors before deciding to support the proposed operations. These records included decision memorandums, situation assessments, concept papers, and summaries of interagency discussions. For five of the eight decisions, the State Department prepared comprehensive Directive 25 analyses that candidly assessed the proposed operations, including identifying basic political, military, and resource shortfalls. Analysis of these records showed that executive branch officials considered all applicable Directive 25 factors before making their decisions. Before the late May 1999 decision to support the U.N. Mission in East Timor, for example, executive branch officials prepared 19 assessments of the proposed operation, including a comprehensive Directive 25 analysis. These assessments considered all applicable Directive 25 factors, for example, whether (1) there was support among U.N. member states for U.N. action in Indonesia and (2) the parties consented to the deployment of a U.N. force. Before the August 1999 decision to support the expansion of the U.N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, executive branch officials prepared 16 assessments of the proposed operation, including a

comprehensive Directive 25 analysis. These assessments considered all applicable Directive 25 factors, for example, whether the expanded operation had adequate financing and forces to carry out its mission. In making all eight decisions, executive branch officials also considered assessments provided by other governments, the U.N. Secretariat, diplomatic envoys and negotiators, regional organizations, and others operating in the areas of concern.

For the eight decisions, the Peacekeeping Core Group met several times specifically to consider applicable Directive 25 factors for the proposed operations and develop options and recommendations for senior decision-makers. The Deputies Committee met less frequently to consider and act on the options and recommendations developed by the core group. For example, our analysis of executive branch records showed that the core group met nine times between March and late May 1999 specifically to discuss the proposed U.N. Mission in East Timor. During this same period, the Deputies Committee met three times to consider and act on the core group's recommendations. Similarly, between February and early August 1999, our analysis showed that the core group met eight times to discuss the proposed expansion of the U.N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone. During this same period, the Deputies Committee met twice to consider and act on the core group's recommendations. According to executive branch officials, these meetings were supplemented by frequent informal contacts between members of the core group and Deputies Committee. For example, core group members participated in weekly conference calls.

Operations Judged to Serve U.S. Interests but They Had Some Directive 25 Shortfalls

At the time the eight decisions were made, executive branch assessments indicated that the proposed operations advanced U.S. interests. In defining U.S. interests, executive branch officials used the definitions in the annual U.S. national security strategy reports.¹⁷ These reports defined U.S. interests as (1) vital—those interests that affect the safety and survival of the United States; (2) important—those interests that affect U.S. national well-being, including commitments to allies; and (3) humanitarian and other—those interests related to U.S. values. Executive branch officials judged that the proposed operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo advanced important and humanitarian

¹⁷ The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 requires the president to submit a national security strategy report to the Congress each year. See 50 U.S.C. section 404a(a)(1).

and other U.S. interests. For all operations, the consequences of inaction also were judged unacceptable. Other than the definitions in the annual national security strategy reports, we could find no criteria to guide executive branch officials in making judgments about these two Directive 25 factors.

At the time the eight decisions were made, executive branch assessments identified at least one Directive 25 shortfall in all of the proposed operations and several shortfalls in six of them. Most of these shortfalls were related to the proposed operations' operational feasibility, such as whether they had adequate means for carrying out their missions and their duration was tied to clear objectives and realistic exit criteria. Executive branch assessments also identified concerns about some factors. On the basis of our analysis of executive branch records, figure 2 summarizes executive branch assessments of the Directive 25 factors for the proposed operations at the time of the eight Deputies Committee decisions.

Figure 2: Executive Branch Assessments of Directive 25 Factors for the Proposed U.N. and Multilateral Operations at the Time of the U.S. Decisions to Support Them

Directive 25 factors		Factor judged present at decision time?							
		East Timor			Sierra Leone			Congo	
		1 ^a	2 ^b	3 ^b	1 ^a	2 ^a	3 ^c	1 ^a	2 ^c
Political feasibility factors	A threat to, or breach of, international peace and security exists?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	U.S. interests are advanced by multilateral action?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	International community of interest exists for multilateral action?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Consequences of inaction by the international community are considered unacceptable?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	For peacekeeping operations—a cease-fire is in place and the warring parties consent to the deployment of a U.N. force?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	For peace enforcement operations—the threat to international peace and security is considered significant?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Operational feasibility factors	Proposed operation has clear objectives?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Clear understanding of where the proposed operation fits between peacekeeping and peace enforcement?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Proposed operation has adequate means—including appropriate forces, financing, and mandate?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
	Proposed operation's duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic exit criteria?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	

- Legend:
- Evidence that Directive 25 factor was judged present at decision time.
 - This factor did not apply to this operation.
 - Concerns about this Directive 25 factor but no clear judgment about its presence or absence.
 - Evidence that Directive 25 factor was judged absent at decision time (shortfall).

^aPeacekeeping operation falling under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter ("Pacific Settlement of Disputes"). Directive 25 established two considerations for U.S. support for peacekeeping operations: (1) cease-fire was in place and (2) the warring parties consented to the deployment of the U.N. force.

^bPeace enforcement operation authorized under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter ("Action With Respect to Threats to Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression"). Directive 25 established the expectation that the United States would support peace enforcement operations only where there was a significant threat to international peace.

^cOperation's mandate contained both peacekeeping (Chapter VI) and peace enforcement (Chapter VII) elements. Executive branch assessments considered both peacekeeping and peace enforcement factors for these operations.

Source: GAO analysis of executive branch records.

The following sections briefly describe the Directive 25 shortfalls identified in executive branch assessments of the proposed operations.

East Timor

As shown in figure 2, executive branch assessments of the proposed U.N. Mission in East Timor identified four Directive 25 shortfalls. First, assessments questioned whether the preconditions for a peacekeeping operation (a cease-fire in place and the parties consent to the deployment of a U.N. force) existed in East Timor. Violence against pro-independence factions continued and, despite the Indonesian government's announced consent to the operation, Indonesian security forces appeared to be supporting this violence. Second, assessments questioned whether, in the face of this continuing violence, there was a clear understanding of where the proposed operation would fit between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Third, assessments questioned whether the proposed operation's mandate was appropriate. Despite concern about violence, the proposed operation did not include peacekeeping troops primarily because Indonesia objected to the deployment of such forces. Additionally, the role and objectives of the civilian police component were unclear given the scope of the violence. Fourth, assessments questioned whether the proposed operation's exit criteria were realistic because there was a gap of several months between the end of the operation and a proposed follow-on U.N. operation. On May 27, 1999, the Deputies Committee decided the United States would vote in the U.N. Security Council to authorize the proposed peacekeeping operation. Factors considered in this decision included U.S. interests in aiding Australia and ending the violence in East Timor, regional support for U.N. action, and the judgment that U.N. action was East Timor's best opportunity for democratic development.

Executive branch assessments of the proposed International Force in East Timor identified one Directive 25 shortfall. As shown in figure 2, assessments questioned whether the operation's duration was linked to realistic criteria for ending the operation. The operation's general exit strategy was to restore peace and security to East Timor and then transfer responsibility for maintaining peace and security to the proposed U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor. However, at the time executive branch officials made their decision, the specific timing and criteria for this transfer were uncertain. The Deputies Committee decided that the United States would vote in the U.N. Security Council to authorize the proposed multilateral peace enforcement operation. As before, factors considered in this decision included U.S. interests in aiding Australia and ending the violence in East Timor. Led by Australia, the multinational force began deploying in East Timor on September 20, 1999.

Executive branch assessments of the proposed U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor identified one Directive 25 shortfall. As shown in figure 2, assessments questioned whether the proposed operation had adequate means—specifically, forces and financing—to carry out its extensive nation-building tasks. In particular, assessments questioned whether the United Nations could recruit sufficient troops and international civilians to staff the operation. Although not identifying a clear shortfall in international support for U.N. action in East Timor, several assessments noted some members states’ concerns about whether the proposed operation would violate Indonesia’s sovereignty. On October 8, 1999, the Deputies Committee decided that the United States would vote for the proposed peace enforcement and nation-building operation. Factors considered in this decision included U.S. interests in aiding important regional allies and the judgment that a U.N. operation was the best choice for administering East Timor during its transition to independence.

Sierra Leone

As shown in figure 2, executive branch assessments of the proposed expansion of the U.N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone identified three shortfalls. First, assessments questioned whether the preconditions for a peacekeeping operation existed in Sierra Leone. Fighting continued in some areas of the country, and there was concern about whether the rebels and Liberia truly consented to the deployment of an expanded U.N. force.¹⁸ Second, assessments questioned whether the proposed operation had adequate means to carry out its mission in the face of potential rebel resistance. Third, assessments questioned whether the proposed operation’s duration was linked to realistic criteria for ending it. Concerns included whether the proposed milestones for completing some tasks were realistic and whether rebel forces would disarm and relinquish control of diamond-producing areas, as called for in the Lomé Peace Agreement. On August 5, 1999, the Deputies Committee decided to support the proposed expansion of the peacekeeping operation. Factors considered in this decision included U.S. interests in resolving the conflict in Sierra Leone, maintaining regional stability, and ending the violence against innocent civilians.

Executive branch assessments of the proposed U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone identified four shortfalls, as shown in figure 2. First, assessments

¹⁸ Liberia signed the Lomé Peace Agreement as a “moral guarantor” but was not a party to it. Liberia reportedly had trained and supplied rebel forces.

again questioned whether the preconditions for a peacekeeping operation existed in Sierra Leone. Fighting continued in some areas of the country, and there was continuing concern about whether the rebels and Liberia truly consented to the deployment of an expanded U.N. force. Second, assessments questioned whether, in the face of continuing violence, there was a clear understanding of where the proposed operation would fit between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Third, assessments questioned whether the proposed operation had adequate means to carry out its mission—identifying shortfalls in its forces, financing, and mandate. One concern was whether some proposed troop contingents had adequate training and equipment to deal effectively with rebel resistance. Fourth, assessments questioned whether the proposed operation’s duration was linked to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending it. One concern was whether rebel forces would disarm and relinquish control of diamond-producing areas. On October 8, 1999, the Deputies Committee decided that the United States would vote to authorize this new peacekeeping operation. Factors considered in this decision included the unacceptable humanitarian consequences of inaction, particularly continued human rights abuses by rebel forces, and support for U.N. action by U.N. Security Council members and important regional states, including Nigeria, Guinea, and Ghana.

