

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

STRATEGIC INFLUENCE OPERATIONS - THE INFORMATION CONNECTION

by

COL BRAD M. WARD  
UNITED STATES ARMY

PROF. FRANK JONES  
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No.  
0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 07-04-2003		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED (FROM - TO) xx-xx-2002 to xx-xx-2003	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Strategic Influence Operations - The Information Connection Unclassified			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S) Ward, Brad M. ; Author			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks Carlisle, PA17013-5050			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS ,			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APUBLIC RELEASE					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See attached file.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:		17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON	
		Same as Report (SAR)	41	Rife, Dave RifeD@awc.carlisle.army.mil	
a. REPORT Unclassified	b. ABSTRACT Unclassified	c. THIS PAGE Unclassified	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER International Area Code Area Code Telephone Number DSN		
				Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39.18	



## ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: COL Brad M. Ward

TITLE: Strategic Influence Operations – The Information Connection

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 07 April 2003      PAGES: 41      CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The intent of this paper is to analyze and highlight the U.S. government's (USG) current approach to conducting strategic influence operations within the international environment. Strategic influence is the confluence of information entities integrated with the interagency integration process concerning public diplomacy, public affairs and international military information (DOD Psychological Operations). Specifically, this paper will conduct a comparative analysis of the fundamental approaches that the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State (DOS), and the National Security Council/White House (NSC/WH) utilize internationally, and provide recommendations that magnify informational techniques to further U.S. strategic objectives.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .....	iii
PREFACE.....	vii
STRATEGIC INFLUENCE – THE INFORMATION CONNECTION.....	1
<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>BACKGROUND.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>HISTORICAL ATTEMPTS AT NATIONAL-LEVEL INFORMATION COORDINATION.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>CONTROL OF THE INFORMATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>POLITICAL REALITIES AND CURRENT INITIATIVES .....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL .....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>INTERAGENCY PROCESS.....</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC INFORMATION (IPI).....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>OFFICE OF STRATEGIC INFLUENCE (OSI).....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS (BBG).....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION POLICY COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SCPCC)....</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY.....</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS (IIP).....</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.....</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) .....</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>PUBLIC AFFAIRS (PA).....</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP), <i>NOT</i> PROPAGANDA.....</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON MANAGED INFORMATION     DISSEMINATION.....</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>RECOMMENDATIONS .....</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>CONCLUSIONS.....</b>	<b>24</b>
ENDNOTES.....	27

BIBLIOGRAPHY .....31

## PREFACE

This paper is a culmination of a life-long project to increase our countries influence capability abroad, through peacetime and crisis. It became more focused when I was provided the opportunity to serve as the senior military advisor to the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and specifically to serve on the Presidentially mandated International Public Information Secretariat from 1999 through 2002. Over the past three years, the concept for strategic influence has matured and has begun to orchestrate the synergy required to further promote and explain our national goals and objectives to foreign audiences.

I would like to thank William V. Parker and the members of the Department of State's International Public Information Secretariat for providing me the opportunity to expand my professional horizons and personal experience in the world of "Washington Beltway" politics and international public diplomacy. Thanks are also due to all the former members of the Department of Defense's Office of Strategic Influence and specifically to BG Simon P. Worden for developing a strategic vision that created a safer America through the use of information and technology, and for his professional bravery in attempting to execute this strategy. Special kudos to Reggie Brown and members of the NIC's Perception Management Threat Panel; you did great work; hopefully someone will listen and learn. Special thanks to Mr. Frank Jones and the professionals within ASD-SOLIC for providing me the opportunity to experience strategic reality first hand. Thanks to COL (R) Tom Timmes, the U.S. government's premiere functional expert and historian on psychological and influence operations, for his knowledge and tutelage on the interagency process. Finally, I owe a special dept of gratitude to my wife Janet for putting up with my idiosyncrasies, terrible work hours and months deployed away from home.



## STRATEGIC INFLUENCE – THE INFORMATION CONNECTION

### INTRODUCTION

There is a battle in progress that is far subtler than strategic bombing missions, commando direct action raids against Al Qa 'ida camps or the partisan political wrangling connected to America's global war on terrorism. This battle is the "war of the words," which is designed to capture the minds of the world's citizenry, influence their attitudes and behaviors and produce responses favorable to U.S. policy. In this world of globalization and instantaneous data dissemination, it is often said the human mind "has no firewall."<sup>1</sup> But in reality, there is a wall dividing the perceptions and beliefs of the West verses those of emerging nations, failing states and the radical Islamists from the Middle East/North Africa, Southwest Asia and the Pacific. America is losing this "war of the words" because of our overdependence on technology, inability or interest to understand the ethnic driving forces and motivations of non-western populations and cultures, and our domestic culture of political correctness. These shortfalls, coupled with a consensus-based, lethargic governmental process have resulted in ineffective governmental guidelines and "cookie-cutting" procedures that favor short-term, politically acceptable techniques and informational responses.

American leaders, in concert with our British allies, are working with the United Nations to develop and maintain favorable attitudes abroad concerning U.S. and coalition military actions in Afghanistan and other parts of the world. Concurrently, the U.S. government is attempting to execute other national priorities such as potential regime change and disarmament in Iraq and a National Missile Defense System as well as minimize potential hostilities on the Korean peninsula simultaneously. But does our government have the political will and possess the informational capability to develop, coordinate, synchronize and then explain our national strategy to the world with favorable results, much less enter into an adversary's information decision cycle to minimize hostile acts against the United States?

This paper will address and compare historical and current informational and influence programs; examine the structures and inter-governmental approaches to strategic influence; and argue that their enduring values may not remain valid. It will conclude by discussing the derivative of strategic influence for the future.

### BACKGROUND

Strategic influence operations have historically been a government's ability to further its national strategic goals and objectives internationally through an integrated, synchronized and

Interagency-vetted information campaign using the tools of public diplomacy, public affairs and international Military Information (DoD Psychological Operations) as its media. This has been undertaken within the framework of the National Security Council and the Departments of Defense and State. In our American form of democracy, strategic influence is and will remain the inherent responsibility of the President of the United States and his appointed cabinet to craft and execute the “U.S. Grand Strategy” directed at influencing foreign target audiences. This “Grand Strategy” is a combination of domestic and international objectives designed to accomplish both short and long-term policy objectives.

Since the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 (9-11), the United States has had to restructure its global strategy, transitioning to a “capabilities based approach.”<sup>2</sup> Most significantly, the previous U.S. threat based strategy, has proved lacking due to the asymmetric threats posed by non-state actors who have demonstrated and continue to demonstrate that traditional diplomatic means and previously valued methods of deterrence are ineffective<sup>3</sup> in ensuring American and allied security. In assessing our capabilities, the National Intelligence Community (NIC) and principally, Department of State’s Office of Strategic Communication (OSC), has determined that the U.S. is severely lacking in the area of information and influence operations with respect to three major areas: its ability to develop systematic informational approaches with central control and functional leadership; its ability to integrate technological innovations within government; and a dedicated interagency analytical structure or fusion cell with a dissemination capability.

Most importantly, the USG lacks the political will to establish a single organization designed to serve as the conduit for USG informational policy development and dissemination within the globalized environment. These critical shortfalls have become more visible since 9-11 and the USG is attempting to correct these weaknesses through bold interagency coordination efforts and the establishment of a central communication mechanism. The nexus for these initiatives is the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee (SCPCC) within the National Security Council system, which tasked with analyzing and developing proactive a series of programmatic responses in support of the President's policies.

