PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for the planning and conduct of joint military mobilization and demobilization, force expansion, use of volunteers, and Presidential Reserve Call-up.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the US, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

DANIEL J. O’DONOHUE
Lieutenant General, USMC
Director, Joint Force Development
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SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 4-05
DATED 21 FEBRUARY 2014

• Updated the language of the apportionment section to ensure consistency with the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance.

• Added the definition of “total force” to the Joint Military Perspective section.

• Updated the description of Adaptive Planning and Execution per Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Planning, dated 16 June 2017.

• Provided clarification to the role of the United States Coast Guard in the Mobilization Roles and Responsibilities section.

• Updated the new Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) mission as a force provider as directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as provided by DCMA.

• Added verbiage to update the role of United States Transportation Command as the Joint Deployment and Distribution Coordinator per Unified Command Plan 2017.

• Updated the definition of a mobilization planner.

• Updated the Mobilization Planning and Execution chapter to remain consistent with JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

• Added language that supports the Secretary of Homeland Security’s authority to call-up United States Coast Guard reserves to augment forces.

• Updated the section on Joint Engineer Planning and Execution System to ensure consistency with JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

• Terms, definitions, and references throughout were updated, both in figures and in text, to ensure accuracy and consistency across the catalog of JPs.
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COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

- Outlines how to assemble and organize personnel and materiel for active duty military forces, activating the Reserve Component (including federalizing the National Guard), extending terms of service, surging and mobilizing the industrial base and training bases, and bringing the Armed Forces of the United States to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency.

- Describes the five tenets of successful mobilization: objective, timeliness, unity of effort, flexibility, and sustainability.

- Discusses the roles and responsibilities extended from the President and Secretary of Defense down through the combatant commands, joint task forces, Services, and Department of Defense agencies to installations.

- Outlines the assembly and organization of resources in 12 interdependent resource areas (legal authorities, funding, environment, manpower, materiel and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial base, training base, joint health services, communications, and host-nation support).

- Provides the national and joint military perspectives of demobilization planning and execution.

Mobilization and National Security

Mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies.

A responsive mobilization capability is critical to our national security and the execution of the President’s National Security Strategy (NSS) and its derivatives, the Secretary of Defense’s (SecDef’s) National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (CJCS’s) National Military Strategy (NMS). The US employs military capabilities at home and abroad in support of strategies in a variety of operations.

The National Perspective

The NSS outlines the major national security concerns of the US and how the President’s administration plans to address them using all instruments of national power. The document is often purposely general in content, and its implementation by the Department of Defense (DOD) relies on elaborating direction provided in supporting
documents (e.g., NDS, *Guidance for Employment of the Force*, and NMS).

**Global Force Management (GFM).** The GFM process integrates force assignment, apportionment, and allocation.

Two important attributes of GFM include being able to globally assess force sourcing risk to address mitigation options and enabling global sourcing with the best force sourcing option, regardless of command, organization, or Service to which the force or personnel are assigned.

**The Joint Military Perspective**

**Total Joint Force Policy.** The total force includes the organizations, units, and individuals that compromise the DOD resources for implementing the NSS. It includes Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) military personnel; military retired members; and DOD civilian personnel, including foreign national direct and in-direct, as well as non-appropriated fund employees, contractors, and host-nation support (HNS) personnel.

**Mobilization Tenets**

There are five mobilization tenets that describe the characteristics of successful mobilization: **objective, timeliness, unity of effort, flexibility, and sustainability.**

**Mobilization Tenets**

**Objective.** Joint operations are directed toward clearly defined, decisive, and achievable objectives.

**Timeliness.** Timely mobilization of all resources is essential to achieving overwhelming force on the battlefield at the right time and place.

**Unity of Effort.** Unity of effort in mobilization demands the integrated efforts of the nation’s military and supporting resource areas toward achievement of common objectives.

**Flexibility.** Flexibility is necessary to develop an appropriate response in a crisis, overcome unforeseen problems, adapt to uncertainties, and adjust to the friction of war.
Sustainability. Sustainability in joint operations provides the joint force commander flexibility, endurance, and the ability to extend operational reach.

Mobilization Roles and Responsibilities

In times of crisis and war, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) assists SecDef in managing the mobilization of the RC by developing implementation guidance for issue by SecDef or designated representative to the Joint Staff (JS), combatant commands, Military Departments (MILDEPs), and DOD agencies. OSD assembles cost data and compiles reports on the cost of military operations, as required by law.

The Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). The JPEC collectively plans for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces.

- The CJCS, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prepares integrated plans for military mobilization, establishes planning relationships, develops mobilization options, and provides mobilization recommendations to SecDef.
- The JS supports the CJCS in integrating the mobilization plans of the MILDEPs and DOD agencies.
- The combatant commanders (CCDRs) organize and employ assigned and attached forces and are principally responsible for the preparation of campaign plans, support plans, operation plans (OPLANs) and operation orders. They participate in the development of national military and theater strategies and participate in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process in addition to their planning responsibilities.
- The MILDEPs provide forces and logistic support to the CCDRs at the direction of SecDef.
- DOD agencies, including the Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Logistics Agency...

Resource Areas

Military mobilization requires the assembly and organization of resources in 12 interdependent resource areas (legal authorities, funding, environment, manpower, materiel and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial base, training base, joint health services, communications, and HNS).

Legal Authorities

There is a range of legal authority that enables or limits mobilization and emergency actions. Many authorities are available to the President in any level of emergency; others become available with a Presidential declaration of national emergency. Still, others have been reserved by Congress pending passage of a public law or joint resolution of national emergency or declaration of war.

Funding

The CJCS does not make funding decisions. In peacetime, the CJCS assesses the impact of operational resource requests made by the MILDEPs and DOD agencies in the PPBE process and recommends to SecDef how available funding should be distributed to implement the NMS. In wartime, the CJCS, in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, may provide advice to the President and SecDef concerning funding priorities.

Environment

Awareness of environmental issues, requirements for compliance, and the liabilities or penalties associated with noncompliance mandate the identification and resolution of environmental issues that affect mobilization. It is DOD policy to comply with applicable environmental laws and regulations, although national security exemptions may be available.

Manpower

Manpower mobilization augments the peacetime AC military end strength. Sources of military mobilization manpower include members of the RC, military retirees, volunteers with prior service, and nonprior service (NPS) personnel who volunteer.
**Materiel and Equipment**

Materiel and equipment mobilization consists of many activities that can be grouped under two major tasks: increasing the availability of materiel and equipment to accommodate the needs of a larger active force and alleviating shortages by allocating or redistributing materiel and equipment in accordance with validated priorities.

**Transportation**

Transportation resources are required to support mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization operations. Mobilization activities are supported principally by continental United States (CONUS) air, rail, highway, pipeline, port facilities, and inland waterway assets of commercial firms. Deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment operations are supported primarily by intertheater airlift and sealift, which move unit equipment and unit personnel, and sustainment items (non-unit equipment and supplies) from the US to the theater of operation.

**Facilities**

Options for expanding facilities during mobilization include reopening unused capacity with actions short of new construction, initiating emergency military construction projects to increase capacity at existing facilities, and acquisition of new facilities through the recapture of former federal property. Facilities can include all kinds of military installations, airfields, and seaports in and outside CONUS.

**Industrial Base**

Industrial base expansion includes actions to accelerate production within the existing industrial infrastructure, add new production lines and factories, and implement provisions of the Defense Priorities and Allocation System. Because many components of key military items of equipment are now procured from foreign sources, increased emergency procurement from these sources has become, of necessity, a major industrial mobilization option.

**Training Base**

The Services expand their institutional training bases to train NPS personnel to support and sustain an expanded force structure.
Options for mobilizing additional health and medical services professionals parallel those for other manpower skills. In time of national emergency, the transfer of members of the United States Public Health Service commissioned corps to DOD may also provide additional health service professionals.

Although the US military utilizes its own communications systems to execute many national defense/crisis response requirements, it frequently relies upon commercial providers to fulfill its administrative support needs.

Manpower, equipment, facilities, and services provided by host or allied nations during war or emergency can offset requirements for corresponding US military resources that are not affordable or practical to maintain in peacetime. A number of agreements are maintained with an ever-growing array of allies for defense cooperation.

Mobilization plans must be carefully integrated among participants and the 12 resource areas. Mobilization execution must be sequenced and carefully synchronized to ensure resources are available to the supported and supporting commanders when needed. The CJCS, supported by the JS, integrates mobilization planning and monitors the status and progress of mobilization execution.

The Mobilization Information Management Plan provides guidance on information systems related to mobilization planning and execution. This plan identifies the flow of information related to mobilization during joint planning, and is designed to provide a coherent and accurate status of mobilization efforts.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3110.03, (U) Logistics Supplement (LOGSUP) for the 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), guides the MILDEPs and CCDRs in preparing mobilization plans that support the CCDRs’ contingency plans. The planning guidance is focused on the areas of manpower and industrial mobilization.

To maintain a mobilization base at resource levels adequate to support the mobilization requirements of
OPLANs is a full-time task for mobilization planners. Training exercises are used to evaluate adequacy of mobilization plans, resources, and training. The mobilization base is the total of all resources available, or that can be made available, to meet foreseeable wartime needs. The two most critical resources in the mobilization base are manpower and industrial base capacity because of the time and expense involved in developing skilled military and civilian personnel and technologically sophisticated military equipment.

**Planning in a Crisis**

During a crisis, the CJCS and CCDRs expedite vital decision-making information up the chain of command to the President and SecDef. The expedited information flow in a crisis also facilitates information sharing among the members of the JPEC and the integration of military advice from the CJCS in the analysis of military options.

**Joint Demobilization Planning and Execution**

**Demobilization and National Security**

From a national perspective, the results of a successful demobilization process should put the US in a position to respond to future challenges to our national security. Policies should be established to regulate the pace of demobilization and retain the military capability required to ensure post-conflict national security commitments. Force structure changes are not inherent to the demobilization process. Industrial base and other civil sector resources mobilized during the conflict will be released to fuel the post-conflict national economy.

From a joint military perspective, demobilization plans should reflect the post-conflict missions of supported CCDRs and be synchronized with plans for recovery, reconstitution, and redeployment operations. DOD policies for the release of reservists and RC units ordered to active duty should first reflect military requirements and then considerations of equity and fairness for military personnel and their families.

**Demobilization Planning Guidelines**

Studies of the demobilizations after the two world wars and the Gulf War provide valuable lessons for demobilization planners: mission first, begin planning early, and coordinate and communicate plans and policies.

**Planning Considerations**

- Recovery activities must also be planned along with demobilization.
Executive Summary

- National-level decisions drive demobilization planning and resource requests at the theater and supporting levels.
- The supported CCDR remains the key to military demobilization.

Recovery Planning

Recovery planning should be closely coordinated with demobilization planning. Recovery includes the reset actions necessary in the theater and CONUS base to restore force readiness and a credible capability to respond, in the short term, to a future threat.

Demobilization Execution

Following redeployment, the MILDEPs deactivate units or return them to a reserve status. Military personnel are released from active duty or returned to reserve status. The number of civilian employees may be reduced. Materiel and equipment may be returned to bases of origin or other reserve/guard units, mothballed, stored, distributed to other nations through foreign military sales or other security assistance programs, destroyed, sold for scrap, or turned over to the DLA Disposition Services.

Planning

Demobilization planning involves reviewing policies and establishing procedures to demobilize. Planners determine operational support requirements and identify the forces to demobilize and those to support the demobilization operations. The planning function is divided into two activities: plan demobilization force and plan demobilization support.

Execution

During execution, mobilization planners constantly tailor the demobilization operation envisioned in the plan to the evolving situation. They staff recommendations and obtain decisions regarding units and individuals to be demobilized and adapt the demobilization support structure.

Conclusion

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for the planning and conduct of joint military mobilization and demobilization, force expansion, use of volunteers, and Presidential Reserve Call-up.
CHAPTER I
MOBILIZATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

1. Introduction

a. Mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. Mobilization includes assembling and organizing personnel and materiel for active duty military forces, activating the Reserve Component (RC) (including federalizing the National Guard), extending terms of service, surging and mobilizing the industrial base and training bases, and bringing the Armed Forces of the United States to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This description implies two processes:

(1) The military mobilization process by which the Armed Forces of the United States are brought to an increased state of readiness.

(2) The national mobilization process, which mobilizes the interdependent resource areas (see Chapter IV, “Resource Areas”) to meet nondefense needs, as well as sustaining the Armed Forces of the United States during all military operations.

b. A responsive mobilization capability is critical to our national security and the execution of the President’s National Security Strategy (NSS) and its derivatives, the Secretary of Defense’s (SecDef’s) National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (CJCS’s) National Military Strategy (NMS). The US employs military capabilities at home and abroad in support of strategies in a variety of operations. This chapter examines the relationship between mobilization and national security. It concludes with a discussion of demobilization, an essential first step toward maintaining national security after a crisis or war.

2. The National Perspective

a. The NSS. The NSS outlines the major national security concerns of the US and how the President’s administration plans to address them using all instruments of national power. The document is often purposely general in content, and its implementation by the Department of Defense (DOD) relies on elaborating direction provided in supporting documents (e.g., NDS, Guidance for Employment of the Force [GEF], and NMS).

b. The NDS. The NDS articulates a defense strategy consistent with the most recent NSS by defining the strategic environment, identifying overarching DOD objectives, and
describing the strategic approach used to achieve them. It outlines the required force structure, modernization plans, alliances and partnerships, and budgetary guidance that will allow DOD to successfully execute the full range of missions within that strategy. The NDS flows from the NSS, informs the NMS, and provides the foundation for other DOD strategic guidance.

c. The NMS

(1) The **NMS**, derived from the NSS and NDS, prioritizes and focuses the efforts of the Armed Forces of the United States by conveying the CJCS’s direction with regard to the dynamic global security environment and the necessary military actions to protect national security interests. The NMS defines the national military objectives (ends), provides guidance on how to accomplish these objectives (ways), and addresses the military capabilities required to execute the strategy (means). The NMS provides focus for military activities by defining a set of interrelated military objectives and joint operating concepts from which the Service chiefs and combatant commanders (CCDRs) identify desired capabilities and against which the CJCS assesses risk. Explicit in the military strategy is the requirement for access and mobilization of the total joint force. That joint force is a carefully tailored combination of Active Component (AC) and RC (including Retired Reserve, individual mobilization augmentees [IMAs], and Individual Ready Reserve [IRR]). The total joint force, together with DOD civilian employees and DOD contractors, will be required to meet these challenges. Implicit in the military strategy is the need to maintain and improve the capability to rapidly and efficiently mobilize forces and resources to respond to natural disaster challenges at the low end of the range of military operations and to deter or counter a broad spectrum of serious threats to our national security, such as threats to the homeland.

(2) Figure I-1 depicts a representative range of military commitments together with the levels of mobilization and emergency authorities available to the President when RC forces are needed for an appropriate response. Congress has provided the President with a comprehensive menu of authorities for tailoring an appropriate response in a crisis. Several of these are available without a declaration of national emergency. Others require Presidential or congressional emergency declarations.

d. **Global Force Management (GFM).** The GFM process integrates force assignment, apportionment, and allocation. It provides comprehensive insights into the global availability of US military forces and capabilities and provides senior decision makers a process to quickly and accurately assess the impact and risk of proposed changes in assigning, apportioning, and allocating forces and capabilities among combatant commands (CCMDs). Two important attributes of GFM include being able to globally assess force sourcing risk to address mitigation options and enabling global sourcing with the best force sourcing option, regardless of command, organization, or Service to which the force or personnel are assigned. Figure I-2 provides a visual of the GFM process. SecDef’s Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) integrates complementary assignment, allocation, and apportionment information into a single authoritative document in support of DOD’s strategic guidance. See the GFMIG for additional detail.
e. **Force Sourcing—Assignment, Allocation, and Apportionment**

   (1) Title 10, United States Code (USC), delineates responsibilities for assignment, allocation, and apportionment of forces. SecDef assigns forces/capabilities, allocates forces/capabilities, provides planning guidance to CCMDs, and provides overarching strategic guidance to the CJCS.

   (2) GFM supports decision making by integrating the three processes of assignment, apportionment, and allocation. This integration aligns operational forces with known apportionment and allocation requirements in advance of planning and deployment preparation timelines.

   (a) **Assignment.** In accordance with Title 10, USC, Section 162, the Secretaries of the Military Departments (MILDEPS) assign specified forces to CCDRs or to the US Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command, as directed by SecDef to perform missions assigned to those commands. CCDRs exercise combatant command (command authority) over forces assigned to them. Assignment of forces is conducted annually and documented in the GFMIG.
(b) **Apportionment.** Force inventory, force generation capacity, and availability information are provided to CCDRs for planning purposes but are not necessarily an identification of the actual forces that may be allocated for use when a contingency plan transitions to execution. No authorities or formal command relationships are established through the apportionment of a force. Apportioned forces provide an estimate of the MILDEPs/Services’ capacity to generate capabilities along general timelines for CCDRs’ planning purposes. Pursuant to Title 10, USC, Section 153, the CJCS is responsible for preparing strategic plans, including plans which conform with resource levels projected by SecDef to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be effective. Apportionment is necessarily dependent on the number of operational forces, the readiness and availability of the forces, and the number of forces employed globally.

(c) **Allocation.** Pursuant to Title 10, USC, Section 162, a force assigned to a CCMD or the US Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command, may be transferred from the command to which it is assigned only by authority of SecDef and under procedures prescribed by SecDef and approved by the President. Under this authority, SecDef allocates forces between CCDRs. The allocation process temporarily adjusts the distribution of forces among the CCDRs to meet force requirements in support of current operations and campaign plans to mitigate near-term military and strategic risk. SecDef decisions to allocate
forces are published in the CJCS annual deployment order called the Global Force Management Allocation Plan and its associated annexes. When allocating forces, SecDef specifies the command relationship the gaining CCDR will exercise and the losing CCDR will relinquish. CCDRs request joint individual augmentees (JIAs), when required, to staff a joint task force headquarters. These JIA requirements are allocated by SecDef and ordered in the Global Force Management Allocation Plan. See Figure I-3 for a flow chart of the allocation staffing process.

For more information on GFM, see the GFMIG; Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Planning; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.06, (U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures.

(3) The Unified Command Plan; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.01, (U) 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) (referred to as the JSCP); the GEF; and JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, are the baseline documents that establish the policy framework and inform the GFMIG, which further delineates GFM processes:

(a) Provides direction from SecDef regarding assignment of forces to CCDRs,

(b) Includes the force/capabilities allocation process that provides CCMDs access to all available military or DOD resources for rotational requirements and requests for capabilities or forces in response to crises or emergent contingencies,

(c) Includes apportionment guidance provided in the JSCP, and

(d) Informs joint force structure and capability assessment processes.

(4) GFM informs DOD’s assessment processes by identifying sporadic or persistent under-sourced or hard-to-source forces/capabilities.

(5) The Joint Staff J-3 [Operations Directorate] Joint Force Coordinator focuses on the global allocation of capabilities and forces to support CCMD requirements. The Joint Staff J-3 Joint Force Coordinator uses GFM board-developed and approved guidance to recommend global sourcing solutions. CCMDs, MILDEPs, and the National Guard Bureau provide force/capability commitment, availability, and readiness data to the Joint Staff J-3 Joint Force Coordinator. Additionally, the Joint Staff J-3 Joint Force Coordinator assesses the ability to sustain joint presence, operational commitments, and global surge capabilities over time based on allocation decision/actions in effect. Reporting on the readiness, disposition, and development of sourcing recommendations for forces/capabilities sourced by United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), US Strategic Command, US Cyber Command, and United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) will be coordinated by the CJCS, CCMDs, Services, and other CCDRs.
Although demands on the force pool they are not allocated through this process.

Legend

AO action officer
CCDR combatant commander
CCMD combatant command
CJCS Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
COA course of action
GFMAP Global Force Management Allocation Plan
GO/FO general officer/flag officer
JFC Joint Force Coordinator
JFM joint functional manager
JFP joint force provider
JIA joint individual augmentee
JS Joint Staff
OPSDEPS Service Operations Deputies
SDOB Secretary of Defense Operations Book
Secdef Secretary of Defense
SVTC secure video teleconference
USAFRICOM United States Africa Command
USCENTCOM United States Central Command
USCYBERCOM United States Cyber Command
USEUCOM United States European Command
USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command
USINDOPACOM United States Indo-Pacific Command
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM United States Southern Command
USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command
USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command
3. The Joint Military Perspective

a. **Total Joint Force Policy.** The total force includes the organizations, units, and individuals that compromise the DOD resources for implementing the NSS. It includes AC and RC military personnel; military retired members; and DOD civilian personnel, including foreign national direct and in-direct, as well as non-appropriated fund employees, contractors, and host-nation support (HNS) personnel. The total joint force policy is one fundamental premise upon which our military force structure is built. Mobilization activities require the support of the private sector (employers and community), DOD civilian workforce, and contractor employees. Total joint force policy guides thorough mobilization planning and the development of procedures that are essential to the timely employment of reserve military power. Managing the RC as an operational force is part of the DOD total joint force policy.

b. **RC as an Operational Force.** The RC provides operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet US defense requirements across conflict continuum. The RC can augment capabilities primarily found in the AC or provide the sole or primary source of a capability not resident in the AC. In their operational roles, elements of the RC participate in a full range of missions according to their Services’ force generation plans. Units and individuals participate in missions in an established cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for the CCMDs, the Services, Service members, their families, and employers. Title 10, USC, Section 12304b, gives the Secretaries of the MILDEPs the authority to activate their selected reserves up to 365 days to augment the active forces for preplanned missions in support of a CCMD, thus utilizing the RC as an operational force with cyclical predictability. In their strategic roles, RC units and individuals train or are available for missions in accordance with the NDS. As such, the RC provides strategic depth and is available to transition to operational roles as needed. In keeping with the total force policy, continual coordination and training integration between AC and RC forces enhances mobilization preparedness.

c. **Mobilization and Demobilization in Joint Planning and Operations.** The Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) enterprise is the department-level enterprise of policies, processes, procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications and information technology (IT) used by the joint planning and execution community (JPEC) to plan and execute joint operations. The joint planning process (JPP) is an integral part of APEX and is an adaptive and collaborative tool that supports all planning.

(1) Mobilization

(a) The mobilization function includes activation (order to active duty [other than for training] in the federal service) of the RC, federalizing the National Guard, IMA, IRR, and surging or expanding the industrial base. Figure I-4 illustrates the duration of availability and levels of mobilization.