As shown in figure 2, executive branch assessments of the proposed expansion of the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone identified three shortfalls. First, assessments questioned whether there was a clear understanding of where the proposed operation would fit between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. One concern was whether a peace enforcement operation could maintain the neutrality and consent needed to carry out some peacekeeping tasks. Second, assessments questioned whether the proposed operation had adequate means to carry out its mission, expressing concern about whether its forces, financing, and mandate were appropriate. One concern was whether some proposed troop contingents—which were poorly trained and equipped—could effectively carry out peace enforcement tasks. Third, assessments questioned whether the proposed operation’s duration was linked to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending it. A continuing concern was whether the rebels would disarm and relinquish control of diamond-producing areas. On January 24, 2000, the Deputies Committee decided that the United States would vote to expand the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone and authorize it to use force to accomplish some tasks. Factors considered in this decision included U.S. interests in preventing this conflict from spreading to neighboring states, the unacceptable humanitarian consequences of inaction, and international support for U.N. action.

Democratic Republic of the
Congo

Executive branch assessments of the proposed U.N. Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo identified four shortfalls, as shown in figure 2. First, assessments questioned whether the preconditions for a peacekeeping operation existed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Fighting continued in some areas of the country, and it was uncertain whether the warring parties consented to the deployment of a U.N. force. Second, assessments questioned whether, in the face of continuing violence, there was a clear understanding of where the proposed operation fit between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Third, assessments questioned whether the proposed operation had adequate means—appropriate forces, financing, and mandate—to carry out its mission. Concerns included whether U.N. forces would have adequate protection and could move about the vast country effectively. Fourth, assessments questioned whether the proposed operation’s duration was linked to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending it. One concern was the potential for the United Nations to become more deeply involved in the conflict. In recognition of such shortfalls, the United States rejected proposals to deploy a large (up to 30,000 troops) U.N. peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Instead, the Deputies Committee decided on July 23, 1999, that the United States would vote to support a small monitoring operation. Factors considered in this decision included U.S. interests in resolving the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which involved several regional states; maintaining regional stability; and preventing the resurgence of genocide and mass killings in Central Africa.

As shown in figure 2, executive branch assessments of the proposed expansion (phase II) of the U.N. Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo identified three Directive 25 shortfalls. These assessments reflected the same basic concerns identified in executive branch assessments of the initial operation (previously described). Again, in recognition of such shortfalls, the United States rejected proposals to deploy a large U.N. peacekeeping force. Instead, the Deputies Committee decided on January 24, 2000, that the United States would vote to support a proposed peacekeeping operation that would deploy up to 5,537 troops (including up to 500 observers) in phases. Under the proposal, these phased deployments were tied to the attainment of specific objectives related to the shortfalls, such as the parties establishing a durable cease-fire. As before, factors considered in the decision included U.S. interests in resolving the conflict, restoring regional stability, and humanitarian concerns.

Executive Branch Officials Took Actions to Eliminate or Mitigate Directive 25 Shortfalls

As part of the process of making the eight decisions, executive branch officials attempted to improve the operations' chances of success by shaping their mandates and forces to eliminate identified shortfalls. For example, concerned that objectives for the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone were unclear, the Peacekeeping Core Group directed officials at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations to work with other U.N. member states and U.N. officials to link the objectives more directly to helping the government and the rebels implement the Lomé Peace Agreement. This was accomplished before the Deputies Committee decided to support the operation and allowed executive branch officials to change their assessment of this Directive 25 factor to reflect that the operation had clear objectives (see fig. 2). Additionally, concerned that the presence of regional peacekeeping forces was vital to the success to this operation, the Deputies Committee and Peacekeeping Core Group directed State and Defense officials to develop options for providing financial and logistical support to encourage the continued engagement of regional forces. In other cases, for example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, executive branch officials "helped shape the scope and scale of the U.N. mission...to ensure [it had] achievable objectives...and avoid overextending the [United Nations] and sending in [U.N.] peacekeepers before the conflict was ripe for resolution or a political settlement was still in the making."¹⁹

In all eight decisions where Directive 25 shortfalls could not be addressed adequately before the U.N. Security Council voted, executive branch officials worked to mitigate the risks associated with these weaknesses by reducing the shortfalls' impact on the operations. For example, concerned about the capability of forces serving in the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone, the Deputies Committee and the Peacekeeping Core Group directed U.S. officials to (1) contact U.N. members and officials to seek more capable forces and (2) develop options for providing logistical support for some troop contingents. Furthermore, concerned about whether the cease-fire would hold in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Deputies Committee directed U.S. officials to monitor compliance closely and apply diplomatic pressure to the warring parties to observe the cease-fire agreement. Our analysis of executive branch records identified similar attempts to address other Directive 25 shortfalls for the eight decisions we reviewed. Appendix IV provides information about some of the actions taken by the executive branch to address Directive 25 shortfalls.

¹⁹ *Information Paper: Application of U.S. Peacekeeping Policy Under PDD-25* [Presidential Decision Directive 25].

Executive Branch Provided Considerable Information but Did Not Consult Fully With the Congress About Shortfalls

The executive branch provided a substantial amount of information to the Congress about the proposed operations in consultations before or just after the decisions to support them. This information described how the proposed operations advanced U.S. interests, the conflicts that the proposed operations were intended to address, and other related considerations. Executive branch consultations about the two decisions regarding proposed operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo also described Directive 25 shortfalls, which helped build support in the Congress for the decisions to vote for deploying these operations. However, for the other six decisions we found little or no evidence that executive branch officials informed the Congress about the proposed operations' Directive 25 shortfalls either in consultations with the Congress before the executive branch decided on the operations or in the information provided to the Congress in writing just after the decisions were made. Additionally, aside from the shortfall issue, executive branch officials had considerable detailed information about the proposed operations well in advance of the time they provided this information to the Congress.

Process Provided Substantial Opportunities for Consultation

Our analysis of executive branch records and transcripts of monthly peacekeeping briefings for the Senate, supplemented by our observation of similar briefings for the House, showed that the executive branch began providing information to the Congress about the proposed operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo as long as 4 to 6 months before the eight decisions. At monthly peacekeeping briefings, executive officials provided information about the status of ongoing U.N. operations and proposals for new or expanded operations. At these briefings, executive branch officials provided copies of key U.N. Secretary General reports, the U.N. Security Council's upcoming calendar and work program, and monthly reports of peacekeeping finances and troop contributions. Additionally, senior executive branch officials briefed Members of Congress and their staffs about the U.N. Secretary General's proposals for proposed peacekeeping operations and related topics. For example, in February 2000, senior officials provided a special briefing to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations about the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The briefing included detailed information about the factions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the role of neighboring states in the conflict, such as Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Administration officials also testified several times before the Congress about the operations and had separate

telephone discussions and other meetings as noted in their log of congressional contacts.


For seven of the eight decisions we reviewed, the executive branch informed the Congress in writing of its decision to support the proposed operation within a few days of the Deputies Committee's decision.²⁰ These letters were dated at least 15 days before the U.N. Security Council voted on the matter and were transmitted to the Congress for the purpose of meeting one of the peacekeeping reporting requirements in the U.N. Participation Act.²¹ The information required to be provided for each proposed operation includes the "anticipated duration, mandate, and command and control arrangements...the planned exit strategy, and the vital national interests to be served." These letters provided the Congress with the most comprehensive and detailed information it received about the proposed operations.

As discussed in the following section, executive branch consultations—such as briefings and reports—provided the Congress with substantial information about the U.S. interests in the proposed operations and details about their mandate, cost, and exit strategy. However, these consultations provided limited information about Directive 25 shortfalls. Figure 3 shows the typical timing and content of consultations with the Congress about the seven decisions.

²⁰ The executive branch did not inform the Congress in writing of its decision to support the International Force in East Timor because it was a multilateral operation led by Australia and not a U.N. operation.

²¹ As previously discussed, the U.N. Participation Act requires the president to (1) consult each month with the Congress on the status of U.N. peacekeeping operations and (2) in conjunction with this consultation requirement, provide information to the Congress at least 15 days before the U.N. Security Council is expected to vote on a resolution authorizing new or expanded operations. See footnotes 4 and 5.

Figure 3: Timing and Content of Consultations for U.N. Operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1999 to Early 2000



Source: GAO analysis of executive branch records.

Consultations for Six Decisions Provided Limited Information About Proposed Operations' Shortfalls

Although neither Directive 25 nor the U.N. Participation Act required that the executive branch consult with the Congress about operational shortfalls in the proposed operations, executive branch officials recognize that “U.S. policy-makers’ views on the shortfalls, challenges and risks associated with successfully undertaking an operation” should be addressed comprehensively during consultation discussions with the Congress.²² Our analysis of executive branch records and transcripts of monthly peacekeeping briefings for the Senate, supplemented by our observation of similar briefings for the House, showed that the executive branch provided the Congress with substantial information about the U.S. interests in all of the proposed operations and general information about their mandates, cost, and exit strategies. However, we found no evidence that the Congress was informed about most shortfalls identified in executive branch assessments of the proposed operations for East Timor and Sierra Leone. As previously discussed, these shortfalls included

²² See, for example, *Information Paper: Application of U.S. Peacekeeping Policy Under PDD-25* [Presidential Decision Directive 25].

judgments that the proposed operations lacked adequate means to carry out their missions or their duration was not linked to realistic exit criteria. In contrast, our analysis showed that the Congress was informed about most shortfalls identified in executive branch assessments of the proposed operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. According to congressional staff, this information provided the Congress with an opportunity to develop a more informed opinion about the proposed operations and better convey to policy-makers its views about them. The following examples illustrate our findings about the content of executive branch consultations.

- Prior to the May 1999 decision to support the U.N. Mission in East Timor, executive branch assessments identified four Directive 25 shortfalls in the proposed operation. For example, 13 assessments questioned whether the operation's mandate was appropriate, in part because the role and objectives of the civilian police component were unclear. Similarly, five assessments questioned whether the operation's duration was tied to realistic exit criteria. In the months before the May decision, executive branch officials briefed the Congress at least 10 times about peacekeeping issues. Our analysis of executive branch and congressional records showed that those briefings provided substantial information about (1) how the proposed operation would advance the United States' substantial security, political, and commercial interests in Indonesia; (2) the threat to international peace and security posed by the violent attacks in civilians; and (3) the necessity of U.N. action to ensure a free and fair vote. Additionally, these briefings provided information about one shortfall—concerns about whether the preconditions for a peacekeeping operation existed in East Timor. However, these briefings did not provide information about the other three shortfalls identified in executive branch assessments. Moreover, our analysis showed that these three shortfalls were not cited in the reports and other written material provided to the Congress.
- Prior to the August 1999 decision to support the expansion of the U.N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, executive branch assessments identified three shortfalls in the proposed operation. For example, six assessments questioned whether the rebels truly consented to the deployment of an expanded U.N. force and the proposed operation had adequate means to carry out its mission in the face of potential rebel resistance. In the months before the August decision, executive branch officials briefed the Congress at least 16 times about peacekeeping issues. Our analysis of executive branch and congressional records showed that six of those briefings provided substantial information about the threat to international

peace and security posed by the humanitarian crisis and the danger of the conflict spreading to neighboring countries. These briefings also provided information about how the proposed operation would advance U.S. interests in supporting the West African peacekeeping force in providing regional security. Additionally, these briefings provided information about one shortfall—concerns about whether the preconditions for a peacekeeping operation existed in Sierra Leone because of uncertain rebel consent. However, these briefings did not provide information about the other two shortfalls; moreover, these two shortfalls were not cited in the reports and other written material provided to the Congress.

