SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program

References: See Enclosure 1

1. PURPOSE. This manual reissues DoD 5210.42-R (Reference (a)) as a DoD manual in accordance with the authority in DoD Directive 5134.08 (Reference (b)). It implements the policy in DoD Instruction 5210.42 (Reference (c)), assigns responsibilities, and prescribes mandatory procedures for the DoD Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) to ensure the safety and security of the U.S. nuclear deterrent mission.

2. APPLICABILITY. This manual applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this manual as the “DoD Components”).

3. POLICY. In accordance with Reference (c), it is DoD policy that:

   a. Nuclear weapons require special consideration because of their policy implications, military importance, destructive power, and the political consequences of an accident or an unauthorized act. The safety, security, control, and effectiveness of nuclear weapons are of paramount importance to the security of the United States.

   b. Only those persons who demonstrate reliability will be certified to perform specified duties associated with U.S. nuclear weapons, nuclear command and control (NC2) systems, material, and equipment, and special nuclear material (SNM). Those persons will be continuously evaluated for adherence to PRP standards in order to maintain PRP status.

   c. DoD personnel who are assigned to positions or who are in training for assignments to sensitive positions within nuclear capable units will be enrolled in PRP.
4. **RESPONSIBILITIES.** See Enclosure 2.

5. **PROCEDURES.** See Enclosure 3.

6. **INFORMATION COLLECTIONS REQUIREMENTS.** The DoD Nuclear Weapons PRP Annual Status Report, referred to in paragraphs 2b and 5p of Enclosure 2 and Appendix 5 to Enclosure 3 of this manual, has been assigned report control symbol DD-AT&L(A)1403 in accordance with the procedures in Volume 1 of DoD Manual 8910.01 (Reference (d)).

7. **RELEASABILITY. Cleared for public release.** This manual is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives.

8. **EFFECTIVE DATE.** This manual is effective January 13, 2015.

Enclosures

1. References
2. Responsibilities
3. Procedures

Glossary
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ENCLOSURE 1: REFERENCES ................................................................................................... 4  
ENCLOSURE 2: RESPONSIBILITIES .......................................................................................... 6  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS (ASD(NCB)) ............................................................... 6  
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR MATTERS (DASD(NM)) ....................................................................................................................... 6  
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY (DTRA) ........................................... 6  
DoD COMPONENT HEADS INVOLVED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NC2 SYSTEMS, POSITIVE CONTROL MATERIAL (PCM), AND SNM ...................................................... 7  
SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS ................................................................ 8  
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND (CDRUSSTRATCOM) ...... 8  
ENCLOSURE 3: PROCEDURES ................................................................................................. 9  
PRP KEY ELEMENTS ............................................................................................................. 9  
EVALUATION GUIDELINES ..................................................................................................... 9  
REMOVAL AND REINSTATEMENT ........................................................................................ 11  
APPENDIXES  
APPENDIX 1: PRP ADMINISTRATION .............................................................................. 12  
APPENDIX 2: CERTIFICATION ............................................................................................ 15  
APPENDIX 3: PRP POSITIONS .............................................................................................. 19  
APPENDIX 4: PRP SUITABILITY FACTORS ........................................................................ 25  
APPENDIX 5: DoD NUCLEAR WEAPON PRP ANNUAL REPORT ......................................... 33  
GLOSSARY .................................................................................................................................. 37  
PART I: ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ........................................................................ 37  
PART II: DEFINITIONS ............................................................................................................. 37  
TABLE  
Identifying PRP Positions ....................................................................................................... 20  
FIGURE  
Recommended Format for DoD Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program Annual Status Report ....................................................................................................................... 33
REFERENCES

(b) DoD Directive 5134.08, “Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ASD(NCB)),” January 14, 2009, as amended
(e) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3263.05B, “Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspections,” November 17, 2014
(f) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Instruction 3262.01H, “Nuclear Command and Control Staff Assessment Visit Program,” February 20, 2015
(g) Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), current edition
(m) DoD 6025.18-R, “DoD Health Information Privacy Regulation,” January 24, 2003
(n) DoD Instruction 1010.04, “Problematic Substance Use by DoD Personnel,” February 20, 2014
(q) DoD Instruction 1010.01, “Military Personnel Drug Abuse Testing Program (MPDATP),” September 13, 2012
(s) DoD Manual 3150.08, “Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP),” August 22, 2013
(u) DoD Instruction 1215.06, “Uniform Reserve, Training, and Retirement Categories for the Reserve Components,” March 11, 2014, as amended

1 This is a classified document. Available through SIPRNET from the CJCS Electronic Library.
“Arming and the Use of Force,” November 18, 2016
(x) Section 1091 of Title 10, United States Code

2 Published by the American Psychiatric Association, 1400 K St., NW, Washington, DC 20005.
ENCLOSURE 2

RESPONSIBILITIES

1. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS (ASD(NCB)). Under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), the ASD(NCB):

   a. Develops PRP policy and reviews DoD Component implementation guidance for consistency and compliance with policy.

   b. Serves as the OSD principal point of contact for DoD PRP with the DoD Components.

   c. Maintains liaison activities with the Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, and with other departments and agencies on mutual PRP-related matters.

   d. Ensures that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Program of Cooperation nations, where personnel of such nations have access to U.S. nuclear weapons (but not to U.S. NC2 systems, material, or equipment), implement a national PRP equivalent to the U.S. PRP.

2. DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR MATTERS (DASD(NM)). Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L) and through the ASD(NCB), the DASD(NM):

   a. Assists the ASD(NCB) execute assigned responsibilities and functions related to the PRP pursuant to Reference (b).

   b. Compiles and analyzes DoD Component annual PRP status reports. Provides significant negative decertification trend information to the DoD Components.

   c. Reviews all DoD Component PRP implementation guidance to ensure consistency with this manual.

3. DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY (DTRA). Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L), the Director, DTRA:

   a. Conducts Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection Oversight for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and PRP Staff Assessment Visits in accordance with CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3263.05A (Reference (e)), CJCSI 3262.01 (Reference (f)), and Enclosure 3 of this manual.

   b. Develops and maintains DoD-level PRP training programs.
4. **DoD COMPONENT HEADS INVOLVED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NC2 SYSTEMS, POSITIVE CONTROL MATERIAL (PCM), AND SNM**. The DoD Component heads involved with nuclear weapons, NC2 systems, PCM, and SNM:

   a. Incorporate the requirements of this manual into and make these requirements part of contracts for services and resources related to nuclear operations.

   b. Select personnel for PRP who meet the reliability standards in this manual.

   c. Establish procedures for formally designating reviewing and certifying officials.

   d. Develop and implement a continuous oversight plan to help the certifying officials continually evaluate PRP-certified National Guard and Reserve personnel.

   e. Provide initial and refresher training for PRP personnel. Define and establish training requirements in Component guidance, including frequency of refresher training.

   f. Train all appropriate medical personnel in the purpose of PRP and advise them of their responsibilities.

   g. Train all appropriate personnel in the personnel security requirements for assignment to the nuclear weapons PRP and their responsibility to advise the certifying official of personnel security issues that adversely affect the certification of PRP members.

   h. Define roles and responsibilities for PRP individuals, supervisors, and administrators.

   i. Define contractor requirements on procedures for incorporation into contracts when the statement of work under the contract involves activities that are subject to the PRP.

   j. Establish procedures to appoint agency or installation competent medical authorities (CMAs) and procedures for individual health record information review.

   k. Prescribe procedures for conducting PRP inspections and staff assessments as part of the Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection system in accordance with Reference (e).

   l. Establish a drug abuse testing program for all personnel assigned to PRP positions, and for contractor personnel under the terms of applicable contracts and part 223.5 of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) (Reference (g)), as appropriate, and determine the criteria and extent to which PRP personnel will be tested.

   m. Develop and implement standards and procedures for ensuring due process for individuals identified for disqualification or decertification in accordance with this manual.

   n. Act as the final approval authority for requalification or reinstatement for individuals disqualified or decertified in accordance with this manual.
o. Review and evaluate the PRP during appropriate inspections and staff visits at all levels of command. The results will be reviewed periodically at the highest level in the DoD Component to ensure effective and consistent application of PRP.

p. Submit annual program status reports to the DASD(NM), as described in Appendix 5 to Enclosure 3.

q. Ensure that personally identifiable information (PII) involved in the execution of PRP is collected, maintained, used, and disseminated in accordance with DoD Directive 5400.11 (Reference (h)) and DoD 5400.11-R (Reference (i)).

5. SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS. In addition to the responsibilities in Section 4 of this enclosure, the Secretaries of the Military Departments are authorized to develop reliability guidance specific to personnel guarding nuclear weapons. If promulgated, that guidance must meet the reliability assurance standards in Reference (j) and the essential elements listed in Reference (c) and will be used in lieu of the PRP requirements listed in the issuance.

6. COMMANDER, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND (CDRUSSTRATCOM). In addition to the responsibilities in section 4 of this enclosure, the CDRUSSTRATCOM acts as the reviewing official for USSTRATCOM and certifying official for all general and flag officers who perform Airborne Emergency Action Officer duties as part of the Airborne Launch Control System mission:

a. If their current duties do not require PRP certification; or

b. They are currently assigned to commands without an existing program.
ENCLOSURE 3

PROCEDURES

1. PRP KEY ELEMENTS. PRP is the commander’s program. The commander is exclusively accountable for determining the fitness for duty of individuals subject to PRP. DoD Components and subordinate organizations may establish procedures for implementation of this manual but will not establish additional PRP requirements.

   a. PRP is a critical link in nuclear surety. PRP-required screening programs, personnel security investigations (PSIs), and the PRP continuous evaluation requirement are designed to mitigate risks and protect the nuclear deterrent from insider threats. As such, PRP-supporting DoD Component heads and supervisors must aid reviewing and certifying officials in their initial and continuing evaluation duties by ensuring they are provided all relevant information on those trusted with PRP duties.

   b. Only those individuals who demonstrate the highest levels of integrity and dependability will be chosen for PRP duties. PRP ensures that each person trusted with U.S. nuclear weapons, NC2 systems and equipment, PCM, and SNM, in accordance with DoD Directive S-5210.81 (Reference (j)) and Reference (d), meets the highest levels of reliability. Those trusted with PRP duties have an obligation to report any behavior or circumstance about themselves or others in PRP that may affect reliability or result in an unsafe or insecure condition.

   c. Only certified personnel will be assigned to designated PRP positions. All PRP positions will be formally designated as either critical or controlled and restricted to the minimum number required to accomplish the mission. Unless required by other PRP duties, the reviewing official need not be designated as a PRP position. Examples of typical PRP positions are shown in Appendix 3 to this enclosure.

2. EVALUATION GUIDELINES. Certifying officials are responsible for ensuring that all military, civilian, and contractor personnel under the terms of their contracts assigned to PRP positions meet all of the requirements of the continuing evaluation process. Certifying officials must observe the behavior and performance of members certified under PRP on a frequent and consistent basis. The primary consideration for certifying officials should be that the sum of all observations, including personal and peer observation and reporting, is sufficiently detailed to allow for thorough evaluation of the individual.

   a. Personnel Not Under Routine Observation. Certifying officials must maintain an equivalent level of confidence in the reliability of personnel whose normal duties do not provide for routine observation, excluding periods of administrative absence (leave, pass, temporary duty, or temporary additional duty). Individuals certified under PRP must agree that certifying officials and CMAs can review certain information and materials concerning their on- and off-duty activities (medical, mental health, police, employment records, credit reports, etc.).
(1) DoD Components will develop procedures and approval authority for personnel not under routine observation. The approval authority may be delegated in writing to a single official of at least O-7 military grade/Senior Executive Service member on the staff. All exceptions to routine observation will be submitted for review on an annual basis to the DASD(NM). The certifying official will submit a specific plan outlining the application of the tools outlined in paragraph 2a(2) of this enclosure, tailored to the circumstances of the individual being considered, that provides for the equivalent level of confidence mentioned in paragraphs 1a, b, and c of this enclosure.

(2) For periods in which a PRP-certified individual was not subject to continuing evaluation, the certifying official must ensure that the individual’s reliability during these times meets PRP requirements. The certifying official will employ additional means and methods sufficient to assist in that determination, e.g., an additional personal interview, periodic medical records review, additional drug screening, contact with civilian employer of Reserve and National Guard personnel or previous supervisor, service or personnel records review, periodic criminal records and history checks, and credit checks.

b. Medical Care. When an individual’s performance may be impaired by medical care or the use of prescribed medication or short-term stress, the certifying official will be notified to decide if the individual needs to be removed from PRP duties for the period of medical care, stress, or use of medication, as determined by the CMA.

(1) The CMA is responsible for determining what information qualifies as medical factors that may affect an individual’s suitability for PRP, and will convey these factors to the certifying official. DoD Components may establish protocols that may be applied by independent duty medical technicians (IDMTs) at munitions support squadrons and independent duty corpsmen (IDCs) not designated as CMAs.

(2) A sexual assault victim certified under PRP is eligible for both the Restricted and Unrestricted reporting options in accordance with DoD Instruction 6495.02 (Reference (k)). If electing restricted reporting, the victim is required to advise the CMA of any factors that could have an adverse impact on the victim’s performance, reliability, or safety while performing PRP duties. If necessary, the CMA will inform the certifying official that the person in question should be suspended from PRP status, without revealing the individual is a victim of sexual assault, thus preserving the Restricted Report.

c. Contractor PRP Continuing Evaluation. Contractor employees who, under the terms of the contracts, have been determined eligible by the contract monitor and have been assigned to PRP positions will be annotated in the DoD designated personnel security information system of record (currently Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS)). Any file documentation that can’t be submitted through JPAS should be submitted to the DoD Consolidated Adjudications Facility (CAF) Division A, 600 10th Street, Suite 160, Ft. Meade, MD 20755, or the Defense Security Service, Personnel Security Management Office for Industry (PSMO-I), 7556 Teague Road, Suite 500, Hanover, MD 21076, whichever holds the clearance or reviews and triages continuous evaluation information. On receipt of any information that may affect the reliability
of a contractor employee under the PRP, the DoD CAF or PSMO-I will forward that information to the appropriate certifying official.

3. REMOVAL AND REINSTATEMENT

   a. **Suspension.** Suspension is used to remove a member from PRP duties without starting decertification action. Although a recommendation to suspend may come from many sources, only the certifying official is authorized to determine whether suspension is appropriate.

   b. **Decertification.** Any individual who fails to meet the reliability standards specified in this manual will not be assigned to, or continued in, duties of a PRP position. PRP certification will be revoked on a certifying official’s determination and reviewing official approval that an individual no longer meets PRP standards.

   c. **Requalification or Reinstatement.** A certifying official or reviewing official may request requalification consideration or reinstatement of an individual’s PRP certification for individuals who were disqualified or decertified, provided the reason or condition of the disqualification or decertification or ineligibility no longer exists. Requalification and reinstatement procedures are in Appendix 1 to this enclosure.
APPENDIX 1 TO ENCLOSURE 3

PRP ADMINISTRATION

1. ROLES

a. Reviewing and Certifying Officials

   (1) The reviewing official is responsible for the management of PRP. That official ensures that the requirements of PRP are implemented and all personnel comply with applicable standards. The reviewing official will review individual personnel and health records, as necessary. Before assuming PRP certifying official duties, the reviewing official must screen and certify the certifying official. Commanders and reviewing officials who are not in a PRP position may certify their designated certifying official and subordinate commanders.