(b) Because the most visible mobilization activity is the activation of RC members, military planners tend to focus planning on manpower issues. Mobilization involves much more than expanding and filling the military force with people. The force
must be equipped, trained, and sustained over time if it is to achieve and maintain its designed capability. Mobilization activities require the support of the public and private sector (employers and community), DOD civilian workforce, employees, and Service members’ families. Mobilized activities also require increased resources in the areas of materiel, transportation, facilities, industrial production, training base capacity, health services, and communications. Actions may be required to ensure continued compliance with, or obtain temporary waivers of, environmental protection laws. The US military requires adequate funding and sufficient legal authorities to initiate and sustain mobilization activities. Mobilization includes determining and satisfying demands for those resources required to support the total joint force during deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment. RC call-up decision making involves a formal process that recognizes the balance between the Joint Staff (JS), the RC leadership, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Figure I-5 illustrates responsibilities associated with RC call-up decision making.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Activation Options</th>
<th>Total Mobilization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congressional Declaration of National Emergency</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Full Mobilization</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 12301(a)</td>
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<tr>
<th>Partial Mobilization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Declaration of National Emergency</td>
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<td>Title 10, USC, Section 12302</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Presidential Reserve Call-Up</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title 10, USC, Section 12304</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Preplanned Mobilization Support</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Continental United States Emergency Call-Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involuntary Call-Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 10, USC, Section 12301(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 10, USC, Section 12304a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 10, USC, Section 12304b</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Expansion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Existing Active and/or Reserve Force Structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 1,000,000 Ready Reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forces and/or Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 200,000 Selected Reserves (including up to 30,000 Individual Ready Reserve)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Up to 60,000 Selected Reserves</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voluntary Call-Up</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title 10, USC, Section 12301(d)</td>
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<tr>
<td>No Time Limit</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration of Availability</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120 Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>365 Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Duration + 6 Months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mobilization and National Security

I-9

(c) **Mobilization planning complements and supports joint planning.** It is accomplished primarily by the Services and their major subordinate commands based on SecDef guidance. It requires development of supporting plans by other United States Government (USG) departments and agencies. Just as the Services mobilize their reserve organizations and individuals to augment military capability, supporting USG departments and agencies must oversee mobilization of the support base required to sustain the mobilized force.
Detailed discussions of mobilization levels and emergency authorities are provided in Chapter IV, “Resource Areas,” and Chapter V, “Mobilization Planning and Execution.”

(d) The JS supports the CJCS’s role as principal military advisor to the President and SecDef; facilitates resolution of conflicts for scarce resources among the Services, CCDRs, and DOD agencies; provides input for resolution of claims for resources between the military and civil sectors in wartime; and oversees mobilization planning. To facilitate the CJCS’s role in such matters, the mobilization working group (MWG) has been established. The MWG is chaired by the Joint Staff J-4 [Logistics Directorate] Strategy and Readiness Division, assisted by the Force Mobilization Branch chief. The MWG is designed to enhance communications among OSD, the JS, and the Services when military operations warrant the use of the RC.

Appendix D, “Mobilization Working Group,” contains specific policy and procedures related to the MWG.

(2) Demobilization. Demobilization is the process to transition from a conflict or wartime military establishment and defense-based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration to maintain national security and economic vitality. Implied in this description are two types of activities: those associated with reducing the percentage of the nation’s production capacity devoted to the Armed Forces and defense industry and those undertaken to maintain national security and economic vitality. These tasks, which historically compete for resources, can make the management of demobilization even more complex and challenging than mobilization.

Demobilization planning and execution are covered in Chapter VI, “Joint Demobilization Planning and Execution.”
MANAGING THE RESERVE COMPONENT AS AN OPERATIONAL FORCE

It is the Department of Defense policy that:

1. The Reserve Component (RC) provides operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet United States defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict including under Title 10, United States Code (USC), Sections 12301, 12302, 12304, and 12306.

2. The Active Component and RC are integrated as a total force based on the attributes of the particular component and individual competencies.

3. Homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities are total force missions. Unity of effort is maintained consistent with statutory responsibilities in operations involving federal forces and non-federalized National Guard forces.

4. The RC provides connection to and commitment of the American public.

5. The continuum of service is utilized to enhance the effectiveness of and sustain the all-volunteer force with flexible service options that are attractive to a broad population.

6. Utilization rules are implemented to govern frequency and duration of activations. Since expectation management is critical to the success of the management of the RC as an operational force, these rules enhance predictability and judicious and prudent use of the RC.

7. Voluntary duty, per Title 10, USC, Section 12301(d), and Title 32, USC, Section 502(f)(2), is encouraged to meet mission requirements.

8. The RC is resourced to meet readiness requirements per Title 10, USC, Sections 3013, 5013, and 8013. RC resourcing plans shall ensure visibility to track resources from formulation, appropriation, and allocation through execution.

9. Outreach services are established and available for RC members, their families, and employers from pre-activation through reintegration.

For more details, see Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force.
CHAPTER II
MOBILIZATION TENETS

“The AC [Active Component] and RC [Reserve Component] are fully integrated partners in executing US military strategy, to include HD [homeland defense] and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) operations.”

Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States

1. Introduction

There are five mobilization tenets that describe the characteristics of successful mobilization: **objective, timeliness, unity of effort, flexibility, and sustainability.**

2. Mobilization Tenets

a. **Objective.** Joint operations are directed toward clearly defined, decisive, and achievable objectives. Planning for joint operations provides the basis for determining whether the mobilization of reserve forces and other resources are required to achieve the objectives. Commanders and operational planners must clearly understand the mobilization implications associated with their plans to ensure needed resources are identified, mobilized, protected, and used effectively. Requirements for activating RC forces must be clearly identified, as well as the need to expand the capability or capacity of other resource areas. Commanders and operational and mobilization planners must coordinate their efforts to ensure they clearly understand the time required for mobilization actions, they identify the limitations associated with industrial and civil mobilization, and they address the resulting impacts.

b. **Timeliness.** Timely mobilization of all resources is essential to achieving overwhelming force on the battlefield at the right time and place. It is also essential to seizing and maintaining the initiative. We must be able to act faster than the enemy is able to react. Achieving effective mobilization of resources requires timely warnings of the threat and appropriate response to such warnings; efficient mobilization procedures and frequent exercises and rehearsals; RC forces with the resources necessary to maintain required readiness levels; a supportive employer and community base; a civilian workforce prepared to support military missions; contractors and their employees prepared for their roles; stockpiles of materiel and equipment to sustain the force until industrial base output can be expanded; and synchronized plans for the expansion of transportation, facilities, training base, health services, communications, and other support necessary to deploy, employ, sustain, redeploy, and, when appropriate, demobilize forces.

c. **Unity of Effort.** Unity of effort in mobilization demands the integrated efforts of the nation’s military and supporting resource areas toward achievement of common objectives. Integration is achieved through the effective use of planning and execution processes that provide for timely and thorough coordination within the chain of command.
TIMELINESS FROM 20TH CENTURY WARS

Timeliness has always been a major problem in mobilization. In World War I, industrial mobilization was geared to a projected big push planned for the summer of 1919. The surprising success of the last-ditch German offensive in the spring of 1918, followed that autumn by the climactic Allied counteroffensive, precipitated the commitment of US troops to combat armed and equipped with British and French rather than American supplies and weaponry.

In World War II, personnel mobilization could never be completely synchronized with requirements. The result was a recurrent boom and bust cycle with regard to enlisted and junior officer replacements. Partially trained troops repeatedly had to be stripped out of units in training to fill up units in combat or about to be deployed, thereby delaying the combat readiness of later deploying units.

The rapid demobilization after World War II, and neglect of military readiness in the immediate postwar period, left the US without a viable capability for responding to a crisis that arose with little or no warning. The unfortunate result was that we were woefully unprepared for the surprise North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950. We conducted a desperate delaying action, and were nearly forced off the Korean peninsula at Pusan, before reinforcing units and other resources could be mobilized and deployed to effectively counter the initial North Korean offensive.

Major mobilization decisions during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM were deliberately synchronized with United Nations resolutions and US congressional action. In so doing, these decisions not only satisfied the operational requirements of our joint military forces, they also provided clear signals of US resolve to adversaries, allies, and the US public, whose continuing policy support was critical to its success.

Various Sources

and among DOD, other USG departments and agencies, and the private sector. A manpower call-up, without employer and community support, is not sustainable over a long period of time. The failure to integrate mobilization activities within and among the various resource areas could delay the arrival of units and individual replacements in the operational area or impair their combat effectiveness.

d. **Flexibility.** Flexibility is necessary to develop an appropriate response in a crisis, overcome unforeseen problems, adapt to uncertainties, and adjust to the friction of war. Flexibility for mobilization planning and execution has been provided for in APEX and in the comprehensive set of legislated emergency powers that give the President, as Commander-in-Chief, wide latitude in crafting a response to a developing crisis. Substantial emergency authorities are available to the President before a declaration of national emergency, such as the Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) authority and authorities establishing the priority of industrial production for defense needs. Other
The absence of unity of effort contributed to a confusing and wasteful World War I mobilization. Only the most rudimentary advance planning had been accomplished before the US declaration of war in April 1917.

There was little coordination of personnel and materiel acquisition activities. Hundreds of thousands of conscripts reported to hastily constructed training installations that would not be supplied with enough organizational clothing, equipment, and weapons to properly equip them for several months.

The Government, civilian economy, and Services competed for resources without a competent coordinating authority. War production was chaotic. Priorities for raw materials, labor, and electric power were determined in ad hoc negotiations among public and private officials. East Coast ports of embarkation were quickly overwhelmed, and inland transportation became so congested that the President was forced to nationalize the country’s railroad system.

A sealift shortage, evident even before German submarines began sinking merchant ships faster than new ones could be built, cast doubts on the nation’s ability to deploy forces to Europe even after they were trained and equipped. The net result was that half-trained US forces were sent to France in British vessels. The forces were largely equipped with British and French artillery, tanks, machine guns, and aircraft, and were required to undergo further training before they could be used effectively on the battlefield.

Various Sources

authorities are made available to the President upon a declaration of national emergency. The National Emergencies Act states, when the President declares a national emergency, the President must specify the powers being invoked. Although the powers are limited to those specifically invoked, others may be subsequently invoked. This provides the President the flexibility to act incrementally to signal US resolve in developing crises and to authorize certain preparatory actions without causing undue provocation. APEX also provides flexibility in mobilization by delegating authority to the maximum extent consistent with control to promote freedom of action by subordinates and ensure continuity when communications are disrupted. The JPEC also contributes to flexibility by developing a wide range of military response options for consideration by decision makers. Flexibility also demands a system to accurately monitor the status and progress of mobilization and the ability to replan, reprogram, and redirect mobilization activities to work around bottlenecks and resource shortfalls and for providing protection of the force, equipment, and infrastructure being mobilized. For example, Title 10, USC, Section 12304a, authority provides for a short-term (up to 120 days) involuntary mobilization for any ready reserve unit under federal authority to respond to a domestic emergency or major disaster.
e. **Sustainability.** Mobilization sustainability is the ability to continuously provide logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission completion. Timely, rapid mobilization planning is critical to ensuring logistics sustainability. Sustainability in joint operations provides the joint force commander (JFC) flexibility, endurance, and the ability to extend operational reach. To maintain sustainability, commanders must ensure personnel services, health services, field services, quality of life, and general supply support are adequate. Effective sustainment determines the depth to which the joint force can conduct decisive operations, allowing the JFC to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Sustainment is primarily the responsibility of the supported CCDR and subordinate Service component commanders in close cooperation with the Services, combat support agencies (CSAs), and supporting commands.

**FLEXIBILITY: OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM**

Flexibility overcame limitations in planning, force structure, and capabilities in a number of instances during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM in 1990-1991. The availability of pre-positioned supplies and a fairly extensive host-nation infrastructure enabled the combatant commander to turn the absence of a fully developed deployment and transportation schedule to tactical advantage at the beginning of the crisis by gambling on the deployment of combat elements at the expense of logistic and administrative support units.

Forces deployed to the theater had insufficient organic transportation capability to carry out the campaign plan. Intensive efforts by the Joint Staff and the Department of State mobilized critical ground transport from host-nation and allied assets to execute the planned offensive.

The decision to deploy the US Army's VII Corps from Europe showed considerable flexibility. Besides powerful combat forces, VII Corps also included a fully structured support command, which proved extremely useful in addressing theater logistic shortfalls.

Although Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM did not provide a truly strenuous test of production surge capabilities, industry did accelerate output of critical supplies, equipment, and munitions. Perhaps the best example of flexibility in this area was the deployment of a system prototype still undergoing developmental testing, the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System aircraft. Its advanced technology gave the combatant commander the capability to monitor the battlefield and look deep behind enemy lines in a way never before possible.

Various Sources
CHAPTER III
MOBILIZATION ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

"Services and their component commands also determine mobilization requirements and plan for the provision of individual augmentee sustainment."

Joint Publication 3-35,
Deployment and Redeployment Operations

1. Introduction

This chapter describes roles and responsibilities for joint military mobilization planning and execution. These roles and responsibilities extend from the President and SecDef down through the CCMDs, joint task forces, Services, and DOD agencies to installations.

2. Joint Military Mobilization Planning and Execution

a. OSD

(1) In times of crisis and war, OSD assists SecDef in managing the mobilization of the RC by developing implementation guidance for issue by SecDef or designated representative to the JS, CCMDs, MILDEPs, and DOD agencies. OSD assembles cost data and compiles reports on the cost of military operations, as required by law.

(2) Mobilization planning is heavily influenced by the JSCP, which tasks the CCDRs, their Service components, and the MILDEPs to develop and refine operation plans (OPLANs) and supporting mobilization plans. Another influence on mobilization planning is Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 1225.06, Equipping the Reserve Forces, which specifies DOD policy regardless of component.

b. JPEC. The JPEC collectively plans for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces.

(1) CJCS. The CJCS, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prepares integrated plans for military mobilization, establishes planning relationships, develops mobilization options, and provides mobilization recommendations to SecDef. The CJCS also prepares and submits general strategic guidance for the development of industrial mobilization programs to SecDef, monitors the status and progress of mobilization, and prepares required reports for the President to submit to Congress. CJCSI 3110.03, (U) Logistics Supplement (LOGSUP) for the 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), establishes planning relationships.

(2) JS. The JS supports the CJCS in integrating the mobilization plans of the MILDEPs and DOD agencies. The JS J-3 and J-4 are the focal points in the JS for integrating mobilization plans and coordinating mobilization execution. The mobilization responsibilities of the JS are shown in Figure III-1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JOINT STAFF DIRECTORATE</th>
<th>RESPONSIBILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manpower and Personnel, J-1</td>
<td>Reviews manpower-related mobilization requirements.                                                                                           Identifies options for personnel augmentation, validates augmentation requests, and recommends appropriate authorities. Monitors the allocation and prioritization of inductees to the Services. Initiates manpower mobilization reporting for the Joint Staff during a crisis and serves as the Joint Staff point of contact for reporting policies and procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence, J-2</td>
<td>Validates national intelligence augmentation support requirements for national intelligence support teams, quick reaction teams, and augmentation from national intelligence agencies that involve personnel or equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations, J-3</td>
<td>Provides the combatant commander’s requirements and the J-3’s recommendation to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the need for mobilizing Reserve Component units to support current operations. Prepares alert and mobilization packages for submission to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and the Secretary of Defense for approval. Monitors the status and progress of mobilization and prepares required reports for submission by the President to Congress. Develops recommendations for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the level of mobilization, emergency authorities required, and the need for induction under the Selective Service Act. Presents alert and mobilization packages through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense for final approval. Develops joint mobilization doctrine, policies, procedures, and reporting instructions. Develops recommendations for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the level of mobilization, emergency authorities required, and the need for induction under the Selective Service Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics, J-4</td>
<td>Serves as the Joint Staff point of contact for matters pertaining to materiel and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial base, health service support, and their impact on the environment and the economy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5</td>
<td>Prepares mobilization planning guidance for combatant commanders and Services. Develops concepts for military mobilization to support strategic concepts and objectives. Prepares recommendations for declarations of national emergency and war. Determines the adequacy and feasibility of mobilization plans to support operation plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications Systems, J-6</td>
<td>Through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides Joint Staff position to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Military Departments concerning mobilization requirements for communications during mobilization. Ensures the design of command and control systems is capable of supporting the President, Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Military Departments, and combatant commanders during mobilization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Force Development, J-7</td>
<td>Supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the joint warfighter through joint force development (joint doctrine, training, education, lessons learned, capabilities, and assessments) to advance the operational effectiveness of the current and future joint force. As part of this responsibility, the J-7 plans, develops, and executes mobilization exercises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment, J-8</td>
<td>Prepares joint mobilization estimates and studies.                                                                                             Serves as the Joint Staff point of contact concerning Active/Reserve Component mix and other force and resource development issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Staff Legal Counsel</td>
<td>Serves as the Joint Staff point of contact for legal authorities pertaining to mobilization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistants to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for National Guard Matters and Reserve Matters</td>
<td>Advise the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on National Guard and reserve matters.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure III-1. Joint Staff Mobilization Responsibilities*
(3) **CCDRs.** The CCDRs organize and employ assigned and attached forces and are principally responsible for the preparation of campaign plans, support plans, OPLANs and operation orders (OPORDs). They participate in the development of national military and theater strategies and participate in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process in addition to their planning responsibilities. As part of their operation responsibilities, CCDRs identify and determine force and capability requirements, including time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) as a part of developing campaign plans, OPLANs, and OPORDs. CCDRs identify capability requirements of assigned RC forces and provide on-the-job training on theater-specific requirements when assigned forces are not on active duty or when they are on active duty for training. CCDRs will normally exercise training and readiness oversight of assigned forces through Service component commanders.

For more information on training and readiness oversight authority, see JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

For more information on CCDR responsibilities specific to the RC, see DODI 1235.12, Accessing the Reserve Components (RC).

(a) **Supported CCDRs.** The JSCP or other joint planning authority tasks supported CCDRs to prepare specific plans. They identify the capabilities needed to support the plan; time-phased requirements for capabilities; and capabilities needed for reinforcement, deployment, and movement of the force and for backfill of deployed capabilities. This planning establishes the capabilities required and sustaining capabilities upon which supporting mobilization plans are based. This planning requires extensive coordination among the supported CCDRs, supporting CCDRs, Services, and other involved USG departments and agencies. Supported CCDRs request invocation of emergency mobilization authorities when ordered to execute OPORDs requiring mobilization support.

(b) **Supporting CCDRs.** The JSCP or other joint planning authority tasks supporting CCDRs to provide augmentation forces and other support to designated supported CCDRs. They may also require mobilized assets to accomplish their respective support missions. Their supporting plans include mobilization requirements when appropriate. When needed, supporting CCDRs should request the mobilization of resources through the supported CDDR.

(4) **MILDEPs and United States Coast Guard (USCG).** The MILDEPs provide forces and logistic support to the CCDRs at the direction of SecDef. In peacetime, and until transferred to the Department of the Navy when directed by the President of the United States or in time of war if Congress so directs, the USCG is a Service in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). While under DHS, USCG forces may be allocated to a CCDR per the 2008 Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security on the Use of US Coast Guard Capabilities and Resources in Support of the National Military Strategy, at the discretion of the Commandant, USCG, for the Secretary of Homeland Security. USCG subordinate commanders, normally the commanders of Atlantic and Pacific area, may retain
operational control of USCG forces and capabilities allocated to a CCDR. The MILDEPs and the USCG provide trained forces to the CCDRs. They prepare detailed mobilization plans that identify actual forces and support to be provided and execute mobilization at the direction of SecDef. Specifically, the Secretaries of the MILDEPs have the responsibilities shown in Figure III-2.

(5) **DOD Agencies.** Six DOD agencies have significant responsibilities for supporting joint military mobilization. These are the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and Defense Health Agency. DISA and NGA receive operational direction from and report through the CJCS to SecDef. The following paragraphs summarize the roles and responsibilities of each of these agencies in support of joint military mobilization.

(a) **DISA.** DISA participates in all communications system mobilization planning activities. DISA collects and analyzes the telecommunications requirements derived from these planning activities and develops mobilization plans. DISA modifies its mobilization plans, if required, and ensures the responsiveness of the Defense Communications System to the actual requirements of the President, OSD, the JS, CCDRs, and Services. DISA also supports the National Communications System (NCS) and employs the nation’s commercial communications resources to support defense requirements.

(b) **DLA.** Based on Service mobilization plans, DLA develops plans to support the MILDEPs and other authorized customers with DLA-managed materiel and services. These plans include substantial industrial preparedness planning based on the CCDRs’ critical item list and extensive production base analysis conducted in coordination with OSD, the JS, and the MILDEPs. Across the range of military operations, DLA provides logistic support to the Services, advises the JS and CCDRs on the status of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Department Secretary Responsibilities</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Prepare military and industrial mobilization plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identify and request invocation of emergency authorities necessary to implement mobilization plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Plan for the fill and sustainment of organized and/or structured units with all categories of personnel and equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mobilize and demobilize their portion of the Reserve Component in crisis and war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mobilize their civilian work force in crisis and war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reorganize, reconstitute, and redeploy rotational forces during sustained crises and war.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure III-2. Military Department Secretary Responsibilities*
inventories of DLA-managed items, and recommends resource allocations and production priorities when appropriate.

(c) **DCMA.** DCMA is the CSA responsible for providing contract administration services to the DOD acquisition enterprise and its partners to ensure delivery of quality products and services to the operating force. In addition to the Services, DCMA may also serve as a contingency contract administration services force provider in major contingency and expeditionary operations when requested by the supported geographic combatant commander (GCC) and as directed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. DCMA is the defense infrastructure sector lead agent with defense industrial base responsibilities to continually analyze industrial capabilities and identify risks with recommended solutions to DOD to ensure a robust, secure, resilient, and innovative defense industrial base.

(d) **DFAS.** DFAS is the focal point for joint financial management issues. DFAS works with the CCDRs to develop the financial management annexes to joint OPLANs. DFAS develops guidance regarding personnel pay issues, provides entitlement and tax information to members and dependents, and ensures the financial systems are able to support mobilization efforts.

(e) **NGA.** In peacetime, NGA develops and maintains mobilization plans to ensure continued geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) support to joint forces under crisis and wartime conditions. NGA, in conjunction with DLA, provides the CCDRs with operational levels of geospatial information and services (GI&S) sufficient to meet initial mobilization requirements. In crisis and war, NGA executes its plans and procedures for increased data collection and increased production and distribution of its products.

*For more discussion on GI&S and GEOINT, see JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations.*

(f) **Defense Health Agency.** The Defense Health Agency provides medical support throughout mobilization, to include TRICARE and other medical logistical support.

c. **Joint Deployment Process Owner (JDPO) and the Joint Deployment and Distribution Coordinator (JDDC).** The JS J-3 Joint Force Coordinator, as the JDPO, serves as the DOD focal point to improve the joint deployment process. USTRANSCOM supports the JS J-3 Joint Force Coordinator and other joint force providers during the planning and execution of the deployment and redeployment process. This includes providing the strategic distribution capability to move forces and materiel in support of JFC operational requirements and to return personnel, equipment, and materiel home and/or to demobilization stations. Commander, USTRANSCOM, as the JDDC, exercises coordinating authority for the joint deployment and distribution enterprise operations and planning and will collaborate with CCMDs, the Services, and as directed, USG departments and agencies. The JDPO and the JDDC provide guidance throughout the planning and deployment process.
For more information on the JDPO, see DODI 5158.05, Joint Deployment Process Owner, and JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

d. Mobilization Planner. The mobilization planner serves on the staff as the subject matter expert in the movement of personnel and equipment. The mobilization planner maybe an AC or RC member mobilized to augment DOD, CCMD, joint force, and Service staffs in support of planning and execution of joint mobilization plans. The roles and responsibilities of the mobilization planner include reviewing and developing mobilization plans, policies, and procedures; updating projected RC requirements; coordinating reporting requirements; determining sourcing of immediate manpower and equipment augmentation; reviewing and incorporating best practices and lessons learned from previous mobilizations and exercises; monitoring the mobilization process; and monitoring force assignments against requirements.
CHAPTER IV
RESOURCE AREAS

“Still unclear was the nation’s willingness to learn the war’s lessons about preparedness. It was plain that the materiel side of mobilization was the most costly, complex, and time consuming. The war (referring to World War I) Assistant Secretary of War Benedict Crowell said had ‘upset the previous opinion that adequate military preparedness is largely a question of trained manpower.’”