- Prior to the February 2000 decision to support the expansion of the U.N. Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, executive branch assessments identified three shortfalls in the proposed operation. For example, six assessments questioned whether the operation had adequate means—appropriate forces, financing, and mandate—to accomplish its mission and its duration was tied to realistic exit criteria. In the months before the February decision, executive branch officials briefed the Congress at least 12 times about peacekeeping issues. Our analysis of executive branch and congressional records showed that, in contrast to the previous two examples, those briefings provided substantial information about all three shortfalls. Moreover, our analysis showed that these three shortfalls were cited in the reports and other written material provided to the Congress. The February 7 letter informing the Congress of the decision to support the proposed operation, for example, clearly cited executive branch concerns that the warring parties were not observing the cease-fire and that the U.N. force would have to provide for its own security and protection in many areas because the parties lacked the capability. According to congressional staff, this information helped the Congress develop an informed opinion about the risks associated with this operation and reflected similar information provided in briefings and other consultations that occurred before the notification.

Figure 4 summarizes our analysis of the information the executive branch provided to the Congress about the Directive 25 shortfalls that existed at the time the Deputies Committee decided the United States would vote for the operations. In each case in which the figure identifies a lack of consultation about a shortfall, our analysis of executive branch records showed that assessments consistently had identified a shortfall in this factor before the decision to support the operation in the U.N. Security Council. Our analysis also showed that executive branch assessments had identified shortfalls in other factors, but figure 4 does not include these

shortfalls because assessments of these factors changed during the decision-making process.

Figure 4: Summary of Executive Branch Consultations With the Congress About Directive 25 Shortfalls That Existed at the Time of the U.S. Decisions to Support Them

		Executive branch consulted with the Congress about shortfall?								
		East Timor			Sierra Leone			Congo		
Directive 25 factors		1 ^a	2 ^b	3 ^b	1 ^a	2 ^a	3 ^c	1 ^a	2 ^c	
Political feasibility factors	A threat to, or breach of, international peace and security exists?	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
	U.S. interests are advanced by multilateral action?	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
	International community of interest exists for multilateral action?	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
	Consequences of inaction by the international community are considered unacceptable?	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
	For peacekeeping operations—a cease-fire is in place and the warring parties consent to the deployment of a U.N. force?	□	■	■	□	■	■	□	□	
	For peace enforcement operations—the threat to international peace and security is considered significant?	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
Operational feasibility factors	Proposed operation has clear objectives?	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
	Clear understanding of where the proposed operation fits between peacekeeping and peace enforcement?	■	■	■	■	■	■	□	■	
	Proposed operation has adequate means—including appropriate forces, financing, and mandate?	■	■	■	■	■	■	□	□	
	Proposed operation's duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic exit criteria?	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	□	

Legend:

- Evidence that the executive branch informed the Congress about the Directive 25 shortfall.
- This factor did not apply to this operation.
- No Directive 25 shortfall identified.
- No evidence that the executive branch informed the Congress about the Directive 25 shortfall.

^aPeacekeeping operation falling under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter ("Pacific Settlement of Disputes").

^bPeace enforcement operation authorized under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter ("Action With Respect to Threats to Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression").

^cOperation's mandate contained both peacekeeping (Chapter VI) and peace enforcement (Chapter VII) elements. Executive branch assessments considered both peacekeeping and peace enforcement factors for these operations.

Source: GAO analysis of executive branch records.

Senior executive branch officials told us that they did not consult with the Congress about some Directive 25 shortfalls because (1) the administration had not reached a consensus on whether they were actual shortfalls and (2) it had not decided whether to support the operations. Additionally, executive branch officials stated that congressional committees, members, and staff had ample opportunity to ask questions about the shortfalls but did not pose specific questions to the executive branch about Directive 25 weaknesses. Moreover, according to one executive branch official, the administration provided considerable negative information about the operations, but it was up to the Congress to reach its own conclusion. Finally, executive branch officials said that it could be more forthcoming in briefing the Congress if the briefings were held in secure settings. According to these officials, the information about shortfalls was sensitive, and many of the briefings were held in relatively open forums. If the information were to become publicly known, it could be used to undermine U.S. strategy and U.N. operations.

Despite these issues, executive branch officials said that the concerns expressed by the Congress during the consultations were integrated into the executive branch's decision-making deliberations. Our review of executive branch records showed that officials did consider anticipated congressional reactions during the decision-making process. For example, the executive branch often internally discussed the reaction of congressional Members and staff to the costs and availability of troops to support the operations, particularly with the proposed expansion of the operations in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Some Information Could Have Been Provided Sooner

The information provided to the Congress in writing by the executive branch for the purpose of meeting the consultation requirements established by the U.N. Participation Act provided the Congress with the most comprehensive and detailed information it received about the proposed peacekeeping operations. The executive branch provided this information at about the same time that the U.N. Secretary General first made recommendations to the U.N. Security Council about the composition and mandate of the proposed operations. However, U.S. officials knew many details about the likely shape of the operations well before this time, because they had been working with other U.N. members and U.N. officials to develop and refine them. Although neither Directive 25 nor the U.N. Participation Act required the executive branch to provide such information sooner than it did, earlier disclosure of this information would have provided the Congress with more time to assess and develop

an informed opinion about the proposed operations. The following two examples involving East Timor illustrate this issue.

- The executive branch informed the Congress of its intent to vote for the U.N. Mission in East Timor in a letter dated May 27, 1999—just over 2 weeks before the U.N. Security Council authorized the operation.²³ This letter provided the Congress with the most complete information it had received to date about the proposed operation’s purpose, composition, mandate, financing, exit strategy, and relationship to U.S. national interests. The letter also informed the Congress for the first time that the executive branch anticipated a U.N. operation to administer the transition to independence if the people of East Timor rejected autonomy and Indonesia ended the territory’s annexation. However, executive branch officials had been working since early April 1999 to develop a conceptual framework for a series of operations in East Timor. On April 8, for example, executive branch officials had completed a paper outlining a conceptual framework for three potential operations in East Timor. This paper proposed three sequential operations—one to organize and conduct a free and fair vote to determine East Timor’s future status, one to stabilize East Timor following the vote, and one to organize and direct its transition to autonomy or independence. This paper noted that the stabilization mission might require a multinational force and that the transition mission would involve development assistance and the creation of governmental and economic institutions. Additionally, on May 7, executive branch officials completed a detailed Directive 25 analysis of the proposed U.N. Mission in East Timor. During April and May 1999, executive branch officials briefed congressional staff four times about U.N. peacekeeping issues, but our analysis showed that they did not provide details about the proposed East Timor operations at these briefings.
- The executive branch informed the Congress of its intent to vote for the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor in a letter dated October 8, 1999—about 2-½ weeks before the U.N. Security Council authorized the operation.²⁴ As before, this letter provided the Congress with the most

²³ The U.N. Secretary General proposed establishing the U.N. Mission in East Timor on May 22, 1999. See *Question of East Timor: Report of the Secretary General (S/1999/595, May 22, 1999)*.

²⁴ The U.N. Secretary General proposed establishing the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor on October 4, 1999. See *Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in East Timor (S/1999/1024, Oct. 4, 1999)*.

complete information it had received to date about the proposed operation's purpose, composition, mandate, financing, exit strategy, and relationship to U.S. national interests. However, in August 1999, the executive branch had completed a paper that (1) described in detail many components of the proposed operation (as one of several possible contingencies) and (2) directed U.S. officials to work with U.N. and other officials in developing more detailed plans for these components. By early September 1999, the executive branch had completed a full concept of operations for this operation. During August and September, executive branch officials briefed congressional staff several times about U.N. peacekeeping issues, but our analysis showed that they did not provide details about the proposed East Timor operation at these briefings.

Executive branch officials told us that, although they provided considerable information to the Congress about potential or proposed peacekeeping operations in East Timor and other locations, they did not provide some detailed information sooner because it was related to (1) their routine, ongoing work with U.N. and other officials and did not represent a unified executive branch position and (2) the internal deliberative process of the executive branch.

Conclusions

For the cases we examined, the driving factors in the decisions to support operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo were the executive branch judgments that the operations advanced U.S. interests and that the consequences of inaction were unacceptable. Directive 25 served as a framework for identifying shortfalls and tasks to be undertaken to strengthen the proposed operations. Consequently, the decisions we examined clearly demonstrated a trade-off—proceed with operations judged to advance U.S. interests but accept the risk of failure inherent in operations having Directive 25 shortfalls.

Consultation with the Congress did occur, but information about the full range of executive branch officials' views on the benefits, challenges, and risks associated with supporting the operations in East Timor and Sierra Leone was not provided to the Congress so that it could develop a fully informed opinion and make decisions about appropriating funds for the operations. In contrast, more complete information about the benefits, risks, and challenges associated with supporting the operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was provided to the Congress. This positive model of consultation helped in developing congressional support for the executive branch's decisions on these operations and was

consistent with the expectations of Directive 25 and the spirit of the U.N. Participation Act.

Recommendation for Executive Action

To improve executive branch consultations with the Congress, we recommend that the Secretary of State and other appropriate officials provide the Congress with timely, detailed, and complete information about Directive 25 shortfalls for all proposed new or substantially revised peacekeeping operations and the plans to mitigate the shortfalls. The timing of providing such information to the Congress is a matter of judgment; however, at a minimum, this information should be provided no later than at the time the Congress is informed in writing about the decisions to support such operations.

Agency Comments

Although Presidential Decision Directive 25 was issued by the Clinton administration, the Bush administration continues to use this guidance and is required by law to consult with the Congress about peacekeeping decisions. Accordingly, we obtained comments from the current administration (the National Security Council and the Departments of State and Defense) regarding its evaluation of this report and our recommendation on consultation. The National Security Council and the State Department provided written comments on this report. Their comments are reprinted in appendixes V and VI. The Defense Department elected not to provide written comments, but a Defense official told us that the Department concurred with State's written comments. The Departments of State and Defense also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into this report as appropriate.

