FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

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SUMMARY OF CHANGES

The Air Force Doctrine Working Group has reviewed this document and recommended that it remains valid and will again be reviewed no later than September 2012. AFDD numbering has also been changed to correspond with the joint doctrine publication numbering architecture. AFDD titles and content remain unchanged until updated in the next full revision. A margin bar indicates newly revised material.

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FOREWORD

Today, the United States finds itself embroiled in counterinsurgency operations with multiple manifestations and broad implications.

The resurgence of radical Islam and its use of terrorism to subvert and overthrow established governments to reshape society in its own image is but one of these manifestations. Other manifestations include ultra-nationalist militiants seeking political autonomy within existing states and the use of violence and illicit narcotics trafficking to subvert or overthrow legitimate governments.

Since the 9/11 tragedy, our efforts to prosecute terrorism and insurgency have produced the realization that a successful conclusion lies many years in the future and that success will be impossible without the active participation of global partners. A strategy of enabling partner nations to defend themselves against these internal threats is clearly emerging from that realization. US initiatives to support this strategy fall within an operating area termed foreign internal defense (FID). In fact, the Global War on Terrorism is taking place largely in the FID arena. The strategic end game is a partner nation capable of successfully integrating military force with other instruments of national power to eradicate lawlessness, terrorism, subversion, and insurgency.

Although Air Force forces can perform FID across the range of military operations, the main form of FID support consists of assessing, training, advising, and assisting foreign aviation forces. Doctrine stresses this indirect approach to capture those aspects of FID that apply worldwide and that extend beyond the present conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Increased emphasis in this area can multiply US influence globally without requiring a standing-force presence in a multitude of locations.

We know that military forces in many lesser-developed nations cannot engage in joint and coalition operations without US Air Force FID assistance. While Air Force forces can apply airpower at virtually any level of intensity, our ability to prosecute an indirect approach is crucial to Air Force FID. Virtually all nations have laws prohibiting foreign combat operations within their sovereign territory. Accordingly, partner nation forces will, in most instances, have to take the tactical offensive supported by US Air Force training and advisory assistance. That form of assistance will most often be the instrument of both choice and necessity.

Where US forces must fight as a coalition partner with foreign forces, the full weight of airpower can be brought to bear in appropriate ways, and will play a crucial role. This doctrine document is designed to help Air Force commanders select appropriate options and tailor their efforts to fit the conditions at hand.

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INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3.1, Foreign Internal Defense, provides Air Force doctrine for foreign internal defense (FID) operations and supports basic Air Force doctrine. AFDD 2-3.1 provides the Air Force perspective on FID operations and discusses the broad, enduring beliefs about the best way to employ airpower in FID operations.

APPLICATION

This AFDD applies to the Total Force: all Air Force military and civilian personnel, including regular, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard units and members. Unless specifically stated otherwise, Air Force doctrine applies to the full range of operations.

The doctrine in this document is authoritative, but not directive. Therefore, commanders need to consider the contents of this AFDD and the particular situation when accomplishing their missions. Airmen should read it, discuss it, and practice it.

SCOPE

This document articulates fundamental Air Force roles for FID and advises commanders how to employ and integrate Air Force resources to achieve US objectives through FID operations. It includes a discussion of the operational environment, command and control, and planning considerations.
FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS

Foundational doctrine statements are the basic principles and beliefs upon which AFDDs are built. Other information in the AFDDs expands on or supports these statements.

- Foreign internal defense (FID) efforts are most successful when they preclude the need to deploy large numbers of US military personnel and equipment. (Page 1)

- Most Air Force FID actions entail working by, with, and through foreign aviation forces to achieve US strategic and operational objectives. (Page 2)

- Joint training and advisory support offers long-term, strategic relevance far beyond US direct tactical actions. (Page 4)

- The greatest FID challenge is understanding the nature of irregular conflicts that can impact US national security interests and the security interests of important friends and allies. (Page 10)

- Airpower plays a critical role in supporting counterinsurgency and counterterrorism and entails supporting civil law-enforcement agencies and government administrative mechanisms, as well as military surface forces. (Page 20)

- Air Force commanders and their assigned or attached forces should be prepared to function as part of a joint-interagency team with mutually supporting programs and objectives. (Page 31)

- Air Force FID operations do not automatically transition from indirect to direct forms of assistance based on any precondition or sequence of events. The transition, if required, is based on policy decisions made by the appropriate, legally empowered, authorities. (Page 32)

- Deployed Air Force FID training and advisory teams, including mobile training teams and combat aviation advisor forces, should work closely with security assistance organization authorities to formulate appropriate FID goals, devise in-country operating procedures, and coordinate FID operations and training with host nation (HN) counterpart forces. (Page 34)

- Air Force FID primarily entails airpower enablement, i.e., helping foreign aviation forces employ, sustain, and defend their own resources at required levels of capability. (Page 54)

- Commanders should seek opportunities to elevate Air Force training and advisory efforts to higher levels of HN military leadership and address such issues as basic air force infrastructure, organization, training, command and control, logistics, and procurement processes. (Page 58)
CHAPTER ONE
FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID) FUNDAMENTALS

“Often treated by Americans as an exceptional form of warfare, insurgency is anything but. Spanning the globe, centuries, and societies, insurgency is quite common. Given the threat insurgency presents to U.S. interests and allies around the world, the importance of counterinsurgency is no surprise. However, history has shown that insurgencies are rarely defeated by outside powers. Rather, the best role for outsiders is an indirect one: training, advising, and equipping the local nation, which must win the war politically and militarily. And while counterinsurgency might seem to be a task most suited to ground forces, air power has much to contribute. These facts combine to suggest that advising, training, and equipping partner air forces will be a key component of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts worldwide. The authors note that, if the Air Force is to participate in these tasks, it will need to make counterinsurgency an institutional priority, developing the capabilities of its personnel both as advisors and trainers and as combatants, as well as developing the necessary institutional support structures.”


Foreign internal defense (FID) is defined as participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (Joint Publication [JP] 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms). The term FID was devised by the US Army in 1976 as a euphemism for “support for counterinsurgency.” In reality, FID is a very large domain encompassing the total political, economic, informational, and military support the US provides to enable other governments to field viable internal defense and development (IDAD) programs for counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, and counter-narcotics. FID is a component of irregular warfare (IW), defined as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. For more information on IW, see AFDD 2-3, Irregular Warfare.

The National Security Council provides planning guidance for FID at the strategic level. The Department of State (DOS) is normally designated the lead agency for execution, while the Department of Defense (DOD) provides personnel and equipment to help achieve military FID objectives. The strategic end state is a host nation capable of successfully integrating military force with other instruments of national power to eradicate terrorism, lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency. FID efforts are most successful when they preclude the need to deploy large numbers of US military personnel and equipment.
FID is not limited to low intensity conflict or non-combat operations, and it entails far more than training foreign military forces. Incorporating all elements of national power, FID can be applied across the range of military operations. US military FID assistance can be applied as indirect support (primarily training and equipment transfers), direct support not including combat (e.g., advisory programs, intelligence sharing, logistic airlift, and certain equipment loans), and, at the highest end of the scale, direct support with US forces functioning in tactical combat roles, including advising, assisting, and direct execution. Moving across the thresholds that separate one level of engagement from the next carries serious legal and policy implications for the United States.

Generally, the preferred methods of helping another country are through education and developmental assistance programs. Most Air Force FID actions entail working by, with, and through foreign aviation forces to achieve US strategic and operational objectives. With Presidential direction, however, FID can entail the use of US combat units and advisors in coercive roles aimed at stabilizing the security and survival of a foreign regime and vital institutions under siege by insurgent or terrorist forces. FID includes military training and equipping, technical assistance, advisory support, and infrastructure development as well as tactical operations. When feasible, military assistance should be closely coordinated with diplomatic, economic, and informational initiatives.

**Foreign Internal Defense – The Past to the Present**

The US has a long history of assisting the governments of friendly nations facing internal threats. The post-World War II policy of assisting friendly nations to develop stable governments to counter the threat of communism led to our involvement in the Greek civil war. The Greek Communist Party mounted a rural insurgency in 1946 against a war-weakened Greek government that threatened to absorb Greece into the communist Iron Curtain. The US provided economic, equipment, training, and advisory support pivotal to the Greek government's victory against the insurgency in 1949.

As in other cases from 1945 through 1989 (Malaya, the Philippines, Vietnam, and El Salvador), insurgency had its origins in communism. Communist-based insurgency following the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union no longer presents the same type of threat. The security challenges, as well as the relative stability, of a bipolar world have been replaced by increased uncertainty and often more dangerous problems. Insurgency based on political, socio-economic, or religious ideology is a serious threat. The fundamental concept of the IDAD program, supported by US training and materiel assistance in aiding friendly nations to develop stable governments and resist internal threats, is the foundation of FID and is an integral component in today’s security environment.

—Various Sources
Air Force FID actions should be designed to support and reinforce the host-nation’s IDAD strategy, its overarching strategy that focuses all instruments of national power on countering the internal problems of subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (including terrorism and illicit narcotics production and trafficking). The Air Force provides FID assistance to the supported country’s air forces, but it may provide assistance to other military Services and civil aviation agencies, depending on how air support responsibilities are assigned within the host country and on the types of airpower assets employed.

Air Force FID incorporates a broad range of airpower missions, resources, and capabilities. Specific operations rely on both special operations and conventional forces to achieve FID objectives. In most instances, Air Force FID operations are conducted jointly with other US Service components and government agencies and are combined with the activities of foreign military forces in the host country. With proper authorization, the Air Force may conduct operations in support of nation-assistance programs or specific FID activities of other US Government departments and agencies.

The Air Force uses agile combat support (ACS) capabilities to create, prepare, deploy, employ, sustain, protect, and redeploy Air Forces to conduct FID operations as required by the joint force commander (JFC) to train advise and assist host nation forces. Failure to incorporate ACS early in any operation may result in the inability of the Air Force capabilities to bring the desired effects to bear in a given conflict. For more information, see AFDD 2-4, Combat Support.

Air Force FID operations fall under the broad category of nation assistance. Nation assistance is comprised of three separate but complementary programs: humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA), security assistance (SA), and FID. Security assistance—though having much broader application than FID—can be integrated with FID strategies and operations. Security assistance is designed to help select countries meet their internal defense needs and to promote sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. There is a clear distinction between personnel performing mission activities under the command and control of a combatant commander and personnel performing those activities under the laws, regulations, and funding applicable to Title 22, United States Code (U.S.C.), Security Assistance-funded Programs.

The overall Air Force FID orientation is global, although some Air Force elements may be organized and trained for FID operations in specific geographic areas. FID operations may be conducted in the host country, in other friendly foreign countries, or in the US. Air Force regional area specialists proficient in foreign languages and cultures help geographic combatant commanders sustain coalitions, achieve regional stability, and contribute to multinational operations and FID efforts. Language capabilities and international skills are a force multiplier and essential to the Air Force’s ability to operate globally. Currently, Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is tasked with maintaining forces that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct FID missions.
STRATEGIC REALITIES

Today’s conflict environment requires international cooperation and commitment. The US cannot unilaterally neutralize every significant terrorist threat or eliminate every guerrilla insurgency threatening the stability of friendly and allied nations. There are also serious legal and policy restrictions on what the US can do to directly counter or neutralize such non-state threats. Most countries' laws and constitutions do not allow for direct military intervention on their own territory by another country.

At the same time, the resources and tactical skills needed to locate, identify, and destroy guerrilla and terrorist targets do not exist or are not well developed in most countries of the non-industrialized world. This is particularly true in the case of airpower. In addition to foreign constitutional frameworks restricting US combat operations abroad, a wide range of strategic, political, and logistical factors affecting our own strategic path places serious reliance on the ability of other nations to defend themselves and to function as viable coalition partners. The ability of those nations to maintain their own internal security is critical to everyone's success.

Each host nation must eventually find its own winning combination of political, economic, informational, and military instruments to neutralize or eliminate internal threats. It is in direct US interest, however, to help these nations with various strategic, operational, and tactical initiatives. America’s desired course of action will often require partnering with select countries assisting their efforts to deal with internal threats. For the Air Force, this primarily involves providing balanced combinations of US equipment, training, advisory assistance, and assisted execution aimed at helping foreign aviation forces defend home populations, economic resources and foundations, cultural traditions, and vital national institutions against belligerent militants and criminal threats. The greatest long-term return on US airpower investments in combating terrorism and support for counterinsurgency (COIN) is realized when helping host nations build and maintain viable aviation capabilities to support their own IDAD.

Joint training and advisory support generally offers long-term strategic relevance far beyond US direct tactical actions. Complementing an enablement strategy, tactical combat initiatives by US forces continue to have important and immediate applications in certain conflict scenarios. Given the scope and complexity of the challenge, commanders should be prepared to pursue a broad range of direct and indirect military actions to help the US and supported host nations avoid or alleviate crisis situations and to achieve desired levels of security and stability.

The most realistic FID model is another nation that must deal with insurgent and terrorist threats within its own sovereign boundaries and legal framework, and which may require external assistance to do so effectively. US military assistance in the form of assessing, training, and advising, coupled with assisted execution, continue to be vital to US as well as foreign security interests. These initiatives involve application of US military power that, when blended with other security efforts, can help foreign nations stabilize their regimes and connected interests.
A principal reason many of our supported host nations cannot deal with terrorism and guerrilla insurgency is because they only possess surface militaries and have little or nothing to offer in the way of airpower to find, fix, and finish critical terrorist and guerrilla targets. In many cases, these host nations cannot adequately prepare a hostile target set or position their surface forces into attack position when and where they wish, and they cannot sustain, protect, and evacuate these forces in the field. These air forces often consist of small air units flying a few token sorties per month in decrepit, marginally airworthy aircraft. Accordingly, surface forces are the primary national defense force. Moreover, they are likely to remain ground-based unless Airmen step in with initiatives to promote the development and use of indigenous airpower for this type of conflict.

Viable airpower capabilities structured for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism (CT) operations are needed in those developing nations for the same reason any defending force needs them—to apply flexible airpower initiatives through such functions as reconnaissance, surveillance, close air support, interdiction, mobility for surface forces, and medical evacuation. Airpower adds an entire dimension to friendly force capability, setting the conditions that can allow friendly forces to seize and maintain the initiative and prevent terrorists and insurgents from shaping and pacing operations. If countries possessed airpower capabilities providing presence and persistence, then political visibility, surface-force mobility, situational awareness, and options for coercive actions, large and broad-based extremist elements might not exist today.

Airpower, and all its aspects of employment and sustainment, cannot carry the day, but properly tailored aviation capabilities can help lesser-developed countries govern and administer more effectively. Foreign airpower leaders, in many cases, may not fully understand this perspective.

**PRINCIPAL AIR FORCE FID INITIATIVES**

Air Force FID operations are primarily aimed at developing and improving host-nation airpower capabilities. FID initiatives can take a variety of forms and should address the overall needs and capabilities of foreign airpower employment and sustainment.

A principal US instrument for conducting FID is the transfer of major items (weapon systems and related support items) to selected host nations, primarily through the security assistance program. The Air Force often facilitates such transfers through operational and strategic assessments, airpower studies, security assistance-funded aircraft refurbishment, airlift of security assistance-funded defense articles, training on
specific weapon systems and support items through security assistance-funded mobile training teams, and security assistance case management and oversight. Delivery of foreign military sales items can be performed in conjunction with combined operations and contingencies and with other training programs conducted by the geographic combatant commands (GCC) and by various departments and agencies of the US government.

Air Force training and advisory assistance may be employed to facilitate the availability, reliability, safety, and interoperability of foreign aviation forces engaged in IDAD operations and in joint or multinational contingencies and actions. Training and advisory operations are a cost-effective means of helping host nations deal with internal problems before they assume regional or global dimensions requiring large-scale introduction of US combat forces. This assistance also builds enduring relationships with foreign officials who may provide or facilitate access to important resources and real estate during crises or emerging contingencies. Critical access problems have often been overcome through bonds of trust forged between advisors and foreign military leaders during FID initiatives.

Air Force FID operations can establish a US presence, build rapport, achieve combined integration of forces, and build a foundation for future regional cooperation. If necessary, commanders can employ an even greater range of capabilities and resources in more direct forms of FID support when host-nation aviation units are inadequately sized or structured to make necessary and timely contributions to their own defense effort. Figure 1.1 summarizes the principal initiatives to accomplish FID objectives.

![Figure 1.1. FID Activities](image-url)
Facilitate the transfer of US defense articles and services under the Security Assistance Program to eligible foreign government aviation units engaged in IDAD operations.

Assess foreign military aviation capabilities and provide direction or recommendations towards improving host-nation airpower employment and sustainment methods. Aviation assessments are carried out primarily in support of GCC requirements and for other key agencies and departments of the US government. Assessments focus on foreign aviation capabilities and limitations, specifically aircrew capability and safety, aircraft airworthiness, critical resource availability, resource sustainability, and operational potential.

Train foreign military forces to operate and sustain indigenous airpower resources and capabilities. Training includes tactics, techniques, and procedures in such areas as command and control (C2); combat search and rescue (CSAR); communications systems support; air-ground interface; aerial insertion, extraction, and resupply; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); close air support (CAS); and airdrop operations. Training is neither time- nor situation-specific. Appropriately funded training can be used to close specific gaps in foreign aviation skills and raise the level of competency where they can be advised on the proper employment of acquired capabilities. Training assistance in the aviation support and sustainment areas includes aircraft maintenance, logistics, life support, medical, air base defense, personal survival, personnel recovery, munitions, ground safety, and other functions supporting combat air operations.

Advise foreign military forces and governmental agencies on how to employ airpower in specific operational situations. Advisory assistance may also be provided to GCCs on such issues as foreign airpower capabilities, limitations, and potential roles supporting joint and combined operations. Advising is conducted within the context of specific times, places, and situations. Advisory assistance addresses such areas as airpower doctrine (i.e., how to employ airpower as opposed to how to operate airplanes), mission planning, basing concepts, operational sustainment methods, tactical employment, communications capabilities, and C2 development/employment for real-world operations and contingency actions. Along with training, Air Force advisory assistance helps foreign military forces and government agencies generate and sustain airpower supporting IDAD programs.

Assist foreign aviation forces in executing specific missions or contingency operations. Assistance can take on many forms, but generally includes hands-on assistance in ACS capabilities such as aircraft maintenance, fuels, health services support, and aviation medicine. Assistance may also include operational capabilities like C2, intelligence exploitation, aircrew mission planning, and direct on-board advisory assistance in tactical operations. In the tactical realm, assistance can be applied to such functions as CSAR; fixed and
rotary-wing airlift, including personnel insertion and extraction; casualty evacuation; ISR; and air attack.

- **Facilitate force integration for multinational operations.** Air Force personnel bring all other key tasks (assessing, training, advising, and assisting) together in a coordinated effort to draw foreign aviation forces into joint or combined operations.

- **Provide direct support to host countries** by using Air Force resources to provide intelligence, communications capability, logistics support, and airpower effects.
CHAPTER TWO
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

…it is clearer now than ever before that we must foster and maintain sufficient overseas presence and international relationships in order to conduct future training as well as contingency or combat operations. In essence, this is “geopresence”—a multifaceted presence that allows the US military to operate in any region of the world, promoted by conscious diplomatic, economic, military, and political involvement in the necessary regions and with the necessary countries.


Until recently, only a few regional experts and conflict theorists possessed a genuine understanding of the irregular warfare environment comprised of insurgency, counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, and narco-trafficking. Given the current and projected path of irregular warfare, this understanding must expand and become part of the Air Force’s professional knowledge base. These forms of conflict represent the most pervasive and persistent forms of modern warfare, and Air Force commanders should anticipate operating in this arena, probably indefinitely. The political, economic, and physical terrains of host nations present significant challenges to both US and host-nation air forces. The physical condition and operational posture of typical host-nation air forces are only discussed in general terms; commanders should assess each situation on its own and take into account the total operational environment before employing a specific “operational strategy” or concept of operations. The desired objective is to first achieve an understanding of the local situation and then apply Air Force FID efforts tailored to that situation.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

A review of global geopolitical conditions reveals a world of failed states and ungoverned territories dominated by non-state actors, syndicated narco-violence, and emerging warrior cultures. The scene is characterized by lawlessness, ethnic violence, and devastating weapons in the hands of hostile, irregular forces. Typically, threat locations shift geographically, often into remote wilderness sanctuaries. A non-uniformed enemy, often difficult to identify within surrounding society, operates on the
basis of commitment to ideologies and principles totally alien to Western culture. Even where the motivation is purely monetary, the enemy employs tactics and rules of engagement not subject to the same risk factors and limitations that democratic states impose on themselves.

This global dynamic is the genesis of an increasingly complex form of modern warfare—insurgency, terrorism, drug wars, separatist insurrections, radical nationalist movements, and spiritual revolutions, all taking place now with unprecedented intensity on various political, economic, informational, and military battlefields around the world. This broad range of politically destabilizing violence is growing more lethal and broader in scope with the expansion of heavily armed, drug-funded professional organizations that can cripple or dominate lesser-developed countries. These organizations are moving into the midst of modern, industrialized society, including the US.

Influenced to some extent by the fall of the Soviet Union, the principal conflict environment has altered from a state-versus-state confrontation into a far more sophisticated domain of radical militant organizations and ideologically-based movements, mostly of non-state origin, that target governments and institutions vastly superior in terms of organization, size, wealth, and technology.