   (2) The certifying officials will be designated as critical or controlled PRP positions commensurate with the highest category of any nuclear duty position in the unit or activity concerned. The certifying official makes a judgment on the reliability of each individual identified for PRP duties.

b. CMA. The CMA will act as a PRP medical consultant to provide recommendations to reviewing and certifying officials on individuals’ suitability to perform PRP duties.

c. DoD Component and Installation PRP Monitor. The DoD Component or installation PRP monitor:

   (1) Coordinates and distributes PRP information to the reviewing and certifying officials, unit commanders, PRP monitors, and supporting staff agencies.

   (2) Indoctrinates and trains unit PRP personnel and administrators on program objectives and procedures; maintains the installation PRP roster.

   (3) Conducts staff assistance visits to all subordinate units with a PRP.

2. JOINT BASING AND MULTI-AGENCY PRP. Joint basing and multi-agency PRP will create a collaborative environment with open lines of communication. Support DoD Components will provide priority consideration and support to PRP certifying officials regardless of Military Service or DoD Component affiliation. This applies to every PRP command located on another Military Service installation.

   a. Program authority and direction will reside with the PRP-certified command.
b. Joint installations and installations with tenant Combatant Commands or other non-traditional organizations will comply with this manual to determine the best way to implement PRP at the installation.

3. TRAINING. Reviewing officials, certifying officials, PRP monitors, CMAs and other medical personnel (e.g., IDMTs and IDCs that are not CMAs who review PRP medical issues), and individuals assigned to PRP duties will receive initial training, refresher PRP training, and be thoroughly briefed on their PRP management and oversight responsibilities. Initial training will include, at a minimum:

   a. PRP purpose and applicability.
   b. PRP roles and responsibilities.
   c. PRP certification.
   d. Continuing evaluation.
   e. Disqualification, removal, and reinstatement.
   f. Requirements of Public Law 104-191 (Reference (l)) and DoD 6025.18-R (Reference (m)).

4. PRP REVIEW AND EVALUATION

   a. DoD Components will ensure that PRP is reviewed and evaluated for effectiveness during appropriate inspections and staff visits at all levels of command.

   b. PII collected, maintained, used, or disseminated in PRP execution must be safeguarded to prevent any unauthorized use. The DoD Components will ensure the collection, use, and dissemination of PII complies with the requirements of References (h) and (i).

5. PERSONNEL TRANSFER. When a PRP-certified individual is transferred to another PRP position, he or she must be interviewed by the new certifying official. If this transfer does not involve a change in the reviewing official, the individual’s medical and personnel records do not need to be re-screened.

6. SUSPENSION. When suspending an individual and removing him or her from PRP duties, the certifying official will notify the individual and his or her supervisor of the nature and circumstances of the suspension. A suspension can initially last up to 3 months. The certifying official may extend the period of suspension to 1 year in 3 month increments.
7. DECERTIFICATION. Individuals who have been determined by the certifying official to no longer meet PRP standards will be decertified. Within 15 workdays of the determination, the certifying official will advise the individual, in writing, of the reasons for decertification and of the requirement for review by the reviewing official.

   a. To ensure uniform application of the PRP standards specified by this manual, the reviewing official will review each case involving a decertification decision. The reviewing official may seek additional information or explanations of extenuating circumstances from the certifying official, the CMA, personnel officials, and the individual concerned, if appropriate.

   b. After reviewing the decertification action, the reviewing official will notify the individual and the certifying official of the findings and conclusion within 15 work days. In the case of a DoD contractor employee, the contractor will be told that the employee has been decertified and may no longer be assigned to or continue performing PRP duties in compliance with contractual requirements.

   c. If the reviewing official approves the decertification, the individual will be removed from positions requiring PRP certification, and the action will be made a matter of permanent record.

8. REQUALIFICATION AND REINSTATEMENT

   a. DoD Component heads are the approval authority for requalification or reinstatement. Requests for requalification or reinstatement must be in writing and include justification. If requalification or reinstatement is approved, initial qualification and screening will be completed, as described in Appendix 2 to this enclosure.

   b. Individuals disqualified or decertified for alcohol use disorder may be requalified or reinstated for PRP duties if the individual, before requesting reinstatement, successfully completed:

      (1) An initial intensive outpatient-level treatment or higher level treatment in accordance with DoD Instruction 1010.04 (Reference (n)).

      (2) A 1-year period of strict compliance with aftercare program requirements in accordance with Reference (n).

      (3) A PRP qualification screening and psychological evaluation with a favorable prognosis by the CMA.
1. CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. The certifying official will judge the reliability of each individual identified for PRP duties. This will be based on the appropriate PSI, review of personnel and health records, position qualification requirements, and a personal interview. Certification will be formally documented and maintained while the individual is performing PRP duties. The certification will terminate administratively when an individual transfers to a position not requiring PRP certification.

   a. Qualifying Criteria. Due to the special trust placed in them, personnel assigned to PRP duties must:

      (1) Be dependable, mentally alert, and technically proficient commensurate with their respective duty requirements.

      (2) Be flexible in adjusting to changes in the working environment, including ability to work in adverse or emergency situations.

      (3) Have good social adjustment, emotional stability, personal integrity, sound judgment, and allegiance to the United States.

      (4) Have a positive attitude toward nuclear weapons duty.

   b. PSI. The primary purpose of a PSI and national security adjudication is to ensure a trusted workforce. Standards for access to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties are outlined in DoD 5200.2-R (Reference (o)). Personnel selected for designated NC2 PRP positions in accordance with Reference (j) will be subject to random counterintelligence-scope polygraph examinations administered in accordance with DoD Instruction 5210.91 (Reference (p)).

      (1) All civilian, active duty military, Reserve and National Guard personnel, and contractor personnel under the terms of contracts assigned to PRP positions will be subject to a periodic reinvestigation every 5 years, in accordance with Reference (o). Additionally:

         (a) A PSI will be requested for personnel that have a break in active service or government employment exceeding 24 months, and for contractor employees, a break in status exceeding 24 months.

         (b) The certifying official may request a new PSI based on newly discovered significant derogatory information or allegations.

   c. Medical Evaluation. For the purposes of PRP, Reference (m) authorizes disclosure of protected health information of military personnel without authorization and of civilians and
contractor employees pursuant to valid authorization. A CMA or other medical personnel specifically trained and formally designated to perform that function will screen the individual’s health records.

d. Personnel File Review. The certifying official will review in detail the individual’s personnel file, other official records, and information locally available on his or her behavior, conduct, and reliability. Personnel records will reflect assignment of an individual to a PRP position.

e. Personal Interview. The certifying official will personally interview each candidate for PRP duties. The personal interview will not be conducted as a part of a routine orientation briefing for new personnel.

f. Position Qualification. The individual must demonstrate potential for technical proficiency commensurate with nuclear weapon or NC2 duty position requirements prior to PRP certification.

