The US Intelligence Community has traditionally used publicly accessible information, in addition to any clandestine sources, to conduct analysis. Analysts draw on information contained in academic works, journals, magazines, newspapers, and files of US corporations with overseas operations1. They have often gained important insights from open sources without resorting to clandestine methods of collection.
The IC interacts with industry and academia in three principal ways.
It is worth re-examining the IC's relationship with industry and academia in the Post Cold-War era for several reasons. First, international political developments and new technologies have greatly improved the quality and quantity of open source material3. Secondly, the IC is facing large budget cuts. Thirdly, there is no dominant focus in the current national security environment. Finally, 'secrets' may be less important than 'mysteries' in the Post Cold-War era4. According to the former chairman of the NIC Joseph Nye, "a greater proportion of the questions that decision-makers and policy-makers want answers to are mysteries... a great deal of what's good analysis of mysteries comes from diverse, open sources"5.
The IC should provide its scientific, analytical and management personnel with assignments in industry and academia. Those on assignment should be required to file reports on what they have learned, and conduct educational sessions for other IC employees, in order to maximize the benefits of their experience. The IC should also offer short term employment opportunities for outside experts who could bring and share their expertise within the community. Outside analysts should be used more frequently on specific projects.
Civilian Intelligence Reserve Corps
The IC should create a civilian reserve corps. It should establish links with outside experts in academia and industry in order to monitor low priority, medium priority and non-traditional threats (health, environment). Outside experts would be electronically linked to the IC. They should be tasked with submitting regular reports to the IC in their field of expertise. As long as their work is in a low priority area, their analysis should be based only on open source material, and should not go through a process of validation. Experts in low priority areas should not be required to receive security clearance. They should volunteer for this task, understanding that if the threat escalated, they might be called on to work more closely with the IC. As long as their work remained a low priority for the IC, their reports (on non-traditional threats for instance) could also be shared with NGOs.
If a threat went from low to medium priority, outside reports should be validated. Experts should receive security clearance, so that they can be asked to review classified material. They should also be paid for their work.
Experts from academia and industry should be chosen based on they independent qualifications, the relevance of their work to the IC, and their ability to serve in the event of a crisis. They should receive basic training so that they know how to structure their reports to be most useful to policy-makers. Several different experts should cover every issue, and their analysis should be competitive and complementary.
A commission should be created to evaluate dual-use technologies. In particular, the following questions should be considered. Do dual-use technologies cut costs? What have been the implications for national security? The commission should be tasked with stream-lining current efforts, and assessing to what extent the IC should share technology with the private sector.
Outside experts should be used to advise the IC to a greater extent. Input from groups of scientists and academics is valuable on IC issues ranging from setting priorities to declassification efforts.
1I know I read this somewhere but I am still trying to figure out where. Sorry.
2Anthony F. Czajkowski, "Techniques of Domestic Intelligence Collection," Studies in Intelligence, vol.3, no.1 (Winter 1959), pp. 69-83.
3IC21: Intelligence in the 21st Century. House Permanent Select Committee Staff Study. April 1996.
4Nye, Joseph. Testimony at the Hearing of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, Room SD-106. Dirksen State Office Building. Washington, D.C. Friday Jan. 19, 1996: http://www.fas.org/irp/commission/testnye.htm
5Nye, Joseph. Testimony at the Hearing of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, Room SD-106. Dirksen State Office Building. Washington, D.C. Friday Jan. 19, 1996: http://www.fas.org/irp/commission/testnye.htm
Industry and academia have collaborated with the Intelligence Community (IC) throughout its history. Outside experts perform essential services for the IC, including research and development of new technologies, and they are also important sources of information. With the end of the cold war, the U.S. government has cut back IC funding. Meanwhile, policymakers have needed information on a much wider range of topics. In order to ease the strain on the intelligence community, observers have recommended that greater use be made of outside experts to meet these new challenges.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationships between the Intelligence Community, and industry, and academia. The paper is divided into three major parts. The first section is primarily historical. It discusses the types of relationships that have existed, their costs and benefits, and how well they have worked in the past. Section II deals with the current situation. It discusses why the IC should re-revaluate its relationships with industry and academia in the post cold war era, and summarizes the government's current policies. Finally, section III recommends that the IC strengthen its relationships with industry and academia, and discusses the advantages of five specific measures.
(I) Historical Overview
A. Types of Relationships
Industry and Academia have traditionally served intelligence in three principal ways. Outside experts act as sources of information, they are hired to perform services, and they oversee and advise the IC.
1. Industry and Academia as intelligence sources
IC analysts draw on the findings of outside experts to compile their reports. They use publicly accessible information contained in academic works, journals, magazines, and newspapers.
The IC has often gained important insights from open sources alone. During World War II, for example, the Office of Strategic Services accurately predicted that Nazi food production was inadequate by examining statistics on German agricultural exports and by reading obituaries1. Throughout the history of the intelligence community, open sources, appropriately analyzed, have proved to be more useful than expected2.
Intelligence officers also question individuals in industry and academia directly. Since the late 1940's, the Contact Division of the CIA's Office of Operations has been tapping into the "vast potential of information"3 available from academia and industry. Contact officers interview outside experts with international experience. Scientists and academics attend international conferences, where they meet and exchange information with colleagues from all parts of the world. Similarly, business-people travel continually, and compile reports on foreign economic and financial affairs. They are generally very good at assessing the political and economic situation in the regions in which they operate4. Thus, academic and industrial sources have expertise and contacts that are valuable to the Intelligence Community. In fact, between 1948 and 1959, more than 40 000 individuals and companies acted as Sources for the IC.5
Informants in industry and academia do not receive financial compensation for collaborating with intelligence, nor do they gain access to classified information. According to one recently declassified intelligence document, "intelligence collection is essentially a one-way street, with the Source giving and the collector receiving"6. Experts in industry and academia have acted as sources of information largely for patriotic reasons.
No security clearance is required for initial contact with a US citizen.7 In approaching a new company or institution, the contact officer always goes to the top person first- to the president, or the chairman of the board, or whoever determines broad policy for the company. As Anthony F. Czajkowski points out in an article on domestic intelligence collection, "if subordinates are contacted first, an embarrassing situation can arise if the president of the company inquires why the company is being 'penetrated' by the U.S. government"8. Businesses sometimes hesitate to collaborate with US intelligence for fear that damaging information will be revealed to a competitor, or that the association will damage its relationships with foreign companies. But intelligence officers protect their sources by not connecting the source's name with the information that he or she provides. In addition, the information revealed is never turned over to any other federal agency.
Unlike business-people who act as representatives of a company, academic informants are approached on an individual basis. The president of the university is still the initial point of contact because the IC needs his or her acquiescence to use university records and personnel.9 Intelligence agents generally look for professors who have just traveled abroad, attended an international conference, or entertained foreign visitors.
2. Contract work
The intelligence community has used, and continues to use private contractors to research and develop new technologies. Often, the IC will identify a desired capability and commission a company to design it. In 1969, for instance, the intelligence community commissioned the Hughes Tool Company to design a recovery ship that could retrieve a Russian submarine off the coast of California.
