ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION
"We must be prepared to accept heavy casualties whenever we invade Japan. Our previous success against ill-fed and poorly supplied units, cut down by our overpowering naval and air action, should not be used as the sole basis of estimating the type of resistance we will meet in the Japanese homeland where the enemy lines of communication will be short and the enemy supplies more adequate."
- Admiral Chester Nimitz, CINCPAC, in a memo to Admiral King, CNO, June 1945
MacArthur's Intelligence Estimate of March 1945
During the early part of 1945, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed plans to force the unconditional surrender of Japan, General MacArthur's staff in Australia undertook intelligence studies to assess Japanese defensive capabilities remaining in the home islands. On 24 March, General MacArthur's G-2 issued the first official intelligence report concerning the yet unnamed operation to invade Japan; G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation With Respect to Operations Against Kyushu and Honshu. This report was a strategic overview of what naval, air, and ground forces the Japanese currently had which could oppose an Allied invasion scheduled for the fall of 1945. This preliminary report estimated that by the fall of 1945, three divisions would be deployed in southern Kyushu, three divisions in northern Kyushu, and up to four divisions could reinforce from Honshu. The intelligence estimate assessed that ten combat divisions were the maximum the Japanese could tactically employ on Kyushu.(1) General MacArthur's staff used this initial estimate of ten combat divisions as the basis for the early planning for Operation Olympic.
Intelligence Estimate of April 1945
The second intelligence estimate to be published was much more detailed and specific in regard to the location of Operation Olympic. The USAFPAC G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation With Respect to an Operation Against Southern Kyushu in November 1945 was issued on 25 April 1945. It identified the Japanese Sixteenth Area Army, headquartered at Fukuoka, as having the responsibility for the defense of Kyushu. It was believed that Japanese planners would assign six combat divisions (plus two depot divisions) to garrison Kyushu initially, and that they were prepared to expend up to ten combat divisions. Air reconnaissance identified depot facilities in northern Kyushu to maintain such a force.(2) As first identified in the March estimate, it was expected that three of the divisions would be deployed in southern Kyushu and three north of the central mountain mass. The 25 April intelligence estimate addressed forces in southern and northern Kyushu as two distinct elements. The geographical feature of the central mountain region in Kyushu was assessed to pose a major obstacle in the Japanese coordination of forces between northern and southern Kyushu.
The 25 April document assessed the Japanese strength in southern Kyushu to be between 80,000 to 85,000 troops, of all classes. It estimated that by 1 November 1945, southern Kyushu would have been reinforced by two combat divisions, along with the corresponding number of base and service troops.(3)
Enemy strength in northern Kyushu, which was determined as not having a major impact on the assault in the south, was estimated at between 140,000 to 145,000 troops of all classes. It estimated that by 1 November 1945, northern Kyushu would have been reinforced by two combat divisions and one tank regiment, along with the corresponding number of base and service troops.(4)
By the target date of 1 November, it was estimated that Japan would have 2,000 to 2,500 aircraft immediately available to defend the Empire. Of these, probably 1,500 to
2,000 would be first line aircraft, while the remainder would be training planes or obsolete models.(5) It was expected that an intense and violent air reaction would occur prior to landing, and probably consist largely of kamikaze attacks. The attacks would include both massed air attacks, and frequent small sorties. However, it was assessed that no more than 500 to 800 aircraft would be sacrificed in attempts to prevent the Allied landing, therefore this threat would be manageable by the massive Allied naval and air invasion force.(6) There was the belief that the Japanese were going to save the preponderance of their aircraft for the decisive battle on the Tokyo Plain, which would come in the spring of 1946.