2. INITIAL CERTIFICATION

a. Security Clearance Eligibility Requirements. As part of the required screening process, the certifying official will verify personnel security clearance eligibility. If appropriate, the certifying official will review the results of the investigation. The DoD Components may establish procedures to facilitate timely screening of individuals required to support wartime missions.

   (1) Critical Position. Top Secret eligibility, a security clearance to have been completed (investigation closed) within the last 5 years and favorably adjudicated in accordance with Reference (o) is required. If it becomes necessary to consider an individual for a critical position and the required investigation has not been completed, the certifying official may grant interim certification (see section 3 of this appendix for interim certification conditions). However, individuals with current Top Secret PSI may be PRP certified if:

      (a) The periodic reinvestigation was submitted to OPM prior to the 5-year anniversary of the last investigation.

      (b) The certifying official has documented a review of the completed security questionnaire and is satisfied there are no known risks.

   (2) Controlled Position. Secret eligibility or higher level investigation, a security clearance to have been completed (investigation closed) within the last 5 years, and favorably adjudicated in accordance with Reference (o) is required. If it becomes necessary to consider an individual for a controlled position and the required investigation has not been completed, the certifying official may grant interim certification (see section 3 of this appendix for interim certification conditions).
b. **Medical Evaluation.** As part of the required screening process, the CMA or other medical personnel specifically trained and designated will evaluate health history and records to determine the candidate’s medical qualifications under PRP standards.

   (1) The CMA is the sole authority in determining what information qualifies as medical factors that may affect an individual’s suitability for PRP, and will convey these factors to the certifying official. If the health records review is conducted by medical personnel other than the CMA, and questionable information about an individual’s medical suitability for assignment to a PRP position is identified, the records will be referred to the CMA for further evaluation. The results of the CMA’s review will be provided to the certifying official, who will make the determination on the individual’s suitability to perform PRP duties.

   (2) If available medical records are inadequate, the CMA will conduct an evaluation to determine medical qualification under PRP standards. That medical evaluation will include a mental health consultation when indicated.

c. **Personnel File Review.** The certifying official will review in detail the individual’s personnel file, other official records, and information locally available about the individual’s reliability.

d. **Personal Interview.** During a personal interview the certifying official will inform the individual of his or her significance to national security and nuclear surety, PRP standards, the need for reliable performance, the individual’s responsibility for self-reporting, and peer review of factors and situations that could adversely affect job performance or reliability. The certifying official will determine suitability using Appendix 4 to this enclosure as a guide.

e. **Drug Testing.** Mandatory drug testing for illegal or unauthorized substances of all military and civilian personnel assigned to PRP duties will be conducted in accordance with DoD Instructions 1010.01 (Reference (q)) and 1010.09 (Reference (r)). Drug testing requirements applicable to contractor personnel assigned to PRP duties will be prescribed in applicable contracts in accordance with Reference (g).

f. **Position Qualification.** The candidate must demonstrate potential for technical proficiency commensurate with nuclear weapon or NC2 duty position requirements.

### 3. INTERIM CERTIFICATION

a. **Critical Position.** If it becomes necessary to consider an individual for a critical position and the required investigation has not been completed, interim critical certification may be made under the following conditions:

   (1) The individual must have either Secret eligibility, a security clearance to have been completed (investigation closed) within the last 5 years and favorably adjudicated, or Top Secret eligibility, a security clearance to have been completed (investigation closed) within the last 10
years and favorably adjudicated, without a break in active service or employment longer than 24 months.

(2) The appropriate background investigation request must be submitted and shown as opened in the JPAS before interim certification and all other requirements of the PRP screening process will be fulfilled.

b. **Controlled Position.** If it becomes necessary to consider an individual for a controlled position and the required investigation has not been completed, interim controlled certification may be made under the following conditions:

(1) The individual must have Secret eligibility, a security clearance to have been completed (investigation closed) within the last 10 years and favorably adjudicated, without a break in active service over 24 months.

(2) The appropriate background investigation must be submitted before interim certification and all other requirements for the PRP screening process will be fulfilled.

c. **Individuals with Interim Certification**

(1) These individuals will be identified to supervisory personnel, entry controllers who directly control access to exclusion areas, and others as necessary, as having only interim certification. Entry authorization lists and individual access media will be specifically marked to designate interim certification status.

(2) An individual with interim certification will not be paired in a two-person team with another individual with interim PRP certification.
APPENDIX 3 TO ENCLOSURE 3

PRP POSITIONS

1. GENERAL. The reliability standards established in Appendix 2 to this enclosure will be used to determine an individual’s eligibility for a PRP position. All PRP positions will be formally designated as either critical or controlled and will be restricted to the minimum number required to accomplish the mission. Only certified personnel will be assigned to designated PRP positions and when PRP positions become vacant, certified personnel will be assigned as rapidly as possible. Examples of typical PRP positions are shown in the Table.

2. REVIEW OF PRP POSITIONS. Certifying officials will re-evaluate designated PRP positions annually to determine the need for additional positions or the cancellation of unnecessary positions.