Industry may also approach the IC with plans for a new technology. The U-2 bomber, for instance, was conceived of and designed by Clarence L. Johnson- the president of the Lockheed Corporation. He chose to develop the plane- which he believed would fly high enough not to be detected by Soviet radars- for government rather than commercial use. The Lockheed Corporation built the plane for 22 million dollars, and earned a standard 9% profit margin10. High profit margins have kept businesses competing for intelligence contracts.
In 1976, the Church Committee described how the Central Intelligence Agency had benefited from its collaboration with industry: "The U-2 marked the beginning of the [CIA]'s emergence as the intelligence community's leader in the area of technical collection capability...The agency never attempted to establish its own Research and Development capacity. Instead, it continued to utilize the best private industry manpower available. In large part this arrangement accounts for a very consistent vitality and quality of the agency's technical research and development capacity, which remains unsurpassed to this day."11
Private contractors support intelligence collection in the Department of Defense (DoD), as well as in the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, Directorate of Operations, and Directorate of Science and Technology. The National Reconnaissance Office in the DoD does most of its work through private contracts. It has the highest level on funding of any program in the IC, but virtually no federal workforce.
Academics with special expertise have also been hired by the IC as consultants on specific projects. They are paid for this work, but usually not as well as they would be if they were working in the private sector.
Representatives from academia and industry have served on committees to oversee and advise the IC. In 1950, for instance, a panel of "Princeton consultants" was established to correct what was perceived as a disproportionate number of academics on the Board of Office of National Estimates12. Members included George F. Keenan, Hamilton Fish Armstrong- the editor of Foreign Affairs, and Vannevar Bush- an atomic scientist. The "Princeton consultants" drew on their experience in public affairs to review draft estimates. In 1956, President Eisenhower established the Presidential Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (later strengthened and renamed the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board by President Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs fiasco). This part-time board of private citizens is responsible for reporting to the President on the performance, progress and problems of the IC13. Members have included Edward Teller- a Nobel Prize-winning physicist, Edwin Land- former-president of Polaroid, and William Baker- former-president of Bell.
More recently, the JASONS- a group of leading scientists and experienced weapon-designers- have played a significant role in advising the IC. The President's decision to support a zero-yield test ban on nuclear weapons, publicly supported by Joint Chiefs of Staff, was in part achieved thanks to a report submitted to the Energy Department by the JASONS which endorsed a test ban.14
4. Joint projects
During the Cold War, business, labor and intelligence worked together to develop the American Institute for Free Labor Development. Large multi-national corporations such as the Chase Manhattan Bank, Pan American World Airways, IBM World Trade Corporation, and Coca-Cola Export Corporation supported training programs for labor union officials and helped spread anti-Communist propaganda in Latin America. More than 200,000 Latin American labor union officials were trained through the project, and it is perceived to have been among the more successful CIA ventures.15
Business leaders have also exchanged ideas with the Intelligence Community informally. Under DCI Turner, business leaders occasionally attended CIA briefings for the Commerce Department. According to Turner, these forums met with limited success because the interests of business and intelligence do not always coincide. Businesses are much more concerned about specific market segments, whereas the government is more interested in national commercial strategies.16
More recently, the IC has agreed to collaborate with a group of scientists in the name of the environment. Under the MEDEA initiative, the IC will periodically image selected sites of environmental significance. This will give scientists an ongoing record of change and improve their understanding of environmental processes. It should also greatly enhance their ability to anticipate catastrophic threats to the health and welfare of the general public17.
According to former-DCI John Deutch, this project has had direct benefits for the IC: "MEDEA has worked closely with our analysts to develop techniques that have enhanced our ability to collect and interpret data from our collection systems." Deutch adds that IC efforts cost them very little, and yield tremendous benefits for relief agencies, disaster victims, and potential victims whose lives are saved by timely warning.18
B. Costs and Benefits for the IC of interaction with Industry and Academia
Experts in industry and academia are valuable resources for the IC, but there are costs as well as benefits associated with eliciting their help.
An obvious problem with incorporating outsiders into the intelligence process is the added risk to national security. The more people that have access to classified information, the greater the chance of a security breach. In addition, outside experts do not make the same professional commitment to national security and secrecy that intelligence officers do. As a result, they may be more inclined to compromise security.
In Jan. 1977, for instance, Christopher Boyce- a clerk at the TRW Corporation which was working on the Pyramid satellite system- sold details of the project to the Soviets. J.S. Gordon- President of Lockheed Martin Skunk Works suggests that "the greatest threat to a defense contractor does not come from outside sources. Historically, it has been someone from within that is most likely to commit espionage".19
In some ways, close ties to academia has had drawbacks for the Intelligence Community. Analysts have been criticized, particularly by the military, for taking the "egghead approach" to their work, occasionally compiling intelligence reports "like an academic treatise"20. One of the first National Intelligence Estimates (NIE), for example, was produced on Norway. It took 41 pages and 6 chapters to reach its conclusions, even though NIE's are most useful if they are concise21.
Joseph Nye describes having friends who were academics send him papers to help him: "I would get 30 or 40-page papers with lots of footnotes and so forth. They had no idea how useless that was"22. Academics are less constrained by time. Intelligence officers must find the best possible answer, on time.
Using private industry to research and develop new technologies has enabled the IC to maintain advanced capabilities at a lower cost than if it undertook these activities internally. Companies compete for IC contracts. This forces manufacturers to minimize their cost of development. Contracting out also gives the IC the freedom to hire companies with specialized expertise on a project by project basis, and to take full advantage of the spectrum of resources available in the commercial sector.
In addition, collection of intelligence from experts in industry and academia is very cost-efficient. As Anthony Czajowski points out in his article Techniques of Domestic Intelligence Collection, through this collection operation, "the community has at its disposal the expert analysis and commentary of the most knowledgeable people in the academic, scientific, professional and industrial fields".23 For this service, outsiders receive financial compensation from the IC.
2) Special Expertise
Collaborating with Industry and Academia also allows the IC to take advantage of specialized experts. There are millions of academics in the world, studying an incredible spectrum of topics. The IC, with its few thousand analysts, cannot afford to have them be very narrowly focused. Thus, outside experts often have unique knowledge and understanding, and their perspective can be very helpful to the IC.
3. Public Awareness
As more academics have access to intelligence documents, they increase public awareness of the IC. In evaluating intelligence work, they also provide unbiased and credible analysis of intelligence work. As the keynote speaker at the Symposium for Teaching Intelligence pointed out: "For it is in the interests of the IC to have its work dealt with as part of the warp and woof of international relations even if, as is sure to be the case, the descriptions are sometimes unflattering or critical or worse.24
C. Benefits of interacting with Intelligence for Industry and Academia
Outside experts that act as intelligence sources do not receive remuneration for collaborating with the IC, but consultants and companies that enter into contracts with the IC are paid for their work. Outside experts earn less working for the government than they might otherwise working in the private sector, but companies that develop technologies for the IC earn sizable profits.
2) Joint projects
Intelligence and Industry have collaborated on projects to both of their benefits. As detailed above, business, labor and intelligence worked together during the Cold War to develop the American Institute for Free Labor Development. Today, industry and intelligence are collaborating to develop dual-use technologies. Such projects enable industry to earn added profits by marketing variations of IC technology commercially. As a result, the IC can acquire technologies for less, and gains a "surge capacity". By using components, subsystems, and technologies developed by commercial industry in IC systems, it will be easier to build back capabilities to a higher level if necessary in the future.25
3. Patriotic duty
Many outside experts gladly volunteer their services to the IC because they welcome the opportunity to serve their country.