The State Department did not characterize its views on this report. However, in reference to our recommendation, State said that it intended to continue to provide the Congress with timely, detailed and complete information about all new or substantially revised U.N. peacekeeping operations, including known potential and actual problem areas. Noting that the timing of the provision of this information is a matter of judgment, State said that it planned to continue to provide this information in a timely way, no later than the time that the Congress is informed in writing about decisions to support such operations. The National Security Council said that it appreciated the opportunity to review our report, had taken note of its findings, but did not have any comments on the report. The Acting Senior Director for Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations wrote that the Council understood the importance of consulting with the Congress on peacekeeping missions and

looked forward to working closely with the Congress on these and other important national security issues.

As arranged with your office, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the date of the report unless you publicly announce its contents earlier. At that time, we will send copies to interested congressional committees and to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Secretary of State; and the Secretary of Defense. Copies will also be made available to other interested parties upon request.

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4128. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix VII.



Susan S. Westin
Managing Director, International Affairs
and Trade

Appendix I: U.S. Policy and Law Established Guidance and Requirements for Peacekeeping Decisions and Consultations

Since the end of the Cold War, U.N. and other multilateral peacekeeping operations have been an important component of U.S. foreign policy. For the eight decisions we reviewed, annual U.S. national security strategy reports and several Presidential Decision Directives provided guidance to executive branch officials making decisions about U.S. support for these operations, managing these operations once authorized, and consulting with the Congress about these matters. Additionally, the Congress in recent years has enacted peacekeeping notification and reporting requirements to enhance its ability to play a more effective role on these matters.

U.S. Policy Established Framework for Peacekeeping Decision-making

Several U.S. policies established the basic framework for executive branch decision-making about U.S. support for U.N. or other multilateral peacekeeping operations. Annual U.S. national security strategy reports defined U.S. national interests. Several Presidential Decision Directives established the basic framework for U.S. national security decision-making and provide specific guidance to executive branch officials for making decisions about U.S. support for peacekeeping operations and managing these operations once authorized.

U.S. National Security Strategy Reports Defined U.S. National Interests

Annual U.S. national security strategy reports²⁵ recognize that, since there are always many demands for U.S. action, U.S. national interests must be clear.²⁶ Toward this end, these reports established a three-level basic hierarchy of U.S. interests to guide executive branch decisions about national security matters, including peacekeeping. Table 2 describes these interests.

²⁵ As previously discussed, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 requires the President to submit a national security strategy report to the Congress each year. See 50 U.S.C. section 404a(a)(1).

²⁶ See, for example, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (The White House, Dec. 1999).

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Table 2: U.S. National Interests

Category of interest	Description
Vital interests	Those interests of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety, and vitality of the United States. These include the physical security of U.S. territory and that of our allies, the safety of U.S. citizens, the economic well-being of U.S. society, and the protection of U.S. critical infrastructure from paralyzing attack. The United States will do whatever is necessary to defend its vital interests, including the unilateral and decisive use of U.S. military force when necessary and appropriate.
Important interests	Those interests that do not affect U.S. national survival but do affect U.S. national well-being and the character of the world. These include regions in which the United States has large economic interests or commitments to allies and crises with a potential to generate substantial and highly destabilizing refugee flows. The 1999 Strategy specifically cites U.S. "assistance to Asian allies and friends supporting the transition in East Timor" as an example of an important U.S. interest.
Humanitarian and other interests	Those interests related to U.S. values. These include responding to natural and manmade disasters; promoting human rights and seeking to halt gross violations of those rights; and supporting the spread of democracy, adherence to the rule of law, and civilian control of the military. The 1999 Strategy states that, whenever possible, the United States seeks to avert humanitarian disasters and conflict through diplomacy and cooperation with a wide range of partners, including other governments, international institutions, and nongovernmental organizations.

Source: GAO analysis of annual U.S. national security strategy reports.

In addition to defining U.S. national interests, the 1996 U.S. National Security Strategy Report recognized that, to maximize the benefits (to U.S. interests) of U.N. peace operations, the United States must make highly disciplined choices about when and under what circumstances to support or participate in these operations.

**Presidential Decision
Directive 2 Established
National Security
Decision-making
Framework**

Presidential Decision Directive 2 (*Organization of the National Security Council*), issued in March 1993, established the basic framework for executive branch decision-making on national security issues,²⁷ consistent with the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.²⁸ This directive established two senior-level interagency committees, known as the Principals and the Deputies Committees.

²⁷ Presidential Decision Directive 2 was superceded by National Security Presidential Directive 1, which President Bush signed on February 13, 2001.

²⁸ See 50 U.S.C. sections 401 and following.

The Principals Committee was the senior interagency forum for the consideration of policy issues affecting U.S. national security. The committee's function was to review, coordinate, and monitor the development and implementation of national security policy. It was intended to be a flexible forum for Cabinet-level officials to meet to discuss and resolve issues not requiring the President's participation. Members of the committee were as follows in 1999-2000:

- Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (chair)
- Secretary of State (or Deputy Secretary)
- Secretary of Defense (or Deputy Secretary)
- U.S. Representative to the United Nations
- Director of Central Intelligence
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Assistant to the President for Economic Policy
- Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
- The Secretary of Treasury, the Attorney General, and other heads of departments and agencies were invited as needed.

The Deputies Committee was the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting U.S. national security. The committee's function was to review and monitor the work of the interagency process and to focus attention on policy implementation. It assisted the Principals Committee by addressing policy decisions below the Principals' level and was the main forum for making decisions on U.S. support for U.N. peacekeeping. Members of the committee were as follows in 1999-2000:

- Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (chair)
- Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
- Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Deputy Assistant to the President for Economic Policy
- Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
- Other senior department and agency officials were invited as needed.

**Presidential Decision
Directive 25 Established
Analytical Framework and
Expectations for
Peacekeeping Decisions**

Presidential Decision Directive 25 (*Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*), issued in May 1994, charged executive branch officials with making "disciplined and coherent choices" about when and under what circumstances to support or participate in these operations. It directed executive branch officials to consider a range of factors to determine operations' political and practical feasibility when

deciding whether to vote in the U.N. Security Council for proposed U.N. or U.N.-authorized peacekeeping operations. Directive 25 stated that (1) these factors were an aid in executive branch decision-making and did not constitute a prescriptive device and (2) decisions would be made on the cumulative weight of the factors, with no single factor necessarily being an absolute determinant. Table 3 lists the Directive 25 factors.

Table 3: Presidential Decision Directive 25 Political and Operational Feasibility Factors

Political feasibility factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A threat to, or breach of, international peace and security exists? • U.S. interests are advanced by multilateral action? • International community of interest exists for multilateral action? • The political, economic, and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable? • For peacekeeping operations—a cease-fire is in place and the warring parties consent to the deployment of a U.N. force? • For peace enforcement operations—the threat to international peace and security is considered significant?
Operational feasibility factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proposed operation has clear objectives? • Clear understanding of where the proposed operation fits on a spectrum between peacekeeping and peace enforcement exists? • Proposed operation has adequate means—including appropriate forces, financing, and mandate? • Proposed operation’s duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic exit criteria?

Source: GAO analysis of Directive 25.

Directive 25 instructed U.S. officials to apply additional factors when deciding whether to recommend to the President that U.S. personnel participate in proposed multilateral operations. For operations that were likely to involve combat, it directed U.S. officials to apply even more rigorous factors in their decision-making.

Directive 25 assigned the State Department primary responsibility for managing and funding peacekeeping operations in which U.S. combat troops did not participate. It assigned the Defense Department primary responsibility for managing and funding those peacekeeping operations in which U.S. combat troops participated and for all peace enforcement operations. However, the Defense Department never actually received this responsibility.

An interagency working group—known as the Peacekeeping Core Group—managed day-to-day Directive 25 decision-making and implementation for U.N. peacekeeping operations. This group was chaired by the National Security Council’s Senior Director for Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs and consisted of assistant and deputy assistant secretaries of U.S. government Departments and agencies.

Presidential Decision
Directives 56, 68, and 71
Provided Guidance for
Managing Peacekeeping
Operations

Directive 56 (*Managing Complex Contingency Operations*), issued in 1997, guided executive branch officials in managing implementation of ongoing, smaller-scale contingency operations, including some multilateral peacekeeping operations.

Directive 68 (*International Public Information*), issued in 1999, guided executive branch officials in coordinating public information activities in support of complex contingency operations, including multilateral peacekeeping operations.

Directive 71 (*Strengthening Criminal Justice Systems in support of Peace Operations and Other Complex Contingencies*), issued in 2000, guided executive branch officials in improving U.S. response to the criminal justice aspects of peacekeeping operations to aid in the successful transition to durable peace and a timely exit of peacekeepers.

U.S. Policy and Law
Established Guidance
and Requirements for
Consultations About
Peacekeeping

Presidential Decision Directive 25 recognized that sustaining U.S. support for U.N. and multilateral operations requires that the Congress and the American people understand and accept the value of such operations as tools for advancing U.S. interests. Toward this end, Directive 25 stated that the “Congress must...be actively involved in the continuing implementation of U.S. policy on peacekeeping” and that the “Congress and the American people must...be genuine participants in the processes that support U.S. decision-making on new and on-going peace operations.” Directive 25 recognized that the executive branch traditionally “has not solicited the involvement of Congress or the American people on matters related to U.N. peacekeeping.” It concluded that this “lack of communication is not desirable in an era when peace operations have become numerous, complex, and expensive.” Directive 25 instructed executive branch officials to undertake six specific initiatives “to improve and regularize communication and consultation” with the Congress about U.N. peacekeeping to ensure that sufficient public and congressional support existed for proposed operations.

Additionally, the Congress has enacted peacekeeping consultation and reporting requirements to enhance its ability to play a more effective role on these matters. The U.N. Participation Act of 1945, as amended, for example, requires the President to (1) consult with and provide information to the Congress in writing at least 15 days before the U.N.

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Security Council votes to authorize or expand U.N. peacekeeping operations²⁹ and (2) consult monthly with the Congress on the status of U.N. peacekeeping operations, including anticipated operations. Table 4 summarizes the consultation, notification, and reporting requirements for U.N. peacekeeping operations.

²⁹ For the decisions in our study that occurred before November 29, 1999, the president generally was required to submit a report to the Congress not less than 5 days before the U.N. Security Council was expected to vote on a resolution authorizing a peacekeeping operation. Public Law 103-236, section 407(a)(4), 108 Stat. 449.