3. PRP POSITION ELIGIBILITY. Eligibility for assignment to PRP positions, subject to the reliability standards in Appendix 2 of this enclosure, will be confirmed in writing by a certifying official. Before an individual is assigned to PRP duties, the certifying official will certify that the individual has the required PSI and clearance, been screened according to the reliability standards, been personally interviewed, and been found eligible and qualified for assignment to a PRP position.
### Table. Identifying PRP Positions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty Position</th>
<th>Duty Position Example</th>
<th>PRP Designation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Commanders</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Delivery units</td>
<td>Navy submarine, Air Force wing-group, and squadron; persons delegated to act for the above on nuclear weapon operations.</td>
<td>Critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Nuclear support units</td>
<td>Strategic weapons facilities, Air Force munitions or missile maintenance squadron.</td>
<td>Critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Missile and Air Crews</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Delivery aircraft; missile crew</td>
<td>Pilots, navigators, and bombardiers; weapon system officers; electronic system officers; missile crew members.</td>
<td>Critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Non-Delivery Transport aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) With access, no technical knowledge</td>
<td>Prime Nuclear Airlift Force, Pilots, and Loadmasters who provide transportation of nuclear cargo or nuclear components.</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Without access</td>
<td>Self-explanatory</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Delivery Unit Personnel and Supervisors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. With access and technical knowledge</td>
<td>Persons who could cause damage, unauthorized activities, or unauthorized launch activities.</td>
<td>Critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. With access, no technical knowledge</td>
<td>Handling, transporting, and launch personnel.</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Without access</td>
<td>Support such as clerks, cooks.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Nuclear support unit personnel and supervisors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. With access and technical knowledge</td>
<td>Persons who perform modifications, retrofits, limited life component changes, and similar tasks.</td>
<td>Critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. With access, no technical knowledge</td>
<td>Handling, transporting, and launch personnel.</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Without access</td>
<td>Support personnel such as clerks, cooks.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. Handling and transport personnel</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. With access, no technical knowledge</td>
<td>Vehicle operator, crane operators.</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6. Command disablement management team</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. With access and technical knowledge</td>
<td>Personnel tasked with coding or recoding and checking built-in Command Disable System and external controlled Command Disable.</td>
<td>Critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. With access, no technical knowledge</td>
<td>Command Disablement Team.</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7. Delivery system maintenance personnel and supervisors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. With access and technical knowledge</td>
<td>Persons who could cause damage, unauthorized activities, or unauthorized launch activities.</td>
<td>Critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. With access, no technical knowledge</td>
<td></td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Without access</td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table: Identifying PRP Positions, Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty Position</th>
<th>Duty Position Example</th>
<th>PRP Designation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>8. Custodial unit personnel</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Custodians</td>
<td></td>
<td>Critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Custodial agents</td>
<td></td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>9. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. EOD technicians designated to conduct follow-on render safe procedures and disposal procedures in accordance with DoD Manual 3150.08 (Reference(s))</td>
<td>Military Service EOD technicians with an assigned mission to support a response task force.</td>
<td>Critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. EOD technicians conducting initial response in accordance with Reference(s).</td>
<td>EOD technicians providing emergency support to an initial response force; EOD support such as clerks and mechanics.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>10. Security Forces</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>a. General</strong> See DoD Directive O-5210.41 (Reference(s)) for additional security requirements.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Escort</td>
<td>Persons controlling access to weapons during transport.</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Convoy</td>
<td>Convoy commanders, security escorts, and entry controllers to areas containing nuclear weapons during ground transport.</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) For NC2 aircraft</td>
<td>Persons controlling access to occupied or locked NC2 aircraft with positive control material present.</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Augmenters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Armed</td>
<td>Persons routinely assigned to duties directly for nuclear weapon security who are armed and assigned to duties protect and guard a nuclear weapon or, when joined, the delivery system.</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Persons assigned to the follow-on backup forces.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Not armed</td>
<td>Persons not routinely assigned to nuclear weapon security duty, who are not armed, and not assigned duties to protect and guard a nuclear weapon or, when joined, the delivery system.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>b. Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Access control personnel</td>
<td>Entry control personnel and security guards directly controlling access to Army SNM.</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Alarm monitors</td>
<td>Persons controlling and monitoring primary and redundant intrusion detection system for Army SNM.</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table. Identifying PRP Positions, Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty Position</th>
<th>Duty Position Example</th>
<th>PRP Designation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(3) Security force on-site commanders</td>
<td>Full-time member of the security force, assigned to Army nuclear support mission, who is on site with the authority and capability to direct Army SNM physical protection activities and security response forces under emergency situations.</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Armed guards</td>
<td>Armed personnel specifically assigned duties to protect and guard Army SNM.</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Security response forces</td>
<td>Armed security personnel assigned to installations with an Army SNM but not directly assigned to day-to-day guard duties.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Navy and Marine Corps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Security Forces Afloat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Internal and inside of perimeter</td>
<td>Persons who control entry into an exclusion area; includes permanently assigned guards and personnel assigned and stationed to support a submarine exclusion area.</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Alarm monitors</td>
<td>Persons who control primary and redundant intrusion detection system’s annunciation equipment.</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Response Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Armed initial response forces</td>
<td>Reaction forces assigned reaction force direct support duties. Persons assigned to the security response team.</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Armed augmentation forces</td>
<td>Reaction forces assigned support duties. Persons assigned to the backup alert force, reserve force, and augmentation force.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Security Forces Ashore</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Internal and inside perimeter</td>
<td>Persons who control entry into waterfront restricted area, exclusion area, or limited area; includes permanently assigned guards in any such area.</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Alarm monitors</td>
<td>Persons who control primary and redundant intrusion detection system’s annunciation equipment.</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) External to perimeter</td>
<td>Persons permanently ordered and solely dedicated to nuclear weapons security duties who are armed and specifically assigned duties to protect and guard a nuclear weapon or, when joined, the delivery system.</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Escort</td>
<td>Persons controlling access to weapons during transport.</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Air Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Inside restricted areas and at close-in or exclusion areas</td>
<td>Permanently assigned security forces posted in these areas to guard nuclear weapons and control entry to the areas. Includes entry controllers, alarm monitors, Response Force, camper alert team, security escort team, close-in sentries, and area supervisors.</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table. Identifying PRP Positions, Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty Position</th>
<th>Duty Position Example</th>
<th>PRP Designation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(2) Security system operators and administrators, security controllers and intercontinental ballistic missile flight security controllers</td>
<td>Security forces personnel who operate, monitor, or administer primary, remote or redundant nuclear area or facility electronic security systems, integrated security systems, or subsystems. Security personnel who provide primary command, control, and communications for nuclear weapon security operations.</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Convoy</td>
<td>Convoy commanders, security escorts, and entry controllers to areas containing nuclear weapons during ground transport.</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Lethal denial system operators</td>
<td>Primary, alternate, or remote operators of lethal denial systems dedicated to nuclear weapon security.</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Keys and codes</td>
<td>Persons who maintain, account for, and issue keys, codes, and combinations that provide access to nuclear weapons.</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| (6) Response Forces | a. Posted in a restricted (limited) or exclusion areas.  
b. Posted outside of a restricted (limited) or exclusion area. | Controlled  
None |
| (7) Backup Forces | a. Posted in a restricted (limited) area.  
b. Posted outside of a restricted (limited) area (or have other than nuclear security as duty) | Controlled  
None |
| **11. Nuclear weapon inspectors** | | |
| a. With access | Position equal to that being inspected. | Critical or controlled |
| b. Without access | | None |
| **12. Others** | | |
| a. Personnel in command and control line | Persons who control or use authenticators and/or emergency action messages; permissive action link (PAL) teams and PAL and other coded control devices teams; staff officers, contractors and other personnel who control or use strategic or tactical nuclear-certified computer data. | Critical  
May also be specially designated personnel – (See position example 12 c below.) |
| b. Communications security personnel | Persons who receive and distribute sealed authenticators, PAL material, or related PCM codes. | Critical |
Table. Identifying PRP Positions, Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty Position</th>
<th>Duty Position Example</th>
<th>PRP Designation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>c. Designated NC2 personnel</td>
<td>Personnel with access to NC2 coding and authentication processes and a communications medium necessary to transmit release, execution, or termination orders; personnel involved in the preparation and production of NC2 PCM coding and authentication documents and equipment; personnel involved in preparation and production of nuclear weapons targeting tapes and materials; and other personnel who could have an adverse impact on system performance for nodes and equipment that represent near-single-point-failure elements for the NC2 system.</td>
<td>Critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Designated SNM personnel</td>
<td>Personnel in positions that would allow the individual, acting alone, the opportunity to divert, or cause the diversion of, Category I- or Category II-specified quantities of SNM.</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 4 TO ENCLOSURE 3

PRP SUITABILITY FACTORS

1. GENERAL. The following guidelines are established to assist certifying officials in determining the suitability of all personnel subject to PRP. The ultimate determination of whether to grant or continue an individual’s enrollment in PRP is based on an overall common sense judgment by the certifying official. Each case must be judged on its own merits, and above all, be consistent with the interests of U.S. national security. Sexual orientation or preference may not be used as a basis for or a disqualifying factor in determining a person’s eligibility for PRP. In evaluating the relevance of an individual’s conduct, certifying officials are encouraged to carefully weigh a number of variables in consideration of the whole person concept of determining suitability. These variables include:

   a. Personal Conduct. Conduct involving questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations could indicate that the person may not be suitable for enrollment in PRP.

      (1) Conditions that the certifying official should carefully consider include:

         (a) Reliable, unfavorable information.

         (b) Deliberate provision of false or misleading information.

         (c) Personal conduct or concealment of information that may increase an individual’s vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or duties, such as engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person’s personal, professional, or community standing or render the person susceptible to blackmail.

         (d) A pattern of dishonesty or rule violations.

         (e) Known or witting association with persons involved in criminal activity.

         (f) Loss of confidence by the certifying official in the reliability in the individual.