4. Returning the favor
In the course of its activities, the IC has helped advance the interests of industry and academia.
Since World War II, intelligence agencies have taken American business interests into consideration when intervening directly abroad. According to John Ranelagh, after World War II, American governments were willing to use their influence and strength to see ideological implications in the 'persecution' of US business interests.26
Although there has always been institutional resistance to commercial espionage, it is generally believed that if in the course of collecting information, US intelligence agencies discovered evidence of unfair trade practices by foreign companies that put US firms at a disadvantage, the information should be divulged equitably, as long as the source remained protected. When the IC uncovers foreign competitors of US firms using bribery and other illegal tactics to obtain contracts with other foreign government, it notifies the State or Commerce Department. In the last 5 years alone, diplomatic intervention to assure a "level playing-field" has enabled US firms to obtain billions of dollars in contracts that would otherwise have been lost.
The IC has also tried to feed back into the academic pool as much of its research as possible without compromising its sources. Kruschev's "Secret Speech", for instance, was published in 1970, soon after it was obtained by the CIA. In addition to confirming intelligence claims about the Soviet regime, it provided scholars and students with valuable insights into the workings of Stalinist Russia.
5. Being "inside"
Former DCI-Turner suggests in his autobiography that professors benefit from helping the IC because they get to see "how governments really work"27. If they act as consultants, professors may have access to classified information. Although they cannot reveal this information or use it in their teachings, professors may gain new insight into their field.
Bradford Westerfield, who obtained temporary access to "secret" level classified materials in order to request priority review for articles that would be appropriate for Yale publication, believes that understanding the role that intelligence has played is an integral part of understanding international relations. "In my writing and teaching I have always, more than most scholars, recognized the importance of the covert dimension and have incorporated what I could find in the public domain."
Intellectuals are also attracted to intelligence work because it gives them the opportunity to have powerful influence. Academics get to see their work have real-life implications in the undertakings of their government and have access to information that would otherwise have been unavailable to them. John Ranelagh points out that "CIA analysts have always known more about more than their peers on the outside"28.
The relationship academia and intelligence, and to a lesser extent the relationship between industry and intelligence, have evolved over the last fifty years.
Initially, the IC had close ties to outside experts in academia. A respect for scholarship was established in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and it was passed on to the Central Intelligence Agency when it was formed in 1947. John Ranelagh suggests in The Agency that "the most valuable OSS legacy that endured was Donovan's belief in the values of bringing people from all walks of life into intelligence work. He lifted intelligence out of its military rut, where it had little prestige, and little dynamism, and made it a career for adventurous, broad-minded civilians."29 The CIA, in fact, was formed with the intention of bringing greater civilian involvement to the intelligence process30. Ranelagh points out that the CIA recruited "some of the most able graduates" from U.S. universities. Although the US military was initially skeptical that intellectuals could come up with anything that was of practical use, the intelligence provided by the CIA proved to be effective31.
Respect for scholarship may have been the Intelligence Community's greatest strength. According to Alexander Orlov, a Soviet spy who defected to the United States, it was research and analysis, not secret intelligence, that differentiated US intelligence from the KGB.
By 1966, the CIA functioned as a mini research institute.32 Analysts inside the agency kept in touch with colleagues on the outside. Many professors had such close ties to the CIA that they readily moved into and out of intelligence work. Max Milikan- a professor of economics at MIT- worked closely with the CIA. In 1951/52, he organized the Economic Research Unit within the Office of Research and Reports to analyze the economic conditions in the Soviet Union. In 1953, he returned to the Center for International Studies, but he continued to collaborate with the IC.
The first generation of CIA employees was largely drawn from the East Coast Establishment. They brought a wide range of experience with them to the agency. Many were lawyers, journalists, or had taught at Universities. Members of the same generation ran other government agencies and private sector businesses. As a result, "there was always someone in the agency who new the right person to call..."33
But members of the intelligence community recognized early on that industry and academia had "untapped potential". By 1970, some insiders believed that the intelligence community should take better advantage of these resources. Joseph W. Martin wrote, pointing to the massive research effort mounted by US universities on the non-European world since the end of World War II: "I wonder how fully the intelligence community has recognized its activities as essentially supplementary to the larger American effort- public and private- and conceded that more of its own attention should center on facilitating, by various means, the government official's access to these other sources of information."34
Allen Dulles, who served as DCI between 1953 and 1961, identified another important reason that the IC should maintain strong ties to academia. He worried that the IC would have trouble attracting bright individuals to work on projects that had to remain a secret. He argued that it was wrong to bottle up IC's intellectuals, and believed that they should be able to publish their work in declassified forms so that they could gain the respect of their peers on the outside.
Despite those who felt that closer ties were desirable, intelligence and academia collaborated effectively until the 1960s. The relationship soured as the Cold-War consensus broke down. The Church committee investigation damaged the long-standing relationship that the IC had with the academic community. The committee revealed that some professors had worked for the CIA without informing their universities. Several University presidents asked the CIA to reveal the names of the professors in question, but the agency refused, having already agreed to keep the relationships secret. Universities began drafting regulations on faculty interaction with the intelligence community. On March 25, 1977, Harvard issued a set of guidelines that greatly inhibited faculty association with the CIA. Although the president of Harvard asked DCI Turner to prohibit the IC from working with academics who did not disclose the relationship to their university, Turner refused35. Instead, he made a point of reviewing the cases where professors did not voluntarily disclose the relationship. If university policy required professors to reveal all outside relationships, Turner usually required the professor to disclose the relationship before proceeding. If, however, the university only required faculty to disclose its relationships with intelligence, Turner would not intervene. During his tenure, DCI Turner also established a regulation that prohibited using media contacts and clergy as informants, except in exceptional circumstances.
As the world grew suspicious of intelligence agencies, so did academia. Because of a series of revelations about the IC's work, Americans had a sense that there was an invisible government operating that was engaged in shadowy and questionable undertakings. The CIA's role in funding the MKUltra programs, for example, was particularly upsetting to the academic community. According to John Ranelagh, the incident "formed a firm base for subsequent paranoia".36 The MKUltra programs were drug and counter-drug research and development projects, and their purpose was to achieve brain control. Researchers included scientists from the University of Rochester, the University of Oklahoma, and the University of Illinois Medical School. In one of the programs, the CIA funded LSD research through two foundations. Many of the scientists involved did not know that they were working for the CIA.
Academia was also affected by Senator McCarthy's crusade against communism. Owen Lattimore, an academic and noted expert on China, was singled out and viciously attacked by McCarthy37. Lattimore did not work for the government, but he had written articles and books which had influenced the State Department. The incident discouraged other academics from collaborating with intelligence agencies.
In the 1970's, it was also revealed that the CIA had been secretly involved in student movements. In the summer of 1947, the CIA began to fund anti-Communist student organizations38. Its involvement was not questioned by student leaders in the 1950's and 60's, when American students were overwhelmingly supportive of the government stand in the Cold War. But when student attitudes changed during the Vietnam era, the agency's secret contacts were revealed and criticized in the press.