Mobilization, Center for Military History Publication 72-32

1. Introduction

   a. Military mobilization requires the assembly and organization of resources in 12 interdependent resource areas (legal authorities, funding, environment, manpower, materiel and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial base, training base, joint health services, communications, and HNS). Commanders and mobilization planners should understand the activities occurring in a particular area that may have an influence on others. Depending on the situation, activating additional manpower may generate requirements for additional industrial production, training base capacity, health services, communications support, and HNS.

   b. This chapter provides an overview of major mobilization activities by resource area. The discussion in each resource area includes a list of the providers of the resource, the options available to decision makers for using the resource, and the likely impact a mobilization decision made in one area could have on the other areas.

   c. Each of the 12 resource areas discussed in this chapter contributes to developing, expanding, sustaining, or positioning military capability so it may be applied to protect our national security interests in an emergency (see Figure IV-1). Commanders and mobilization planners consider the impact of mobilization activities on the environment as well as the requirements of legal authorities and funding to enable the timely execution of mobilization activities. The CCMDs, Services, and subordinate commands have an obligation to consider possible environmental effects with respect to construction, modernization, and other activities to facilitate mobilization and demobilization, to include obtaining environmental permits as required by applicable US law. Mobilization planners should also anticipate and plan for the impact of additional facility, training land, and range usage resulting from the influx of personnel and increased operating tempo. Lessons learned may provide useful information during planning. This section discusses, in turn, the sources of these enabling resources as well as the options available and actions necessary to obtain them.

For detailed discussion of joint lessons learned, see CJCSI 3150.25, Joint Lessons Learned Program.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESOURCE AREA</th>
<th>ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal Authorities</td>
<td>Requests to mobilize personnel generally require the identification of a specific level of emergency to trigger the applicable authority. Statutes providing emergency authority specify the level of emergency at which they can be invoked or implemented. Once invoked, the President may delegate his authority to lower levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>It is necessary to ensure sufficient funding is available for known obligations and may be necessary to seek additional appropriations or authorizing legislation to fund the mobilization. Supplemental funding requests should include all costs of training and equipping the force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Mobilization planners must consider four categories of environmental statutes: compliance, clean-up, conservation, and impact analysis. The potential impact mobilization might have upon the environment should be identified and, if compliance may not be possible, legal counsel should be engaged to determine possible options: negotiations, exemptions, waivers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower</td>
<td>Sources of military and civilian manpower for mobilization must be identified: Reserve Component (RC), military retirees, volunteers, civilians, contractors, etc. Three additional actions may be taken: stop-loss, stop-movement, and redistribution actions. Military manpower mobilization options are depicted in Figure IV-2. Impact of RC utilization on the economy and employers should be considered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materiel and Equipment</td>
<td>Planners must determine the need to increase the availability of materiel and equipment to accommodate the needs of a larger active force and/or alleviate shortages by allocating or redistributing materiel and equipment in accordance with validated priorities. See Figure IV-3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>Transportation mobilization options (intertheater and intratheater) must be identified, and the impact of augmenting intertheater air mobility, strategic sealift, and intracontinental US transportation assets on other resource areas should be considered. See Figure IV-4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
<td>Sources of facilities to house, train, equip, and support personnel must be identified. Options for expanding facilities include reopening unused capacity, initiating emergency military construction projects, and acquiring new facilities. See Figure IV-5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Base</td>
<td>Planners must consider the need and impacts for industrial base expansion and accelerated production. Options include expanding the industrial base, implementing the Defense Production Act, and obtaining allied production support. Additional legal authorities, environmental impacts, and funding may be required. See Figure IV-6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Base</td>
<td>Planners must identify the requirement to expand the training base for nonprior service personnel and reclassification and refresher training. This will additionally affect manpower, materiel and equipment, facilities, health services, and funding resource areas. See Figure IV-7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Services</td>
<td>Theater required medical support, patient evacuation, and force health protection policies must be identified. Military mobilization plans should include provisions for activating RC health services professionals for theater medical support and hospital beds to meet additional health care requirements. Options include RC backfill and expanding the continental US health services base. See Figure IV-8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>The Department of Homeland Security monitors and provides recommendations for the use of communications resources, and maintains liaison with commercial providers. The President can take immediate measure to ensure the continuous operation and security of telecommunications systems (Title 47, United States Code, Section 606).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host-Nation Support</td>
<td>Department of State and Department of Defense must establish some form of mutual support, defense cooperation, and/or acquisition and cross-servicing agreements with US allies and friends. If agreements are not in place, new agreements must be developed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure IV-1. Representative Mobilization Actions in Resource Areas
SECTION A. LEGAL AUTHORITIES

2. Legal Authorities

   a. Categories of Legal Authority. There is a range of legal authority that enables or limits mobilization and emergency actions. Many of these authorities are available to the President in any level of emergency; others become available with a Presidential declaration of national emergency. Still, others have been reserved by Congress pending passage of a public law or joint resolution of national emergency or declaration of war.

   b. Action Required to Invoke Legal Authorities. Statutes providing emergency authority specify the level of emergency at which they can be invoked and implemented. Once invoked, the President may delegate authority to lower levels (e.g., SecDef, Secretaries of the MILDEPs, CCDRs) (Title 3, USC, Section 301). As provided in the National Emergencies Act of 1976, Title 50, USC, Section 1631, the President must specify the authority upon which he or other officers will act and such specification must be identified in executive orders published in the Federal Register and transmitted to Congress. Requests to mobilize personnel generally require the identification of a specific level of emergency to trigger the applicable authority. For example, when mobilization requests are received from the MILDEPs or CCDRs, the requests are integrated by the JS and forwarded with a draft executive order to SecDef as a recommendation for Presidential action. Failure to obtain the requested authority in a timely fashion could preclude or limit the desired activity in one or more resource areas. Appendix A, “Legal Authorities,” contains a more complete description of key legal authorities relative to mobilization.

SECTION B. FUNDING

3. Funding

   a. Funding considerations often require special attention. To facilitate mobilization for unplanned military operations, it is necessary to ensure sufficient funding is available for known obligations. At the outset of an operation, senior decision makers should be aware of the magnitude of associated costs and recognize the possible impacts on other areas. It may be necessary to seek additional appropriations or authorizing legislation to fund the mobilization. The CJCS does not make funding decisions. In peacetime, the CJCS assesses the impact of operational resource requests made by the MILDEPs and DOD agencies in the PPBE process and recommends to SecDef how available funding should be distributed to implement the NMS. In wartime, the CJCS, in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, may provide advice to the President and SecDef concerning funding priorities.

   b. A major mobilization will affect virtually all resource areas, well beyond the costs of salaries, benefits, and subsistence of the personnel involved. Planners should include the costs of transportation, housing, health services, training, personnel security investigations, and equipping the force in estimating the total cost and supplemental or amended funding requests.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Partial Mobilization for World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks

Pursuant to Section 12302 of Title 10 of the United States Code and the Executive Order 13223 of September 14, 2001, entitled “Ordering the Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces to Active Duty and Delegating Certain Authorities to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation,” I hereby delegate to the Secretaries of the Military Departments authority to order to active duty Ready Reserve members as follows:

(1) Army: not more than 10,000 members of the Army Ready Reserve to provide combat support and combat service support.

(2) Navy and Marine Corps: not more than 3,000 members of the Naval Ready Reserve and not more than 7,500 members of the Marine Corps Ready Reserve.

(3) Air Force: not more than 13,000 members of the Air Force Ready Reserve.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall coordinate their exercise of the authority delegated by this memorandum with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or his designee.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall submit to me requests for additional authority to order Ready Reserve units and personnel to active duty as necessary, after coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I hereby redelegate to the Secretaries of the Military Departments the President’s authorities under Sections 123, 123a, 527, 12006, 12302, and 12305 of Title 10, United States Code. The authorities delegated by this memorandum may be redelegated to civilian subordinates who are appointed to their offices by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The authorities granted herein may not be exercised to exceed general officer, field grade officer, and E-8 and E-9 enlisted personnel authorizations. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy may issue such instructions consistent with the memorandum as may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of this memorandum.

Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
14 September 2001
SECTION C. ENVIRONMENT

4. Environment

   a. **General.** The US has a substantial framework of environmental laws. Awareness of environmental issues, requirements for compliance, and the liabilities or penalties associated with noncompliance mandate the identification and resolution of environmental issues that affect mobilization. It is DOD policy to comply with applicable environmental laws and regulations, although national security exemptions may be available in accordance with DODI 4715.06, *Environmental Compliance in the United States.*

   b. Mobilization activities, particularly as they relate to facilities, may trigger the need for an environmental assessment or an environmental impact statement. Mobilization planners should consult with staff legal counsel to determine whether planned activities constitute a major federal action or otherwise require specific actions under law. Impact analysis is conducted in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Title 42, USC, Sections 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347, and 4361. It requires that major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment be preceded by a detailed statement by the responsible federal official. This statement identifies environmental effects of the proposed actions that cannot be avoided and alternatives to the proposed actions.

   c. **Options for Obtaining Relief from Environmental Requirements**

      (1) Planners should identify the potential impact that mobilization might have upon the environment in supporting mobilization plans and provide for compliance with applicable environmental laws. If it appears compliance may not be possible, planners should consult legal counsel to determine what, if any, options may be available. Possible options include negotiations with federal, state, and local agencies to develop acceptable alternative means of environmental protection; seeking a national security exemption under certain laws; and a request for legislation may be submitted to exempt critical industries and DOD organizations from regulatory requirements. Triggers should be established during mobilization planning so that the required environmental waivers can be prepared before training of mobilized forces is jeopardized during a crisis.

      (2) Planning for actions to remedy damage caused as the result of waivers or noncompliance with environmental standards during mobilization should be taken as soon as possible.

      (3) Response to no-notice emergencies and contingencies should not be delayed due to National Environmental Protection Act requirements. Documentation should take place as soon as possible.

*For additional guidance on environmental considerations for operational planning, see JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.*
SECTION D. MANPOWER

5. Sources of Military Manpower

a. Manpower mobilization augments the peacetime AC military end strength. Sources of military mobilization manpower include members of the RC, military retirees, volunteers with prior service, and nonprior service (NPS) personnel who volunteer. These resources are organized by law to provide responsiveness in crises. Figure IV-2 associates these sources of manpower with manpower mobilization options and the actions required to initiate a call-up. The legal authorities required for the call-up of the various manpower pools are listed with the corresponding option. All personnel augmentation requirements should be identified, validated, and sourced either through the Service components or the JS/MILDEPs.

b. Though legal authority allows Secretaries of the MILDEPs to draw on RC forces (which include retirees) during times of crisis, the impact of transferring productive members of the civilian sector into the military must be carefully weighed. Commanders must prudently weigh their needs to support a crisis with RC members with the needs of the civilian sector and the impact on future RC readiness. An increasing reliance on the RC could eventually diminish employer and community support and thus RC participation.

6. Additional Military Manpower Mobilization Actions

In addition to the call-up of manpower from reserve and retiree manpower pools, three other actions can be taken to ensure adequate manpower during mobilization. These are stop-loss, stop-movement, and personnel redistribution actions. Stop-loss actions allow the MILDEPs to retain personnel beyond their terms of service. Stop-movement actions refer to a number of policy and procedural actions that can be taken by the MILDEPs to stabilize AC and RC personnel and ensure the maximum number are available for assignment to high-priority duties. MILDEPs take internal redistribution actions during a crisis to ensure that they maintain high-priority units at the highest level of personnel readiness until personnel fill and replacement network throughput can be increased. Readiness underpins every mobilization event.

7. Civilian Manpower

Civilian manpower is an integral part of the DOD total joint force policy. Future crises will require careful management of the civilian work force.

a. In theaters, USG service employees and contractor employees, with skills essential to support military missions, may remain after other US civilians and their families have been evacuated. The Services and DOD agencies designate these government service and contractor employees as emergency-essential and provide necessary training and other support for their crisis and wartime duties. Other government and contractor employees with critical skills may deploy to the theater individually or with supported military units. The GCC determines admission requirements to the theater, and the respective Services
and agencies implement those requirements for their employees. Some foreign-national civilian employees (local or third country nationals) may also remain to support the mission based on the need for their skills, level of danger, and agreements with the host nation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITUATION</th>
<th>SOURCES OF MANPOWER</th>
<th>MOBILIZATION OPTIONS</th>
<th>ACTION REQUIRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic emergency (e.g., natural disaster, civil disturbance)</td>
<td>Army National Guard and Air National Guard</td>
<td>Federalize National Guard troops under Title 10, United States Code (USC), Sections 12406 and 251-253</td>
<td>President publishes proclamation and an executive order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Air Force Reserve</td>
<td>Call to active duty for up to 120 days under Title 10, USC, Section 12304a</td>
<td>Governor requests Federal Assistance for a major disaster or emergency; Secretary of Defense (SecDef) orders the mobilization, authority delegates to Secretaries of the Military Departments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coast Guard Ready Reserve</td>
<td>Call to active duty Ready Reservist for not more than 120 days in any two-year period under Title 14, USC, Section 712</td>
<td>Secretary of Homeland Security determines need to augment Regular Coast Guard forces to aid in prevention of response to an imminent, serious, natural or man-made disaster; act of terrorism; or transportation security incident.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any level of emergency (with or without a declared national emergency)</td>
<td>Volunteers from the National Guard and Reserve</td>
<td>Call for volunteers under Title 10, USC, Section 12301(d)</td>
<td>Secretaries of the Military Departments solicit volunteers with needed skills and publish call-up orders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regular and Reserve retirees with 20+ years of active service</td>
<td>Recall retirees under Title 10, USC, Section 688(a)</td>
<td>Secretaries of the Military Departments publish call-up orders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Volunteer enlistees</td>
<td>Enlist qualified volunteers</td>
<td>Military Departments accept qualified applicants in accordance with Department of Defense and Service standards and policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected Reserve: - Units - Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs)</td>
<td>Call to active duty up to 200,000 Selected Reservists (no more than 30,000 members of the Individual Ready Reserve [IRR]) under Title 10, USC, Section 12304 (Presidential Reserve Call-up)</td>
<td>President publishes executive order. Military Departments publish call-up orders based on SecDef implementing instructions. President must report to the Congress within 24 hours on anticipated use of forces.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Call to active duty up to 60,000 Selected Reservists for not more than 365 consecutive days for a preplanned mission in support of a combatant command under Title 10, USC, Section 12304b</td>
<td>Secretary of the Military Department publish call-up orders and submit a report to Congress setting forth the circumstances necessitating the action. Manpower and associated costs must be specifically included and identified in the defense budget materials for appropriate fiscal year(s).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draftees</td>
<td>Initiate conscription</td>
<td>The President and SecDef request amendment to the Military Selective Service Act (Title 50, USC, Section 3801) authorizing conscription.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War or national emergency</td>
<td>Ready Reserve: - Units - IRRs - IMAs</td>
<td>Call to active duty up to 1,000,000 Ready Reservists for up to 24 months under Title 10, USC, Section 12302 (Partial Mobilization)</td>
<td>Presidential proclamation of a national emergency and an executive order (or congressional declaration of national emergency). Military Departments publish call-up orders based on SecDef implementing instructions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Remaining Ready Reserve: - Retired Reserve - Standby Reserve</td>
<td>Call to active duty remaining Reserve Component personnel under Title 10, USC, Section 12301a (Full Mobilization)</td>
<td>Passage of legislation or a joint resolution of Congress declaring war or national emergency. Military Departments publish call-up orders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New units and personnel</td>
<td>Add new force structure and personnel necessary to achieve national security objectives (Total Mobilization)</td>
<td>Passage of legislation authorizing additional force structure and manpower.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure IV-2. Military Manpower Mobilization: Sources and Options
b. In the US, the Services and DOD agencies reallocate incumbent civilian personnel from peacetime to the highest priority functions through detailing, reassignment, and cross-training. When a crisis begins, the Services and agencies activate recruiting area staffing committees to find local solutions for meeting these requirements. Solutions can include:

1. Overtime and extended workweek authorizations.

2. Implementing plans to replace employees ordered to active duty due to RC or retired-military obligations.

3. Using civilian retirees and military retirees not expected to be recalled.

4. Using employees on loan from other federal, state, or local agencies.

5. Using contractor employees.

6. Redistribution of new employees after hiring.

7. Activation of applicable crisis procedures with Office of Personnel Management regional offices and with state and local employment offices to provide required applicants on an expedited basis.

8. Manpower Mobilization Options

a. Manpower mobilization options provide great flexibility to the President and SecDef for responding to a crisis. Response levels are tied to the legal authorities available before a Presidential declaration of national emergency or a congressional declaration of national emergency or war as shown in Figure IV-2. Before a declaration of national emergency, the Secretaries of the MILDEPs can call for RC volunteers who have needed skills and activate them for short periods of time. Secretaries of the MILDEPs can involuntarily mobilize up to 60,000 members of the Selected Reserve up to 365 consecutive days to augment active forces for preplanned and pre-budgeted missions in support of a CCMD per Title 10, USC, Section 12304b. The budget information on such costs must include a description of the mission for which such units are anticipated to be ordered to active duty and the anticipated length of time of the order of such units to active duty on an involuntary basis. PRC authority makes up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve (including up to 30,000 IRR members) available for involuntary activation for up to 365 consecutive days in support of a named operational mission per Title 10, USC, Section 12304. This authority was used effectively to mobilize Air and Army National Guard units during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, operations in Haiti, and the Ebola response in Africa. This authority can be used to send a strong signal of US resolve to friends and foes alike and can serve as a prelude to partial mobilization. When a governor requests federal assistance in responding to a major disaster or emergency, SecDef may order any member of the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Air Force Reserve to involuntary active duty up to 120 days per Title 10, USC, Section 12304a. This authority was used effectively to assist with Hurricane Sandy response operations. A Presidential declaration of national emergency and invocation of the partial mobilization authority makes up to one million members of the Ready Reserve available for up to 24
consecutive months per Title 10, USC, Section 12302. This partial mobilization authority includes members of the IRR, which is an additional source of trained manpower to be used as Service needs dictate. Like the PRC, activations under this authority can be made incrementally or all at once to meet the needs of the crisis as it develops. Full mobilization may be ordered in time of war or national emergency declared by Congress or when otherwise authorized by law per Title 10, USC, Section 12301(a). Under full mobilization the Retired and Standby Reserves become available, as well as Ready Reserves not called previously. Manpower requirements for force expansion beyond the peacetime-authorized force structure and sustainment in a protracted conflict may require legislation authorizing activation of the Selective Service System (SSS) for the conscription of additional forces. Some retirees are available for recall during all levels of mobilization per Title 10, USC, Sections 688(a), 690(c), and 12307.

b. Although volunteerism is important, the mobilization planner should be judicious in exercising this course of action (COA). The use of RC volunteers is very attractive because they can fill PRC billets but do not count against the Service’s PRC personnel cap for tours of 365 days or less. However, excessive use of volunteers removes personnel from RC units, which could result in a reduction of the unit’s readiness in the event of unit mobilization. Individual voluntary reserve participation affects the availability of the member in a mobilization augmentation role. Another condition mobilization planners must take into account is dwell time policy which establishes the length of time RC units should not be mobilized after demobilizing from a prior mobilization/call-up.

For information on dwell time, see DODI 1235.12, Accessing the Reserve Components (RC).

9. Impact of Manpower Mobilization and Activation on Other Resource Areas

a. Selected Reserve Manpower. Mobilized Selected Reserve units create time-phased demands for all classes of supply, especially rations, fuel, and ammunition; major items of equipment; and repair parts. They also create temporary, but significant, demands for intracontinental US transportation as they move from home stations to marshalling areas for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration with the gaining force commander. The RC is an economical contribution to the force mix; however, planners must anticipate the cost of adequate housing and proper outfitting of the RC in a contingency. They create increased workloads at existing facilities for personnel support, energy, housing, training areas, and storage and may require construction of new facilities. They create demands for additional industrial base output of all classes of consumables and for major end items when war reserve stocks are depleted. Mobilized Selected Reserve units and personnel may impose additional demands on the training base if some unit members are unskilled or have not completed mandatory training. They may create significant demands on health services as they mobilize. Dependents of RC members will also impose additional workloads on continental United States (CONUS) base support services and health care resources.

b. Individual Augmentees (IAs). The two categories of IA are individual Service augmentee (ISA) or a JIA. IAs can be used to fill shortages or when an individual with
specialized knowledge or skill sets is required. As a result, IAs can include members from an entirely different branch of Service. The current IA system works on a combination of ordered and volunteer assignments mirroring manning requirements. An ISA is an individual augment sourced internally within the Service to meet Service-specific requirements and tasks. It is a position established and validated under approved Service procedures for the purpose of satisfying a grouping of tasks, capable of being performed by one individual, for whom no authorized position has been established in the unit’s manning documents. A JIA is an unfunded, temporary manpower requirement (or member filling an unfunded temporary manpower position) identified on a joint manning document by a supported CCDR to augment joint force staff operations during contingencies. A JIA will fill joint force headquarters requirements; tactical-level deployment is not appropriate for JIA sourcing. Sourcing by JIA is meant to be the last method for obtaining manpower for positions. This includes positions at permanent organizations required to satisfy an elevated mission in direct support of contingency operations. Aside from mandated personal protective equipment, JIAs will not deploy with additional equipment. Neither collective team training nor specialized training exceeding one to two weeks should be needed. Either AC or RC or DOD civilian personnel can fill JIA positions. IMAs filling, or activated to fill, their IMA billets are not considered a JIA.

c. **Considerations for IAs.** Individuals mobilized from the various sources (IRR, military retirees, and Standby Reserve) place the same demands on other resource areas, as described above for Selected Reserve manpower, once they report to their assigned units. Before they are assigned to a unit, however, they create demands for intracontinental US transportation; for an initial issue of clothing and individual equipment; and for subsistence, housing, and health care. Most individuals mobilized as IAs will need reclassification or refresher training at the training base, placing unique timeliness demands on the organizations tasked with processing and training. If assigned overseas for unit backfill or as replacements, they will place a demand for a non-unit personnel space on the strategic transportation system and require weapons, ammunition, and mobility bags.

d. **NPS Manpower.** NPS manpower (draftees and volunteers) imposes essentially the same demands as IA imposes on the other resource areas. Because they are untrained at accession, they will impose demands on the training base for basic and initial skills training. Once the Services reach maximum capacity at their existing recruit training infrastructure, it may take significant time to build additional capacity to further increase recruit throughput.

e. **Civilian Manpower.** Civilian personnel create demands on resource areas based on their employment categories. DOD civilian employees at military installations normally live at home and require only a salary and workspace to do their jobs. A DOD civilian or contractor employee required in the theater may require clothing; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense equipment and training; passports and visas; housing and subsistence; intracontinental US, intertheater, and intratheater transportation; combat skills; survival, evasion, resistance, and escape training; and health services, as well as becoming an additional force protection consideration. The use of DOD civilian and contractor personnel or local nationals frees military personnel to perform operational vice ancillary supporting tasks. DOD civilians, along with system support and external support
contractor personnel, are often used to augment military forces in noncombat operations. The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program provides contingency support to augment Army force structure. The Air Force Contract Augmentation Program and global contingency construction provide contingency support for the Air Force and Navy, respectively. Contracting capability is needed early in the mobilization process.

For additional guidance on planning, executing, and managing operational contract support, see DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS); JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support; and CJCSM 4301.01, Planning Operational Contract Support.

f. DOD Expeditionary Civilian Workforce. The DOD expeditionary civilian program provides a pre-identified source of civilian manpower to support DOD combat operations, contingencies, emergencies, humanitarian missions, and other expeditionary requirements. The DOD expeditionary civilian workforce is both position-based and person-based, facilitating the organizing, training, and equipping of civilians for rapid response and quick assimilation into new operational environments.