The Japanese surface fleet would have little effect on future Allied operations, as it would have been destroyed by November of 1945. The primary naval threat came from both large and midget submarines and one man suicide torpedoes; both threats were expected during the approach and throughout the amphibious operation. Also, increased use of assault demolition boats (suicide boats) was probable.(7)
The USAFPAC estimate generally described what was thought to be the Japanese defense strategy. Landings on any of the three coastal plains of southern Kyushu would probably have been opposed initially by small beach defense groups dispersed through the areas immediately behind the landing beaches. They would be well dug in and would rely principally on automatic weapons and mortar fire. The surrounding hills provided excellent observation over practically all landing beaches in southern Kyushu. The Japanese had an excellent opportunity to oppose the beach assault with observed artillery fire from well concealed and fortified battery positions. These artillery positions would only be silenced when the assault echelons could advance into the foothills.(8) During the 24 to 48 hours subsequent to landing, Japanese local reserves of front-line battalions and regiments would be encountered. These troops would probably be employed in local counter-attacks and/or occupy prepared positions behind the beach areas covering the approaches to critical inland areas.(9)
Specifically concerning the Kushikino Plain where the V Amphibious Corps would land, the intelligence estimate detailed the Japanese defensive plan:
Division reserves in this area will probably be disposed in the vicinity of Kagoshima. Assuming optimum conditions of road maintenance and readiness of troops and transports, and discounting Allied interference, these troops could begin to enter action in the Kushikino Plain within 24 to 48 hours subsequent to landing. Corps reserves from Kokubu could begin arriving within 3 to 5 nights. Restricted routes would require progressive buildup of strength by successive arrival of small units. It is estimated that during the 24 to 48 hours subsequent to landing the Japanese could oppose our forces in the Kushikino Plain with up to 1 division plus 4,000 to 7,000 air, base and service troops; building up to 2 divisions by about X-3 to X-5.(10)
This 25 April intelligence estimate became the basis for the initial planning for Operation Olympic and for the Japanese strategy meeting of 18 May, when President Truman approved it. With this estimate, the American force list was developed to achieve a three to one advantage to the number of Japanese troops in southern Kyushu. It was also used as the basis for the casualty estimates presented by General Marshall, in the briefing to Truman.(11)
On 29 July 1945, the USAFPAC G-2 issued an amendment to the 25 April intelligence estimate. By 1 July, as many combat divisions were estimated to have been disposed in southern Kyushu alone as earlier estimates had computed would be allotted to the whole of Kyushu by 1 November 1945! This new estimate warned that if the Japanese troop deployments into Kyushu were not checked then the U.S. attack ratio may become one (1) to one (1).(12) The estimate identified two Corps headquarters: the 56th Corps, established in May, was responsible for northern Kyushu, and the 57th Corps, established in June, was responsible for southern Kyushu. It raised the possibility that a third Corps might be formed because of the considerable increase in strength in southern Kyushu.(13) The Japanese were also augmenting Army and Navy units with large numbers of Volunteer Home Defense Units composed largely of partially trained reservists. It was estimated that approximately 125,000 of these were available in southern Kyushu, and approximately 450,000 in northern Kyushu.(14) It was assessed that as of April 1945, 400,000 males between the ages of 17 and 44 not then in the military lived in southern Kyushu. Some 300,000 of these were fit for military service, and available for civilian combat duty. The conclusions of the 29 July intelligence estimate were:
- The rate and probable continuity of Japanese reinforcements into the Kyushu area are changing the tactical and strategic situation sharply.... we are engaged in a race against time by which the ratio of attack-effort vis-a-vis defense capacity is perilously balanced.
- The Japanese have correctly estimated southern Kyushu as a probable invasion objective, and have hastened their preparations to defend it.
- Japanese strength in southern Kyushu has grown to an estimated 206,000 troops. 7 divisions and 2 to 3 independent brigades, plus Naval, Air-Ground, and Base and Service troops.
- Unless the use of these (supply) routes is restricted by air and/or naval action ... enemy forces in southern Kyushu may be still further augmented until our planned local superiority is overcome, and the Japanese will enjoy complete freedom of action in organizing the area and in completing their preparations for defense.(15)
It is interesting to note that by the time this amendment was written, the first Atomic bomb test had taken place in the desert of New Mexico. One of the impacts that this estimate had was in the mind of General Marshall, for he contemplated the possibility of using the newly developed atomic bomb against Japanese forces on Kyushu in support of the invasion instead of against Japanese cities.(16) Japan surrendered before there were any formal revisions to the Olympic plan or new casualty estimates were made using this revised estimate of Japanese strength.
V Amphibious Corps Intelligence
The U.S. Sixth Army provided the intelligence estimates utilized by the V Amphibious Corps for their initial planning. These estimates were basically derived from the same intelligence used by the USAFPAC estimates addressed above. The Sixth Army was heavily engaged in, and therefore was focused on, Luzon during March, April and May of 1945. By the end of June 1945 the Philippines had been secured and the Sixth Army began to concentrate on the invasion plans for Olympic.