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Table 4: Congressional Consultation and Reporting Requirements for U.N. Peacekeeping

<p>Requirements established by Directive 25</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consult periodically with bipartisan congressional leaders on foreign policy engagements that might involve U.S. forces, including possible deployments of U.S. military units in U.N. operations. • Brief congressional staff monthly on the United Nations' upcoming calendar, including current, new, and expanded peacekeeping operations. • Inform the Congress as soon as possible of unanticipated U.N. Security Council votes on new or expanded operations. • Inform the Congress of U.N. command and control arrangements when U.S. military units participate in U.N. operations. • Provide U.N. documents to appropriate congressional committees on a timely basis. • Submit a comprehensive annual report on U.N. peacekeeping operations to the Congress.
<p>Requirements established by U.S. law^a</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consult monthly with the Congress on the status of U.N. peacekeeping operations, including anticipated operations. • Provide information to the Congress in writing at least 15 days before voting in the U.N. Security Council to authorize or expand operations. • Submit to the Congress all U.N. Security Council resolutions and any supporting documentation no later than 3 working days after adoption. • Promptly transmit to the Congress any published U.N. report distributed to U.N. Security Council members that contains assessments of proposed, ongoing, or concluded U.N. operations. • Submit to the Congress quarterly reports on U.S. assistance provided to support U.N. peacekeeping operations and a comprehensive annual report on U.N. operations. • Notify the Congress at least 15 days before the United States provides any assistance to the United Nations to support peacekeeping operations.

^a22 U.S.C. section 287b.

Source: GAO analysis of Directive 25, U.S. law, and other information.

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our study is based on a review of eight executive branch decisions made between May 1999 and February 2000 to vote in the U.N. Security Council to authorize or expand the operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see table 1). The Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations and the Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, House Committee on International Relations, asked us to assess how executive branch officials used Presidential Decision Directive 25 in deciding to support the authorization or expansion of peacekeeping operations in these locations and how the officials consulted with the Congress about the decisions. Specifically, we assessed

- whether executive branch officials considered all applicable Directive 25 factors before making their decisions and identified shortfalls in any of these factors at the time the decisions were made and
- how the executive branch officials consulted with the Congress during the decision-making process, including the timing and content of the information provided.

To assess whether executive branch officials considered all applicable Directive 25 factors, we collected and analyzed information from more than 200 National Security Council and State and Defense Department records related to these decisions. These records included summaries of conclusions of Deputies Committee and Peacekeeping Core Group meetings, decision memorandums, concept and briefing papers, and Directive 25 analyses (prepared for five of the eight decisions).³⁰ We used a checklist of Directive 25 factors to collect information from these records about executive branch consideration and assessment of Directive 25 factors. We entered information into a database and analyzed it to determine whether executive branch officials (1) considered all Directive 25 factors before deciding to vote to authorize or expand U.N. operations, (2) identified Directive 25 shortfalls at the time they made their decisions, and (3) took actions to address identified shortfalls. To gain an understanding of the wider context in which these decisions were made, we supplemented this analysis by (1) reviewing several hundred other executive branch records, such as State and Defense Department intelligence analyses, and (2) discussing our analysis of the eight decisions

³⁰ We had to rely on executive branch officials to identify these and other executive branch records. We asked these officials to identify all executive branch records relevant to the eight decisions created from January 1999 through June 2000.

with State and Defense Department and National Security Council officials.

As we informed you several times, executive branch officials, citing deliberative process concerns, denied us full and complete access to records related to the eight decisions in our study, particularly records created during the earlier stages of the decision-making process.³¹ Although executive branch officials briefed us about some of the information in these records, as discussed in our auditing standards, this lack of full and complete access limited our ability to form independent and objective opinions and conclusions about the process used by U.S. decision-makers to weigh various assessments and arrive at an interagency position. As a result, we limited the scope of our study primarily to the outcome of the decision-making process—that is, whether executive officials considered Directive 25 factors in making decisions, not how they considered them and arrived at decisions. For example, although our analysis showed that State and Defense officials' assessments of some Directive 25 factors differed at some points, we were unable to determine how executive branch officials reached consensus on these factors during the interagency process. Consequently, this report does not discuss such issues. Because most of the records we examined were classified, some of the information in this report is necessarily general.

To assess executive branch consultations with the Congress about the eight decisions, we collected and analyzed information from both executive branch and congressional records. Executive branch records included State and Defense Department summaries of monthly and special briefings, notification letters and reports required by U.S. law, the State Department's congressional contact log, and written statements of senior executive branch officials testifying before Senate and House committees. Congressional records included transcripts of monthly executive branch briefings for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and written statements by committee and subcommittee chairmen and other Members of Congress. We examined these records to determine whether executive branch officials had complied with the consultation and reporting requirements in Directive 25 and relevant laws. For example, we determined whether executive branch officials had notified the Congress in writing of their decisions before the U.S. Representative to the United Nations voted in the U.N. Security Council. We used a checklist of

³¹ See [GAO-01-440R](#), [GAO-01-100T](#), and [GAO-01-180T](#).

Directive 25 factors to collect information from executive branch and congressional records about executive branch consultations for the eight decisions. We entered this information into a database and analyzed it to determine the timing and content of information provided to the Congress.

We conducted our work from March 2000 to July 2001 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix III: Key Events Related to Operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

The following tables present timelines of the key international and U.S. events leading up to the approval of the proposed U.N. and multilateral operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the eight decisions we reviewed.

East Timor

Table 5 presents a timeline of key events leading up to the approval of the U.N. Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET), and the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The shaded text highlights summaries of the mandates for these three operations.

Table 5: Timeline of Key Events Related to U.S. Decisions About U.N. and Multilateral Operations in East Timor, 1960 to March 2000

Date	Key international and U.S. events
1960	The U.N. General Assembly added East Timor—a Portuguese colony—to the list of non-self-governing territories falling under Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter.
1975-76	Portugal withdrew from East Timor and civil war broke out between East Timorese factions. In late 1975, Indonesian forces invaded East Timor and forcibly incorporated the former colony into Indonesia. United Nations and most member states never formally recognized Indonesia's takeover of East Timor (e.g., see U.N. Security Council Resolutions 384 (1975) and 389 (1976)). United States supported U.N. Security Council Resolutions 384 (1975) and 389 (1976), which called for self-determination for East Timor.
1983	Portugal and Indonesia began regular talks aimed at resolving East Timor's status.
1998	June —Indonesia agreed to enter U.N.-mediated talks about autonomy for East Timor.
1999	January —Indonesia's President announced that if East Timor rejected autonomy, his cabinet would recommend that Indonesia's supreme legislative assembly separate East Timor from Indonesia. March —Indonesia and Portugal agreed to use a direct ballot to consult East Timor's people about whether they accept or reject autonomy.

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Date	Key international and U.S. events
	<p>May 4—U.N. Secretary General dispatched a team to East Timor to evaluate the political and security situation and gather information for use in developing a detailed operational plan for holding a consultation.</p> <p>May 5—Indonesia and Portugal concluded an agreement for East Timor (S/1999/513, Annex I)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • called for the establishment of a U.N. operation to conduct a popular consultation to determine East Timor’s future status (autonomy or independence) • made Indonesia responsible for maintaining peace and security to ensure that the consultation occurred in an atmosphere free of intimidation, violence, or interference • called on Indonesia, Portugal, and the United Nations to arrange for the orderly transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Nations if the consultation vote was for independence • called on the United Nations to maintain “an adequate” presence in East Timor between the consultation and the implementation of autonomy or independence <p>Separate agreements detailed the process for holding the popular consultation and security arrangements (S/1999/513, Annexes II and III).</p> <p>May 7—State Department completed a Directive 25 analysis of the proposed U.N. operation.</p> <p>May 27</p> <p>The Deputies Committee decided that the United States would vote to establish a new peacekeeping operation in East Timor.</p> <p>State Department notified the Congress that the United States intended to vote to authorize UNAMET, citing the following factors:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • U.S. interests in supporting UNAMET <ul style="list-style-type: none"> --important U.S. security, political, financial, economic, and commercial interests in Indonesia --U.S. regional interests in Indonesian stability --importance of holding a fair and credible consultation to resolve the longstanding problem in East Timor --Indonesia’s stability a vital national interest for Australia, a close U.S. ally • UNAMET’s objective—ensure a free and fair consultation • UNAMET’s exit strategy was dependent on the outcome of the consultation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> --autonomy accepted—U.N. operation would end shortly after the consultation --autonomy rejected—UN-run transition to independence that probably would involve a peacekeeping component • U.S. cost—\$13.1 million
	<p>June 11—U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1246 (1999), which established UNAMET to organize and conduct a secret ballot to determine the future status of East Timor. The United States voted in favor of this resolution.</p> <p>U.N. Security Council Resolution 1246 (1999) established UNAMET to organize and conduct a popular consultation (vote) to determine the future status of East Timor (autonomy or independence):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civilian police component—up to 280 civilian police officers to advise the Indonesian police and, at the time of the vote, supervise the escort of ballots to and from the polling sites. • Military liaison component—up to 50 military liaison officers to maintain contact with the Indonesian military. • Political component—monitor the fairness of the political environment, ensure the freedom of all organizations to carry out their responsibilities freely, and monitor and advise the U.N. Secretary General’s Special Representative for East Timor on all matters with political implications. • Electoral component—implement activities related to registration and voting. • Information component—explain to the East Timorese people, in an objective and impartial manner, the terms of the General Agreement and the proposed autonomy framework; provide information about the process and procedure of the vote; and explain the implications of a vote for autonomy or independence. <p>Resolution 1246 reiterated the Indonesian government’s responsibility under the May 5, 1999, agreement for maintaining peace and security to ensure the consultation occurred in an atmosphere free of intimidation, violence, or interference and ensuring the safety and security of U.N. personnel and other international staff and observers.</p> <p>Resolution 1246 authorized UNAMET through August 31, 1999; Resolution 1257 (1999), adopted August 3, 1999, extended UNAMET’s mandate until September 30, 1999; Resolution 1262 (1999), adopted August 27, 1999, extended UNAMET’s mandate until November 30, 1999.</p>