Being able to hide and maneuver within an often sympathetic host population or tribal group, the non-state militant actor is far less visible and presents much less of a target than state institutions. Having no need to mass his forces, the radical militant possesses far more tactical agility and can take the tactical initiative virtually at will, using rules of engagement of his own design. Asymmetric threats posed by militant and criminal organizations have the potential to significantly alter global economic and political orders and relationships.

The nature of threats has shifted from governments fighting field-worn guerrillas and communist political cadres roaming the countryside “winning hearts and minds” to international networks of financiers, investors, promoters, recruiters, weapons trainers, forgery experts, communications specialists, electronics technicians, spies, bombers, and shooters deeply imbedded in many countries of the developed and developing worlds. At heart, the scene is little changed from classic models, though now the tools of revolution and insurgency include global reach and potentially weapons of mass destruction. This is a key change that mandates a re-evaluation of the US approach to traditionally-viewed “low-intensity” threats. The events of September 11, 2001, demonstrated that a single tactical event can have a devastating and lasting strategic impact.

UNDERSTANDING THE ENVIRONMENT

The greatest FID challenge is understanding the nature of irregular conflicts that can impact US national security interests and the security interests of important friends and allies. The first step should be to identify those threats for what they really are, the kinds of administrative and financial mechanisms that power them,
and the kinds of beliefs and ideologies that underpin their persistence and vitality among millions of the world’s population. Even the way insurgency is fought has an enormous influence on the types of forces and weapon systems that can be successfully employed.

The global information environment contributes to the efficacy of these concepts. Commanders should apply as much vigor to information campaigns as other FID initiatives since these activities, as part of a broader strategic communication plan, can be a force multiplier. Strategic communication shapes perceptions at the global, regional and national levels. Air Force operations can play a significant supporting role in the US government to communicate policy and demonstrate US commitment.

The lessons derived from the classic models, or paradigms, of insurgency, small wars, and terrorism are crucial for building theoretical backgrounds for recognizing and analyzing both current and possible future manifestations of these types of conflict. Subjects should include political, economic, and military imperatives governing IDAD strategies as well as the basic concepts of insurgency, e.g., political mobilization, struggles for legitimacy, minimum violence, alternate centers of gravity, and the use of terrorism as a tactic of guerrilla warfare.

Accordingly, commanders who enter this arena should examine the individual characteristics of the conflict environment. Current studies and analyses should address the specific characteristics of current and emerging insurgency threats. Of specific importance are the insurgencies that are growing and expanding in Southwest Asia. Past insurgency models are not entirely sufficient to describe the impact when a local or regional insurgency is exported on a global scale against established or emerging governments that foster, sponsor, or accommodate forces of change and modernization.

**Social and Physical Conditions**

*The only peace we will ever know will be low intensity conflict (irregular, asymmetric warfare), and maintaining the peace means managing low-intensity conflict.*

—Ada Boseman, *War and the Clash of Ideas*

Major environmental factors affecting FID planning and execution include physical and psychological pressures from hostile elements, social fragmentation, political instability, and economic impoverishment. Difficult terrain, physical isolation of population groups, and poorly developed infrastructures often impede counterinsurgency and FID operations. Airpower, because of its inherent flexibility, can overcome many of these obstacles.

Nations most susceptible to lawlessness, terrorism, and insurgency are characterized by various forms of social, economic, and political fragmentation and by a
lack of national identity within population groups who resist, or are denied, integration into the national community. Some actions that contribute to this fragmentation include political and ethnic alienation, separatism, and lack of accessibility to government resources by certain groups, poor income distribution among social classes, and disenfranchisement or lack of other political rights. Situations most likely to involve Air Force FID activities are prevalent in developing nations where public services, industrial infrastructures, and air support facilities are relatively primitive by Western standards.

Difficult terrain, seasonal weather patterns, physical isolation of population groups, and poorly developed physical infrastructures often impede military operations. However, such obstacles also provide opportunities to use airpower in a variety of combat and non-combat roles. In many cases, air transportation affords the only reliable form of physical contact with civil-military elements in rural areas.

Terrain varies widely and can impact FID operations. Typically, rugged or austere terrain, adverse climate, and the scarcity of improved airfields affect not only the tempo, scale, and character of air operations but also the types of aircraft that can be employed.

In some regions, seasonal weather patterns dictate the timing and form of military campaigning. Major offensives supported exclusively by ground logistics may be restricted to prolonged periods of dry weather. During extended periods of heavy rain and high water, airpower offers significant advantages in rural administration, logistics, and tactical mobility.

THREAT FORMS

Subversion, insurgency, lawlessness, and terrorism manifest themselves in a variety of forms capable of seriously challenging the authority and survival of host nations. Below are examples of internal threats that may require Air Force FID assistance. Strategic and operational level planning should address the degree to which each one of these forms manifests itself in the overall threat to host nation (HN) internal security.

Subversion

Subversion comprises an extremely broad range of actions aimed at eroding, undermining, or destroying the political, economic, psychological, and military strength of a government or political party. At one end of the scale, subversion may take the form of a major drug cartel weakening government authority through extortion, bribery, and physical threats. In other cases, opponents of the government can foment widespread civil disorder eventually leading to political and economic crises, ethnic and religious confrontations, and armed disputes among rival political factions external to the government. Local dissident groups may use propaganda and terrorism against citizens and property, which are symbols of government authority, to dramatize political causes or to extort concessions from host governments. At the other end of the scale, certain forms of civil disorder and anarchy can produce widespread violence and social
upheaval precipitating a host government’s collapse. These situations can require military intervention and reinforcement of civil law enforcement agencies.

**Insurgency**

*Insurgency is a complex, protracted form of subversion employing psychological pressure, armed force, and terror to force or prevent social, economic, and political changes within the host nation.* Insurgencies often develop as a result of internal perceptions that a host government is unable or unwilling to solve important domestic, economic, or political problems. An insurgent’s aim is attaining legitimacy derived from popular support. Popular support fuels the political mobilization required to generate workers, fighters, money, and weapons while denying the same to the government. Preemptively addressing critical economic and political issues by host governments is central to countering insurgencies and should generally take precedence over military force. Insurgency often assumes an ideological foundation with social, economic, political, or religious components. The relationship of force application to the central issues underlying an insurgency warrants special consideration in planning. Insurgency dominates the direction of violent political change occurring in the world today. Appendix A discusses the principles of classic insurgency and counterinsurgency.

Insurgencies have individual characteristics that commanders should take into consideration when initiating FID operations. It is imperative that commanders understand as precisely as possible the nature of the conflict in which they are going to engage. The essential elements of information typically shift from empirical estimates (enemy strength, position, tactical posture, and direction of movement) to cultural and political identity and motivation. Standard insurgency-counterinsurgency paradigms may not work. A failure to apply critical analyses and recognize the insurgent conflict for its exact nature at the beginning of an internal confrontation can waste FID dollars and actually contribute to fueling rather than reducing the insurgency.

**Lawlessness**

*In the FID context, lawlessness includes both subversion and insurgency, including terrorism and illicit narcotics production and trafficking.* The term does not simply mean lack of public support or obedience to authority, which some governments label “lawlessness.” The term, as it applies to FID, carries the connotation of anarchy and revolt, indiscriminate killing of innocents by insurgents, narco-terrorists, gangs, and warlords, as well as rampant theft and destruction of property.

Lawlessness often occurs when a government has marginal or ineffective oversight and control over its population or territories. Lawlessness may also exist when the government lacks the mechanisms required to monitor and control the formation and activities of subversive organizations. Local dissident groups may use terrorism against government agencies, or against other ethnic or religious groups, to demonstrate and reinforce their claims to autonomy. The inability of a government to extend its administration and influence into outlying regions results typically in the emergence of
“ungoverned territories.” This is often the result of not having the technological means to provide physical presence and persistence in forward areas. Airpower can help alleviate this deficiency.

Subversion, insurgency, illegal drug production, and narco-terrorism are all forms of lawlessness. Illicit drug production and trafficking can function subversively when international drug cartels seek permissive environments and resort to intimidation and violence to suppress government interference. “Partnerships” involving exchanges of drugs, weapons, and money between insurgents and drug cartels may also support subversive activities, terrorist organizations, and revolutionary movements. Terrorist organizations, insurgents, and drug cartels often share common infrastructures. In such cases, revolutionary or separatist claims may be fraudulently used to justify the cartel’s existence, as in the case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC). Lawlessness is destabilizing to a legitimate regime and may also serve to promote insurgent goals.

A potential shift in focus and required capabilities in irregular warfare stands at every corner of the FID landscape. Trained regional area specialists should be available to commanders and planners from the outset of any FID initiative to maximize the chances of proceeding effectively in foreign environments.

**Terrorism**

*At the opening of the 21st Century, the most dangerous form of lawless violence threatening the internal security of free nations is terrorism of regional origin expanded into insurgency of global scope and impact.* This type of terrorism now extends the threat of internal violence to virtually every country in the world.

Classically, terrorism is employed as a tactic of insurgency and guerrilla warfare. Terrorism uses intimidation and violence to achieve its aims, which are usually linked to a goal or cause. Terrorism carried out in pursuit of religious as well as political and ideological goals may be aimed at replacing governments and regimes that give in to, or encourage, forces of change and modernization that threaten to sweep away traditional religious orders and ways of life. In other cases, terrorism may be used to simply gain political or economic concessions from a host government.

Where political mobilization and legitimacy form the critical centers of gravity, terrorism often demonstrates the inability of incumbent regimes to defend themselves and their population. Terrorism is generally considered a major component or tactical instrument of the whole threat array, not necessarily a separate, stand-alone phenomenon without ideological or political content and motivation. Even the suicide bombers who blow themselves up generally serve the political ends of a larger revolutionary movement dominated by an ideological religious elite who do not blow themselves up.
US security interests can be adversely affected when HN governments are threatened by terrorist violence. In some cases, the internal security efforts of foreign friends and allies may require US assistance through FID. In addition to helping other countries manage internal conflicts through training and advisory assistance, the Air Force can help with ISR, C2, and certain forms of direct assistance.

Selection of Air Force FID capabilities offered to the HN depends on the strength and capability of the host nations being assisted. The socio-economic and political stability of the host nation, prevailing local conditions, and the efficacy of the host nation’s airpower capabilities are major determinants in planning Air Force FID operations.

AIRPOWER IN DEVELOPING NATIONS

In general, Air Force FID operations focus on support to HN aviation forces. By Air Force standards, the scale of military airpower operations in lesser-developed nations is relatively small in terms of force size, total sortie potential, resource consumption and availability, and overall support costs. For example, the entire fixed-wing tactical air mobility capability of these nations may consist of only a limited number of small or medium transports. The contributions of these HN aircraft, however, can be vital to the success of counterinsurgency or drug suppression operations. Because host governments possess so few aircraft, airframe availability, maintenance turnaround times, and sortie generation rates are critical. Additionally, sustainment and supportability are difficult problems with small inventories. Because of funding constraints and supply shortages in host countries, small logistics problems can assume major proportions. The grounding or combat loss of one or two aircraft can seriously impair or neutralize an air effort.

Air Force commanders commencing FID operations should anticipate stark differences between US and foreign organizational structures and personnel policies. These differences must be taken into account in planning and executing FID training and advisory assistance. High degrees of centralization and division of labor are prevalent in the military cultures of lesser-developed nations where workers are viewed discretely as factors of production rather than thoughtful contributors of organizational output. Giving noncommissioned officers and company grade commissioned officers any significant degree of authority and responsibility is not a priority issue with most air force units in the lesser-developed nations, particularly in cases where decision making has traditionally been in the hands of a few senior leaders who maintain almost total control of political and administrative structures.

There is growing recognition among some countries that they must build new administrative structures, distribute authority and decision-making tasks, and institute new policies, or become militarily irrelevant. This is an important realization, as combating terrorism and insurgency requires organizational effectiveness and flexibility not traditionally found in the cultures of lesser-developed nations. Senior foreign air force commanders and staff members are now approaching US Air Force authorities with
questions concerning processes, systems, and operating procedures for running a modern air force. Questions range from how to manage aircraft maintenance to how to build complete air logistics systems. There are important opportunities at many overseas locations for senior Air Force officers and enlisted personnel to train and advise foreign counterparts on how to organize, direct, and supervise airpower forces.

Host nations threatened by insurgency and other forms of internal conflict usually require some form of outside financial or materiel assistance to acquire, operate, and maintain their air forces. In some cases, their military aviation programs are entirely dependent upon foreign assistance for major weapon systems, aviation support equipment, aircraft spares, training, advice, technical services, survival equipment, specialized clothing, munitions, and even consumables.

Aircraft

Host-nation military aircraft available for counterinsurgency operations (air mobility; ISR; air battle management; and air attack) are typically well-used, older-generation aircraft acquired from the US and other foreign sources. In most cases, these aircraft are non-standard to US Air Force inventories and are difficult to maintain because of dwindling sources of spare parts and supplies. FID initiatives in those countries are complicated by lack of commonality with existing US Air Force platforms and parts inventories. At the same time, the cost and complexity of modern aircraft systems usually rule out new procurement and always magnify life-cycle support problems. Lacking modern counterinsurgency aircraft, older-generation, non-standard aircraft may be the only viable option for host nations.

Friendly and allied nations in the lesser-developed nations possess few, if any, precision-guided munitions. In fact, most air forces in the developing world lack the basic capacity to place lethal fire close to friendly troops in contact at night. Many air forces are presently capable of “area engagement” but not “precision engagement.”

An effective air attack capability is conspicuously lacking in most developing nations. Many nations in the developing world possess some kind of weapons delivery platforms (mostly fighter aircraft) but cannot field these resources because of restricted funding for operations and maintenance. Most of these aircraft remain grounded in their respective countries because of lack of spare parts and fuel.

Agile Combat Support Capabilities

Aircraft Maintenance

Most military aviation support facilities are able to conduct routine maintenance on piston-driven aircraft. A few have a limited capability for airframe overhaul and rebuild of non-pressurized aircraft; jet engine repair facilities are extremely limited. In most developing nations, there are no facilities for major overhaul of aircraft engines. Subsequently, in regions where major aircraft repair facilities do exist; they are often
located only in the civilian sector. Local shop facilities may have limited capabilities for test and calibration. Depot-level repair and overhaul facilities for support items are not generally available. In many cases, aircraft support items and services are not available from local sources. Often insufficient technical skills, scarcity of tools and equipment, and lack of adequate plant facilities in the host nation limit aircraft and support system maintenance capabilities. Local refining capability and supply routes influence the type of fuel available and the ability to operate jet, piston, or reciprocal engines.

**Personnel**

Generally, military aviation programs in developing nations rely on an extremely narrow base of trained personnel to accomplish even routine operational tasks and support functions. Routine flightline servicing and maintenance often suffer because technical manuals are not always published in the local language. Maintenance technicians may lack the foreign language skills needed to receive technical instruction and advice from outside sources. Although basic flying skills are often well developed, most individuals are not tactically qualified and are insufficiently trained in joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. The most serious training deficiencies are generally in aircraft and support systems maintenance. Most host aviation units lack technical proficiency and mid-level supervision in these functional areas.

**Training**

Technical training for qualified students is often severely limited because formal courses of instruction and on-the-job training programs have not been sufficiently developed or resources are not available to fund instruction. In some cases, a large portion of the enlisted force, often composed primarily of conscripts and short-term enlistees, do not receive technical training during their period of service because they lack the required education (principally math and reading skills), mechanical background, and service retention. Internal instruction programs are difficult to establish due to insufficient numbers of qualified technicians to instruct others and maintain the assigned force. In most cases, outside training assistance is needed to generate host-nation training programs capable of self-sustaining operations.

**Communications**

Air communications capabilities in developing nations may be antiquated. To offset the lack of modern communications, lesser-developed nations often exercise considerable resourcefulness in designing communications for military air operations. This resourcefulness, however, often entails the use of obsolete, low-performance radios that provide poor connectivity between air and surface elements. The makeshift nature of communications often found within the typical host country renders it extremely vulnerable to enemy intercept and jamming. Air request networks may not extend into remote areas of a nation’s interior. A general lack of communications security training and procedures further degrades command and control effectiveness.
Air Facilities

Aerial port facilities vary. Most capital cities in developing nations are served by airports capable of accepting medium to heavy multi-engine jet aircraft. However, conducting military air operations from major civilian airports is often impractical, due to traffic congestion, space restrictions, and political sensitivity. Outside capital cities, civil and military aviation support facilities are relatively primitive. In many cases, military aviation units have access to only one or two main operating locations with hard-surface runways.

Forward operating locations usually consist of short, unimproved airstrips with limited approach or runway lighting, central electric power, and no passive defense capabilities. Modern, ground-based navigational aids may be extremely limited. Non-directional beacons are prevalent, though often unreliable. Except for navigation aids found at air installations occupied by US military forces, there are generally no terminal approach aids outside international airports. As a consequence, military flying operations rely extensively on visual flight rules procedures or global positioning system navigation.

Intelligence

Intelligence collection capabilities are limited in scope. Human intelligence (HUMINT) is limited by the lack of all-source analysis or fusion and uncertain source credibility. Nevertheless, HUMINT is often the best source for intelligence many host nations possess. Often, HN reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft lack the means of collecting intelligence through thermal imaging and most are incapable of exploiting the electromagnetic medium beyond a very limited capacity for communications intercept.

Generally, collection is limited to visual and photographic means. That said, usually only a limited number of air platforms are configured for photoreconnaissance. Even where intelligence resources and programs and a viable cadre of intelligence professionals exist, the lack of efficient procedures for timely dissemination of tactical intelligence often degrades overall mission effectiveness. Aviation units in the lesser-developed nations rarely understand how to incorporate intelligence products into the mission planning process.
Insurgency in El Salvador
The US Air Force’s Role in Training the Salvadoran Air Force

El Salvador was the scene of escalating violence from a mix of factions through the 1970s. These groups eventually culminated in 1980 into a common organization, the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) and carried the marks of communist influence. The FMLN depended heavily on the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua for support.

The US response to the communist insurgency in El Salvador was vastly different from the US military build-up and involvement in South Vietnam. The US specifically limited involvement to a small number of troops stationed in the country and limited their involvement to training.

The Salvadoran Air Force consisted largely of US-supplied aircraft. The USAF trained the Salvadoran pilots and maintenance personnel and provided limited advice on flying operations and tactics. Restrictions prohibited USAF personnel from flying with Salvadorans on combat or combat support missions and from performing operations on Salvadoran equipment or aircraft. By 1987, the Salvadoran Air Force owned 135 aircraft, but still only half as many pilots. The Salvadoran Air Force also did not have training facilities or instructor pilots. Pilots and maintenance personnel had to maintain proficiency in more than one aircraft type hindering their ability to attain mission readiness. The US responded by improving their training program, sending the Salvadorans to the Inter-American Air Force Academy.

The FMLN launched a final and unsuccessful offensive against El Salvador in 1989. Peace accords were finally signed between the FMLN and El Salvador in 1992. While the US strengthened the ability of El Salvador to defend itself, the peace in El Salvador was fought for and won by Salvadorans.

Enhanced organic, regional airpower capabilities will add stability and thereby shape the environment and promote stability without the need to project a large US force presence abroad.


Air Force FID operations are founded on the basic tenets of airpower. These tenets, which apply equally to US and HN forces, include centralized control and decentralized execution, flexibility and versatility, synergistic effects, persistence, concentration, balance, and priority. Specific methods, applications, and expectations, however, may vary according to the nature, political imperatives, and location of the conflict. In counterinsurgency and combating terrorism, for instance, the number of air attacks against defended positions often indicates deterioration in security and stability. Airpower plays a critical role in supporting counterinsurgency and counterterrorism and entails supporting civil law-enforcement agencies and government administrative mechanisms, as well as military surface forces. For additional discussions on support to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism see AFDD 2-3, *Irregular Warfare*. The most commonly employed airpower functions in this arena include air mobility, ISR, and C2.

In counterinsurgency, civilian security and stability are of utmost importance. Air strikes are significantly restricted in order to limit collateral damage—a factor that can alienate a population and increase sympathies for the insurgents, as well as weaken domestic and international political support. The lesser requirement for kinetic effects does not obviate the importance of armed aircraft. CAS, for example, may prove critical in emergency situations with friendly troops in close contact with hostile forces. Air attacks may be required prior to launching operations against armed terrorist and insurgent targets. Armed aircraft can also accomplish route reconnaissance, defend convoys, and conduct searches for missing friendly forces. A major challenge for commanders is achieving a proper balance between lethal and non-lethal effects and assigning realistic priorities to the use of military force.
The host-nation’s IDAD strategy (its overarching counterinsurgency strategy) provides the basis for determining appropriate airpower objectives. Accordingly, Air Force FID assistance should be designed to support and reinforce the host-nation’s IDAD strategy. A typical IDAD strategy, illustrated in Figure 3.1, incorporates four basic tasks designed to help prevent or counter internal threats. Airpower operations are most successful when their resources and methods support the total range of IDAD strategies.

**Flexibility and Versatility**

Flexibility and versatility should be aggressively exploited in countering subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. To achieve its strategic aims, a host government should establish and maintain effective administration and control on the ground, often in contested areas. The inherent flexibility and versatility of airpower can enable the government to accomplish this. *Airpower’s flexibility can help government forces achieve rapid concentration of effort from great distances and overcome terrain features with increased margins of safety.* This flexibility can be exploited with varying degrees of success, depending on the types of airpower resources possessed and the relative strengths of friendly surface forces.

The principal weight of airpower should be applied where the government seeks critical points of leverage against the insurgent/terrorist movement. These points of leverage, located at a conflict’s common center of gravity, generally involve political mobilization and legitimacy. Airpower can often be employed to establish government presence and persistence in contested areas of a country to exercise political and economic influence over the population. Where IDAD actions are focused on socioeconomic development and mobilization, airpower resources are employed “administratively” in support of infrastructure development and mobilization.