      (2) Conditions the certifying official might consider to mitigate reliability concerns:

         (a) The information was unsubstantiated or not pertinent to a determination of judgment, trustworthiness, or reliability.

         (b) The individual made prompt, good faith efforts to correct the falsification before being confronted with the facts.
(c) Omission of material facts was caused or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of authorized personnel, and the previously omitted information was promptly and fully provided.

(d) The individual has taken positive steps to eliminate vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or duress.

(e) The individual has ceased known or witting association with persons involved in criminal activities.

(f) The behavior occurred during or before adolescence and there is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature

b. Emotional, Mental, and Personality Disorders. Emotional, mental, and personality disorders can cause a significant deficit in an individual’s psychological, social, and occupational functioning. These disorders present suitability concerns for individuals subject to PRP because they may indicate a defect in reliability. The certifying official will take the necessary actions to ensure that the individual is properly screened both medically and psychologically. As with all potentially disqualifying medical conditions, the certifying official must decide each case on the specific medical and other pertinent evaluations of the individual involved. Any suspected suicidal behavior will result in the individual’s suspension from PRP duties pending the results of a mental health assessment.

(1) Conditions that the certifying official should carefully consider include:

(a) An opinion by a credentialed mental health professional that the individual has a condition or treatment that may indicate a defect in judgment, reliability, or stability.

(b) Information that suggests that an individual has failed to follow appropriate medical advice relating to treatment of a condition, e.g., failure to take prescribed medication.

(c) A pattern of high-risk, irresponsible, aggressive, anti-social, or emotionally unstable behavior.

(d) Information that suggests that the individual’s current behavior indicates a defect in his or her judgment or reliability.

(e) Information that suggests the individual displays psychological symptoms that impact reliability because he or she has witnessed or experienced personal trauma in the course of his or her duties, including but not limited to such events as family illness or death and violent crime. When individuals affected by personal trauma seek treatment, the CMA will assess potential impact upon reliability and advise the certifying official accordingly. The CMA will not disclose the personal circumstance that resulted in trauma, but is required to inform the certifying official of the specific medical or psychological diagnosis and treatment that may potentially impact reliability.
(f) Poor attitude or lack of motivation.

(2) Conditions the certifying official might consider to mitigate reliability concerns include:

(a) There is no indication of a current problem.

(b) A credentialed mental health professional is of the (recent) opinion that an individual’s previous emotional, mental, or personality disorder is cured, under control, or in remission and has a low probability of recurrence or exacerbation.

(c) The past emotional instability was a temporary condition (e.g., one caused by a death, illness, or marital breakup), the situation has been resolved, and the individual is no longer emotionally unstable.

c. Financial Considerations. An individual who is financially overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. Unexplained affluence is often linked to proceeds from financially profitable criminal acts.

(1) Conditions that the certifying official should carefully consider include:

(a) A history of not meeting financial obligations.

(b) Deceptive or illegal financial practices such as embezzlement, employee theft, check fraud, income tax evasion, expense account fraud, filing deceptive loan statements, and other intentional financial breaches of trust.

(c) Inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts.

(d) Unexplained affluence.

(e) Financial problems that are linked to gambling, drug abuse, alcoholism, or other issues of security concern.

(2) Conditions the certifying official might consider to mitigate reliability concerns include:

(a) The behavior was not recent.

(b) It was an isolated incident.

(c) The conditions that resulted in the behavior were largely beyond the person’s control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce, or separation).
(d) The person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem and there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control.

(e) The affluence resulted from a legal source.

(f) The individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts.

d. **Criminal Conduct.** A history or pattern of criminal activity creates doubt about a person’s judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness.

   (1) Conditions that the certifying official should carefully consider include:

      (a) Credible allegations or admissions of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person was formally charged.

      (b) A single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses.

   (2) Conditions the certifying official might consider to mitigate reliability concerns include:

      (a) The criminal behavior was not recent.

      (b) The crime was an isolated incident.

      (c) The person was pressured or coerced into committing the act and those pressures are no longer present in that person’s life.

      (d) The person did not voluntarily commit the act or the factors leading to the violation are not likely to recur.

      (e) Acquittal.

      (f) There is clear evidence of successful rehabilitation.

e. **Substance or Drug Misuse and Drug Incidents.** Improper or illegal involvement with drugs raises questions regarding an individual’s suitability for PRP. Substance use disorder may impair social or occupational functioning, increasing the risk of an individual’s inability to ensure the safety, security, control, and effectiveness of nuclear weapons. Pre-Service use of marijuana, hashish, or other cannabis-based product does not necessarily render an individual ineligible for consideration for or retention in a PRP position. It is incumbent on the certifying official, with CMA consultation, to determine the degree that pre-service use impacts the individual’s reliability.

   (1) Conditions that the certifying official should carefully consider include:
(a) Any substance or drug misuse (see Glossary).

(b) Diagnosis by a credentialed medical professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of substance use disorder.

(c) Evaluation of substance use disorder by a licensed clinical social worker or licensed professional counselor who is a staff member of a recognized drug treatment program.

(d) Failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program prescribed by a credentialed medical professional.

(2) Conditions the certifying official might consider to mitigate reliability concerns include:

(a) The substance or drug misuse was not recent.

(b) The substance or drug misuse was an isolated incident or aberrant event.

(c) The individual has displayed a demonstrated intent not to misuse any substances or drugs in the future.

(d) The individual has satisfactorily completed a prescribed drug treatment program, including rehabilitation and aftercare requirements, without recurrence of abuse, and received a favorable prognosis by a credentialed medical professional.

f. Alcohol Use Disorder and Alcohol-related Incidents. Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment, unreliability, failure to control impulses, and increases the risk of an individual inability to meet their PRP responsibilities to ensure the safety, security, control, and effectiveness of nuclear weapons. Individuals diagnosed with mild, moderate, or severe alcohol use disorder, or who have been involved in an alcohol related incident will be, at a minimum, suspended from PRP duties. The certifying official, after consultation with the CMA or conducting an investigation of the circumstances of an incident, will determine the degree to which the diagnosis affects the reliability of the individual being considered for or who is currently under PRP assignment. Those individuals may be returned to PRP duties after successfully completing a prescribed rehabilitation program or treatment regimen, when they have displayed positive changes in job reliability and lifestyle, and receive a favorable medical prognosis by the CMA.

(1) Conditions that the certifying official should carefully consider include:

(a) Alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving while under the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, or other criminal incidents related to alcohol use.

(b) Alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for work or duty in an intoxicated or impaired condition or drinking on the job.
(c) Diagnosis by a credentialed medical professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of moderate or severe alcohol use disorder.

(d) Evaluation of moderate or severe alcohol use disorder by a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol treatment program.

(e) Habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of impaired judgment.

(f) Consumption of alcohol, subsequent to a diagnosis of moderate or severe alcohol use disorder by a credentialed medical professional and following completion of an alcohol rehabilitation program.

(2) Conditions the certifying official might consider to mitigate reliability concerns include:

(a) The alcohol related incidents do not indicate a pattern.

(b) There is no indication of a recent problem.

(c) The individual has made positive changes in behavior supportive of sobriety.

(d) Following diagnosis of moderate or severe alcohol use disorder, the individual successfully completed inpatient or outpatient rehabilitation along with aftercare requirements, participates frequently in meetings of appropriate recovery support organizations, has abstained from alcohol for at least 12 months, and received a favorable prognosis by a credentialed medical professional or a licensed clinical social worker or licensed professional counselor who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol treatment program.

g. Sexual Harassment and Assault. Sexual harassment imposes significant costs, such as impairing unit readiness and disrupting unit cohesion.