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Date	Key international and U.S. events
	June 27 —United States called on U.N. forces to use force preemptively to demonstrate that the United Nations would not tolerate militia violence and intimidation.
	July 16 —Voter registration started as senior Indonesian and Portuguese officials concluded security discussions.
	July 20 —U.N. Secretary General reported that UNAMET was fully deployed and violence continued to interfere with preparations for the popular consultation (A/1999/803).
	July 28 —U.N. Secretary General delayed the consultation vote until August 30, 1999.
	August 3 —U.N. Security Council extended UNAMET’s mandate until September 30, 1999.
	August 9 —U.S. agencies completed a political-military plan for East Timor.
	August 12 —United States expressed concern about violence and intimidation during the campaign and called on Indonesia to provide a secure environment and promote disarmament of all paramilitary forces.
	August 17 —U.S. officials told House staff that <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • voter registration efforts appeared successful • voters were likely to choose independence • such an outcome could result in violence
	August 30 —Popular consultation held in East Timor.
	August 31 —Deputies Committee met to consider a multinational force and an expanded U.N. operation in East Timor.
	September 1 —Violence erupted outside the U.N. compound in Dili, East Timor.
	September 2 —Militia kill two local U.N. staff in Dili as the United Nations started counting ballots.
	September 3 —United Nations announced the consultation results. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • U.N. Secretary General reported that about 79 percent of the East Timorese people voted against autonomy (and thus for independence). • Pro-independence outcome sparked widespread violence by pro-autonomy militia.
	September 4 —Deputies Committee met again to consider a multinational force and an expanded U.N. operation in East Timor.
	September 8 —U.N. Security Council dispatched a five-member mission to Indonesia and East Timor to discuss peaceful implementation of the May 5 agreement.
	September 9 U.S. agencies completed an updated political-military plan for East Timor. Under Secretary of State told a joint congressional hearing that the United States <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • had suspended military-to-military relations with Indonesia • would support a multinational force to restore order in East Timor • was working to obtain Indonesia’s consent to such a force
	September 11 U.N. Security Council met in formal session to consider the situation in East Timor. Members stressed the need for a multinational force to restore peace and security in East Timor. Deputies Committee decided that the United States would support a multinational force in East Timor.
	September 12 —Indonesia’s President announced Indonesia would accept international assistance to restore peace and security in East Timor.
	September 14 —U.N. Security Council mission recommended that the Security Council <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • authorize a framework for an international peacekeeping force • hold Indonesia to its obligations under the May 5, 1999, agreement • institute an investigation of apparent abuses of international law in East Timor
	September 15 —U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1264 (1999), which authorized a multilateral force to restore peace and security in East Timor, protect and support UNAMET, and facilitate humanitarian assistance operations. The United States voted in favor of this resolution.

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Date	Key international and U.S. events
	<p>U.N. Security Council Resolution 1264 (1999) authorized a multinational force in East Timor (INTERFET) under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to “take all necessary measures” to</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • restore peace and security in East Timor • protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks • facilitate humanitarian assistance operations <p>Resolution 1264 agreed this force would remain deployed in East Timor until replaced by a follow-on U.N. peacekeeping operation and invited the U.N. Secretary General to plan and prepare for a U.N. transitional administration in East Timor, incorporating a U.N. peacekeeping operation.</p> <p>September 20-21 INTERFET started deploying.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Australian and New Zealand troops inserted by air secure airport and began deploying around Dili (East Timor’s capital). • Additional troops inserted through the port continued deploying around Dili. • INTERFET eventually deployed about 8,000 troops. • The United States contributed over 400 communications, logistics, and intelligence personnel to INTERFET as well as airlift capability. <p>September 23—Foreign ministers of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council condemned the violence in East Timor, voiced their support for the deployment of a multinational force, and called on all parties to cooperate.</p> <p>September 29—Deputies Committee met to consider an expanded U.N. operation in East Timor.</p> <hr/> <p>October 8—State Department notified the Congress that the United States intended to vote to establish UNTAET, citing the following factors:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collapse of civil administration in East Timor had forced the United Nations to accelerate preparations for a transitional administration for East Timor. • Severe humanitarian crisis in the aftermath of Indonesian military and militia violence, with an estimated 350,000 internally displaced and 200,000 refugees in West Timor. • U.S. interests in supporting UNTAET <ul style="list-style-type: none"> --critical U.S. security, political, financial, economic, and commercial interests in Indonesia --U.S. regional interests in Indonesia’s stability --Indonesia’s stability a vital national interest for Australia, a close U.S. ally • UNTAET’s objective—replace INTERFET and administer the territory of East Timor during its transition to independence <ul style="list-style-type: none"> --maintain security and order --facilitate and coordinate relief assistance --facilitate emergency rehabilitation of physical infrastructure --administer East Timor and create structures for sustainable governance and rule of law --assist in drafting a constitution and conduct elections for a national government • UNTAET’s exit strategy—operation would end after an expected 2- to 3-year process of transferring responsibilities for government to the people of East Timor. • U.S. cost—\$170 million for 12 months (25 percent of an estimated \$680 million). <p>October 12 and 16—Deputies Committee met to consider issues related to the proposed UNTAET and East Timor.</p> <p>October 19—Indonesia’s supreme legislative assembly recognized the outcome of the consultation, marking the formal start of East Timor’s transition to independence.</p> <p>October 21—Deputies Committee met to consider issues related to the proposed UNTAET and East Timor.</p> <p>October 25—U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1272 (1999), which established UNTAET to administer East Timor during its transition to independence. The United States voted in favor of this resolution.</p>

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Operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and
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Date	Key international and U.S. events
	<p>U.N. Security Council Resolution 1272 (1999) established UNTAET under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter through January 31, 2001. The resolution endowed UNTAET with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor; empowered it to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice, and take all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate; and specified the following elements for its mandate:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • provide security and maintain law and order throughout East Timor • establish an effective civil administration • assist in the development of civil and social services • ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, and development assistance • support capacity-building for self government • assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development <p>Resolution 1272 authorized three components for UNTAET:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • governance and public administration component, including a civilian police division with up to 1,640 officers • humanitarian assistance and emergency rehabilitation component • military component, with a strength of up to 8,950 troops and up to 200 military observers <p>November 1—Last Indonesian Army units left East Timor.</p> <p>November 4—Militia forces intimidated returning refugees along the border between East and West Timor.</p> <p>December 1—Nobel Laureate Jose Ramos Horta returns to East Timor after 24 years in exile.</p> <p>December 2—15-member National Consultative Council established to allow East Timorese to participate in the transitional authority’s decision-making process.</p>
2000	<p>February 1—INTERFET began handing over military authority to UNTAET.</p> <p>February 23—UNTAET assumed responsibility for security in East Timor.</p> <p>March 3</p> <p>UNTAET declared western parts of East Timor “high threat” areas after a series of armed attacks against civilians and U.N. troops.</p> <p>U.N. report concluded that the Indonesian military was complicit in 16 incidents of militia violence between February 21 and March 7, 2000.</p>

Source: GAO analysis of U.S., U.N., and other records.

Sierra Leone

Table 6 presents a timeline of key events leading up to the approval of the U.N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and the expansion of UNAMSIL. The shaded text highlights summaries of the mandates for these three operations.

Table 6: Timeline of Key Events Related to U.S. Decisions About U.N. Operations in Sierra Leone, March 1991 to May 2000

Date	Key international and U.S. events
1991	March —Revolutionary United Front forces began attacking government forces near the Liberian border.
1992	Sierra Leone government overthrown by Sierra Leone Army.
1995	February —U.N. Special Envoy appointed to assist Organization of African Unity and Economic Community of West African States efforts to negotiate a settlement and return Sierra Leone to civilian rule.
1996	<p>February—Parliamentary and presidential elections held and Sierra Leone Army relinquished power to President Kabbah. Conflict continued because rebels did not participate in the elections and did not recognize the results.</p> <p>June—U.S. Congress adopted concurrent resolution congratulating the people of Sierra Leone on their first democratic presidential and parliamentary elections in nearly 30 years and encouraging its citizens to work together for peace.</p> <p>November—Sierra Leone government and rebels negotiated a peace agreement (Abidjan Accord).</p>
1997	<p>May—Sierra Leone Army and rebels overthrew government, sending President Kabbah and his government into exile in neighboring Guinea.</p> <p>May-June—U.S. Marine Expeditionary Unit evacuated about 2,500 foreign nationals, including 450 Americans, from Freetown, Sierra Leone to Conakry, Guinea.</p> <p>October 3—United States condemned the seizure of power by the Sierra Leone Army and rebels.</p> <p>October 8—U.N. Security Council imposed an oil and arms embargo and authorized the Economic Community of West African States Military Observers Group (ECOMOG) to enforce the embargo.</p> <p>October 23—Economic Community of West African States, Sierra Leone Army, and rebel representatives signed a peace agreement that called for a cease-fire to be monitored by ECOMOG assisted by U.N. military observers.</p> <p>November 5—President Kabbah stated his acceptance of the agreement and his government’s willingness to cooperate with the Economic Community of West African States, ECOMOG, and the United Nations in implementing the agreement.</p>
1998	<p>January—State Department’s Sierra Leone Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997 reported widespread violation of human rights in Sierra Leone.</p> <p>February—ECOMOG launched a military attack in response to an attack by rebel/army forces that led to the junta’s collapse and its expulsion from Freetown.</p> <p>March President Kabbah returned to office. U.N. Security Council terminated the oil and arms embargo and strengthened the office of the U.N. Special Envoy to include U.N. military liaison officers and security advisory personnel.</p> <p>June U.N. Security Council established UNOMSIL to monitor efforts to disarm combatants and restructure the Sierra Leone’s security forces under the protection of ECOMOG. UNOMSIL documented reports of ongoing atrocities and human rights abuses committed against civilians. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs testified before the Congress that a humanitarian crisis was looming in Sierra Leone.</p> <p>July—U.S. Special Envoy meets with the presidents of Liberia and Sierra Leone and influences signing of nonaggression agreement.</p> <p>November—U.S. Special Envoy met with African heads of state, including Nigeria and Sierra Leone.</p> <p>December—Rebel forces began an offensive to retake Freetown.</p>

**Appendix III: Key Events Related to
Operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo**

Date	Key international and U.S. events
1999	<p>January Rebel forces took control of most of Freetown. UNOMSIL personnel evacuated. Later in the month, ECOMOG troops retook Freetown.</p> <hr/> <p>May—Sierra Leone government and rebels began negotiations.</p> <hr/> <p>July Sierra Leone government and rebels signed the Lomé Peace Agreement (S/1999/777) on July 7, agreeing to end hostilities, form a government of national unity, and request an expanded role for UNOMSIL. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs briefed the Congress about the situation in Sierra Leone; stated that the Lomé Peace Agreement held promise. State Department completed a Directive 25 analysis of the proposed operation.</p> <hr/> <p>August 20—U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1260 (1999), which authorized UNOMSIL’s expansion. The United States voted in favor of this resolution.</p> <div style="background-color: #f0f0f0; padding: 5px;"> <p>U.N. Security Council Resolution 1260 (1999) authorized the provisional expansion of UNOMSIL to up to 210 military observers, along with the necessary equipment and administrative and medical support, under security provided by the Economic Community of West Africa Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • strengthen and expand the contacts already established by UNOMSIL with the Revolutionary United Front and government troops in the countryside • extend UNOMSIL’s cease-fire monitoring activities to a wider geographical area (security conditions permitting) • strengthen and assist the cease-fire monitoring mechanisms established under the Lomé Peace Agreement • monitor the military and security situation in the country and report to the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General • assist and monitor the disarmament and demobilization of combatants in areas where adequate security is provided • work closely with humanitarian organizations to exchange information on security conditions with a view to ensuring the widest possible access for humanitarian assistance • work closely with human rights officers, as required, in their visits throughout the country • maintain liaison and coordinate closely with ECOMOG • assist in the preparation of plans for the deployment of neutral peacekeeping troops, as envisioned in the agreement <p>Resolution 1260 authorized strengthening UNOMSIL’s political, civil affairs, information, human rights, and child protection elements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • appointed a deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the expansion of the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General • augmented the human rights component by authorizing 10 international human rights officers, including 2 child protection officers • required up to 35 military (or civilian) medical personnel • included an aviation capability to provide 24-hour medical evacuation as well as daytime monitoring and observation </div> <hr/> <p>September 30—State Department completed a Directive 25 analysis of the proposed operation (UNAMSIL).</p> <hr/> <p>October—U.S. Secretary of State meets with President of Sierra Leone and pledges support of peace efforts.</p> <p>October 22—U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1270 (1999), which established UNAMSIL. The United States voted in favor of this resolution.</p>

