1. Scope

This publication provides doctrine for the preparation, planning, execution, and adaptation of personnel recovery (PR) by the Armed Forces of the United States during joint and multinational operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides doctrine for conduct of PR. It also addresses military coordination with other US Government departments and agencies during PR and for US military involvement in multinational PR. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and defense agencies in support of joint operations.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM E. GORTNEY
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Staff
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-50 DATED 5 JANUARY 2007

• Refines the discussions of civilian contractors and who should be covered for personnel recovery.

• Consolidates and refines discussion of authentication during an isolating event.

• Expands the discussion of adaptation.

• Explains the roles and responsibilities of the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency; deletes reference to US Joint Force Command and the position of Executive Agent for Personnel Recovery which was eliminated.

• Updates the description of levels A, B, and C survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training requirements.

• Expands the discussion of support to families during an isolating incident and during reintegration.

• Minimizes the use of hard-copy isolated personnel reports and promotes the use of electronic means, primarily the personnel recovery management system.

• Provides a sample format to assist in developing an emergency plan of action.

• Discusses the prioritization of medical care SERE and intelligence debriefings during reintegration.

• Introduces National Security Presidential Directive 12, Annex I and the interagency implications for the Department of Defense personnel recovery; eliminates other discussions of policy publications.

• Updates appendices as required.

• Adds a classified Appendix B, *Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery* (published separately).
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- Provides an Overview of Personnel Recovery and the Department of Defense Personnel Recovery System
- Presents Personnel Recovery Functions and Responsibilities
- Describes Command and Control of Personnel Recovery Operations
- Discusses Operation Planning for Personnel Recovery
- Explains the Five Personnel Recovery Execution Tasks - Report, Locate, Support, Recover, and Reintegrate

Personnel Recovery

Isolated personnel are those US military, Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, and DOD contracted employees and others designated by the President or Secretary of Defense who are separated from their unit, as an individual or group, while participating in a US-sponsored military activity or mission and who are, or may be, in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape.

Personnel recovery (PR) is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. Adversaries have historically exploited captured personnel for either intelligence, propaganda, or used as leverage during negotiations to cease the conflict. PR intends to mitigate those effects. Military commanders plan, prepare for, and execute recovery operations by ensuring individuals are trained to contend with an isolating event, forces are capable of recovering personnel, and the staff can react quickly to the situation in accordance with standing plans and procedures to prevent loss of life, capture, and exploitation.

The DOD Personnel Recovery System

PR is a system in which the objectives are to return isolated personnel to duty, sustain morale, increase operational performance, and deny adversaries the opportunity to influence our military strategy and national will by exploiting the intelligence and propaganda value of isolated personnel. It is a system comprised of four functions: preparation, planning, execution, and adaptation.
**Executive Summary**

**Preparation**
In PR, success is far more likely if the forces involved are properly organized, trained, equipped, and employed to gain and maintain the ability to process relevant information and to take appropriate action.

**Planning**
Joint force commanders (JFCs) and their staffs consider all available PR options and capabilities to successfully plan for recovery operations within their operational areas. Options to recover isolated personnel include military, diplomatic, civil, or a combination thereof.

**Execution**
The Department of Defense (DOD) PR system is centered on five PR execution tasks [report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate] and supporting activities that should be accomplished once an isolating event has occurred. The ability to complete these tasks does not reside within a single entity, but instead resides among command and staff elements (including components), forces, and isolated personnel.

**Adaptation**
Adaptation is dependent on the collection of PR information and data from after action reports, PR mission logs, debriefings, and oral interviews. This information enables a process that includes continuous analysis of everything that is going on in PR as it happens, the recognition of what is working correctly and what is not, and implementing change when and where needed. Some change can happen on the spot, other change might require rigorous vetting.

**Functions and Responsibilities**

**Secretary of Defense**
Secretary of Defense (SecDef) develops, coordinates, and oversees the implementation of DOD policy and plans for recovering and accounting for isolated personnel.

**Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is responsible for operational implementation of PR policy and development of joint doctrine for PR.
### Geographic Combatant Commanders

Geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) and staffs are responsible for planning and executing PR throughout their areas of responsibility.

### Services and United States Special Operations Command

The Military Departments normally establish a PR office of primary responsibility within their Service organizations. Each Service Chief and Commander, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping their forces for PR, and providing forces and processes, as required, to accomplish the five PR execution tasks, consistent with DOD guidance and operation plans (OPLANs). The GCCs in coordination with the Service components establish levels of risk of isolation associated with location, mission, or other criteria. The Services and USSOCOM identify personnel to receive the appropriate levels of survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training commensurate with the GCCs’ identified level of risk.

### Joint Personnel Recovery Agency

Joint Personnel Recovery Agency serves as a CJCS-controlled activity through the Joint Staff Directorate for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development for PR. It also provides operational support teams and exercises support to assist GCC planning and deployed and deploying forces executing PR to meet a commander’s force protection requirement.

### Joint Personnel Recovery Center

GCCs, or their designated subordinate JFCs, should establish a joint personnel recovery center (JPRC) to plan, coordinate, and monitor PR missions, and to integrate PR activities with other operations and activities in the assigned operational area. The JPRC is also the JFC’s primary coordination center for PR assistance to another nation or other appropriate civil entity, when such assistance is authorized by the President, SecDef, or by US-approved prior agreements.

### Component Commanders and Subordinate Organizations

Joint force component commanders are responsible for planning and conducting PR in support of their own operations and for isolating
events occurring within their assigned operational area or as tasked by the JFC. Component planners should consider the availability and capabilities of forces of the other components, multinational forces, other government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations operating in the operational area. Component commanders establish a personnel recovery coordination cell (PRCC) to coordinate all component PR activities, including coordination with the JPRC and other component PRCCs.

**Intelligence Organizations**

Commanders and staffs should be aware of the capabilities of intelligence assets and how to leverage their use throughout the conduct of the five PR execution tasks. A thorough understanding of the appropriate procedures to request a specific asset or capability is essential to avoid critical delays in obtaining time-sensitive information, which helps ensure that available intelligence resources are applied most effectively.

**Command and Control**

**Command Relationships and Organization**

JFCs may coordinate PR through their operations directorate of a joint staff or through a component commander. If a component commander is designated to coordinate joint PR, the JPRC should be integrated into the designated component’s operations center. In the case where a component commander is designated to coordinate PR for the joint force, the component also retains a PRCC capability to conduct component PR missions.

**Delineating appropriate command relationships for personnel recovery (PR) facilitates the synchronization and integration of recovery operations.**

**Coordination and Liaison**

Coordination is a key element for successful prosecution of PR missions. Command authority is retained by the JFC; coordinating authority is delegated to the JPRC or a designated supported commander for PR. The JPRC should be granted direct liaison authorized with all agencies and organizations, as required.
Communications

Joint and component communications planning should include potential PR requirements, to include requirements for component communications interoperability including air-to-air, air-to-surface, surface-to-surface, or subsurface. PR communications should be rapid, reliable, secure, and flexible.

Preparation

Preparation is a combination of command guidance, education and training, and products and equipment.

Command and Policy Guidance

In addition to overarching guidance provided by SecDef and the CJCS, Services and combatant commanders (CCDRs) should provide command-specific implementation guidance. Additionally, JFCs should provide definitive PR guidance as it relates to the assigned missions for their operational areas.

Personnel Recovery Education and Training

PR joint education and training efforts focus on three groups—commanders and staffs, forces, and individuals at risk of isolation. Recovery force training is a Service and component responsibility. Various levels of SERE training are available to personnel when the requirements are defined and validated.

Products and Equipment

The capability to survive, evade, and help facilitate the other PR execution tasks is enhanced by preparing personnel with adequate PR equipment and products. Personnel at risk of isolation should also be familiar with and follow the combatant command’s minimum evasion requirements. Evasion kits provide isolated personnel with essential equipment, tools, and other items necessary for successful survival, evasion, and recovery.

Planning

Personnel Recovery Plan

The detailed joint force PR plan is located within appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery) to annex C (Operations) of the plan [OPLAN]. The PR appendix supports the basic plan, promulgates the
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<td>In the PR mission analysis, the commander first determines the context in which the mission should be performed and specifies tasks necessary to accomplish the PR execution tasks. Next, the commander determines the capability to accomplish those specified tasks with assigned forces, identifies shortfalls, and decides whether to build requirements to address the shortfalls or accept the risk of not doing so.</td>
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<td>PR guidance considers the synergistic capabilities of public diplomacy, information operations, public affairs, and international broadcasting, along with the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power, to ensure a whole-of-government approach in achieving the following objectives:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Reduce the vulnerability of the capture, detention, and illegal seizure of US and partner nation personnel and citizens.</td>
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<td>• Mitigate the effects of attempts by adversaries to exploit isolated personnel as part of their larger strategic communication campaign.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Increase the survivability of those held in captivity, detained, or illegally seized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Directly support the National Security Strategy by protecting the lives and livelihoods of US citizens, and indirectly by severing support to terrorist networks.</td>
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<td>The PR planner coordinates with and assists other staff planners in developing the basic plan to ensure it establishes the foundation for the scope, authorities, and priority for PR. The basic plan should incorporate the JFC’s priority for isolated personnel, accomplishing the five PR execution tasks and CONOPS for PR in support of the joint force and specify subordinate commanders’</td>
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responsibility to establish and disseminate the criteria that designates personnel as isolated and to accomplish the five PR execution tasks.

The Personnel Recovery Appendix in the Operation Plan

The PR appendix contains the JFC’s PR CONOPS for a specific campaign or operation. It tasks commanders and staffs, isolated personnel, and forces with actions that, when completed, will develop the PR capability envisioned by the JFC.

Personnel Recovery Mission Planning and Execution

Commanders and staffs from the JPRC and PRCCs to unit levels need to develop a systematic process to enhance decision making during a PR mission (i.e., save time) and develop a “battle-rhythm” between command and control (C2) nodes. A decision process tool, whether it is a flow chart (e.g., go/no-go) or procedure document, will guide decision makers from the time a report of isolated personnel is received through the reintegration of those personnel. Based on the PR command authorities established, a commander’s awareness of the situation and level of confidence in communication, authentication, location, intentions, condition, and situation, recovery forces can be launched and/or given an execute order at any time after a PR incident report is received.

Execution

Personnel Recovery Execution Tasks

Commanders and staffs, forces, and personnel at risk of isolation should use the following validated procedures and techniques to accomplish the five PR execution tasks [report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate].

The Report Task

The report task begins with the recognition of an isolation event and ends when appropriate C2 authorities are informed.

Distress Notification

JFCs may be notified of a PR requirement through any means within the joint or component force C2 structure.
### Notification Methods and Procedures

Notifications fall into two general categories: observer reported and self-reported. An observer report is either a positive action such as a radio call or a negative activity such as the failure to return from a mission. The ideal method to validate the occurrence of an isolation event and to convey the accurate location and physical health of the isolated person is through self-reporting by the isolated person.

### The Locate Task

The **locate task** involves the effort taken to precisely find and authenticate isolated personnel. It starts upon recognition of an isolation event and continues until the isolated person is recovered. An accurate location and positive authentication are normally required prior to committing recovery forces.

### Determine and Maintain Location

A successful recovery generally depends on the accuracy and reliability of the coordinates or description of the isolated personnel’s location. The JPRC/PRCC, working with employed forces, supporting functions, and when possible, the isolated personnel, should continue to refine the accuracy and reliability of location information (coordinates and description) until the isolated person is recovered. There are various search methods to ascertain an isolated person’s location. **Search methods** include electronic, ground force reconnaissance, and/or visual search methods specifically tailored for each isolation incident. The operational environment, adversary activity, weather, time of day, terrain, and available resources all play an important role in selection of the search area and method.

### Extended Searches

There are occasions during hostilities when isolated personnel cannot be located in a timely manner and all investigative avenues have been pursued. Once hostilities are over and depending upon the US military presence, the GCC will seek guidance on the disposition of unresolved cases. Internal accountability of the evidence remains a responsibility of the CCDR or JFC, and continuous efforts need to be made to bring the case to closure.
**Authenticate**

Every effort will be made to authenticate isolated personnel prior to committing recovery forces in a threat environment. Where reference biometric files for isolated personnel or methods of transmitting biometric data are not available, other effective authentication methods include use of isolated personnel report (ISOPREP) data, theater code words, challenge and password, and visual signals discussed earlier.

**The Support Task**

The support task involves providing support to both the isolated person and to the isolated person’s family, with specific objectives for each.

**Support to Isolated Personnel**

There are five objectives in supporting isolated personnel:

- **Communication.** Establishing communication with the isolated person will facilitate all other tasks.

- **Situational Awareness.** Gaining, maintaining, and increasing the isolated person’s situational awareness.

- **Morale.** All interaction with the isolated person should consider the need to establish, maintain, and enhance their positive attitude.

- **Protection.** Protection activities can range from fire support (close air support, artillery) to deception techniques designed to make an adversary believe the isolated person is someplace other than the actual location.

- **Resupply.** Caches may be pre-positioned in adversary-controlled territory or in regions subject to being overrun by adversary forces. When there are no pre-positioned caches, it is possible to deliver resupply packages to isolated personnel by aircraft.

**Support to Families of Isolated Personnel**

Support to the families begins at a time deemed appropriate by the Service. The objective is to make them aware of the commitment and
capability of the US Government to recover the isolated person and to educate them on themes they should project and information they should protect to best support the isolated person.

**The Recover Task**

The recover task involves the coordinated actions and efforts of commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel to bring isolated personnel under the physical custody of a friendly organization.

**Recovery Methods**

Methods that may be employed independently or as part of a joint recovery effort include immediate, deliberate, or external supported recovery (US Army); combat search and rescue (US Air Force and US Navy); tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (US Marine Corps); nonconventional assisted recovery (NAR) (special operations forces); hostage rescue; or any tactics, techniques, and procedures employed for a PR mission.

**A Personnel Recovery Task Force**

A personnel recovery task force (PRTF) is organized to execute a specific PR mission. A PRTF is capable of locating and authenticating isolated personnel, protecting isolated personnel from adversary threats, providing force protection for itself, providing mission C2 systems support, and recovering isolated personnel.

**Recovery Vehicles and Forces**

Recovery vehicles and forces may include: rotary-wing aircraft, fixed-wing aircraft, ground forces, Navy surface ships and submarines, and NAR forces.