When American troops invaded Cambodia in April of 1970, more than 500 college campuses went on strike. Existing ties between intelligence and academia were further undermined by the government's handling of the situation. The National Guard was called in to control students at Kent State in Ohio, and Jackson State in Mississippi. Several protesters were shot and killed.
By the 1970's, associating with the Intelligence Community jeopardized an academic's career. The relationship between intelligence and academia had deteriorated to the point that even informal exchanges were regarded with suspicion. In 1977, for instance, a professor at Brooklyn College asked the CIA for some information on an Iron curtain country that he was going to visit. When he returned, he called the CIA to share his thoughts on the trip. As a result of this exchange, the professor's colleagues attempted to block his obtaining tenure39.
Although academia certainly pulled away from the intelligence community, there is some evidence that the IC began to distrust academia as well. IC management apparently feared that collaborating with academia engendered security risks. Former DCI Colby commented: "I don't care whether they are blabbing secrets or not. Just give me the name of the people at the Georgetown cocktail parties."40
According to Jeffrey Richelson in The U.S. Intelligence Community, the 1970's were characterized by the "neo-isolation" of the intelligence community. Academics dominated the CIA until the 1960's, but the technical collection demands of the Korean War meant that more electronic experts, engineers and scientists were hired by the IC. In the early 70's, the Intelligence Community steered away from recruiting through professors, and began advertising for new talent in newspapers.
The Church Committee investigations had very relatively little impact on the relationship between the Intelligence Community and industry. According to Stansfield Turner, only some businesses stopped dealing with the CIA as a result of the Church Committee's revelations. He believes they did so out of fear that the CIA, which seemed to be unable to keep secrets, would reveal proprietary information, or that stockholders would sue if they learned that the company had used resources to aid the CIA41.
II) Current situation
A. Current statutes
Today, there are clear statutes that govern IC interaction with Industry and Academia. Executive Order No. 12333 authorizes the IC to collect information domestically only if it is publicly accessible, or with the consent of the person concerned (with some notable exceptions). IC agencies are permitted to enter into contracts with private companies without revealing their sponsorship, but IC participation in contracts with academic institutions must be open and fully disclosed. Similarly, anyone acting on behalf of agencies within the IC is required to disclose his or her intelligence affiliation in order to participate in an organization within the United States42.
B. Post-Cold war realities
There are several reasons that the IC should reexamine its relationships with industry and academia in the post Cold-War era.
1. Growth of open sources
Much of the work that the IC does today is overt. Recent international political developments and new technologies have increased the quality and the quantity of open source information. Information is now available almost immediately through telephone, fax, the Internet, radio, and television. With the fall of communism, East-West contact has increased dramatically. Thousands of U.S. citizens have now traveled to countries that were once part of the Soviet Bloc. In the CIA alone, some estimate that the amount of open source information has grown by a factor of ten over the last four years. In addition, up to ninety five percent of economic intelligence currently comes from open sources.43 As the Council on Foreign Relations Report put it: "The IC now has more competitors in providing information to military and civilian officials and users".44
The wealth of open sources now available to policymakers should have an impact on the types of activities that the IC undertakes. As Joseph Nye points out in his testimony to the Aspin-Brown Commission: "I think the challenge for current intelligence is to ask what's our value added that CNN doesn't do? And the challenge for estimative intelligence is what's our value added that the economist or the financial times doesn't provide?".45
2. Tight budget environment
The Intelligence Community is presently facing large budget cuts. When US survival seemed to be at stake, the American public felt that intelligence was worth the any cost. The collapse of the Soviet Union has dramatically decreased the danger of global thermonuclear war, for the moment. Most Americans now expect the government to be able to reduce intelligence spending significantly. Isolationist policies are becoming more popular, and the newest generation of congressional representatives have few international and foreign policy issues on their agendas. Thus, the IC is having to find innovative ways of reducing its costs.
3. Unpredictable threats
Unlike the Cold-War world, there is no dominant focus in the current national security environment. As Dr. John H. Hedley put it in The Checklist for the Future of Intelligence: "If today intelligence seems somewhat easier to acquire, what is harder is knowing what we want and from where we need it. For the forty years following WWII we mainly wanted to know the military capabilities of the Soviet Union. Now we want to know everything... There are no obscure countries or remote regions anymore".46
Since the end of the Cold War, the IC has been struggling to predict which areas will be relevant to US policymakers in the near future. Recently, the IC has suddenly found itself needing intelligence on countries such as Somalia and Burundi. Joseph Nye has described the problem: After the end of the Cold War it looked pretty clear that Somalia and the Horn of Africa was no longer relevant to the world balance of power. But soon after we began to cut back resources devoted to Somalia we found ourselves involved with Somalia and desperately needing intelligence on Somalia, because of the total different type of analysis which didn't start with balance of power politics, but started out of the role of T.V. and humanitarian crisis.47
Thus, many observers point out that the IC now needs to find a way to adequately monitor an extraordinary number potential threats. As Ambassador Robert Kimmit, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, has said: "The IC will have to be an inch thick and a mile wide, with the ability to go a mile deep on any given issue."48
4. Today's questions
Information collected clandestinely is less useful today. Joseph Nye draws a useful distinction between 'mysteries' and 'secrets' to explain why that is the case.
Secrets are things which you can steal, like the size of a warhead on the SS-20. Mysteries are things which it doesn't do you any good to steal, because the people you are stealing from don't know the answer, either, such as will Yeltsin be in power a year from now? Yeltsin doesn't know the answer to that.
The Cold War, I think, was a setting in which many more secrets were important. And in the period after the Cold War I think a greater proportion of the questions that decisionmakers and policymakers want answers to are mysteries..... a great deal of what's good analysis of mysteries comes from diverse open sources.49 Thus, outsiders, including experts in industry and academia, may be just as qualified to answer the kinds of intelligence questions that are likely in the post Cold-War era.
5. Personnel problems
Particularly since the Ames spy case, the IC has had problems recruiting qualified new employees.50 According the 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, significant reductions in personnel and other resources throughout the IC have created a short-fall in analytic resources, especially in areas of all-source analysis and linguists.
Government salaries are generally not competitive with the private sector. The average salary at the CIA, although high by U.S. government standards, is lower than at banks, law firms, or businesses. In addition, more publicity and prestige is associated with employment in the private sector.51 The secrecy of intelligence work remains a potential barrier to attracting high caliber people.
In the post Cold War era, qualified analysts are less likely to be attracted to intelligence work for patriotic reasons, and may be more tempted by higher salaried in the commercial sector. Thus, recruiting qualified personnel may become even more of a problem. Increasing the flow of personnel between the private sector businesses and intelligence, and between academia and intelligence, may help the IC solve some of these problems.
6. Commercial technology
Science and Technology have been central to ensuring the US's position as global leader.52 Where the IC once drove technological development, much of the best emerging technology now originates in the commercial sector. In the last thirty years, barriers have been created between defense and civilian industrial sectors53. The President's National Security Science and Technology Strategy acknowledges that the US "can no longer afford to maintain two distinct industrial bases".
C. Today's Barriers
The IC continues to face practical barriers to interaction with academia and industry. When members of the intelligence community approach businesses, the visit arouses an instinctive fear that the company books are about to be examined for tax purposes.54 Similarly, academics still worry that their cooperation with U.S. intelligence will become known and hinder their future activity in a foreign area.