On 1 August 1945, the Sixth Army published the G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation with respect to Olympic Operation. Although it contained the same Order of Battle numbers as USAFPAC's 29 July intelligence estimate, Sixth Army came to different conclusions as to the capabilities and intentions of the Japanese forces. Sixth Army assumed that the Japanese had a very high degree of organization of the ground chosen for defense. Except for the three main lowland areas facing the sea, southern Kyushu is a complex jumble of low, rugged mountains and upland plateaus varying in elevation from 1500 to 2500 feet. These terrain features lent themselves almost ideally to the development of the typical Japanese dug-in defensive systems in depth. It was expected that the rugged inland terrain would be thoroughly organized, principally by means of underground positions, in a series of centers of resistance, each of which would be manned by a unit of battalion size. Allied forces would expect to encounter a whole series of organized positions like the "Shimbu" and Balete Pass defense lines on Luzon and the "Shuri" line on Okinawa.(17) Sixth Army believed that the Allied invasion force would be up against the Japanese 56th Corps. The exact boundary between the Japanese 56th and 57th Corps was unknown, however, it was estimated to be the central mountain range, on a line running from Minamata to Nobeoka. If a third army was present, its boundary with the 56th Army was estimated to be on a line from the head of Kagoshima Wan to Kajiki to Hitoyoshi. Sixth Army estimated enemy strength in Kyushu south of the Minamata-Nobeoka line as of 21 July to be around 196,000 troops.
In a major disagreement with the USAFPAC estimate, the Sixth Army assessed that there were 5,000 enemy combat planes of all types within range of intervention. In addition, an estimated 4,000 - 5,000 training planes could be used for kamikaze attacks.(18) The Sixth Army also believed that the Japanese would fight the decisive battle on Kyushu, and commit all of their aircraft, primarily in kamikaze attacks. Upwards of 10,000 aircraft would be available to the Japanese to conduct an all-out suicide air offensive against the transport ships and landing craft.(19) These attacks would be strengthened by the probable widespread use of the suicide-piloted rocket plane (BAKA), which was modeled after the German V-1 rocket bomb.(20)
Japanese tactical doctrine as promulgated in captured field manuals, and as experienced on Iwo Jima, Okinawa and Luzon, showed a change in Japanese defensive thinking since the beginning of the war. In early campaigns, reliance was on strong defenses in the beach areas with no defense in depth. However, because of the power of American naval gunfire, in later campaigns like Peleliu, Iwo Jima and Okinawa, the beach defense had been almost wholly abandoned. The Japanese trend had been away from large-scale counterattacks launched against the beachhead soon after the landing. Instead, the Japanese emphasized smaller counterattacks launched from strongpoints.
However, Sixth Army assessed that it was highly probable that an invasion of Kyushu would be regarded by the Japanese as dictating the necessity of a large scale counterattack, possible early, and that the Japanese would resort to defending the beach to fix the attackers while providing for a mobile reserve to counterattack.(21) The Sixth Army G-2 estimate stated:
Due to the numerical strength and terrain advantages the enemy will possess in southern Kyushu, it is believed highly probable that he will revert to his long-favored doctrine of annihilating the enemy at the water's edge and that a very strong and ferocious defense will be interposed at the beaches.(22)
Sixth Army believed that by 1 November the Japanese could employ ten or eleven combat divisions, together with the appropriate base and service units in southern Kyushu.(23)
Throughout the month of July, Sixth Army passed along intelligence to the
V Amphibious Corps concerning the Japanese buildup on Kyushu. The information that
V Amphibious Corps used for planning showed a total Japanese force of approximately 46,000 troops in their zone of action. The makeup of this force is shown in figure 8.