In the 2002 National Security Strategy, President Bush highlighted that “the gravest threat our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology.”<sup>4</sup> (WAYS) As the interagency process restructures and organizes for the War on Terrorism, it is essential that the USG review its capabilities and establish a doctrinal approach for information development and dissemination. Presently, the SCPCC has established a combined fusion cell which integrates various agencies’ (State, Defense, CIA, USAID) analytical capabilities to conduct appropriate

levels of target audience analysis prior to campaign and product development. The fusion cell is chartered to develop both short and long-term informational based programs in support of current policy. These product based programs are then integrated into a synchronized informational strategy where key leaders provide information to domestic and foreign target audiences utilizing full spectrum media. The key to success for future informational programs will be its analytical basis using a metric based approach for measuring of effectiveness both domestically and abroad.

The U.S. government has had limited strategic and operational informational successes in promoting its policies on the War on Terrorism internationally. Those successes it has had have been when the interagency was able to completely integrate policy goals and objectives into a single information campaign, collectively executed within a specific timeline. While emphasis is being placed on establishing an operational capability within the SCPC and Office of Global Communication-Coalition Information Center (OGC-CIC), certain key communicators within the interagency are still satisfied with the "status quo" and are reluctant to give up their limited power base. During the President's State of the Union address on 3 February 2003, he highlighted specific funding which should address some of the shortfalls mentioned in this paper. One of the essential steps mentioned was allocating \$3.384 billion to be used for such programs as hiring additional personnel, improving information technology and additional funding for educational and cultural exchange programs. Additionally, \$565.5 million will be allocated to the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), including \$30 million to initiate a new Arabic-language satellite TV network to counter the effects of Al Jazeera and other Islamic media.

The following sections will provide a historical perspective of information procedures within the USG, discuss control mechanisms and then touch upon current informational initiatives.

### **HISTORICAL ATTEMPTS AT NATIONAL-LEVEL INFORMATION COORDINATION**

Between World War I and 1986, there were, at least six instances where the USG created national level Information or Influence type committees. "Communicators, unlike most military leaders, understood World War I was a totally new mechanized, mass conflict, requiring the use of mass communications to succeed. Populations were mobilized and, "taught" to hate the enemy, and respond emotionally to atrocities, even if invented or exaggerated. Domestic and international opinion would be molded following the declaration of war in April 1917; President Woodrow Wilson authorized the Committee of Public Information, more popularly known as the

Creel Committee for its leader George Creel. Creel's inflammatory efforts and propagandizing rhetoric reshaped American public opinion on Germany, transforming a once highly respected ethnic group into one to be feared, and reviled. Creel's committee used every means of communications available to shape opinion, as well as to control, centralize, and even censor information (1917-1919). The committee's objectives were to encourage loyalty and unity at home while promoting understanding and support of U.S. foreign policy objectives abroad. To accomplish its objectives, the Committee established "country bureaus" to focus its efforts and created numerous overseas offices to distribute literature and audio/visual products. The Committee employed motion pictures, sponsored tours, held mass rallies, and distributed millions of posters, leaflets, newspapers and sign boards. The most famous domestic product of the Creel committee's work was the "four-minute men" program which generated thousands of speeches in public theaters, schools and various organizations across the U.S. reaching an audience in excess of 314 million.<sup>5</sup> The "four minute men" was a series of politically designed speeches and addresses which were designed to garner favorable public opinion and could be completed in four minutes. Criticism of the committee's and Wilson's tactics may be justified, but these techniques proved highly effective in galvanizing forces to defeat the enemy."<sup>6</sup>

In 1919, with the end of World War I and the dissolution of the Creel Committee, the first and most ambitious attempt to develop a national security coordination system was proposed by Franklin D. Roosevelt, then Secretary of the Navy. The proposal met a quick death due to bureaucratic infighting and lack of "perceived need" in a time of peace.

Shortly before Pearl Harbor, now President Roosevelt established the Office of Coordinator of Information (COI) and designated Colonel William Donovan as its first director. The COI was responsible for espionage, propaganda and subversion. Colonel Donovan established two separate divisions for his organization: Research and Analysis and Foreign Information Service (FIS). The FIS was a psychological warfare division charged with explaining the objectives and goals of the United States throughout the world with the exception of Latin America. FIS used information from the wire services on its eleven commercial short-wave radio stations and broadcasted over 300 programs per week into Europe and Asia. In June 1942, the president by executive order dissolved the COI and created the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Major responsibility for overt psychological warfare shifted to OWI (which later became the United States Information Agency), while responsibility for covert psychological warfare belonged to the OSS – under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the war's end, a newly established interagency

organization, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee became responsible for psychological warfare policy and planning for peacetime and wartime.<sup>7</sup>

Following WW II, with U.S. national strategy transitioning to containment of the Soviet Union, the USG established three overlapping and similar national level boards and Committees that addressed foreign information programs and psychological planning as an outgrowth of the Cold War in general and the Korean War in particular. The first, the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee, was established by NSC59/1 in March 1950; the second was the Psychological Strategy Board created by executive order in April 1951 and headed by Mr. Gordon Gray, former Secretary of the Army; and the third was the Operations Coordinating Board which was established by executive order in September 1953 and continued until 1961. All three interagency organizations were responsible for the formulation of policies and plans for a USG information program directed at foreign governments in time of peace and the formulation of policies for a national-level psychological warfare program during peace, crisis, and the initial stages of war.<sup>8</sup>

The conflict in Vietnam spawned no less than four national level psychological operations committees between 1955 and 1972, but the last instance was the short-lived Psychological Operations Committee created in July 1986 by the NSC pursuant to NSDD 130. The committee was responsible for establishing national psychological operations (PSYOP) guidelines and to define the roles and relationships of the agencies involved. The committee ceased meeting in early 1987.<sup>9</sup>

## **CONTROL OF THE INFORMATIONAL ENVIRONMENT**

Control of the informational environment at the strategic level has always been the critical requirement for our national leaders. These efforts underscore all others in importance at the domestic level and internationally during time of crisis. Various administrations have attempted to consolidate strategic information into a concise and executable strategy through various presidential directives, National Security Decision Directives (NSDD's), Presidential Decision Directives (PDD's) and most recently, National Security Presidential Directives (NSPD's). Numerous government entities, to include the White House (Executive Office of the President – EOP), National Security Council (NSC), Departments of State, Defense, Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and most recently, the White House's Office of Global Communication (OGC) and Homeland Security, have attempted to establish mechanisms to develop, coordinate, synchronize and execute a proactive multi-dimensional information capability,<sup>10</sup> but to no avail.

As the government restructures, it is essential that we review all previous practices, current directives and capabilities concerning the USG's ability to conduct influence operations across the informational spectrum. Primacy of effort must be directed towards effective management within the interagency process, and thereby affect and shape the international information environment to support the U.S. national strategy for the War on Terrorism and beyond.

## **POLITICAL REALITIES AND CURRENT INITIATIVES**

The U.S. government consists of over forty separate and independent bureaus and agencies; each with separate charters, budgets, agendas, personalities and unique bureaucratic cultures. These agencies often possess separate and distinct educational and training requirements, promotion criteria for advancement, and, with the exception of the Department of Defense, none attempt to formally initiate their personnel into the interagency process through advanced schooling and assignments.

Is it naive to believe that the U.S. government is incapable of executing an interagency vetted influence campaign? Is it possible, that the USG is not effective due to long standing bureaucratic ineptitudes, political correctness, historic jealousy or trivial differences between appointed officials? Throughout the history of our government, key or select communicators have always retained levels of influence not necessarily equal to their rank or position within institutions. These select individuals will continue to shape the informational environment to either the advancement or detriment of our policies until a formalized process is developed, where analysis is fully considered and integrated throughout the interagency and then executed collectively.