The IC has traditionally had difficulty finding qualified business-people to work in intelligence. During his tenure, DCI Turner tried to find a leader in the business community to head the branch of CIA that contacts business sources. Turner believes that he was unsuccessful because there is not enough money or prestige in intelligence to lure a talented business-person away from the private sector.
Academics, in particular, may resist interacting with the Intelligence Community because it has traditionally operated under a veil of secrecy. Even assuming that improved oversight will prevent the IC from engaging in 'shadowy' activities in the future, the IC has a history of operating in a way that many feel is incompatible with academia.
Another reason academia and industry may be less willing to cooperate with intelligence is the fact that the Cold War is over. They currently receive no remuneration for the information they provide, and because they may feel less patriotic duty now that the Soviet threat is not imminent, they may be less willing to take the time to help the IC.
For some outside experts, the "onerous" security requirements- particularly the polygraph examination and the requirement to submit subsequent publications for review- are reason enough not to collaborate with the IC. During the Cold War, the intelligence community developed a number of procedures that essentially cut it off from the outside. Although appropriate at the time, these procedures continue to make it difficult for intelligence officers to access academics on the outside55. Security requirements also make it more costly for the IC to collaborate with outsiders.
Finally, skepticism on the part of IC employees on value of outsider's analysis may also impede collaborative efforts56.
D. Current trends: Greater efforts to use outsiders
Although internal guidelines continue to restrict the use of journalists, clergy and academics for operational purposes by the IC, the Intelligence Community has taken steps in recent years to make more effective use of open sources, including academia and industry. The CIA has procedures in place which enable it to use former employees to increase its capabilities on a temporary basis57. When employees leave the agency, they are asked maintain a level of expertise in their field which is based primarily on open sources. The hope is that these experts will be available to work with intelligence if a crisis arises in a relevant area. The National Intelligence Council is also currently bringing in National Intelligence Officer's from outside the IC (from academia and from industry).
There have also been efforts to take greater advantage of technological developments in the commercial sector, without compromising national security. The President's National Security Science and Technology Strategy advocates a "dual-use" approach to technology development, where military and intelligence systems use components, subsystems, and technologies developed by commercial industry. This plan is intended to allow the defense department, as well as the IC, to exploit the rapid rate of innovation and market-driven efficiencies of the commercial industries to meet their needs.
In March 1994, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 23, and established an industrial policy permitting US firms to obtain licenses to market imagery products and systems commercially. PDD23 is intended to expand business opportunities for US firms that work closely with the IC and the DoD in areas that affect national security. Observers remain skeptical, however, of PDD23's effectiveness58.
Until recently, there was no standardized, community-wide set of security requirements for private contractors to follow. Having to meet different criteria for each of its customers added significantly to the cost of production for private contractors. The new National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual attempts to standardize security guidelines. J.S. Gordon of Lockheed Martin Skunk Works, however, asserts that these new measures are inadequate, and that more change is necessary before there is any real cost savings.
While the government has taken steps to facilitate interaction with the private sector, it has also cut back its procurement budget. According to Daniel M. Tellep, chairman of the Lockheed Martin Corporation, the government's procurement account is down 72 percent in real purchasing power, from $138 billion in 1985 to $39 billion in Fiscal Year 1997 request. Scientists and industrialists have expressed concern about the wisdom of cutbacks in research and development funding for non-defense purposes. The director of National Science Foundation, Neal Lane, said "This nation is getting ready to run an experiment it has never done before to see if we can reduce federal investment in R & D by one-third and still be a world leader in the 21st century. Nobody knows the outcome but it seems to be a pretty high risk."59
Finally, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 amends section 103 b of the National Security Act of 1947 to allow the National Intelligence Council to carry out its responsibilities by contract.
E. New relationship facilitators
Since the end of the Cold-War, the Intelligence Community has become more open about its activities. Increasingly, secret documents are being declassified. Many of today's analysts publish their findings in academic journals, and are acknowledged by name in intelligence reports.
Recent statutory reforms have made it easier for the Pentagon to take advantage of inventiveness and efficiency in the commercial sector. In October of 1993, President Clinton signed into law the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act which reforms Federal procurement. In June of 1994, Defense Secretary William Perry instructed the military services to use commercial (performance-based) specifications instead of the 31,000 military specifications and standards that describe how military items are to be made and tested.
Observers remain critical of the IC's security standards for collaborating with industry and recommend less intrusive measures to facilitate the relationship. Specifically, J.S. Gordon of Lockheed Martin Skunk Works has said:
In original classification, the government has often relied on outdated perceptions concerning the value of the information, the whims of an overzealous classification official or, if all else fails, the status quo...The consequence of this action directly relates to added cost affecting the bottom line of industry and inflating procurement costs to the government.60
Gordon suggests that there may be more benefit to information system security through an effective personnel security system program than through 'arbitrary', costly physical restrictions on the computer system. He believes that the IC should concentrate on strengthening Information and Personnel security programs61.
F. Industry and Academia in the post Cold-War era
The Intelligence Community has greatly benefited from interacting with industry and academia. Current collaborative efforts are effective, and certainly worth-while. But industry and academia can do more to help the IC meet the demands of the post Cold War era. Steps have already been taken to help the IC take advantage of the inventiveness and efficiency of commercial industry. Less in the way of statuary reform has been done to expand the IC's relationship with academia. But formalizing IC interaction with academia may prove to be untenable. Academics may hesitate to collaborate formally with the IC for fear of compromising their access to foreign countries and contacts.
Nevertheless, industry and academia have the potential to help the IC solve a spectrum of emerging problems. Increasing the flow of personnel between the IC and industry and academia may help improve the skills of IC employees and attract more qualified people to intelligence work. Using industry and academia for analysis and technology development, instead of duplicating their efforts, may help reduce costs. Greater use of outsiders may also increase the IC's flexibility, increase accountability, and improve public relations. Finally, with the explosion of open sources, outsiders who may be better aware of the distribution of information in society62 might be able to help the IC navigate and better manage publicly available information.
A. Policy recommendations
1. Strengthen the relationship between Industry, Academia and Intelligence
Most observers, including the Aspin-Brown Commission report, the House report, the Checklist on the Future of Intelligence, the Council on Foreign Relations report, and the Twentieth Century Fund report, suggest that the intelligence community should take advantage of the wealth of open sources now available to reduce it costs and increase its effectiveness. They acknowledge that the IC needs to maintain an independent collection capability to cover areas such as military capabilities of countries that remain hard to penetrate. But as industry and academia have access to more and more information that is relevant to intelligence, and because they do analyses for their own purposes, intelligence should eliminate efforts that are duplicative. Collaborating with industry and academia may be the only cost-effective way for the IC to maintain a "global reach". Intelligence reform must involve strengthening IC ties to industry and academia.
2. Use industry and academia to enhance the skills of IC employees
The IC's work environment was characterized by the Aspin-Brown Commission report as follows: "Once inside there is little incentive to move outside, even temporarily. Indeed to do so only jeopardizes one's chances for advancement. While such dynamics are not uncommon elsewhere in Government, they are especially in evidence among the employees of intelligence agencies whose experiences create a special bond that cannot normally be shared with the outside world."63 It is the general consensus of recent reports that the IC should encourage skill development among its employees.