**Appendix III: Key Events Related to
Operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo**

Date	Key international and U.S. events
	<p>U.N. Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999) established UNAMSIL under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter to cooperate with the Government of Sierra Leone and the other parties in implementing the Lomé Peace Agreement and assist the Government of Sierra Leone in implementing the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration plan. Key elements of UNAMSIL’s mandate were as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • establish a presence at key locations throughout Sierra Leone, including disarmament, reception, and demobilization centers • ensure the security and freedom of movement of U.N. personnel • monitor adherence to the cease-fire agreement • encourage the parties to create and implement confidence-building mechanisms • facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance • support the activities of U.N. officials, including the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and human rights and civil affairs officers • provide support, as requested, to the elections to be held in accordance with Sierra Leone’s constitution
2000	<p>January 13—State Department completed a Directive 25 analysis of the proposed expansion of UNAMSIL.</p> <p>February 7—U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1289 (2000), which authorized the expansion of UNAMSIL. The United States voted in favor of the resolution.</p> <p>U.N. Security Council Resolution 1289 (2000) authorized the expansion of UNAMSIL under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to take all necessary action to accomplish the following objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • provide security at key locations and government buildings, in particular in Freetown; important intersections; and major airports, including Lungi airport • facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance • provide security in and at all disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program sites • coordinate with and assist the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities • guard weapons, ammunition, and other military equipment collected from ex-combatants and assist in their subsequent disposal or destruction <p>Resolution 1289 affirmed that, in the discharge of its mandate, UNAMSIL could take all necessary action to</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel • afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence <p>May—U.S. Special Envoy, undertaking a diplomatic mission to Sierra Leone, stated “our mission is on target.”</p>

Source: GAO analysis of U.S., U.N., and other records.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Table 7 presents a timeline of key events leading up to the approval of the U.N. Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and the expansion of this operation (Phase II). The shaded text highlights summaries of the mandates for these two operations.

Table 7: Key Events Related to U.S. Decisions About U.N. Operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, August 1998 to February 2000

Date	Key international and U.S. events
1998	August —Southern Africa Development Community and the Organization for African Unity announced a regional initiative to end the Congo conflict, which U.S. officials supported.
1999	<p>February 9—State Department press statement</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • welcomed efforts to mediate conflict and urged parties to reach a peaceful settlement • reiterated U.S. support for the Democratic Republic of the Congo territorial integrity and sovereignty <p>March 19—U.S. statement in the U.N. Security Council</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • asserted that the Congo conflict had created a deepening humanitarian crisis and presented a grave threat to regional peace, stability, and development • declared U.S. support for the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and welcomed efforts to mediate conflict and reach a peaceful settlement • called for establishing an immediate cease-fire and a mechanism to address the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s and neighboring countries’ internal and external security concerns • condemned reported violence and some regional states’ cooperation with groups guilty of genocide • declared U.S. support for a peacekeeping operation in Congo under the following conditions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> --parties reached a comprehensive settlement to end the conflict and observed a cease-fire --proposed operation was limited in size and had a mandate to observe and monitor—not to enforce peace or maintain the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s border security <p>April 9—U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1234 (1999). The United States voted in favor of this resolution. Resolution 1234</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • welcomed the appointment of a U.N. Special Envoy for the peace process and expressed support for regional efforts to end the conflict • reaffirmed states’ obligation to respect the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s and other states’ territorial integrity, political independence, and national sovereignty • deplored the continued fighting and presence of foreign forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and demanded an immediate halt to hostilities • called for an immediate cease-fire agreement and the withdrawal of all foreign forces, reestablishment of government authority, and disarmament of nongovernment forces • stressed the need for, and welcomed the government’s intention to hold, an inclusive political dialogue • called for the protection of human rights, respect for international humanitarian law, and safe and unhindered access for humanitarian assistance; condemned all massacres in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and called for an international investigation • reaffirmed its readiness to consider a U.N. operation to assist in implementing a cease-fire agreement and a political settlement; asked the U.N. Secretary General to work with the Organization for African Unity in promoting a peaceful settlement of the conflict <p>April 18—Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, and Chad signed an agreement calling for the cessation of hostilities, deployment of an African peacekeeping force, and the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan troops.</p> <p>May 28—Rwanda declared a unilateral cease-fire, which triggered a flurry of diplomatic activity and reenergized regional peacemaking efforts.</p> <p>May 29—U.S. delegation to the inauguration of Nigeria’s new civilian government met with the presidents of the Congo, Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe to urge progress in the wake of Rwanda’s May 28 cease-fire declaration.</p>

**Appendix III: Key Events Related to
Operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo**

Date	Key international and U.S. events
	<p>July 10—Six countries signed the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement (S/1999/815).</p> <p>July 15—U.N. Secretary General report recommended establishing a U.N. observer mission and deploying a technical survey team to assess conditions to prepare for subsequent U.N. operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/1999/790).</p> <p>July 23—State Department notified the Congress that the United States intended to vote to establish a U.N. liaison mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • mission would safeguard clear U.S. political and economic interests threatened by the conflict's potential to destabilize the region • estimated U.S. cost of the U.N. operation was \$4 million for 3 months
	<p>August 1—Representatives of the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo, one of two rebel groups involved in the conflict, signed the Lusaka agreement.</p> <p>August 6—U.N. Security Council adopted resolution 1258 (1999), establishing MONUC. The United States voted in favor of this resolution.</p>
	<p>U.N. Security Council Resolution 1258 (1999) welcomed the signing of a cease-fire agreement in Lusaka on July 10, 1999, and the formation of a joint military commission by the parties. It authorized the deployment of up to 90 U.N. military liaisons, together with necessary civilian, political, humanitarian, and administrative staff for 3 months with the following mandate:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • establish and maintain liaison with the joint military commission and the parties • assist the joint military commission and the parties in planning the implementation of the cease-fire agreement • provide information to help the Secretary General refine a concept of operations for a further U.N. role in implementing the cease-fire agreement • secure assurances of cooperation and security from the parties for the possible deployment of U.N. military observers <p>U.N. Security Council Resolution 1273 (1999), adopted November 5, 1999, extended the operation's mandate until January 15, 2000; Resolution 1279 (1999), adopted November 30, 1999, formally named the operation the U.N. Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and extended its mandate until March 1, 2000.</p>
	<p>August 31—Representatives of the Rally for Congolese Democracy, the second of two rebel groups involved in the conflict, signed the Lusaka agreement.</p> <p>September—MONUC military liaison officers began deploying to parties' capitals.</p> <p>September 23—Statement by Foreign Ministers of the Five Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council (S/1999/996, Annex I)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • expressed deep concerns about continuing conflict in Africa; reaffirmed the relationship between peace and development; underlined necessity for U.N. system to give a high priority to Africa's needs and concerns • welcomed efforts by the United Nations and regional organizations to promote peace and stability and peacefully settle conflicts • reaffirmed the Democratic Republic of the Congo's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence and expressed concern about the situation there • welcomed the Lusaka accords; urged the parties to implement their commitments fully; and expressed appreciation for regional and international mediation efforts • appealed to the international community to assist the peace process, including a possible U.N. peacekeeping operation; and welcomed the deployment of military liaison officers
	<p>November 5—U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1273 (1999), which extended MONUC's mandate until January 15, 2000 (as recommended by U.N. Secretary General report S/1999/1116). The United States voted in favor of this resolution.</p> <p>November 30—U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1279 (1999), which asked the Secretary General to accelerate the development of a concept of operations for an expanded MONUC and prepare to deploy up to 500 U.N. military observers. The United States voted in favor of this resolution.</p>
	<p>December 12—U.N. Security Council met to consider the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The United States stated its opposition to authorizing a U.N. operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo until its mandate, size, composition, structure, command and control arrangements, cost, and other factors were better understood.</p>

**Appendix III: Key Events Related to
Operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo**

Date	Key international and U.S. events
2000	<p>January 24 U.N. Security Council met to consider the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. At the meeting, the U.S. Secretary of State</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • asserted the Congo conflict could be called “Africa’s first world war,” because of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s location and size and the number of states involved • promised to consult with the Congress and work to achieve a swift U.N. Security Council consensus on authorizing an expanded MONUC • noted the need to apply lessons learned about U.N. peacekeeping “firmly and realistically” in the Democratic Republic of the Congo <p>State Department completed a Directive 25 analysis of the proposed U.N. operation.</p> <p>January 26—Deputies Committee met to consider U.S. support for MONUC (phase II).</p> <p>February 7—State Department notified the Congress that the United States intended to vote to expand MONUC, citing the following factors:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • U.S. political and economic interests threatened by the conflict’s potential to destabilize Central Africa • U.S. interest in preventing the resurgence of genocide and mass killings in the region • U.S. cost—\$160 million for 6 months • Exit strategy—completion of phase II linked to progress in planning for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict • U.N. Security Council would consider MONUC’s further expansion [phase III] to help implement a comprehensive settlement <p>February 15—U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations and the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs testified about the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo before the Subcommittee on Africa, House Committee on International Relations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International action was necessary to prevent further conflict and the resurgence of genocide and mass killings in Central Africa. • Although fighting continued in a few areas, the parties had renewed their commitments to the Lusaka accords and called for immediate deployment of an expanded U.N. operation. <p>February 23—Summit meeting in Lusaka endorsed the proposed joint MONUC/Joint Military Commission structure</p> <p>February 24 U.N. Security Council adopted resolution 1291 (2000), which expanded MONUC. The United States voted in favor of this resolution.</p> <p>A statement in the U.N. Security Council by the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations explained the U.S. vote:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Although deeply concerned by reported cease-fire violations, the United States supported expanding the U.N. presence to help implement the Lusaka accords, partly because these accords were the “only viable process” for durable resolution of conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo • Keys to U.N. success: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> --effective integration of MONUC and Joint Military Commission efforts --disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and resettlement of armed groups --ending support for forces involved in genocide • U.S. support for phase II expansion did not constitute prior approval of a phase III (further expanded) operation. U.S. support for phase III contingent on the parties achieving specific political and military objectives: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> --full observance of the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement --initiation of disengagement and redeployment --substantial progress on a national dialogue