**IDAD STRATEGY**

As the government brings all four tasks of the IDAD strategy into play, airpower resources should help the HN government administer and create synergies among various defense and development initiatives. These roles are principally ACS capabilities such as aircraft maintenance, parts supply, fuels, and communications efforts to establish government influence and control in contested areas of the country. Mobile, space-based C2, for example, allows HN forces to operate with a non-intrusive footprint in contested areas. Using airpower in these roles enhances the host government’s ability to focus on political and economic solutions to a crisis. At the same time, airpower’s flexibility can

<table>
<thead>
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<th>IDAD Strategy: Basic Tasks</th>
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<tr>
<td>✰ Develop balanced social, economic, and political institutions</td>
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<td>✰ Mobilize manpower and materiel</td>
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<tr>
<td>✰ Secure the population and natural resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>✰ Neutralize hostile elements</td>
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Figure 3.1. IDAD Strategy
help government forces achieve rapid concentration of effort from great distances and overcome terrain features. Appendix A provides additional details.

US and foreign commanders, as well as Air Force advisors, planners, and analysts, should carefully weigh the likely consequences of applying airpower in an environment where the critical center of gravity is not the defeat and destruction of opposing forces but rather political mobilization and credibility. Where a negative impact on the civilian population provides further legitimacy to the insurgent movement, assigning correct airpower priorities may mean the difference between success and failure. Where friendly lives and property are at risk from insurgent attack, for instance, air combat power should function as a component of coordinated joint security and neutralization actions aimed at creating a safe environment for developmental programs that in turn promote and sustain political mobilization and credibility.

**Development and Mobilization**

The US role in development and mobilization should focus on helping the government administer and govern. Where ground lines of communication (LOC) cannot be maintained because of terrain or enemy presence, aerial logistics and communications networks carrying information, supplies, and services to civilian elements establish critical links between the government and the population. Such “direct contact” initiatives as government health care services and disease control measures demonstrate the regime’s willingness and ability to govern and, at the same time, provide access to important HUMINT.

**Security and Neutralization**

A government defending itself and the population against insurgent attack must be able to exercise two additional critical functions—security and neutralization. Security entails specific government actions to protect vital human and institutional resources and, at the same time, create a safe, permissive environment for balanced development and mobilization. Neutralization employs civil law enforcement and military forces in lawful actions to physically and psychologically separate insurgents from the population. Appropriate tools for neutralization range all the way from information operations to combat engagement.

Airpower can contribute most effectively to security and neutralization when it functions as an integrated, joint component of the overall internal defense effort. It is least effective when employed unilaterally merely as a substitute for ground maneuver or long-range artillery. In many instances, airpower can be exploited to greatest advantage by emphasizing ISR, C2, and logistics mobility.

Insurgents generally possess no airpower capabilities, although that may change with the advent of small, easy-to-acquire unmanned aircraft (UA). They have no heartland and no fixed industrial facilities. Insurgents’ lack of extensive strength and
weaponry is offset by tactical mobility, surprise, and deception. Their irregular forces are deployed in small units that find easy concealment in rural terrain and civilian society. Typically, insurgents are unwilling to concentrate their forces and are integrated within the civilian population, presenting difficult and contentious targets for air attack. The application of ground firepower, an errant bomb, loss of civilian life, or damage to civilian property can be used against the government and provide increased support for the insurgents. In some cases, it may be more appropriate to use airpower primarily to deploy, sustain, and reinforce military surface forces and civil law enforcement agencies. Employed in correct roles, airpower capabilities can demonstrate to the population that a legitimate government is in control.

AIRPOWER FUNCTIONS

Depending on the objectives and the general situation, airpower assets can work synergistically to support counterinsurgency operations and cyberspace capabilities. In all cases where airpower may be applied (combat or non-combat roles), commanders should consider the political, economic, informational, and military implications of using the functions of airpower.

Air Mobility

Air mobility increases the government’s capacity to govern and administer through presence and persistence in otherwise inaccessible regions of the country, and by physically extending the reach of public policy and information programs. Air mobility also provides a means of rapidly transporting security forces and supplies to forward areas.

To promote balanced development and mobilization through nation assistance, air transportation can be used to access remote regions and bring in resources and personnel to address a wide variety of problems and issues. Airlift, by fixed or rotary-winged aircraft, for example, can carry specialists and trainers to remote regions to provide on-site technical training and assistance in specific areas like public services management, sanitation and hygiene, agronomy, agribusiness management and technology (marketing, supply, and distribution), veterinary medicine, ecology, environmental protection, and public schools administration.

Air mobility can also support developmental initiatives by delivering construction equipment, supplies, and personnel for building rural housing projects, power generation plants and hydroelectric facilities, bridge building, and other public works programs. To support security and neutralization, air mobility can be used to deploy, sustain, and reinforce civil law enforcement agencies as well as military and paramilitary surface elements. Air mobility has even been used successfully to support political goals by extending the electoral process to rural groups.

Logistics tasks are carried out through air landing, airdrop, and aerial extraction of equipment, supplies, and personnel. Air mobility operations can include any
combination of combat operations, casualty evacuation, emergency extraction of military forces, noncombatant evacuation, troop movement, and resupply. Air mobility can also be used for infiltration and recovery of ground reconnaissance teams, surveillance personnel, and special intelligence resources

Tactical battlefield mobility, including casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) and logistics support for surface combat units, is a vital airpower function for maintaining security and neutralizing hostile forces during COIN and combating terrorism operations. Both fixed- and rotary-wing airlift play crucial roles. In the military realm, fixed-wing transports are best suited for carrying ground assault forces into forward staging areas for tactical insertion by rotary-winged vehicles. Fixed-winged and vertical lift vehicles are ideal platforms to carry ground assault teams into the immediate target area or employment site. CASEVAC should be integral to any operation involving the employment of personnel in hostile-fire situations. Rotary-winged and vertical lift vehicles are best suited for this task because of their vertical retrieval capability and their ability to land and take off in the immediate vicinity of the target area.

**Agile Combat Support**

ACS operations in FID may be designed to support US-only or multinational operations, enable host nation airpower capabilities against irregular threats, or a combination thereof. ACS may transition from a purely Air Force support role to one of more direct involvement as when training host nation aviation forces in such areas as maintenance, air base defense, medical, etc. FID operations and activities present challenges to commanders who should consider the different capabilities associated with employing ACS in FID:

- Operating in austere environments with limited infrastructure.
- Increased combat readiness for surviving and operating in increased threat environments to include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments.
- Increased security and force protection requirements.
- Extended logistical lines.
- Communications limitations.
- Multiple distributed operations

Host nation forces combat support capabilities should be assessed and training and education developed to ensure full mission capability.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

Airpower can help commanders maintain situational awareness through robust ISR capabilities. Airpower platforms, in some cases, provide intelligence collection capabilities for security and neutralization. These capabilities may provide intelligence to civilian law enforcement agencies engaged in insurgent, terrorist, or drug cartel undercover operations, or to military and paramilitary units engaged in combating terrorist and insurgent forces. In some cases, platforms equipped with signals intelligence (SIGINT) or geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) capabilities may be used to identify and assess insurgent, terrorist, or drug enterprise infrastructures. Further, SIGINT and GEOINT capabilities can provide real-time battlefield awareness and battle damage assessments, and identify and pinpoint high value targets in real- or near-real time.

For all the capabilities offered by technical collection means, in many cases, the most useful intelligence in counterinsurgency and combating terrorism operations has proven to be human intelligence. HUMINT can tell a commander far more than what is happening during a given conflict or battle. HUMINT-derived information can yield insights into sources and potential vectors of destabilization and revolt before the situation spirals out of control. It can be used to build strategic assessments and plans for IDAD, and for planning US strategic paths. HUMINT can provide information on how well US FID programs are working in other countries and how HN authorities intend to employ FID-provided weapons and training. This information can be used to improve or modify the FID effort.

Air- or space-based reconnaissance and surveillance can be used to monitor the condition of isolated friendly enclaves, surface LOCs, and civilian population groups, or to collect intelligence on enemy strength, location, and movement in denied areas. Information on hostile activities is also accessible through other intelligence disciplines, including HUMINT. Airpower assets can expand and accelerate the HUMINT process by opening up collection sites not accessible by surface transportation, and by speeding up collection and recovery of time-sensitive data.

ISR is a critical airpower function in counterinsurgency. Air or space-based reconnaissance and surveillance are rarely a suitable replacement for HUMINT, but ISR is the principal technology underlying the government’s ability to maintain situational awareness of ground events and the physical disposition of insurgent forces within the country’s borders. ISR is also employed at the beginning of the find, fix, target, track, engage, and assess target cycle. Those platforms best suited for this mission are equipment fitted with forward-looking infrared and deployed throughout the country’s interior and along its borders to detect, identify, and report maneuvering terrorist groups and cross-border traffic. The principal task of ISR supporting offensive security and neutralization is finding and identifying targets, in both rural and urban settings, for exploitation by HN forces.
Many ISR requirements can be satisfied through unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Until these assets are made available to lesser-developed nations, however, there will continue to be a need for manned ISR platforms in counterinsurgency and combating terrorism operations.

Command and Control

Positive control of air strikes by airborne elements of the theater air control system (AETACS) platforms as well as tactical air control parties increases the accuracy of air strikes and decreases the likelihood of fratricide and collateral damage. Fixed or rotary-wing aircraft may also be able to provide line-of-sight relay between ground combat units and between tactical operations centers and deployed ground forces for critical updates. For more information on the AETACS, see AFDD 2-1.7, Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.

The primary role for the AETACS is to control air assets beyond the coverage of ground based C2, while providing an accurate and reliable real-time battlespace picture. The ideal platform for this task is one that can operate for extended periods of time from unimproved sites and remain in close proximity to surface attack forces. With such an aircraft, ground assault teams can ensure they maintain a safe stand-off distance until after the aerial attack is complete before closing in. The aircraft can function as an airborne command and control platform affording connectivity between ground attack forces and air support elements.

Counterland Operations

In a counterinsurgency operation, the counterland operations mission is essentially an air attack role with emphasis on precision engagement operations, both preplanned and immediate, via interdiction, CAS, and strike coordination and reconnaissance. Offensive air attack provides the ability to neutralize or seriously degrade enemy resistance before inserting ground assault teams. The COIN air attack normally flows in sequence from aerial ISR into interdiction for target preparation before insertion of ground assault forces, and from there into CAS and CASEVAC and, finally, to air cover for extraction.

The applications of air attack for security and neutralization are in instances when hostile elements openly commit their forces during assembly and attack against friendly positions or when their command and control centers and logistics elements are exposed and identified.

Air attack operations should be planned and executed on a scale commensurate with the required effects. In countering certain forms of lawlessness (e.g., illicit narcotics production and civil disorders), surface operations are generally aimed at controlling territory, arresting people, and seizing contraband rather than inflicting casualties. CAS, if required, should be limited to protecting the surface forces by using tactics and munitions designed for suppression, shock, and intimidation, rather than
maximum lethality. For information on conventional counterland operations, see AFDD 2-1.3, *Counterland Operations*.

**Personnel Recovery Operations**

Personnel recovery (PR) operations can be employed in virtually every aspect of counterinsurgency air operations. The part of PR that plays the largest role in counterinsurgency and combating terrorism is CSAR. For additional information, see AFDD 2-1.6, *Personnel Recovery Operations*.

The availability of dependable CSAR and CASEVAC, especially at night, has dramatically improved the willingness and ability of host nation ground combatant forces to engage in operations they may otherwise be less motivated to perform. This was particularly noticeable in the Philippines during the years immediately following the September 11, 2001, tragedy. Philippine ground forces would not engage terrorists at night knowing there was no night CASEVAC capability available. Ground combat teams began night operations immediately after the Philippine Air Force acquired this capability provided by Air Force combat aviation advisor (CAA) trainers.

**Information Operations**

Information operations should be integrated into all aspects of development, mobilization, security, and neutralization to disrupt the unity and motivation of hostile forces and to politically isolate them from friendly civilian elements. Information Operations (electronic warfare operations, netware warfare operations, and influence operations) provide force flexibility for both combat and non-combat operations (direct and indirect support). Specific information operations such as psychological operations (PSYOP), for example, can help defeat insurgencies and help support host governments. Other information operations may also support counterinsurgency operations.

Airpower provides critical PSYOP capabilities such as delivering information by radio, television, loudspeakers, and print. Using air mobility to establish the physical presence of government officials at isolated locations increases and improves information dissemination and collection efforts with the added benefit of building psychological support among target audiences. PSYOP can be used to help turn hostile elements into neutral elements and neutral elements into friendly. While not part of PSYOP, public affairs operations can help support the overall PSYOP effort. See AFDD 2-5.3, *Public Affairs Operations*.

In addition to technical means of information delivery, airpower forces possess inherent capabilities to produce psychological effects by demonstrating superior mobility, responsiveness, and firepower. The psychological effect of air activities on the behavior of target groups may be pursued as a principal goal to weaken enemy resistance, capture public support, or both. Psychological effects may produce a
secondary benefit resulting from such initiatives as humanitarian assistance and civic assistance action.

Development and mobilization programs involving military security forces should include informational initiatives that clarify and promote government intentions. Air transportation of public information officials can provide a means of disseminating vital information when development and mobilization actions are undertaken in isolated areas. Public affairs operations can be an effective tool to bolster a HN’s public support for counterinsurgency operations.

Electronic protection (EP) support to foreign air forces will provide increased survivability and effectiveness through increased situational awareness to foreign aircrews. Electronic attack (EA) or communications jamming can further increase the effectiveness of air, land, or sea operations by HN, coalition, or US forces.

Network attack capabilities provide an indirect or direct combat role to support or extend kinetic and non-kinetic effects while network defense can provide defense in-depth options in the face of increased probing and attempted intrusion or attack of coalition networks.

**Air Force Special Operations Forces**

Air Force special operations forces (AFSOF) offer extended military capabilities and tailored options providing great flexibility, stealth, surgical execution, speed, and surprise. AFSOF aviation is inherently offensive in nature and is especially useful in situations where insurgent and terrorist threats are not amenable to large-scale conventional solutions. The development and maintenance of AFSOF aviation is particularly important to countries that must deal with such internal asymmetric threats as guerrilla insurgency, terrorism, criminal subversion, and illicit drug production and trafficking.

AFSOF aviation should be primarily organized, trained, and equipped to support special operations surface forces in hostile or denied territory with air mobility and resupply, insertion and extraction, personnel recovery, ISR, and CAS. AFSOF aviation should enable surface forces to conduct small-unit tactical operations in territory that cannot be accessed or occupied by conventional forces. Whereas many foreign nations possess surface special operations units, few possess special operations aviation assets. Where needed, indigenous aviation forces may find it expedient to organize, train, and equip to support ground special operations surface forces in hostile or denied territory with air mobility and resupply, insertion and extraction, CASEVAC, PR, ISR, and CAS. As with US forces, indigenous capabilities should be adaptive, fluid, and responsive to asymmetric threats and circumstances. For additional information, see AFDD 2-7, *Special Operations.*
The Philippines were the scene of a rural-based communist insurgency during the years 1946-1954. The Philippines were granted independence from American colonization in 1946 and were threatened by the Communist Party of the Philippines which mobilized guerilla forces originally formed during World War II to struggle against the Japanese. The insurgent group was known as the Hukbalahap. The Philippine government was newly established, struggling with the after-effects of the war, and ill-equipped to deal with the threat as the military was in the process of being rebuilt.

Wealth was concentrated in the hands of the few, with most of the rural population at a low standard of living. The strongest appeal of the insurgents was to the land-hunger of the people, which the Hukbalahaps sloganized as “land for the landless.”

The Philippine government recognized the need to influence, by means other than force, the actions and attitudes of all those who played a role in the insurgency and in the effort to counter it. A civic action office was established in “Huklandia” (the areas under insurgent control).

Government programs involving building roads, repairing bridges, digging wells, rebuilding houses and building schools developed good relations with the population and undercut the appeal of the insurgents. Loyalty to the government was necessary. A combination of governmental programs and information operations was aimed directly against the demand of “land for the landless.” The Philippine government offered to resettle and provide land to any surrendered Hukbalahap.

The coordinated efforts of the internal development programs and information operations successfully countered the communist insurgency in the Philippines.

—Various Sources
CHAPTER FOUR
FID OPERATIONS

Even with the myriad of combat-oriented operations that occurred over the past decade, US airpower extends our nation’s reach in more subtle ways. From Mozambique to the Philippines to Europe to South America, airpower supports diplomatic and humanitarian efforts to ease suffering and improve human dignity for thousands each year. This stance sends a dramatic, asymmetric double message to both people and governments: (1) “Airpower can deliver justice to your borders as easily as it delivers food, medicine, and other supplies,” and (2) “America prefers to help rather than to destroy.”

—Lt Col Anthony C. Cain, Editor, Air and Space Power Journal, Spring 2003

FID operations are divided into three major categories—indirect support, direct support (not involving combat), and combat operations. Although various capabilities, programs, and activities within these categories may occur simultaneously, the categories themselves represent significantly different levels of Air Force involvement. They also indicate the broad range of Air Force FID options that can be exercised depending upon the level of US military commitment.

Airpower functions as a force multiplier in countering subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (including terrorism) by increasing the survivability and effectiveness of internal security activities. As a force multiplier, airpower is most useful during the early stages of conflict when the host government’s chances of success are highest. Early Air Force initiatives to develop or improve HN capabilities also reduce the need for higher forms of direct support or intervention.

CHARACTERISTICS OF AIR FORCE FID OPERATIONS

Air Force FID operations support US response measures that, according to the principles of international and domestic law, affirm the inherent right of states to assist one another in maintaining internal order against insurgency and other forms of internal violence. This is based on the host government’s inherent right of self-defense, recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) charter and international law. The
UN charter also recognizes, through the right of collective self-defense, that targets of aggression may request assistance, to include armed assistance, from other states. Such requests, under international law, should be evaluated according to the principles of necessity and proportionality.

FID operations take place within the larger context of US strategies for shaping, influencing, and dominating the operational environment. Normally, the Air Force will conduct FID operations when the President or Secretary of State honors a HN request for military assistance and Air Force forces have been directed to do so by appropriate legal authorities. The decision to conduct FID operations is based on US and international laws, however, the culture and norms of the affected nation influence how the operation is conducted. The US may assist host nations and, in some cases, may directly intervene. Commanders should understand that operations must be tied to specific objectives and may be conducted over extended periods. All stability operations, regardless of context, require an exit strategy.

INTEGRATED INTERAGENCY OBJECTIVES

The first requirement for Air Force FID operations is to ensure that commanders clearly articulate military objectives based on HN and US objectives. Air Force FID activities should be sensitive to HN needs while directly relating plans and operations of other participating departments, executive agencies, and US government organizations. Commanders should structure the FID effort to fit the precise requirements of the conflict at hand. The various FID efforts need to function together coherently within the FID continuum, as shown in Figure 4.1.

Commanders should ensure that Air Force FID-related security assistance efforts and direct support operations function as integrated elements of the overall US FID effort. **Air Force commanders and their assigned or attached forces should be prepared to function as part of a joint-interagency team with mutually supporting programs and objectives.** Clearly defined relationships among various command agencies are of paramount concern. Air Force FID activities will often fall under the purview of non-DOD agencies.

Implementing FID involves a wide range of responses by various agencies, departments, and independent establishments of the US Government plus many non-government organizations (NGOs). These multi-agency operations involve all instruments of national power as well as participation with the international humanitarian and reconstruction community, to support major combat actions if necessary; establish internal security; facilitate reconciliation among local adversaries; help establish political, social, and economic infrastructures; and facilitate HN defense initiatives.
THE FID CONTINUUM

The principal thrust of Air Force FID operations is to encourage and support host-nation solutions to their problems of subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency to reduce the possibility of direct US military involvement. Accordingly, Air Force support is usually applied indirectly through security assistance training, advisory help, and logistics support.

Additionally, the Air Force can provide certain forms of direct support that do not commit US forces to combat. If all other options have been exhausted and the US decides to use force, the Air Force has the capability to engage in combat to meet US and HN objectives. **Air Force FID operations do not automatically transition from indirect to direct forms of assistance based on any precondition or sequence of events. The transition, if required, is based on policy decisions made by the appropriate, legally empowered, authorities.**

![Figure 4.1. The Continuum of Air Force FID](image)

If direct support is required, the level and type of assistance should be appropriate to the situation and should preserve or increase HN strength and responsibility for self defense. Direct support should be withdrawn as soon as possible, consistent with HN needs and capabilities. Tailored Air Force teams can assess, train, advise, assist, and integrate (into multinational or joint operations) HN aviation forces in employment and sustainment at all three levels of US support.
The Air Force FID capabilities described in the following paragraphs help commanders develop appropriate options to support US objectives and are specifically tailored to HN airpower needs and capabilities. The air component may be simultaneously operating in all phases of FID. These capabilities fall under the three main FID categories—indirect support, direct support (not involving combat), and combat operations—as illustrated in Figure 4.1.

FID operations in the Philippines between 2002 and 2006 offer a well-documented case of using security assistance defense articles and services to build solid self-defense capabilities in a foreign aviation force. In 2002, the US delivered a squadron of UH-1H helicopters to the Philippine Air Force (PAF) to help them conduct defensive operations against insurgent-terrorist forces in the southern region of the country. During the four years following aircraft delivery, Air Force FID trainers and advisors increased PAF helicopter capabilities from day-only, point-to-point navigation to a full, day-night tactical insertion-extraction posture, including raids, rescues, and casualty evacuation.