I recommend that the IC make rotational assignments in industry and academia mandatory for its staff every five years. For instance, an analyst who specializes in the former Soviet Union would benefit from taking Soviet politics classes or teaching in a University setting. Given recent developments in Central and West Africa, IC analysts would likely learn a lot from taking relevant classes in a University setting. IC managers could develop their skills by working in a private company such as General Electric, or IBM for a year or two. IC scientists could work in commercial or academic labs. Those on assignment should be required to file reports on their experience, and conduct educational sessions for other IC employees, in order to maximize the benefits of their experience. The IC should make promotion conditional on relevant outside experience.
The IC should also offer more short term employment opportunities for outside experts who can bring and share their expertise within the community. For instance, teams of specialists on rotational assignments (from policy departments, academia, think-tanks and the IC) could produce the National Intelligence Estimates, where the IC now has a low comparative advantage. Most of expert knowledge on the long-term interests of the US now lies outside IC- in policy agencies, academia, think tanks, foreign countries, media, and the Library of Congress.64
Finally, the IC should do more lateral and midcareer hiring, and sponsor open conferences to increase the opportunities for exchange between its analysts and outside experts.
Increasing the flow of personnel between industry, academia and intelligence has several advantages. First, it helps ensure that IC personnel remains vital, dynamic, and highly skilled. In addition, closer professional ties to the outside may attract more qualified people to intelligence work, who might otherwise have hesitated for fear of being closed off from the outside. Reforming the personnel system also helps IC employees develop outside contracts, and gives the IC more flexibility to adjust its skill mix. This plan also has advantages for industry and academia who, by offering positions to IC professionals on rotation, will gain very qualified employees for very little cost. To avoid conflict of interest problems, the IC must continue to pay their employees on temporary leave. Thus, rotational assignments on a wide scale mean that the IC will function without a significant portion of its employees at any given time. But the skills, experience and contacts gained should enable the IC to function efficiently enough to more than compensate for the loss.
In order to ensure that this program is successful, IC employees should submit an evaluation of their experience to their immediate superiors at the conclusion of their rotation. These evaluations, along with performance reviews from superiors, should be used to monitor the program on an ongoing basis.
3. The IC should create a Civilian Intelligence Reserve Corps
The IC currently has no mechanism to ensure that it maintains a basic level coverage of all potential intelligence issues65. Under the 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, the DCI has been tasked with studying the implications of creating a Civilian Intelligence Reserve Corps. The CIRC is envisioned as a group of academic and think-tank experts who are kept on retainer and required to notify the IC on a regular basis of significant trends and changes in their field of study. The Council on Foreign Relations report, the House report, and the Checklist on the Future of Intelligence all advocate creating an CIRC.
I also recommend that the IC create a civilian intelligence reserve corps. The IC should establish links with outside experts in academia, in industry and in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in order to monitor low priority threats such as environmental and health-related issues. Outside experts should be electronically linked to the IC, and must submit regular reports in their field.
As long as the developments in their field remain low priorities for the IC, members of the CIRC should not have access to any classified information obtained by the IC. Their analyses should be based on open source material alone, and their reports need not go through a process of validation. Experts in low priority areas should not be required to receive security clearance.
Civilian experts would not be paid for the reports, unless a crisis developed unexpectedly, and they were called on to work more closely with the IC. The CIRC will be most useful for the IC if it covers a broad range of fields. Thus, a fairly large number of outside experts will be needed the program. It is unlikely to be cost-effective for the IC to keep outside experts on paid retainer permanently. Furthermore, outside experts, particularly academics, may feel that accepting a paid job from the IC will jeopardize their own careers and contacts. Thus, they will be asked to collaborate with the IC for the patriotic reasons, to serve the community, and for the prestige that may be associated with the work. As long as their work remained a low priority for the IC, reports could be shared with NGOs because they would remain unclassified.
If a low priority area becomes a concern (ie. an outside expert following Canadian politics warns that the province of Quebec may declare its independence, and cause mass civil unrest on the U.S. border), the IC could then ask its civilian experts in the relevant field to work more closely with IC in order to bring it "up to speed". Willing experts would then receive security clearance, so that they can be asked to review classified material. They would submit much more frequent reports to the IC, and their work would be validated. In addition, members of the CIRC will need to be paid for this level work.
Experts from academia and industry should be chosen based on their independent qualifications, the relevance of their work to the IC, and their ability to serve in the event of a crisis. They should receive basic training so that they know how to structure their reports to be most useful to policy-makers. Several different experts should cover every issue, and their analysis should be overlapping and complementary in order to ensure a fair overall assessment.
Thus, I envision a two-step process for the CIRC. I believe that such a system will be necessary to ensure the cooperation of talented academics. Clearly, it is in the interests of the IC to have civilian experts commit to being available if their services are needed. The IC must obtain this commitment whenever possible, and should take a person's ability to serve in the event of an emergency into account when selecting civilian experts for the program. But some outside experts may be unwilling to formalize their relationship with the IC beyond submitting periodic reports based on open source material for fear that their relationship with intelligence will make foreign governments and contacts unwilling to cooperate with them. (They may also balk at the onerous security requirements that access to classified information entails such as the requirement to submit future publication for review.) Clearly, academics who formally commit to help the IC and then lose privileged access to information in their field will be of limited value to the IC anyway.
For patriotic reasons, it should be relatively easy to qualified find academics who are willing to inform the IC of developments in their field. When faced with a crisis, experts who might otherwise have been unwilling to compromise their sources or access to work formally with intelligence may find themselves compelled to be of service after all.
The two-tiered approach to the CIRC also allows the IC to maintain a reasonable balance between cost-savings and security. Validation and obtaining security clearance are expensive undertakings. The IC can eliminate these costs for low priority issues when accuracy and secrecy are not absolutely essential. The purpose of these reports is to alert the IC to issues that it should monitor, not to support decisionmakers directly. But if the situation escalates, security clearance is necessary to ensure that civilian experts can be trusted with classified information.
To summarize, there are a number of advantages associated with the CIRC system outlined above. Civilian experts whose work is based on publicly accessible information will provide the IC with knowledgeable access to open sources. The Civilian Intelligence Reserve Corps is potentially a highly effective and economical alternative to "standing armies of analysts" attempting to cover every issue. The CIRC enables IC analysts to concentrate their efforts on its highest priorities, while helping to ensure that the IC is not caught completely unaware should a crisis emerge unexpectedly. Finally, this program would help the IC make better use of talented outside professions, many of whom have specialized expertise.
The best way to test the effectiveness of this program is to see whether or not the IC's ability to anticipate threats improves, and whether or not it 'catches up' more quickly as a result of its involvement with outside experts. This will have to be evaluated on a case by case basis.
4. Use A team/ B team tests to compare reports prepared by traditional intelligence means to open source reports
The Aspin-Brown Commission conducted an impromptu test to compare how readily information could be obtained from open sources on a topic of current national security interest. They compared the open source report, to one obtained from the IC. They concluded that "the information obtained from open sources was substantial and on some points more detailed than that provided by the IC. On the other hand, the information that came from open sources took longer to produce, required validation, and failed to cover many of the key aspects of the situation important to policymakers." Others suggest that open source material is much more relevant. Minority staff adviser Chris Straub, for instance, suggested that policymakers get almost as much "intelligence" from reading the New York Times, and that they often make their decisions based primarily on what they read in the paper.66
I recommend that the IC undertake such A team/B team tests to ensure that there is significant value-added in their reports vis a vis open source material. The IC should commission outside experts or agencies to compile the open source report. These tests should be undertaken periodically, perhaps five per year, and will help the IC gauge whether it should be devoting resources to a particular issue, as well as bring in a fresh, outside perspective. This initiative may also help to persuade skeptical intelligence professionals about the value of outside expertise, and encourage insiders to take greater advantage of knowledgeable outside experts.