10. Employer and Community Support

The success of the nation’s defense is dependent on the availability of highly trained members of the total force. Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR), a DOD program, promotes both public and private understanding of the RC to gain US employer and community support. This is accomplished through programs, personnel policies, and practices that encourage employee and citizen participation in RC programs. ESGR’s mission is to obtain employer and community support to ensure the availability and readiness of reserve/guard forces. Among their many responsibilities, the ESGR assists in preventing, resolving, and/or reducing employer and employee problems and misunderstandings that result from National Guard or reserve membership, training, and duty requirements. This is accomplished through information services and informal mediation, as well as assisting in the education of RC members with respect to their obligations and responsibilities to employers.

a. Impact of RC Utilization on the Economy and Community. Community support is crucial to maintaining a viable source of military manpower—RC personnel. Mobilization impacts the economy, employers, and the community. Commanders and mobilization planners should be aware that the call-ups may impact key national economic segments. Critical economic segments closely related to RC call-ups include communications, transportation (especially airline services), and public services (e.g., police, fire, and medical).

b. Throughout the mobilization process and prior to release from active duty, RC members will be provided with transition assistance services in accordance with DODI 1332.35, Transition Assistance Program (TAP) for Military Personnel, and employment outreach services as described in Title 5, USC, Section 2108a.

c. The MILDEP Secretary should not use RC call-ups as a long-term fix to active duty force structure shortfalls unrelated to the call-up contingency. It must be remembered that
continued reliance on the RC requires the transferring of productive members of the economy and community into the military, which may result in diminished employer and community support over time, thus adversely impacting RC readiness and retention.

SECTION E. MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT

11. Sources of Materiel and Equipment

The materiel and equipment resource area includes all classes of supply. It includes equipment on hand in units, remain-behind equipment in theater, war reserves, pre-positioned equipment, and the output of the depot maintenance system and industrial base. Additional sources include items in the security assistance pipelines and the commercial off-the-shelf items from domestic and foreign sources. Figure IV-3 lists the sources and options available for material and equipment mobilization.

12. Materiel and Equipment Mobilization Options

Materiel and equipment mobilization consists of many activities that can be grouped under two major tasks: increasing the availability of materiel and equipment to accommodate the needs of a larger active force and alleviating shortages by **allocating or redistributing** materiel and equipment in accordance with validated priorities.

a. **Increasing Materiel and Equipment Availability.** Decision options that increase materiel and equipment availability include the release of war reserve and depot stocks; accelerating the output of the depot maintenance system; diverting items from foreign military sales and other security assistance programs; accelerating production rates of existing contracts for items like clothing, ammunition, vehicles and combat systems, and rations; and procurement of commercial substitutes from domestic or foreign sources. Each of these actions increases the number of items in the supply network. Except for the diversion of items earmarked for security assistance programs, these options are exercised

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT MOBILIZATION: SOURCES AND OPTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOURCES OF MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continental United States/in-theater equipment on hand in units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War reserve and pre-positioned stockpiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depot system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materiel and equipment in security assistance pipelines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic and foreign commercial vendors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure IV-3. Materiel and Equipment Mobilization: Sources and Options*
by the MILDEPs, DLA, and other DOD agencies as they provide for the logistic needs of their forces assigned to the CCDRs. Action to divert items from security assistance programs could have a significant impact on our relations with affected nations. This decision should follow discussions with the Department of State, specific chiefs of mission and country teams, and the President or SecDef. However, once diverted and allocated to a MILDEP, they are distributed as determined by the owning MILDEP.

b. Allocating Materiel and Equipment Shortages. Shortages of Service-unique items are resolved by priority and allocation decisions made internally by the MILDEPs based on OPLAN priorities and guided by DOD policy to equip earlier deploying units before those scheduled to deploy later, regardless of Service component. When confronted with a materiel or equipment shortage common to two or more US military claimants, SecDef, with the advice of the CJCS, determines priorities among the Services. The Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB) executes this responsibility. The JMPAB is chaired by the JS J-4 and includes other JS directors, as well as general or flag officer representatives from the MILDEPs. In multinational operations, the US may be responsible for providing significant materiel and equipment support to one or more allies or coalition partners. When shortages occur, priority and allocation decisions for resolving conflicts among multinational partners, or between US claimants and multinational partners, are made by SecDef.

For more information on the JMPAB, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

SECTION F. TRANSPORTATION

13. Sources of Mobilization Transportation

Transportation resources are required to support mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization operations. Mobilization activities are supported principally by CONUS air, rail, highway, pipeline, port facilities, and inland waterway assets of commercial firms. These assets move units and unit equipment through the mobilization process from home stations to marshalling areas to air and sea ports of embarkation, IAs from their homes to reception and training sites and then to replacement centers and ports of embarkation, and individual issue equipment from production and storage sites to air and sea ports of embarkation. Deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment operations are supported primarily by intertheater airlift and sealift, which move unit equipment and unit personnel, and sustainment items (non-unit equipment and supplies) from the US to the theater of operation. RC transportation terminal units provide the military interface at commercial seaports of embarkation, deployment support units assist with loading the equipment on commercial transportation, and port security companies provide security at military ocean terminals. In many cases, these units are mobilized early to support deployment from CONUS. Figure IV-4 lists transportation resources for mobilization and the options for mobilizing them.

See JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, for further information on deployment and redeployment.
14. Transportation Mobilization Options

A variety of options are available for mobilization of intertheater and intratheater airlift assets. USTRANSCOM assets can quickly be expanded by the Air National Guard, Air Force Reserves, and the airlift assets of the US Navy Reserve. Additionally, the fleet can be augmented via contract commercial charters, and through the Civil Reserve Air Fleet. Similarly, Military Sealift Command assets can also be quickly expanded by vessels activated from the Maritime Administration Ready Reserve Force and by chartering US flag and foreign flag commercial vessels. After activation of the Maritime Administration Ready Reserve Force, additional ships can be activated from the National Defense Reserve Fleet to fill additional requirements for sealift. Additional sealift sources detailed in Figure IV-4, such as the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement, the Maritime Security Program, the Voluntary Tanker Agreement, requisitioning, and air and shipping capacity through allied agreements may also be available.

For more information on sealift capabilities to support mobilization and deployment of US forces, see JP 4-01.2, Sealift Support to Joint Operations.

15. Impact of Transportation Mobilization on Other Resource Areas

Mobilization of transportation resources will substantially affect the manpower resource area because highly skilled operators and crews are required, as well as maintenance cargo handling, and security personnel, at ports and transshipment points. The impact of mobilized transportation resources on ports, airfields, highways, pipelines, railroads, and inland waterways; facilities required for activation, maintenance, and storage; and repair parts and materials handling equipment may be significant. Legal authorities and funding are required to enable transportation resource expansion. Influence on the training base could be significant in a protracted conflict with high attrition rates of operator or crew personnel.

a. Augmenting Intertheater Air Mobility. Each additional aircraft affects runway, throughput, marshalling, and temporary storage capacity at airfields. These factors could become constraints at departure, en route, and arrival airfields. Aircrews require subsistence and transient quarters, and aircrew shortages and crew rest considerations could also become constraints. Some additional demands will be placed on the industrial base as stocks of repair parts are depleted. Shortages of aviation fuel, lubricants, repair parts, hull and liability insurance, and qualified mechanics could become constraints.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of Transportation Augmentation</th>
<th>Transportation Mobilization Options</th>
<th>Actions Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANY LEVEL OF EMERGENCY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Airlift</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Component air mobility assets</td>
<td>Task Air Mobility Command, gained, Air Reserve Component, and Naval Reserve assets</td>
<td>Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy activate units and individuals with an appropriate call-up order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary charter</td>
<td>Charter available commercial aircraft</td>
<td>Commander, United States Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM), obtains commercial charter aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Stage I</td>
<td>Activate when required to augment capacity</td>
<td>CDRUSTRANSCOM activates and operationally directs CRAF I assets with Secretary of Defense (SecDef) approval.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRAF Stage II</td>
<td>Activate when required to augment capacity</td>
<td>CDRUSTRANSCOM activates and operationally directs CRAF II assets with SecDef approval.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Sealift</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial sealift</td>
<td>Utilize available commercial vessels when required to augment US Transportation Command controlled fleet</td>
<td>CDRUSTRANSCOM obtains commercial shipping.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Defense (DOD) reduced operational status ships</td>
<td>Activate when required to augment sealift capacity</td>
<td>CDRUSTRANSCOM activates as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ready Reserve Force</td>
<td>CDRUSTRANSCOM activates as delegated by SecDef</td>
<td>CDRUSTRANSCOM requests through Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS); SecDef approves by agreement with the Secretary of Transportation (SECTRANS); Maritime Administration (National Defense Reserve Fleet) implements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA)</td>
<td>Activate when required to augment sealift capacity</td>
<td>CDRUSTRANSCOM, with approval of SecDef, activates VISA with concurrence of SECTRANS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary tanker agreement</td>
<td>Activate when required to augment sealift (tanker) capacity</td>
<td>CDRUSTRANSCOM activates as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Continental United States (CONUS) Transportation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial air, rail, highway, barge, transportation terminal unit</td>
<td>Activate the contingency response program. Mobilize seaport of embarkation transportation terminal units</td>
<td>The contingency response program team assembles at the call of CDRUSTRANSCOM to prevent or resolve transportation shortfalls. Secretary of the Army publishes call-up order for transportation terminal units.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure IV-4. Transportation Mobilization: Sources and Options
Chapter IV

TRANSPORTATION MOBILIZATION: SOURCES AND OPTIONS (continued)

### NATIONAL EMERGENCY OR WAR

#### Strategic Airlift

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Responsible Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CRAF Stage III</td>
<td>Activate when necessary to augment airlift capacity</td>
<td>CDRUSTRANSCOM activates and commands CRAF III assets with the approval of SecDef.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign voluntary charters</td>
<td>Charter available foreign aircraft</td>
<td>CDRUSTRANSCOM enters into agreements with foreign carriers consistent with the Fly American Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allied Pre-committed Civil Aircraft Program aircraft</td>
<td>Request NATO resources when required to augment US airlift capacity</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council requests reinforcements and responds to requests for airlift.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Strategic Sealift

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Responsible Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requisitioned US-flag and effective US-controlled shipping vessels</td>
<td>Requisitioned as required to meet sealift requirements</td>
<td>With declaration of national emergency, SECTRANS requisitions ships at the request of SecDef.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Inactive Fleet of the National Defense Reserve Fleet</td>
<td>Activate when required to augment sealift capacity</td>
<td>With declaration of national emergency, CDRUSTRANSCOM requests through CJCS; SecDef orders activation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### CONUS Transportation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of Transportation</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Responsible Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air, rail, highway, and barge</td>
<td>Seek priorities and allocations of domestic transportation when required to augment capacity</td>
<td>With declaration of national emergency, the President invokes priorities and allocations for DOD.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure IV-4. Transportation Mobilization: Sources and Options (continued)**

b. **Augmenting Strategic Sealift.** In addition to applicable constraints listed above, the charter, requisition, or activation of each additional ship draws on the available pool of licensed officers and certified merchant seamen. The withdrawal of commercial vessel insurance and war-risk exclusion for crew life insurance may also constrain the use of commercial vessels. To surmount this constraint, the President may authorize SecDef, acting through the Secretary of Transportation, to issue war-risk insurance under the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 (Title 46, USC, Chapter 539). Additionally, Title 46, USC, Section 8103(g), requires that deck and engineer officers, if eligible, be a member of the Navy Reserve if serving on vessels on which an operating differential subsidy is paid or on vessels (except a vessel of the Coast Guard or Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation) owned or operated by the Department of Transportation (DOT) or by a corporation organized or controlled by DOT. Crew shortages could become a constraint, particularly if market forces and casualty rates result in a reduced pool of available private sector US merchant mariners. Also, pulling ships from normal commercial service can have adverse long-term impacts on the commercial sealift carrier’s business. Ships require berthing and anchorage space at ports, which, together with temporary storage, staging areas, cargo handling capabilities, and transportation mode links, determine throughput capacity. Laws governing the handling of hazardous materials, such as ammunition, limit the number of ports that can handle such loads. Dry docks, shipyard facilities, and skilled labor are required for activation and periodic refitting. Additionally, shortages of stevedores may be experienced if heavy demands are placed on multiple commercial ports within the same geographic area.
c. **Augmenting Intra-CONUS Transportation Resources.** DOD can request DOT issue priority service or allocation orders to the commercial transportation industry to support DOD requirements. Demands in the other resource areas should not be significant, except in extreme circumstances. Spot shortages in operator, crew, or maintenance personnel could occur if large numbers of commercial carrier employees are ordered to military duty or if local transportation demands are heavy. Spot shortages of fuel, repair parts, maintenance, and transshipment facilities could also occur during peak periods. At some installations, capacity of railheads and spurs could be a constraint.

d. **Service-Unique Self-Deployment.** Planners should keep in mind that some Service personnel/units (e.g., ships, combat aircraft and aircrews) deploy to theater on board their own warfighting equipment. Sometimes combat aircraft carry a full load of weapons and/or support equipment and crew members.

**SECTION G. FACILITIES**

16. **Sources of Facilities**

DOD uses a wide variety of facilities to house, train, equip, and support personnel. Facilities also provide storage, maintain equipment, and conduct operations. Military bases, depots, medical treatment facilities, airfields, and seaports are representative examples. Facilities with the capacity for supporting increased workloads during mobilization are obtained from the following sources: commercial facilities that support DOD in peacetime; unused and standby capacity at existing government facilities; and new capacity developed on property acquired by DOD through lease, purchase, or exercise of other legal means. Figure IV-5 shows the facility options and actions for acquiring for facilities during mobilization.

17. **Facilities Mobilization Options**

Options for expanding facilities during mobilization include reopening unused capacity with actions short of new construction, initiating emergency military construction projects to increase capacity at existing facilities, and acquisition of new facilities through the recapture of former federal property. Facilities can include all kinds of military installations, airfields, and seaports in and outside CONUS.

a. **Initiate Emergency Military Construction.** SecDef and Secretaries of the MILDEPs can initiate emergency military construction projects with unobligated balances of military construction funds, the SecDef contingency construction authority, or with a modified military construction program, enabled with a declaration of national emergency and unobligated military construction and family housing funds. Beyond these options, construction of new or expanded facilities requires a request for a supplemental military construction appropriation. Waivers or relief from environmental protection statutes and some occupational health and safety regulations may need to be requested through the appropriate chain of command.
b. **Acquire Additional Real Property and Commercial Facilities.** Under Title 10, USC, Section 2663, hundreds of parcels of former federal property may be reacquired to provide land and improved infrastructure for conversion into needed facilities. In addition, privately owned lands may be acquired by condemnation for defense purposes, such as training or manufacturing of ammunition and other materiel. Reacquiring ex-federal property must be handled in accordance with applicable federal and military regulations before use, and this process may take some significant time and effort. For example, an environmental baseline survey will be needed to determine the condition of the property to be acquired.

**18. Impact of Facilities Mobilization on Other Resource Areas**

Expanding facilities will require more manpower, both military and civilian, to staff tenant organizations and provide required services. The greatest impact will be on the civilian side in the form of contract construction workers and DOD personnel employed to expand tenant support services. Host-nation civilians will provide the bulk of this support overseas. There will be a significant local demand for construction materials and equipment—from stocks and from the industrial base. As the facility grows in capacity or expands operations, the increased population will require more health services and other
support services. If these resources are available, the impact on planned facilities expansion will be minimal. Shortfalls in these areas will reduce capacity and constrain productivity.

SECTION H. INDUSTRIAL BASE

19. Industrial Mobilization Sources

The US industrial base includes commercial production facilities and government-owned facilities. Some of the government-owned facilities are government-operated and some are contractor-operated. Foreign producers of essential components, parts, and ammunition are included, because foreign producers may be the only source for components of major equipment items. Because of the unique relationship existing between the US and Canada, the Canadian defense industry is recognized as part of a single North American defense industrial base. The capabilities of Canadian industry may be included in US industrial preparedness planning. Figure IV-6 lists these sources together with the options and actions required to expand their output.

20. Industrial Mobilization Options

Industrial base expansion includes actions to accelerate production within the existing industrial infrastructure, add new production lines and factories, and implement provisions of the Defense Priorities and Allocation System (DPAS). Because many components of key military items of equipment are now procured from foreign sources, increased emergency procurement from these sources has become, of necessity, a major industrial mobilization option.

21. Impact of Industrial Mobilization on the Other Resource Areas

a. **Expand the Industrial Base.** Surge production and industrial base expansion will require additional skilled manpower from the nondefense sectors of the national economy. Local manpower shortages could develop in areas hardest hit by extensive military manpower mobilization and competition between DOD contractors and others for limited numbers of the same skills. Materiel and equipment stocks, transportation, and facilities could be significantly affected if raw materials, finished products, tools, and test equipment become short; local and long distance hauling is not sufficiently manned; and new construction does not meet the demand. Additional legal authorities may be invoked or requested from Congress upon the determination that DOD production in a crisis is being adversely affected. Environmental and occupational health and safety regulations may also require waivers. Substantial additional funding may be required to enable increased production.

b. **Implement the DPAS.** The DPAS is authorized by the Defense Production Act (Title 50, USC, Section 4511) and allows preferential treatment for contracts or orders relating to certain approved defense or energy programs for military production and construction, military assistance to any foreign nation, and stockpiling. This authority specifically includes reordering national priorities and rationing available industrial resources (articles, materials, services, and facilities, including construction materials).
The Department of Commerce is responsible for DPAS activities concerning industrial resources. Accordingly, DOD will coordinate with the Department of Commerce concerning industrial resource issues requiring resolution through DPAS.

c. **Obtain Allied Production Support.** DOD has become increasingly reliant on foreign production of essential components, repair parts, tools, and test equipment needed for domestic production of virtually all major weapons systems and other key items of materiel and equipment. Wartime surge and industrial base expansion can be expected to have a significant impact on foreign producers as well. The reliability of these sources could significantly influence the ability to provide needed materiel and equipment to support and sustain operations. Conversely, the availability of foreign production support in areas where the domestic production base can no longer expand could have substantial positive results on the manpower, materiel and equipment, and facilities resource areas. Similar to domestic source problems, foreign supplier problems should be forwarded through the DPAS chain for resolution by OSD and the Department of Commerce.

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**Figure IV-6. Industrial Mobilization: Sources and Options**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDUSTRIAL BASE SOURCES</th>
<th>INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION OPTIONS</th>
<th>ACTIONS REQUIRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DOMESTIC INDUSTRY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial producers of goods and services</td>
<td>Accelerate production from current sources of goods and services</td>
<td>Military Departments and Defense Logistics Agency contract for accelerated production from current producers of materiel based on planned or actual consumption rates and prioritized requirements of the combatant commanders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expand production base capacity</td>
<td>Using the Defense Priorities and Allocation System (DPAS), Title 50, United States Code, Section 2071, obtain priority performance on Department of Defense contracts and orders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Using the DPAS, Title 50, United States Code, Section 4511, obtain priority performance on Department of Defense contracts and orders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government-owned/government-operated production facilities</td>
<td>Primary industrial base to support peacetime training, deployment, contingency operations, war, peacekeeping, antiterrorism, and homeland defense and to protect and secure the US forces’ technological advantage against our adversaries. This encompasses foreign military sales and other service support.</td>
<td>Accelerate production rates or activate standby and laid-away production capacity at government-owned/government-operated facilities and government-owned/contractor-operated facilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government-owned/contractor-operated production facilities</td>
<td>See above</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FOREIGN INDUSTRY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial producers of goods and services</td>
<td>Seek additional production from foreign suppliers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECTION I. TRAINING BASE

22. Sources and Options for Expanding Training Base Capacity

The Services expand their institutional training bases to train NPS personnel to support and sustain an expanded force structure. The training base also provides reclassification and refresher training for IAs who need it. Training base output requirements are determined by the Services and compared to available capacity. If there is a shortfall, additional capacity is added by mobilizing additional training organizations from the RC, by hiring DOD civilian employees, and by contracting for additional instructors and other training resources from the private sector. Sources, options, and actions for expanding training base capacity are listed in Figure IV-7.

23. Impact of Training Base Expansion on Other Resource Areas

Training base expansion may have significant impact on the manpower, materiel and equipment, facilities, health services, and funding resource areas. It may also affect the environmental, transportation, industrial base, communications, and legal areas. It is not expected to have any measurable influence on HNS, although the training of allied military personnel, along with security assistance and other agreements, could affect the training base capacity. Planners need awareness that the impact of expanding the training base capacity may require the mobilization of RC training organizations’ use of DOD government employees and contractors.

SECTION J. JOINT HEALTH SERVICES

24. General

Theater, US, and aeromedical evacuation (AE) support are expanded to serve the mobilized force and provide the capability to treat, evacuate, receive, and redistribute casualties in the US. Joint health service support requirements are determined from decisions establishing the theater joint health service support, intertheater and intratheater patient movement, and force health protection policies. Several factors, such as casualty rates; population at risk; availability and readiness of health services units; transportation

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<tr>
<th>EXPANDING TRAINING BASE CAPACITY: SOURCES AND OPTIONS</th>
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<tr>
<td>SITUATION</td>
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<tr>
<td>Any level of emergency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wartime policies and programs of instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reserve Component (RC) training units</td>
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<td>New training centers and schools</td>
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Figure IV-7. Expanding Training Base Capacity: Sources and Options
resources; supplies and pre-event distribution of blood, vaccines, and personal protective equipment; and HNS assist in determining the theater health services required. CONUS hospital beds and facilities are increased to accommodate the expected flow of casualties and increases in the population of the CONUS support base. The AE system is responsive in order to employ the necessary contingency AE elements required to support the increased intratheater, intertheater, and CONUS evacuee requirements. The nonactive duty beneficiary population eligible for government health care may be transferred to a managed care/TRICARE contract as requirements for serving uniformed military beneficiaries approach the available capacity. MILDEP mobilization plans should include provisions for activating RC medical professionals for theater health services as required.

25. Sources of Emergency Health Services

The sources of skilled health services manpower and hospital beds to meet emergency and wartime requirements for health care are listed in Figure IV-8, together with the options and actions required to mobilize additional health care capacity.

26. Options for Mobilizing Health Services

a. Options for mobilizing additional health and medical services professionals parallel those for other manpower skills. In time of national emergency, the transfer of members of the United States Public Health Service (USPHS) commissioned corps to DOD may also provide additional health service professionals.

b. Theater health services and aeromedical support is expanded by calling up, transferring, and reassigning health and medical professionals, AC and RC health services units, and hospital ships deployed to the theater. See JP 4-02, Joint Health Services, for specific information on organic DOD health services capabilities. Some mobilized RC personnel are assigned to CONUS’s medical treatment facility as backfill. This enables the facilities to support care of returning casualties and the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) missions.

c. The CONUS health services base is expanded, as necessary, to provide care for casualties returned from the theater. In addition to expanding CONUS military hospitals, this process may also include implementing, in turn, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)-DOD Contingency Hospital System and the NDMS, which provide additional beds and professional staff from VA and commercial civilian resources.