**Appendix III: Key Events Related to
Operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo**

Date	Key international and U.S. events
	<p>U.N. Security Council Resolution 1291 (2000) authorized expanding MONUC up to 5,537 military personnel (including up to 500 observers) contingent on the following conditions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the parties observe the cease-fire and relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions • development of a plan for disengagement and redeployment of forces • the parties provide firm and credible assurances for the security and movement of U.N. forces <p>Resolution 1291 specified the following elements for MONUC’s mandate:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • monitor the cease-fire and investigate violations • establish and maintain liaison with the parties’ military field headquarters • develop a plan for implementing the cease-fire agreement that provides for the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> --collection and verification of information about the parties’ military forces --maintenance of the cease-fire and disengagement and redeployment of parties’ military forces --disarmament, demobilization, resettlement, and reintegration of combatants --orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces • work with the parties to obtain the release of all prisoners of war • supervise and verify the disengagement and redeployment of the parties’ forces • monitor compliance with weapons and ammunition restrictions in the cease-fire agreement • facilitate humanitarian and human rights monitoring • cooperate with, and provide assistance to, the facilitator of the national (political) dialogue • deploy mine-clearing experts to assess the scope of the land mine problem, coordinate mine-clearing activities, develop a mine-clearing plan, and conduct emergency mine-clearing <p>Resolution 1291 authorized MONUC under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to take all necessary action to protect U.N. and other personnel, facilities, and equipment; ensure the security and freedom on movement of its personnel; and protect civilians under imminent threat of violence.</p>

Source: GAO analysis of U.S., U.N., and other records.

Appendix IV: Executive Branch Actions to Address Presidential Decision Directive 25 Shortfalls

Our analysis of executive branch records showed that, for the eight decisions we reviewed, executive branch officials worked to reduce risks and maximize the chances of operational success by taking steps to eliminate, or reduce the impact of, Presidential Decision Directive 25 shortfalls on the proposed operations. Before the Deputies Committee or U.N. Security Council approved the operations, executive branch officials worked to shape the proposed operations’ objectives, mandates, and forces to eliminate shortfalls or reduce their impact. Where such shortfalls could not be addressed before operations were approved, executive branch officials undertook various activities to reduce their operational impact. Table 8 shows some of the actions taken by executive branch officials to address Directive 25 shortfalls for the eight decisions we reviewed.

Table 8: Executive Branch Actions to Address Directive 25 Shortfalls

Directive 25 factor	Shortfalls identified	Executive branch actions
East Timor		
International support for multilateral action exists?	Uncertain or declining international support for U.N. action	Worked to establish a “friends group” for East Timor to build international support and coordinate planning.
For peacekeeping operations—a cease-fire is in place and the warring parties consent to the deployment of a U.N. force?	Potential or ongoing violence and human rights abuses	Worked informally with the parties to obtain consent for U.N. force.
	Uncertainty regarding parties’ consent/intentions	Encouraged the parties to disarm. Encouraged the Indonesian government and military and East Timorese to halt militia violence. Assessed Indonesian government and military intentions after the consultation vote, assuming voters (1) rejected autonomy or (2) accepted autonomy.
Proposed operation has clear objectives?	Objectives unclear	Worked with U.N. members and officials to clarify operation’s objectives, for example, by encouraging a coordinated planning effort that includes the United Nations, Indonesia, and others.
Proposed operation has adequate means—including appropriate forces, financing, and mandate?	Forces and/or financing uncertain	Encouraged “friends group” to solicit capable troops and take lead in establishing a voluntary trust fund and soliciting contributions.
	Presence of specific forces or capabilities key to operational success	Authorized funds to recruit, prepare, and deploy U.S. civilian police.
	Proposed mandate unclear	Ensured the operation included a human rights officer.

**Appendix IV: Executive Branch Actions to
Address Presidential Decision Directive 25
Shortfalls**

Directive 25 factor	Shortfalls identified	Executive branch actions
Proposed operation's duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic exit criteria? Sierra Leone	Objectives and exit strategy unclear.	Sought changes to proposed mandate, for example, to ensure that civilian police were tasked to provide a secure and stable atmosphere for voting. Defined/Clarified objectives and exit criteria. Developed a more complete plan with target dates.
International support for multilateral action exists?	Uncertain or declining international support for U.N. action	Contacted U.N. members and regional nations to build/maintain international support for a U.N. operation.
For peacekeeping operations—a cease-fire is in place and the warring parties consent to the deployment of a U.N. force?	Uncertainty regarding parties' commitment to peace agreement Uncertainty regarding parties' consent/intentions Potential or ongoing violence and human rights abuses	Monitored willingness of parties to comply with cease-fire and negotiate a peaceful settlement. Worked to ensure operation expanded only after parties demonstrate their commitment to peace by negotiating a settlement. Encouraged parties to devise and implement concrete confidence-building measures as a precursor to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Pressured rebel leadership to remain committed to peace agreement. Developed options for two scenarios: rebel parties (1) cooperated and comply with peace process or (2) resorted to violence and civil war resumed. Encouraged United Nations to document and denounce violence and human rights violations.
Proposed operation has clear objectives?	Objectives unclear	Work with U.N. members and officials to shape operation to clarify objectives.
Proposed operation has adequate means—including appropriate forces, financing, and mandate?	Presence of specific forces or capabilities key to operational success Current or proposed forces lack needed logistics and operational capabilities Operation threatened by quick withdrawal of some forces and U.N. command and control weaknesses Proposed mandate unclear or inappropriate	Encouraged regional African peacekeeping force (ECOMOG) to remain engaged: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • sought international donor support for ECOMOG • provided financial and logistical support for ECOMOG forces Sought large role for ECOMOG to allow a more limited U.N. security role. Sought more capable troop contingents and provide logistical support. Strengthened U.N. command and control capabilities. Encouraged ECOMOG members to slow withdrawal of ECOMOG troops until replacements can arrive.

**Appendix IV: Executive Branch Actions to
Address Presidential Decision Directive 25
Shortfalls**

Directive 25 factor	Shortfalls identified	Executive branch actions
		Worked with U.N. members and officials to avoid a broad enforcement mandate.
Proposed operation's duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic exit criteria?	Objectives and exit strategy realistic only in the context of a comprehensive peace settlement	Strongly encouraged parties to seek a peaceful settlement. Encouraged U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative to use good offices to shape and facilitate settlement. Worked with U.N. members and officials to avoid open-ended commitment by developing and setting clear objectives and exit criteria: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • form national government of reconciliation • transform rebel groups into political parties • hold free and fair national elections • create accountable, representative, and professional police force and army • establish mechanism to control diamond mining and revenues for legitimate purposes • improve government administrative capabilities • establish truth and reconciliation committee to investigate human rights abuses • establish timetable for the withdrawal of foreign forces
Democratic Republic of the Congo		
International support for multilateral action exists?	Uncertain or declining international support for U.N. action	Contacted U.N. members to seek/build support for phased approach to U.N. operation. Contacted regional nations to seek/build support for U.N. operation.
For peacekeeping operations—a cease-fire is in place and the warring parties consent to the deployment of a U.N. force?	Potential or ongoing violence and human rights abuses Uncertainty regarding parties' commitment to peace agreement	Monitored parties' compliance with cease-fire. Pressured parties to comply with cease-fire.
Proposed operation has clear objectives?	Objectives unclear	Worked with U.N. members and officials to shape operation to clarify objectives.
Proposed operation has adequate means—including appropriate forces, financing, and mandate?	Uncertain forces and/or financing Operation threatened by U.N. command and control weaknesses Proposed mandate unclear or inappropriate	Developed U.S. funding options. Explored/Developed options for U.S. technical support. Worked with U.N. members and officials to ensure appropriate mandate.

Source: GAO analysis of executive branch records.

Appendix V: Comments From the National Security Council

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

August 6, 2001

Dear Ms. Westin:

I am writing in response to your July 20 letter to the National Security Advisor concerning your draft report on U.N. peacekeeping operations and executive branch consultations with the Congress during the previous Administration.

We appreciate the opportunity to review your report. We have taken note of the report's findings, but do not have any comment on the report. We understand the importance of consulting with the Congress on peacekeeping missions and look forward to working closely with the Congress on these and other important national security issues.

Thank you again for the opportunity to review your report.

Sincerely,



Anthony N. Banbury
Acting Senior Director for Democracy,
Human Rights, and International Operations

Ms. Susan S. Westin
Managing Director
International Affairs and Trade
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548

Appendix VI: Comments From the Department of State



United States Department of State

Chief Financial Officer

Washington, D.C. 20520-7427

AUG - 6 2001

Dear Ms. Westin:

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "UN PEACEKEEPING: Executive Branch Consultations With Congress Did Not Fully Meet Expectations in 1999-2000," GAO-01-917, GAO Job Code 711507.

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Mr. Charles R. Casper, Office of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, at (202) 736-7789.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Larry J. Eisenhart".

Larry J. Eisenhart
Acting

Enclosure:

As stated.

cc: GAO/IAT - Mr. Miyabara
State/OIG - Mr. Atkins
State/IO/PHO - Mr. Casper

Ms. Susan S. Westin,
Managing Director,
International Affairs and Trade,
U.S. General Accounting Office.

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report
UN PEACEKEEPING: Executive Branch Consultations With
Congress Did Not Fully Meet Expectations in 1999-2000
(GAO-01-917, GAO Code 711507)

The Department of State intends to continue to provide Congress with timely, detailed and complete information on all new or substantially revised UN peacekeeping operations including known potential and actual problem areas. As GAO recognized, the timing of the provision of this information is a matter of judgement; however, we plan to continue to provide this information in a timely way, no later than the time the Congress is informed in writing about decisions to support such operations.

We will provide technical comments and corrections separately to GAO staff.

Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts

Harold J. Johnson, (202) 512-4128
Tet Miyabara, (202) 512-8974

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the persons named above, Michael Rohrback, Zina Merritt, Richard Seldin, Rona Mendelsohn, and Lynn Cothorn made key contributions to this report.

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