The V Amphibious Corps landing in the Kushikino area would initially be opposed by one division; a minimum of 24-48 hours would presumably be required to assemble it in position to counterattack. Another division in reserve in the Kokusu area would likely be committed to the Kushikino Plain and could counterattack within 48-72 hours. Sixth Army assessed that there was still the possibility for another division to be deployed on the Satsuma peninsula prior to 1 November. So by 1 November, three Japanese divisions could front the VAC beachhead area creating an an attack ratio of
1 to 1 for the Marines.(24)
Along the western coast of the Satsuma Peninsula where VAC was to assault, there are terraces at varying distances from the beaches, except in the northern portion, where there are low rolling hills whose spurs approach the beach rather closely. It was obvious to VAC planners that the main defense in this area would be anchored on the high terrain to rear of the beaches, and bordering the narrow corridors through low rugged hills connecting the plain with Makurazaki and the Kagoshima lowlands.(25)
Sixth Army assessed that there was the possibility that the Japanese would commit substantially their whole force to the effort of destroying the Allied assault on Kyushu. Heavy aerial suicide attacks would be made against the Allied invading amphibious forces air heads, beachheads, and ground positions.(26) The Japanese would also employ one-man torpedoes and suicide assault demolition boats in large quantities targeting the transports.
Information on Japanese beach defenses in Southern Kyushu was meager, but it was known that top priority had been given to preparations for the defense of that area. It was assessed that fixed defenses would probably cover all of the proposed landing beaches, and that minefields had been laid in Kagoshima Wan, Ariake Wan, in the waters off Miyazaki beach, and in the Osumi Kaikyo.(27)
The experience of VAC Marines in the Pacific war, specifically on Iwo Jima, had demonstrated the fanatic and skilled fighting ability of the individual Japanese soldier. It was obvious to the VAC planners that when he was actually fighting on one of his home islands, he would show an even greater ferocity and tenacity. Furthermore, he would be aided this time by a completely friendly resistance on the part of the Japanese civilian population.(28)
U.S. Intelligence Sources, Methods and Organizations
Intelligence for campaign planning in the Pacific during World War II was principally gathered through two methods: Communications intercepts and aerial photography. Other sources of intelligence for campaign planning included diplomatic reporting, OSS reporting, coast watcher reporting, prisoner of war interrogation reports, translation of captured documents, and submarine photography.
In MacArthur's Southwest Pacific theater, all intelligence activities came under the direction of his G-2, Major General Charles A. Willoughby. Willoughby exercised broad authority over a wide variety of intelligence activities. The intelligence organizations in the Southwest Pacific theater included the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB); the latter was responsible for the secret collection of intelligence in Japanese held areas mainly by agents on the ground.(29) The coastwatcher program was the most successful operation of this Bureau. Another organization was the Allied Translator And Interpreter Section (ATIS), which was responsible for the translation of captured documents and the interrogation of prisoners. The Allied Geographical Section (AGS) was responsible for producing terrain studies. MacArthur's communications intercept and code breaking unit was located in Australia and called the Central Bureau; at the end of the war, this organization had a strength of over 4,000 personnel, comprised of Australian, American, British and Canadian forces.(30)
In Admiral Nimitz's Pacific Ocean Areas, the principal intelligence organization was the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Areas (JICPOA) located in Hawaii.(31) They were responsible for the interpretation of aerial photographs, translation of captured documents, and the interrogation of prisoners. Nimitz received his communications intercept and code breaking support from two units. These were Fleet Radio Units located in Australia and Hawaii. Both of these Radio Units actually came under the control of the Chief of Naval Operations, but reported intelligence directly to Nimitz. These units were the source of the successful MAGIC intercepts throughout the war. Photo reconnaissance was conducted by five primary organizations. The navy controlled three: the carrier task forces had photo recce capability, as did the two Navy Photo Groups located on Guam and Okinawa.
The 20th Air Force had the capability for photo recce, as did the Far East Air Force which was owned by USAFPAC and came under MacArthur's control.(32)
By far the most successful and important source of intelligence for the planning of Operation Olympic was the communications intercepts. Through this intelligence, the Japanese units on Kyushu were identified. Aerial photography was then used to verify troop buildup and to locate static defenses and obstacles. Another source used for planning in Operation Olympic was the OSS. The OSS recruited Thai's and, through their embassy in Tokyo, the Thai underground leaders supplied information on the conditions in Japan.(33)
One major challenge presented itself to American intelligence analysts: most of the prior Central Pacific campaigns against Japan had been conducted against isolated targets. The Japanese forces at these isolated targets could not be reinforced and, therefore, there was little change in the situation on these islands. On Kyushu, the Japanese forces were not isolated. This would lead to a more dynamic defensive situation. It was difficult for the U.S. intelligence analysts to keep up with the changing Japanese situation on Kyushu. As of 1 August 1945, limited aerial photography, some visual air sightings, and a few prisoner of war interrogation reports were available to U.S. planners concerning Japanese dispositions on Kyushu.(34) However, communications intercepts provided the bulk of the Japanese order of battle data.