5. The IC should improve public relations
The public remains very suspicious of the activities undertaken by the intelligence community, and the CIA in particular. Bradford Westerfield, an academic who reviewed classified material for publication, felt that he needed "to guard against the appearance of being co-opted by the CIA". Dr. John Hedley, at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown, says that "The reality is that most scholars and serious journalists do not know enough about the real history of the IC to explain to citizens why Congress should drop money into that black box." He adds that people do not endorse the IC's intrinsic indispensability67.
I recommend that the IC improve public relations in order to increase public support, and to encourage collaboration by outside experts. The IC should make declassified documents more accessible. Not only would this help the public better understand intelligence, in would provide outsiders with information that is valuable to them. Currently, members of the general public can purchase declassified intelligence products. But the IC should consider publishing declassified reports on current issues of intelligence on the Internet. The IC might look to CSIS, the Canadian Security Intelligence Organization, as a model.
Canadian intelligence explicitly seeks to "encourage better public understanding of the global security environment and national security issues." CSIS publishes a monthly intelligence report called Commentary which is written by CSIS intelligence analysts and is issued in unclassified form for public consumption. Recent articles include "Insurgency, Legitimacy and Intervention in Algeria", "The Security Implications for China of Environmental Degradation", and "Prospects for Democracy in Latin America". Each article includes a fax number and a contact address where the author can be reached.
CSIS spokesman Mark Boyer says that "Commentary is an extremely popular product both among the general public and within other government agencies." As a result of continuing growth in demand for subscriptions, CSIS has made Commentary available on its website.
Tom Gervais, CSIS communications officer, points out that Commentary is also a platform to engage the academic community.68 In fact, CSIS encourages scholars to do their own analysis of national security issues, and often publishes their reports along with original CSIS analysis, in Commentary.
Any benefits derived from a similar IC initiative will have to be evaluated from public feedback.
6. The IC should work with industry to develop appropriate, community-wide security guidelines for contractors
According to G.S. Gordon of the Lockheed Martin Corporation, there are vast differences in the security requirements required by Skunk Works' customers (including the IC and the DoD). Although the new National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM) attempts to standardize the security requirements, contractors have complained that the revised system continues to add to their production costs. I recommend that the IC work with industry to develop appropriate guidelines that will facilitate and stream-line procedures. Not only would these ease the burden on current contractors, it is likely to encourage more companies to bid on IC (and DoD) contracts.
A good way to gauge whether or not this initiative is successful is to keep track of company cost-savings, and the number of new companies entering who bid on IC contracts.
B. Limits of interaction with industry and academia
There are obviously limits to the amount of cooperation possible between the IC, industry and academia. There are some issues that no outside expert is qualified to cover. It would be impossible, for instance, to find a outsider who could compile reports on the armed forces and intelligence systems of a hostile power (ie. Iraq). In addition, the stronger the ties between the IC and the outside, the more open the IC will have to be. Unless the IC is prepared to redefine what it considers to be an acceptable level of secrecy, it will not be able to increase its level of collaboration.
By strengthening its relationship with Industry and Academia the IC will increase its use of publicly accessible information, but it must also find a systematic way of dealing with the wealth of open source material. According to Ann Z. Caracristi, a number of witnesses who spoke to the Aspin-Brown Commission gave instances where the IC missed significant information available publicly because of being focused too much on intelligence sources69.
Industry and Academia are important resources for the IC. To meet the challenges of the post Cold-War world, the IC should take greater advantage of their expertise. With a little risk management in the form of appropriately applied security clearances, the IC can benefit significantly. Strengthening ties to industry and academia will further develop the skills of its employees. It will allow the IC to draw on very specialized expertise, and to cover more potential threats. It will also improve public relations, increase efficiently and may even reduce costs. Strengthening the IC's relationships with industry and academia is realistic, and worth pursuing. The mutual benefits of cooperation will accrue to the outside experts as well.
1Ranelagh, John. The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA. (London, U.K.: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1986), p. 85
3Anthony F. Czajkowski, "Techniques of Domestic Intelligence Collection," in Bradford Westerfield, ed. Inside the CIA's Private World (New Haven: Yale University Press) p.51.
4Turner, Stansfield. Secrecy and Democracy: the CIA in Transition. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985) p.109.
5See Czajkowski, "Techniques of Domestic Intelligence Collection," p.52.
6See Czajkowski, "Techniques of Domestic Intelligence Collection," p.58.
9See Czajkowski, "Techniques of Domestic Intelligence Collection," p.53.
10Ranelagh, John. The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA. (London, U.K.: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1986), p. 314.
11See Ranelagh, The Agency, p.321.
12Leary, William.The Central Intelligence Agency. (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1992), p.31.
13Ranelagh, John. The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA. (London, U.K.: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1986), p. 279.
14Robert A. Manning "Test Ban Advances National Security, Opens Opportunity for Nuclear Agenda", Policy Briefing on Aug 16, 1995 (http://www.dlcppi.org/texts/foreign/ctbt.txt)
15Ranelagh, John. The agency: the Rise and Decline of the CIA. (London, U.K.: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986) p.249.
16Turner, Stansfield. Secrecy and Democracy: the CIA in Transition. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985) p.111.
17John M. Deutch "Where is the Environment on the Intelligence Agenda". Speech before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on July 25,1996. (http://www5,homecom.com/host759/deutch.html) page \* arabic
19Gordon, J.S. Point Paper- Response to Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy (Lockheed Martin Skunk Works: September 13, 1995), p.3.
20Ranelagh, John. The agency: the Rise and Decline of the CIA. (London, U.K.: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986) p.176.
22U.S. Congress, Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community. Testimony of Joseph Nye, Hearing, 104th Cong., January 19, 1996, Washington D.C. (http://www.fas.org/irp/commission/testnye.htm.)
23Anthony F. Czajkowski, "Techniques of Domestic Intelligence Collection," in Bradford Westerfield, ed. Inside the CIA's Private World (New Haven: Yale University Press) p.52.
24Keynote address, Symposium for Teaching Intelligence, Center for the Study of Intelligence, October 1 and 2, 1993 (http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/95clas/may.html)
25National Security Science and Technology Strategy. Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Committee for National Security of the National Science and Technology Council, 1995. (http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/nssts/html/chapt1.html)
26Ranelagh, John. The agency: the Rise and Decline of the CIA. (London, U.K.: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986) p. 268.
27Turner, Stansfield. Secrecy and Democracy: the CIA in Transition. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985) p.108.
28Ranelagh, John. The Agency: the Rise and Decline of the CIA. (London, U.K.: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986) p. 25.
29Ibid, p. 86.
31Ibid, p. 85.