The combination of information development and distribution, social anthropological analysis, technological innovations, and influence present our nation it's most challenging mission in decades. Since 9-11 we face a paradigm shift, requiring a restructuring of our government's ability to analyze and develop a grand strategy, and then concretize that strategy into concepts and policies designed to deal with the asymmetric challenges presented to us during this time of crisis. Numerous USG studies, directives and proposed legislation such as the 2001 Defense Science Board Task Force Report on Managed Information Dissemination, Congressional proposals such as the Hyde-Lantos bill to provide the U.S. government with an enhanced strategic information and public diplomacy capability, DoD's formation and dissolution the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) and previously initiated and presently revalidated

presidential directives (e.g.,PDD-68, International Public Information) continue to be inadequately supported.

The following sections will provide an overview concerning the development of the interagency process and briefly discuss current USG organizations and initiatives presently operating today.

## **NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

During World War II, President Roosevelt still controlled the information flow and policy development through ad hoc organizations and working groups for policy coordination. The Congress identified this organizational shortfall and imposed upon President Truman by enacting the National Security Act, a coordination mechanism designed to assist the President in quickly addressing foreign and domestic national security issues.

“There is hereby established a council to be known as the National Security Council...the function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security.”<sup>1</sup>

This act established two separate and distinct entities, the National Security Council and the Department of Defense. The Council's mission was to permanently synchronize and coordinate the USG's national defense and foreign affairs policies through the use of the elements of national power. While the National Security Council has coordinated policy and provided various levels of oversight, it has never been granted full authority to direct policy independently.

Presently, the National Security Council system consists of the NSC, the Principals Committee (consisting of the National Security Advisor, Secretaries of Defense, State and Treasury, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and most recently, the Director, Homeland Security), the Deputies Committee (includes the deputies fore mentioned senior officials he feels required for the DC and the Deputy Attorney General, Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, Deputy Chief of Staff to the President for Policy, Chief of Staff to the Vice President and the Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs), six regional policy coordinating committees, and eleven functional policy coordinating committees. Most recently, the Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee was formed on 15 September of 2002,. Under the National Security Presidential

Directive -1, each Policy Coordinating Committee will be chaired by an official of Under or Assistant Secretary Rank.

Within all organizations of the NSC system and primarily the Policy Coordinating Committees, the greatest weakness lies in the system's ability to routinely transfer and coordinate information as well as develop a synchronized influence program. While a department or agency may be assigned to chair a Policy Coordinating Committee, it possesses no tasking authority over the interagency or its resources for the accomplishment of his mission. Simultaneously, the chair may also possess neither tasking nor directive authority within his own organization. The lack of central tasking authority has always presented the greatest challenge for policy implementation. Numerous failures or ineffective actions have occurred when the chair is not capable of gaining or maintaining consensus among the interagency participants. Secondly, the chair must understand those capabilities internal to the various bureaus and capitalize on their "intra-agency" strengths and weaknesses.

### **INTERAGENCY PROCESS**

The interagency process provides a means to facilitate policy coordination and development. "The interagency process is designed to ensure that information and options are developed and passed up the line and that decisions and guidance are passed back down to staffs which must write orders and oversee their execution."<sup>12</sup>

Within the U.S. government, the interagency process is a living organism, one which possesses no firm structure or doctrine and occasionally consumes its participants. The process itself is a direct reflection of the President, is emphasis, that is, his level of trust and comfort with the political appointees and his philosophy on government. Under each administration, governmental agencies are provided general guidance through directives (e.g., PDDs, NSPDs) as to how the President would like national security policy to be conducted. These documents establish basic guidelines for agency interoperability on specific subjects, but may fail to provide lead actors with interagency tasking authority and resources to accomplish the mission. Depending on the priority identified by senior leaders or by the placement of key personnel in charge of interagency working groups, individual agencies may not provide support to the process. Some agencies may not deem it to participate fully in the interagency process or key agencies may be left out completely due to the lead organization's lack of understanding of the value various agencies can contribute.

Within the interagency process, the NSC senior directors can be tasked by the National Security Advisor, Principals Committee (PC) or the Deputies Committee (DC) to establish

exploratory working groups based on regional orientation or specific subjects such as terrorism, human rights or non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction/Effects (WMD/E). Based on the group findings and importance, the PC/DC can elect to establish a Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) with a functional lead identified in accordance with NSPD 1<sup>13</sup>.

### **INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC INFORMATION (IPI)**

Within NSPD 1 was signed by President Bush, he revalidated and maintained select PDD's from the previous administration, one of which was PDD-68, International Public Information (IPI) and the organizations formal structure it created. One of the organizations created was the IPI Secretariat which was established on April 30th 1999, and which continues as PDD-68 has been revalidated under NSPD-1. The premise for the PDD was that dramatic changes in the global information environment (GIE) required the USG to implement a more deliberate and well-developed international public information strategy in promoting our American values and interests.

IPI activities resulting from the PDD were undertaken to address only foreign target audiences because of Smith/Mundt Act restrictions as well as its informational and influence programs were designed to truthfully depict USG foreign policy. These activities were designed to enhance USG information efforts within the interagency, multilaterally and with NGOs while neither misleading nor compromising the integrity or independence of non-governmental organizations. Within its charter, the IPI Secretariat's mission statement required it to "improve our ability to coordinate independent public diplomacy, public affairs, and overt International Military Information (IMI) efforts, and to ensure that they are more successfully integrated into foreign and national security policy-making."<sup>14</sup>

Before to the PDD was signed by President Clinton, significant interagency turf battles were conducted to determine who would be the proponent for this Secretariat and maintain overall control and influence of its activities. Initially, IPI was to be placed under the NSC due to the Clinton administration's philosophy of the NSC being more operational in nature. However, during a series of PC and DC meetings, it was determined that the Department of State should be the lead agency since USIA had been dissolved and its personnel and responsibilities were incorporated into State. Initially, IPI activities were placed under the functional control of the International Operations Bureau, but then were transferred to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs for direct control and resourcing.

Initially, State was less than enthusiastic about filling the required slots in the Secretariat and providing resources to this organization primarily because of internal conflicts and

philosophical differences between appointed officials even though an Interagency Working Group (IWG) at the NSC was established to execute the PDD. Eventually, State and DoD came to a joint agreement on IPI and allocated personnel and resources to the Secretariat in August 1999.

The five members of the Secretariat, augmented by personnel from ASD/SOLIC and the Joint Staff were immediately thrown into a diplomatic crisis and began facilitating interagency efforts to develop and execute a vetted influence campaign directed against Slobodan Milosevic and his government within the Former Yugoslavian Republic (FYR). This influence campaign was designed to destabilize his regime and promote democracy and free elections within the FYR. Numerous interagency activities were planned and coordinated to include establishing the "Ring Around Serbia" where State, DoD, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) and other USG government agencies established a ring of independent news radio stations within the adjacent countries. This "ring" provided the FYR citizens with unbiased news and factual information on international activities. Additionally, a series of "internet cafes" were funded by the IWG and established for anti-Miloshavic and pro-democracy supporters throughout the region to promote democratic values and support electoral reform within the region. A series of FYR key communicators were identified and provided equipment and passwords to protected IIP websites where they could download the most current information of USG and western policy pronouncements against Milosevic and disseminate it to local audiences.