**Isolated Personnel Responsibilities Prior to Recovery**

Isolated personnel are an integral part of any recovery effort. During recovery, a few things isolated personnel should do are: respond quickly and accurately to authentication procedures and requests for ISOPREP information; provide positional assistance to recovery forces to the greatest extent possible; and pay close attention to, and explicitly follow, instructions of recovery forces to the maximum extent possible given the tactical situation. They should not run toward the recovery vehicle until or unless directed.
Weapons should not be held in a manner that could be perceived as threatening.

**Physical Custody**

Recovered isolated personnel should be searched and secured pending confirmation of their identity. Any weapons will be confiscated. Recovered isolated personnel should be quiet, avoid resisting, and carefully follow all instructions to avoid compromising the security of the recovery force.

**The Reintegrate Task**

Reintegrate is a critical task that allows DOD to gather necessary intelligence and SERE information while coordinating multiple activities and protecting the health and well-being of returned isolated personnel.

**Reintegrate Process**

The reintegration process consists of three phases, whose activities and levels of intensity are based on their location. **Phase I** encompasses the process of transporting the recovered isolated person to a safe area to conduct initial medical/psychological assessment and debriefings. Phase I will end with the recovered isolated personnel being returned to duty or recommended for phase II. **Phase II** encompasses the transition from phase I to a theater treatment and processing facility and further SERE and intelligence debriefings and decompression. Phase II will end with the recovered isolated personnel being released to duty or recommended for phase III. Phase III begins with the transition of recovered isolated personnel to the phase III team of the appropriate Service. **Phase III** does not have a prescribed time limit and depends on the needs of the recovered isolated personnel in coordination with the concerns of the Service, SERE and intelligence debriefers, and the SERE psychologist.

**Reintegration Challenge**

The challenges faced by formerly isolated personnel depend on the situation. Someone recovered within a few hours or days evading with no contact with the adversary will face different challenges than someone held captive
Executive Summary

for years. The former may require simple medical treatment and SERE and intelligence debriefings, while the latter will need more in-depth reintegration.

**Follow-Up**

SERE psychologists will follow-up with recovered isolated personnel, as needed, for at least one year. Intelligence organizations may require follow-up contact with recovered isolated personnel to pursue additional intelligence requirements, particularly to support investigations of unresolved prisoner of war and/or missing in action incidents.

**Medical**

Medical personnel play a key role in the successful debriefing and reintegration of returned isolated personnel. The objective of medical support during reintegration is to provide recovered isolated personnel with appropriate and complete medical evaluation and treatment, establish a detailed medical record for future reference, maintain or restore dignity, and facilitate readjustment to society.

**Support to Families**

During reintegration, the early stages of support to families involve keeping the family informed and assisting them in coping with a variety of well meaning people or media organizations. In reintegration phase II, families may show up, often against the advice of the reintegration team, when the individual has been moved to a medical facility in a more easily accessible foreign location. Support to families may become more intense and complex during reintegration phase III, when the formerly isolated personnel return to a medical treatment facility within the US.

**CONCLUSION**

This publication provides doctrine for the preparation, planning, execution, and adaptation of PR by the Armed Forces of the United States during joint and multinational operations.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

“By pledging to put every effort into recovering our highly trained [personnel], we send a powerful signal about their importance and help sustain their spirit under the stress of combat.”

General Hugh Shelton
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
1 October 1997—30 September 2001

1. Overview

a. Introduction. This publication provides basic concepts and principles to guide the Services, combatant commanders (CCDRs), and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) to plan, prepare for, and execute personnel recovery (PR). It describes the military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to recover and reintegrate isolated personnel and provides general guidance to military commanders on the planning, preparation, prevention, and execution of PR operations as a geographic combatant commander (GCC), subordinate unified commander, or a joint task force (JTF) commander. In addition to uniformed personnel, commanders must consider and assess the risk to military family members, civilian employees, and contractors authorized to accompany the force (CAAF). The GCC and JFC should be prepared to support other governments, agencies, organizations, and individuals in accordance with (IAW) all applicable laws, regulations, and when directed by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef).

(1) **PR** is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel.

(2) **Isolated personnel** are those US military, Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, and DOD contracted employees and others designated by the President or SecDef who are separated from their unit, as an individual or group, while participating in a US-sponsored military activity or mission and who are, or may be, in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape.

b. Importance of Personnel Recovery. Adversaries have historically exploited captured personnel for either intelligence, propaganda, or used as leverage during negotiations to cease the conflict. PR intends to mitigate those effects.

c. Military commanders plan, prepare for, and execute recovery operations by ensuring individuals are trained to contend with an isolating event, forces are capable of recovering personnel, and the staff can react quickly to the situation IAW standing plans and procedures to prevent loss of life, capture, and exploitation.

Taking and Other Isolating Events,” expands the PR responsibilities to prevent, plan for, and coordinate a response to isolating events to include all United States Government (USG) departments and agencies. They are encouraged to coordinate with one another to overcome any capability shortfalls, creating a whole of government approach to PR, including reintegration. NSPD-12 and Annex 1 also encourage cooperation and information sharing with US allies and partners. The annex tasks the Department of Justice, the Department of State (DOS), the Director of National Intelligence, and DOD with enabling objectives and PR responsibilities. The experience of the US military can be expected to be the foundational knowledge for other agencies and nations to adapt to their situation and requirements. The responsibility for overall US direction of a recovery remains with the chief of mission (COM) or the GCC, when so designated, in cooperation with host government officials.

2. The Department of Defense Personnel Recovery System

PR is a system in which the objectives are to return isolated personnel to duty, sustain morale, increase operational performance, and deny adversaries the opportunity to influence our military strategy and national will by exploiting the intelligence and propaganda value of isolated personnel. It is a system comprised of four functions: preparation, planning, execution, and adaptation. The system prepares three elements: commanders and staff, recovery forces, and isolated personnel, through education, training, and equipping to plan and execute PR. Planning and execution considers three recovery options: diplomatic, military, and civil across all phases of operation, and then it examines the capabilities within each of those options. Within the military option, there are five categories of capabilities that can be drawn upon: the isolated individual, component, joint, multinational forces, and other government departments and agencies. Commanders should know the PR capabilities available to maximize unified action, achieve economy of force, and enhance situational awareness (SA) to enable those most capable of executing the five PR execution tasks: report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate. To perform these tasks requires an organization fully networked to respond to an isolating event. The system addresses the debriefing and care of recovered personnel through the reintegration process. The entire system continually improves and learns from its mistakes and successes through adaptation. Although the functions are presented in the apparent sequential order of preparation, planning, execution, and adaptation, it is important to understand that these functions can occur simultaneously or in any sequence. The PR system is iterative and the individual activities are interdependent; a change occurring in one function can affect what is happening in the other three. The functions are not discrete steps, but rather activities that continuously interact with one another and adjust or adapt to maintain a relevant and effective system. See Figure I-1 and Figure I-2.
a. **Preparation.** Every person, process, and capability should be aimed at protection of the force, successful recovery, and reintegration of formerly isolated personnel. In PR, success is far more likely if the forces involved are properly organized, trained, equipped, and employed to gain and maintain the ability to process relevant information and to take appropriate action. The ability to take appropriate action in a given situation is based on one’s knowledge, skills, physical capability, confidence, will, and often courage. Commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel should be organized, trained, and
equipped to perform its responsibilities and interface effectively with one another in order to accomplish the five PR execution tasks.

b. Planning

(1) General. JFCs and their staffs consider all available PR options and capabilities to successfully plan for recovery operations within their operational areas. While JFCs may not control or influence the nonmilitary options, they and their staffs work to coordinate all military actions with any diplomatic and civil options being exercised.

(2) PR Options. Options to recover isolated personnel include military, diplomatic, civil, or a combination thereof.

(a) The military option includes the use of US, partner nation, host nation (HN) military capabilities, or a combination of, to recover isolated personnel. The military option may employ a standing, ad hoc, or opportune force to conduct a recovery. Options are based on deliberate plans and procedures or a time critical situation. Military options can contribute to diplomatic and civil options. This publication focuses on the planning,
preparation, and execution of the military option for PR. Under the military option, there are five capabilities that Services and GCCs seek to develop and employ: the individual, component, joint, multinational, and other government departments and agencies.

(b) The diplomatic option involves USG contact with the various parties involved in the isolating incident and through negotiation and communications recover isolated personnel or set conditions for one of the other options. Diplomatic options are not a sole action of the diplomatic corps; military personnel also can be involved in the diplomatic option. The diplomatic option makes the best use of professional and personal contacts of USG personnel supported by trained negotiators and prepared communications plans. Diplomatic options are complicated by the nature of the isolating event, US relationship with the sovereign nation where the incident is occurring, and the legal status of the adversary. Diplomatic communication may be direct, indirect, or through the use of a third party.

(c) Civil options may include sanctioned or unsanctioned intervention by intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), influential persons, and/or private citizens. The civil option is similar to the diplomatic option with the exception the primary negotiator has no official ties and may want to distance themselves from the US or HN government. The civil option uses private citizens who can resolve the isolating incident. They may also inject themselves into the situation without DOD solicitation. Civil methods include, but are not limited to, the use of influential private citizens, NGOs, or private businesses. The topics of negotiations, approach, and agreements to resolve the isolating event may not be supportable or sanctioned by DOD.

(3) PR Capabilities. Commanders can expand and achieve maximum effectiveness of their PR capabilities by employing those capabilities in the context of one or more of the five capabilities in Figure I-2. To effectively mitigate the risk of personnel becoming isolated, the JFC, staff, and each component needs to be cognizant of the benefits and limitations of the capabilities to optimize the employment of PR assets and capabilities.

(a) Individual. Individuals are trained and equipped to facilitate or conduct their own recovery using one of two methods described as unassisted or opportune. The operational environment will determine the individual skills and equipment for recovery. The nature of the unit’s mission and an individual’s military occupational skill will determine the required training to mitigate the risk of exploitation should the individual be captured.

1. Unassisted. Isolated personnel have a responsibility to facilitate their own recovery as much as possible, especially when situations or environments may hamper.
other methods of recovery. For most isolating events, personnel will be unassisted for a period of time until they can contribute to their recovery. The necessary training and equipment to mitigate the risks of isolation are determined by mission analysis and is reflected in survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training criteria as part of theater entry or training requirements. Preparation includes the use of isolated personnel guidance (IPG), evasion aids, evasion charts (EVCs), blood chits, and pointee-talkees. See Chapter IV, “Preparation,” for more details. Knowledge of the operational area is key and information that supports the development of the individuals’ capabilities includes, but are not limited to threat, cultural understanding, dynamics of the local population, friendly forces, and the availability of items that support survival and is worked in coordination with the GCC.

2. **Opportune.** When an isolated person, wittingly or unwittingly obtains the aid of another not associated with the military mission (e.g., local civilians), the opportune capability is being employed. The isolated person may actively seek an act of mercy as an opportunity to facilitate their return to friendly control, or be apprehended by persons whose motivation is not immediately known, but who are willing to conceal the isolated person from the adversary. Planners need to assess and advise personnel on the risks and benefits when making contact with or coming under the control of the local population. Recovery forces must also be aware that the isolated personnel are being assisted under this method, ascertain the motivation of the individual providing the support, and take the appropriate precautions.

(b) **Component.** The JFC will normally task the components with specific PR responsibilities for their own forces and for other isolated personnel within their areas of operation. Components identify their capability and shortfalls to meet the JFC’s requirements and adjust assigned forces or capabilities where required. The JFC may rely entirely on component PR capability, or some combination of joint, multinational, or other capability to meet the JFC’s operational intent. Service capabilities and methods are further discussed in Appendices C, “United States Army Personnel Recovery,” through H, “Special Operations Forces Personnel Recovery.”

(c) **Joint.** Combining the capabilities of two or more components gives the JFC a very potent tool for conducting PR, especially when DOD intelligence agencies such as the Defense Human Intelligence Service or the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) services are used. The successful use of joint capabilities requires preparation and planning for forces to jointly conduct the same PR mission. For these reasons, the JFC should state the commander’s intent regarding PR and provide clear and concise specified PR tasks to components. PR using a joint force can be a difficult mission under the best of circumstances, and the risk increases when performed by an ad hoc force.

(d) **Multinational.** Combining US capabilities with one or more partner nations’ capabilities may provide the commander more options and increased flexibility to meet PR requirements. Multinational capabilities may provide a broader range of PR capability, it could also increase interoperability and intelligence sharing concerns. Exercises and prior planning are critical to overcoming challenges such as security
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classification restrictions, interoperability of command and control (C2), rules of engagement (ROE) and equipment, capabilities, procedures, and language differences.

(e) Other Government Departments and Agencies. Employing or exploiting these capabilities enhances the JFC’s ability to successfully plan and accomplish the PR missions. As is the case in other capabilities, other government departments and agencies may fill a critical joint force requirement, and may have a presence or wield some influence in the JFC’s operational area. A thorough understanding of their capabilities enables the JFC to effectively coordinate with, and when appropriate, to integrate them into the joint force PR effort.

(4) Methods. The recovery methods depicted in Figure I-2 are representative, but not all-inclusive. Evasion, for example, is an action on the part of individuals, and they can recover themselves without assistance or by taking advantage of an opportunity by asking the local indigenous populace for assistance. Alternatively, the other methods require some type of organized assistance, either through a component, or perhaps with the assistance of NGOs. Alternative methods are more fully explained in Chapter V, “Planning,” and in Appendices C, “United States Army Personnel Recovery” through H, “Special Operations Forces Personnel Recovery.” Brief descriptions of the methods listed in Figure I-2 are provided here for a basic understanding.

(a) Combat search and rescue (CSAR) are tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) performed by US Air Force and US Navy forces to recover isolated personnel from hostile or uncertain operational environments.

(b) Tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP) is a Marine Corps mission performed by any combination of aviation, ground, or waterborne assets for the specific purpose of the recovery of personnel, equipment, and/or aircraft when the tactical situation precludes search and rescue (SAR) assets from responding and when survivors and their location have been confirmed.

(c) SAR uses aircraft, surface craft, submarines, and specialized rescue teams and equipment to search for and rescue distressed persons on land or at sea in a permissive environment.