(1) Conditions that the certifying official should carefully consider include:

(a) An individual is determined to have made unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, either explicitly or implicitly.

(b) Such advances are made as a term or condition of a person’s job, pay, or career.

(c) An individual’s conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with another’s work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.

(d) The individual’s conduct can be considered sexual assault as defined in the Glossary.
(2) Conditions the certifying official might consider to mitigate reliability concerns include:

   (a) The behavior occurred during or before adolescence and there is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature.

   (b) The behavior was not recent and there is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature.

   (c) There is no other evidence of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emotional instability.

   (d) The behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion, exploitation, or duress.

h. Security Violations. Noncompliance with security regulations raises doubt about an individual’s trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to safeguard classified information.

   (1) Conditions that the certifying official should carefully consider include:

       (a) Unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

       (b) Violations that are deliberate or multiple or due to negligence.

   (2) Conditions the certifying official might consider to mitigate reliability concerns include:

       (a) The violations were inadvertent.

       (b) The violations were isolated or infrequent.

       (c) The violations were due to improper or inadequate training.

       (d) The individual demonstrates a positive attitude toward the discharge of PRP responsibilities.

i. Misuse of Information Technology Systems. Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines, or regulations pertaining to information technology systems may raise security concerns about an individual’s trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to properly protect classified systems, networks, and information.

   (1) Conditions that the certifying official should carefully consider include:

       (a) Illegal or unauthorized entry into any information technology system.

       (b) Illegal or unauthorized modification, destruction, manipulation, or denial of access to information residing on an information technology system.
(c) Removal (or use) of hardware, software, or media from any information technology system without authorization, when specifically prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines, or regulations.

(d) Introduction of hardware, software, or media into any information technology system without authorization, when specifically prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines, or regulations.

(2) Conditions the certifying official might consider to mitigate reliability concerns include:

(a) The conduct was unintentional or inadvertent.

(b) The introduction or removal of media was authorized.

(c) The misuse was followed by a prompt, good faith effort to correct the situation.

2. MANDATORY DECERTIFICATION OR DISQUALIFICATION. Any of the following conditions will result in decertification or disqualification of individuals being considered for a PRP position:

   a. An individual diagnosed with alcohol use disorder who subsequently fails or fails to participate in the prescribed rehabilitation program or treatment regimen.

   b. An individual found to be involved in the unauthorized trafficking, cultivation, processing, manufacturing, or sale of any controlled or illegal drug, including cannabis-based products.

   c. An individual found to have ever used a drug that could cause flashbacks.

   d. An individual diagnosed with severe substance use disorder.

   e. Loss of confidence by the certifying official in the reliability in the individual.

   f. Revocation of the individual’s security clearance.
APPENDIX 5 TO ENCLOSURE 3

DoD NUCLEAR WEAPON PRP ANNUAL REPORT

Each DoD Component maintaining a PRP will provide an annual program status report to the ASD(NCB) by February 15 of the following year. The annual status report will include, for the preceding calendar year ending December 31, PRP certification and decertification statistics by Component and category of personnel (e.g., Air Force (military); federal or DoD civilian; and active duty, Reserves, and National Guard, or defense contractor). A recommended format is provided in the Figure.

Figure. Recommended Format for DoD Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program Annual Status Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DoD Component: ____________</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Total Number of PRP Certified Personnel**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Pacific</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Critical</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
<td>Critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Duty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guard/Reserves</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Number of Personnel Pending Investigation or Adjudication For PRP Assignment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Pacific</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Critical</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
<td>Critical</td>
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<td>Contractors</td>
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**Figure. Recommended Format for DoD Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program Annual Status Report, Continued**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total PRP Decertifications</th>
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<td>Critical</td>
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<td>Contractors</td>
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**Reason for Decertifications**

**Personal Conduct**

<table>
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<th>Active Duty</th>
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<th>Civilians</th>
<th>Contractors</th>
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**Emotional, Mental, and Personality Disorder**

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<tr>
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<th>Contractors</th>
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**Financial**

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<th>Active Duty</th>
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<th>Contractors</th>
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**Criminal Conduct**

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Guard/Reserves</th>
<th>Civilians</th>
<th>Contractors</th>
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Figure. Recommended Format for DoD Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program Annual Status Report, Continued

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Substance or Drug Misuse</th>
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<th>Europe</th>
<th>Pacific</th>
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<td>Controlled</td>
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<td>Contractors</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Alcohol Use Disorder and Alcohol Related Incidents</strong></td>
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<td>Active Duty</td>
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<td>Contractors</td>
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<td><strong>Sexual Harassment</strong></td>
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<td>Contractors</td>
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<td><strong>Security Violations</strong></td>
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<td>Active Duty</td>
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<td>Guard/Reserves</td>
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<td>Civilians</td>
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<td>Contractors</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Disqualifying Medical Condition:</strong> (substantiated by competent medical authority, that is not considered an emotional, mental, or personality disorder)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Active Duty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guard/Reserves</td>
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<td>Civilians</td>
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<td>Contractors</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Figure. Recommended Format for DoD Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program Annual Status Report, Continued

| Total Number of Personnel Granted Requalification or Reinstatement to PRP Assignment |
|---------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
|                                 | U.S.             | Europe           | Pacific          | Total            |
|                                 | Critical         | Controlled       | Critical         | Controlled       |
| Active Duty                     |                  |                  |                  |                  |
| Guard/ Reserves                 |                  |                  |                  |                  |
| Civilians                       |                  |                  |                  |                  |
| Contractors                     |                  |                  |                  |                  |
## GLOSSARY

### PART I. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASD(NCB)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Consolidated Adjudications Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDRUSSTRATCOM</td>
<td>Commander, United States Strategic Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCSI</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMA</td>
<td>competent medical authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DASD(NM)</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTRA</td>
<td>Defense Threat Reduction Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDC</td>
<td>independent duty corpsman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDMT</td>
<td>independent duty medical technician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPAS</td>
<td>Joint Personnel Adjudication System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC2</td>
<td>nuclear command and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCD</td>
<td>nuclear-certified computer data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAL</td>
<td>permissive action link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCM</td>
<td>positive control material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PII</td>
<td>personally identifiable information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRP</td>
<td>Personnel Reliability Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>personnel security investigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSMO-I</td>
<td>Personnel Security Management Office for Industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNM</td>
<td>special nuclear material</td>
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</table>

### PART II. DEFINITIONS

These terms and their definitions are for the purposes of this manual.

**access.** The opportunity to tamper with or modify a nuclear weapon, critical nuclear weapon system component, or positive control NC2 material. A person who is escorted by or under observation of PRP-certified individual(s) capable of detecting unauthorized actions is not considered to have access.

**active service.** For assignment to PRP: active duty in the U.S. military; employment in the federal civil service; employment by a U.S. Government contractor involving access to classified
information under the National Industrial Security Program; continuous federal service by National Guard members; service as a cadet or midshipmen in the Military, Naval, Air Force, or Coast Guard academies; members of the Selected Reserve, as defined in DoD Instruction 1215.06 (Reference (u)). For PRP purposes, the following apply:

An interruption in active service of over 24 months constitutes a break in active service.

Assignment as a Reserve Officers Training Corps, Merchant Marine Academy, and Maritime Academy cadet or midshipman is not considered active service.