Capitalizing on these early achievements, a formalized series of IPI interagency templates were developed for conducting influence campaigns. These templates included time sequencing for Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO), mechanisms to coordinate and synchronize international public diplomacy and public affairs events, and a process to integrate U.S. government and non-governmental programs and activities in support of USG actions and objectives. Subsequent IPI facilitated information events were successful and because of this, IPI was immediately tasked by various NSC staff directorates to assist in the conduct of additional USG information programs. These programs crossed over both functional and regional equities and encompassed operations which included peacekeeping/peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, immigration control, counter-drug, counter-terrorism, and refugee/detainee operations. IPI worked within and facilitated several regional IWGs, assisted in the development and execution of USG-directed counter-propaganda and counter-hostile information campaigns and served as members in the National Intelligence Community (NIC) sponsored Perception Management Threat Panel (PMTP).

As the success and utility of the IPI Secretariat spread throughout the interagency, it became the designated NSC IWG facilitator for the Serbian War Crimes Tribunal and the West African Peace Initiatives program. Using its experience and improved methodology, the Secretariat developed with appropriate funding and executed a US/UK bi-lateral influence campaign within West Africa to support efforts of the United Nations and UNAMSIL. Specifically, these influence programs were designed to magnify and synchronize UN and NGO sponsored humanitarian initiatives, promote the Disarmament, Demobilization Reintegration (DDR) process. Concurrently, IPI conducted a series of host nation and NGO coordinated multi-media informational programs that explained and promoted current USG and international policies using both traditional and non-traditional dissemination methods. Simultaneously, IPI developed and conducted a series of counter-disinformation programs against Liberia's President Charles Taylor and the criminal insurgent group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Overall, the influence campaign was very successful. To date, the UN sponsored War Crimes Tribunal is being conducted within Sierra Leone and Guinea; over 50,000 insurgents surrendered to their West African governments and were integrated into the DDR process; and Charles Taylor and the RUF's power and influence has been minimized in the region and internationally.

After the attack on 9-11, the Department of State has not fully capitalized on the proven capabilities of the IPI Secretariat and its methodology. Previous lessons learned have been ignored and IPI's ability to influence activities within the interagency and around the world may have been lost. IPI continues to be part of State's Office of Strategic Communications (OSC), and will now serve as the secretariat for the NSC's Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee (SCPCC). The IPI Secretariat continues to function, but the NSC and DoS need to capitalize on its personnel's experience and interagency communication methodology and reinforce its successes with adequate personnel and resources to effectively execute America's message.

#### **OFFICE OF STRATEGIC INFLUENCE (OSI)**

"If you know the enemy and know yourself; you need not fear the results in a hundred battles. If you know yourself, and not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle."<sup>15</sup>

—Sun Tzu

While the Office of Strategic Influence was primarily a DoD initiative, and should normally fall under the Department of Defense, it is key to mention it within the confines of the interagency because the history of the organization and the actions which occurred prior to OSI being dissolved may occur again.

After 9-11, international sympathy was expressed for the innocent civilian loss of life, but world opinion concerning the United States, primarily from within the Muslim world, was at its lowest level in measurable history. In numerous governmental and independent surveys conducted, the consensus from the Muslim “man on the street” was that the U.S. deserved to be “knocked off their pedestal” because of its pro-Israeli and anti-Palestinian/Arab policies. How could this have happened, why do they hate us and what we can do to change these perceptions became the buzz of the “Beltway?”

For weeks following the terrorist attacks on 9-11, the interagency process was in chaos and significant disagreements existed as to the informational mechanisms required, but most importantly, how to respond. Every government agency was scrambling, each had its own concept or approach for responding to the crisis, and in many cases key government agencies, working unilaterally, would have more than one approach, all uncoordinated at the intra-agency and interagency level.

Key individuals within DoD and the USG understood the asymmetric threats directed against the United States, and the potential long-term implications of not only responding to the hostile foreign information environment, but the requirement to influence it through proactive informational programs and positive reinforcing actions. In November 2001, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) stood up the Office of Strategic Influence under the direct supervision of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD-P). OSI was designed to provide DoD with a series of information policy options and programs that conducted worldwide and target specific analysis and opinion polls. OSI was also tasked to initiate programs that countered hostile propaganda, misinformation and disinformation directed against the United States and its allies from foreign sources. The organization was composed of civilian and military personnel with interagency, informational, technological and regional expertise and placed under the direction of Brigadier General Simon P. Worden, a highly experienced influence specialist, astro-scientist and technologist from USSPACECOM.

From its inception, OSI did not have to contend with normal bureaucratic growth pains. Its organization had a robust operational budget, and its activities and programs were integrated and vetted in the interagency at the Under and Assistant Secretary level. The organization, working closely with the multiple government agencies developed new concepts for, and

capitalized on, ongoing informational programs that promoted democratic values and initiatives, supported and highlighted international educational reform programs. It also participated in the conduct of international surveys to determine the root cause and effect for international perceptions of hate and disdain directed against the United States.

Informed speculation has it that while OSI was highly successful in determining its baseline mission requirement against the GWOT and beginning to execute pro-US influence programs abroad, it was not capable of protecting itself from political “rice bowl” issues and petty jealousies. When a series of coordinated press releases with intentionally leading disinformation hit the media on the February 20, 2002, a media feeding frenzy against OSI ensued. DoD decided to close the office rather than counter the internally spread disinformation and take corrective actions to eliminate leaks and security violations.

Since OSI was dissolved, no other organization within the interagency has attempted to identify, coordinate, synchronize and conduct long-term, analytically based, influence programs in support of the U.S. government in the global environment.

#### **BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS (BBG)**

The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) is an independent organization authorized “to direct and supervise” all civilian broadcasting activities of the U.S. Government.<sup>16</sup> The BBG views this independence as “an embrace of the idea that all of our broadcasted are journalists” and a reaffirmation of broadcasting’s role “as a voice of human rights and democratic freedoms with new global challenges and priorities to address.”<sup>17</sup> Components of the BBG include the federally funded International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), Voice of America (VOA), Office of Cuba Broadcasting (Radio and TV Marti), WORLDNET Television and administration of appropriated funds for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and Radio Free Afghanistan (RFA). Current BBG program funds exceed \$450 million in 2002. Its multiple programs are transmitted in sixty-one languages to an estimated audience of over 100 million persons throughout the world.

When it was part of USIA, the BBG leadership worked closely with Congress to design the International Broadcasting Act of 1994 (IBA) to include and provide the following:

1. NEWS WHICH IS CONSISTENTLY RELIABLE AND AUTHORITATIVE, ACCURATE, OBJECTIVE, AND COMPREHENSIVE;
2. A BALANCED AND COMPREHENSIVE PROJECTION OF THE UNITED STATES THOUGHT AND INSTITUTIONS, REFLECTING THE DIVERSITY OF THE UNITED STATES CULTURE AND SOCIETY;
3. CLEAR AND EFFECTIVE PRESENTATION OF THE POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND RESPONSIBLE DISCUSSION AND OPINION ON THOSE POLICIES;
4. PROGRAMMING TO MEET NEEDS WHICH REMAIN UNSERVED BY THE TOTALITY OF MEDIA VOICES AVAILABLE TO THE PEOPLE OF CERTAIN NATIONS;
5. INFORMATION ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN EACH SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE WORLD;
6. A VARIETY OF OPINIONS AND VOICE WITHIN PARTICULAR NATIONS AND REGIONS PREVENTED BY CENSORSHIP OR REPRESSIONS FROM SPEAKING TO THEIR FELLOW COUNTRYMEN;
7. RELIABLE RESEARCH CAPACITY TO MEET CRITERIA UNDER THIS SECTION;
8. ADEQUATE TRANSMITTER AND RELAY CAPACITY TO SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED IN THIS SECTION; AND
9. TRAINING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENT INDIGENOUS MEDIA THROUGH GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND PRIVATE UNITED STATES ENTITIES.