(d) Retasking of Maneuver Forces. Isolated personnel may be recovered by forces redirected to react to an isolating event or by a quick reaction force (QRF). Maneuver forces can be redirected to the location of the isolating incident. QRF, a common method used by the Army and Marine Corps, is organized to react quickly to multiple missions, not just PR. The QRF has a general plan and adapts to the situation at hand. A QRF can respond via ground or air, depending on availability of assets and stage from afloat or from ground locations.

(e) Nonconventional assisted recovery (NAR) uses indigenous/surrogate personnel who are trained, supported, and led by special operations forces (SOF), unconventional warfare (UW) ground and maritime forces, or other government agencies’ (OGAs’) personnel who have been specifically trained and directed to establish and operate
indigenous or surrogate infrastructures. NAR is used when the use of conventional recovery forces in hostile areas is not feasible or acceptable, or is nonexistent. When NAR is performed by SOF, it is called unconventional assisted recovery (UAR).

(f) Hostage rescue (HR) is used to rescue personnel who are specifically designated as hostages.

c. **Execution.** The DOD PR system is centered on five PR execution tasks and supporting activities that should be accomplished once an isolating event has occurred. The ability to complete these tasks does not reside within a single entity, but instead resides among command and staff elements (including components), forces, and isolated personnel. The Services and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) are responsible to prepare and provide forces to the GCCs that are organized, trained, and equipped to perform PR tasks. The five PR execution tasks are discussed briefly below; however, the joint procedures used to accomplish them are thoroughly discussed in Chapter VI, “Execution.” See Service methods amplified in Appendices C, “United States Army Personnel Recovery,” through H, “Special Operations Forces Personnel Recovery.”

(1) The **report** task consists of actions required to provide notification that personnel are or may have become isolated. The report task begins with the recognition of an isolation event and ends when appropriate C2 authorities are informed. Anyone can report isolated individuals based on actual sighting, a missed report time or waypoint, observation by intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, etc. Various procedures are used to notify appropriate organizations to validate the isolation event and collect information. All reports pertaining to known or suspected isolated personnel are normally forwarded through component operational channels to the component personnel recovery coordination cell (PRCC) and to the joint personnel recovery center (JPRC) as quickly as possible. If a JPRC is not activated or established, reporting should be IAW current theater requirements. Time is of the essence. Direct notification to the JPRC or PRCC that an isolating event has occurred is necessary to facilitate the locate and recover tasks. Additionally, Service or functional components and combatant commands should ensure there is direct and immediate reporting between the staff element responsible for personnel accounting and casualty affairs with the staff section responsible for PR. As discussed later, all reports should be passed as quickly as possible to the appropriate C2 authorities who then initiate validation and location procedures. When reporting, remain mindful that in a nonpermissive environment information on missing or downed aircraft or missing vehicles or vessels while search and recovery operations are being planned or under way is not publicly releasable, since its publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives.

(2) The **locate** task involves the effort taken to precisely find and confirm the identity of isolated personnel. It starts upon recognition of an isolation event and continues until the isolated person is recovered. Locating may be accomplished by various means, such as ISR capabilities, aircrews, ground forces, etc. An accurate location and positive authentication are normally required prior to committing a recovery force. However, this does not preclude the pre-positioning of recovery forces in an area from which they can provide a faster response once the location and positive authentication is made. Location
and authentication should be continually maintained and crosschecked throughout the support and recover execution tasks.

(3) The **support** task involves providing support to both the isolated person and the isolated person’s next of kin (NOK). The support to the isolated person may begin upon reporting that an individual is isolated and ends when the person is recovered, once reintegration begins. Support efforts include: establishing two-way communications, increasing the isolated person’s SA, providing morale-building support, suppressing adversary threats, delivering subsistence and supplies, or providing directions to a cache. Once the isolated individual is located and authenticated, support efforts can intensify. Commanders should be creative in developing support activities using all capabilities that can be understood by isolated personnel who may not be equipped with communications, signaling, or navigational aids (e.g., predetermined signal lights as a reference point for orienting an isolated person). These activities should be embedded in deception and evasion plans. The support to NOK begins when the JFC, Service, or functional component determines it is appropriate and may extend throughout the entire reintegration process. JFCs should be aware of Service responsibilities and DOD efforts to provide NOK support (e.g., casualty assistance, public affairs [PA], and family support networks). A portion of the support to NOK during isolation or captivity is designed to increase the likelihood that isolated personnel will not be inadvertently harmed by well-intentioned public comments made by NOK.

(4) The **recover** task involves the coordinated actions and efforts of commanders and staffs, recovery forces, and isolated personnel. The objective is to bring isolated personnel under the physical custody of a friendly organization. The recover task begins when planning is initiated for recovering isolated personnel and ends when the recovery element hands off the formerly isolated person to the reintegration team. Once in custody, the recovery force will normally perform one last authentication. Isolated personnel have a significant responsibility in the recovery process. See Chapter IV, “Preparation.”

(a) Recognizing that each Service or USSOCOM may use different terminology to describe their recovery methods, this publication prescribes joint recovery as the standard term to be used for all joint PR missions. Joint recovery operations are thoroughly addressed in Chapter VI, “Execution.” Since HR is a recovery method, commanders need to plan for their ISR and PR capabilities to coordinate with and support those organizations involved in HR. The JFC’s PR C2 architecture will likely be the reporting vehicle for a hostage event and a valuable source of information regarding the isolated person.

(b) After action reports (AARs) and lessons learned (LL) are accomplished throughout the PR system. This information is used to identify strengths and weaknesses in the PR system and validate or change processes to improve the system.

(5) The **reintegrate** task begins when the report notification is received and there is a possibility the recovered isolated person will enter the reintegration process. The reintegrate task employs systematic and controlled methods to process recovered isolated personnel from the time they are recovered until they are fully reintegrated with their unit,
their family, and society (see Chapter VI, “Execution,” Section E, “Reintegrate”). The goal of the reintegrate task is to gather critical information from recovered personnel through a series of debriefings and conduct the processes inherent in their reintegration, while protecting their health and welfare. This allows them to return to duty as expeditiously as possible, and physically and emotionally fit. All isolated personnel should be entered into the reintegration process immediately following recovery. The reintegrate task may be as simple as both an intelligence and a SERE debriefing with a medical evaluation, or as involved as the complete three-phase reintegration process that terminates in the US, depending on the recovered person’s situation (health, length and type of isolation, etc.). The execution of the reintegrate task requires the cooperative efforts of the GCC’s staff, the components, and the Services. Generally, the early responsibilities of reintegration belong to the GCC or are split between the GCC and the JTF, if there is a JTF assigned. The Services are responsible for later reintegration procedures. The conduct of, and procedures involved in, the reintegrate task are directed by theater standing operating procedures (SOPs) and directives, and operation orders (OPORDs), all of which are governed by the guidance in Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 2310.4, Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel.

d. Adaptation

(1) General. Adaptation is dependent on the collection of PR information and data from AARs, PR mission logs, debriefings, and oral interviews. This information enables a process that includes continuous analysis of everything that is going on in PR as it happens, the recognition of what is working correctly and what is not, and implementing change when and where needed. Some change can happen on the spot, other change might require rigorous vetting. Adaptation includes, but is not the same as, assessment. Adaptation includes implementing (or discarding) proposed actions following an assessment.

(2) There are two other ways to adapt. The first is anticipation of future actions and preparation for those actions prior to their occurrence. Anticipation permits adaptation in prepared and planned ways. This planning can be thought of as anticipatory adaptation. Given the nature of PR in joint operations, anticipating every occurrence cannot be accomplished. Adaptation, therefore, requires a second part, sometimes called improvisation, which is simply taking actions that are not initially planned. Improvisation requires modification of plans in order to react to unforeseen actions. Adaptation, therefore, includes both anticipation and improvisation.

(a) Improvements. Adaptation assures continuous improvements to the PR system through LL, assessments, requirements determination, concept development, war games, and experimentation. Additionally, this process directs forces to adapt to new ideas and concepts in order to better accomplish the mission. Adaptation impacts the other PR functions while they are being accomplished; it is not restricted to post mission input. Adaptation improvements should be responsive and continuously applied.

(b) Changes can be driven by the adaptation of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities to fit a situation confronting a JFC, or a verified need from the field to fill a void. No single action can be
applied to all situations, thus new ideas or approaches may be developed while recognizing
the reality that new developments are unfolding that were not anticipated in PR planning.

(c) **Time Relevance.** Adaptation is most effective when it is applied as soon
as possible, such as the development of a “field expedient” solution. Actions should be
taken to ensure that adaptation (especially LL) does not wait until the completion of an
isolating event or redeployment from a theater of war. Timely capture of “institutional
memory” or some of the details of a particular PR event can be important to JFCs. The
reintegration task includes a process to debrief the recovered person to collect intelligence
and SERE information. Similarly, information should be collected from the C2 perspective
to establish a complete accounting of the PR event. Collecting C2 information can be more
difficult. Reintegration involves debriefing just one person (or a few people). A larger
number of people and organizations are involved in the C2 side of a PR mission. Commanders should consider processes to facilitate the collection of timely C2 PR mission
information and data such as:

1. AARs from key PR C2 nodes (JPRC, PRCC, recovery forces, national
intelligence organizations, etc.).

2. Directing the collection of PR mission logs.

3. Recorded debriefs of key C2 node personnel involved in the PR
mission.

(3) PR practitioners should be constantly aware of how to make PR better, safer,
and more efficient. Not all implemented “fixes” will work in all situations, but recognizing a
need when it occurs and passing along that observation, will improve overall PR
performance. All information collected from the reintegration of the recovered person and
the C2 personnel should be forwarded to Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) for
dissemination/sharing, further assessment and analysis, and archiving.
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CHAPTER II
FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

“Personnel recovery is the task of bringing our warriors home. Every leader is responsible to plan and prepare their unit and personnel for isolating events and support of recovery activities. This includes the complete integration of vertical and horizontal systems and personnel.”

Lieutenant General James J. Lovelace, United States Army G-3/5/7 in a message dated 220057Z June 2005

1. General

   a. SecDef develops, coordinates, and oversees the implementation of DOD policy and plans for recovering and accounting for isolated personnel. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is responsible for operational implementation of PR policy and development of joint doctrine for PR.

   b. The PR responsibilities of the CCDRs, the Services, and others are listed in Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3002.01E, Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense; DODI 2310.4, Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel; DODI 2310.6, Nonconventional Assisted Recovery in the Department of Defense; DODD 1300.7, Training and Education to Support the Code of Conduct (CoC); DODI 1300.21, Code of Conduct (CoC) Training and Education; DODI 1300.23, Isolated Personnel Training for Department of Defense Civilian and Contractors; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3270.01A, Personnel Recovery within the Department of Defense, (Secret).

   c. GCCs may also establish a JPRC to coordinate PR missions in their areas of responsibility (AORs).

   d. CCDRs, in keeping with contractor force protection (FP) and theater management requirements, should promulgate FP and theater entry requirements for adherence by contractors and contracting companies. The GCC may designate other selected contractor personnel to be eligible for DOD PR assistance IAW DODI 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces.

2. Geographic Combatant Commanders

GCCs and staffs are responsible for planning and executing PR throughout their AORs. (Specific staff considerations are included in Appendix N, “Sample Checklists,” Annex E, “Joint Force Staff Considerations for Personnel Recovery.”) The key capabilities to fulfill this responsibility are:

   a. Plan for effective and comprehensive PR.
b. Establish command relationships and clearly articulate procedures required to employ forces from different components to execute PR jointly.

c. Establish a PR coordination architecture and ensure PR trained personnel are included and fill critical positions.

d. Identify command, component, and subordinate unit PR intelligence requirements, produce intelligence to support theater PR planning and operations, and establish procedures and architecture to obtain national level PR intelligence support.

e. Develop standards, in coordination with the components, Services, and USSOCOM, for determining the SERE education, training, and equipment required for DOD personnel within a specified operational area.

f. Support personnel accounting practices.

3. Services and United States Special Operations Command

The Military Departments normally establish a PR office of primary responsibility (OPR) within their Service organizations. Each Service Chief and Commander, USSOCOM, is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping their forces for PR, and providing forces and processes, as required, to accomplish the five PR execution tasks, consistent with DOD guidance and operation plans (OPLANs). (See Appendix N, “Sample Checklists,” Annex G, “Typical Service and United States Special Operations Command Personnel Recovery Office of Primary Responsibility Functions and Responsibilities.”) The Services:

a. Develop doctrine and Service-level policy for PR, to include concept development and new technologies, that helps Service members prepare for deployment with the confidence that they can survive, evade, resist, and escape, or will be recovered if the need arises.

b. Provide the appropriate SERE training, commensurate with combatant command guidance, and as directed in DODD 1300.7, Training and Education to Support the Code of Conduct (CoC), DODI 1300.21, Code of Conduct (CoC) Training and Education, DODI 1300.23, Isolated Personnel Training for DOD Civilians and Contractors, and DODI 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces.

c. Assist JPRA in developing training standards for personnel the CCDR determines to be at risk of isolation.

d. Develop PR intelligence and C2 capabilities by organizing, training, and equipping personnel to execute the functions and responsibilities of a PRCC, JPRC, and unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell (UARCC) as listed in paragraphs 6, “Joint Personnel Recovery Center,” and 7, “Component Commanders and Subordinate Organizations.”

e. Ensure policies and procedures are in place to identify and track personnel who have been trained or are experienced in recovery operations and ensure components have access to this data for coordination and sourcing.
f. Establish reintegration plans incorporating guidance from applicable DODIs, the combatant commands, and JPRA and exercise this capability in order to maintain required effectiveness.

4. Joint Personnel Recovery Agency

Serves as a CJCS-controlled activity through the Joint Staff Directorate for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7) for PR.

a. JPRA facilitates interoperable PR capabilities through the development of joint PR guidance and PR products.

b. Under the Joint Lessons Learned Information System JPRA is the official repository of historical and archival materials generated by isolating events. This supports operational assessment and adaptation of the PR mission.

c. JPRA provides operational support teams and exercise support to assist GCC planning, and deployed and deploying forces executing PR to meet a commander’s FP requirement.

d. JPRA provides specialized joint PR training. Technical support is provided through the publishing of IPGs, pointee-talkees, EVCs, blood chits, and ensuring interoperability of technical capabilities.

5. Biometrics Identity Management Agency

The US Army is the DOD executive agent for biometrics, the Biometrics Identity Management Agency (BIMA) maintains the DOD authorized biometric repository providing storage, search, and matching functions to support PR.