The tactical intelligence collection plan was to commence with advance force operations on 24 October, X-8. On X-8 Day to 0600 on X-Day, the Naval Fire Support Groups were to conduct photographic reconnaissance missions over Kyushu. They were to report daily by dispatch by 2000 as to beach, sea, and weather information, and all other intelligence data obtained from photographs or other sources. Selected air and surface photographic prints of the beaches and related defenses were to be prepared and delivered to the attack forces by noon on X-1. On and after X-Day, the attack force commanders were to reproduce and distribute photographs and photo interpretation reports.(35)
Beginning on X-8, aerial hydrographic observers were to conduct daily aerial reconnaissance of every assault beach. They would observe surf and swell conditions, beach conditions and approaches, navigational dangers and beach defenses. Observations at each beach would terminate with a sunrise reconnaissance on the day of the assault.(36) Reconnaissance of all the assault beaches would also be made by underwater demolition teams prior to landing. Written and oral reports were to be made available to the attack force commanders.
By noon X-5, the Fire Support Groups, conducting advance force operations were to provide:(37)
- selected air and surface photographic prints of beaches and related defenses.
- Navigational information which differed from charts; and locations of buoys laid.
- UDT charts and descriptions of beaches, approaches, and defenses.
Throughout the entire planning phase, assistance was received from the JICPOA and Fleet Marine Force Headquarters in the procurement of maps, relief models, and special intelligence information.(38)
The maps and charts to be used for Olympic were based on captured Japanese maps. These were checked through photographs and aerial reconnaissance, and found to be accurate. The 1:25,000 official battle map which was prepared from a Japanese Imperial Land Survey in 1938 was believed to have been the most accurate map ever furnished the VAC for an operation. All maps were to be forwarded to the divisions by
1 September 1945. JICPOA would also blow up the 1:25,000 map of the immediate beach landing area to a scale of 1:10,000.(39)
Rubber relief models were also being prepared in three different scales of the landing areas.(40) Distribution of these models would have been down through the rifle companies. Much difficulty was encountered in obtaining adequate photographic coverage early in the planning phase. Initially, requests were sent to Sixth Army and they in turn were dependent on the Far Eastern Air Forces. While the G-2 of VAC was in Guam on 14 July 1945, he discussed the problem with the commander of Interpretation Squadron 2. Interpron 2 arranged to furnish VAC one copy of all photographic coverage flown in the Kushikino area. Under this arrangement, photographs from 21 sorties flown between 14 May and 3 July were forwarded to VAC. Six copies of each photograph were then sent to each division, one to Corps Artillery, and two retained at Corps. Although the coverage was adequate for planning purposes, it was not entirely complete as the scales varied from 1:10,000 to 1:20,000. At these scales, defensive fortifications near the landing beaches could not be detected. VAC requested photographs of a scale not smaller than 1:5,000, but none were ever received.(41) The G-2 of VAC expressed concern regarding the adequacy of photographs that could be expected during the operational phase as no airfield was planned for the VAC beachhead area. Support photography would be flown from carriers, which had always been unsatisfactory due to the difficulty of delivering timely photographs ashore.(42)
A detailed beach study based on Japanese maps was being prepared by VAC. This was to include underwater profiles showing the landing conditions at the Corps beaches for all types of landing craft at various stages of the tide and oblique freehand sketches of each beach. The beach study was to be similar to one prepared by VAC for the Iwo Jima operation. A tactical terrain study was also being prepared detailing the highways from Kushikino to Sendai and from Kushikino to Kagoshima, showing characteristics, width, and condition of all bridges, the road profile, and a study of the terrain on both flanks of the road. Both the terrain and beach studies were to be ready for distribution by
In the summer of 1945, VAC planners complained about the lack of detailed intelligence to support detailed operational planning. However, it was felt that such intelligence would be received as the invasion date grew closer. Arrangements had been made to prepare a last minute joint situation map at Guam during the rehearsals in mid-October. The map was to depict the actual defenses as they would exist upon landing.