FIG. 1 INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING ACT OF 1994, PUBLIC LAW 103-236, SECTION 303

The independence the BBG gained from the 1994 legislation has caused considerable confusion and consternation among the interagency members responsible for influence and strategic information. While its goals and objectives are outlined in the IBA of 1994, the present organization has deviated from its statutory mission through the personal interpretations by a small body of its membership. These actions have caused the organization to be compelled to appear before Congress and explain its program of activities and how they are developed, its internal quality control mechanisms and approval mechanisms utilized prior to dissemination of product and most importantly, its justification for continued existence.

Most of the problems associated with the IBA have been removed, but the underlying reason for confusion still exists. There is not a lead agency with tasking authority that develops the U.S strategy for promoting and magnifying the government's goals and objectives of

fostering democratic principles worldwide and providing international target audiences with truthful and factual information on U.S. activities. Additionally, there is not an interagency organization that conducts appropriate target audience analysis while countering hostile disinformation, misinformation and hostile propaganda.

Fundamental to all these requirements is the question of how the BBG is related to and integrated with national security strategies and foreign policy. While credibility of information, journalistic integrity and accurate reporting are important for international acceptance, primacy of effort should be directed towards target audiences, types of languages to broadcast in, length of broadcast, dissemination techniques, area of coverage and measurements of effectiveness used to determine format and process.

Simultaneously, the major problem which must be solved lies in the area of U.S. policy and law: who decides how and when the broadcasting assets are utilized during times of crisis, and how to define the appropriate relationships between the BBG, and the Departments of State and Defense, and other U.S. national security agencies.<sup>18</sup> The BBG has played a crucial role in disseminating the U.S. message to denied countries and target audiences where freedom of information is restricted. This organization faces numerous difficult choices if it's going to remain a key entity within the USG influence arena for the 21st century. The statutory authority under which it presently operates degrades the U.S. international broadcasting potential and limits its effectiveness for future influence activities. These shortfalls lie within the parameters of a interagency vetted information program where long-term, sustained and synchronized operations are required to influence international target audiences using traditional mediums and advanced technologies including internet based radio and direct broadcast satellites.

#### **STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION POLICY COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SCPCC)**

The Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee, in accordance with NSPD-1, was established on 10 September 2002 with the specific mission coordinating all U.S. informational policies and programs through an NSC directed interagency medium. This group is designed to foster positive international and domestic public opinion on current USG strategic objectives and influence foreign audiences in ways favorable to USG goals and objectives.<sup>19</sup>

The Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee is co-chaired by the Department of State's Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and a the Special Assistant to the President for Democracy, Human Rights and International Operations. Its membership will consist of the chair of the Combating Terrorism Information Strategy PCC, the Deputy Assistant to the President and Counselor to the National Security Advisor for

Communications, and the Director, White House of Global Communications. Relevant agencies will be represented at the Assistant Secretary level with the capability to expand or contract as required<sup>20</sup>. The PCC possesses IA tasking authority for information as well as analytical capabilities required to develop future influence plans through the IPI Secretariat which is now integrated into State's Office of Strategic Communication (OSC). Its primary mission will be to coordinate domestic and foreign releases and act as the single point of contact for USG information programs. Subsequently, this PCC is responsible for: coordinating interagency support for international broadcasting, foreign information programs, and public diplomacy; and promoting the development of strategic communications capabilities throughout government.<sup>21</sup> Concurrently with the SCPCC structure, the OSC is tasked to develop and disseminate of a National Information Strategy (NIS) and are responsible for analyzing and responding to hostile propaganda and dis/misinformation directed against the USG.

The PCC will utilize the IPI Secretariat as its principal coordinating mechanism to facilitate the interagency process. Even though the PCC was activated on 10 September 2002, it has only held three meetings. Additionally, its members and potential interagency participants have not been fully utilized. As with any PCC, the President or his agent of Influence will have to tell the interagency that informational programs and its secondary effects are critical to the successful conduct of influence activities throughout the world. Hopefully, in the near-term, key communicators will understand the implications and act accordingly.

#### **DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY**

“But if the watchman sees the sword coming and fails to blow the warning trumpet...I will hold the watchman responsible...”

—Ezekiel 33:6

The Department of State, one of America's oldest and most important instruments of statecraft is an antiquated agency whose level of performance and effectiveness has been questioned by numerous administrations and members of Congress. While this organization has been led by some of our greatest leaders and diplomats, the rank and file consider themselves part of an elite organization within the U.S. government and are generally xenophobic when dealing outside of their bureaus. The Department is broken down into multiple areas of specialization, but in actuality is organized into two main areas of responsibility; regional and functional bureaus. These two separate entities also include a series of internal struggles between functional areas called cones (e.g., political, economic, counselor affairs, public diplomacy) or Foreign Service (FS) specialties. The State Department

is the government agency responsible for the conduct of diplomatic activities worldwide, but this paper will only concentrate on its public diplomacy responsibility.

The Reagan administration in 1983 produced the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) -77, which defined public diplomacy as those actions of the U.S. government designed to generate support among foreign audiences for our national security objectives. While State remains the lead for public diplomacy efforts worldwide, other government agencies to include the Departments of Defense, Commerce, Transportation, Justice, Education and USAID conduct global activities with a significant public diplomacy impact, but the activities are usually uncoordinated and unsynchronized with DoS for maximum effect.

The United States Information Agency (USIA) had successfully told "America's Story," for almost 50 years, deftly adapting each new successive technological advance in broadcasting, satellite communication, transportation, and finally, computers and the internet. More than two generations of people around the world learned about the United States through USIA libraries, broadcasts, exhibits and publications and cultural exchanges. "During the Cold War, USIA's diplomacy of information and ideas penetrated the Iron Curtain and projected America's message of freedom to audiences in both developing and industrial societies."<sup>22</sup> USIA, created in 1953, was the brainchild of the Eisenhower administration. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, a stubborn and traditional diplomat who wanted to divorce "information" programs from the department's diplomatic efforts. The world has experienced revolutionary changes since 1953, and the requirement to update diplomatic techniques has only increased due to the advent of technological achievements and globalization. Nonetheless, in October 1999, USIA was integrated into the Department of State as part of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, but its absence is being critically felt throughout the world.

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright declared at the integration ceremony, "the full integration of public diplomacy into American foreign policy will make it more agile and open and more convincing to the rest of the world."<sup>23</sup> Her statements were simultaneously being countered by John Reinhardt, a senior USIA official who stated: "There is no one in this room who doesn't approach this merger with trepidation. We fear that public diplomacy will be swallowed and destroyed by the State Department, which practices formal diplomacy"<sup>24</sup> His fears have proven true, and to the detriment of public diplomacy, US foreign policy and international relations.

First, one must understand that the elimination of USIA was a political concession by the Clinton Administration to Senator Jesse Helms who wanted to downsize government and thought the consolidation of USIA into DoS was a positive step. USIA was independent from

the State Department, and concentrated on long-term information, educational and cultural programs at the strategic level. Its members, while assigned to U.S. embassies, were somewhat independent from the “Country Team” since they possessed their own budgets, and conducted both strategic and regional information program. Most importantly, the final approval for their programs was the director of USIA and not the U.S. Ambassador or Secretary of State. USIA also controlled all USG strategic dissemination assets and produced government publications that told the “American Story.” After the Cold War, USIA became an easy target for elimination because it lacked a domestic constituency since its focus was solely on foreign target audiences.