32Ranelagh, John. The agency: the Rise and Decline of the CIA. (London, U.K.: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986) p. 86
34Joseph W. Martin. "What Basic Intelligence Seeks To Do", Studies in Intelligence, vol. 14, no.2 (Fall 1970), p.111.
35Turner, Stansfield. Secrecy and Democracy: the CIA in Transition. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985) p. 106.
36Ranelagh, John. The agency: the Rise and Decline of the CIA. (London, U.K.: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986), p. 211.
37Ibid, p. 245.
38Ranelagh, John. The agency: the Rise and Decline of the CIA. (London, U.K.: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986), p. 250.
39Turner, Stansfield. Secrecy and Democracy: the CIA in Transition. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985) p. 107.
40Ranelagh, John. The agency: the Rise and Decline of the CIA. (London, U.K.: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986), p. 199.
41Turner, Stansfield. Secrecy and Democracy: the CIA in Transition. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985) p. 109.
42Executive Order 12333. "United States Intelligence Activities." Presidential Documents, signed December 4, 1981. Federal Register, Vol. 40, No. 235, Washington, D.C.: December 8, 1981.
43U.S. Congress. Commission on the Roles and Missions of the United States Intelligence Community. Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of US intelligence (March 1, 1996).
44Council on Foreign Relations, Making Intelligence Smarter (http:www.fas.org/irp/cfr.html)
45U.S. Congress, Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community. Testimony of Joseph Nye, Hearing, 104th Cong., January 19, 1996, Washington D.C. (http://www.fas.org/irp/commission/testnye.htm.)
46Hedley, Dr. John Hollister. Checklist for The Future of Intelligence. (Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1995) pp.5-6.
47U.S. Congress, Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community. Testimony of Joseph Nye, Hearing, 104th Cong., January 19, 1996, Washington D.C. (http://www.fas.org/irp/commission/testnye.htm.)
48U.S. Congress, House of Representatives. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Community in The 21st Century, (Washington, D.C.: 1996), p.26.
49U.S. Congress, Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community. Testimony of Joseph Nye, Hearing, 104th Cong., January 19, 1996, Washington D.C. (http://www.fas.org/irp/commission/testnye.htm.)
50U.S. Congress, House of Representatives. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Community in The 21st Century, (Washington, D.C.: 1996), p.214.
51Ranelagh, John. The agency: the Rise and Decline of the CIA. (London, U.K.: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986), p. 21.
52National Security Science and Technology Strategy. Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Committee for National Security of the National Science and Technology Council, 1995. (http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/nssts/html/chapt1.html)
54Anthony F. Czajkowski, "Techniques of Domestic Intelligence Collection," Studies in Intelligence, vol.3, no.1 (Winter 1959), p. 52.
55U.S. Congress, Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community. Testimony of Joseph Nye, Hearing, 104th Cong., January 19, 1996, Washington D.C. (http://www.fas.org/irp/commission/testnye.htm.)
56Hedley, Dr. John Hollister. Checklist for The Future of Intelligence. (Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1995), p.14.
57U.S. Congress, House of Representatives. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Community in The 21st Century, (Washington, D.C.: 1996), p.27.
58U.S. Congress. Commission on the Roles and Missions of the United States Intelligence Community. Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of US intelligence (March 1, 1996).
59Daniel M. Tellep, Chairman Lockheed Martin Corporation. Speech upon receiving the James Forrestal Memorial Award from the National Security Industrial Association Washington D.C. March 12, 1996. (http://www.lmco.com/speeches/dmt031296.hml)
60Gordon, J.S. Point Paper- Response to Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy (Lockheed Martin Skunk Works, September 13, 1995), p.2.
61Gordon, J.S. Point Paper- Response to Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy (Lockheed Martin Skunk Works, September 13, 1995) p.7.
62U.S. Congress, Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community. Testimony of Joseph Nye, Hearing, 104th Cong., January 19, 1996, Washington D.C. (http://www.fas.org/irp/commission/testnye.htm.)
63U.S. Congress. Commission on the Roles and Missions of the United States Intelligence Community. Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of US intelligence, March 1, 1996
65U.S. Congress, House of Representatives. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Community in The 21st Century, (Washington, D.C.: 1996).
66Chris Straub, minority staff director of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, presentation to WWS 401a, November 13, 1996.
67Hedley, Dr. John Hollister. Checklist for The Future of Intelligence. Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1995
68"Canada: Integrating Intelligence and Democracy", Secrecy and Government Bulletin, Issue Number 63, December 1996 (http://www.fas.org/sgp/bulletin/sec63.html)
69The Brown Commission and the Future of Intelligence- A Roundtable Discussion, March 26, 1996, http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/96unclas/brown.htm.
Canada: Integrating Intelligence and Democracy", Secrecy and Government Bulletin, Issue Number 63, December 1996 (http://www.fas.org/sgp/bulletin/sec63.html)
A Consumer's Guide to Intelligence. Publication No. PAS 95-00010. Washington, D.C.: Public Affiars Staff, CIA, July 1995.
Council on Foreign Relations, Making Intelligence Smarter (http:www.fas.org/irp/cfr.html)
Czajkowski, Anthony F, "Techniques of Domestic Intelligence Collection," Studies in Intelligence, vol.3, no.1 (Winter 1959).
John M. Deutch "Where is the Environment on the Intelligence Agenda". Speech before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on July 25,1996.
John M. Deutch "Where is the Environment on the Intelligence Agenda". Speech before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on July 25,1996. (http://www5,homecom.com/host759/deutch.html)
Director of Central Intelligence Directive 2/12, Community Open Source Program, effective March 1, 1994. (http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nscid07.htm)
Executive Order 12333. "United States Intelligence Activities." Presidential Documents, signed December 4, 1981. Federal Register, Vol. 40, No. 235, Washington, D.C.: December 8, 1981.
Gentry, John A. A Framework for Intelligence Reform, June 6 1995. ((http://www.fas.org/irp/gentry/)
Gordon, J.S. Point Paper- Response to Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, Lockheed Martin Skunk Works, September 13, 1995.
Halperin, Morton H. Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974.
Harris, Jeffrey K. RIT Center for Imaging Science and Industrial Associates Meeting- Keynote address, October 23, 1995. (http://www.nro.odci.gov/ritsp.htm)
Hedley, Dr. John Hollister. Checklist for The Future of Intelligence. Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1995
Hedley, Dr. John Hollister. The Intelligence Community: Is it broken? How to fix it?, 1995. (http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/96unclas/hedley.htm)
Leary, William.The Central Intelligence Agency. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1992
Martin, Joseph W. "What Basic Intelligence Seeks To Do", Studies in Intelligence, vol. 14, no.2 (Fall 1970).
Robert A. Manning "Test Ban Advances National Security, Opens Opportunity for Nuclear Agenda", Policy Briefing on Aug 16, 1995 (http://www.dlcppi.org/texts/foreign/ctbt.txt)
National Security Council Directive No. 7, Domestic Exploitation. Washington, D.C., February 12, 1948.
National Security Science and Technology Strategy. Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Committee for National Security of the National Science and Technology Council, 1995. (http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/nssts/html/chapt1.html)
Ranelagh, John. The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA. London, U.K.: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1986.
Richelson, Jeffrey T. The U.S. Intelligence Community. New York: Harper Collins, 1995.
Senior Commissioner's Report, Intelligence Reform in the Post-Cold War Era, Princeton University, presented to WWS 401a
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