6. Joint Personnel Recovery Center

GCCs, or their designated subordinate JFCs, should establish a JPRC to plan, coordinate, and monitor PR missions, and to integrate PR activities with other operations and activities in the assigned operational area. The JPRC is also the JFC’s primary coordination center for PR assistance to another nation or other appropriate civil entity, when such assistance is authorized by the President, SecDef, or by US-approved prior agreements. GCCs should establish a JPRC in the earliest stages of operational planning or designate a supported commander for PR to ensure integration with other C2 and ISR activities. The JPRC should be integrated into the JFC’s or designated supported commander’s appropriate operations center.

a. The JPRC, as well as the component’s PRCCs, should be in place and functioning well before operations begin and a potential isolating event occurs.

b. Typical JPRC functions and responsibilities include the following:

(1) Coordinate, plan, and monitor joint PR operations.
(2) Integrate PR into other plans and operations in the operational area.

(3) Review all component PR plans and orders for consistency with OPLANs and other JFC planning.

(4) Develop or continue to refine appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery) to annex C (Operations) of the basic OPLAN and recommend PR related intelligence matters for inclusion in annex B (Intelligence). Be prepared to coordinate joint recovery missions based on this plan. Publish additional PR guidance, as required.

(5) Clearly identify the JPRC’s authority, responsibilities, and support requirements to the JFC and staff, component commanders and their staffs, PRCCs, and all other agencies and multinational forces through operating instructions and activation message traffic.

(6) Establish PR reporting requirements for component PRCCs.

(7) Coordinate and ensure establishment and dissemination of operation-specific IPG, theater risk-of-isolation preparation, evasion aids, and PR-related intelligence.

(8) Recommend and monitor appropriate PR related training and theater entry requirements.

(9) Develop requirements for country/theater specific PR materials. Recommend SERE TTP and appropriate clothing and equipment.

(10) Develop a backup/contingency system of signals for isolated personnel when radio use is not an option and incorporate alternatives in plans (e.g., OPLANs, OPORDs, and deception, evasion, and recovery plans).

(11) Develop reintegration plans, using existing theater directives, in coordination with command staff directorates, the PRCCs, and other supporting commands outside the AOR.

(12) Develop joint force PR communications plans; use existing plans if available. Coordinate with joint force and Service communications directorates to ensure the JPRC has sufficient and redundant secure communications, as required.

(a) Ensure component PRCCs identify PR satellite coverage requirements through their commands.

(b) Request and establish required satellite coverage.

(c) Ensure component PRCCs identify specific survival radio waveform frequencies and various forms of tracking devices used by recovery forces and isolated personnel to appropriate organizations.

(13) Integrate military information support operations (MISO) efforts to favorably influence the local population regarding PR efforts.
(14) Integrate PR into all information operations (IO) planning and execution.

(15) Coordinate with the special operations liaison element (SOLE), the battlefield coordination detachment, naval and amphibious liaison element, Marine liaison officer (LNO), Air Force liaison element, and the multinational liaisons to access assets available to support theater PR plan.

(16) Submit ROE requirements for PR (status of isolated personnel, recovery force use of nonlethal and deadly force, recovery force interaction with civilians, etc.) through the chain of command.

(17) Develop a standardized notification process (i.e., special instructions [SPINS], communication or signals instructions) to disseminate daily PR information (authentication, word of the day, challenge and pass, etc.) to all components.

(18) Coordinate and disseminate launch and execute criteria, responsibilities, and procedures. Criteria should include approval by all applicable foreign nations to transit their sovereign territories IAW international law and bilateral/multinational treaties, agreements, and arrangements.

(19) Coordinate with the joint force surgeon to obtain current locations of medical treatment facilities and pass that information to all PRCCs and recovery forces, if required.

(20) Develop and disseminate guidelines for completion and compilation of isolated personnel report (ISOPREP) and evasion plans of action (EPAs) or their equivalents and, when needed, obtain ISOPREP and EPA data for further dissemination to recovery forces.

(21) Recommend to the JFC the tasking of component commands to support PR missions requiring joint capabilities, or to support PR missions when another component needs assistance or cannot accomplish the mission, or when another component command has better capability to respond.

(22) Ensure the UARCC receives all pertinent information so they can plan in parallel and are fully prepared to support or assume control of the mission, as necessary.

(23) Monitor and support all PR missions prosecuted by component PRCCs and the UARCC.

(24) Coordinate with all sources, to include the appropriate component and multinational forces operations centers, etc., to obtain assets in support of PR missions, as required.

(25) Coordinate with component PRCCs to maintain a current location and status of PR resources.

(26) Coordinate and deconflict mutual PR support operations by joint force components, multinational forces, and OGAs.
(27) Recommend a component for the overall tactical control (TACON) of a PR mission on a mission-by-mission basis and ensure supported and supporting relationships are defined.

(28) Ensure available data, including all-source intelligence, on the evasion environment is collected, maintained, and disseminated to appropriate commands.

(29) Coordinate with appropriate intelligence organizations to gather information relating to the location and the threat that may affect their successful recovery.

(30) Coordinate with the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) to identify all trained or experienced intelligence debriefers to assist in reintegration.

(31) Coordinate with joint force deception planners for tactical deception support.

(32) Coordinate the status of isolated personnel with appropriate command’s staff directorates.

(33) Alert appropriate organizations of the known or probable location(s) of isolated personnel.

(34) Maintain current location(s) of isolated personnel.

(35) Monitor all recovery operations prosecuted within the JFC’s operational area.


(37) Coordinate PA releases with joint force and component public affairs offices (PAOs), US embassies, and other participating agencies, as required, through appropriate hierarchical levels. If the isolated person is a contractor, coordinate with the Service responsible for the contract. The Service is responsible for coordinating with the company and advising them on the situation and the company’s support to the family.

(38) Keep affected component and DOD organizations informed on the status of ongoing PR missions.

(39) Provide information to assist the Services in completing Department of Defense (DD) Form 2812, Commander’s Preliminary Assessment and Recommendation Regarding Missing Persons. DODI 2310.5, Accounting for Missing Persons-Board of Inquiry, authorizes a Military Department to establish a board of inquiry for determining an isolated person’s status.

(40) Coordinate with PRCC and maintain a file on each isolated person until recovery is complete. Forward all completed recovery mission files and databases to JPRA for review and storage. The files are not destroyed, regardless of whether a recovery operation was executed successfully or not. Ensure important/long term information (social
security number, home of record, etc.) of key personnel, especially nonmilitary, are included in the file in the event the case/file is reopened and the isolated person’s status is reviewed at a later date.

(41) Ensure PR plans address and provide for the appropriate debrief and after action review of all recovered isolated personnel participants in the recovery effort, and commanders and staffs. Additionally, if NAR mechanisms are employed, adhere to specific debriefing requirements.

(42) Assist the JFC and the components in executing their reintegration plans.

(43) Ensure debriefs of recovered isolated personnel are forwarded to the JPRA. Conduct and collect observations, AARs, and LL to post on the joint LL information system and Service LL databases.

(44) Review recovery missions to determine if forces are establishing patterns that can be used by the adversary, and take advantage of those patterns, or eliminate/disrupt the pattern as appropriate.

(45) Develop and disseminate an emergency plan of action to describe actions to be taken if the JPRC goes down or if one of the subordinate PRCCs goes down due to communications failures or other tactical reasons.

(46) Develop instructions describing the proper procedures for handling (both physically handling and chain of custody handling/accountability), storing, and transferring physical evidence.

(47) Consider adding a focal point representative to the UAR/NAR debriefing requirements.

7. Component Commanders and Subordinate Organizations

a. General. Joint force component commanders are responsible for planning and conducting PR in support of their own operations and for isolating events occurring within their assigned operational area or as tasked by the JFC. Component planners should consider the availability and capabilities of forces of the other components, multinational forces, OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs operating in the operational area. Additionally, component commanders may take the following actions to ensure they are capable of conducting PR in support of their own operations or in response to JFC tasking:

(1) Clearly define the circumstances, which may be specific to an operation or specific military skill specialties, when personnel are considered in a survival or evasion situation.

(2) Ensure subordinate units and key personnel, such as the PRCCs, personnel at risk of isolation, intelligence sections, and recovery forces, are familiar with PR TTP, directives, PR notification processes (e.g., air tasking order [ATO] SPINS, data bursts),
theater SERE procedures, and any unique or specific PR TTP that may pertain to their operational area and/or component operations.

(3) Ensure that a capability is established to coordinate all pre-combat PR preparations and to respond to PR events should they occur. The most common and effective means to achieve this capability is through the establishment of a PRCC with a trained staff and appropriate authorities to accomplish PR missions and objectives.

(4) Publish a component PR supporting plan to appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery) to annex C (Operations) of the OPLANs. Ensure this plan details the necessary intelligence required to support PR operations. See appendix B (Intelligence) of the OPLAN.

(5) Be prepared to establish a JPRC if directed or if designated as the joint force supported commander for PR. This will not negate the requirement to perform component PRCC functions. This will require that the education, training, and staffing requirements of component PR staffs be maintained to meet the mission requirements.

(6) Ensure subordinate commanders routinely address actions to be taken should personnel become isolated.

(7) Ensure designated units and personnel develop and maintain a current EPA and ISOPREP in personnel recovery mission software (PRMS) that is readily accessible on the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

(8) Ensure subordinate units are familiar with component PRCC(s) and immediately transmit information on isolated personnel to the PRCC or C2 node that coordinates PR events.

(9) Ensure isolated personnel authentication procedures are coordinated with the JPRC and disseminated in subordinate PR plans.

(10) Provide functionally trained PR augmentees to the JPRC as directed by the JFC. These personnel also represent their component and assist in coordinating and deconflicting their component’s PR capabilities at the joint level.

(11) Clearly articulate PR launch (or pre-position) and execute procedures in support of other component commanders to the JPRCs, PRCC(s), and subordinate commanders.

(12) Ensure intelligence to support PR planning is disseminated in a timely manner to subordinate units.

(13) Provide mutual support to the recovery operations of the other components to the greatest extent possible. Such support normally is requested and coordinated through the JPRC using established PR communications channels maintained and monitored in the PRCC.
(14) Support higher headquarters (HQ) and Service reintegration plans by crafting supporting plans and identifying reintegration team key personnel. Ensure those personnel attend training as directed by the JFC.

b. **Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell.** Component commanders establish a PRCC to coordinate all component PR activities, including coordination with the JPRC and other component PRCCs. The PRCC should be colocated in the operations center or, at a minimum, where it can obtain and maintain the best SA of the isolating events and the environment in which they are occurring, and exercise its authority to coordinate and control the execution of the five PR execution tasks. Additionally, the PRCC should be in close proximity to the organic intelligence division or team (i.e., joint intelligence support element [JISE]) to receive and disseminate timely intelligence. The PRCC director is responsible to the component commander for the coordination of component forces in the performance of PR missions. To be most effective, the PRCC requires dedicated, equipped, and functionally trained personnel to effectively prepare, plan, exercise, and execute both the PR functions and missions of the component commander. Typical PRCC responsibilities and functions include the following:

1. Develop the PR support plan as an appendix of the operations annex to the OPLANs. Ensure PR considerations (collection, joint force counterintelligence and human intelligence [HUMINT] staff element support, imagery support, etc.) are adequately addressed in annex B of the OPLAN.

2. Maintain cognizance of ISOPREPs, EPAs, IPG, and NAR options for the operational area. Monitor the development of ROE and legal status decisions as they affect isolated personnel and recovery forces.

3. Establish points of contact (POCs) with PRMS unit managers, and filing locations for EPAs, ISOPREPs (until PRMS becomes available at the unit), survival radio identification (ID) numbers and codes, PR alerting or communications equipment, and blue force tracker device numbers within subordinate commands.

4. Establish communications with the JPRC and other PRCCs and develop procedures to ensure the timely flow and protection of PR-related information. During preparation, establish standards for redundant communications, if possible, among the C2 and ISR nodes, as well as with isolated personnel.

5. Establish PR reporting requirements for component units to include activation and de-activation notification to the adjacent PRCCs and the JPRC.

6. Develop and promulgate component PR communications plans. These plans are coordinated with the component commands and the JPRC, and included in plans.

7. Coordinate for short-notice aircraft diplomatic authorization through command channels and with JPRC.

8. Develop a standardized notification process (e.g., communication or signals instructions, data bursts, SPINS) to disseminate daily PR information (authentication, word
of the day, etc.) to all subordinate units. Ensure ground force signals (e.g., daily challenge and password, near and far recognition signals) are included in the SPINS.

(9) Coordinate with the component staff legal officer for ROE issues, legal status, and other matters, as required.

(10) Coordinate with other component staff sections and elements, including multinational and interorganizational partners.

(11) Monitor all recovery operations prosecuted by component forces and remain ready to assist as requested by the JPRC.

(12) Notify the JPRC when isolated personnel are reported. Keep the JPRC informed on component intentions or actions.

(13) Forward pertinent data regarding isolated personnel, their status, and/or location to the JPRC, recovery force and others, as required.

(14) Coordinate with the JPRC for PR support provided to, or received from, other components.

(15) Coordinate with the component medical treatment facilities. If no component facility exists, establish liaison with primary facility within the operational area, and develop procedures for receiving recovered isolated personnel and preparing for phase I reintegration, at a minimum.

(16) Coordinate with JPRC and maintain a file on each isolated person until recovery has been completed or confirmation of death has been verified. Pass files on completed recoveries and closed incidents to the JPRC for forwarding to JPRA for review and archiving.

(17) Exercise the system to ensure:

(a) Units can locate and transmit ISOPREPs and EPAs efficiently and that they are in a usable format for JPRCs, PRCCs, and recovery forces.

(b) PRCC personnel can execute their PR functions and the component commander’s mission.

(18) Exercise the national-level and theater-level intelligence reporting architecture to ensure timely dissemination of intelligence products supporting PR. See OPLAN annex B (Intelligence).

c. Unconventional Assisted Recovery Coordination Cell. The JFC normally designates the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) with overall responsibility for planning, coordinating, and executing all NAR operations in support of the PR plan. The JFSOCC retains operational control (OPCON) of all SOF UAR forces in the operational area. The JFSOCC normally exercises control through the operations officer,
who designates an UARCC director and, when directed, establishes the UARCC. The UARCC is a compartmented SOF facility staffed on a continuous basis by supervisory personnel and tactical planners who are representative of each NAR capability. The UARCC integrates, coordinates, deconflicts, and synchronizes all existing unconventional and NAR capabilities and activities in support of the JFC’s PR requirements. The UARCC interfaces with the JFSOCC’s operations center, the JPRC, and the other component PRCCs. Other organizations supporting theater NAR operations normally retain OPCON of their forces or capabilities. Once established, the UARCC responsibilities include:

(1) Coordinating and preparing NAR and UAR plans for the JFC. Coordinate planning with the JPRC.