Prior to the consolidation, USIA controlled and developed radio and television programs charged with telling America’s story to foreign audiences. When Congress merged the U.S. Information Agency with the Department of State, it also established the Broadcasting Board of Governors as an independent entity, which only furthered confused the direction and execution of public diplomacy strategy, programs and activities. The State Department integrated the majority of former USIA into the Office of International Information Programs (IIP) and dispersed the remainder of PD personnel into regional and functional bureaus where they became supporting members. While the integration may have been conceptually valid, the application and rationale behind its focus is totally unjustified and the capability that USIA had to conduct long-term public diplomacy activities has been greatly reduced and not replicated.

### **INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS (IIP)**

The Office of International Information Programs (IIP) is one of three entities reporting to the Department of State’s Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The others are the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and the Bureau of Public Affairs, both administered by Assistant Secretaries. IIP is the supposed successor to the United States Information Agency, but is a replacement with limited public diplomacy resources, personnel and influence within the Department of State.

IIP is presently in its eighth year of existence within the Department of State. It continues in its attempt to become an innovative, aggressive organization which produces vital public diplomacy programs and products for the USG. Nonetheless, during the reorganization, its responsibilities and activities were splintered between the State Department and other government agencies and it has lost the holistic approach it needs for executing public diplomacy.

In addition to disbanding USIA, numerous key areas of strategic influence have been left neglected or partially split between agencies. The Foreign Press Center has been transferred to State's Bureau of Public Affairs, which also assumed responsibility for the former WORLDNET interactive television productions, now labeled American Embassy TV<sup>25</sup> In addition to losing this key asset and influence node, responsibility for their state-of-the-art printing plant in Manila has been transferred to State's Office of Administration thereby greatly reducing overall efficiency of strategic dissemination assets.

IIP operates with an annual budget of 40 million and a staff of 279, which is considerably smaller than the over 600-person staff of its predecessor a decade ago.<sup>26</sup> Any student of bureaucracy fully understands that your capacity is lessened when your organization loses control of dedicated functional assets designed to support its primary mission, and that bureaucratic requirements significantly increase when required to task assets outside of an organization. Nonetheless, the spirit of USIA continues to exist within IIP and the organization has successfully enhanced the internet capability within the U.S. government, providing the most comprehensive record of American foreign policy or of the U.S. Government's public record in the last decade.

IIP's current programs, products and services include: strategic planning where both short and long-term public diplomacy strategies are designed to support State Department diplomatic initiatives; support the International Public Information Secretariat chartered by PDD-68 and revalidated by NSPD 1; and develop and execute a series of multi-language web sites (usinfo.state.gov) where information is provided on a wide variety of major policy issues – such as the War on Terrorism, the treatment of detainees, environmental regulations and initiatives in five languages, which are updated daily. It also conducts speaker programs where functional experts from the United State travel abroad and meet with foreign officials, media, academic, religious or other elites to address specific areas identified by the country team. Through enhanced technology, it provides Information Resource Centers (IRC) to over 170 countries worldwide. The IRCS are the successor to the USIA open shelf American libraries abroad. They are located at the American Center and use computer and digital technology to disseminate information to key audiences, train mission staff and mine electronic data bases.

Since the State-USIA consolidation, IIP's public diplomacy initiatives have had mixed results. While State respects the technological capabilities provided to them from IIP and understands the requirements for immediacy of dissemination, the greatest shortfall is the lack of an appreciation for IIP capabilities. These neglected capabilities include: long-term

information policy development, multi-media product production and non-computer dissemination, and non-diplomatic, face-to-face meetings at the American centers.

## **DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

The real target in war is the mind of the enemy commander, not the bodies of his troops.

—Captain Sir Basil Liddel Hart,  
Thoughts on War, 1944

During the past ten years, the Department of Defense has attempted to define information operations (IO), organize forces, and develop acceptable and executable intra- and inter-service doctrine that incorporates and makes operational the functions constituting IO – Psychological Operations (PSYOPs), Computer-Network Attack/Defense (CNA/CND), Electronic Warfare (EW), Operational Security (OPSEC), Physical Destruction and Deception Operations<sup>27</sup> as well as connections to Public Affairs and Civil Affairs.

## **INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO)**

IO has different meanings for different government agencies, but most importantly it even differs between services within DOD. Presently each service has its own manual pertaining to IO which includes control and integration, and currently the joint doctrine writers are rewording its definition to one of consensus, which is causing additional confusion. The joint IO goal is to have information superiority: the capability to collect process and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. The current IO organizational structure has caused significant planning, developing, coordination and dissemination problems within DoD due to the approval process for execution. Multiple OSD organizations (e.g., USD-P, ASD-SOLIC, ASD-C3I, ASD-PA) possess specific and/or limited approval authority for portions of IO (CNA/CND, PSYOPs, Deception). Additionally, they have limited influence on the operational and tactical portions (Physical Destruction, Electronic Warfare and OPSEC) because the approval authority is granted to the Combatant Commanders' during time of crisis. There is also ongoing confusion regarding the various DOD organizations such as Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA), Naval Information Warfare Activity (NIWA), Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC), U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) areas of responsibilities and authorities to conduct IO. Additionally, IO is DoD-centric, and its applications limited in the interagency due to required security clearances, fears concerning sovereignty and privacy issues, and required presidential approval for Computer Network Attack (CNA). These

interagency fears are primarily due to a concern about open-ended legal interpretations concerning CNA and the potential for crossing over departmental charters and responsibilities while potentially threatening a country's sovereignty.

The Department of Defense has had limited operational and tactical successes using IO in support of the GWOT in Afghanistan. What successes there were came from the Combined/Joint PSYOP Task Force (CJPOTF), a USSOCOM traditional functional command in support of the Combatant Commander, and not the Joint Information Operations Task Force (JIOTF). The JIOTF is an ad hoc organization, possessing no organic forces or functional staff in the Pentagon, and not under the control of either the Joint Staff or OSD (U/S-Policy)

### **PUBLIC AFFAIRS (PA)**

The Department of Defense maintains very robust and relatively sophisticated influence mechanisms to inform and influence foreign audiences at the operational and tactical levels during peacetime and in war. This organization is headed by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD/PA) with public affairs offices and detachments located throughout the Department of Defense organization. Public affairs organizations usually disseminate information using short-term, action directed strategies for specific missions or periods. They do not incorporate regional analysis of foreign target audiences. Their primary means of communicating with foreign audiences are through this public affairs apparatus and in coordination with Department of Defense's overt military Psychological Operations (PSYOP) programs which expands Department of Defense's ability to reach foreign audiences. DoD PA activities are normally coordinated within the interagency process and should support DoS Public Diplomacy initiatives.

The Department of Defense public affairs activities in support of national strategic goals include traditional public affairs, that is, news releases, public announcements, briefings for foreign and domestic journalists, visits, tours, open houses, guest speaker programs, community relations programs, web site production, and regional command information programs. Additionally, it participates in interagency public affairs forums and the National Security Council's Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee.

The primary purpose of public affairs within Department of Defense is to provide timely, free flowing and accurate information to commanders and staff, military and civilian members, Department of Defense family members and multiple U.S. internal audiences to include Congress and the civilian news media. These efforts are performed under the provisions of the Secretary of Defense's "Principles of Information."<sup>28</sup> Additionally, Public Affairs Officers provide

advice on matters pertaining to international media relations that affect DoD activities as well as missions with allied and friendly nations.