—Various Sources

Indirect Support

Indirect support emphasizes Air Force efforts to develop and sustain HN self-sufficiency and is often associated with Phase 0 shaping. Security assistance, appropriately supplemented by joint and multinational exercises and other joint initiatives, constitutes the primary Air Force contribution to indirect support FID operations.

Air Force security cooperation efforts are defined by the Air Force Security Cooperation Strategy (AFSCS), and security assistance is one of the tools available for FID operations. The intent of this assistance is to help nations acquire, maintain, and, if necessary, employ a self-defense capability. The principal objective of security assistance in FID is to establish secure environments in which foreign governments can pursue social, economic, and political initiatives to relieve tensions in their nations and to prevent insurgent or terrorist organizations from establishing a safe haven. Although security assistance encompasses far more than FID, it is an important component inherent in other FID operations such as logistics, training, and advisory support.

Air Force security assistance efforts should focus on defense equipment and services that reduce host-nation dependency on continuous in-country supervision and support by the US. Recipient nations’ personnel should be trained to operate and
maintain the systems provided. In some cases, they should also be shown how to employ these systems for specific operations. As HN proficiency in air operations improves, developing internal training capabilities within host-aviation units can reduce dependence on in-country Air Force assistance. To overcome sustainability problems inherent in maintaining older generation aircraft and systems, Air Force security assistance operations may also include administration and logistics support of nonstandard items.

The DOS has the overall responsibility for military and economic security assistance. The DOD administers the military assistance portion, under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The Air Force is responsible, as an implementing agency, for those security assistance programs assigned by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). Of the several security assistance programs, involving the Air Force, the main programs typically include mobile training teams (MTT), foreign military financing, and international military education and training (IMET). See AFSCS for types of security assistance.

**Foreign Military Financing**

Security assistance organizations (SAOs) are those armed forces organizations permanently assigned to US diplomatic missions to carry out security assistance responsibilities. Air Force elements assigned to SAOs administer and manage Air Force programs and serve under the direction and supervision of the chief of the US diplomatic mission (usually the ambassador), as provided by law.

Primary tasks traditionally assigned to SAOs include security assistance case management and oversight, including monitoring the program; managing equipment, services and training; evaluating and planning host-government capabilities and requirements; and providing administrative support and liaison functions exclusive of advisory and training functions. Commanders should refer to the appropriate directives and publications for additional details on SAO duties.

The transfer of all US defense equipment and services must be accomplished under proper statutory authority. When authorized by statute, defense articles or services may at times be provided in accordance with bilateral agreements negotiated to cover a particular program. Negotiation of such assistance agreements is subject to specific requirements for delegation of authority and reporting and requires knowledge of international law, procurement law, and security assistance law.

Deployed Air Force FID training and advisory teams, including MTTs and CAA forces, should work closely with SAO authorities to formulate appropriate FID goals, devise in-country operating procedures, and coordinate FID operations and training with HN counterpart forces. Where an SAO is not established, the defense attaché office (DAO) will assume SAO duties, functions, and responsibilities. SAO/DAO offices generally exercise policy supervision and oversight of deployed FID training and advisory teams operating with foreign military forces.
International Military Education and Training

Multinational exercises are conducted to test and evaluate mutual capabilities of US and foreign coalition partners. These exercises complement security assistance goals by testing and evaluating capabilities that security assistance recipients want to improve. These exercises may include specific types of training and construction, as well as HCA projects, within the host country. Appendix B provides further information on exercise objectives, constraints, and funding.

Exchange programs are also a form of a multinational activity having potential FID applications. While some exchanges are authorized under security assistance (e.g., unit exchanges and professional military education exchanges), individual permanent change of station (PCS) and temporary duty (TDY) exchanges are designated as DOD mission functions separate from security assistance. These exchanges provide commanders a means to further FID objectives by fostering mutual understanding among multinational forces, and by familiarizing each force with the organization, administration, and operations of the other. The office of the Secretary of Air Force, International Affairs, in concert with the geographic combatant commanders develops and executes exchange programs in accordance with the AFSCS.

Mutual understanding between Air Force personnel and HN forces is strengthened through orientation visits, doctrine outreach programs, conferences, and joint security consultations. Other initiatives include counter-narcotics-funded training of HN forces, subject matter expert exchanges, and various military-to-military contact events. The guidance, conditions, and limitations pertaining to these kinds of initiatives vary considerably. Accordingly, commanders should seek proper legal and administrative guidance before execution.

Building the FID Trainer-Advisor Team

Air Force experience supporting counterinsurgency over the past 40 years indicates that dedicated FID trainers and advisors should be organized as regionally-oriented units comprised of individuals encompassing a broad range of aviation specialties, who train and deploy as cohesive coordinated teams. Most important, and most difficult to acquire, is the ability to connect tactical and operational-level advisory efforts to the much larger objectives of theater commanders and host governments. An advisor’s success involves knowing what is at stake all the way up to the strategic level and being able to estimate how military force applied at specific times and places will affect, or interact with, HN political, economic, and informational initiatives. This FID task entails a team member advising foreign aviation counterparts on how to employ their aviation resources (an operational-level task), as opposed to how to operate an airplane (a tactical-level issue).

Such a task entails creating a range of professional skills that can only be acquired through extensive training, self-study, and experience. An aviation advisor’s personal skill sets encompass a broad range of hard-won personal attributes and skills that are unique within the Air Force. These peculiar attributes and skills constitute what may be
referred to as the advisor’s *tradecraft*. It is one’s mastery of the tradecraft that usually determines whether or not one succeeds in training or advising the aviation forces of a foreign power. It may even determine whether or not one survives the political and environmental hazards of the advisory business. It is the multi-dimensional nature of this tradecraft that qualifies the aviation advisor for the mission and provides a basis for maintaining dedicated FID organizations within the Air Force.

**DIRECT SUPPORT (NOT INVOLVING COMBAT)**

When it is impractical for the host air force to develop self-sufficiency in time to counter a threat, the Air Force may be tasked to provide direct support that does not commit US personnel to combat. Such support encompasses Service-funded activities that improve host air force effectiveness without duplicating or replacing security assistance efforts to create or maintain host-nation capabilities. Air Force activities at this level normally focus on civil-military operations (CMO), intelligence collection and analysis, logistics support, and other “stand-off” support functions. *Air Force activities should emphasize the host military’s combat role.*

Air Force intelligence resources, in conjunction with country team and theater programs and initiatives, can support host-nation IDAD planning through long-range strategic collection and analysis. At the tactical level, Air Force technical capabilities can complement and augment host-nation collection programs. Intelligence sharing involves providing intelligence products. It does not mean transferring collection methods, sources, or technology to the host nation.

Air Force ground, airborne, and space-based communications resources can support HN security forces by providing critical C2 capabilities. The Air Force can also provide positioning, navigation, and timing aids where HN resources are lacking. Such support may include HN use of US communication assets, but it does not involve the transfer of communications systems or technology to the host nation. The Air Force maintains control of systems employed in the direct support role and ensures protection of classified communications and computer technology.

Air Force forces and capabilities can support CMO. Civil-military operations are a broad area embracing the relationship between military forces, civilian authorities, and the population and are employed to develop favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. The five major areas of CMO, each with important applications in FID, are civil affairs (CA), PSYOP, humanitarian assistance (HA), HCA, and military civic action (MCA). Although the Air Force does not possess CA units, Air Force resources can provide support to joint US civil affairs operations through air
mobility and contingency response element support, communications backup, information broadcasting, and technical advice on airpower operations.

The inherent psychological effects of airpower can be employed to further FID objectives through shows of strength and overt demonstrations of support to friends and allies. Specific, stand-alone PSYOP capabilities can be used to support the dissemination of host-government informational programs. Aircraft can dispense leaflets or conduct PSYOP broadcasting over standard radio, television, short wave, and military communications bands.

With appropriate authorization and direction, the Air Force can undertake HA independent of joint/multinational exercises or other military operations. Air Force capabilities for HA include personnel evacuation, air mobility, and medical support for disaster victims. Aerial platforms can also support relief activities by broadcasting evacuation instructions and other public information and by temporarily replacing or expanding coverage of existing ground transmitters.

Whereas HA focuses on emergency transportation support and other support to alleviate urgent host-nation needs caused by natural disasters and catastrophes, HCA activities are planned in advance and carried out in conjunction with military operations and exercises. Appendix B contains more detailed information on HCA. MCA can be undertaken along with security assistance training or as part of traditional theater activities. MCA is essentially a US military-to-HN military program involving projects undertaken by primarily indigenous forces. Examples include construction, health care, and agriculture projects. Air Force support of MCA is generally limited to training and advisory assistance.

The Air Force provides critical ISR capabilities. Maps of developing nations often lack sufficient scale and definition for planning and executing exercises and tactical operations. Air Force capability in this area can also be used for testing and evaluating mutual intelligence analysis techniques and procedures. A steady supply of photographs and maps for HN personnel in quantities larger than that consumed in exercises usually requires security assistance funding.
Air Force meteorological reporting, analysis, forecasting, and interpretation can be employed as part of the direct support effort to enhance HN IDAD initiatives. Interpretation of weather data for local effects (rainfall, flooding, wind, visibility, etc.) can be used in an MCA role or applied to host-military planning activities.

**Exercise Nuevos Horizontes, 2000**

Over 2,000 Service members from throughout the US deployed to El Salvador in February 2000 to participate in Nuevos Horizontes. This exercise was a training mission to exchange experience and knowledge for construction engineers, military police, medical units, and other combat service support units. Four schools and a medical clinic were built and six potable water wells were drilled in the four-month exercise. Physicians, dentists, pharmacists, veterinarians, and preventative medicine instructors conducted training and medical assistance to improve the health and quality of life for El Salvadorans.

The Air Force’s 823rd RED HORSE Squadron, out of Hurlburt Field, established the base camp and poured the foundations for the schools and clinic. The Air Force’s 7th Medical Group served as a medical readiness team and treated up to 600 Salvadoran patients each day during the exercise.

The US Ambassador to El Salvador stated the exercise would be remembered as evidence of US efforts.

—Headquarters 12th Air Force Annual History for 2000

Air mobility is another capability crucial to FID direct support operations. Air mobility can be used for delivery, recovery, and resupply of US defense equipment and services, returning items to the US for repair, transporting HN personnel to out-of-country training locations, and providing aeromedical evacuation from main operating bases in the host nation.

Air Force resources may be used in concert with counter-drug activities in countries receiving FID assistance. Such activities may include intercept of aircraft, vessels, or vehicles for communications purposes, gathering and processing tactical intelligence from a variety of sources (including fixed and mobile surveillance assets), and intelligence sharing.

Subject to DOD policy and legislative guidance, the Air Force may offer certain types of direct support to host-nation counter-drug personnel. Air Force resources may also provide capabilities to US civilian law enforcement agencies that may be operating in the region and to the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics Matters. Combatant commanders direct their components’ execution of counter-drug activities within their geographic areas of responsibility (AORs).
Counter-drug activities, subject to legislative constraints, may involve Air Force capabilities like intelligence sharing; meteorological services; aerial reconnaissance and mapping; air mobility of personnel, supplies and equipment; communications support; counter-drug training; upgrading and maintenance of equipment; and establishing and operating bases or training sites that facilitate counter-drug activities. However, US forces are prohibited from engaging in direct law enforcement activities unless directed by the President or Secretary of Defense.

DIRECT SUPPORT (INVOLVING COMBAT)

Air Force personnel can conduct joint/multinational combat operations in the host country. Air Force assets can provide air mobility for both US and host-nation forces. ISR, attack, and forward air control assets provide capabilities in support of US and host ground and naval forces. Air Force electronic warfare platforms can also provide support including communications jamming. Additionally, USAF can provide all capabilities listed in Figure 4.1.
Specific C2 systems and processes for indirect and direct support vary according to the conflict situation, HN requirements, US objectives, and the level of US involvement. C2 systems and processes for security assistance and most forms of direct support (not involving combat) contain civilian as well as military elements. NGOs and commercial consortia can provide much of the C2 infrastructure that enables FID operations. Air Force security assistance activities overseas are organized under a military command structure within security assistance offices, but both civilian and military elements control and supervise aspects of these activities. Military authorities command, control, and supervise tactical operations in the field.

Overseas SAOs respond to two channels: One through the US diplomatic mission and the other through the GCC. All US government personnel performing security assistance duties in a foreign country are under the policy direction and supervision of the US chief of mission. Commanders and senior officers assigned to SAO positions in foreign countries should be given special training that defines the limits of “policy direction and supervision” and appropriate reporting instructions in military channels when guidance may not be consistent with DOD policy.

INDIRECT SUPPORT

The Air Force conducts indirect support in accordance with the guidance contained in statutory authorities and executive orders, as well as directives, regulations, and manuals issued by the DOS and the DOD. Military personnel temporarily assigned within a foreign nation serve under the policy direction, coordination, and supervision of the chief of mission, unless deployed to perform duties directed by the geographic combatant commander. Forces temporarily deployed overseas to accomplish security assistance functions within a combatant commander’s AOR should normally be attached to that commander. The supported geographic combatant commander normally exercises operational control (OPCON) of these forces.

Security assistance-funded MTTs accomplish tasks and objectives established in security assistance case letters of offer and acceptance by the State Department, Secretary of the Air Force, and the security assistance community, rather than a GCC or Special Operations Command (SOC). MTTs fall under security assistance case management and oversight of the SAO, or US Military Group, in the American
Embassy. The MTT carries out contractual functions with a training "product" at the end. AFSOC MTT deployments, however, should be coordinated with the theater SOC personnel to advise them of the team's presence in the AOR.

Air Force teams deployed temporarily for training events and exercises with HN forces normally fall under the policy supervision and oversight of the American Embassy, generally through the SAO. Where practical, temporarily deployed teams should be attached to the SAO for in-country administrative support (including appropriate technical, legal, and administrative status in the host nation) and for procedural guidance established by the combatant commander and the US chief of mission.

DIRECT SUPPORT (NOT INVOLVING COMBAT)

Direct FID support (not involving combat) is authorized and directed on a case-by-case basis by the President or Secretary of Defense. Direct support of this nature is classified as a military mission with respect to command and control responsibilities of the combatant commander in whose AOR the operation is conducted.

Deployed Air Force special operations trainers and advisors are routinely assigned for purposes of C2 to the theater special operations component commander; however, the joint force air component commander (JFACC), through the GCC and the US Special Operations Command, can request and employ this capability. Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 2011, allows such units as AFSOC’s CAA to expend unit operation and maintenance funds (O&M) to train (and train with) foreign forces. This legal provision gives Air Force special operations forces greater flexibility than other FID and military coalition support activities. Their inherent flexibility makes CAA forces a very attractive and cost-effective way for the US to establish important foreign relationships.

The US chief of mission can request certain forms of indirect and direct support, and it is generally subject to his or her approval. Coordination of mission requirements, operational constraints, and tasking should take place with the JFC or other designated agencies of the joint command. The ambassador normally exercises in-country policy supervision and oversight of these activities.

DIRECT SUPPORT (COMBAT OPERATIONS)

As a general rule, Air Force forces employed in combat FID operations should be organized, commanded, and controlled on the basis of guidance established in joint and Air Force doctrine and directives; however, C2 structures may require tailoring to fit specific operational environments, force allocations, and US-HN agreements on command of multinational forces.

When deployed, AFSOF are normally attached to a joint task force (JTF) as part of a subordinate joint special operations task force (JSOTF) commanded by a joint force special operations component commander. However, AFSOC personnel performing
FID missions may be attached directly to a non-special operations forces (SOF) air and space expeditionary task force (AETF) under a commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR). If FID operations expand into larger combat operations, these AFSOC forces may either remain part of the AETF or be reorganized as part of the JSOTF. COMAFFORs and participants should be prepared for either command relationship.

COORDINATION

Where military and civilian responsibilities overlap, planning and execution of FID initiatives require emphasis on close, continuous coordination rather than on command and control as defined in purely military terms. In many cases, the relationship between agencies is one of interdependence. Combatant commanders, for instance, have functions and responsibilities that go beyond security assistance. SAOs and country teams, with their knowledge of security assistance activities and other foreign aid efforts, serve the combatant commander as important sources of information on HN IDAD planning and military preparedness. In addition, combatant commanders have war plans and intelligence at their disposal that may be relevant to security assistance planning and crisis response. These commanders also have assigned forces, TDY personnel, strategic expertise, and materiel resources that can be used in host-nation relations, security assistance, joint-multinational exercises, and certain forms of direct support. They can also promote interoperability and standardization for multinational operations involving US and host-nation forces.

Coordination tailored to specific locations and missions benefits not only US diplomatic mission objectives but also the combatant commander’s security assistance mission. For example, Air Force elements assigned to combatant commands and SAOs (or other country team components) support joint-interagency coordination of airpower requirements and capabilities for security assistance planning, administration, logistics support, and direct support operations. To accomplish such coordination, Air Force representatives may choose to use an appropriate channel of communication that may extend outside formal coordination procedures. These channels can be used to support combatant commander efforts to help SAOs develop realistic air defense requirements in host countries. They can also be used to keep US diplomatic missions informed about airpower resources and capabilities available for direct support and crisis response.

JOINT-INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

FID operations frequently involve joint actions. Additionally, Air Force FID operations often support the goals and objectives of other US departments and
agencies. Success of these operations depends on secure and nonsecure communications for tasking, coordinating, monitoring, and reporting among the various US civilian and military agencies. Air Force C2 structures should be tailored to specific environments, missions, and joint force compositions and should be adaptable to varying scenarios. These structures should connect in-country, joint, and interagency elements and should establish links between in-country elements, the combatant commander, and US command and supervisory elements. Deployed Air Force teams may function as elements attached to other Service units or attached, under special arrangements, to interagency organizations.

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

Air Force elements play a key FID role by helping to develop and support multinational C2 capabilities for airpower operations. Multinational (combined) activity is inherent in all forms of military FID assistance, and all these forms require links between US and HN C2 elements. Command relationships and responsibilities for multinational exercises and contingency operations are established in accordance with US-HN agreements. Connectivity is essential, particularly when US and HN forces function in mutual support during combat operations. Interoperability issues should also be considered in light of the Air Force’s need for information assurance.

Significant C2 interoperability challenges in multinational operations typically involve incompatible equipment and standards, language barriers, differing C2 procedures, lack of HN experience, and inadequate HN logistics infrastructures to maintain modern communications equipment. Equipment modernization provided under security assistance can alleviate some of these deficiencies, but commanders should also consider the use of Air Force trainers and advisors to improve HN C2 doctrine, coordinate combined C2 procedures, and facilitate interoperability.
CHAPTER SIX
PLANNING

By defining the extremist movement as a global insurgency, we can better determine what capabilities and actions are needed to effectively defeat the threat posed by such an enemy.

—House Armed Services Committee Professional Staff memorandum to members of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities

Maintenance FID training in Niger

Where appropriate, FID planning should be incorporated into theater security cooperation plans, strategies, theater campaign plans, and FID contingency actions. Moreover, FID planning should account for the AFSCS. The FID plan defines objectives to be accomplished in pursuit of national strategy and provides subordinate commanders with general force employment guidance. A combatant commander bases this guidance on an assessment of employment opportunities and an analysis of the relative strengths and weaknesses of friendly and hostile forces.

FID plans provide joint forces a concept of operations and establish resource requirements, priorities, channels of communication, and basing modes. Plans for indirect and direct support are extensions of theater strategy, and contribute to theater goals and objectives, but vary in purpose and execution. FID operations can be planned and carried out independent of US military actions, performed in conjunction with major joint and combined actions, or carried out following major campaigns aimed at securing specific military objectives.

INDIRECT SUPPORT

The principal function of US military operations is to secure US and allied strategic interests through indirect FID assistance, therefore planning should be directed at specific ACS capabilities like aircraft maintenance, fuels, and training; as well as advisory help to create and sustain HN military capabilities. HN military commanders carry out force deployment, employment, and the orchestration of tactical events to accomplish objectives established in the HN IDAD plan. Accordingly, joint planning for indirect FID assistance should guide US military commanders and executive agents charged with security assistance and joint-multinational exercise responsibilities. These plans for indirect FID assistance serve US strategic interests by supporting HN IDAD
programs where such assistance is politically feasible, strategically sound, and logistically supportable.

DIRECT SUPPORT

Direct-support planning for FID, whether it involves combat or not, primarily involves the employment and logistical support of US forces. Direct support planning guides US military activities and, at the same time, complements and supports host-nation IDAD programs. Direct support planning does not normally include training and equipment transfers to the host nation, though it may include combat advisors to help HN forces execute tactical operations and keep them connected to multinational joint forces at the tactical level. Airpower priorities and tasks established in the plan involve the allocation and apportionment of Air Force aircraft, aircrews, and support resources. Planning may include mobility and employment considerations for allied foreign forces when multinational operations are involved.

PLANNING REQUIREMENTS

Air Force FID planning requires a clear statement of airpower objectives in the host nation, specifically, what major role (or roles) airpower should play and what that role should accomplish in furthering the host-nation’s IDAD strategy. These objectives, derived from priorities contained in the IDAD plan, should function as the basis for planning various forms of airpower support to the host government. Air Force planners need to be involved in the FID planning process in order to account for Air Force capabilities to create desired effects.

Operational-level airpower planning for FID generally requires extensive cooperation and coordination among a variety of agencies within the joint, multinational, and interagency arenas. In most cases, combatant commanders and their staffs function as focal points for coordinating indirect as well as direct forms of assistance. In many cases, the planning process requires the direct participation of the supported government and its military forces.