By the end of the war on 15 August 1945, U.S. intelligence believed they had an accurate assessment of the Japanese forces on Kyushu. Although far from having a complete picture, there was the belief that as the invasion date drew closer, the intelligence picture would become clearer. With the end of the war and U.S. forces moving to occupy Japan, intelligence officers and operational planners would have the opportunity to analyze the actual Japanese defense plan for Kyushu.
1. General HQs, Southwest Pacific Area , G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation With Respect to Operations Against Kyushu and Honshu, 24 March 1945, 6.
2. General HQs, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific (USAFPAC), G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation With Respect to an Operation Against Southern Kyushu in November 1945, 25 April 1945, 2.
3. ibid., 4.
4. ibid., 12.
5. ibid., 7.
6. ibid., 28.
7. ibid., 32.
8. ibid., 12.
9. ibid., 25.
10. ibid., 26.
11. White House, Minutes of 18 June 1945, Japanese Strategy meeting.
12. General HQs, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific (USAFPAC), Amendment No. 1 to G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation With Respect to an Operation Against Southern Kyushu in November 1945, 29 July 1945, 1.
13. ibid., 3.
15. ibid. 5.
16. Edward J. Drea, "Previews of Hell," MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History, Spring 1995, Vol. 7, No. 3, 80. General Marshall received a report from Major General Leslie Groves on 30 July 1945 concerning the use of the atomic bombs as tactical weapons. MajGen. Groves indicated that the U.S. would have eleven or twelve atomic bombs by the invasion date of 1 November 1945. The report detailed the effects of an atomic bomb (same size as Hiroshima) detonated over the landing beaches of Kyushu with American forces six miles offshore.
17. U.S. Sixth Army, G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation With Respect to Operation Olympic, 1 August 1945, 18.
18. ibid., 6.
19. Williamson Murray, "Armageddon Revisited," MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History, Spring 1995, Vol. 7, No. 3, 10. The transports and landing craft were more vulnerable to suicide attacks than the battleships and aircraft carriers. Also the Army was in charge of the defense planning and assessed that the best target would be the ground forces while still embarked aboard ships.
20. Commander Amphibious Forces Pacific Fleet (ComPhibsPac), Annex C - Intelligence Plan, No. A11-45, 10 August 1945, 5.
21. ibid., 14.
23. U.S. Sixth Army, G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation With Respect to Operation Olympic, 1 August 1945, 13.
24. ibid., 20.
26. ibid., 28.
27. Commander Amphibious Forces Pacific Fleet (ComPhibsPac), Annex C - Intelligence Plan, No. A11-45, 10 August 1945, 2.
28. ibid., 4.
29. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, 458.
30. ibid., 455.
31. ibid., 457.
32. Commander Amphibious Forces Pacific Fleet (ComPhibsPac), Annex C - Intelligence Plan, No. A11-45, 10 August 1945, 7. There were five sources for aerial photographs in the Pacific,
Com-Photo Group 1 based on Guam
Com-Photo Group 2 based on Okinawa
20th Air Force Photo Reconnaissance
Far East Air Forces under CINCAFPAC
Carrier Task Forces, Reconnaissance Teams
33. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, 458.
34. U.S. Sixth Army, G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation With Respect to Operation Olympic, 1 August 1945, 6.
35. Commander Amphibious Forces Pacific Fleet (ComPhibsPac), Annex C - Intelligence Plan, No. A11-45, 10 August 1945, 7.
36. ibid., 8.
37. Commander Amphibious Forces Pacific Fleet (ComPhibsPac), Operation Order No. A11-45, 10 August 1945.6
38. V Amphibious Corps, Annex C to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan, 30 November 1945, 2.
39. ibid., 3.
40. Fifth Marine Division, Annex C - Intelligence to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan, 4. Scales of the rubber models were 1:200,000 showing the Island of Kyushu, 1:25,000 showing the VAC Beachhead Area, and 1:5,000 showing the landing beaches.
41. V Amphibious Corps, Annex C to Operation Report, Occupation of Japan, 30 November 1945, 5. The G-2 of the VAC believed that they would have received some of the 1:5,000 scale photos, but, the war ended before the reconnaissance missions were flown.
43. ibid., 6.