27. Impact of Health Services Mobilization on Other Resource Areas

The process of expanding theater health services may significantly burden the manpower, materiel and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial base, training base, HNS, and legal resource areas. It could also affect the transportation and training base areas, and it may require expanded legal authority. The transfer of dependent and retiree health care support to the managed care/TRICARE contract may have a significant impact on funding.
SECTION K. COMMUNICATIONS

28. Sources and Options for Mobilization Communications Support

Although the US military utilizes its own communications systems to execute many national defense/crisis response requirements, it frequently relies upon commercial providers to fulfill its administrative support needs. For this reason, the Communications Act of 1934 (Title 47, USC, Section 606) provides the President with substantial authority during times of national emergency or war to regulate and control virtually every form of telecommunications resource at the national and local levels. Included within this authority are devices and stations for wire, radio, and microwave transmissions. DHS, the manager of the NCS, monitors situations that could develop into emergencies, provides recommendations for the use of resources, and maintains liaison with commercial providers. The DOD information network supports DOD and the Armed Forces of the United States. Other NCS assets support other departments and agencies of the USG. These other assets may be made available to DOD in crises and war when needed. The JS controls only a few communications assets, which are allocated during emergencies to provide additional communications in the theater.

29. Impact of Communications Mobilization Activities on Other Resource Areas

Virtually all communications resources required come from unused and redirected capacity maintained in peacetime. Some increases in personnel to accommodate additional operations, maintenance, and security needs may be required. The impact on other
resource areas is expected to be minimal, except as the result of unexpected attrition or protracted operation that would generate requirements to replace fixed infrastructure.

SECTION L. HOST-NATION SUPPORT

30. Sources of Host-Nation Support

Manpower, equipment, facilities, and services provided by host or allied nations during war or emergency can offset requirements for corresponding US military resources that are not affordable or practical to maintain in peacetime. A number of agreements are maintained with an ever-growing array of allies for defense cooperation. Every effort should be made through the Department of State and DOD to establish some form of mutual support, defense cooperation, and/or acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs) with US allies and friends around the globe. Initial cooperation can be achieved by helping to establish a database of military and commercial capabilities available in each nation, as well as standardized procedures to allow for rapid communication and understanding in a crisis situation. Direct HNS can be provided by an ally’s military units that are organized and equipped for that specific purpose. Financial arrangements may have already been established on a bilateral basis with a formula spelled out formally in a defense cooperation agreement.

31. Coordinating Host-Nation Support

a. Implement Existing Agreements. Mutual support agreements, ACSAs, or defense cooperation agreements may be in effect between the US and the host nation. Such international agreements may adequately provide for support.

b. Develop New Agreements. The variable, uncertain nature of global security threats may create situations where it is necessary to negotiate new agreements providing for HNS. Legal counsel should assist in the development of new agreements by coordinating with relevant CCMD staff judge advocates and by ensuring compliance with DOD and CJCS policy related to the negotiation of international agreements. The variable and uncertain nature of global security threats may create unforeseen situations where it may be necessary to seek ad hoc HNS. Such support is normally obtained through government-to-government negotiations or negotiations conducted at a mutually agreed lower level.

See JP 4-08, Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations, for more details. For North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) doctrine, see the Allied Joint Publication-4 series of publications and associated NATO standardization agreements.

32. Impact of Mobilizing Host-Nation Support on Other Resource Areas

Implementation of existing or additional mutual support or defense cooperation agreements, depending on the support provided, will affect the providing nation’s or nations’ resource areas, particularly manpower, materiel and equipment, transportation assets, and possibly facilities. Careful consideration should be given to the impact upon the host nation and its capabilities compared to the offset of US resource requirements.
CHAPTER V
MOBILIZATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION

“The Greeks by their laws, and the Romans by the spirit of their people, took care to put into the hands of their rulers no such engine of oppression as a standing army. Their system was to make every man a soldier, and oblige him to repair to the standard of his country whenever that was reared. This made them invincible; and the same remedy will make us so.”

Thomas Jefferson
(Letter to Thomas Cooper, 1814)

1. Introduction

a. Mobilization plans support CCDRs’ campaign plans, OPLANs, concept plans, and OPORD. They are detailed plans prepared by the MILDEPs and DOD agencies. They are based on policy and planning guidance in the GEF, Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), GFMIG, and in tasks specified by the CJCS in the JSCP. They reflect requirements for force expansion with RC units and IAs and for expansion of the CONUS base to sustain the mobilized force for as long as necessary to achieve military and national security objectives. Mobilization plans explain how force and resource expansion is to be accomplished.

b. Mobilization is a complex, time-sensitive process with many participants and activities. Mobilization plans must be carefully integrated among participants and the 12 resource areas. Mobilization execution must be sequenced and carefully synchronized to ensure resources are available to the supported and supporting commanders when needed. The CJCS, supported by the JS, integrates mobilization planning and monitors the status and progress of mobilization execution. The CJCS advises SecDef on establishing priorities, allocating resource shortages among claimants and redirecting execution activities, when necessary, to eliminate bottlenecks and overcome unforeseen problems.

c. The Mobilization Information Management Plan (MIMP) provides guidance on information systems related to mobilization planning and execution. This plan identifies the flow of information related to mobilization during joint planning and is designed to provide a coherent and accurate status of mobilization efforts. Appendix C, “Mobilization Information Management Plan,” contains specific policies regarding the MIMP.

d. Opportunities to determine the validity of mobilization plans and procedures are provided by periodic CJCS-sponsored worldwide command post exercises involving SecDef, OSD, the JS, Services, CCMDs, and other USG departments and agencies. These may be augmented by field training exercises conducted by CCMDs and/or Services.

e. This chapter provides a joint perspective of mobilization planning, execution, and reporting. It explains the relationships between mobilization plans, OPLANs, and campaign plans. It introduces the mobilization estimate of the situation, a tool to assist the thought processes of commanders and mobilization planners. It describes the joint
mobilization planning processes. It also provides an overview of the mobilization execution process.

SECTION A. MOBILIZATION PLANNING

2. Mobilization Planning and Operation Plans

   a. The GEF, DPG, and JSCP provide SecDef guidance for mobilization planning in support of joint operations.

   b. CJCSI 3110.03, *(U) Logistics Supplement (LOGSUP) for the 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)*, guides the MILDEPs and CCDRs in preparing mobilization plans that support the CCDRs’ contingency plans. The planning guidance is focused on the areas of manpower and industrial mobilization. Manpower mobilization requirements derived for each contingency establish the level of mobilization assumed for each contingency and drive the determination of mobilization requirements in the 12 resource areas. The industrial mobilization guidance requires the MILDEPs to conduct industrial preparedness planning and to maintain a production base that will support contingency requirements.

   c. During the JPP, the MILDEPs furnish mobilization-related information to the CCDRs, who incorporate it into the OPLANs under development or revision. The major mobilization plans and planning systems are shown in Figure V-1.

   d. Manpower mobilization information furnished by the MILDEPs for inclusion in OPLANs provides the foundation for detailed planning in the other resource areas. This information comprises the number of AC and RC personnel required by Service and skill for each option included in the OPLAN. These functions are:

      (1) Direct support for each option (i.e., units and individuals needed to augment the supported commander’s combat and support force).

      (2) CONUS base (i.e., units and individuals required for the level of CONUS-based expansion to support each option).

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Mobilization Plans and Planning Systems</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Adaptive Planning and Execution System</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Army Regulation 500-5, <em>Army Mobilization</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3060.7, <em>Navy Manpower Mobilization/Demobilization Guide</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Air Force Instruction 10-402, <em>Mobilization Planning</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Marine Corps Mobilization, Activation, Integration, and Deactivation Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Coast Guard Manpower Mobilization Policies and Procedures</td>
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Figure V-1. Major Mobilization Plans and Planning Systems
(3) CONUS and outside the continental United States (OCONUS) backfill (i.e., units and individuals required to replace those deployed to the theater).

(4) Strategic transportation (i.e., units and individuals needed to augment peacetime strategic air mobility and sealift capabilities).

3. Mobilization Plans and Military Campaign Plans

A campaign plan has important implications for mobilization planners. Firm strategic objectives, force levels, and time constraints are key elements of information with which the commander and mobilization planner can execute mobilization planning and initiate additional force and resource expansion options if needed. Additional industrial mobilization and the reinstitution of the draft may be indicated in the campaign plan if there is an expectation of a long war with high materiel and personnel attrition. Conversely, if the campaign plan expects a short war with low attrition, mobilization planners can concentrate on managing mobilization at a lower level.

A more complete discussion of campaign plans is provided in JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

4. Mobilization Estimate of the Situation

a. A mobilization estimate is a logical process by which a commander considers personnel and resource requirements affecting the military situation and develops a COA taken to accomplish the mission. A staff estimate is a process or conclusion or recommendation communicated to the commander.

b. Although not every situation demands an extensive planning effort, the mobilization process is complex and involves interactions that may influence the outcome of the analysis. The mobilization estimate provides a tool for planners to make a systematic appraisal of mobilization requirements. It requires coordination from all functional areas of the JS, CCMD, joint force, and Services. In Appendix E, “Mobilization Estimate,” is a format to assist the mobilization planner in developing a mobilization estimate.

c. The analysis in paragraph 2 and paragraph 3 in the mobilization estimate must be complete, accurate, and valid.

(1) In paragraph 2, a net assessment is made of the mobilization capability in each resource area. The net assessment consists of the time-phased mobilization capability or capacity in each resource area compared to the requirements of each COA. Shortages or overages should be identified and quantified in terms of the unit of measure used in the area (e.g., number of personnel, training seats, short tons, hospital beds, days of supply).

(2) In paragraph 3, estimates of the impacts of mobilization activities in each resource area on the other areas are made to determine if the mobilization action is feasible. For example, when a COA requires training base expansion, the analysis process for paragraph 3 should establish that there are enough qualified instructors, facilities, equipment, and medical support for an expanded training establishment. A shortage in one
or more of these areas will limit the training base expansion and may render the COA infeasible.

d. In paragraphs 4 and 5, the completed mobilization analysis should support conclusions concerning the feasibility or infeasibility of each staff COA recommendations.

5. Mobilization Planning

Mobilization planners in the JPEC participate in two primary activities: maintaining a mobilization base and participating in the JPP to develop detailed mobilization plans to support OPLANs.

a. To maintain a mobilization base at resource levels adequate to support the mobilization requirements of OPLANs is a full-time task for mobilization planners in all resource areas. Training exercises are used to evaluate adequacy of mobilization plans, resources, and training. The mobilization base is described as the total of all resources available, or that can be made available, to meet foreseeable wartime needs. The two most critical resources in the mobilization base are manpower and industrial base capacity because of the time and expense involved in developing skilled military and civilian personnel and technologically sophisticated military equipment. Maintaining a mobilization base in the other resource areas requires planning and investment by the MILDEPs for mobilization activities such as facilities and training base expansion, mobilization of strategic and CONUS transportation resources, and expanding joint health services capabilities.

b. Mobilization planning to support combatant command campaign plans (CCPs) and contingency plan execution takes place in every phase of the JPP and identifies the total requirement for RC forces to support the given OPLAN. The RC requirements summary tables list the aggregate RC support necessary for the execution of the OPLAN, are used as the numerical justification for requesting specific legal authorities and levels of mobilization, and will be included in annex A (Task Organization). CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance, establishes the standard formats and guidance for developing OPLANs.

For further information, see CJCSI 3110.03, (U) Logistics Supplement (LOGSUP) for the 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

c. Functions of the APEX Enterprise System. The APEX functions include strategic guidance, concept development, plan development, and plan refinement (see Figure V-2). Each step of the RC requirements process (in context with the APEX functions) is described in subsequent subparagraphs.

(1) Strategic Guidance. The GFMIG force apportionment tables provide for the apportionment of major combat forces and selected special operations forces (SOF). These and other force requirements are broadly defined by the supported CCDR’s strategic concept and TPFDD letter of instruction (LOI) to guide plan development. Strategic guidance should:
Consider implications of RC use that are not limited to the strategic guidance function. Apportioned RC combat forces and major theater combat service/combat service support (CSS) are known but visibility of smaller RC units will only occur after sourcing is complete. Provide input or feedback on RC requirements and assumptions to the staffing of high-level guidance documents such as the GEF; DPG; CJCSI 3110.01, (U) 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP); and CJCSI 3110.03, (U) Logistics Supplement (LOGSUP) for the 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

Facilitate the planner’s development of the supported CCDR’s TPFDD LOI and related actions to ensure RC mobilization guidance and taskings are visible and
understood for apportioned RC major combat forces, SOF units, and theater-level combat support and CSS units.

(c) Facilitate the review of the LOI to ensure the stated requirement for the aggregate RC requirements are contained in annex A (Task Organization) to the OPLAN.

(2) During the mobilization planning process, the mobilization planner conducts in-progress reviews to develop a range of COAs that integrates a set of robust options available for concept development. As the concept development progresses, the mobilization planner will refine COAs as military operations evolve. The mobilization planner uses strategic guidance documents, the mission analysis, initial concept plan, notional TPFDD, and concept of employment under the APEX concept development planning process. Detailed mobilization planning begins upon COA approval by the supported CCDR.

3 Plan Development. During plan development, preferred force identification or contingency sourcing occurs to develop a notional TPFDD (see Figure V-2). During these sourcing events, the Services select units to meet the time-phased requirements of the supported CCDR. When the Services source the notional OPLAN TPFDD, the planner, with the mobilization planner’s advice, adds an important dimension to the sourcing process by considering where Service capabilities reside. These selected units may be active forces, a combination of AC and RC, or even combinations that include civilian and contractor support. After requirements are determined, there must be a concerted effort to identify component sourcing, either AC or RC, to increase the accuracy of specifying the total RC units and manpower required. At the end of this phase, the notional TPFDD is available. Normally, this provides the bulk of the RC requirement and enables the supported CCMD’s mobilization planner to create the draft RC requirements. At this point, the notional TPFDD is sourced and ready for feasibility analysis and refinement as necessary but not ready for execution. The RC requirements must still be finalized by each Service using TPFDD data. The Services and supporting CCDRs give the supported CCDR draft data that must be compiled and included in the supporting plans to complete the RC requirement (see Figure V-3). Once a plan is completed, all assumptions are either validated or refuted.

4 Plan Refinement. In plan refinement, the CCDR, in coordination with the JPEC, conducts a formal review of the plan. The JS J-4 mobilization planner and other JS directorates review the RC requirements summaries and supporting data. The supporting CCDRs and Services finalize requirements in several areas: movement of the force, mobilization and deployment support, sustainment operations, and backfill capabilities. CONUS-based and other forces supporting the deployment are also included in the TPFDD. During execution sourcing requirement are validated and the RC unit is selected and called to active duty.

d. RC Requirements Summary Tables. The summary tables identify RC forces and support forces required to accomplish the following: deploy to the GCC’s area of responsibility (AOR); move the force; assist in mobilization, deployment, and sustainment; and backfill departing AC units and individuals. Too often, planners are unaware of the
Mobilization Planning and Execution

总RC需求支持OPLAN下发展。CJCSM 3130.03，《弹性规划与执行（APEX）规划格式与指导》；CJCSI 3110.01，《（U）2015联合战略能力计划（JSCP）》；和CJCSI 3110.03，《（U）联合战略能力计划（JSCP）》LOGSUP的要求，完成附录A（任务组织）到OPLANs。RC部分的附录A（任务组织）应包含支持请求的RC需求摘要。例如，如果灵活威慑选项（FDOs）或灵活响应选项（FROs）在建模或威慑阶段需要PRC，而后续阶段需要部分动员，则必须为这些阶段分别准备RC需求摘要来支持请求PRC。动员规划者分析FDOs/FROs的总数来确定何时需要PRC，并准备一个摘要来支持请求。这些摘要为高级领导提供执行规划所需的各种功能的数据。

图V-4是一个CCDR的RC需求摘要支持一个FDO与一个OPLAN的示例。此摘要将由动员规划者使用以证明要求提出PRC的必要性。

1. **RC in AOR。** 在规划开发过程中，服务提供支持CCDR与数据RC单位和RC非单位人员在TPFDD中开发RC人员数量的“RC in AOR”列。此数字计算为提供TPFDD非单位人员的最好估计的RC部分。这包括计划的填补和替代人员，可能不全来自AC，特别是在计划两个主要行动或战役时。例如，如果10,000填补和替代人员计划为部署单位，规划者可能会估计其中2,000为RC。这可以基于预先确定的假设，如活动或RC力量的物理位置，动员时间，动员RC力量的时间，决定性力量在计划执行中的持续时间，或考虑到另一个主要行动或战役。尽管计划和TPFDD可能不明确AC或RC为填补人员和
replacements, the mobilization planner provides the planner with assistance to define the RC portion of this requirement to complete the table.

(2) Move the Force; Assist Mobilization, Deployment, or Sustainment; and Backfill. During plan refinement, the Services, supporting CCDRs, USTRANSCOM, and other agencies define their non-TPFDD requirements to support complete plan execution. The Services coordinate with these organizations to identify actual RC forces needed to meet these requirements.

6. Planning in a Crisis

a. A crisis is an incident or situation that typically develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that the President or SecDef considers a commitment of US military forces and resources to achieve national objectives. It may occur with little or no warning and require accelerated decision making.

b. During a crisis, the CJCS and CCDRs expedite vital decision-making information up the chain of command to the President and SecDef. The expedited information flow in a crisis also facilitates information sharing among the members of the JPEC and the integration of military advice from the CJCS in the analysis of military options. A crisis scenario allows the President and SecDef to communicate their decisions rapidly and accurately through the CJCS to the CCDRs, subordinate and supporting commanders, Services, and CSAs to initiate more detailed planning, change deployment posture of the identified force, and execute military options. The transition from mobilization to execution in an emergent situation encompasses the activities associated with the time-sensitive development of OPORDs for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of
assigned, attached, and allocated forces and capabilities in response to a situation. Mobilization planners consider and analyze plans developed for a similar contingency for suitability. If unanticipated circumstances occur, and no plan proves adequate for the operational circumstances, then planning and execution would begin mission analysis under the JPP in a “no plan” situation. The time available to plan responses to such real-time events is short. In as little as a few days, commanders and staffs must develop and approve a feasible COA with TPFDD, publish the plan or order, prepare forces, ensure sufficient communications systems support, and arrange sustainment for the employment of US military forces.

For more information on planning and the planning process, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

c. In a crisis, situational awareness is continuously updated by the latest all-source intelligence and operations reports. An adequate and feasible military response in a crisis demands flexible procedures that consider time available, rapid, and effective communications and relevant previous planning products whenever possible.

d. In a crisis or time-sensitive situation, the CCDR reviews previously prepared contingency plans for suitability. The CCDR converts these plans to executable OPORDs or develops OPORDs from scratch when no useful contingency plan exists.

e. Planning to execution procedures provide for the rapid and effective exchange of information and analysis, the timely preparation of military COAs for consideration by the President or SecDef, and the prompt transmission of their decisions to the JPEC. Planning activities may be performed sequentially or in parallel, with supporting and subordinate plans or OPORDs being developed concurrently. The exact flow of activities is largely determined by the time available to complete the planning and by the significance of the crisis (see Figure V-5). Refer to the CJCSM 3122 series and CJCSM 3130 series of publications, which address planning policies and procedures, for detailed procedures.

SECTION B. MOBILIZATION EXECUTION

7. Mobilization Decisions and Orders

a. The CJCS recommends to SecDef the assets that are to be called up and their planned use when RC forces are to be mobilized to augment the AC. SecDef approval is required for the execution of a mobilization OPORD. Figure V-6 shows the mobilization execution planning process. In preparing a mobilization recommendation to the President, the following should be considered:

(1) Assessments of the Services, CCDRs, and Service component commanders.
(2) Input from the JS.
(3) Technical advice, legal opinions, and policy considerations from OSD.

b. After the President’s decision to initiate mobilization, SecDef directs the MILDEPs to proceed. The Services publish mobilization orders in accordance with their respective
procedures. OSD may issue implementation instructions and provide additional policy guidance, if required.

c. Some mobilization actions require the President or SecDef to notify Congress. For example, some legal authorities require reports at specific intervals. Others require specific information on how the authority is being used and how long it will be needed. Reports on expenditures related to the crisis are also required. The CJCS and the DOD Comptroller normally prepare these reports, which require continuous coordination throughout the JPEC. Figure V-6 illustrates the RC decision-making process. DODI 1235.12, *Accessing the Reserve Components (RC)*, provides detailed guidelines and procedures for the mobilization execution process and the required level of authorities and approval.

8. Monitoring the Status and Progress of Mobilization

Because mobilization involves interrelated activities in 12 resource areas, SecDef, OSD, the CJCS, Secretaries of the MILDEPs, and other members of the JPEC need accurate and timely information on the status and progress of mobilization. Information received by proponents in each of the resource areas is analyzed and coordinated with the other resource area proponents to provide decision makers with recommendations for
Reserve Component Decision-Making Process (Subsequent Call-Up or Transition from Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up to Partial Mobilization)

controlling, replanning, redirecting, or stopping mobilization operations. CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures), provides detailed procedures and automated information to support operations planning and execution.

SECTION C. MOBILIZATION REPORTING

9. Reporting Requirements

a. Reporting involves extracting information obtained from monitoring activities, then providing the data to appropriate organizations involved with mobilization and demobilization.
The mobilization planner responds to formal and informal reporting requirements. The formal requirements are those specified in statutes or directives such as reporting to Congress, the JS, or the Services. Three formal reports are generated: RC requirements from annex A (Task Organization) of each OPLAN, which lists the total RC requirements; the mobilization report (MOBREP); and, during partial mobilization, the President’s report to Congress. Figure V-7 illustrates the information flow for these reports.

b. Congressional requests and queries may require informal or special case reporting. Future rotation plans, mobilization capability or status requests, limitations on reservists, seasonal or personal information, and redeployment and demobilization plans may be required to fulfill informal or special case reporting requirements.

**Figure V-7. Mobilization Reporting Information Flows**

Legend:
- CCDR: combatant commander
- GSORTS: Global Status of Resources and Training System (in accordance with mobilization report)
- IAW: in accordance with
- MOBREP: mobilization report
- RC: Reserve Component
- SecDef: Secretary of Defense
- SITREP: situation report
- TPFDD: time-phased force and deployment data
- USC: United States Code
c. Once the Services begin to order RC units and individuals to active duty, the joint reporting process begins. Joint reporting entails reporting on people and units. The MOBREP shows people available and/or mobilized. After direction from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Readiness, the Services submit the MOBREP to the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Readiness daily (or as otherwise directed). Units update the Status of Resources and Training System database, which is available for review on the local area network.

10. Four Subjects Require Reporting

a. **Problems in Providing Forces.** The Services must notify the requester and the JS if they are unable to provide RC forces by the specified dates. Then, the JS can attempt to resolve the problem. This is not a formal report but is required promptly to ensure expeditious resolution.

b. **RC Forces No Longer Required.** All organizations monitor their missions to determine when RC capabilities are no longer required or if it is feasible to provide other means of support. Organizations with releasable RC forces inform the appropriate Service; in turn, the Service coordinates with the JS J-3 Joint Force Coordinator/USSOCOM to determine if forces are needed elsewhere.

c. **Mobilization Information to JS J-3 Director of Operations as Required.** The JS J-4 coordinates with the JS J-3 briefing team to ascertain the information needed.

d. **Demobilization Schedules.** The Services have primary responsibility to demobilize their units and personnel. The Services will reconcile demobilization timelines with the supported CCDR’s priorities and will notify CCDRs who have assigned/attached RC forces of the planned demobilization dates and corresponding timeline accounting for demobilization movement and out processing.
CHAPTER VI
JOINT DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION

“Resolved, that the commanding officer be and he is hereby directed to discharge the troops now in the service of the United States, except twenty-five privates, to guard the stores at Fort Pitt, and fifty-five to guard the stores at West Point and other magazines, with a proportionate number of officers; no officer to remain in service above the rank of a captain.”