Plans establishing guidance and objectives for all types of direct and indirect support should be compatible with host-government IDAD initiatives.

Planning should determine airpower tools appropriate to the operational environment and local conditions, for example, transferring available air platforms to the HN that fit within the technological and financial resources of that nation.

Air Force FID planning should be flexible. Periodic revisions may be necessary to accommodate alterations in HN planning, unanticipated restrictions on US assistance, and significant shifts in conflict intensity and levels of US support.

Air Force FID planning should be conducted jointly, or, where appropriate, coordinated with joint US military components and with US civilian agencies exercising control, supervision, and oversight of FID activities in the recipient nation.
All forms of indirect and direct FID support is coordinated with, and approved by, the supported nation. In most cases, the planning process requires direct participation by the supported government and its military forces. Joint-combined planning gives participants a means to negotiate and agree on such issues as mission objectives, force levels, composition of forces, support arrangements, C2 relationships, and rules of engagement.

Air Force FID planning should be carried out according to US procurement and security assistance law. Allowable FID activities vary within the US government, the DOD, and the Air Force. To ensure compliance with legislative constraints and funding procedures, FID planners should involve knowledgeable judge advocates early and often in the planning process. It is a mistake to fully develop a FID plan then submit it for legal review, only then to find a substantial legal obstacle exists. Sound legal advice throughout the planning and execution of FID operations is essential to mission success.

AIRPOWER ANALYSES AND THE OPERATIONAL DESIGN

Planning for FID operations, as with all contingency actions, starts with an analysis of critical capabilities and vulnerabilities of both friendly and adversary forces. This allows planners to determine appropriate courses of action for employing airpower. Much of the ACS and deployment planning for FID operations can be undertaken using standard planning techniques and procedures. The failure to incorporate ACS in planning future operations may result in the inability to adequately support and sustain selected courses of action. Employment planning for asymmetric engagement and certain types of foreign training and advisory actions, however, may require a different approach or operational design.

The analysis may indicate that the most direct approach to meeting desired end states requires leveraging HN civil and military capabilities. That determination may, in turn, lead to the conclusion that the desired end state, and major thrust of US actions, should be through enabling HN forces to defend their own sovereign territory from internal threats. The air planner’s operational design is then structured around achieving strategic aims by working with a HN’s aviation forces.

The air planner should address certain key questions that ultimately lead to an understanding (or estimate) of appropriate airpower roles and missions as well as required organizational structures, command and control capabilities, training programs, tactical resources, etc. The primary focus of planning should be centered on the internal threats to HN national security and how those threats can be met within that nation’s financial and technological resources, specifically, what priorities are assigned to countering these threats.
STRATEGY-TO-TASK FID PLANNING

Having identified and assigned priorities to the threats, the next issue is how the HN government should employ and integrate its political, economic, informational, and military instruments of national power to counter these threats. The goal here is to specify the ends (desired results), the ways (methods), and the means (actual resources) to achieve national security objectives, thus creating a national security strategy. The following illustrates this focused, integrated scheme.

The ends (desired result) may be to:

- Prevent insurgent/terrorist incursions throughout the country’s interior and across its borders from a neighboring country.

The ways (method) may be to:

- Launch an information campaign designed to turn international opinion against the insurgents.
- Invest money in training, education, and medical programs to improve living conditions and psychological resistance in affected areas of the country.
- Implement political reforms throughout the country to mobilize public support of the government.
- Mount a military response to the insurgent threat and enforce, underscore, and protect HN economic and political initiatives.

The means (actual resources) may include:

- All facets of the local and national media to broadcast the government’s message to the world.
- The country’s financial cash reserves derived from product exports, taxes, etc.
- Legal actions carried out in the courts to implement political reforms.
- Personnel and material resources of the nation’s armed forces.

Next, planners should determine what the roles (purpose and function) of military force are: What tasks the military performs to meet HN national strategic needs and goals, and how airpower fits into this equation, i.e., what specific airpower missions are appropriate to support surface force operations; carry the fight to the insurgent or terrorist forces; and ultimately support the national strategy. They should determine what priorities should be assigned to these airpower missions. Finally, they should determine what the host nation possesses in the way of appropriate airpower to accomplish these missions and what additional airpower resources are required through
FID assistance efforts to bring HN aviation forces up to required operational status. These issues require an airpower assessment conducted by a qualified Air Force assessment team.

Having determined what airpower should be doing to support the national security/military strategy; it is now possible to establish requirements, priorities, goals, and physical parameters for recruiting, organizing, training, equipping, and employing HN military aviation forces. This includes a determination of major end items and training the US might furnish the HN government under an enablement strategy. These requirements, priorities, and goals also establish the basis for formulating what higher echelons of HN military command should do, or be capable of doing, to enable their own commanders at the tactical level to exploit battlefield events to ultimately meet national security and military objectives.

Having proceeded this far with the operational design, the planner can now build a FID plan with a concept of operations that includes estimated timelines with phased initiatives, goals, and objectives for US actions. The FID plan can then be reconciled with the HN’s IDAD strategy, and adjustments made accordingly. The FID plan gives the Air Force commander a starting point for initiating appropriate actions.

**CRITICAL SEQUENCING**

Although the most desirable FID course of action is often through indirect support, minimizing US presence and participation, analysis may show that HN aviation forces alone cannot prevail under the estimated timelines and conditions required to bring their units up to operational status. The operational design and resulting plan may require that Air Force airpower be introduced in combination with enabling FID initiatives aimed at helping the HN counter, survive, and prevail against a serious threat to internal stability. However, even when FID actions involve the direct use of Air Force forces, there is a critical sequence of initiatives to incorporate into the planning process:

- Air Force direct support operations are carried out in accordance with the JFC’s guidance and performed in concert with other joint and combined military forces and civilian agencies.

- HN airpower is brought into play through training, advising, assisting, and providing material support. HN airpower should become functional as soon as practical and, where possible, be applied simultaneously with the Air Force direct support effort.

- Air Force advisors facilitate combined operations with HN forces followed by a transition to a HN-only, joint battlefield.

- Air Force direct-support forces and operations are phased out of the campaign or contingency.
The Air Force supports HN air operations with ongoing sustainment initiatives, including specific ACS capabilities and advisory assistance, until the host nation attains a successful conclusion to the conflict.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT OF FID

The key to effective employment of US intelligence is early development of essential elements of information (EEIs) by combatant commanders, air component commanders, and intelligence analysts. In all cases, it is essential that commanders understand the operational environment well enough to accurately determine the EEIs for intelligence planning and execution. Commanders should have access to regional area specialists to help develop these EEIs. These EEIs should be translated into collection requirements for intelligence collection processes, resources, and methodologies.

Because the internal dynamics of insurgency, counterinsurgency, and other forms of internal conflict vary with each situation, FID planning should begin with an analysis of the operational environment. Intelligence requirements are based on the commander’s information needs and can include risk assessments, analyses of friendly and enemy forces and infrastructures, endemic health threats to deployed personnel, situation reporting, and targeting data. HUMINT is a major source of information for FID planning and execution.

Critical intelligence in this field is constructed from conflict and crisis backgrounds such as historical analysis and cultural factors; social, economic, and political components of the conflict; and the personalities and ambitions of the key players. Early intelligence estimates provide a foundation for establishing proper correlation and priorities among military and nonmilitary airpower roles for both the host nation and Air Force FID forces. Early assessments derived from basic and estimative intelligence also increase the HN’s chances to counter the insurgent or terrorist threat with the least amount of force.

If an insurgency progresses to the point where intelligence activities are reduced to crisis reporting, non-military options are severely limited. At the crisis stage, the EEIs focus primarily on how large the enemy force is, what its capabilities and intent are, where it is located, and how it can be destroyed. During the early, incipient phase, the questions shift from what and where to who and why. Knowing the answers to this last set of questions allows defenders to address the insurgency, not just the insurgent.

SPACE SUPPORT TO FID

Space support should be integrated into FID at all stages of engagement. Space systems and personnel, for example, provide commanders with ISR; C2 support; and position, navigation, and timing (PNT) services. Proper command relationships, normally direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH), should be established between in-country teams and national agencies, such as the National Reconnaissance Office.
(NRO) and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA). Those relationships allow in-country teams access to timely intelligence data and analysis.

Long-haul and over-the-horizon communication systems are vitally important for FID teams operating in austere locations. These teams should have access to the regional satellite communications (SATCOM) support centers (RSSC) for the areas in which they operate to provide them SATCOM capabilities. Similarly, DIRLAUTH, with the mission management center for blue-force tracking (BFT), allows proper management and use of BFT capabilities.

Many space capabilities and services can be shared with HN forces. Air Force FID planners should take appropriate measures to ensure that security and classification guidelines are in place and followed.

DIRLAUTH with the space air and space operations center (AOC)/joint space operations center (JSpOC) allows in-country FID teams access to DOD space support. The space AOC/JSpOC can also request and coordinate reachback to many non-DOD space service providers that offer non-DOD, foreign, and commercial space support. The space AOC/JSpOC provides reachback to many space-service providers that offer ISR, C2, and PNT capabilities. Depending on where the FID effort is taking place, the HN will often have better relations with foreign-service providers than the US does. In those cases, the FID team should provide the host nation with information that will enable them to request services directly from sources that may not want to support US efforts.

ACS CAPABILITIES

ACS elements play a dominant role in security assistance and form the backbone of indirect Air Force FID assistance. Air Force ACS elements also support US force deployment and specific joint-multinational operations in more direct forms of support. Information developed by Air Force ACS elements through site surveys, joint-multinational exercises, ACS studies, and other assessments supporting security assistance activities may contain significant information for planners. A key step in ACS planning is to understand the HN’s IDAD strategy and define its aviation requirements and capabilities.

The HN’s IDAD strategy should be understood and its aviation requirements and capabilities defined before detailed ACS planning commences. Accordingly, ACS planning for significant force structure improvements should focus initially on what the host nation intends to do, or can do, for itself. Specifically:

- How the host government intends to employ its national resources to reach its IDAD goals.
- What immediate and long-range priorities are assigned to the IDAD strategy.
How the host nation intends to employ airpower to support both military and nonmilitary objectives contained in the overall strategy.

What the host-nation’s capacity is to receive, store, operate, and maintain both present and projected air, space, and information resources.

Resource priorities should be aligned with objectives identified in the IDAD plan. ACS planning should take into account the limited logistics infrastructures often prevalent in developing nations and should consider social, economic, and political factors that could enhance or impede Air Force ACS operations.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGE OPERATIONS

Foreign air forces receiving security assistance often possess the nucleus of a counterinsurgency or counter-drug capability but are not able to generate the air support required to meet national emergencies. Significant improvements can be made in emergency situations through security assistance surge operations. These surge operations often involve new or increased support in equipment transfers, training, advice, and other forms of technical assistance. Where possible, surge operations support should focus on low-cost options to upgrade current host aviation capabilities. Where the HN faces imminent threat and US interests are at risk, the surge support may include more extensive efforts at increasing levels of funding. Security assistance actions are conducted by the appropriate DOD component. Planners normally coordinate their proposed actions with the Deputy Undersecretary of the Air Force (International Affairs).

Surge requirements for airpower resources and services should be based on assessments and recommendations from country team members (including SAO representatives), Air Force survey teams, and combatant commanders. Because of the extraordinary logistics effort generally required during surges, planning conducted within the security assistance community should be closely coordinated with joint military and civilian defense agencies supporting the transportation and execution phases of the operation. In developing transportation schedules and modes of delivery, including Air Force air mobility, planners should consider such factors as the size of the logistics effort, overall budget constraints, the time limits imposed, and political restrictions on the presence of US military aircraft in the host country.

Surge requirements should be anticipated as early as possible. Some foreign air force organizations may have difficulty absorbing large, rapid infusions of additional security assistance. Surge activities involving additional aircraft, support items, and facilities should be geared to the availability of qualified aircrews and ground support specialists. For this reason, additional aircrew and ground training requirements are often a major planning factor in surge operations. A surge effort, therefore, begins by determining the near-term “build-up” potential of the host air force.
Tactical Air Improvement Plan, Cambodia, 1974:  
A Surge Operation

In mid-1973, while pulling American combat forces out of Vietnam, US authorities launched their final strategy in Southeast Asia—hold the line in Laos and Cambodia until Army of the Republic of Vietnam forces, using massive amounts of US-provided military hardware, could defeat the North Vietnamese Army in the South. This strategy depended on the Khmer Republic not losing to communist forces, an outcome requiring timely US assistance.

The Khmer Republic’s army fought hard, but lacked weapons and supplies. They also lacked air support and it became clear to anyone with experience in Southeast Asia that holding off the Khmer Rouge would take more than artillery-backed infantry employing conventional fire-and-maneuver tactics. The Khmer Republic’s army needed aggressive air support: air interdiction to degrade enemy logistics, close air support to help defeat Khmer Rouge in contact, and air mobility to give Khmer Republic surface forces an edge in logistics and battlefield maneuver. At the time, the Khmer Air Force (KAF) consisted of personnel only. There were no operational aircraft or functioning maintenance facilities.

Realizing this, the Pentagon’s Defense Security Assistance Agency proposed rebuilding the KAF. An Air Force assessment team entered Cambodia in October 1973 to determine the KAF’s ability to absorb greatly accelerated deliveries of US defense articles and services. Their findings and recommendations, titled the Tactical Air Improvement Plan (TAIP): Cambodia, were favorably reviewed by President Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. They decided to initiate a security assistance surge operation.

The KAF received one squadron of AT-28 attack aircraft, one squadron of C-123 transports, one squadron of AC-47 gunships, one squadron of O-1D forward air control aircraft, and one squadron of AU-24 Helio Stallion light armed utility short takeoff and land aircraft. The surge included all support items and services including training, fuel, munitions, aircraft spare parts, and the complete refurbishment of a squadron of UH-1H helicopters. KAF combat aircrews successfully employed their newly acquired aircraft with great effect throughout the range of assigned airpower tasks and missions.

In the face of a highly motivated and determined foe, Cambodia fell to communist forces in the spring of 1975. While overall US strategy in the region did not succeed, the TAIP helped stave off defeat and preserved the Khmer Republic for a number of months—months it would not have had without a security assistance surge operation. Although it only partially achieved its objectives, the TAIP helped prove the future viability of surge operations.

—Jerome W. Klingaman, Director of Strategy and Plans, Sixth Special Operations Squadron
The long-term implications of major force structure changes in the host air force should be considered during surge planning activities. A near-term payoff in operational capability should be weighed against anticipated post-surge funding levels and long-term requirements within the host nation. The potential for the perception of a lack of support following surge operations should be considered.

**PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP)**

PSYOP and FID operations can be complementary and produce synergistic effects. PSYOP considerations and planning should be included in all FID activities, even when those activities are not primarily designed to achieve psychological effects. Operations and logistics planners at all levels of command should carefully consider the psychological implications of any Air Force action involving direct or indirect support to a foreign government. Accordingly, PSYOP planning should be closely tied to all-source intelligence on friendly and hostile elements. FID planners should also anticipate enemy psychological operations directed at Air Force operations in the host nation. Operations likely to generate counterpropaganda operations requirements should be coordinated with appropriate US and HN public affairs and information agencies.

**CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA)**

In some circumstances, US Army or Marine Corps CA augmentation teams may be needed to support Air Force elements deployed overseas on FID operations. FID planners should identify requirements for CA support early in the planning process. CA teams can assist in preparing overseas bases and facilities by securing local acceptance and support of Air Force operations. CA teams can also assist deployed Air Force forces by providing information on local civilian attitudes, culture, religions, ethics, infrastructure, and conflict dynamics in the area of operations. CA teams can also coordinate Air Force humanitarian and civic assistance and civic action programs and help HN authorities secure the cooperation and support of their own citizens.

**SIMULATION AND GAMING**

Simulation and gaming may be used to facilitate planning for FID. Success of military operations in FID often depends on the planner’s ability to assess a broad range of complex, mutually related problems involving human and technological factors. Simulation and gaming based on country-specific models are useful tools for identifying these factors and for developing and testing appropriate airpower roles and operations, security assistance initiatives, and direct-support options.
CHAPTER SEVEN
EMPLOYMENT

The Air Force needs to look hard at expanding CAA into something bigger in scope than it is today. CAA is an important facet of foreign internal defense, but our new coalition partners require training beyond specialized airpower. There is a growing need to conduct air centric, post conflict stability operations—for example, rebuilding air force and civil air infrastructure. We see an increasing demand for conventional Air Force expertise in command and control, fighters, training and simulation, base setup and support, and information operations.

—Lieutenant General Michael W. Wooley
Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command

Air Force FID primarily entails airpower enablement, i.e., helping foreign aviation forces employ, sustain, and defend their resources at required levels of capability. US and supported allied commanders practice unity of command, create economy of force, and use maneuver to achieve desired objectives.

As with their US counterparts, allied commanders should employ airpower forces as mutually supporting, integrated systems capable of functioning synergistically with surface operations. Air Force commanders should tailor their own FID efforts to specific conflict situations, objectives, and priorities. Direct and indirect efforts should be mutually supporting and integrated with defense and employment efforts on the ground.

Air Force units routinely conduct FID operations as an integral part of the overall military assistance effort the US extends to selected foreign governments. The delivery of US defense articles and services, in the form of major weapon systems, spare parts, maintenance support items, and training provided under security assistance are examples. Although the US aviation role can be extensive, the term “aviation FID” generally refers to DOD programs for assessing, training, advising, and assisting HN aviation forces in the sustained use of airpower to help their governments deal with internal threats.

FID operations are not a SOF-only arena. It may be necessary to expand and tailor the FID capabilities of general-purpose forces to accomplish national security objectives. This stems from dramatic shortfalls in the infrastructures and administrative mechanisms of important partner nations in the lesser-developed world. Protracted FID efforts may require forces to know how to operate by, with, and through indigenous forces to reach end goals. Operating by, with, and through the personnel and aviation resources of another air force is a crucial skill to be developed to meet the demands of the modern asymmetric battlefield.
During extended counterinsurgency operations, Air Force commanders should be prepared to play an important role in identifying and introducing to foreign aviation forces aircraft types and capabilities, as well as airpower operational functions, ACS resources, information, and technology specifically suited to the needs and capabilities of lesser-developed partner nations. Commanders may be required to help foreign aviation forces fly and maintain aircraft that are non-standard to the US Air Force inventory.

FID-provided training includes development of basic skills in flight operations, logistics, force protection, ISR, weather, health services, and other support functions. More advanced specialized training should be used to provide foreign personnel a means of applying these basic skills to specific problems affecting internal security in their countries. Such training directly supports internal, host-nation solutions to the conflict, thus decreasing the likelihood of a larger US military role. Where practical, tactical and operational-level training should be conducted jointly. Joint training offers major advantages in developing common understandings among host-military Services of requirements, capabilities, limitations, and procedures. Multinational participation lays the groundwork for future contacts between US and host-country personnel by establishing mutual understanding of FID-IDAD requirements and objectives.

**AIR FORCE FID**

The geopolitical environment and US force structure reductions have increased US reliance on the ability of foreign friends and allies to defend themselves and to function as viable coalition partners. There is increased emphasis by planners and joint force commanders on creating combined as well as joint battlefields. That task, which involves facilitating the availability, reliability, safety, and interoperability of foreign forces, will fall to US military trainers and advisors.

The advisor is the JFC’s most immediate point of contact with foreign counterparts and coalition forces. Air Force training and advisory personnel represent the airpower component of this overall advisory effort.

The size and composition of US military training and advisory teams should be sufficient to address the major deficiencies that affect the host air force. Trainers and advisors should also be able to recognize potential airpower applications in a given internal conflict. Trainers and advisors should understand the various elements of ACS as well as their application and interdependence when conducting FID. They should understand the means and
possible limitations of integrating airpower operations into the HN’s social, economic, psychological, political, and joint military initiatives.

Trainers and advisors exert a major influence on foreign counterpart forces. They help the JFC bring foreign forces into contingency planning as force multipliers and help keep the coalition connected at the tactical level by engaging foreign forces in tactical environments. This task includes advising foreign aviation units in both airpower applications and airpower sustainment methods supporting joint and combined objectives.

The assess-train-advise-assist mission set can be performed at any level of FID: Indirect support, direct support (not including combat), and direct support (including combat). Air Force FID assistance to foreign governments conducting counterinsurgency is referred to as “support for counterinsurgency.”

Aviation FID operations primarily involve support to HN counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, and counter-narcotics programs. Aviation FID is intended to function as a complement to other SOF component operations involving ground, maritime, and riverine advisory assistance and training conducted with HN forces in various theaters of operation. In the case of FID, training and advisory operations can be employed to encourage and support HN solutions to the problems of internal subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency, and should be conducted prior to the onset of crisis or war, thus supporting the strategic goals of conflict prevention and deterrence as well as regime and regional stability.

Commanders should anticipate the precise types and levels of training needed by HNs to succeed in military operations to counter terrorist groups or insurgents. As an example, foreign forces engaged in CT operations should train in specific tactical actions needed to accomplish the task, e.g., small-unit tactics, helicopter alternate insertion and extraction, rappelling, and night operations. This training may require foreign air force units to shift their basic tactics for both rotary-winged vehicles and fixed-wing aircraft from point-to-point airlift to precision insertion, extraction, and resupply. It is not simply a matter of what platform to use, but how to use that platform. Air support elements also have to work closely with their surface force counterparts to develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures required for combat operations against terrorist forces.