(2) Providing time-critical information between NAR forces and other PR nodes.

(3) Advising the JFSOCC on the development and employment of NAR capabilities in support of the JFC’s PR plan.

(4) Integrating NAR into the JFC’s PR plan. The JPRC director should be fully aware of NAR capabilities. The UARCC should provide a liaison to the JPRC to coordinate and deconflict NAR capabilities with conventional capabilities.

(5) Acting as the conduit through which NAR launch and execute criteria are passed.

(6) Deconflicting NAR operations internally with all NAR forces conducting a single recovery operation, and externally with other joint and component operations to aid mission execution and avoid disruption of ongoing operations and fratricide.

(7) Synchronizing ground tactical plans between NAR forces, and synchronizing and deconflicting NAR operations and other recovery operations, military operations, and interagency activity.

8. Intelligence Organizations

a. General. An understanding of relevant organizations, products, and procedures is essential to effectively apply intelligence in recovery operations. Under the management of the combatant command or JTF J-2, intelligence organizations at every level should have PR-knowledgeable personnel integrated into their staffs. The JPRC, component PRCCs, UARCC, and PR-dedicated forces should be manned with personnel knowledgeable in PR intelligence requirements and intelligence capabilities to facilitate the timely dissemination of all-source intelligence from supporting intelligence organizations.

For further information, refer to DODI 3115.10E, Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery.

b. Commanders and staffs should be aware of the capabilities of intelligence assets and how to leverage their use throughout the conduct of the five PR execution tasks. A thorough understanding of the appropriate procedures to request a specific asset or capability is
essential to avoid critical delays in obtaining time-sensitive information, which helps ensure that available intelligence resources are applied most effectively (see Figure II-1).

(1) **Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC).** The theater PR OPR and the JFC’s JPRC receive their intelligence support from the JIOC, which can assign or attach dedicated intelligence personnel to service PR requirements. The JIOC is responsible for providing and producing the intelligence required to support the GCC and staff, components, subordinate joint forces and elements, and the national intelligence community (IC). Requests for external intelligence resources, including national agency support, are validated by the combatant command J-2 and submitted by the JIOC.

(2) **Joint Intelligence Support Element.** The JISE supports the JPRC, PRCC, or UARCC at the JTF or component-level and, in turn, receives its intelligence support from the JIOC.

(3) **National Intelligence Support Team (NIST).** The NIST is a nationally sourced team composed of intelligence analysts and communications experts from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), NGA, and other IC agencies as required. The JPRC, PRCC, or UARCC can draw upon NIST expertise and connectivity, through the JISE, to pursue time-sensitive information that is beyond the reach of theater resources.

(4) **IC Prisoner of War (POW)/Missing in Action (MIA) Analytic Cell.** Established within the DIA by statute and Director of Central Intelligence memorandum, the IC POW/MIA Analytic Cell is responsible for national-level intelligence in support of activities relating to unaccounted for US personnel. The command PR OPR, JPRC, PRCC, and UARCC can request analytic support from this organization through the JISE or the JIOC. IAW DODI 3115.10E, *Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery*, the cell will provide baseline PR and NAR related assessments in support of PR planning and operations.

(5) **Organic Intelligence Support.** Units typically have organic personnel to perform routine intelligence tasks in support of operations at the tactical level. Unit commanders should ensure that assigned intelligence personnel are familiar with other intelligence organizations at higher echelons of command that function in support of PR operations. Unit intelligence personnel should maintain continuous channels of communication and intelligence feeds with their supporting intelligence support element to facilitate mission planning and maintain SA.
**PERSONNEL RECOVERY INTELLIGENCE NODES**

**INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY**

- **INTERAGENCY**
  - **INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY POW/MIA ANALYTIC CELL**
    - **NMJIC**
    - **DCCC**

**COMBATANT COMMANDS**

- **J-2/JIOC**
- **J-2/JISE**
- **UARCC**

**JOINT TASK FORCE**

- **JPRC**
- **INTEL**

**COMPONENTS**

- **A-2/G-2/N-2**
- **PRCC**
- **UNITS**

**LEGEND**

- **A-2**: Air Force intelligence staff officer
- **CJCS**: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- **DCCC**: Defense Collection Coordination Center
- **DPMO**: Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office
- **G-2**: Army or Marine Corps component intelligence staff officer
- **INTEL**: Intelligence
- **J-2**: Intelligence directorate of a joint staff
- **JIOC**: Joint intelligence operations center
- **JISE**: Joint intelligence support element
- **JPRC**: Joint personnel recovery center
- **N-2**: Navy component intelligence staff officer
- **NMJIC**: National Military Joint Intelligence Center
- **OSD**: Office of the Secretary of Defense
- **POW/MIA**: Prisoner of war/missing in action personnel recovery coordination cell
- **PRCC**: Personnel recovery coordination cell
- **UARCC**: Unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell

* Personnel Recovery Policy
** Intelligence Community Lead for POW/MIA and Missing Personnel Issues

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Figure II-1. Personnel Recovery Intelligence Nodes
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CHAPTER III
COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. Command Relationships and Organization

   a. General. Delineating appropriate command relationships for PR facilitates the synchronization and integration of recovery operations. The specific command relationships for a particular joint force are tailored to the situation and evaluated against the mission, the environment, and the specific force structure (see PR mission analysis in Chapter V, “Planning”). Coordination of PR planning is vital to effective and successful PR mission execution. PR often requires coordination with staff elements at the JTF and subordinate levels (see Appendix N, “Sample Checklists,” Annex E, “Joint Force Staff Considerations for Personnel Recovery”). Command relationships and PR coordination authority should be clearly defined and delineated in appropriate JTF and component OPORDs and, as required, fragmentary orders.

   b. Command Authority

      (1) CCDRs exercise combatant command (command authority) over forces assigned or reassigned by the President or SecDef. They normally exercise OPCON or TACON over forces attached by SecDef. The GCCs normally delegate the necessary levels of authority to subordinate commanders so they best plan and conduct recoveries within the assigned operational area.

      (a) JFCs may coordinate PR through their operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) or through a component commander. If a component commander is designated to coordinate joint PR, the JPRC should be integrated into the designated component’s operations center. In the case where a component commander is designated to coordinate PR for the joint force, the component also retains a PRCC capability to conduct component PR missions.

      (b) If the JFC’s assigned missions require establishing multiple subordinate joint force commands with separate missions and/or operational areas, multiple JPRCs within the operational area may be required. The commander has the option to establish multiple JPRCs (one for each subordinate joint force command), or consolidate PR coordination functions under one JPRC. The decision should be carefully evaluated with respect to PR joint requirements. Considerations include the following:

         1. Ability of the joint force C2 infrastructure to support recovery operations if the JPRC is established at the joint force HQ.
2. Ability of the component’s C2 architecture to adequately control and support component recovery operations if it is also designated the JPRC.

3. Potential operations tempo of the component’s PRCC, while also staffing a JPRC, and its ability to handle additional PR mission activity.

4. Availability and experience level of JPRC personnel, including the JPRC director(s).

5. Capability and/or availability of forces within each joint force.

6. Distances between the operational areas.

7. Relationship between (e.g., support, separate entities) and responsibilities of the JPRCs.

8. Command level(s) where each JPRC will reside and their responsibilities (i.e., joint force HQ, component command HQ).

9. If more than one JPRC is established, the overall authority for PR in theater should be identified.

(c) The JFC, or the designated supported commander for PR, will normally designate the JFSOCC as the supported commander for NAR. Supporting relationships are established and proper authorities are delegated to facilitate efficient and flexible NAR operations. The JFSOCC normally coordinates NAR and UAR through the J-3, who establishes a UARCC within the operations center. (See Chapter VI, “Execution,” and Appendix H, “Special Operations Forces Personnel Recovery.”)

(2) A component experiencing an isolation event within its force or operational area may be able to conduct the recovery mission without external support. However, if two or more components are involved, the JPRC normally coordinates the augmentation of forces and recommends PR mission-specific command relationships to the JFC or designated supported commander for PR. Respective component commanders normally retain OPCON of their forces; while for the PR mission, the JFC, designated supported commander for PR, or component commander conducting the mission will normally have TACON of participating forces.

(3) Coordinating Authority. The GCC or subordinate JFC should delegate appropriate coordinating authority for planning and consultation between multiple commands, multinational, and other government organizations (see Figure III-1). For PR this normally is granted to the JPRC, PRCC, and UARCC and operation centers. Coordination authority is not command authority, however, this coordination assists the supported commander during a PR event.
c. **Composition and Organization.** The JPRC should consist of a director, deputy director (if required), watch supervisors, controllers, personnel recovery duty officers (PRDOs), SERE experts, dedicated intelligence support, and general communications support to provide 24-hour coverage. Representation from each participating component is key. All personnel assigned to the JPRC should have proper security clearances and be trained and integrated to perform specific JPRC functions while simultaneously bringing...
their particular Service skill sets to the JPRC staff. Joint staffing facilitates timely coordination of component PR requirements, provides quick access to information relative to specific component PR resources and operational concepts, fosters component interest and participation in the overall PR effort, and spreads additional personnel support requirements throughout the joint force. A notional JPRC organizational chart is provided in Figure III-2. Grades and numbers of personnel staffing the JPRC will vary based on the size of the joint force involved and availability of qualified individuals. Each JPRC requires a minimum number of controllers to be available during ongoing or projected PR missions, and to be immediately available at all other times based on ongoing operations and projected plans. Intelligence specialists should either be assigned to the JPRC director/watch supervisor or provided as dedicated support to provide recurring updates and respond to JPRC intelligence requirements. Typically, the JISE will provide 24-hour intelligence support for a JTF-level JPRC, and the combatant command JIOC will provide such support to a theater PR OPR during contingency planning, or a theater-level JPRC, if established.

d. Host Nation and Multinational Considerations for Personnel Recovery

   (1) Before a situation in an HN develops requiring the intervention of US forces, or in the early phases of an operation or campaign, the GCC may not be in the lead. As long as a nation’s sovereignty remains intact, that nation has the responsibility for PR matters within their own boundaries. There will be close coordination with the US embassy, and the regional security officer (RSO) or senior defense official (SDO)/defense attaché (DATT), if a DOD person becomes isolated, but the responsibility for recovery remains with the HN until it asks for US assistance. Established relationships between the combatant command and the US embassy staff will be pivotal in keeping the military informed of the status of location and recovery efforts, as well as providing an avenue for US offers of assistance to the HN.

   (2) In other instances, the formation of an alliance or coalition of forces led by the US or another nation will require an integrated PR architecture composed of representatives and capabilities from the nations. The structure of such an architecture may be established by standing international agreements (e.g., North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]) or during the negotiations for the composition and creation of a coalition. Multinational efforts provide the opportunity to apply expanded and integrated PR capabilities. PR exercises, with individual nations or with a group of nations, invite future successes.

   (3) Planning for multinational PR activities will be more complex than a US-only OPLAN. In addition to military capabilities to be considered, some nations have political considerations applied by their governments that restrict what capabilities they can bring to the fight or in which situations they are allowed to apply those capabilities. The melding of these national caveats will require careful consideration during PR plan development.

   (4) If time does not permit appropriate diplomatic coordination, on-scene commanders (OSCs) may take whatever action is necessary in life-threatening situations.

For further information on multinational operations, refer to Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, Multinational Operations.
2. Coordination and Liaison

a. **General.** Coordination is a key element for successful prosecution of PR missions. Continuous coordination should be conducted both vertically and horizontally. Command authority is retained by the JFC; coordinating authority is delegated to the JPRC or a designated supported commander for PR. PR coordinating authority enables a commander
or individual to require the consultation of other commanders for planning or other purposes, but it cannot be applied to compel agreement. Principal nodes where coordination takes place and information is shared are described below.

b. By the JPRC. The JPRC should be granted direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) with all agencies and organizations, as required. The JPRC is responsible for coordinating PR related matters for the JFC with all C2 nodes as well as joint, nongovernment, and multinational agencies.

c. Between the JPRC and the Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC). The JAOC (when established) is the focal point for planning, directing, and executing joint air operations. Since recovery operations often rely on air assets to accomplish some of the PR execution tasks, coordination between the JPRC and JAOC is essential. The JPRC is responsible for providing the information that goes into the PR portion of the ATO SPINS. The joint force air component commander (JFACC) should construct ATOs that include sufficient air assets to accomplish PR tasks. During execution, the JFACC is the command authority for revising the tasking of joint air operations, unless authority to redirect and task is delegated to a subordinate C2 organization. Deconfliction of PR missions from other air missions is accomplished through the ATO. If the JPRC is not colocated and integrated into the JAOC, it is essential the JPRC director establish a liaison element within the JAOC to facilitate tasking of dedicated PR assets in the ATO, coordinate tasking or redirection of air assets to support PR mission execution, monitor ATO and PR mission execution, coordinate changes to PR information in the ATO SPINS, assess the effectiveness of PR operations, and recommend changes to JFC/JFACC guidance for PR.