Resolution of the Continental Congress
(Disbanding the Continental Army, 2 June 1784)

1. Introduction

a. Demobilization involves more than releasing personnel from active duty, deactivating units, and reorganizing the RC. Although these activities drive the process, capability or capacity in the other resource areas must be reduced and reorganized at the same time. As in mobilization, activities in each resource area during demobilization will affect each of the others. For this reason, close coordination among resource area proponents is just as important during demobilization as it is during mobilization.

b. This chapter provides the national and joint military perspectives of demobilization planning and execution. It also provides guidelines for demobilization planning and execution and an overview of demobilization activities in the twelve resource areas.

2. Demobilization and National Security

a. From a national perspective, the results of a successful demobilization process should put the US in a position to respond to future challenges to our national security. Policies should be established to regulate the pace of demobilization and retain the military capability required to ensure post-conflict national security commitments. Force structure changes are not inherent to the demobilization process. Industrial base and other civil sector resources mobilized during the conflict will be released to fuel the post-conflict national economy.

b. The scope of demobilization will vary according to the extent of the preceding mobilization. The scope of mobilization can range from a relatively brief use of a few volunteer reservists to a protracted force and resource expansion well beyond the original peacetime levels.

c. From a joint military perspective, demobilization plans should reflect the post-conflict missions of supported CCDRs and be synchronized with plans for recovery, reconstitution, and redeployment operations. DOD policies for the release of reservists and RC units ordered to active duty should first reflect military requirements and then considerations of equity and fairness for military personnel and their families. The demobilization personnel management programs of the MILDEPs will be challenged to facilitate the return of Service members and their families to civilian life and need to provide substantive transition assistance, such as screening for medical care requirements.
and potential long-term health care support, and assistance in availing themselves of statutory reemployment rights, as members reenter the civilian workforce. Title 10, USC, Section 1144(c), mandates participation of all Service members in the Transition Assistance Program of DOD. These requirements must be completed prior to release from active duty at the demobilization location of the Service component. National Guard and reserve units and members ordered to active duty to augment the AC will, consistent with operational requirements, receive priority for redeployment. They will be released from active duty as expeditiously as possible and will remain eligible for transition services up to 180 days after release from active duty.

3. Demobilization Planning Guidelines

Studies of the demobilizations following the two world wars and the Gulf War provide valuable lessons for today’s demobilization planners:

a. **Mission First.** Demobilization plans must support the post-conflict mission as it evolves. The supported commander’s immediate postwar priorities should come first. As the transition to a post-conflict state proceeds, long-range national security objectives should drive demobilization activities to ensure the Armed Forces are prepared for the next crisis.

b. **Begin Planning Early.** Demobilization planning should begin soon after mobilization starts.

c. **Coordinate and Communicate Plans and Policies.** The demobilization policies and procedures that worked best in the past were those that had been developed and coordinated by interested personnel and agencies both within and outside DOD. Public information programs that explained demobilization policies helped gain and maintain public support.

**SECTION A. DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING**

4. Planning Considerations

a. Demobilizing the Armed Forces could be a relatively straightforward return of mobilized/activated units and individuals to their former status. It could also be a broader process including measures such as deactivation of units, rapid discharge of individuals, and a major reorganization of the RC. Similarly, demobilization of the defense industry could range from an almost total reconversion of a defense-oriented industrial base to a simple reduction in the output of a few providers who surged production to meet the near-term demands of a short-lived crisis.

b. **Recovery activities must also be planned along with demobilization.** These include activities for restoring force readiness (reset/reconstitution) and controlling the rate of industrial base conversion to avoid disrupting the national economy. As manpower is being released from the Services and industrial production is being cut back, the Services must retain or replace skilled manpower required to restore readiness and replenish war reserves and other stocks to be prepared for the next crisis.
c. **Demobilization planning is accomplished at two levels.** At the national level, the President and SecDef must decide on the rate of demobilization and the size and composition of the post-conflict force structure and its resource base. These national-level decisions drive demobilization planning and resource requests at the theater and supporting levels. They also guide the post-conflict activities of the supported and supporting commanders.

d. **The supported CCDR remains the key to military demobilization.** The supported GCC’s mission and requirements should take precedence over all others. Other general planning factors should include:

   (1) The situation and requirements in other theaters. SecDef, with the advice of the CJCS, should establish a priority of support.

   (2) Future missions in the theater.

   (3) Availability of strategic lift for redeployment.

   (4) CONUS reception and processing capacities for manpower and materiel.

   (5) Lessons learned from previous demobilization operations.

5. **Recovery Planning**

   a. Recovery planning should be closely coordinated with demobilization planning. Recovery includes the reset actions necessary in the theater and CONUS base to restore force readiness and a credible capability to respond, in the short term, to a future threat. Included activities are to:

   (1) Rebuild major equipment items.

   (2) Restore personnel strength and training readiness to required wartime levels for future contingencies.

   (3) Restore war reserve stocks to acceptable levels.

   (4) Maintain essential industrial surge and expansion capabilities.

   (5) Finalize recovery of redeployed equipment returned to CONUS or address shortages created by remain-behind equipment requirements.

   (6) Terminate war-related contracts for the convenience of the government.

   (7) Reestablish contracts at garrison or home base as troops return.

   (8) Restore pre-positioning ships and embarked equipment and stores.

   b. The planning and resourcing of these activities are the responsibility of OSD and the MILDEPs. The CJCS assists SecDef in providing strategic direction for these efforts.
SECTION B. EXECUTION

6. General

Demobilization activities can begin before the end of the crisis or war as the need for resources diminishes and assets for demobilization support become available. Most demobilization actions will commence following the conflict when immediate post-conflict missions have been assigned by the supported CCDR and requirements for military forces and resources decline. Although demobilization, like mobilization, is essentially a MILDEP responsibility, the supported and supporting commanders play coordinating and synchronizing roles. In any event, the CCDRs monitor the status and progress of demobilization and concurrent recovery operations to assess the adequacy of actions to restore readiness of assigned forces to required levels for future conflicts.

7. Demobilization Execution

Following redeployment, the MILDEPs deactivate units or return them to a reserve status. Military personnel are released from active duty or returned to reserve status. The number of civilian employees may be reduced. Materiel and equipment may be returned to bases of origin or other reserve/guard units, mothballed, stored, distributed to other nations through foreign military sales or other security assistance programs, destroyed, sold for scrap, or turned over to the DLA Disposition Services. As with mobilization, assets in the other resource areas are required to support the demobilization of manpower and equipment; but, as these support requirements decline, demobilization activities are accomplished in the other resource areas. Representative actions in other resource areas are listed in Figure VI-1.

SECTION C. MOBILIZATION PLANNER DEMOBILIZATION RESPONSIBILITIES

8. Purpose

This section describes the mobilization planner’s role in the demobilization process. Only the manpower portion of the demobilization process is discussed. RC units and individuals are released from active duty under the demobilization process. Although not as time-sensitive as mobilization, demobilization is a complex operation that requires detailed planning and execution.

a. Demobilization planning should occur during an operation for the following reasons: expiration of authorized service time, changes in the forces required, or political pressure to demobilize forces. Mobilization and demobilization planning may occur simultaneously. Consequently, each Service must ensure demobilization plans are flexible, consistent, responsive, and sufficiently comprehensive to meet all contingencies. Poorly planned and executed demobilization operations will have two major impacts: degradation to supported operations and reduced support for the RC program.
b. Figure VI-2 shows the demobilization activities. A summary of these activities and the specific tasks the mobilization planner accomplishes is found in Annex E, “Demobilization Activities,” to Appendix C, “Mobilization Information Management Plan.” This summary is a reference of the tasks that must be accomplished at each organizational level to avoid poorly planned and executed demobilization operations.

9. Preliminary Actions

Preliminary actions set the stage for planning and executing a successful demobilization. Primarily, they involve establishing and disseminating broad guidance that the mobilization community incorporates into mobilization plans.

a. Establish Demobilization Concepts and Policies. Mobilization planners assist in selecting units for demobilization, defining the process, and integrating demobilization into the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) (see Figure VI-3). DODI 1235.12, Accessing the Reserve Components (RC), establishes demobilization policy. This instruction states, “Units and individuals of the Ready Reserve ordered to active duty without their consent shall be kept on active duty no longer than absolutely necessary. They shall be released from active duty as promptly as possible, consistent with operational
requirements. Individuals activated as a unit should be demobilized as a unit.” DODI 1235.12, Accessing the Reserve Components (RC), lists the following demobilization guidelines:

(1) MILDEP Secretaries through their Service chiefs shall ensure demobilization plans are flexible, consistent, responsive, and comprehensive to meet all challenges.
Joint Demobilization Planning and Execution

Demobilization Policy Issues

- To the extent operationally feasible, redeploy Reserve Component forces first.
- Management of partial units (if only part of unit needed).
- Use of volunteers, contractors, and host-nation support.
- Retaining on active duty only those forces necessary.

Figure VI-3. Demobilization Policy Issues

(2) RC members must meet requirements for separation prior to release from active duty.

(3) Units and individual reservists ordered to active duty should be demobilized at the same mobilization site at which they were initially ordered to report to active duty.

(4) Planners should review DOD policy concerning RC members taking all leave earned during mobilization prior to orders termination unless exceptional circumstances exist. If necessary, orders should be extended to allow accumulated leave to be taken.

b. Provide Input to the JSCP on RC Forces Demobilization. Mobilization planners address issues such as demobilization support requirements, assumptions on release of forces, RC support of redeployment operations, and times necessary to conduct demobilization. Broad references to demobilization may be appropriate for inclusion in CJCSI 3110.01, (U) 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), while more detailed assumptions and guidance should be included in CJCSI 3110.03, (U) Logistics Supplement (LOGSUP) for the 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), published subsequent to each JSCP.

10. Planning

Demobilization planning involves reviewing policies and establishing procedures to demobilize. Planners determine operational support requirements and identify the forces to demobilize and those to support the demobilization operations. The planning function is divided into two activities: plan demobilization force and plan demobilization support (see Figure VI-4.)

a. Plan Demobilization Force. This activity establishes the criteria for selecting forces for demobilization, selecting units, and developing a time-phased schedule. Tasks in planning the demobilization force include:

(1) Determine Redeployment and Demobilization Strategy. The Services develop broad concepts for demobilization that are the basis for subsequent detailed planning. These areas include ports, demobilization stations, equipment return policies,
medical processing and follow-up, personnel support requirements, and equipment disposition.

For additional guidance on redeployment, see JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

(a) Mobilization planners must consider carefully those functional areas where most, if not all, of the capability is in the RC. If additional units must be mobilized, shortages of the capability could exist. For example, units may not be available to provide a rotational base in the functional area; in that case, with the onset of another operation, the RC may not be able to support both contingencies.

(b) **Equipment retrograde has manpower implications.** Equipment may be returned from the mission location directly to the unit or may be sent to a processing center for refurbishment. Sometimes equipment may remain in the theater or be transferred to other nations. These considerations may cause personnel from demobilizing units to stay behind to process the equipment. The mobilization planners must incorporate these decisions into demobilization plans.

(2) **Develop Tentative Demobilization Schedule.** The Services create a tentative demobilization schedule based on the assumed level of mobilization. This schedule is used to develop more detailed plans and to estimate resource requirements. Likewise, the commands where the RC forces will be assigned develop schedules to determine support requirements and to ensure the continuation of specific capabilities.
Mobilization planners must ascertain if replacement units are required; if they are, the mobilization planners then coordinate with force planners to schedule the overlap with the replacement units.

b. **Plan Demobilization Support.** In this second activity, mobilization planners consider the specific forces, such as medical, logistic, and transportation, needed to support demobilization; also, they develop more detailed demobilization procedures. During this effort, the mobilization planners must address the support issues such as backfill; ports; demobilization stations; equipment retrograde, processing, and redistribution; outprocessing procedures; and leave policies. Demobilization support tasks include:

1. **Determine Redeployment Support Requirements.** Having determined the RC forces required to support the redeployment of units and individuals, supported CCDRs coordinate with force planners to incorporate these additional requirements into the TPFDD. Other organizations coordinate their requirements with the Services.

2. **Determine Required Outprocessing.** The Service mobilization planners allot the time and resources necessary for personnel, finance, legal, and medical processing accomplished at the transportation hubs and demobilization stations. They ensure these factors are integrated into planned movement schedules and organizations with RC forces are given the information. Service mobilization planners also plan for the homecoming support and ceremonies.

3. **Determine, Source, and Approve Forces Needed to Support Demobilization.** The Services and CCDRs develop and source the additional manpower needed to support the redeployment, backfill departing units, and support homecoming activities within CONUS. After the Services approve the additional requirements, these must be integrated with all other mobilization resources to ensure ceilings are not violated.

11. **Execution**

a. Before demobilization is executed, mobilization planners must ensure a unit or individual is not needed for the operation. Politically, recall of units once demobilized is difficult to justify; therefore, the Services should be conservative in releasing forces, especially if they involve unique units or skills. In assessing the continuing need for the RC forces, the mobilization planners must consider the entire DOD response, since an RC unit not needed by one component may be useful to another organization.

b. During execution, mobilization planners constantly tailor the demobilization operation envisioned in the plan to the evolving situation. They staff recommendations and obtain decisions regarding units and individuals to be demobilized and adapt the demobilization support structure.

c. Per Figure VI-5, mobilization planners participate in the following execution tasks:

1. **Educate the Leadership.** Provide decision makers at all levels with information on demobilization plans and policies, including the schedule of units and the number of personnel to be demobilized and those units and personnel already demobilized.
When staffing demobilization recommendations, the mobilization planners ensure the applicable public affairs and legislative affairs offices are included in the actions. The mobilization planners should alert their leadership that RC call-ups may continue through all phases of an operation to provide an evolving logistics operations support system which must continue after combat or the crisis is over. It is particularly important to ensure the leadership does not prematurely recommend ending the emergency which may provide the legal basis for the mobilization of needed RC forces.

(2) **Review and Modify Demobilization Concepts and Support Plans.** The mobilization planners need to update the existing demobilization plan, created in the planning environment, to ensure the demobilization concepts, policies, and supporting plans are accurate and reflect actual circumstances. They staff the demobilization plans with the appropriate organizations to verify the users understand the demobilization concept and to enable them to modify their plans and operations.

(3) **Monitor Changing Requirements and Theater Backfill Requirements.** Since demobilization is a fluid process, the mobilization planners continue to review changing operational requirements which may result in units’ being demobilized or extended. The supported CCDR must notify the Services, JS, and supporting CCDRs when units or individuals are no longer required or when it is feasible to use alternative manpower sources. If the requirement continues to exist, the appropriate Services,
supported CCDR, and supporting CCDRs must request authority to extend the active duty period or obtain rotational units for replacement. DODI 1235.12, Accessing the Reserve Component (RC), states the MILDEP Secretaries should ensure RC forces identified for mobilization are considered for other missions during changes in operational requirements using the following guidelines:

(a) Attempt to redirect the RC unit or member to another requirement 90 days prior to the original mobilization date.

1. Seek to align the RC unit against another like requirement.

2. Consider deploying an RC unit instead of an AC unit.

3. Consider the RC forces for global reallocation if the supported CCDR is unable to reallocate.

(b) De-alert or demobilize the RC unit as soon as practical if another mission is not available.

(c) Identify and mitigate individual hardships caused by changes to operational requirements.

(4) Seek Demobilization Approval. The supported CCDR identifies units and individuals no longer required to support operations in the redeployment plan. Based on the redeployment plan, each Service will develop a demobilization list which is then disseminated within the Service for action. Authority to approve the demobilization list will depend on the Service and the particular operation that may be delegated.

(5) Develop Demobilization Schedule. Working closely with the affected organizations and USTRANSCOM, the Services create a demobilization schedule. The schedule includes forces to be demobilized; specific demobilization times; and projected release dates from theater, ports, and demobilization stations. When the schedule is complete, the Services ensure organizations with RC forces review the schedule and update their supporting plans.

(6) Monitor RC Mobilizations and Demobilizations. The mobilization planners start monitoring and reporting on RC units from the beginning of mobilization, and these activities continue through demobilization. This tracking is necessary to obtain information to keep the leadership and Congress apprised of RC actions during the operation. Chapter V, “Mobilization Planning and Execution,” Section C, “Mobilization Reporting,” covers this function in detail.

(7) Highlight Critical Support Issues in Situation Reports (SITREPs) and Other Forums. Using the SITREPs, other JOPES reports, or special functional reports, the mobilization planner presents conflicts and critical issues to the leadership and the appropriate organization. The mobilization planners’ early action enables the responsible individuals and commands to resolve issues expeditiously before they become roadblocks to further activities.
(8) **Terminate Legal Authorities.** Once RC forces are no longer needed to support the operation, demobilization of remaining RC forces occurs. Upon complete demobilization, the JS informs SecDef there is no longer a need for RC forces in support of the operation. SecDef may terminate the authorization to order RC forces to active duty (if such authorization was granted or delegated to SecDef), direct the Services to terminate the order to activate RC forces, or inform the President so Presidential authorization may be withdrawn. This authority automatically is terminated if the President or Congress retracts the original declaration of national emergency. The same legislation that authorizes mobilization implements certain emergency authorities and capabilities. These depend upon the original mobilization authority continuing for their enforcement. Examples of this legislation include those which suspend certain laws pertaining to the promotion, separation, and retirement of active duty personnel (stop loss) and the suspension of Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations. Until the need for supporting or related authorities is eliminated, planners should urge SecDef, through the CJCS, not to rescind the order or declaration authorizing the call-up.
1. General

   a. Flexible and adaptive mobilization planning requires a range of options available both before and after a national emergency is declared. A broad range of legal authorities support mobilization actions ranging from mobilization for contingency operations, which does not require a declaration of national emergency, as well as full-scale war or other national emergencies. Due to the highly specific nature of legal authorities supporting mobilization actions, it is important the JPEC and commanders responsible for mobilizing reserve forces consult frequently with staff legal counsel to ensure specific actions are implemented consistent with legal requirements.

   b. Mobilization legal authority is available in a time of war or of national emergency declared by Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law, and an authority designated by the Secretary concerned under the provisions of Title 10, USC, Section 12301. Examples of such authorities are the PRC pursuant to Title 10, USC, Section 12304; the President’s option to suspend any provision of law pertaining to promotion, retirement, or separation of a Service member during an RC activation (the stop-loss authority) pursuant to Title 10, Sections 123 and 12305; the MILDEP Secretaries’ authority to recall regular and reserve military retirees pursuant to Title 10, USC, Sections 12307 and 12308; and authorities requiring priority performance on defense contracts pursuant to Title 50, USC, Chapter 29.

   c. A national emergency can be declared by the President, Congress, or both. Current law regarding national emergencies is contained in the National Emergencies Act of 1976 (Title 50, USC, Sections 1601-1651). The act provides that when the President declares a national emergency, the specific authorities must be included in the declaration or by one or more contemporaneous or subsequent executive orders. Presidential powers are limited to those authorities invoked until the President subsequently announces the invocation of additional specified authorities (Title 50, USC, Section 1631). Congress may terminate the President’s declaration at any time with a concurrent resolution and must review the declaration and situation every six months (Title 50, USC, Section 1622).

   d. The National Emergencies Act of 1976 greatly reduced the risk that a declaration of national emergency would send overly provocative signals of US intent to adversaries and unduly alarm allies. With the same broad range of emergency powers, the President can now tailor the national response in a crisis, without undue provocation, and convey more accurate signals of US intent to allies as well as adversaries.

   e. The War Powers Resolution (WPR) (Title 50, USC, Sections 1541-1548) is a statute, enacted over Presidential veto, that attempts to impose limits upon the President’s authority as Commander-in-Chief to introduce the Armed Forces of the United States into hostilities or potentially hostile situations. Presidents have consistently maintained that the law unconstitutionally intrudes upon Presidential authority. Among other things, the statute attempts to impose consultation and reporting requirements related to the
introduction of armed forces into hostilities. While no President has accepted the limitations imposed by the WPR, Presidents have directed DOD to prepare reports “consistent” with the reporting provisions of the WPR. Accordingly, while the statute itself does not control mobilization, the President may require the preparation of a report, “consistent with the provisions of the WPR,” regarding the status of US forces, including mobilized RC forces, involved in hostilities.

f. The Digest of War and Emergency Legislation Affecting the Department of Defense, 2003, lists nearly 400 emergency authorities available for mobilization and crisis planning. This appendix identifies and briefly describes or provides excerpts of many legal authorities relevant to those emergency authorities most likely to affect joint mobilization planning and execution. Additional resources with mobilization authorities include the Selected Defense-Related Laws (Volume II—as amended through December 31, 2003), published by the Committee on Armed Services of the United States House of Representatives. These references should assist planners but do not eliminate the need to consult with staff legal counsel.