Major improvements in the air support capabilities of candidate foreign aviation forces may be required to achieve “mission-ready” COIN or CT status. Foreign forces need to be able to generate and apply detailed intelligence in the air support mission planning and execution processes. It also means transitioning from day or night, point-to-point visual flight rules navigation in relatively benign environments to night, low-level navigation into remote, hostile locations using night vision goggles. These capabilities have been successfully introduced in some lesser-developed nations, but the skill sets are not universal.
Assess-Train-Advise-Assist

A variety of personnel throughout the Air Force can accomplish the assess, train, advise, and assist mission set. Although the Air Force possesses forces specifically organized, trained, and equipped to accomplish the assess, train, advise, and assist mission, the need for these skills worldwide exceeds the number of specialized forces available. This is especially true in cases when training and advisory forces must maintain presence and persistence at overseas locations for extended periods of time. Commanders should consider all available options for enabling foreign aviation forces through FID training and advisory initiatives.

When tasked, Air Force training and advisory personnel deploy to a designated country, collocate with HN aviation elements at squadron, wing, or headquarters levels, and assess, train, advise, and assist counterpart personnel in the employment and sustainment of airpower operations. Training and advisory assistance is conducted at both the operational and tactical levels.

In appropriate instances, US instructor aircrews fly with foreign counterparts at the deployment location, generally using HN aircraft, to assess capabilities and determine current levels of proficiency and safety. The instructors may then train HN aviation personnel in required tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint and combined warfare.

The mission set of assessing, training, advising, and assisting is founded on critical sequencing. All training and advisory efforts involving flying should be preceded by an assessment of the airworthiness and safety of the HN unit’s aircraft and crews. The assessment is required for familiarization with HN aviation capabilities and procedures before commencement of combined operations. It is also required as a basis for conducting risk management and for estimating possible levels of combined interoperability.

Tactical flying training may be required to bring HN aviation forces to the point where they can be advised in airpower applications supporting campaign or air operations objectives. The basic steps in this process are sequential—assess, train, advise, assist. Commanders should issue directives or operating instructions clearly defining which steps are authorized and tasked.

Upon appropriate direction, tactically qualified aircrews may be required to fly with HN counterparts on certain critical missions to provide the needed margin of safety and reliability, especially when supporting other US or US-advised forces. To facilitate combined air planning, aircrews also advise appropriate US command elements (based on first-hand experience) of foreign-aviation capabilities and limitations.

General-purpose Air Force forces can be brought into such programs as security assistance-funded MTTs, advisory support teams, and military transition teams (MiTT) that train, advise, or simply mentor foreign aviation forces. These teams provide a
means of reaching outside the special operations-oriented arena to train and advise in a broader range of airpower functions and supporting tasks for FID and counterinsurgency.

While such teams can be created for specific purposes, commanders should take appropriate steps to ensure that members deploying to overseas locations are properly trained and equipped for the task. As an example, during the late summer of 2006, 105 Air Force MiTT members were trained by AFSOC CAA forces and deployed for extended duty as embedded advisors with the Iraqi Air Force.

FID training and advising have traditionally focused on tactical flying skills and associated sustainment capabilities at the squadron and wing levels of foreign aviation units. Historically, however, the most significant problems encountered during Air Force overseas training and contingency operations involve senior HN air force leaders having no idea how to effectively organize and train their forces and not knowing how to even approach the task of creating regulations and operating instructions to establish operational boundaries. The problem affects operational-level sustainment in such areas as administration, resource programming, training, aircraft maintenance, logistics, force protection, standardization and evaluation, and certification of skills.

Commanders should seek opportunities to elevate Air Force training and advisory efforts to higher levels of HN military leadership and address such issues as basic air force infrastructure, organization, training, C2, logistics, and procurement processes. The effort should be focused on building effective foundations for a lasting and competent self defense, rather than a temporary capability that swiftly erodes with the exodus of external support. In most cases, this larger perspective is needed before evaluating, recommending, and funding specific tactical weapon systems, technical capabilities, and training.

The task of training and advising foreign aviation forces in these large-scale infrastructure changes and initiatives is a significant challenge for Air Force training and advisory personnel. Air Force CAA resources and skill sets do not usually include mechanisms for assisting foreign aviation forces with broad, fundamental changes to basic administrative processes and logistics infrastructures. The skills and level of experience needed to accomplish this task generally reside within the more experienced levels of the Air Force community.

The Air Force approach to foreign assistance and advisory efforts should be integrated at the joint and interagency levels. Commanders should consider ways and means to identify qualified senior-level officers and noncommissioned officers to either augment CAA operations or carry out well-defined FID airpower infrastructure-building initiatives on their own.

The level of success achievable in Air Force FID operations is contingent on the training and performance of the people performing this specialized mission. Foreign
area and geopolitical expertise, language ability, cultural intelligence, and advanced force protection capability are indispensable tools in the FID toolkit.

**Training Versus Advising**

There is an important difference between training and advising. Training, a form of indirect support, can provide a doctrinal or procedural foundation for military operations and activities. Advising is a form of direct support that may or may not include combat, and involves the practical application of operational doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures in the host country. Advising is real-world, situation-specific, and can directly implicate the US in a given HN contingency or operation. Generally, the step from training to advising crosses a critical political threshold requiring Presidential approval. Commanders should ensure that clearly-defined rules of engagement containing operational guidelines and parameters are drawn up and made available to tasked Air Force training and advisory personnel.

Training enables foreign aviation forces to accomplish a variety of airpower functional tasks, roles, and missions. Instructional programs impart employable capabilities ranging from technical skills, sustainment functions, and tactical flying skills to knowledge of airpower doctrine. Training includes operational planning and employment methods; combat tactics, techniques, and procedures; sustainment methods; and operational support activities including design and employment of communication structures. FID training initiatives should be tailored to fit a realistic analysis of human factors as well as the technological and financial limitations in recipient nations.

Advice on airpower application is often most effective when applied at top decision-making levels within the host government. Advice on strategic matters, operational-level planning, joint operations, and the integration of multiple governmental agencies is appropriately directed at higher levels of the military command structure. In addition, advisory efforts may have a more lasting effect and can carry considerably more weight when acted upon by senior members of the host military.

Advisors should help HN commanders apply an operational-level perspective to such issues as air base planning and construction, air base defense, logistics, intelligence, C2, and training. Field advisors should help local subordinate commanders ensure that tactical air support planning follows joint operational-level guidance and that tactical operations are properly coordinated and integrated with other military and civil activities. Besides providing technical assistance on operating and maintaining US defense articles, field advice should focus on such issues as air base security and operability, resource conservation, munitions safety, and ground-handling procedures. Advisors also should help HN air force commanders focus on the political and psychological implications of combat operations.

Air Force advisors are often in the best position to identify requirements for additional security assistance efforts or more direct forms of support because of their
close contact with in-country IDAD operations. When tasked by proper authorities, they should coordinate US direct support activities with host authorities and help analyze and interpret US-provided intelligence.

**FID Assistance**

FID assistance extends the duties of an Air Force trainer or advisor to the level of helping a foreign counterpart accomplish his/her technical specialty. This may entail an Air Force maintenance technician helping a foreign counterpart fix or maintain an aircraft or item of equipment or engage an Air Force Security Forces trainer or advisor in directly assisting a foreign counterpart establish and maintain base security.

Generally, the step from advising to assisting crosses another political threshold, requiring Presidential authority when the tasks are performed in conjunction with real-world HN tactical operations. Assisting in the capacity of aircrew member under hostile-fire conditions is an example of direct support (including combat). Commanders should ensure that clearly-defined rules of engagement are drawn up and made available to Air Force training and advisory teams.

**Combat Aviation Advisors**

While most Air Force units could conduct FID operations, a small number of Air Force personnel are specifically focused on training and maintaining readiness for this mission. Leveraging their capabilities increases the probability of success when conducting FID training and advisory operations. Air Force personnel structured and tasked to accomplish the assess, train, advise, and assist mission on a routine basis are referred to as combat aviation advisors. Currently, only AFSOC maintains CAA teams who possess specialized FID skills and capabilities.

Commanders should employ CAA teams when FID operations take place in remote, forward operating locations and there are no other US military forces present. CAA teams should also be employed when the training, advising, and assisting involve special operations-oriented tactics, techniques, and procedures or operations are conducted jointly with or support other US special operations forces.

CAA teams, organized into operational aviation detachments (OAD), assess, train, advise, and assist foreign aviation forces in tactical and operational-level airpower employment and sustainment. Tactical OAD teams facilitate the availability, reliability, safety, and interoperability of air combat and combat support forces, and help integrate those forces into joint and multinational operations throughout the range of military operations.

A CAA team represents a highly specialized collection of capabilities. Taskings for this capability can materialize quickly, and it cannot be put together *ad hoc*. The team’s training is directed towards enabling the individual to operate successfully on the ground in the fluid conditions and sometimes autonomous structures inherent in FID operations.
CAA team members can mission plan, execute, and recover in a variety of FID scenarios with little assistance, accomplishing this within legislative and military guidance. CAA teams generally deploy and operate alone. In most cases, they provide their own tactical communications and force protection when deployed.

Specialized Characteristics of CAA Forces

Although CAA personnel are not the only forces capable of training, advising, and assisting foreign aviation forces, the peculiar demands of this mission have led to the development of unique and specialized skills. These forces train, plan, and conduct operations to maximize several specialized characteristics of the organization: Foreign language skills, tailored force packaging, and competency in nonstandard aircraft and aviation support programs. Combat aviation advisors are distinguished by such attributes as cultural and political astuteness, adaptability to field conditions, and an in-depth knowledge of US and foreign C2 structures. Teams receive extensive training in CAA-peculiar field-craft, advanced weapons and survival, tactical communications, security assistance law, academic-instructor methods, and area/theater orientation.

Most CAA personnel are volunteers who are qualified instructors in a particular Air Force specialty code. Approximately six months of advisor-related, individual- and team-oriented training equip them with area orientation, field-craft, and “move, shoot, and
communicate” ground-combat operating skills that prepare them to function successfully in the joint, SOF, multinational, and interagency arenas. CAA teams generally deploy and operate alone with what they have. In most instances, they provide their own force protection when deployed.

CAA employment characteristics include minimal strategic airlift requirements and limited go-it-alone capability for operating from austere operating locations. Minimum bulk plus simplicity and ease of operation equal tactical agility for CAA team members. CAA characteristics include a small logistics footprint, fast in-theater pick-up-and-go mobility, and communications equipment capable of maintaining critical connectivity among OAD teams, and between the teams and higher C2 elements, e.g., the JFACC or a joint special operations air component.

**CAA Employment**

CAA personnel do not train foreign personnel in basic military skills, although they do provide weapon systems upgrade training under special funding arrangements. Accordingly, the term adaptive training is used to distinguish between instruction in applied tactics, techniques, and procedures tailored to specific tactical needs and types of aircraft and more basic types of instruction provided through such agencies as undergraduate pilot training and the Inter-American Air Forces Academy. The adaptive training approach advances these basic skills through advice or instruction in the host language and is provided in the host country using the equipment at hand. This approach helps foreign air units adapt their basic skills to specific environmental and tactical conflict situations.

Assistance to foreign aviation units can be provided through MTTs programmed and funded under security assistance or performed in conjunction with other programs conducted by the GCCs and by various agencies of the US government. CAA forces conduct MTT activities in fulfillment of US Government and GCC security assistance objectives, but must operate in accordance with security assistance law, which restricts MTT members from taking part in combat operations. Combat restrictions, or constraints, governing CAA activities in such programs are provided under security assistance law and the established rules of engagement.

As part of their overall mission capability, CAA teams provide direct assistance to DOD and non-DOD agencies on foreign aviation issues. This is an inherent capability of any Air Force CAA unit. Commanders should employ CAA teams for assessments of foreign aviation capabilities, liaison with foreign aviation forces, and assistance in air campaign planning. CAA personnel can also be employed to perform surveys aimed at identifying opportunities and requirements for joint and combined operations, contingencies, exercises, and training.

CAA teams can perform their missions with various types of foreign air force units. Given the small size and principal combat orientation of the typical CAA team, however, its priority mission focus is developing and improving foreign aviation special operations capabilities to complement all other joint and combined operations. Developing and
maintaining indigenous special air operations capabilities is important to countries that must deal with internal, asymmetric threats that do not qualify as traditional military targets, e.g., guerrilla insurgency, criminal subversion, terrorism, illicit drug production and trafficking, environmental pillage, and poaching.

Although there are currently very few dedicated AFSOF aviation units in lesser-developed countries, the need for this capability is steadily increasing, primarily for counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and counter-narcotics operations. Where such units do exist, or where special operations-oriented skills can be created from existing conventional resources, the CAA objective is to help indigenous aviation forces provide their governments tailored options and greater flexibility, stealth, surgical execution, speed, and surprise.

**Combat Aviation Advisory Operations—From Past to Present**

More than 30 years ago, air commandos of the Air Force Special Operations Force trained and advised foreign aviation forces around the world in the use of airpower to counter communist-sponsored “wars of national liberation.” That advisory capability was lost at the end of the war in Southeast Asia, and global conflicts eventually transformed themselves into other forms—radical nationalist movements and separatist insurrections, state-sponsored terrorism, syndicated narco violence, and regional warfare.

In October, 1994, the Air Force reactivated one of its original air commando units, the Sixth Special Operations Squadron (6 SOS), to join forces with Army Special Forces and Navy SEALS [sea, air, land forces] to work with foreign counterparts in countering these evolving threats. Today, the combat mission of the 6 SOS is to assess, train, advise, and assist foreign aviation forces in airpower employment, sustainment, and force integration in three interrelated mission areas: Foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, and coalition support. When conducting tactical training and advisory operations, 6 SOS personnel focus on facilitating the availability, reliability, safety, and interoperability of host-nation aviation resources supporting joint and multinational operations.

This mission carries over into training and advising foreign aviation combat and combat support units in logistics sustainment, air base defense, command and control, survival, and other functions supporting air operations. The 6 SOS also helps combatant commanders and civilian agencies plan and integrate foreign air operations into theater campaign plans, contingencies, and other joint and multinational activities.

—Jerome W. Klingaman,
Director of Strategy and Plans,
Sixth Special Operations Squadron
An experienced CAA team member with advanced skills should be armed with the relevant strategic issues surrounding the FID task. Such issues include:

- How a threatened nation applies its instruments of national power to counter an internal threat and how strategic ends, ways, and means differ from previous strategic models.
- The joint and interagency opportunities, tasks, and players.
- Given the current threat posed by radical Islam and its global aims, consideration of a new model.
- The political, economic, informational, and military tools.
- In the military realm, how HN land, maritime, and airpower function, and how military forces gain and maintain currency and relevancy in the CT/COIN fight.
- How coalition operations for CT/COIN affect the way CAAs train as a joint, interagency team.

For the CAA team member, understanding these strategic issues is vital for finding answers and solutions, including at the operational and tactical levels.

CAA mission capabilities are built around the need to provide foreign forces specialized tactical training and advisory assistance in such skills as helicopter alternate insertion and extraction, remote operations, aerial gunnery, night vision device usage, fixed-wing aerial delivery, air-land insertion and extraction, personnel air-drop techniques, air-ground interface, PSYOP, and close air support. These skill sets, which represent critical capabilities in combating terrorism and counterinsurgency, happen to fall mostly within special operations mission boundaries.

**FID Training**

Individuals who command, plan, and administer FID operations should understand the operational environment and how deployed forces function under existing C2 relationships between combatant organizations and US diplomatic missions. FID trainers and advisors should understand the correct relationship of military force to other instruments of national power in counterinsurgency and combating terrorism, and recognize appropriate uses of airpower. Courses of instruction should be tailored to fit user and operator requirements and should be administered to personnel before they assume FID duties. Air Force FID training should enable deploying FID trainers and advisors to operate and survive as small teams in forward, remote areas outside the C2 mechanisms and force protection of other US military forces.

Commanders preparing FID forces for overseas deployment should coordinate with supported agencies to determine the types and depth of training required for specific activities and locations. General familiarization in such areas as operational environments, uses of military force, and airpower functions and operations provides Air
Force personnel a broad conceptual framework for planning and executing FID operations. This training has extensive application for all FID participants and serves as the introduction to more specialized forms of instruction.

The value of foreign language training cannot be overemphasized. Language requirements vary. Experience indicates that training and advising in Central and South America is virtually impossible without being able to speak reasonably fluent Spanish. FID operations in Central Asia will be conducted in Russian, a local native language, or carried out through an interpreter. French is required in many African countries. In other countries, some of the officers speak English while almost none of the enlisted personnel can.

If training or exercises do not reflect realism, the stress and challenges of actual conditions, then our Airmen will not be prepared when they are called upon to execute their mission. Training programs must be aligned with expected outcomes and provide realistic experience to greatly improve skill competency. Stress, unpredictability, fatigue, night operations, adverse weather, simulated equipment breakdowns, and chemical and biological contamination are examples of the challenges our men and women will face in the field and should be trained to overcome.

—Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1, Leadership and Force Development

Although CAA teams are unique in the Air Force, the way in which they achieve mission-ready status can provide a template for training other Air Force forces in this arena. A variety of FID-related instructional programs are available to Air Force personnel. Additional FID training is available through other US military departments and civilian agencies via inter-Service or interagency support agreements. Service academies and developmental education programs should be employed as sources of general education in FID matters. Civilian universities and colleges also have area studies and other instructional programs. Further, the Air Force and joint special operations establishments provide both general education and specialized training in insurgency-counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, and function as the principal source of specialized FID instruction on airpower matters for deploying Air Force training and advisory teams and for direct support elements.

Various civilian departments, agencies, and independent establishments of the US government are potential sources of specialized and technical instruction in such areas
as intelligence, PSYOP, counter-drug, civil and military law enforcement, civic action, nation assistance, nation building, country team operations, and public information programs.

CAA teams undergo extensive preparation before being certified as “mission ready.” This includes training and education in a variety of individual skills including cross-cultural communications, regional area orientation, battlespace C2, and conflict analysis. Integrated skills training (IST) consists of ground school and intense field training exercises that enable candidate aviation advisors to move, shoot, and communicate and to bring a broad range of individual skills together in a focused team effort.

IST training, which includes advanced weapons, combat casualty care, tactical communications, deployment planning, and personnel survival, enables CAA personnel to perform the FID mission and survive in remote regions of the world outside the force-protection capabilities and immediate C2 and logistics support structures of larger US expeditionary forces. IST includes the legal dimensions of FID planning and execution, as well as the development of specialized skills in training and advising foreign military personnel. Advanced field-craft training allows CAA teams to exercise a high degree of self-sufficiency while deployed.

Security Assistance Teams

Air Force security assistance teams supplement SAO capabilities by providing training, advice, and technical assistance to recipient nations. The teams, funded under security assistance, vary in size and composition. Air Force personnel may deploy as an Air Force team or function as the air component of a larger joint effort. When the operation involves training or advisory efforts aimed at developing tactics, techniques, and procedures, teams should include Air Force members and members from the other US Services when appropriate. Appendix C has additional details on security assistance efforts.

Combatant commanders may employ Air Force security assistance teams for limited support on technical training in the operation and maintenance of specific airpower systems. The principal criteria for team selection are competence in the specialty requested, teaching skills, and language compatibility with host-nation recipients. When training and advisory assistance teams are required to provide guidance on planning, developing, and employing airpower, teaching skills in one technical specialty are rarely sufficient.

Country teams or combatant commanders normally initiate in-country support requirements, which should be based on recommendations derived from surveys and assessments. This approach anticipates the problem of a team deploying overseas to develop or improve operational capabilities of a particular weapon system when the host air force lacks the infrastructure or resources to employ the system effectively.
Surveys on security assistance support of FID should include three basic tasks. The first task is to determine appropriate airpower roles and operations for the given conflict or pre-conflict situation. Second, the team then conducts an assessment of the HN’s ability to fulfill these roles with existing airpower resources. Finally, the team develops requirements and recommendations for improvements that can be carried out through HN initiatives or through additional US assistance. Besides helping to provide US defense equipment and services to the host nation, Air Force logistics personnel should advise host-nation authorities on the use of airpower to establish and sustain IDAD programs through aerial lines of supply and personnel movement.

Training and equipment provided to the host nation may not be sufficient to ensure the success of aviation programs in some conflict situations. When authorized and directed by appropriate legal authority, Air Force advisory personnel may also be employed to advise host air force units on how to employ air-support resources in a manner that serves the combined interests of the US and the host nation.

**Joint and Combined Actions**

In certain training scenarios, or during wartime or contingency deployments, training and advisory Air Force personnel may collocate with both US and HN land or naval forces to accomplish required liaison functions and to advise on certain aspects of joint air-ground operations. Specially qualified advisors can accompany US Army or Navy teams into an objective area to provide an Airman’s perspective. Support to Army or Navy counterparts can entail aviation assessments of HN capabilities and limitations as well as operational- or tactical-level advice on the employment of HN airpower in varying political and military environments. Support may also include familiarization with the characteristics of HN tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Personnel of other Services may accompany and train with CAA teams in an objective area to provide the necessary ground or maritime perspective in a combined arms scenario. An Army Special Forces (SF) or Navy SEAL team member, for example, can help a 6 SOS team provide HN air force personnel a surface warfare perspective on joint air-ground operations. At the same time, CAA team members can help the SF or SEAL personnel provide HN army or navy counterparts the corresponding air warfare perspective. This concept is designed to promote effectiveness, safety, and interoperability, not only between HN service components, but also between US SOF and participating HN units. The team’s efforts in this example are aimed at helping the HN aviation unit provide air support to its own ground and maritime forces. In a classic joint initiative, US surface forces, possibly Army SF and Navy SEALs, may be training and advising HN surface-force counterparts.
Commanders should employ CAAs to help plan and integrate foreign aviation forces into combined theater campaigns, contingency actions, and other joint or multinational activities, and to assist foreign aviation forces in operational and tactical planning. To assist in shaping the battlefield prior to the onset of crisis or war, commanders can employ CAAs to promote and test combined effectiveness, safety, and interoperability among joint-coalition players. CAAs have specific capabilities that can be employed by the JFC and JFACC, depending on the characteristics of the operating environment.