For further information on ATO development and C2 of joint air operations, refer to JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.

d. Between the JPRC and Component PR Coordination Cells. The JPRC coordinates and tasks PR support requirements when those PR missions involve forces from more than one component, forces from another nation, forces from one component that need the support of another component to conduct PR missions, or nonmilitary agencies, other than NAR missions. When the JPRC receives a request for PR support, it initiates action to locate the isolated person(s), makes recommendations for, and coordinates the tasking of forces. This coordination is essential to prevent duplication of PR efforts, facilitate efficient exchange of PR information, and provide the most efficient use of PR resources. Coordination is particularly important when a PR incident occurs near the boundary between two components’ operational areas. When a component independently initiates a PR mission, it is required to notify the JPRC, through its PRCC, to help ensure effective coordination and deconfliction. Thereafter, the JPRC will monitor the mission and be prepared to support, as required.

e. Between the JPRC and UARCC. The UARCC normally conducts parallel planning during all PR incidents. The UARCC articulates its capability and the feasibility of providing support to the JPRC and will coordinate with and keep the JPRC informed of ongoing NAR operations to prevent fratricide. The JPRC may recommend the UARCC plan for the mission if it deems that NAR is the best option to prosecute the recovery. If the
UARCC needs external support to complete a recovery mission, it coordinates requests for PR support with the JPRC.

f. **Between the JPRC and External Agencies.** The JPRC coordinates joint force PR operations with other government departments and agencies and NGOs. This coordination is accomplished through the external agency’s designated representative (i.e., PR POC or PR LNO). The coordination enhances relationships to facilitate PR support to other agencies, which either have limited or no PR capability, or from other agencies that want to participate in theater recovery operations. The joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) is an organization normally established at each geographic combatant command to provide a venue for interagency cooperation. The JIACG can be an excellent conduit for the JPRC to coordinate the activities of other government departments and agencies and NGOs within each AOR. The JIACG helps determine if the other government departments and agencies have duress or emergency codes that should be included in the SPINS or other signaling instructions, and that PR staffs and recovery forces are made aware.

g. **Between Component PR Coordination Cells and Their Respective Forces.** Each PRCC will coordinate recovery operations with the assigned and attached forces within its designated operational area, consistent with the component commander’s guidance. This coordination is essential to facilitate timely tasking and accurate reporting of PR events.

h. Effective use of established liaison channels is critical to successful PR coordination. LNOs and/or their elements can foster valuable information exchange regarding other component operations, deconfliction of those operations, and force capabilities. However, these channels should not supersede operational coordination between the component PRCCs and JPRC.

3. **Communications**

   a. **General.** Communications play a major role in PR missions. Joint and component communications planning should include potential PR requirements, to include requirements for component communications interoperability including air-to-air, air-to-surface, surface-to-surface, or subsurface. PR communications should be rapid, reliable, secure, and flexible. A combination of secure/nonsecure commercial and Defense Switched Network (DSN) landline, satellite communications (SATCOM) radios and phones, ultrahigh frequency/very high frequency/high frequency radios, and computer/network “chat” capabilities should be built into communications plans. These communications nodes should be dedicated and integrated systems in the JPRC, PRCCs, UARCC, and other pertinent organizations and functions that should interact in real time to prosecute PR missions.

   b. **Communications Plan.** An effective PR communications plan should:

      1. Provide for the use of communications systems to support C2 of forces, carry out operations security (OPSEC) measures, and execute military deception (MILDEC) actions.

      2. Provide for secure transmission and cryptographic security to deny the adversary OPSEC indicators, isolated personnel locations, and classified information.
(3) Provide for low probability of detection, interception, and jamming.

(4) Provide redundancy (where practical) while ensuring proper authentication and physical defense of communications systems.

(5) Provide for avoidance of mutual interference and jamming by friendly communications.

(6) Exploit the capabilities of advanced survival radios and other electronic signaling/communication devices (such as blue force tracker, combat ID technology, and personal locator beacons [PLBs]) to provide support to isolated personnel. PLB use has been shown to energize the PR system within five minutes after activation. This alert provides the recovery staffs and forces early warning of a potential isolating event and also provides information to confirm the isolating event and refine the search. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that this is an alerting device. Its initiation does not ensure it is a friendly force using it; or that a friendly force is actually in an isolating situation. Verifying the event with subordinate HQ should be initiated. Authenticating the identity of the isolated person is still required.

(7) Include the use of local or HN communications. While not the most effective and secure mode of communication, the varied circumstances in which a PR event could arise may make HN capabilities a viable or only option.

(8) Have capabilities with multi-intelligence sensors such as near real-time audio linkage/video feeds to provide a link between line of sight (LOS) and beyond LOS participants. Often this can be provided by using an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) or other persistent surveillance/ISR capabilities.

(9) Provide a method to exchange information amongst and between the United States and multinational commands. Both the tactical data link (TDL) and a situation awareness data link (SADL) can provide this capability. The NATO designation, Link-16, is synonymous with TDL-J. SADL is a data link capability that provides the means of obtaining mission critical information regarding the isolated personnel, mission, and threat as quickly as possible over a highly secure, jam-resistant means.

(10) Provide a capability to receive critical PR intelligence through the integrated broadcast service (IBS). The IBS delivers threat warnings and other critical information to forces operating within a GCC’s AOR and to the operating forces of IBS collaborating nations.

(11) Provide a capability to detect and locate the signals of distress beacons. This can be provided by search and rescue satellite-aided tracking (SARSAT), which is designed for civil use but is highly susceptible to adversary detection. The capability of the threat should be weighed against the advantages of using the system.

(12) Provide capabilities to report, locate, authenticate, and facilitate isolated PR. This includes some means of voice or data transmission and reception to include over the horizon (OTH), with secure or low probability of adversary intercept, beacon capable,
multiple frequency settings, and ability to obtain and transmit Global Positioning System (GPS) location.

(13) Establish a capability for isolated personnel to be located and recovered in the absence of technical communications. This includes isolated personnel articulating contact and signaling procedures in their EPA. Ensure ground force signals (daily challenge and password, near and far recognition signals) are included in the SPINS. However, if nontechnical communications (signals) differ between the EPA and SPINS, recovery forces must realize that the signals depicted in the isolated personnel’s EPA will take precedence over SPINS.

c. **Voice Communications and Circuits.** The number of voice circuits established to prosecute a PR mission should be kept to a minimum, but backup circuits should be preplanned and available as necessary. Secure voice circuits should be used whenever possible. Use of communications equipment with a low probability of detection or intercept mode should be considered to decrease the risk to the isolated person and the recovery force.

(1) **Radio Use.** Because of the distances typically involved and the requirement for speed and flexibility, radio communications are the best (and most common) means of sending and receiving information and instructions during recovery operations. However, this form of communications is also the most susceptible to adversary exploitation. The possibility of adversary monitoring requires that secure radio communications equipment be provided to the JPRC, component PRCCs, participating PR units, and potential isolated personnel. Communications means resulting in low probability of detection and intercept should be used to the maximum extent possible. The requirement for JPRC and component PR coordinators to maintain an active two-way dialogue during every phase of a PR mission also dictates the need for dedicated or planned backup radios for the JPRC and component coordination centers.

(2) **Landline Use.** Landlines secured by secure voice devices (e.g., secure telephone unit-III, secure terminal equipment, and secure wire line terminals) should be available in all PR coordination organizations and related operations centers. Secure devices provide end-to-end encryption, allowing secure voice and data to be exchanged over non-secure commercial and DSN circuits.

(3) **Frequency Management/Deconfliction.** A well-planned communications matrix is essential to any PR mission. Detailed communications plans are a prominent part of the overall PR plan. It is extremely important that dedicated PR frequencies be developed for use by only isolated persons and the recovery units. Uncordinated use of PR frequencies can result in poor communications because the weak signal strength of the isolated person’s radio is easily overpowered.

d. **Compromised Assets.** Communications personnel should be notified immediately of all compromised communications equipment or cryptographic keying material. When planning PR operations it is important to know which systems and information have been compromised so as to not place the recovery force in jeopardy (e.g., an ambush).
e. **Data Communications.** The capability to complete, store, and transmit ISOPREPs and EPAs is critical. This capability is now possible using digital technology, although planners and executers should be aware that other government departments and agencies and NGOs may not have access to specific DOD classified systems. Additionally, current survival radios are data capable. The SIPRNET has been widely used as the primary means of communications via collaborative tools. Computer software that tracks personnel information, ISOPREPs, EPAs, and other authenticating information, and provides text messaging and transmission can be an effective tool for successfully completing the PR mission. PRMS is the ISOPREP/EPA database that units populate from any SIPRNET terminal with access to the web and provides a joint standard for ISOPREP and EPA data elements, export format, and order format. (Procedures are available for ISOPREP and EPA preparation. For additional information on classification of ISOPREPs and access by those who do not have security clearances, see the Personnel Recovery Security Classification Guide.) Electronic transmission provides a significant tool to rapidly disseminate PRMS ISOPREP and EPA data; however, OPSEC should be assured. PRMS ISOPREP and EPA data can be exported to portable document format for SIPRNET e-mail forwarding and printing, as necessary. See Appendix K, “Evasion.”

f. **Message Traffic.** The automated message handling system (AMHS) is used to back up verbal communications that cross Service or functional component lines, or are forwarded to joint commands and activities. AMHS message or record message traffic is a formal means of tasking, providing direction, or guidance. Planners and operators should remain aware that many government agencies, including US embassies and NGOs, may not access AMHS and may therefore require PR messages to be transmitted via another means. A brief summary of some of the minimal information included in each of the message formats transmitted over AMHS is described below. Actual formats can be found on the US Message Text Format home page.

1. **Search and Rescue Incident Report (SARIR).** SARIR is used to report a situation that may require a PR mission. Normally, the parent unit of the isolated person reports the incident. However, anyone observing a potential PR incident should initiate a voice report to be followed by a backup record message. Within component chains of command, unformatted or other designated message formats may be used up to the component PRCC. The SARIR should contain as much of the following information as possible, with missing data sent in subsequent search and rescue situation summary reports (SARSITs) as it is discovered.

   a. Sea, air, or ground event leading to the PR incident.

   b. Adversary activity, terrain, and weather in the PR incident locale.

   c. Number of isolated personnel and their status.

   d. Location of isolated personnel and objective area.

   e. Unit and component PR resources available.

   f. Designated areas that may affect the PR mission.
(g) Communications capability of isolated personnel.

(h) Date-time group of incident and last sighting and/or contact with isolated personnel.

(i) Any other evidence that isolated personnel are still alive and evading capture.

(j) Identification and location of known media outlets (friendly or non-friendly) that could compromise recovery operations.

(2) **Search and Rescue Situation Summary Report.** SARSIT coordinates, summarizes, or terminates joint recovery operations. The SARSIT should be transmitted at least once daily from the component PRCCs to the JPRC and forwarded as appropriate to the joint force operations officer. The SARSIT should contain the following:

(a) PR mission number (standardized assignment of mission numbers by utilizing theater, year, and sequential numbering is recommended, example: US Central Command 2010-011).

(b) Status (e.g., in progress, completed, on hold).

(c) Call sign of disabled vehicle, aircraft, ship, etc.

(d) Type of disabled craft.

(e) Location of the isolating incident.

(f) Number of personnel involved.

(g) Status of personnel involved (e.g., recovered, located, missing).

(h) Narrative — short explanation to enhance information.

(3) **Search and Rescue Request (SARREQ).** SARREQ is used to request forces to participate in a PR mission. This message normally is sent from the JPRC to component PRCCs and any designated functional commanders to record arrangements made to employ resources from two or more components to prosecute a PR mission. The SARREQ should contain the following minimum information:

(a) Lost (or suspected lost) ships, aircraft, ground units, or individuals.

(b) Capabilities required from the various components to support a specific PR mission.

(c) Coordinating instructions for resources supporting a specific PR mission.

(d) Adversary activity that may affect a specific PR mission.
(4) **Search Action Plan.** A search action plan delineates the C2, communications, search area, and search methods to be used to locate the isolated personnel. This message normally is sent from the requesting or executing unit to the JPRC.

(5) **Other AMHS formats** may be used in conjunction with planning, supporting, and prosecuting PR missions.

*For further information on the format of PR-specific AMHS, refer to Military Standard 6040, US Message Text Formatting Program.*
CHAPTER IV
PREPARATION

“We must train for certainty and educate for uncertainty.”
Anonymous, US Army Command and General Staff College

1. Introduction

Proper preparation enables commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel to gain SA in order to accomplish the five PR execution tasks. Preparation is a combination of command guidance, education and training, and products and equipment.

2. Command and Policy Guidance

a. In addition to overarching guidance provided by SecDef and the CJCS, Services and CCDRs should provide command-specific implementation guidance. Additionally, JFCs should provide definitive PR guidance as it relates to the assigned missions for their operational areas. Necessary and sufficient guidance can be an instrumental facilitator in the joint force accomplishing the PR execution tasks.

b. Appropriately staffed and trained JPRCs and PRCCs allow for continuity, reduce PR response times, and facilitate integration within the joint force. JPRC and PRCC staffing requirements vary based upon operational and mission variables including mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available factors, and any relevant civilian considerations. While formalized training in PR execution and PR planning are highly recommended for all JPRC/PRCC staff personnel, it is the JFC’s responsibility to establish PR requirements. GCCs and theater PR OPRs specify theater-wide JPRC manning and training requirements in the theater PR regulation. JTF commanders and PR planners should identify JPRC and PRCC manning and training requirements during the joint operation planning process (JOPP). Requirements formulated during the planning process are documented in appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery) to annex C (Operations) of the concept plan (CONPLAN), OPLAN, or OPORD and should be reflected in appropriate manning documents (e.g., joint manning documents). Service component PRCC staffing and training requirements are documented in Service level PR doctrine.

3. Personnel Recovery Education and Training

PR joint education and training efforts focus on three groups — commanders and staffs, forces, and individuals at risk of isolation. Education and training programs for commanders and staffs focus on the following learning levels: fundamentals, PR specialties, and PR program management. Formal education and exercises should stress commanders and staffs’ responsibilities to account for personnel, report missing personnel, and take steps to recover them. Recovery force training is a Service and component responsibility. Various levels of SERE training are available to personnel when the requirements are defined and validated.
a. **Service and USSOCOM Education.** Services and USSOCOM provide Service-specific education and training for their personnel. Services adhere to the joint and interoperable standards, developed by JPRA. Information on available Service education and other training is provided in Appendices C, “United States Army Personnel Recovery,” through H, “Special Operations Forces Personnel Recovery.”

b. **Joint Education.** JPRA develops and conducts joint and specialized PR training programs and assists other DOD PR training and education programs. JPRA develops joint standards for DOD training. Courses are available in residence at designated JPRA training facilities or, on a limited basis, through educational materials and mobile training teams.

c. **Training Exercises**

   (1) Joint exercise planners should incorporate PR scenarios to exercise commanders and staffs, forces, and PR capabilities, and ensure the safe recovery of potential isolated personnel. Combatant command PR OPRs, JPRA representatives, “standing” component PRCCs and JPRCs (if established) can assist exercise planners in designing the specific scenario.