### **PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP), NOT PROPAGANDA**

What is PSYOP and how can it help? This question is best answered by first explaining what PSYOP is not. PSYOP is often confused with propaganda, which is practiced by many of our adversaries, and in some cases, by selected U.S. agencies and politicians. Propaganda has connotations of deception and distortion.<sup>29</sup> Propaganda has no rules and can be a mixture of the truth, incorrectly attributed truth (sometimes referred to as gray propaganda), or pure fiction, purposely misattributed (black propaganda or covert propaganda).<sup>30</sup>

U.S. DoD PSYOP, on the other hand, are actions taken to influence the emotions, attitudes and ultimately the behavior of a target audience.<sup>31</sup> The intent is to influence target audiences in ways that support USG national policy objectives at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.<sup>32</sup> Additionally, DoD PSYOP programs are always based on truth in order to maintain local and regional credibility equal to or greater than that of public affairs activities and local journalists. In many instances, PSYOP products and activities (newspapers, radio broadcasts, leaflets, hand bills and face-to-face communication) become the primary source of trusted information within an area of conflict or disaster. Another definition is provided in the United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement which describes PSYOP as “planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning and, ultimately, the behavior of foreign government organizations, groups and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives.”<sup>33</sup> Some PSYOP principles, applied in all categories of PSYOP (strategic, operational, tactical and consolidation), include a credible message (based on truth), a message chosen and shaped to create a positive impression on the target audience, and a message integrated into the overall military, diplomatic or political program which it supports.<sup>34</sup> All PSYOP products, programs and activities are intelligence-based, that is, an adversary’s nation and culture are studied in detail to determine its vulnerabilities, susceptibilities, key communicators, media and methods of communication used to influence elites and various social and ethnic groups.

### **DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON MANAGED INFORMATION DISSEMINATION**

The Defense Science Board is an advisory committee established to provide independent advice to the Secretary of Defense. This board has been operating for over fifty years and

consists of independent subject matter experts (SMEs) from government, industry and academia. Its purpose is to address independently a specific subject, analyze its perceived weaknesses and strengths from various viewpoints and methodologies and then provide unbiased recommendations to eliminate those deficiencies.

The 2001 Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination is a follow-on effort from the May 2000 DSB study on the "Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Military Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict."<sup>35</sup> The Defense Science Board Task Force members were tasked with determining the requirements and feasibility for a coordinated U.S. information capability.<sup>36</sup> Specifically, the Task Force was asked to examine and compare existing USG strategic information activities and capabilities of the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (DOS). It is interesting to note, that this study was jointly sponsored by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (OASD/SO/LIC) and the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (DOS/R).<sup>37</sup>

The Task Force investigated a wide range of informational issues within the roles and missions of DoD, State, and other government agencies (OGA) such as the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) nonmilitary information dissemination capability (Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Marti) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). During the course of its assessment, it expanded its investigative and analytical work and incorporated informational issues to include policy development, legal and resource limitations, and new and emerging technologies designed to further a coordinated USG information dissemination capability.<sup>38</sup> The Task Force assessment expanded well beyond its original direction and eventually included multimedia corporations (CNN, AOL-Time Warner) as well as international and nongovernmental organizations and queried individuals skilled in leading edge media technology as well as strategic communications techniques and analytical capabilities.

Throughout its investigations, the Defense Science Board's observations and empirical data continuously reflected that the U.S. Government requires a coordinated means to speak with a coherent voice abroad.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

The USG and primarily the foreign affairs community should take a hard look at its informational capability during this period of governmental reorganization and transition. The Executive Branch and Congress should jointly reevaluate the current capacity for our

government to project America's message domestically and abroad, and if required, reestablish a USIA like organization to address these shortfalls.

For the USG to conduct informational programs successfully, it needs to expand its horizons using the SCPCC as the catalyst. Adequate interagency resources to include personnel, facilities and a robust budget are required immediately to support U.S. policy initiatives and objectives. The SCPCC, in collaboration with PCC working groups needs to develop programs at the strategic level that address four target audiences separately: the U.S. domestic audience, coalition or multilateral countries, the international media, and specific target audiences in which the campaigns are being directed against (e.g., Iraq, North Korea, international terrorist and/or criminal organizations). The developmental process alone will require the integration of multiple agencies to support the analytical and technical baselines required. Concurrently, a significant increase in dissemination capability needs to be addressed to ensure the integration of state of the art technology with human factor variables. Our capacity to influence must cover the spectrum from high-tech to no-tech and be executed using both traditional and asymmetric means.

Additionally, the SCPCC needs to establish a U.S. sponsored forum that allows for active participation of coalition partners/allies, United Nations and Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) actors. This multilateral organization should be sub-divided into two parts: one which develops and coordinates internationally vetted strategies and programs which support USG/coalition initiatives; and a second sub-organization which actually deploys within a region and operationalizes this strategy through a multi-faceted information campaign.. These parallel organizations will greatly increase the overall effectiveness of U.S. informational programs by providing on-the-ground truth, increased or enhanced international acceptability through participation and increased legitimacy of action.

With any organizational increase in capability or mission change, adequate funding and manpower will be required. The current restructuring of government in support of Homeland Defense is the perfect venue to incorporate these changes. The ability to influence target audiences and project U.S. information is relatively cheap in comparison to using the other instruments of national power. The personnel and capability is ready; only political emphasis will be required.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

After the events of 9-11, a significant event occurred within the government which greatly affected the USG's ability to develop and send a coherent message abroad: every senior official

and political appointee became an “expert” in information and influence operations. Unfortunately, the interagency process looked like a soccer team composed of eight year olds, and when the whistle blew they all ran towards the ball; this ball was that of strategic information.

Control of the information environment at the strategic level has always been a critical capacity for our government. Not since the Creel Committee (1917-1919) has any government organization controlled both the foreign and domestic media, been funded adequately and had the approval authority to further U.S. national goals and objectives. Since that time, numerous government entities have been established to develop coordinate, synchronize and execute a proactive multi-dimensional information capability, however, the results have been meager. The Presidential authorization of the SCPPC seems to be a move in the right direction, but the interagency needs to cooperate to make it a viable entity.

Knowledge, now more than ever, is power. The U.S. needs to capitalize on its technological and economic advantages and begin selling American democracy again. It worked for over fifty years, and is greatly needed now.

“Good understanding wins favor – Every prudent man acts out of knowledge, but the fool exposes his folly.”

—Proverbs 13:15-16

WORD COUNT = 9,520



## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Timothy L. Thomas, "The Mind Has No Firewall," 22 July 98, Psychotronic War: IW and Bioeffects of DEW, [Infowar.com](http://Infowar.com), "Infowar.com/wmd/wmd\_062298a\_j.html-ssi," accessed 27 July 2001.

<sup>2</sup> Department of Defense, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America (pre-decisional Draft, Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, September 02),2.

<sup>3</sup> William V. Parker, Director, Office of Strategic Communication (DoS), telephonic interview by author, 15 January 2003.

<sup>4</sup> President George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (The White House; Washington D.C., September 2002),ii.

<sup>5</sup> Marion K. Pinsdorf, Woodrow Wilson's public relations: "Wag the Hun," Public Relations Review, Greenwich; (Fall 1999),1.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid,2.

<sup>7</sup> Thomas Timmes, OASD-SOLIC Memorandum, Assessment of International Public Information—Historical Perspective, The Pentagon, August 2001.

<sup>8</sup> President Harry Truman, National Security Council NSC 59/1, (Washington, D.C., March 1950).