**Agency and Installation PRP Monitor.** An individual in the military grade of E-5 or above or a civilian in the equivalent grade who is specifically appointed to administer and conduct oversight of the day-to-day functions of the PRP at DoD Components and installations.

**Alcohol-Related Incident.** Any substandard behavior or performance in which the consumption of alcohol by the individual is a contributing factor.

**Alcohol Use Disorder.** A problematic pattern of alcohol use leading to clinically significant impairment or distress, as defined by symptoms in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Reference (v)). Alcohol use disorder levels of severity (i.e., mild, moderate, or severe) are determined through the evaluation of symptoms described in Reference (v).

**Armed.** Defined in DoD Directive 5210.56 (Reference (w)).

**CAF.** A single facility with the primary responsibility to evaluate PSI and other relevant information and to render personnel security determinations.

**Certifying Official.** DoD military or civilian official, in a PRP position, responsible for nuclear weapons, SNM, or NC2 operations having sufficient personal contact with all subordinate PRP personnel to permit continual evaluation of their performance and reliability. For DoD contractor personnel, the certifying official will be the DoD military or civilian official identified for that purpose in the contract.

**CMA.** A U.S. military healthcare provider or a U.S. healthcare provider employed by or under contract or subcontract to the U.S. Government or U.S. Government contractor. Nurse practitioners, physician assistants, and indirectly supervised, certified independent duty hospital corpsman may be CMAs. CMAs must be:

- Awarded regular clinical privileges for independent practice according to Military Service regulations by the healthcare facility responsible for the provider’s place of duty, or if not privileged for independent practice, then be supervised by a physician who is privileged to practice independently.

- Specifically trained as a CMA and be appointed in accordance with procedures established by DoD Component heads.
continuing evaluation. The process by which a PRP-certified individual is observed for compliance with reliability standards. This is an ongoing process that considers duty performance, on- and off-duty behavior, and reliability on a continuing and frequent basis.

controlled position. A position in which an individual is assigned nuclear duties where he or she:

- Has access, but no technical knowledge;
- Controls access into areas containing nuclear weapons, but does not have access or technical knowledge;
- Is armed and assigned duties to protect or guard nuclear weapons; or
- Has been designated as a certifying official at an operational unit or staff activities with only designated controlled PRP positions.

counterintelligence-scope polygraph examination. Defined in Reference (p).

critical position. A position in which an individual is assigned nuclear duties where he or she:

- Has access and technical knowledge;
- Can either directly or indirectly cause the launch or use of a nuclear weapon;
- Has accountability, control, or use of positive control materials or devices such as sealed authentication systems, PAL materials and related codes, strategic and tactical nuclear-certified computer data (NCCD), nuclear targeting tapes or materials, emergency action messages, or release procedures for nuclear weapons; or
- Has been designated as a certifying official at an operational unit or staff activities with designated critical PRP positions.

custodial agent. An individual acting on behalf of the custodian in maintaining control of access to U.S. nuclear weapons and maintaining control of weapons before release.

custodian. The commander of a U.S. custodial unit.

decertification. An action based on the receipt of adverse information leading to removal from PRP of an individual who has been screened, determined reliable, and certified capable of performing duties involving nuclear weapons, NC2 systems and equipment, or specified quantities of SNM.

disqualification. Before certification, an action taken based on the receipt of disqualifying information to deny PRP eligibility of an individual considered for, or in training leading to the assignment to, duties involving nuclear weapons, NC2 systems and equipment, or specified quantities of SNM.
drug incident. The wrongful use, possession, distribution, or introduction onto a military installation (or other property or facility under military supervision) of any illegal substances or the intentional use of substances to alter perceptions or mental faculties, including, but not limited to, illegal narcotics, sniffing glue or aerosol fumes, and intentional misuse of prescription or over-the-counter medication. Positive drug test results without an authorized reason for prohibited substances are also considered drug incidents.

exclusion area. A designated area immediately surrounding one or more nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons systems. Normally, the boundaries of the area are the walls, floor, and ceiling of a structure, or are delineated by a permanent or temporary barrier. In the absence of positive preventive measures, entry into the exclusion area constitutes access to the nuclear weapons or systems.

healthcare provider. Any member of the Military Services, civilian employee of the DoD, or personal services contractor in accordance with section 1091 of Title 10, United States Code (Reference (x)) authorized by the DoD to perform health care functions. The term does not include any contract provider that is not a personal services contractor. Treatment performed by healthcare providers must be reviewed by CMAs or other medical personnel specifically trained and formally designated to perform these duties for PRP purposes.

health records. Documents that include medical, mental health, and dental records.

information technology systems. Systems that include all related equipment used for the communication, transmission, processing, manipulation, and storage of classified or sensitive information.

limited area. A designated area immediately surrounding one or more exclusion areas. Normally, the area is between the boundaries of the exclusion area(s) and the outer or inner barrier or boundary of the perimeter security system.

NC2. Materials and devices used in the coding and authentication processing and communication medium necessary to transmit release, execution, or termination orders; and nuclear weapons targeting tapes or media containing nuclear weapons targeting data.

NCCD. Nuclear certified media containing nuclear mission or launch control data.

positive control materials or devices. Sealed authentication systems, PAL, coded switch system, positive enable system, or NCCD material or devices.

periodic reinvestigation. An investigation conducted at specified intervals for updating a previously completed PSI.

PSI. Any investigation required for determining the security clearance eligibility of DoD military or civilian personnel and contractor employees for access to classified information, acceptance or retention in the Military Services, or assignment to and retention in sensitive positions.
reviewing official. The commander or designated DoD military or civilian official, at a level above that of the certifying official, who is responsible for operations involving nuclear weapons, SNM, PCM, or NC2 operations. Reviewing officials who have no PRP duties other than to appoint and certify a certifying official need not be designated as a PRP position.

screening. A review of medical and dental records, personnel records, PSI, other pertinent documents or information, and a personal interview for the purpose of validating an individual’s reliability to be considered for the PRP.

sexual assault. Any conduct involving the use of force, threats, intimidation, or abuse of authority, or where the victim does not or cannot consent.

sexual harassment. A form of gender discrimination that involves unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature. There are two types of sexual harassment:

- Quid pro quo sexual harassment are conditions placed on a person’s career or terms of employment in return for sexual favors. It involves threats of adverse actions if the victim does not submit or promises of favorable actions if the person does submit.

- Hostile environment sexual harassment occurs when a person is subjected to offensive, unwanted, and unsolicited comments and behavior of a sexual nature that interferes with that person's work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment.

single scope background investigation. A PSI consisting of both record reviews and interviews with sources of information in accordance with Reference (n).

substance or drug misuse. The use of any substance with or without a prescription with the primary goal to alter one’s mental state (e.g., to alter mood, emotion, or state of consciousness) outside of its medically prescribed purpose. May include medications, illicit drugs, or use of a commercial product outside its intended purpose (such as inhalants or synthetic cannabinoids).

substance use disorder. A problematic pattern of substance use leading to clinically significant impairment or distress, as defined by symptoms in Reference (v). Substance use disorder levels of severity (i.e., mild, moderate, or severe) are determined through the evaluation of symptoms described in Reference (v).

suspension. An action to remove an individual from PRP duties.

technical knowledge. Knowledge that would allow an individual to perform an intentional act on a nuclear weapon, a critical nuclear weapon system component, or positive control NC2 material in a manner that could go undetected during normal monitoring or operations and could cause the unauthorized pre-arming, arming, releasing, disablement, or detonation of a nuclear weapon or degradation of weapon performance.