   (2) The JFC’s PR OPR should organize and conduct PR mission training exercises (preferably integrated into broader, established joint exercises) for the joint force, to include multinational forces and other agencies.

d. **Predeployment Training.** It is essential that commanders prepare their forces to meet the PR requirements of their specific theater prior to deployment for military operations. CCDRs set theater entrance requirements for SERE training (pipeline and theater-specific) for those at risk of isolation. Commanders should develop a predeployment program that identifies individuals for specific PR education and training (e.g., SERE training, PRCC formal training) to ensure training is accomplished prior to any possible deployments. The nature of an operational environment will help determine the scope of required training. Commanders prioritize attendance at JPRA formal PR training and track trained PR personnel with a skill identifier to build and sustain PR expertise.

e. **JPRC Qualifications and Responsibilities**

   (1) **JPRC Director and Deputy Director.** The JPRC director and deputy director advise and inform the supported commander for PR and/or the JFC on PR matters and manage all activities of the JPRC. The JPRC director is normally a field grade officer and should be knowledgeable of PR procedures, theater component recovery procedures, and have the appropriate security clearance. Additionally, the JPRC director should be experienced in recovery operations and have completed an approved PR education/training regimen that prepares the individual to perform the assigned duties. The deputy director will ideally have similar qualifications as the director and should normally be from a different Service than the JPRC director, to provide a breadth of knowledge at JPRC supervisory levels.

   (2) **Watch Supervisor.** The watch supervisor is the supervisor of the JPRC watch crew responsible for tending to JPRC current operations and monitoring and coordinating
active missions. Watch supervisors should be PR experienced and graduates of an approved PR controllers course.

(3) JPRC Senior Intelligence Officer. The JPRC senior intelligence officer advises the JPRC director and deputy director on matters regarding intelligence support to PR. This support includes assisting in the establishment of relationships with the various intelligence organizations within the operational area and with national agencies, developing requests for information when the collection plan requires revision, and ensuring the production of the required recurring and ad hoc reports to support the JPRC and the JFC.

(4) Coordinators (Officers and Enlisted). Coordinators assist with all aspects of an isolating incident by monitoring the report, locate, support, and recover tasks of an isolating event, and supporting, coordinating, and responding to the requirements of the recovery force and the isolated individual(s). Coordinators should be PR experienced and graduates of an approved PR coordinators course.

(5) Personnel Recovery Duty Officer. PRDOs function as liaisons between the JPRC and the JFC’s joint operations center (JOC) and/or the JFC’s designated supported commander for PR to ensure effective and efficient coordination of PR plans and mission tasking. The PRDO should be an officer with PR experience and preferably a graduate of an approved PR course.

(6) Intelligence Personnel. Intelligence personnel should span a variety of disciplines that include personnel familiar with collection management up to and including procedures for obtaining national intelligence. Personnel should also include specialists familiar with air, maritime, and land threat assessment throughout all phases of a PR incident. Intelligence personnel should have an understanding of the adversary’s procedures for handling, transporting, housing, securing, and exploiting US captives. Additional specialists should include graduates of PR related intelligence courses (e.g., PR 291). Although not formally instructed in the conduct of PR debriefings, graduates of the DOD Strategic Debriefer’s Course can be utilized by JPRCs to conduct or augment PR debriefing activities.

(7) SERE Expert. The SERE expert should be a noncommissioned officer experienced in PR subject matter who has completed appropriate training and education and possesses the appropriate security clearance. SERE experts should conduct theater SERE planning, coordinate theater SERE support, and conduct theater SERE training, as necessary. The SERE expert should be trained in joint/component PR doctrine and TTP. They should be familiar with the reintegration process for recovered isolated personnel, as well as DOD and theater reintegration plans, and be a trained reintegration debriefer.

f. Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell. PRCCs may vary from component to component in size, composition, and location. They are typically located within the operations directorate where coordination of active PR missions is possible. The PRCC should be integrated into the organizational structure of a component in a manner where PRCC personnel gain immediate access to the component’s designated command/tasking authorities in order to expedite responses to component PR missions or requests for support
to PR joint missions. Additionally, PRCC personnel should have visibility of, and input to, component plans to ensure PR requirements and capabilities are properly addressed. The PRCC typically consists of a PRCC director and enough trained personnel to coordinate PR missions on a 24-hour basis. The PRCC staff members should be trained and experienced in joint and component PR doctrine and TTP, and preferably be graduates of appropriate PR courses.

g. **Unconventional Assisted Recovery Coordination Cell.** The UARCC staff is typically a director, shift supervisor, a controller, and representatives of tactical organizations possessing NAR capabilities. Their mission is to coordinate, synchronize, deconflict, and manage NAR operations within the JFC’s operational area. UARCC personnel should possess an appropriate security clearance and be intimately familiar with joint NAR TTP, all represented NAR capabilities, and the comprehensive NAR ground tactical plan. The UARCC director, shift supervisor, controller, and tactical planners should be graduates of a NAR plans and operations course.

h. **PR Office Of Primary Responsibilities.** Service and combatant command PR OPRs should receive appropriate PR education and training commensurate with their responsibilities. Ideally, the combatant command PR OPR would have tactical PR expertise and have served at least one tour as a JPRC/PRCC director.

i. **Other Staff Elements.** Staff elements throughout the joint and component staff have PR responsibilities and should be adequately prepared prior to deployment. Commanders should pay special attention to certain special staff and directorates’ responsibilities (PAO, legal, chaplain, operations, personnel, intelligence, etc.) with regard to PR. The application of this education and training can be found in the specific list of responsibilities in Chapter II, “Functions and Responsibilities,” and the list of staff planning considerations in Appendix N, “Sample Checklists.”

j. **Forces.** Force preparation is a Service/component responsibility. Forces should be cognizant of their inherent capabilities to perform PR tasks. All force PR education and training efforts should include joint considerations and build interoperability, while maximizing component PR capability. In many cases, processes can be adjusted to increase capability without incurring increased resource requirements or equipment shortages. Forces operating in a joint or multinational environment need a fundamental understanding of theater recovery operations.

k. **Isolated Personnel.** The amount of time that recovery forces need to spend in a hostile operational environment can be affected by the preparation of individuals. An isolated person that is trained, capable of adapting to the situation, and can assist in their recovery increases the probability of mission success. SERE training provides personnel the skills to survive and evade and adapt to the various isolation situations and methods of recovery. Thorough preparation includes a current ISOPREP and a detailed, accurate EPA.

For further detailed information on specific survival TTP, refer to Appendix K, “Evasion,” Army Field Manual (FM) 3-50.3, Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-50.3, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) (Instruction) 3-2.26, Survival,
Preparation

Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery, and appropriate Service publications such as Army FM 3-05.70, Survival.

(1) **SERE Education and Training**

(a) **Formal SERE Curriculum.** The GCCs in coordination with the Service components establish levels of risk of isolation associated with location, mission, or other criteria. The Services and USSOCOM identify personnel to receive the appropriate levels of SERE training commensurate with the GCCs’ identified level of risk. The Services and USSOCOM develop SERE training standards for the SERE training levels described below.

1. **Level A training** provides DOD personnel the minimum level of SERE knowledge and training necessary to meet baseline worldwide theater entry requirements common to all combatant commands. Level A education and training imparts an understanding of the Code of Conduct (CoC), its application and implications, and a basic understanding of the DOD PR system and its capabilities. Following completion of Level A training, DOD personnel possess knowledge regarding preparation for isolation, basic signaling and recovery procedures, and the ability to gain and maintain a level of SA that allows behavioral adaptation during isolation. This training is available through computerized and web-based applications.

2. **Level B training** is provided to DOD personnel who are determined to be at an increased risk of isolation or have a greater exploitation value, thus requiring SERE education and training that exceeds Level A, but is less than Level C standards. Services determine the requisite breadth and depth of Level B education and training based on CCDR and Service requirements.

3. **Level C training** is provided to DOD personnel who are determined to be at the highest risk of isolation or exploitation. Services develop their Level C programs based on Service and CCDR requirements. Level C education and training focuses on an extensive understanding and application of the CoC and SERE skill sets in a dynamic environment representative of the threats posed across the spectrum of potential isolation situations.

For further information regarding current SERE training for military personnel and civilian and contractor employees, refer to DODD 1300.7, Training and Education to Support the Code of Conduct (CoC), and DODI 1300.23, Isolated Personnel Training for Department of Defense Civilian and Contractors.

(b) **In-Unit Training.** DOD policy and Service regulatory guidance prohibit operation of resistance training laboratories and practical resistance and escape hands-on training or exercises without approval of the Commander, JPRA.

(c) **Training Exercises**

1. All personnel at risk of isolation should participate in evasion field exercises whenever possible. This training should include communications techniques and procedures, signaling devices, and other actions that enhance successful recovery.
2. DOD policy and Service regulatory guidance prohibit operation of captive role-play activities without Service approval and prior written notification to JPRA.

(2) Individual Preparation Responsibilities. Personnel at risk of isolation should:

(a) Obtain required formal SERE training prior to deployment.

(b) Undergo GCC/subordinate JFC-directed theater-specific SERE training.

(c) Acquire a comprehensive knowledge of their survival radio and a working knowledge of survival equipment and techniques, and evasion techniques and aids (e.g., EVCs, blood chits, pointee-talkees).

(d) Understand the impact of the isolation environment (e.g., adversary threat, terrain, and weather considerations) on survival and evasion. Review appropriate IPGs.

(e) Become familiar with and know how to access regularly updated PR guidance/publications such as PR SOPs, SPINS, IPGs, and SERE updates. Develop a thorough understanding of PR authentication and reporting requirements.

(f) Know what information the recovery forces likely will need, and be mentally and physically prepared to survive and evade (perhaps over an extended period) until recovered or upon reaching friendly forces.

(g) Understand their status and ROE as an isolated person.

(h) Understand that preparation for an isolating event demands personal responsibility and commitment.

(i) Maintain and be knowledgeable of their ISOPREP.

4. Products and Equipment

The capability to survive, evade, and help facilitate the other PR execution tasks is enhanced by preparing personnel with adequate PR equipment and products. For instance, personnel at risk of isolation should carry evasion aids. Evaders may be quickly separated from their equipment or may not have time to sort through it to select the most useful evasion items. Because space considerations and clothing configurations may limit the number of evasion aids that can be carried, consider selecting items of information and/or equipment that serve more than one purpose. Suggested equipment items include EVCs, blood chits, pointee-talkees, or other means of communicating with the local populace; general reference materials on medical, survival, or cultural information; collapsible water containers; water purification products; large leaf bags for shade, wind, moisture protection, floatation, or water storage; camouflage or environmental protection items; and miscellaneous items such as a small compass, survival knife, hand-held GPS device, or signaling devices like a small mirror, flashlight, glint tape, or brightly colored piece of cloth. Personnel at risk of isolation should also be familiar with and follow the combatant
command’s minimum evasion requirements. Several PR products are designed to enhance their ability to survive and evade.

a. **Equipment Preparation.** During pre-mission planning, carefully consider the operating environment and select the right equipment for survival in the event of isolation. Equipment appropriate to anticipated conditions should be carried as weight, space, and mission permits. Personnel should plan and equip themselves to survive or evade for an indefinite period of time, but at the very least for a minimum of five days. Having a properly equipped individual “grab and go” or evasion kit is necessary if faced with a situation requiring immediate action. Always layer survival equipment and keep the most important items on the body. Carry less important items in a pack. During pre-mission planning, decide what survival items to keep, what to conceal, and what to discard in the event of isolation. Preplanning will prevent carrying unneeded items or excess equipment and allow personnel to retain only the items necessary for survival.

(1) Before deploying, personnel should review the operating instructions of all communications, navigation, signaling, and survival equipment. Familiarity with equipment is necessary for operating equipment in low light or total darkness.

(2) Radios and GPS devices should be loaded with information such as maps, frequencies, and waypoints based on local guidance. Pre-loading cell phones with emergency contact information, such as the appropriate operations center, JPRC, PRCC, and the appropriate US embassy may be beneficial. Test equipment prior to deploying and bring at least one change of batteries for each piece of powered equipment.

b. **Evasion kits** provide isolated personnel with essential equipment, tools, and other items necessary for successful survival, evasion, and recovery. They should be tailored to a specific operational environment and supplement/augment standard survival vests/kits designed to support a much wider range of operating conditions.

(1) Evasion kit composition considerations are as follows:

(a) Tailored to specific units, missions, and PR plan, when possible.

(b) Fits the operational area and specific environmental conditions.

(c) Based on individual employment and space available.

(d) Supplements issued survival and signaling equipment.

(e) Emphasizes survival, signaling, and surface navigation.

(2) **EVCs** are managed by JPRA and jointly developed and produced with NGA in response to CCDR requirements, per CJCSI 3270.01A, *Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense*. The EVC is designed to assist evaders to avoid capture and survive in hostile territory and to provide them with a means of locating and securely transmitting their position or navigating as necessary to follow their EPA. EVCs are a series of charts that cover geographic areas specifically identified by combatant commands. The EVC is
produced on very strong material, which is waterproof and resistant to tearing. Tailored to cover the individual area concerned, it is a unique, multipurpose product that combines standard navigation charts with evasion and survival information located on the margins. A typical EVC contains localized information on navigation techniques, survival medicine, environmental hazards, personal protection, water and food procurement, and color pictures of edible and poisonous plants. Additionally, the chart is overprinted with a camouflage pattern similar to the natural ground colors of the area, and may aid an evader in hiding if the EVC is used as a shelter/cover. The chart is designed to fit in a military uniform or survival vest. Procedures for ordering EVCs are found in NGA’s compact disc, Catalog of Maps, Charts, and Related Products.

For further information on EVCs, see Products and Links menu at SIPRNET: http://www.jpra.jfcom.smil.mil/.

(3) The blood chit (see Figure IV-1) is a small sheet of material on which an American flag, a statement in English and other languages, and a serial number are imprinted. The blood chit identifies the bearer as an American and promises a reward by the USG to anyone providing assistance to the bearer or helping the bearer return to friendly control. The evader has no authority to barter or quote a price for the reward. When the blood chit number is presented to US authorities, the isolated person has been returned to friendly control, and the claim has been properly validated, it represents an obligation of the USG to provide compensation to the claimant for services rendered to evaders. All instances of assistance are classified to protect the assistor and their families. Blood chits are controlled items and are obtained through the theater blood chit program manager. The blood chit has certain limitations as an evasion aid and form of ID; therefore training in the use of the blood chit is essential and should be a prerequisite to their issue. Some of the limitations in the use of the blood chit are:

(a) The person providing aid may be skeptical of the value of a piece of paper with a number on it as something that may produce a reward. Overcoming this difficulty will depend largely on the salesmanship of the evader.