<sup>9</sup> Thomas Timmes, OASD-SOLIC Memorandum, Assessment of International Public Information—Historical Perspective, The Pentagon, August 2001.

<sup>10</sup> Jeffery Jones, Director, Counter-Terrorism PCC (NSC), telephonic interview by author, 12 July 2002.

<sup>11</sup> President Harry S. Truman, The National Security Act of 1947, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), 2.

<sup>12</sup> George T. Raach and Ilana Kass, "National Power and the Interagency Process" Washington D.C.: Joint Forces Quarterly, (Summer, 1995),10.

<sup>13</sup> President George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD 1), (The White House; Washington D.C., April 2001),3.

<sup>14</sup> President William J. Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive 68 – International Public Information, (The White House: Washington D.C., April 1999),2.

<sup>15</sup> Samuel B. Griffith, ed., Sun Tzu: The Art of War (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 84.

<sup>16</sup> Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Defense Science Board on Managed Information Dissemination (Washington D.C., October 2001), 26.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*, 26.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid*, 1.

<sup>19</sup> President George W. Bush, Establishment of the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee (SCPCC), (The White House; Washington D.C., September 10, 2002), 1.

<sup>20</sup> William V. Parker, Director, Office of Strategic Communication (DoS), telephonic interview by author, 15 January 2003.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>22</sup> Dell F Pendergrast, Institutional Shift Who Will Tell America's Story?, Chicago Tribune, Chicago Ill.; September 30 1999.

<sup>23</sup> Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, The Importance of Public Diplomacy to American Foreign Policy, (U.S. Department of State Dispatch; Washington, D.C., Oct 1999).

<sup>24</sup> Sarah Booth Conroy, The Last Word on USIA, The Washington Post; Washington; October 1999.

<sup>25</sup> Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Defense Science Board on Managed Information Dissemination (Washington D.C., October 2001) 34.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid*, 36.

<sup>27</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication for Information Operations (JP 3-13), Oct 1998.

<sup>28</sup> Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Defense Science Board on Managed Information Dissemination (Washington D.C., October 2001) 17.

<sup>29</sup> Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, College Edition, 1964, under the term "propaganda."

<sup>30</sup> Psychological Operation Officer's Course (POOC) instruction, untitled lecture presented in the U.S. Army Officer Psychological Operations Course at the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, N.C., July 1992.

<sup>31</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Psychological Operations, 3-05.30 (FM 33-1), June 2000. Cited hereafter as 3.05.30.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, ,, 3-05.30, 1-1.

<sup>33</sup> Allen H. Holmes & General Wayne A. Downing, United States Special Operations Posture Statement, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Special Operations Command, 1994).

<sup>34</sup> Curtis Glen, An Overview of Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Federal Research Division, Soviet Union-Eastern European Section (4A). (Washington D.C.:USIA, 1994).

<sup>35</sup> Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Defense Science Board on Managed Information Dissemination, (Washington D.C., Oct 2001),68.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid,65.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid,1.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, 65.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Albright, Madeleine., The Importance of Public Diplomacy to American Foreign Policy. U.S. Department of State Dispatch; Washington: Oct 1999.
- Aaron, Christopher., A New Language of Terror. Jane's Intelligence Review, October 2001.  
Alter, Johnathan. The Media's 'Balancing' Act. Newsweek; October 2001.
- Bardos, Arthur A., Public Diplomacy: A Old Art, A new Profession. The Virginia Quarterly Review, Charlottesville; Summer 2001. Bedlington, Stanley. Not Who You Think. The Washington Post; October 2001.
- Bush, George W., National Security Decision Directive 1. Washington, D.C.: The White House, April 2001.
- Bush, George W., The National Security Strategy of the United States of America Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002.
- Bush, George W., Establishment of the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee (SCPCC). The White House; Washington D.C., September 10, 2002.
- Clinton, William J., Presidential Decision Directive 68 – International Public Information Washington, D.C.: The White House, April 1999.
- Clinton, William J., A National Security Strategy for a Global Age. Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 2000.
- Conroy, Sarah Booth, The Last Word on USIA. The Washington Post; Washington; October 1999.
- Department of the Army, U.S. Army Psychological Operations 3-05.30 (FM 33-1). June 2000.
- Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, September 2001.
- Department of State, Fact Sheet – International Affairs-FY 2004 Budget. Washington, D.C., February 2003.
- Dobbs, Michael. Words and Images: Weapons of Other War. The Washington Post; October 2001.
- Efron, Sonni, THE WORLD: America's Got and Image Problem, Panel Warns: Policy: A Study of how the world sees the nation has led to the creation of an office to counter anti-U.S. sentiments. Some wonder whether anything will help. The Los Angeles Times; Los Angeles, Ca; July 2002.
- Glen, Curtis (1990). An Overview of Psychological Operations (PSYOP). Federal Research Division, Soviet Union-Eastern European Section (4A). Washington D.C.:USIA.
- Griffith, Samuel B. ed., Sun Tzu: The Art of War. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 84.

- Hoffman, David. Beyond Public Diplomacy. Foreign Affairs; New York; March/April 2002.
- Holmes, Allen H. & Downing, Wayne A. General. (1994), United States Special Operations Posture Statement.
- Hughes, John. Why America's story needs to be sent overseas. Christian Science Monitor; Boston, Mass.; April 2002.
- Hughes, John. Bring back USIA, and let America tell its story. Christian Science Monitor; Boston, Mass.; December 2001.
- Kaiser, Robert G. US Message Lost Overseas: Officials See Immediate Need for 'Public Diplomacy'. The Washington Post: Washington, D.C.: October 2001.
- Laffin, John. The Arab Mind: A Need For Understanding. London: Cassell and Company limited, 1975.
- Leonard, Mark. Diplomacy By Other Means. Foreign Policy; Washington, D.C.: September/October 2002.
- Mroz, Jacqueline. Selling the War Effort. Sales and Marketing Management; New York; February 2002.
- Office of the Secretary of Defense, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America. Pre-decisional draft, Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, September 2002.
- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Report on the Defense Science Board on Managed Information Dissemination. Washington D.C.: The Pentagon, October 2001.
- Payne, Kenneth B., The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction. University of Kentucky Press, Lexington, Kentucky, 2001.
- Parker, William V., State Department, Director, Office of Strategic Communication. Telephonic Interview by author. September/December 2002, January/February 2003.
- Pendergrast, Dell F., Institutional Shift Who Will Tell America's Story?. Chicago Tribune; Chicago Ill.; September 30 1999.
- Pinsdorf, Marion K., Woodrow Wilson's Public Relations: "Wag the Hun." Public Relations Review; Greenwich; Fall 1999.
- Reagan, Ronald., National Security Decision Directive 130 – US International Information Policy. Washington, D.C.: The White House, March 1984.
- Raach, George T. and Kass, Ilana., National Power and the Interagency Process. Washington D.C.: Joint Forces Quarterly, (Summer, 1995).
- The Joint Staff, Joint Publication for Information Operations (JP 3-13). Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, October 1998.
- The Joint Staff, Joint Vision 2020. Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, June 2000.

Thomas, Timothy L., The Mind Has No Firewall. 22 July 98, *Psychotronic War: IW and Bioeffects of DEW*, Infowar.com, "Infowar.com/wmd/wmd\_062298a\_j.html-ssi," accessed 27 July 2001.

Timmes, Thomas. Department of Defense, OASD-SOLIC, POC for Psychological Operations, Information Operations and interagency procedures. Telephonic interview by author. September 2002.

Truman, Harry S., The National Security Act of 1947. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947.