2. Manpower

Individual and unit members of the RC and retired personnel may be ordered to active duty voluntarily or involuntarily under authorities provided in Titles 10 and 14, USC. Figure A-1 illustrates RC accessibility.

a. Voluntary Order to Active Duty. The MILDEP Secretaries may order any member of the RC, under their jurisdiction, to active duty with the consent of the member (National Guard [Title 32, USC] also requires consent of the state governor) at any time (Title 10, USC, Section 12301[d]). Funding is the limiting factor for the use of this authority. RC members who are voluntarily on active duty for over three years, or accumulate more than three years over a four-year period, will be counted against AC end strengths. Additionally, RC members desiring to complete additional active duty beyond the three years will require a waiver. RC personnel are exempted from certain officer and enlisted grade limits.

b. PRC. The President may activate any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, of the Selected Reserve or any member of the IRR (designated as essential under regulations prescribed by the MILDEP Secretary concerned) without their consent for periods of up to 365 consecutive days when it is determined necessary to augment the active forces for any named operational mission (Title 10, USC, Section 12304). Not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve and the IRR may be on active duty under this section at any one time, of whom not more than 30,000 may be members of the IRR. Specifically, the law provides the authority for the President “to order a unit or member to active duty to provide assistance in responding to an emergency involving a use or threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction; or a terrorist attack or threatened terrorist attack in the US that results, or could result, in significant loss of life or property.” The 365 consecutive day limit is tied to each unit or individual and starts with the day that particular unit or individual is called up (therefore rotations are feasible as long as the cap is not exceeded and no personnel are retained involuntarily on active duty).
duty in excess of 365 consecutive days). PRC automatically brings the operation within the Title 10, USC, definition of a “contingency operation.” Presidential declaration of a national emergency is not a prerequisite to authorizing PRC. Recalled reservists under Title 10, USC, Section 12304, authority do not count against end strengths because of the involuntary nature of this recall.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNITED STATES CODE—RESERVE COMPONENT ACCESSIBILITY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Statute</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Title 10, USC, Section 12301(a) (Volunteers/Entire Reserve Force)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Title 10, USC, Section 12301(b) (Partial Mobilization/Ready Reserve)</td>
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<td>Title 10, USC, Section 12301(d)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Title 10, USC, Section 12302 (Presidential Reserve Call-up/Selected Reserve)</td>
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<td>Title 10, USC, Section 12304</td>
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**Figure A-1. United States Code—Reserve Component Accessibility**
### c. Partial Mobilization Authority

Following a Presidential declaration of national emergency, the President may order to active duty (other than for training) up to 1,000,000 members of the Ready Reserve, without their consent, for a period not to exceed 24 consecutive months (Title 10, USC, Section 12302). As with PRC, the clock starts for each unit or individual as of the time they enter involuntary active duty.
d. **Reserve Emergency Call-Up.** When a governor requests federal assistance in responding to a major disaster or emergency (as those terms are defined in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act [Title 42, USC, Section 5122]), SecDef may, without the consent of the member affected, order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, of the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Air Force Reserve to active duty for a continuous period of not more than 120 days to respond to the governor’s request (Title 10, USC, Section 12304a). The authority to order to active duty per Title 10, USC, Section 12304a has been delegated to the Secretaries of the MILDEPs per SecDef Memorandum, *Delegation of Authority under Title 10, USC, Section 12304a*, dated 7 March 2013. When the Secretary of Homeland Security determines the need to augment regular USCG forces to aid in the prevention or response to an imminent, serious natural or man-made disaster; act of terrorism (as defined in Title 6, USC, Section 101); or transportation security incident (as defined in Title 46, USC, Section 70101), the Secretary of Homeland Security may, without the consent of the member affected, order to active duty of not more than 120 days in any two-year period, an organized training unit of the USCG Ready Reserve, a member thereof, or a member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit. A limited delegation of authority is provided to Commandant of the Coast Guard annually to facilitate the rapid recall of USCG reservists under these circumstances.

e. **Preplanned Mobilization Support.** When the Secretary of a MILDEP determines it is necessary to augment the active forces for a preplanned mission in support of a CCMD, the MILDEP Secretary may order any unit of the Selected Reserve, without the consent of the members, to active duty for not more than 365 consecutive days (Title 10, USC, Section 12304b). The manpower and associated costs of such active duty must be specifically included and identified in the defense budget materials for the fiscal year or years in which such units are anticipated to be ordered to active duty. Not more than 60,000 members of the RCs may be on active duty under this section at one time.

f. **Full Mobilization Authority.** The President, under Title 10, USC, Section 12301; the additional Title 10, USC; and Title 50, USC, Emergency Authorities, upon a congressional declaration of national emergency or war may authorize the MILDEP Secretaries, or their designees, to order to active duty any member of the RC, without their consent, for the duration of the emergency or war plus six months (Title 10, USC, Section 12301[a]). Members in inactive or retired status are not recallable under this provision without the approval of SecDef.

g. **Total Mobilization Authority.** The President, upon a congressional declaration of national emergency or war, and with passage of legislation authorizing force expansion, may authorize the Services to add new forces and personnel necessary to achieve national security objectives.

h. **Active Duty Retiree Recall.** Under Title 10, USC, Section 688, and regulations established by SecDef, the MILDEP Secretaries are authorized, at any time, to recall (without their consent) retired members of the ACs, members of the Retired Reserve who were retired under Title 10, USC, Sections 1293, 3911, 3914, 6323, 8911, or 8914, or members of the Fleet Reserve and Fleet Marine Reserve (this includes reserve members
who retired from active duty with less than 20 years under Temporary Early Retirement Authority). This authorization does not require a declaration of national emergency or war.

i. **Retired Reserve Recall.** Reserve members in a retired status (other than those who fall under the provisions of Active Duty Retiree Recall described above) may be recalled involuntarily to active duty only in time of war or national emergency as declared by Congress. This authority requires the MILDEP Secretaries, with the approval of SecDef, first determine there are not enough qualified reservists available, in the required categories, to fill the required billets (Title 10, USC, Section 12301).

j. **Recall of the Standby Reserve.** Units and members in the Standby Reserve may be ordered to active duty (other than for training) only as provided in Title 10, USC, Sections 12301(a) and 12306. In addition, this authority requires that the MILDEP Secretaries first determine that there are not enough qualified members in the Ready Reserve in the required categories who are readily available.

k. **Call to Active Duty of Delayed Entry Program Personnel.** Qualified personnel with no prior military service may be enlisted as untrained members of the IRR for up to 365 days before reporting for active duty under Title 10, USC, Section 513. All such persons may be ordered to active duty under all provisions of the law and regulations applying to the IRR.

l. **Stop-Loss Authority.** This authority stops normal attrition of experienced military personnel through expiration of enlistments, retirements, and other routine releases from active duty. With this authority, during any period, if RC members have been involuntarily ordered to active duty, the President may suspend any provision of law relating to retirement, promotion, or separation of military personnel determined to be essential to the national security (Title 10, USC, Section 12305).

m. **Conscription.** If Congress deems it necessary, under the Selective Service Act (Title 50, USC, Chapter 49, and Title 10, USC, Section 2535), the SSS can begin involuntarily drafting eligible, nonexempt men for military service.

n. **Employment and Reemployment Rights of Members of the Uniformed Services.** Title 38, USC, Chapter 43, is a federal law intended to ensure persons who serve or have served in the Armed Forces of the United States (AC or RC) or other “uniformed services” are:

   1. Not disadvantaged in their civilian careers because of their service.
   2. Promptly reemployed in their civilian jobs upon their return from duty.
   3. Not discriminated against in employment based on past, present, or future military service.

o. **The Service members Civil Relief Act (Title 50, USC, Chapter 50)** provides a number of statutory protections for activated military members, especially for members of the National Guard and reserve forces. Examples include a six-percent rate cap on
obligations, a 90-day stay of proceedings, and the right to terminate auto and residential leases under certain circumstances. Members should contact their servicing staff judge advocate for further information.

3. The Defense Production Act of 1950

Authority for expanding capability or capacity in the materiel and equipment, transportation, and industrial base resource areas is provided by the Defense Production Act. This act (Title 50, USC, Chapter 55), which has been periodically revised and renewed by Congress, provides the basis for the DPAS. It authorizes the President, in peace, conflict, and war, to divert national resources deemed critical to the national defense from civil to military use and to reorder economic priorities to provide for the national defense and national security. Specifically, the President may require private sector providers of materials and services, identified as essential and critical to national defense, to give priority performance to defense contracts and orders. The President may also authorize USG departments, like DOD, DOT, and Department of Commerce, to guarantee loans needed by defense contractors to expedite production, deliveries, or service.

4. Facilities

There are three fundamental emergency authorities available to facilitate construction projects required to expand facilities during mobilization.

a. Emergency Construction Authority. The Secretary of a MILDEP is authorized by Title 10, USC, Section 2803, to execute emergency military construction projects if the Secretary of a MILDEP determines: the project is vital to the national security or to the protection of health, safety, or the quality of the environment; and the requirement for the project is so urgent that to defer it for the next military construction authorization act would be inconsistent with national security or to the protection of health, safety, or the quality of the environment. Per Title 10, USC, Section 2803, the maximum amount a Secretary of a MILDEP may obligate in any fiscal year is $50 million, taken from the unobligated balances of funds appropriated for military construction.

b. Contingency Construction. SecDef is authorized by Title 10, USC, Section 2804, to execute contingency military construction projects, before a declaration of national emergency, upon determination the deferral of the projects would be inconsistent with national security or national interest. Specific funding limits can change each year. Members should consult with staff judge advocate to determine current contingency construction limits and requirements.

c. Construction Authority in the Event of a Declaration of War or National Emergency. In the event of a declaration of war or the declaration by the President of a national emergency requiring use of the Armed Forces, SecDef may undertake construction projects needed to support the Armed Forces without specific legislative authorization. Such projects, however, must be able to be completed within the total amount of unobligated military construction funds, including funds appropriated for family housing per Title 10, USC, Section 2808.
d. **Reacquisition and Condemnation of Real Property.** There are more than 60 permanent laws in the USC authorizing the President, SecDef, or specified Secretary of a MILDEP to reacquire specific parcels of former federal property for defense purposes. In general, the availability of these authorities is contingent on a declaration of national emergency by the President or Congress or the existence of a state of war. As a practical matter, many of these sites have been rendered virtually unusable for defense purposes, because of commercial development undertaken over the years since some of these laws were enacted (some as early as 1925). The US Army Corps of Engineers, however, maintains a list of properties still usable for national defense purposes. In addition, Title 10, USC, Section 2663, authorizes Secretaries of the MILDEPs to bring condemnation proceedings, in courts with appropriate jurisdiction, to acquire land or facilities deemed necessary for a variety of defense purposes including construction of training sites, and production of explosives or other munitions of war.

5. **Training Base Expansion**

There are no legal authorities specifically directed to expansion of the military training base in connection with mobilization. Training base expansion activities, however, may require activation of RC training units and individual manpower, expansion of facilities, equipment, and transportation resources, under emergency authorities pertaining to these resource areas. Training base expansion plans must also take into account the provision of Title 10, USC, Section 671, which requires a minimum of 12 weeks of basic training (or its equivalent), with some exceptions, before assigning any member of the Armed Forces to duties OCONUS. The intent of this law is to ensure no Service member is assigned overseas without basic combat skills.

6. **Joint Health Services**

a. Activation of RC health services, medical units, and individuals is governed by the same authorities for mobilizing other manpower skills as discussed in paragraph 2, “Manpower.”

b. The President is authorized by Title 42, USC, Section 217, to declare the commissioned corps of the USPHS a military Service in time of war or national emergency.

c. Under the provisions of the VA and DOD Health Resources Sharing and Emergency Operations Act (Title 38, USC, Section 8110[a]), the VA will make beds available to DOD for the care of military casualties.

d. The NDMS, established and administered by the Department of Health and Human Services under the authority of Executive Order 12656, *Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities*, provides backup support to DOD and VA in caring for military casualties. Although not legally obligated, nonfederal public and private hospitals have agreed to provide about 100,000 beds to augment DOD and VA resources, if needed in an emergency. This commitment is triggered when SecDef determines military casualties threaten to overburden the DOD and VA systems.
7. **Communications**

The Communications Act of 1934 (Title 47, USC, Section 606) authorizes the President, during times of emergency or war, to exercise extraordinary management or control over national telecommunications resources to meet requirements for telecommunications services beyond those normally provided by individual commercial suppliers or government agencies.

8. **Host-Nation Support**

Authorities for obtaining HNS manpower and services are provided for in various treaties and other international agreements to which the US is a signatory, including numerous logistic agreements.

*Refer to JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, for further HNS information.*

9. **Environment**

Major environmental protection statutes affecting mobilization are discussed in Chapter IV, “Resource Areas.” While the President has the authority, when in the national interest, to authorize an exemption from certain environmental laws, seeking such an exemption would require highest-level action within DOD. Executive Order 13693, *Planning for Federal Sustainability in the Next Decade*, and DOD policy require full compliance with applicable environmental laws and regulations, unless an authorized exemption or exception is obtained.

10. **Funding**

The following emergency authorities are available to DOD to provide essential funding for mobilization and other emergency defense expenditures.

   a. **Budget Supplemental.** SecDef may submit additional appropriations requests to Congress to meet urgent requirements.

   b. **Budget Amendment.** SecDef may submit budget revisions to Congress before the congressional appropriations process has been completed.

   c. **Reprogramming.** SecDef may reprogram funds within appropriations thresholds established by Congress to meet the requirements of any emergency. Reprogramming actions above established thresholds must be submitted to Congress for approval.

   d. **Transfer Authority.** Authority and thresholds for transferring funds between appropriations are established in the current appropriations act. Transfers that exceed thresholds require congressional approval.

   e. **Deficiency Authority (Food and Forage Act).** Title 41, USC, Section 6301-6304, permits DOD to obligate funds in excess of amounts authorized and appropriated to cover necessities of the current year, under circumstances in which appropriations for clothing,
subsistence, fuel, quarters, transportation, or medical and hospital supplies are exhausted. This authority ensures the availability of sufficient funds to care for the unexpected increases in DOD personnel strength as a result of a crisis and mobilization.
APPENDIX B
AUTOMATED TOOLS

1. General

The JPEC:

a. Prepares systems to monitor forces and phases of the crisis or mobilization.

b. Plans for information management systems to consolidate IT support for all functional areas of a mobilization, thereby reducing the total number of varying systems carrying similar data.

c. Reduces administrative functions to meet mobilization surge requirements.

d. Reviews IT procedures that stimulate development of effective communications system capabilities for enhanced crisis response.

e. Designs and tests mobilization-related IT systems to ensure their ability to operate effectively.

2. Planning

The Services mobilize, train, equip, and prepare forces, including the RC, for movements to meet scheduled deployment and employment dates. Movement of mobilized RC units from home station to mobilization station may be a support installation responsibility. The Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, USTRANSCOM’s US Army Service component, plans intracontinental US movements to support mobilization and deployment using the OPLAN TPFDD and intracontinental US movement data. The Services and DOD agencies will provide significant RC mobilization-related movement requirements to USTRANSCOM. The supported CCDR prioritizes and validates TPFDD movement requirements to USTRANSCOM. USTRANSCOM then coordinates with the support installation and supported CCDR to resolve movement constraints and advises the CJCS of transportation capabilities in CONUS. During deployment, USTRANSCOM monitors the movement of forces and materiel by common-user lift from home station to the theater ports of debarkation. In this circumstance, USTRANSCOM will immediately be able to identify a conflict so resolution can be obtained from the CJCS and the appropriate CCDR.

3. Reporting Systems Supporting Mobilization

a. **JOPES Database.** As part of APEX, the JOPES deployment database contains the necessary information on forces, materiel, and filler and replacement personnel movement requirements to support execution. The database reflects information contained in the TPFDD from existing CCPs or contingency plans or those refined during execution and the movement schedules or tables developed by the transportation component commands to support the deployment of required forces, personnel, and materiel.
b. **Joint Industrial Mobilization Planning Process (JIMPP).** JIMPP is the generic term for the planning and analytic process to be used by the Services, DOD agencies, and the JS to:

1. Prepare industrial mobilization plans linked to CCPs, contingency plans, or plans developed in response to a crisis.
2. Provide the analytical framework to perform the industrial analyses required by the Joint Strategic Planning System and OSD.
3. Establish baseline national industrial base capability assessments tied to potential military demand.
4. JIMPP is used during planning to conduct capability and risk assessments, emergency procurement budget mechanisms, time-phased requirements lists, and narrative COAs. Output may be forwarded to OSD and other USG departments or agencies for use in broader industrial mobilization planning. As an analytical tool, JIMPP allows planners to address “what if” questions from both the supply and demand sides. Expected outputs of the process include supply-side option summaries for level of mobilization, estimates of a mobilizable force, and assessments of plan feasibility. JIMPP consists of three components: a requirements module, which produces weapons and munitions requirements, associated shortfalls, replacement of losses, and consumption rates; a vendor-level module for specific options and capabilities (compares each item requirement with its production rate and produces surge and mobilization requirements and shortfalls); and an industry-level module for a macroeconomic sector-level analysis of mobilization requirements and capabilities for 240 industrial sectors.

c. **Joint Engineer Planning and Execution System (JEPES).** JEPES is the engineer component of the Global Combat Support System-Joint. Engineer planners at the CCMDs and their components use the JEPES to plan for the required engineering force, construction material, and facilities to support plans. JEPES can be used to:

1. Generate time-phased facility requirements.
2. Analyze and assess engineering support by comparing facility requirements to in-theater facility assets and host nation, contract, and troop engineering capability.
3. Provide manpower, equipment, and construction materials, and non-unit cargo requirements for other processes.
4. Provide engineer planning data to assist in mission analysis and COA development.
5. Provide real-time monitoring capability needed to track plan execution.

d. **Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation.** The Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation provides rapid analysis of the transportation feasibility
of OPLANs and COAs before validation by the supported CCMD and transportation acceptance by USTRANSCOM.

e. **Defense Readiness Reporting System-Strategic (DRRS-S).** DRRS-S is an information management system designed to support the decision-making process of the President, SecDef, and the CJCS. DRRS-S supports the registration of units, reporting of basic unit identity elements, monitoring of unit status, and distribution of unit information throughout the JPEC. Distributed information includes unit location, strength, readiness factor, and category levels for equipment and personnel. Individual units update the DRRS-S database by a Defense Information Systems Network communications link. The system constitutes the single automated tool for maintaining and updating unit status.

f. **Global Decision Support System (GDSS).** GDSS is the worldwide command and control system for the mobility airlift and air refueling. GDSS is used to monitor and manage all operational DOD air mobility missions throughout the world including all organic, commercial, and air refueling missions.

See JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, for more information on IT enabling tools.

g. **Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS).** DRRS is a mission-focused, capabilities-based Internet application that provides the CCDRs, Services, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other key DOD users a collaborative environment in which to evaluate the readiness and capability of the Armed Forces to carry out assigned tasks. This enables users to find units which are both ready and available for deployment in support of a given mission.

h. **Enhanced Status of Resources and Training System (ESORTS).** ESORTS feeds DRRS and provides a more complete readiness assessment system by directly measuring outputs—the ability to conduct a task or mission to the prescribed standard—along with inputs. The system is designed to come much closer to the goal of understanding “ready for what?” ESORTS provides a vehicle for each organization from individual units to combined forces to report on its ability to achieve the performance standard of its mission-essential tasks under the conditions of the assignments.
APPENDIX C
MOBILIZATION INFORMATION MANAGEMENT PLAN

Annex A Planning Activities
B Reserve Component Call-Up Decision-Making Activities
C Mobilization Activities
D Monitoring and Reporting Activities
E Demobilization Activities

1. General

   a. When circumstances dictate the formation of an MWG, a MIMP will be developed. The MIMP is designed to provide guidance on information systems used in mobilization planning and execution. It identifies the flow of information related to mobilization during a crisis.

   b. Misconceptions regarding the mobilization process and the resultant procedures are as prevalent as are the abundant sources of information. This plan identifies the various sources and uses of existing mobilization data to enhance awareness and understanding of this data.

   c. The MIMP is published separately by the JS J-4.

2. Information Holders

   Each Service has visibility over its personnel as the entry-point for mobilization processing. Additionally, numerous DOD components track mobilization activities data, such as the following:

   a. Assistants to the CJCS for National Guard Matters and Reserve Matters, per Title 10, USC, Section 155a, advise the CJCS on National Guard and reserve matters, respectively.

   b. Joint Staff J-35 [Deputy Directorate for Regional, Force Management, and Future Operations] is the JS office of primary responsibility for all readiness reporting applications and systems.

   c. Joint Staff J-7 [Joint Force Development Directorate] is the office of primary responsibility for the Joint Lessons Learned Program and program manager for the Joint Lessons Learned Information System, the joint lessons learned system of record.

   d. CJCS Legal Counsel maintains visibility over proper application of statutory requirements as they pertain to mobilization.

   e. CJCS Legislative Assistant maintains visibility over mobilization activities to support congressional inquiries.
f. CJCS Public Affairs maintains visibility over mobilization activities to support media inquiries.

  g. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower and Reserve Affairs receives personnel status reports from the Services. This report provides daily visibility of the number and category of RC personnel called up under Title 10, USC, authority.

  h. DFAS maintains visibility of all Service members for pay purposes.

  i. Defense Manpower Data Center maintains visibility of all Service members for congressional and other special interest reporting purposes.

3. Information Flow

  a. The flow of mobilization information depends on the operational environment—crisis or noncrisis.

  b. During a crisis, information related to mobilization activities typically flows through the current operations team/current action team.

  c. During a noncrisis scenario, information related to mobilization activities typically flows through public affairs or legislative affairs and then to the Service manpower and reserve affairs staff or agency for resolution. Public affairs issues will be presented at the OSD or Service level.

4. Information Tools

A wide array of recurring products are created by the information holders, containing data specific to mobilization. The MIMP identifies the specific MOBREPs generated by the various information holders to expand awareness of these products in managing mobilization activities. Information holders are encouraged to inform the JS J-4 of any changes regarding recurring products related to mobilization activities to allow the MIMP to remain current.
## ANNEX A TO APPENDIX C
### PLANNING ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobilization Planning Community</th>
<th>Develop Concept</th>
<th>Develop Plan</th>
<th>Develop Supporting Plan</th>
<th>Analyses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Common Activities (For all)     | • Provide pre-planning input  
• Provide combatant commander strategic concept feedback  
• Plan participation | | | • Determine levels of mobilization necessary to support projected RC force requirements  
• Answer questions on the justification of RC call-ups  
• Validate or refute defense planning guidance and/or planning assumptions |
| Joint Staff                     | • Confirm tasking for RC requirements summary | | | • Review completed operation plan and most probable FDO |
| Service                         | • Source specific RC units  
• Requirements for complete operation plan and most probable FDO:  
  • RC in area of responsibility  
  • RC unit personnel in TPFDD  
  • RC non-unit personnel in supplemental TPFDD  
  • Move the force, assist mobilization, deployment, and/or sustainment  
  • Backfill | | | |
| Supported Command               | • Draft, coordinate, and issue the supplemental TPFDD letter of instruction  
• Comply with requirements for operation plan  
• FDO determination | | | |
| Subordinate and/or Supporting Commands US Transportation Command Components Joint Task Force | | | • Requirements for complete operation plan and most probable FDO:  
  • Move the force  
  • Assist mobilization, deployment, and/or sustainment  
  • Backfill | |

**Legend**

- **FDO** flexible deterrent option  
- **RC** Reserve Component  
- **TPFDD** time-phased force and deployment data

*Figure C-A-1. Planning Activities*
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## Reserve Component Call-Up Decision-Making Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobilization Planning Community</th>
<th>Pre-Mobilization Review and Coordination</th>
<th>Educate Senior Leadership on RC Potential</th>
<th>Interpret Policies for Use of RC</th>
<th>Confirm Pre-Planned Mobilization Capabilities</th>
<th>Recomended Changes in Peacetime Budgeting Priorities</th>
<th>Modify Demobilization Policy to Suit Contingency</th>
<th>Prepare Decision Packages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common Activities (For all)</td>
<td>• Identify point of contact network</td>
<td>• Conduct meetings and/or briefings on RC mobilization policies: availability, mobilization and deployment criteria, and the different categories of RC and their potential use</td>
<td>• Review and modify call-up instructions and procedures</td>
<td>• Estimate ability of mobilization activities to meet plan schedule</td>
<td>• Review unfunded mobilization requirements</td>
<td>• Initiate planning for the return of RC to civilian status</td>
<td>• Respond to information requests as appropriate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Convene preliminary meetings focused on &quot;what if&quot; questions using current information</td>
<td>• Analyze lessons learned from similar crises</td>
<td>• Recommend modifications and exceptions to policy</td>
<td>• Coordinate with legal counsel</td>
<td>• Coordinate with resource area proponents for adjustments to internal funding priorities</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Consider potential supporting requirements</td>
<td>• Manage media relations and coordinate with public affairs officer</td>
<td>• Review judge advocate general policies and/or procedures for &quot;conscientious objectors&quot; and Soldiers and Sailors Act</td>
<td>• Monitor the development of RC deployment criteria</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
<td>• Become familiar with RC call-up procedures</td>
<td>• Review legal authorities in Title 10, US Code</td>
<td>• Identify opportunities for joint use of Service mobilization assets</td>
<td>• Seek opportunities for cross-Service utilization of RC demobilization facilities and assets</td>
<td>• Prepare draft decision package</td>
<td>• Staff draft decision package with Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Be prepared to recommend level of call-up</td>
<td>• Review mobilization plans, policies, and procedures</td>
<td>• Monitor the development of RC deployment criteria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Forward package to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Brief leadership on call-up authorities and specific qualities of RC units</td>
<td>• Brief leadership on call-up authorities and specific qualities of RC units</td>
<td>• Confirm monitoring and reporting systems: coordinate reporting requirements</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figure C-B-1. Reserve Component Call-Up Decision-Making Activities
### RESERVE COMPONENT CALL-UP DECISION-MAKING ACTIVITIES (CONTINUED)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Supported Command</th>
<th>Subordinate and/or Supporting Commands US Transportation Command Components Joint Task Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • Review monitoring and reporting requirements  
• Consider sources of immediate manpower augmentation  
• Start planning for demobilization | • Ensure RC OPLAN support requirements are projected  
• Ensure theater-unique requirements are known to force providers | • Review RC requirements projected by CCDR  
• Review RC requirements to move force, backfill displaced units, and assist in the mobilization and deployment process  
• Brief leadership on RC mobilization doctrine |
| • Develop deployment criteria consistent with the needs of the CCDR  
• Review Service Readiness Processing policies  
• Validate policies for use of civilians, contractors, and other non-DOD agencies | • Review mobilization doctrine and policy  
• Brief command on RC capabilities and limitations to support plan | • Review RC requirements  
• Review mobilization doctrine and policy  
• Brief command on RC capabilities and limitations to support plan |
| • Coordinate with program assessment and budget office to raise visibility of unfunded mobilization requirements  
• Recommend changes to eliminate shortages | • Validate projected RC requirements of OPLAN | • Support efforts to adjust funding priorities  
• Review demobilization doctrine  
• Support redeployment and/or demobilization operations |
| • Coordinate on Draft Decision Package | | • Coordinate on Draft Decision Package  
• Begin to evaluate need for subsequent RC augmentation |