JFACCs should employ CAAs to maintain vital coordination links between US and combined air tasking authorities and foreign aviation units. Support includes liaison and advisory assistance to the JFACC for air tasking order (ATO) planning and execution involving foreign aviation forces. Assistance includes facilitating airspace deconfliction and area air defense coordination among coalition partners, evaluating safety and interoperability between US and foreign forces, and increasing the tactical effectiveness of foreign airpower in combined operations. CAA teams may be used when foreign aviation forces are employed as theater-assigned assets and operations involving dissimilar types of aircraft are envisioned. For additional information, see JP 3-07.1, Joint Doctrine on Foreign Internal Defense.

**DIRECT SUPPORT**

The Air Force can provide direct support at varying levels of conflict intensity to enhance or supplement security assistance initiatives and host aviation programs. To preserve HN self-sufficiency and legitimacy, the Air Force should maintain a proper balance between direct and indirect forms of assistance. Balanced assistance preserves host self-sufficiency and legitimacy. Such direct support initiatives as combat advising and assisting may be used concurrently with security assistance to prevent the transition to more destructive forms of warfare and higher levels of US involvement. At the same time, direct support initiatives should not undermine the HN’s will or capacity to achieve an internal solution to the crisis.

HN airpower requirements may exceed the objectives and limitations of security assistance and joint-multinational exercises. At the same time, a US combat role may also be tactically inappropriate or politically infeasible as a FID instrument. To satisfy some of these requirements at acceptable levels of commitment and risk, the Air Force can employ its resources in a variety of direct support roles that bridge the gap between indirect assistance and combat operations. Examples include intelligence sharing, logistics airlift, equipment loans, communications support, and other “stand-off” options.

Direct support (not including combat) does not eliminate all risks, but it does offer a means of providing specialized assistance to a host country without intentionally exposing US personnel to hostile fire. Direct Air Force involvement in such activities as HCA and MCA requires the physical presence of Air Force personnel working in close contact with friendly elements. For some operations like intelligence collection and PSYOP, it may be possible to conduct operations from outside the recipient country.
when there are political or operational constraints on the presence of Air Force assets on foreign installations. Clandestine or low-visibility techniques and procedures in politically sensitive or denied areas may also be required for combat operations. Commanders should consider the use of Air Force special operations forces to conduct these kinds of operations if required.

During combined operations, commanders should anticipate differences in tactics, techniques, and procedures between US and HN forces. Commanders should consider using Air Force advisory personnel to resolve these differences and make adjustments to fit the strengths and weaknesses of the combined force. Commanders may also have to tailor their operating procedures to suit specific objectives, operational constraints, and policies pertaining to the use of Air Force forces in the host country.

A central objective of combat operations is to protect vital resources and to buy time for the host government to stabilize its social, economic, and political institutions. The Air Force role here is supportive only. It is not designed to capture the strategic initiative or to transfer strategic responsibilities from the host government to the US. To preserve its legitimacy and achieve a lasting, internal solution to the conflict, the host government must carry full responsibility for the strategic offensive. The Air Force FID effort should be designed to transfer air support tasks and responsibilities to the host nation as soon as practical.

**FORCE PROTECTION**

Force protection for FID applies to deployed operational units supporting host-nation IDAD programs. Commanders exercise force protection to ensure the defense and survival of US personnel, facilities, C2 structures, and weapon systems. Specific force protection guidance is contained in AFDD 2-4.1, *Force Protection*.

FID training and advisory teams often deploy to locations where there is no other US military presence. Commanders should, commensurate with the estimated threat level, ensure that force protection personnel deploy as an integral part of the team. Teams are typically small. Accordingly, force protection personnel should be prepared to conduct threat, criticality, vulnerability, and risk assessments and make recommendations to the commander for risk management. They should also provide some measure of force protection for the deployed team. This allows indigenous security force personnel to augment the US team’s force protection effort and provide security for their own forces and resources. The early integration of HN security forces into the FID operating environment should be afforded priority consideration. In-country training and advisory FID teams should possess a robust BFT capability, or similar capability.
PERSONNEL RECOVERY

PR for FID applies to all deployed operational units supporting HN IDAD programs. Specific personnel recovery guidance is outlined in AFDD 2-1.6, Personnel Recovery Operations.

Training and advisory teams often deploy to locations where there is no other US presence, and are typically outside the normal PR architecture. In those cases, support from national space agencies becomes vitally important. Commanders responsible for this type of FID activity should ensure plans are in place to support self-recovery operations, and that PR plans are integrated with the team’s force protection plan. If lack of HN PR infrastructure dictates, Air Force CSAR forces can assess, train, advise, and assist as needed to maintain team integrity and establish HN mechanisms for PR operations, thereby enhancing safety of US and HN forces.

Effective integration of PR advisory operations serves two primary purposes. First, training and advising in PR assists the HN with its overall employment of airpower during combat operations and search and recovery (SAR) activities. Second, effective PR training enhances the HN’s capability to execute PR operations in support of US activities during potential contingency operations.

FOREIGN AIRCRAFT AND SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS

As long as enhancing foreign airpower capabilities remains essential to US overseas defense posture or exit strategies, Air Force commanders will be increasingly called upon to provide ideas and recommendations to establish or increase foreign capabilities to perform successfully in this vital conflict arena. Commanders may have to define aircraft and systems options for counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and counter-drug programs in terms of various types of equipment that could be employed on certain types of aircraft and indicate possible courses of action, including off-the-shelf air platforms, modifications, and systems match-ups that would fit with foreign aviation needs and capabilities.

The ability of Air Force personnel to conduct FID in the assess-train-advise-assist mode depends on the airpower capabilities of assisted nations. Commanders should be aware that the ability of lesser-developed nations to perform airpower roles varies enormously, based mostly on levels of indigenous funding, technology, and training.

Optimal Solutions

Optimum solutions involving the enablement of foreign aviation forces are those that are the most realistic for a given set of conditions in the host nation. Exploiting the full potential of airpower in foreign aviation units will depend on a host of factors including cost, availability, complexity, ease of maintenance, durability, survivability, performance trade-offs, etc. Regardless of how obvious or desirable a particular capability or air platform may be, the recommended assets must fit within the technological and financial
resources, as well as the mission needs, of assisted nations. As an example, a day-night capability with real-time tactical awareness promoting maximum threat avoidance and minimum threat exposure to defeat a threat in non-permissive environments is a desired goal, but it may be unsupportable given the prevailing financial and technological restrictions in the typical host nation.

Achieving US foreign policy objectives in the FID arena may, in some instances, require that selected host nations actually possess aircraft capable of performing the critical operational functions discussed in Chapter Three—air mobility, ISR, counterland, and CSAR/CASEVAC. In addition to cost and complexity considerations, aircraft optimized for internal defense of countries with lesser developed militaries should be able to operate from relatively unimproved forward operating locations and be sustainable in the field for extended periods of time using small aviation maintenance teams.

At the very heart of warfare lies doctrine....
SUGGESTED READINGS

Air Force Publications
(Note: All Air Force doctrine documents are available on the Air Force Doctrine Center web page at https://www.doctrine.af.mil)
- AFDD 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*
- AFDD 2, *Operations and Organization*
- AFDD 2-1.3, *Counterland Operations*
- AFDD 2-1.6, *Personnel Recovery Operations*
- AFDD 2-3, *Irregular Warfare*
- AFDD 2-4, *Combat Support*
- AFDD 2-4.1, *Force Protection*
- AFDD 2-4.2, *Health Services*
- AFDD 2-5, *Information Operations*
- AFDD 2-7, *Special Operations*

Joint Publications
- JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*
- JP 3-07.6, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*
- JP 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*
- JP 3-57, *Doctrine for Joint Civil-Military Operations*

Other Publications


APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

To establish a realistic context for COIN air operations, this appendix describes the dynamics of classical insurgency and counterinsurgency. A detailed treatment of the many variants and paradigms of counterinsurgency is beyond the scope of this document. Accordingly, the following text attempts to establish a generic profile for the conflict arena, knowing full well that insurgencies vary considerably in scope and detail. There are situations, for example, where insurgent forces may want something less than total control of the government. Insurgents seeking greater autonomy for the province of Kosovo as an integrated part of Serbia are an example, as are Kurdish rebels trying to win basic rights in Turkey. There are also examples of insurgents being totally impervious to government reforms or concessions; e.g., Khmer Rouge fighters bent on destroying the government and all its supporters through combat actions.

The appendix describes ways to apply various instruments of power to achieve balanced development, neutralize enemy combatant forces, and promote political mobilization and legitimacy through reforming economic and legal sectors of society, alleviating grievances, recognizing causes, etc. This appendix provides Air Force commanders, trainers, advisors, and other personnel involved in FID a basic framework for understanding and evaluating the major components of the conflict arena. This framework is the basis for Air Force FID planning and execution, and especially for recognizing appropriate and inappropriate uses of airpower resources.

The discussion focuses on the nature and characteristics of insurgency and counterinsurgency and on the major functions and objectives of a HN’s IDAD strategy. Insurgencies have individual characteristics that should be taken into consideration. The classic concept of social, economic, and political fragmentation engenders a "winning hearts and minds" approach to successfully countering insurgent movements, an idea that gained relevance during the Vietnam War era. This idea does not have universal application.

ANALYZING INSURGENCY

Because insurgencies vary greatly in form, scope, and intensity, it is impossible to construct a universal model for this type of conflict. However, there are many elements that can be analyzed to determine the composition and likely direction of an insurgent movement. The way an insurgency is inspired, organized, and employed should be of principal interest to FID planners. Typically, insurgency incorporates an ideological content that furnishes a revolutionary theory and cause; a revolutionary infrastructure providing leadership, organization, logistics, communications, and intelligence; and a militant arm to defend the revolutionary movement and help achieve its political
objectives. Understanding these elements allows those defending against an insurgency to direct their campaign against root causes and supporting infrastructure as well as the insurgent's military forces. To devise appropriate countermeasures, including the use of airpower, defense planners should also analyze the insurgent's strategy—the goals and likely methods of attack.

**Ideological Content**

Poverty, class oppression, political disenfranchisement, and ethnic or religious strife often furnish the necessary conditions for revolution, but are rarely sufficient to generate armed conflict. Given economic and political grievances, another condition must be met. A catalyst must be furnished to draw attention to these grievances and focus them on the failure of the state to act in the best interests of the people. The catalyst originates in the ideological content of the revolution (Marxism or religion, for example). Together, the grievances and the ideological content function as necessary conditions to set the revolution in motion. Ideology is the mechanism for connecting the population with the central ideas and goals of the revolutionary movement. It defines the economic and political future of the revolutionary state and provides the inspirational basis for revolt. The ideological underpinnings of a revolution may extend beyond the legitimate needs and aspirations of the people. Insurgents bent on achieving power at any cost often view government reforms as a threat to their political ambitions.

**Revolutionary Infrastructure**

Revolutionary infrastructure furnishes the organizational devices to administer and control all social, economic, informational, political, and military initiatives. Leaders, located at the infrastructure's center, formulate strategic plans, policies, and goals. They are the source of political-ideological order and discipline. In many revolutions, political cadres located throughout the organizational structure represent party leadership. Overall, the infrastructure functions as the heart of the insurgent organization’s C2 system.

The infrastructure is often organized into interconnected, clandestine cells responsible for recruitment, training, intelligence, deception, propaganda, and logistics. C2 lines extend to insurgent military elements and, where possible, to agents located in various segments of local and national government, host military organizations, and society at large. Insurgents may conduct political action and psychological operations through legal front organizations such as labor unions, organized student groups, and registered political parties.

The infrastructure is often a coalition of factions with differing grievances, ideological patterns, and political agendas. When faction leaders differ significantly over revolutionary ends, ways, or means, internal alliances are often dynamic and extremely fragile. The nature of these alliances—their dominant political direction and degree of cohesion—is an important indicator of the nature of the revolution, its strategic goals, strengths, and weaknesses.
Insurgent Strategy

Usually, insurgent strategy is carried out on multiple fronts (through social, economic, informational, political, and military initiatives) to separate the government from the population and to neutralize the government's self-defense mechanisms. The contest is for legitimacy and, where possible, political mobilization of the people. Mobilization furnishes the revolution with workers, fighters, money, weapons, and intelligence, while at the same time denying these assets to the government. By neutralizing the government's authority through the use of propaganda and force, the insurgent creates opportunities to implant forms of political and economic control of the population. In certain types of insurgency, the strategy is ultimately aimed at "out-administering" the host government. Although the insurgent does not necessarily require the active participation of the majority of the population, the insurgent can secure neutrality or passive support.

Military Operations

The insurgent movement usually enters armed conflict with a small insurgent force that increases in strength as personnel and weapons become available. The insurgents fight as guerrillas because they lack the means to apply force quickly and decisively in open battle with defending conventional forces. The insurgents usually begin with little of the materiel and manpower resources available to the government. They avoid all-out confrontations, relying instead on accumulating smaller successes to achieve social, economic, psychological, and political objectives.

Guerrilla tactics extend the revolution with the means available, wearing down the host-nation financial and materiel resources and also the political and moral resolve of foreign friends and allies supporting the counterinsurgency effort. By interdicting vital lines of communication, halting or slowing agricultural production, and inhibiting domestic and foreign trade, the insurgency reduces the government's financial ability to resist. Successful interdiction of economic targets also undermines the legitimacy of the government by creating inflation, higher taxes, and critical shortages of goods and services. Insurgents may also employ terrorism or terrorist techniques (e.g., assassination, bombings, kidnapping, extortion, and blackmail) as tactical instruments to suppress or inhibit government actions. Selective attacks against industrial facilities, transportation systems, government officials, and civil law enforcement agencies may have significant psychological effect, primarily in discrediting the host government's ability to manage and administer the affairs of state.

Guerrilla tactics may also function as a crucial lead-in phase to conventional operations aimed at defeating the government's main forces. In many instances, national security forces are driven into their most defensible positions during the protracted guerrilla phase. This withdrawal provides insurgents time and secures maneuvering space to consolidate their political and economic control in rural areas. It also gives them time to establish their legitimacy and to assemble a larger, more
conventionally structured force capable of making decisive, final assaults on government garrisons. When the defending forces become isolated in static positions, the government's chances of success are poor.

**Phased Actions**

A Maoist-type insurgency is usually a progressive, evolutionary process marked by a series of phases corresponding to major transitions in the revolutionary movement. Although insurgencies can take many forms, three phases are common to many: a pre-hostility or incipient phase, a guerrilla warfare phase, and a conventional confrontation phase.

- **Phase I** corresponds to infrastructure development plus initial recruiting, organizing, training, and equipping of combat elements. During this phase, insurgents may engage the government in open political confrontations like public demonstrations, labor strikes, and boycotts. Insurgents often establish secure base areas for military command elements and guerrilla operations during this phase. Political-ideological cadres focus on indoctrination of civilians and armed revolutionaries.

- **Phase II** is the first level of armed violence. Irregular forces engage in sabotage, interdiction of communication and logistics links, assassination, and selective attacks against government forces. Insurgents expand their secure base areas and, where possible, link them to form strategic enclaves of political autonomy.

- **Phase III** marks the transition from guerrilla actions to operations incorporating the tactics, techniques, and procedures of conventional fire and maneuver.

The reference to conflict phases in a Maoist insurgency is only a means of identifying critical shifts in the scope and intensity of insurgent activity. Phases may not signify a clean break between one kind of activity and another and not every Maoist insurgency will pass through all three phases. Furthermore, non-Maoist insurgencies generally do not follow the three-phase model at all. For example, in Afghanistan’s war against Soviet occupation, insurgent operations essentially consisted of armed violence by irregular forces for the duration of the conflict, with no initial phase of infrastructure development and no transition from guerrilla actions to conventional confrontation required to force the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the collapse of the Soviet-supported government in Afghanistan. For example, infrastructure development is a continuous process of expanding administration, C2, training, and employing mobilized resources. Mobilization of insurgent combat forces must continuously expand to carry the insurgency from one phase to the next. Similarly, guerrilla operations may carry over into the conventional confrontation phase as a force multiplier. Also, an insurgency does not have to progress through all three phases to succeed. A critical combination of political, economic, psychological, and military pressures may be sufficient to precipitate a government's collapse or persuade a government's foreign backers to withdraw at any stage of a conflict.
A revolutionary movement is most vulnerable to government countermeasures during the initial build-up phase, before the insurgent develops military forces. Once the insurgency takes up armed combat, government countermeasures become far more complicated and difficult to apply. Insurgent warfare is, however, reversible. Reversibility can work to the advantage of either side in the conflict. If an insurgency fails militarily in one phase, it can revert to a lower phase, thus securing its survival while generating or reinforcing combat capabilities. The government, on the other hand, may be able to capitalize on reduced levels of military activity to focus on solutions aimed at rooting out the infrastructure and eliminating economic and political grievances that may fuel the revolution.

**COUNTERINSURGENCY**

Countering a revolutionary strategy focused on political or ideological mobilization and protracted violence requires a wide range of social, economic, informational, political, and military initiatives. No single government initiative is sufficient, particularly when the insurgents are able to bind political-ideological goals with genuine grievances. The government's initiatives should be taken simultaneously and should reinforce each other. These initiatives require all instruments of national power be combined into a single, integrated IDAD program using both military and civilian resources. An effective IDAD strategy emphasizes unity of effort, maximum use of intelligence, minimum use of violence, and responsive government leadership and administration. Ideally, the IDAD strategy should be used early enough to prevent an insurgency, but it can also be employed to counter an insurgency that has already started. The strategy incorporates four major tasks—balanced development, mobilization, security, and neutralization.

**Balanced Development**

Balanced development attempts to create a social, economic, and political environment resistant to insurgent attack. It does this through reforms aimed at removing or alleviating sources of legitimate grievance that can be exploited by insurgent elements. Although the scope and detail of the reforms vary from country to country, their principal functions are to establish the defending regime's legitimacy, capture the political initiative from the insurgent movement, and mobilize public support of IDAD efforts. In some cases, balanced development may require major investments in the industrial and agricultural sectors. Economic development, however, should be balanced with equally important nation-building initiatives in such areas as human rights, legal process, public education, communications, health care, transportation, utilities, water, and other public service programs. The host military often possesses unique capabilities in transportation, communications, and manpower that can be employed in nation-building programs.

Balanced development should be driven by the nature of the conflict. In conflicts where the insurgency is inspired by economic grievances or class oppression, economic development may be very effective, whereas insurgencies based primarily on
longstanding cultural, ethnic, or religious discord may respond better to other forms of nation building, like human rights and other political reforms.

**Mobilization**

The government mobilizes the population to participate in IDAD efforts. Mobilization maximizes manpower, materiel resources, political support, and intelligence available to the government while denying these resources to the insurgent. The net effect of mobilization is a social-political environment in which the government can "out-administer" the leadership and control mechanisms of the insurgent movement. Mobilization relies heavily on informational instruments to instill public confidence in the government and to reduce anxiety over military initiatives.

**Security**

Security includes all activities to protect the population, the government, and vital economic resources from insurgent violence. Security provides a safe environment for balanced development and denies the enemy access to popular support. The ability of internal security forces to maintain law and order is a key factor in demonstrating the government's legitimacy. During the early stages of insurgency, civil law enforcement agencies should function as a major line of defense for internal security. Revolution's major dynamic—political mobilization—occurs at the grass-roots level, and the government agency closest to that level is the local police. Police are generally the first to detect critical signs of unrest, particularly in rural areas, and they are often closest to important sources of HUMINT on infrastructure organization and methods. They also provide a nucleus for establishing local auxiliaries and paramilitary forces. In some instances, civilian security forces are more acceptable to the local populace than the military. Military participation may begin with lateral support or augmentation of the police during low levels of violence and increase to a direct combat posture if the insurgency escalates.

**Neutralization**

Neutralization is physically and psychologically separating the insurgents from the population. It includes all lawful activities to disrupt, disorganize, and defeat insurgent organizations. Neutralization thus enlarges the objectives of security to include eliminating sources of insurgent violence. Neutralization relies on civil law enforcement agencies as well as military forces to accomplish these objectives.

The principal target of neutralization is the active or tacit support that the insurgents receive from the populace. Neutralization requires internal defense forces that are organized, trained, and equipped for joint combat operations. However, military force rarely is decisive in determining long-term strategic outcomes. Insurgent leaders and forces often are deeply embedded in the civilian sector. They operate in a clandestine manner, many times under the protective cover of legitimate institutions. In most cases, penetrating and rooting out leadership and other insurgent elements is done more
effectively with legal, informational, and civil law enforcement and investigative instruments than with military forces. Defeating the insurgency militarily may drive the conflict to a lower level of violence or drive it underground, but it does not eliminate the social, economic, political, or cultural tensions fueling the insurgency. Military force should be aimed at holding the conflict at the lowest possible level of violence while the government eliminates the insurgents’ infrastructure and engages in balanced development and reform. Force is not an end in itself. It is only a way to buy time until the processes of reform and nation building take effect.

The reversible, multiphase nature of insurgency requires great flexibility in planning and executing military operations. Tactics, techniques, and procedures appropriate for conventional confrontations may be ineffective, even counterproductive, when executing military operations during counter-guerrilla operations. Because of varying situations and force requirements, decision makers and planners require accurate, timely intelligence to facilitate the process of selecting proper options.

The social, psychological, and political implications of military actions, particularly those employing deadly force, should be clearly understood and correctly exploited by the HN government. Excessive or ineffective use of force erodes government legitimacy and promotes political mobilization in favor of the insurgents. Even when the government assumes special emergency powers through legislation or decree, security forces must provide for the safety of law-abiding citizens.
APPENDIX B

JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL EXERCISES

Coincidental with testing and evaluating mutual capabilities, joint and multinational exercises may include certain types of training and construction, as well as HCA projects, within a host country. Although the exercises may be conducted between Air Force and the host air force units only, maximum utility is realized when they involve joint as well as multinational operations.

INTEROPERABILITY AND SAFETY TRAINING

Interoperability Training

The purpose of interoperability training is to ensure that US and HN forces can function as mutually supporting entities during combat operations. Training to achieve interoperability should include doctrine; tactics, individual skills, weapons familiarization (particularly if US and host forces use different weapon systems), maintenance, and C2 procedures.

Interoperability training assumes that comparably proficient units are involved. The training experience allows US commanders to learn how other forces conduct IDAD operations and to develop the most compatible methodology, consistent with US FID policies and objectives, for operating together.

If the foreign force is not proficient enough to conduct multinational operations with US forces, foreign military sales provided under security assistance should be conducted to equalize the foreign force before multinational exercises are undertaken. Joint-multinational exercises are not to be used to provide training to foreign military personnel if that training is normally provided under security assistance.

Safety Training

Safety training reduces the risks inherent in conducting military operations by two or more forces differing widely in language, culture, geographic origin, technology, and practical experience. Mutual safety is improved not only through training in the use of specific weapons but also through standardization of tactics, techniques, and procedures.

CONSTRUCTION

Construction related to multinational exercises is permitted under two sets of rules, one for Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises and another for non-JCS exercises.
JCS Exercises

Set-aside funds contained in the unspecified minor construction account of each US military Service pays for all exercise-related construction during JCS exercises. Set-aside funds cover only material, supplies, nonmilitary labor costs, overhead (except planning and design costs), and DOD-funded costs applicable to O&M of equipment. O&M funds may not be used for construction related to JCS exercises.

Non-JCS Exercises

During non-JCS exercises, O&M funds may be used to construct or improve facilities under US control, if each construction project results in a complete, usable facility necessary for US units to take part in the multinational exercise. Strict project rules and precise funding limits are established for such construction.

HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE

HCA projects conducted predominantly by US personnel may be performed in conjunction with exercises or military operations. HCA is rendered to the local populace. US governing authority prohibits HCA, directly or indirectly, to any military or paramilitary activity.

Authority

HCA is provided under separate authorities established in Comptroller General opinions and legislation that:

- Recognize the DOD’s inherent ability to undertake HCA activities while fulfilling the training needs of the unit involved, which incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace.

- Permit authorized DOD personnel to conduct HCA activities that are unrelated to training requirements by using minimal expenditures of Service funds in conjunction with JCS-directed or JCS-coordinated exercises overseas.

- Recognize the DOD’s ability to carry out HCA on a reimbursable basis for another US government agency with authority and appropriations to conduct such activities. This is referred to as an interagency transaction or economy act transaction. During FID operations, such a transaction usually occurs when the US Agency for International Development funds economic-assistance type activities under Part I, Developmental Assistance, of the Foreign Assistance Act.

- Authorize certain types of HCA activities in conjunction with military operations (not necessarily exercises). This is a statutory authority referred to as the Combatant Commander’s Cooperative Program or Title 10 U.S.C., section 401, Humanitarian Assistance and Other Assistance Authority.
FORMS OF HCA

There are three distinct forms of HCA with important applications in FID-related joint-multinational exercises: Statutory HCA, De Minimus (or Minimal) HCA, and Stevens HCA. Commanders contemplating the use of HCA should seek legal advice on the form of HCA most appropriate for the operation or exercise being conducted, especially with respect to rules governing HCA limitations and funding.

**Statutory HCA.** This is carried out in conjunction with authorized military operations, such as JCS-directed or coordinated exercises and single-Service deployments for training, and is funded from specifically appropriated (host-nation support) O&M funds. The Secretary of State must provide prior approval for DOD to conduct this form of HCA, and the activities should be closely coordinated with State Department personnel in-country.

- The activities should complement, not duplicate, other assistance provided by the US and enhance the security interests of both the US and the host nation. The activities should also enhance the operational skills of US military personnel.

- Although the authority prohibits funding to construct airstrips, Air Force airlift resources may be employed to support joint US HCA elements engaged in construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems, drilling wells and constructing basic sanitation facilities, and rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Further, Air Force personnel and resources may also provide or support medical, dental, and veterinary care in rural areas of a country.

**De Minimus HCA.** This is also carried out along with authorized military operations, but consists of activities for which only minimal expenditures may be incurred. Such HCA is funded from O&M funds and is not subject to the requirements of Statutory HCA. An example of De Minimus HCA activities described by Congress includes a unit doctor's examination of villagers for a few hours, with the administration of a few shots and the issuance of some medicine, but not the deployment of a medical team for the purpose of providing mass inoculations to the local populace. Another example is the opening of an access road for several hundred yards but not the asphalting of any roadway.

**Stevens HCA.** This provides that O&M funds may be used to pay costs incurred in providing HCA incidental to authorized military operations. Stevens HCA is limited to JCS-directed or coordinated exercises.

- Stevens HCA must complement, not duplicate, other assistance provided by the US and enhance the security interests of both the US and the host nation. It must enhance the operational skills of US military personnel and must be "incidental" in nature. Incidental HCA are those activities that are "minor" when viewed in the context of the overall exercise scenario in which they occur.
Stevens HCA activities must be provided as an incidental benefit to a comprehensive training program. They cannot be designed as stand-alone civic action programs or as major exercise activities in their own right. Accordingly, commanders must determine what amount of incremental O&M cost associated with HCA would be reasonable in view of the overall amount of O&M funds to be expended in the JCS-directed or coordinated exercise.
APPENDIX C

AIR FORCE SECURITY ASSISTANCE TEAMS

This appendix assists commanders in identifying and selecting appropriate options for foreign internal defense by providing a brief survey of teams who perform functions under security assistance. One of the key operational-level objectives of Air Force advisory operations is to help integrate host-nation airpower into the multinational and joint arenas. Commanders should refer to current directives and publications for guidelines and specific policy on assistance provided under the Air Force security assistance program. It also discusses functions, goals, and special constraints associated with Air Force advisory support to host nations.

BASIS OF REQUIREMENT

Legislative guidance limits training and advising by permanently assigned SAO personnel. Also, SAOs are not sufficiently sized or configured to advise and train or perform technical assistance duties that extend beyond primary (and essentially logistical) SAO functions. Outside assistance may be required in specific instances.

Types of Teams

Besides SAOs, several teams and organizations may perform limited security assistance functions for specified periods of time on a TDY or PCS basis. These teams include technical assistance teams (TAT), technical assistance field teams (TAFT), MTTs, extended training service specialists (ETSS), quality assurance teams, language training detachments, site survey teams, and defense requirement survey teams. Commanders for FID activities can employ these teams and others assembled for specific purposes, such as health service support teams. In certain instances, temporarily deployed Air Force teams may be called on to advise foreign personnel on operational matters directly related to the use of host-nation resources in specific conflict situations.

Non-training Support of Host-Nation Forces

A variety of non-training assistance functions can be accomplished under the security assistance program. The principal vehicles for non-training support are TATs and TAFTs.

Technical Assistance Teams

In cases where the operational readiness of host aircraft and support equipment is seriously degraded because of battle damage, unexpected materiel failures, or long-term deficiencies in local maintenance and funding, a requirement for one-time repair and refurbishment may exist. Introducing new equipment provided under security
assistance may also require specialized Air Force assistance to place the systems in operation.

TATs and civilian engineering technical surveys can be deployed to provide these services. In some cases, US or foreign civilian contract personnel may be used. Such non-training support may be conducted in the host country or, when prohibited or deemed impractical because of inadequate local facilities, conducted out of country.

TATs should not be used to provide technical training or instruction except for incidental over-the-shoulder technical assistance in conjunction with their primary duties.

**Technical Assistance Field Teams**

Where ongoing aviation support requirements cannot be met through the combined efforts of the host air force, the SAO, and temporarily deployed Air Force teams, TAFTs can be sent to the host nation, normally for one year or longer, from DOD resources. TAFTs help install, operate, maintain, and support foreign military sales, purchased weapon systems, and equipment.

**Specialized Non-training Support**

Besides TATs and TAFTs, other forms of non-training support allow commanders to tailor team capabilities to meet specialized field requirements.

Air Force assistance teams (funded through security assistance) can use periodic visits to offset host-nation aircraft materiel management deficiencies by performing inventories, refining procedures, clearing up back orders, and resolving accounting discrepancies.

The Air Force can provide other specialized forms of non-training support. An example is theater technical training of US logisticians through the logistics team training (LTT) program. Small teams (10 to 15 individuals) train in such ACS skills as aircraft battle damage repair, corrosion control, materiel management, specialized maintenance, transportation operations, or other ACS functions. Service O&M funds support the training of US personnel. Host-nation security assistance funds pay for repair parts and other expendables used by an LTT during training activities.

The LTT concept is designed to ensure, and the Service must certify, that deployments offer opportunities for critical training that would not occur, or would occur at significantly higher costs or reduced efficiency, in another, similar geographic area. The concept is based on the precept that certain US forces training is so critical and reasonably unavailable that incidental, spin-off services provided to a foreign country in exchange for the training opportunities are insignificant in the balance of benefits, thereby making the training in the best interests of the US Government.
As with TATs, training or instruction of host personnel is limited to incidental, "over-the-shoulder" technical assistance.

Training Support to HN Forces

In many cases, incidental "over-the-shoulder" instruction occurring as a byproduct of certain non-training functions may not be sufficient to produce significant improvements in long-term self-sufficiency. Training teams, funded under security assistance, should be used where more extensive, formally structured courses of instruction are required. The teams can be deployed to reinforce SAO capabilities.

Mobile Training Teams

MTTs deployed to the recipient nation add to SAO capabilities by training HN personnel in the operation, maintenance, and employment of airpower weapon systems and support equipment. MTTs are authorized for specific in-country training requirements beyond the capability of SAOs, primarily to develop the recipient's self-training capabilities in particular skills. MTTs may be funded from either foreign military sales or international military education and training programs.

MTTs are also authorized to provide training associated with equipment transfers or to conduct surveys and assessments of training requirements. MTTs may be requested to carry out specific training tasks for limited periods of time. MTTs will not be used to assemble, maintain, operate, or renovate a system.

Extended Training

Sustained Air Force training capabilities are available through ETSS who are technically qualified to provide advice, instruction, and training in the engineering, installation, operation, and maintenance of weapons, equipment, and systems.

Advisory Support to Host-nation Forces

When specifically authorized and directed, deployed Air Force security assistance teams advise host military personnel on using airpower systems and related support capabilities. Advisory functions are subject to legislative restrictions and DOD directives on levels and types of assistance provided. Commanders and SAO personnel requesting this type of assistance must ensure that advisory activities fall within current policy guidelines and legal parameters.

Command Advisory Functions

Air Force advisory assistance may be required to facilitate host air force support of IDAD objectives and to encourage a satisfactory correlation between US security assistance goals and the recipient's use of security assistance assets. Advisory assistance teams accomplish these tasks by advising central command elements of the
host military on the capabilities, limitations, and correct use of airpower in a given conflict. Command advisory functions focus on operational-level planning that can bridge the gap between IDAD strategy and tactical employment.

**Field Advisory Functions**

Air Force advisory assistance conducted at the field level (operational flying units, aviation support elements, and army maneuver units) focuses primarily on improving host military tactics, techniques, and procedures for airpower operations.

Air Force advisory functions include mission-related advice on intelligence collection and analysis, maintenance, logistics, communications, and administration as well as tactical operations. Field advisory support also has important applications in medical and military civic action programs, military construction, and psychological operations. Its principal objective is to provide guidance fostering self-sufficiency in the use of airpower resources for the conflict at hand, not to supplant host-nation capabilities.

Field advisory functions should be closely linked to operational-level objectives supporting overall US/HN strategic goals. This entails such field advisory functions as testing and verifying HN airpower employment and sustainment capabilities, focusing HN aviation resources on appropriate roles and missions, and facilitating the availability of safe, reliable, and interoperable aviation support as a force multiplier for the joint force commander.

Field advisory functions are not automatically linked to direct participation in host military operations. Advisory functions that expose US personnel to hostile fire represent a significant increase in US commitment with profound legal and political implications. Under current law, personnel performing defense services may not perform any duties of a combatant nature, including any duties related to training and advising, that may engage US personnel in combat activities outside the US.
GLOSSARY

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACS    agile combat support
AETACS  airborne elements of theater air control systems
AETF   airpower expeditionary task force
AFSCS  USAF Security Cooperation Strategy
AFSOC  Air Force Special Operations Command
AFSOF  Air Force special operations forces
AOC    air and space operations center
AOR    area of responsibility
ATO    air tasking order
BFT    blue-force tracking

C2      command and control
CA      civil affairs
CAA     combat aviation advisors
CAS    close air support
CASEVAC casualty evacuation
CMO    civil-military operations
COIN   counter-insurgency
COMAFFOR commander of Air Force forces
CSAR   combat search and rescue
CT     counterterrorism
DAO    defense attaché office
DOD    Department of Defense
DOS    Department of State
DSCA   Defense Security Cooperation Agency

EEI    essential elements of information
ETSS   extended training service specialists

FARC   Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia
FID    foreign internal defense
FMLN   Farabundo MartiLiberation Front

GCC    geographic combatant commands

HA     humanitarian assistance
HCA    humanitarian and civil assistance
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
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<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>human intelligence</td>
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<td>IDAD</td>
<td>internal defense and development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>international military education and training</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
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<td>IST</td>
<td>integrated skills training</td>
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<tr>
<td>IW</td>
<td>irregular warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFACC</td>
<td>joint force air component commander (JP 1-02); joint force air and space component commander (Air Force); joint force commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSOTF</td>
<td>joint special operations task force</td>
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<td>JspOC</td>
<td>Joint Space Operations Center</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAF</td>
<td>Khmer Air Force</td>
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<td>LOC</td>
<td>line of communications</td>
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<td>LTT</td>
<td>logistics team training</td>
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<td>MCA</td>
<td>military civil action</td>
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<td>MiTT</td>
<td>military transition team</td>
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<td>MTT</td>
<td>mobile training team</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGA</td>
<td>National Geospatial Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-government organization</td>
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<td>NRO</td>
<td>National Reconnaissance Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>operations and maintenance</td>
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<td>OAD</td>
<td>operational aviation detachment</td>
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<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAF</td>
<td>Philippine Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCS</td>
<td>permanent change of station</td>
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<td>PNT</td>
<td>positional navigation timing</td>
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<td>PR</td>
<td>personnel recovery</td>
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<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>psychological operation</td>
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<td>RSSC</td>
<td>regional satellite communications support center</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>security assistance</td>
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<td>SAR</td>
<td>search and rescue</td>
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<td>SATCOM</td>
<td>satellite communications</td>
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<td>SAO</td>
<td>security assistance organization</td>
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<td>SF</td>
<td>special forces</td>
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<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>signals intelligence</td>
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<td>SOC</td>
<td>Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
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<td>TAT</td>
<td>technical assistance teams</td>
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<td>TAFT</td>
<td>technical assessment field team</td>
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<td>TAIP</td>
<td>tactical air force improvement plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>TDY</td>
<td>temporary duty</td>
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<tr>
<td>UA</td>
<td>unmanned aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAS</td>
<td>unmanned aircraft systems</td>
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Definitions

**air and space expeditionary task force.** The organizational manifestation of Air Force forces afield. The AETF provides a joint force commander with a task-organized, integrated package with the appropriate balance of force, sustainment, control, and force protection. Also called **AETF**. (AFDD 1)

**campaign.** A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. See also **campaign plan**. (JP 1-02)

**campaign plan.** A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. See also **campaign.** (JP 1-02)

**centralized control.** 1. In air defense, the control mode whereby a higher echelon makes direct target assignments to fire units. 2. In joint air operations, placing within one commander the responsibility and authority for planning, directing, and coordinating a military operation or group/category of operations. (JP 1-02)

**civil affairs.** Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called **CA.** See also **civil-military operations.** (JP 1-02)

**civil-military operations.** The activities of a commander that establish,
maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. See also civil affairs. (JP 1-02)

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 0-2)

coordination. The necessary action to ensure adequate exchange of information to integrate, synchronize, and deconflict operations between separate organizations. Coordination is not necessarily a process of gaining approval but is most often used for mutual exchange of information. Normally used between functions of a supporting staff. Direct authority to liaison (DIRLAUTH) is used to coordinate with an organization outside of the immediate staff or organization. (AFDD 1)

counterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called COIN. (JP 1-02)

decentralized execution. Delegation of execution authority to subordinate commanders. (JP 1-02) [Decentralized execution of airpower power is the delegation of execution authority to responsible and capable lower-level commanders to achieve effective span of control and to foster disciplined initiative, situational responsiveness, and tactical flexibility.] (AFDD 1) {Italicized words in brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.}

direction. Guidance to or management of support staff functions. Inherent within command but not a command authority in its own right. In some cases, can be considered an explicit instruction or order. Used by commanders and their designated subordinates to facilitate, channel, or motivate support staff to achieve appropriate action, tempo, or intensity. Used by directors of staff agencies on behalf of the commander to provide guidance to their staffs on how best to accomplish stated objectives IAW the commander’s intent. (AFDD 1)
**direct support.** A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance. Also called **DS.** (JP 1-02)

**effects.** A full range of outcomes, events, or consequences of a particular action or set of actions. The action can derive from any element of power—economic, political, military, diplomatic, or informational—and may occur at any point across the continuum from peace to global conflict. (AFDD 2-1.2)

**essential elements of information.** The critical items of information regarding the enemy and the environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist in reaching a logical decision. Also called **EEI.** (JP 1-02)

**force protection.** Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called **FP.** (JP 1-02) [An integrated application of offensive and defensive actions that deter, detect, preempt, mitigate, or negate threats against Air Force airpower operations and assets, based on an acceptable level of risk.] {Italicized words in brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.}

**foreign internal defense.** Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called **FID.** (JP 1-02)

**foreign military sales.** That portion of US security assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. This assistance differs from the Military Assistance Program and the International Military Education and Training Program in that the recipient provides reimbursement for defense articles and services transferred. Also called **FMS.** (JP 1-02)

**guerrilla warfare.** Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. Also called **GW.** See also **unconventional warfare.** (JP 1-02)

**host nation.** A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or
to transit through its territory. Also called **HN**. (JP 1-02)

**humanitarian and civic assistance.** Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This is specifically authorized by Title 10, U.S. Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. Also called **HCA.** (JP 1-02)

**human intelligence.** A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. Also called **HUMINT.** (JP 1-02)

**indirect support.** Security assistance and other efforts to develop and sustain host nation capabilities. This definition establishes a distinction between security assistance and forms of support involving direct operational employment of US forces which supports the guidance in the **National Security Strategy of the US.** (AFDD 2-3.1)

**insurgency.** An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02)

**internal defense and development.** The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also called **IDAD.** See also **foreign internal defense.** (JP 1-02)

**joint.** Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (JP 0-2)

**joint force.** A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 1-02)

**joint force commander.** A general term applied to a combatant commander, sub-unified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called **JFC.** (JP 1-02)

**joint task force.** A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a sub-unified commander, or an existing joint force commander. Also called **JTF.** (JP 1-02)
**military civic action.** The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) Also called MCA. (JP 1-02)

**mission.** 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. 3. The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task. (JP 1-02)

**narco-terrorism.** Terrorism conducted to further the aims of drug traffickers. It may include assassinations, extortion, hijackings, bombings and kidnappings directed against judges, prosecutors, elected officials, or law enforcement agents, and general disruption of a legitimate government to divert attention from drug operations. (JP 1-02)

**nation assistance.** Civic and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other Title 10 U.S.C. (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations. (JP 1-02)

**operational control.** Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in
operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called **OPCON**. (JP 1-02)

**policy.** Guidance that is directive or instructive, stating what is to be accomplished. It reflects a conscious choice to pursue certain avenues, and not others. Policies may change due to changes in national leadership, political considerations, or for fiscal reasons. At the national level, policy may be expressed in such broad vehicles such as the National Security Strategy. Within military operations, policy may be expressed not only in terms of objectives, but also in rules of engagement—what we may or may not strike, or under what circumstances we may strike particular targets. (AFDD 1)

**psychological operations.** Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called **PSYOP**. (JP 1-02)

**public affairs.** Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. Also called **PA**. (JP 1-02)

**security assistance.** Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the US provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Also called **SA**. (JP 1-02)

**security assistance organization.** All Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance functions. (JP 1-02)

**special operations.** Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces.
Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (JP 1-02)

**strategic intelligence.** Intelligence that is required for the formation of strategy, policy, and military plans and operations at national and theater levels. (JP 1-02)

**strategy.** The art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 1-02)

**subversion.** Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime. (JP 1-02)

**support.** 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02)

**tactical control.** Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02)

**tactical intelligence.** Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting tactical operations. (JP 1-02)

**tactical level of war.** The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (JP 1-02)

**terrorism.** The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to incite fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. See also force protection. (JP 1-02)
**unconventional warfare.** A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. Also called **UW.** (JP 1-02)

**war.** Open and often prolonged conflict between nations (or organized groups within nations) to achieve national objectives. (AFDD 1)