**Legend**

- CCDR: combatant commander
- DOD: Department of Defense
- OPLAN: operation plan
- RC: Reserve Component

*Figure C-B-1. Reserve Component Call-Up Decision-Making Activities (continued)*
### MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobilization Planning Community</th>
<th>Execution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Common Activities** (For all) | • Coordinate with public affairs officer  
• Monitor unit and individual mobilization schedules  
• Review missions needed to be supported to ensure all requirements have been met |
| **Joint Staff** | • Monitor force requirements  
• Coordinate and refine execution policies and guidance |
| **Service** | • Coordinate and refine execution policies and guidance  
• Monitor and adjust call-up procedures for individuals  
• Manage call-up against ceilings  
• Ensure that TPFDD is updated as combatant commander requirements change  
• Notify congressional delegations for call-up prior to public affairs announcement |
| **Supported Command** | • Ensure theater-unique requirements that impact upon the RC are known to force providers  
• Ensure that TPFDD is updated as requirements change |
| **Subordinate and/or Supporting Commands** US Transportation Command Components Joint Task Force | • Ensure that TPFDD is updated as requirements change  
• Ensure unique requirements that impact upon the RC are known to force protection |

**Legend**

- RC: Reserve Component
- TPFDD: Time-phased force and deployment data

**Figure C-C-1. Mobilization Activities**
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## MONITORING AND REPORTING ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobilization Planning Community</th>
<th>Monitoring</th>
<th>Reporting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Common Activities (For all)     | • Monitor the status of mobilization  
                                 | • Monitor unit and individual demobilization schedules | • Gather information to respond to various requests  
                                 |                                                       | • Report Reserve Component (RC) forces no longer needed |
| Joint Staff                     | • Monitor force requirements  
                                 | • Determine any special information requirements and assign reporting requirements | • Direct Services provide input for Report to Congress (partial mobilization)  
                                 |                                                       | • Prepare Report to Congress  
                                 |                                                       | • Provide mobilization information as required  
                                 |                                                       | • Review military manpower mobilization and accession status report |
| Service                         | • Monitor force requirements  
                                 | • Monitor sourcing | • Enter data into RC Apportionment tables  
                                 |                                                       | • Submit mobilization report to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
                                 |                                                       | • Report on problems in providing forces  
                                 |                                                       | • Submit input data to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Presidential Report to Congress |
| Supported Commands              | Not applicable (N/A) | • Enter data into RC Apportionment tables |
| Subordinate and/or Supporting Commands US Transportation Command Components | N/A | N/A |
| Joint Task Force                | N/A | N/A |

Figure C-D-1. Monitoring and Reporting Activities
Annex D to Appendix C

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## DEMOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobilization Planning Community</th>
<th>Preliminary Actions</th>
<th>Planning Actions</th>
<th>Execution</th>
<th>Execution Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common Activities (For all)</td>
<td>• Establish demobilization concepts and policies</td>
<td>• Provide guidance</td>
<td>• Educate the leadership</td>
<td>• Monitor Reserve Component (RC) mobilizations and demobilizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Review and modify demobilization concepts and support plans</td>
<td>• Validate support and rotational requirements</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Resolve any conflicts in resource alignment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Propose that the Secretary of Defense rescind legal authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
<td>• Provide input to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Monitor Reserve Component (RC) mobilizations and demobilizations</td>
<td>• Monitor Reserve Component (RC) mobilizations and demobilizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Validate support and rotational requirements</td>
<td>• Monitor changing requirements and theater backfill requirements</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Resolve any conflicts in resource alignment</td>
<td>• Execute demobilization schedule</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Estimate and source support and rotational requirements</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Seek demobilization approval</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Solve or adjudicate conflicting resource claims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>• Determine redeployment and demobilization strategy</td>
<td>• Determine required out processing</td>
<td>• Monitor RC mobilizations and demobilizations</td>
<td>• Monitor RC mobilizations and demobilizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Develop demobilization schedule</td>
<td>• Determine, source, and approve forces to support demobilizations</td>
<td>• Monitor changing requirements and theater backfill requirements</td>
<td>• Estimate and source support and rotational requirements</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Seek demobilization approval</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Solve or adjudicate conflicting resource claims</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supported Command</td>
<td>• Develop tentative demobilization schedule</td>
<td>• Determine redeployment support requirements</td>
<td>• Offer candidates for demobilization</td>
<td>• Offer candidates for demobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Determine, source, and approve forces to support demobilizations</td>
<td>• Estimate and source support and rotational requirements</td>
<td>• Estimate and source support and rotational requirements</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Highlight critical support issues in situation reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinate and/or Supporting Commands US Transportation Command Components Joint Task Force</td>
<td>• Develop tentative demobilization schedule</td>
<td>• Determine redeployment support requirements</td>
<td>• Offer candidates for demobilization</td>
<td>• Offer candidates for demobilization</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>• Determine, source, and approve forces to support demobilizations</td>
<td>• Estimate and source support and rotational requirements</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Highlight critical support issues in situation reports</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Figure C-E-1. Demobilization Activities**
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APPENDIX D
MOBILIZATION WORKING GROUP

1. Purpose

   a. When circumstances dictate, the CJCS will establish an ad hoc MWG. The MWG is designed to enhance communications between OSD, the JS, CCDRs, and Services when military operations warrant the use of involuntarily recalled RC forces and/or the federalization of National Guard units.

   b. Members are encouraged to raise issues in the forum of the MWG as appropriate to enhance a DOD-wide approach regarding the mobilization of RC forces and/or the federalization of National Guard units.

2. Participants

   a. The MWG is chaired by the JS J-4 and will convene to address mobilization issues resulting from military operations.

   b. The following offices/components are requested to provide at least one representative to the MWG:

      (1) Joint Staff J-1 [Manpower and Personnel Directorate], JS J-3, JS J-4, assistants to the CJCS for National Guard and reserve matters, JS Legal Counsel, and JS Public Affairs.

      (2) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

      (3) CCDR liaison officers, as required.

      (4) Services—Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard, as required.

      (5) National Guard Bureau representatives.

      (6) USPHS representatives.
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APPENDIX E
MOBILIZATION ESTIMATE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Originating Organization
Place of Issue
Date-Time Group, Month, Year
Mobilization Estimate Number _______________

References:

a. Maps and Charts.
b. Other Pertinent Documents.

1. ( ) Mission. State the CCDR’s missions, taken from the mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statements. (Look specifically for RC and federalized National Guard unit missions.)

2. ( ) Situations and Considerations

   a. ( ) Assumptions
   b. ( ) Mobilization Situation

      (1) ( ) Availability of Manpower.
      (2) ( ) Transportation.
      (3) ( ) Equipment/Materiel.
      (4) ( ) Health Services.
      (5) ( ) Facilities.
      (6) ( ) Industrial Base.
      (7) ( ) Training Base.
      (8) ( ) Communications.
      (9) ( ) HNS.
      (10) ( ) Environment.
      (11) ( ) Legal Authorities.
3. ( ) Mobilization Analysis of COAs. Make an orderly examination of the manpower, equipment/materiel, transportation, health services, industrial, training bases, communications, and legal authority resource areas that affect the proposed COAs to determine the manner and degree of that consideration. The objective of this analysis is to determine whether the mobilization requirements can be met and to isolate the implications that should be considered by the CCDR in the commander’s estimate.

   a. ( ) Analyze each COA from a mobilization point of view.

   b. ( ) The mobilization factors in subparagraph 2b are the factors to be analyzed for each COA under consideration. Examine these factors realistically from the standpoint of time-phased requirements versus actual or programmed capabilities that may affect the mobilization COA.

   c. ( ) Throughout the analysis, keep mobilization considerations foremost in mind. The analysis is not intended to produce a decision. It is intended to ensure that all applicable mobilization factors have been properly considered and to serve as the basis for comparisons in paragraph 4.

4. ( ) Comparison of COAs

   a. ( ) List the impact that manpower mobilization for each level, including PRC, has on the other resource areas from a logistic directorate’s point of view.

   b. ( ) Develop a work sheet that identifies decisions that must be made in all resource areas based on the mobilization decision.

5. ( ) Conclusions

   a. ( ) State whether the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from a mobilization standpoint.

   b. ( ) State which mobilization COA can best be supported from a transportation, equipment/materiel, and health services standpoint.

   c. ( ) Identify the major resource area deficiencies that must be brought to the attention of the CCDR. Provide recommendations from the Services as to the methods to eliminate or reduce the impact of those deficiencies.

(Signed) _______________________
APPENDIX F
POINTS OF CONTACT

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APPENDIX G
REFERENCES

The development of JP 4-05 is based upon the following primary references:

1. General
   a. Title 10, USC.
   b. Title 14, USC.
   c. Title 15, USC.
   d. Title 32, USC.
   e. Title 37, USC.
   f. Title 42, USC.
   g. Title 46, USC.
   h. Title 47, USC.

2. Department of Defense Publications
   d. Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Guide.
   f. DODD 4500.54E, DOD Foreign Clearance Program (FCP).
   g. DODI 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix.
   h. DODI 1205.22, Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR).
   i. DODI 1215.06, Uniform Reserve, Training, and Retirement Categories for the Reserve Components.
   j. DODI 1225.06, Equipping the Reserve Forces.
   k. DODI 1235.09, Management of the Standby Reserve.
1. DODI 1235.11, *Management of Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs).*

m. DODI 1235.12, *Accessing the Reserve Components (RC).*

n. DODI 1235.13, *Administration and Management of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and the Inactive National Guard (ING).*

o. DODI 1332.35, *Transition Assistance Program (TAP) for Military Personnel.*

p. DODI 3020.41, *Operational Contract Support (OCS).*

q. DODI 4715.06, *Environmental Compliance.*

r. DODI 5158.05, *Joint Deployment Process Owner.*

s. DODI 8260.03, *The Global Force Management Data Initiative (GFM DI).*

3. **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications**


   b. CJCSI 1301.01F, *Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures.*

   c. CJCSI 3100.01C, *Joint Strategic Planning System.*

   d. CJCSI 3110.01J, *(U) 2015, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).*

   e. CJCSI 3110.03E, *(U) Logistics Supplement (LOGSUP) for the 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).*

   f. CJCSM 3122.01A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures).*

   g. CJCSM 3122.02D, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume III (Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution).*

   h. CJCSM 3130.03, *Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance.*

   i. CJCSM 3130.06B, *Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures.*


   k. CJCSM 3150.25A, *Joint Lessons Learned Program.*

   l. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.*

   m. JP 1-0, *Joint Personnel Support.*

o. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.


q. JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*.


s. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*.

t. JP 4-01.2, *Sealift Support to Joint Operations*

u. JP 4-02, *Joint Health Services*.

v. JP 4-10, *Operational Contract Support*.

w. JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*.

4. Service Publications


c. Marine Corps Mobilization, Activation, Integration, and Deactivation Plan.


e. Commandant Instruction (COMDTINST), M3221.1, *Coast Guard Force Deployment Planning and Execution Policy Manual*.


g. COMDTINST, M30615400.1, *Obtaining Personnel Resources to Meet Surge Requirements*.

h. USCG Pay and Personnel Center Instruction M1000.2, *Personnel and Pay Procedures Manual (PPPM)*
APPENDIX H
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

a. The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Logistics J-4.

b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine development community, made a valuable contribution to the revision of this joint publication: lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor, CDR Taquina Luster, Joint Staff J-4; Lt Col Nathan Maresh, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Analysis Division; and Mr. Larry Seman, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Division.

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning. 21 February 2014.

4. Change Recommendations

a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication, please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine
development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations, events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at https://www.jllis.mil (NIPRNET) or http://www.jllis.smil.mil (SIPRNET).

6. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, DOD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and Declassification, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, DOD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information.

7. Distribution of Electronic Publications


b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies.
GLOSSARY
PART I—ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Active Component</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACSA</td>
<td>acquisition and cross-servicing agreement</td>
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<td>AE</td>
<td>aeromedical evacuation</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<td>APEX</td>
<td>Adaptive Planning and Execution</td>
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<td>CCDR</td>
<td>combatant commander</td>
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<td>CCMD</td>
<td>combatant command</td>
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<td>CCP</td>
<td>combatant command campaign plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CJCSI</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction</td>
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<td>CJCSTM</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
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<td>COMDTINST</td>
<td>Commandant instruction (USCG)</td>
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<td>CONUS</td>
<td>continental United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>combat support agency</td>
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<td>CSS</td>
<td>combat service support</td>
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<td>DCMA</td>
<td>Defense Contract Management Agency</td>
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<td>Defense Finance and Accounting Service</td>
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<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<td>DISA</td>
<td>Defense Information Systems Agency</td>
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<td>Defense Logistics Agency</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense directive</td>
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<td>DODI</td>
<td>Department of Defense instruction</td>
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<td>DOT</td>
<td>Department of Transportation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPAS</td>
<td>Defense Priorities and Allocation System</td>
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<td>DPG</td>
<td>Defense Planning Guidance</td>
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<td>DRRS</td>
<td>Defense Readiness Reporting System</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRRS-S</td>
<td>Defense Readiness Reporting System-Strategic</td>
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<td>ESGR</td>
<td>Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve</td>
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<td>ESORTS</td>
<td>Enhanced Status of Resources and Training System</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDO</td>
<td>flexible deterrent option</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRO</td>
<td>flexible response option</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>geographic combatant commander</td>
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<td>GDSS</td>
<td>Global Decision Support System</td>
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<td>GEF</td>
<td>Guidance for Employment of the Force</td>
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<td>GEOINT</td>
<td>geospatial intelligence</td>
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<td>GFM</td>
<td>global force management</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>GFMIG</td>
<td>Global Force Management Implementation Guidance</td>
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<td>GI&amp;S</td>
<td>geospatial information and services</td>
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<td>HNS</td>
<td>host-nation support</td>
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<td>IA</td>
<td>individual augmentee</td>
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<td>IMA</td>
<td>individual mobilization augmentee</td>
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<td>IRR</td>
<td>Individual Ready Reserve</td>
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<td>ISA</td>
<td>individual Service augmentee</td>
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<td>IT</td>
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<td>JDDC</td>
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<td>Joint Engineer Planning and Execution System</td>
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<td>joint individual augmentee</td>
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<td>JIMPP</td>
<td>joint industrial mobilization planning process</td>
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<td>JPEC</td>
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<td>JPP</td>
<td>joint planning process</td>
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<td>JS</td>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
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<td>LOI</td>
<td>letter of instruction</td>
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<td>MILDEP</td>
<td>Military Department</td>
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<td>MIMP</td>
<td>Mobilization Information Management Plan</td>
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<td>MOBREP</td>
<td>mobilization report</td>
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<td>MWG</td>
<td>mobilization working group</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCS</td>
<td>National Communications System</td>
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<td>National Disaster Medical System (DHHS)</td>
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<td>national defense strategy</td>
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<td>National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>national military strategy</td>
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<td>nonprior service</td>
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<td>national security strategy</td>
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<td>OCONUS</td>
<td>outside the continental United States</td>
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<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
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<td>operation order</td>
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<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPBE</td>
<td>Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>Presidential Reserve Call-up</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve Component</td>
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<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>SITREP</td>
<td>situation report</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
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<td>SSS</td>
<td>Selective Service System</td>
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<td>TPFDD</td>
<td>time-phased force and deployment data</td>
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<td>USPHS</td>
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<td>Department of Veterans Affairs</td>
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<td>WPR</td>
<td>War Powers Resolution</td>
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PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

activation. Order to active duty (other than for training) in the federal service. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-05)

active duty. Full-time duty in the active military service of the United States, including active duty or full-time training duty in the Reserve Component. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-05)

active duty for training. A tour of active duty that is used for training members of the Reserve Component to provide trained units and qualified persons to fill the needs of the Armed Forces of the United States in time of war or national emergency and such other times as the national security requires. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

backfill. Reserve Component units and individuals recalled to replace deploying active units and/or individuals in the continental United States and outside the continental United States. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-05)

correction. The average quantity of an item consumed or expended during a given time interval, expressed in quantities by the most appropriate unit of measurement per applicable stated basis. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-05)

critical item list. A prioritized list identifying supply items and weapon systems that assist Service and Defense Logistics Agency selection of supply items and systems for production surge planning, or in operational situations, used by the combatant commander and/or subordinate joint force commander to cross-level critical supply items between Service components. Also called CIL. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-05)

delayed entry program. A program under which an individual may enlist in a Reserve Component of a Service and specify a future reporting date for entry on active duty that would coincide with availability of training spaces and with personal plans. Also called DEP. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

demobilization. 1. The process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military establishment and defense-based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality. 2. The process necessary to release from active duty, or federal service, units and Reserve Component members who were ordered to active duty or called to federal service. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

federal service. A term applied to National Guard members and units when called to active duty to serve the United States Government under Article I, Section 8 and Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution and Title 10, United States Code, Sections 12401 to 12408. (DOD Dictionary. Source JP 4-05)
full mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces of the United States resulting from action by Congress and the President to mobilize, for the duration of the emergency plus six months, all Reserve Component units and individuals in the existing approved force structure, as well as all retired military personnel, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

home station. The permanent location of active duty units and Reserve Component units. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-05)

inactive status. None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)

individual mobilization augmentee. An individual reservist attending drills who receives training and is preassigned to an Active Component organization, a Selective Service System, or a Federal Emergency Management Agency billet that must be filled on, or shortly after, mobilization. Also called IMA. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-05)

Individual Ready Reserve. A manpower pool consisting of individuals who have had some training or who have served previously in the Active Component or in the Selected Reserve and may have some period of their military service obligation remaining. Also called IRR. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

industrial mobilization. The transformation of industry from its peacetime activity to the industrial program necessary to support the national military objectives. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-05)

industrial preparedness. The state of preparedness of industry to produce essential materiel to support the national military objectives. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-05)

industrial preparedness program. Plans, actions, or measures for the transformation of the industrial base, both government-owned and civilian-owned, from its peacetime activity to the emergency program necessary to support the national military objectives. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-05)

joint individual augmentee. An unfunded, temporary duty position (or member filling an unfunded, temporary duty position) identified on a joint manning document by a supported combatant commander to augment headquarters operations during contingencies. Also called JIA. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

mobilization. 1. The process of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. 2. The process by which the Armed Forces of the United States, or part of them, are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. Also called MOB. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
**mobilization base.** The total of all resources available, or that can be made available, to meet foreseeable wartime needs. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-05)

**mobilization site.** The designated location where a Reserve Component unit or individual mobilizes or moves after mobilization for further processing, training, and employment. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-05)

**mobilization station.** The designated military installation to which a Reserve Component unit or individual is moved for further processing, organizing, equipping, training, and employment and from which the unit or individual may move to an aerial port of embarkation or seaport of embarkation. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-05)

**partial mobilization.** Expansion of the active Armed Forces of the United States resulting from action by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the President (not more than 1,000,000 for not more than 24 consecutive months) to mobilize Ready Reserve component units, individual reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

**Presidential Reserve Call-up.** Provision of a public law (Title 10, United States Code, Section 12304) that provides the President a means to activate, without a declaration of national emergency, not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve (of whom not more than 30,000 may be members of the Individual Ready Reserve) for not more than 365 days to meet the requirements of any operational mission, other than for disaster relief or to suppress insurrection. Also called PRC. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

**production base.** The total national industrial production capacity available for the manufacture of items to meet materiel requirements. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-05)

**Ready Reserve.** The Selected Reserve and Individual Ready Reserve liable for active duty as prescribed by law (Title 10, United States Code, Sections 10142, 12301, and 12302). (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-05)

**remain-behind equipment.** Unit equipment left by deploying forces at their bases when they deploy. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-05)

**reserve.** 1. Portion of a body of troops that is kept to the rear or withheld from action at the beginning of an engagement to be available for a decisive movement. 2. Members of the uniformed Services who are not in active service but who are subject to call to active duty. 3. Portion of an appropriation or contract authorization held or set aside for future operations or contingencies and, in respect to which, administrative authorization to incur commitments or obligations has been withheld. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

**Reserve Component.** The Armed Forces of the United States Reserve Component consists of the Army National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States, the
Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. Also called RC. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-05)

**Retired Reserve.** All reserve members who receive retirement pay on the basis of their active duty and/or reserve service; those members who are otherwise eligible for retirement pay but have not reached age 60 and who have not elected discharge and are not voluntary members of the Ready Reserve or Standby Reserve. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-05)

**Selected Reserve.** Those units and individuals within the Ready Reserve designated by their respective Services and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as so essential to initial wartime missions that they have priority over all other reserves. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-05)

**selective mobilization.** None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)

**Standby Reserve.** Those units and members of the Reserve Component (other than those in the Ready Reserve or Retired Reserve) who are liable for active duty only, as provided in Title 10, United States Code, Sections 10151, 12301, and 12306. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-05)

**stop-loss.** Presidential authority under Title 10, United States Code, Section 12305, to suspend laws relating to promotion, retirement, or separation of any member of the Armed Forces of the United States determined essential to the national security of the United States, to include reservists if serving on active duty under Title 10, United States Code, authorities for Presidential Reserve Call-up, partial mobilization, or full mobilization. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

**time-phased force and deployment list.** None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)

**total mobilization.** Expansion of the active Armed Forces of the United States resulting from action by Congress and the President to organize and/or generate additional units or personnel beyond the existing force structure, and the resources needed for their support, to meet the total requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 4-05 is in the Logistics series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1 - Initiation**
- Joint doctrine development community (JDDC) submission to fill extant operational void
- Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-end analysis
- Joint Doctrine Planning Conference validation
- Program directive (PD) development and staffing/joint working group
- PD includes scope, references, outline, milestones, and draft authorship
- JS J-7 approves and releases PD to lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant command, JS directorate)

**STEP #2 - Development**
- LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first draft (FD)
- PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
- FD comment matrix adjudication
- JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system
- Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment matrix
- FC joint working group

**STEP #3 - Approval**
- JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7
- JS J-7 prepares publication for signature
- JSDS prepares JS staffing package
- JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for signature

**STEP #4 - Maintenance**
- JP published and continuously assessed by users
- Formal assessment begins 24-27 months following publication
- Revision begins 3.5 years after publication
- Each JP revision is completed no later than 5 years after signature

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