(b) When the evader is in the hands of a friendly group or individual, use of the blood chit as a means of reward may depend largely on the effectiveness of communications between the group and the evader. The evader should expect to encounter some reluctance on the part of the recipient who may suspect the chit to be stolen or counterfeit, or the bearer to be an adversary.

(c) Low literacy rates in certain parts of a country, or among certain groups, can hinder the use of a blood chit. In addition, only a small number of translations have been made of the thousands of languages and dialects in the world. Evaders may have to resort to sign language in conjunction with a pointee-talker.

(d) Training of potential evader/blood chit users on when, where, and how to best use the device within the culture is necessary for safety. The blood chit should not be issued without the training to accompany it.
Figure IV-1. Sample Blood Chit
For further guidance on the blood chit program, see Appendix J, “Blood Chit Program Administration.”

(4) **Language translator devices** enable isolated personnel to communicate with indigenous personnel who do not speak English. Examples include:

(a) **Pointee-Talkees** (see Figure IV-2) are in a three column format with English phrases on the left side of the page, the same phrase in the foreign language in the middle, and the phonetic pronunciation on the right side. The evader selects the desired English phrase and points to the translation of the phrase beside it or tries to phonetically pronounce the desired phrase. The evader may augment the pointee-talkee by making drawings and signs to help communicate with a local national. Even though JPRA is not responsible for producing pointee-talkees, JPRA does facilitate pointee-talkee distribution. Development of new pointee-talkees should be requested through combatant command PR requirements to JPRA.

*For further information on pointee-talkees, see Products and Links menu at SIPRNET: http://www.jpra.jfcom.smil.mil/.*

(b) The services may consider the use of commercial, off-the-shelf electronic products which are quickly becoming available. Depending upon the operational environment and common dialect problems, machine and computer translation software may have a limited vocabulary with a focus on conversational phrases. There are limitations. What is produced using these devices may not be exactly what was intended to be conveyed, or the recipient’s breadth of vocabulary may be more limited than the device’s capability. Unusual dialects may also pose a problem.

(5) **IPG** is a series of country-specific products developed to provide information to enhance survivability in the event of isolation or captivity. IPGs incorporate information found in other references and is designed to be used in concert with intelligence assessments, cultural briefs, country studies, and other products.

*For further information on IPG, see Products and Links menu at SIPRNET: http://www.jpra.jfcom.smil.mil/*
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<tr>
<td>I am an American and I need your help, but I do not speak your language. I’ll point to the question in your language and you can point to the answer in your language.</td>
<td>من آمریکایی هستم و به کمک شما احتیاج دارم ولی با زبان شما آشنا نیستم من از روی آین ورقه سوال مورد نظر را نشان خواهم داد و شما با استفاده از آن ورقه جواب مورد نظرتان را نشان بدهید.</td>
<td>MAHN EHM-bre-koH EE hahs TAHM, vah beh koh MAH-keh shoh-MAH-eh-koH-dah REHUM, vah LEE hoh zah-BAH-keh shoh-MAH adi beh RAH-neh NAH ZAH-nahm roh neh SHUHN HOH-hahni DOHT VAH-shoh-MAH BOH EH-neh foh DAH-nee vah rah-GAY jah VOH-nee MAH-keh-deh nah FAH hahm-DOOR nee SHUHN BEH-dah HEET.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Will you help me?</td>
<td>HOH ZEH-ree beh MAHN koh MAH-keh-neeK?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Is there someone that speaks English?</td>
<td>SHAX SAY EHN-glee-see zah BOH-nee suH-ROHK daw-REH?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Are they willing to help me?</td>
<td>ee-SHOHN hoh-REW-eh beh KOH-mah-kay MAHN HAH-stahN?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Can they come here?</td>
<td>MEE-tah-voh NAHND vah EEN-joh boh yo-VAHND?</td>
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<tr>
<td>I must go now but I want to thank you for your help.</td>
<td>boh-YAH th ah OHN BEH-rah-VAHM, vah LEE-nee hoh-XAHM ahsh-shoh-MAH bah-roh YEH koh MAH keh toon tah shah KUHR KOH-nahm.</td>
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<tr>
<td>My government will repay you for your kindness.</td>
<td>DOH LAH-tay-mahm ahzh hoh BAH-tay koh MAH-keh-TUHN beh MAHN hoh shoh-MAH-poh DOHSH hoh-NAHND-dohd.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>I greatly appreciate your assistance.</td>
<td>AHS-koh-MAH-keh shoh-MAH voh-RAHN mahm NOO-nahm.</td>
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<tr>
<td>May I have some water?</td>
<td>MEE-tah-VOH-neet beh MAHN KEH-me-OHB BEH-dah HEET?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May I have some food?</td>
<td>MEE-tah-VOH-neet beh MAHN KEH-me-RAH-zoh BEH-dah HEET?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am injured. Is there someone that can help me?</td>
<td>zahs MEE-shoh-DAHM, KAE see NEE-tah-VOH-nahd beh MAHN koh-MAH koh NAHND?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you have any bandages?</td>
<td>VAH-soh YEH-leh POHN-say-MAHNI DOH-reet?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can you contact someone to help me?</td>
<td>MEE-tah-VOH-neet hoh KAH-seed BAH-roh-yeh koh-MAH TAHJ TOH-mas-MAH BEH-dah REET?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where is the latrine?</td>
<td>dahs-shoo EE koh JAHST?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am very tired. Is there a place I can sleep?</td>
<td>XAY-lee XAHS-tahm. JOH-ee BAH-roh-yeh HOH hahm DOH-reet?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May I have a blanket, or more clothing?</td>
<td>MEE-tah-VOH-neet BAH-roh-YAHM YEHK pah-TOO YOH lay-BOHS FAH-roh hahm koh-NEET?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure IV-2. Sample Portion of a Pointee-Talkee**
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CHAPTER V
PLANNING

“In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.”

Dwight D. Eisenhower, General, United States Army,
34th President (1890–1969)

1. General

a. JOPP underpins planning at all levels and for missions across the full range of military operations. It applies to both supported and supporting JFCs and to joint force component commands when the components participate in joint planning. This process is designed to facilitate interaction between the commander, staff, and subordinate HQ throughout planning. JOPP helps commanders and their staffs organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander’s intent, and develop effective plans and orders.

For further guidance on JOPP, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

b. The detailed joint force PR plan is located within appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery) to annex C (Operations) of the plan. The PR appendix supports the basic plan, promulgates the PR concept of operations (CONOPS), and directs PR guidance and responsibilities to subordinate organizations. Regardless of the type of plan, subordinate commanders should be aware of the JFC’s overall intent and CONOPS to complete a PR mission analysis and a PR supporting plan (see paragraph 4, “The Basic Plan”). In turn, subordinate commanders provide their PR appendix to their commands for tactical planning. The planning process is not necessarily linear; it is a continuous, concurrent process between and among supported and supporting commanders. Commanders:

(1) Complete a PR mission analysis.

(2) Develop the operational concept of, and authorities for, PR in the basic plan.

(3) Develop the PR appendix to the basic plan.

2. Personnel Recovery Mission Analysis

It is important to note that while much of the discussion in this publication is focused on joint operations during phases II (Seize the Initiative), III (Dominate), and IV (Stabilize), isolating events happen during all phases of operations. Mission analysis should consider command relationships within the operational area and who has responsibility for PR. Planning for PR needs to take into consideration all operational and mission variables.

a. PR requirements and planning tasks are developed through coordinated mission analysis. Commanders identify the tasks their staffs, forces, and isolated personnel should
perform, under various conditions, to accomplish the PR execution tasks. In the PR mission analysis, the commander first determines the context in which the mission should be performed and specifies tasks necessary to accomplish the PR execution tasks. Next, the commander determines the capability to accomplish those specified tasks with assigned forces, identifies shortfalls, and decides whether to build requirements to address the shortfalls or accept the risk of not doing so.

b. In determining the context in which the mission should be performed, commanders and their planners should consider the threat, the physical environment, and friendly capabilities.

   1) Vulnerabilities. Adversaries will attempt to exploit isolated personnel and target recovery forces in an effort to cause changes in US national will and military strategy.

   (a) Isolated Personnel. Personnel may become isolated for numerous reasons, such as equipment malfunction, enemy action, or measures beyond their ability to control. An adversary’s ability to successfully exploit isolated personnel or their situation depends on skill and access to people to exploit. Technology and innovation can increase effectiveness. An adversary may attempt to exploit the situation or the isolated person directly for intelligence, propaganda, or economic purposes.

      1. Intelligence. Exploitation for intelligence includes, but is not limited to, technical knowledge of equipment, operational statuses and disposition of personnel and equipment, training methods, current employment tactics and operational plans, and similar knowledge of the adversary.

      2. Propaganda. For propaganda purposes, one’s knowledge is irrelevant. What an isolated person represents or is willing to do or say may be of value to the adversary.

      3. Economic. Some criminal or terrorist elements may be seeking monetary compensation for the turnover of isolated personnel to either friendly or hostile forces, families, or organizations.

   (b) Recovery Forces. The enemy may target the recovery force as a normal response to a military operation or they may attempt to use isolated personnel as bait to ambush recovery forces. An adversary’s technology, imagination, flexibility, will, audacity, and use of extremist measures can increase the threat to all forces.

   2) Environment. Terrain, vegetation, the populace and potential presence of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) contamination have direct affects on PR C2, forces, and isolated personnel. The mission analysis should consider the affects of the environmental conditions on:

      (a) PR C2 to:

         1. Conduct timing and tempo of PR missions.
2. Communicate with forces and isolated personnel.

(b) Forces to:
   1. Communicate with isolated personnel.
   2. Locate isolated personnel.
   3. Recover isolated personnel.

(c) Isolated personnel to:
   1. Communicate (radio or visual signal) with recovery forces.
   2. Evade.
   3. Survive.

(3) **Factors that impact friendly force** capabilities to successfully accomplish the five PR execution tasks could include:

   (a) An adequate number of trained and/or dedicated PR personnel to staff the JPRCs and PRCCs to ensure proper PR planning and coordination.

   (b) Sufficient air, ground, and maritime platforms/equipment (dedicated, designated) to execute a successful recovery.

   (c) Adequate policies and procedures for completing EPAs and ISOPREPs.

   (d) Adequate guidance for developing PR ROE.

   (e) Adequate policies and procedures to communicate PR information and requirements to all personnel in the operational area.

   (f) An adequate number of SERE-qualified personnel to ensure programs are in place to prepare personnel for a possible isolation event.

   (g) Innovative and effective employment of joint force PR capabilities and doctrine.

   (h) The JFC’s procedures for conducting PR (e.g., standardized checklists and processes for evasion aides, ISOPREPs, recovery mission planning, intelligence support to PR, reintegration support).

   (i) A robust C2 capability.

   (j) Properly equipped personnel to support isolated personnel with:
Chapter V

1. Effective communication. (e.g., compatible or interoperable radios, emergency locator transmitters [ELTs], cell or international maritime satellite phone, GPS devices, PLB, and/or alerting devices).

2. Protection from adversary threats, environmental conditions, etc.

3. Morale support to maintain mental well-being and positive attitude.

4. Resupply kits and exercised resupply delivery capability.

5. SA to enable them to make rational decisions.

(k) Accurate map and chart coverage of the entire operational area.

(l) Adequate policy and procedures for coordinating the reintegration of isolated personnel.

(m) Adequate procedures to collect LL and forward them through the proper channels.

(n) International law and arrangements, bilateral and multilateral agreements, and status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs), where appropriate.

c. Determining the PR subtasks identifies those actions that should be taken to accomplish the five PR execution tasks. The identification of the subtasks will enable the planner to subsequently identify conventional PR and NAR capabilities and shortfalls. These PR subtasks are made up of directed tasks, doctrinal tasks, and mission analysis tasks. Directed tasks are derived from DOD directed PR responsibilities. Doctrinal PR execution tasks are derived from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3500.04E, Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). Planning for recovery operations generally employs the JOPP as outlined in JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. Using common processes that are understood throughout the military helps commanders and staffs standardize procedures. Standard processes facilitate effective planning between echelons and with adjacent units.

d. PR capabilities are determined by analyzing the ability of the joint or multinational force to perform the five PR execution tasks and subtasks in the context of the PR operational environment. When gaps are identified, the commander can direct action to resolve the shortfall, develop requirements for higher HQ to resolve, or accept risk.

3. Strategic Communication/Communications Strategy

PR planners and operators should collaborate with the joint force directorate responsible for implementing strategic communication (SC) into the JFC’s communications strategy to ensure PR equities are included in theater and operational area themes and messages.

a. Objectives. PR guidance considers the synergistic capabilities of public diplomacy, IO, PA, and international broadcasting, along with the diplomatic, informational, military,
and economic instruments of national power, to ensure a whole-of-government approach in achieving the following objectives:

(1) Reduce the vulnerability of the capture, detention, and illegal seizure of US and partner nation personnel and citizens.

(2) Mitigate the effects of attempts by adversaries to exploit isolated personnel as part of their larger SC campaign.

(3) Increase the survivability of those held in captivity, detained, or illegally seized.

(4) Directly support the National Security Strategy by protecting the lives and livelihoods of US citizens, and indirectly by severing support to terrorist networks.

b. Methodologies. The communications strategy may be used to support PR preparation and response through the following methodologies:

(1) Targeting potential adversaries with focused activities that disrupt attempts to exploit isolated personnel.

(2) Promoting dialogue with local leaders and the general public in specific areas to segregate adversaries from their potential support base and assist in PR responses.

(3) Establishing the conditions to locate, support, recover, and reintegrate those who have become isolated.

c. Themes. Fundamental themes in US policy need reinforcement before, during, and after an isolating event. The inclusion of these themes in messages, images, and activities should account for cultural sensitivities. These fundamental PR themes include:

(1) The USG holds those who capture, detain, or illegally seize US personnel or citizens directly responsible for their safety and security.

(2) The USG will not make concessions to individuals or groups holding US personnel or citizens hostage. It is USG policy to deny hostage takers the benefits of ransom, prisoner release, policy changes, or other acts of concession.

(3) The USG will do everything practical to recover and/or secure the release of its captured, detained, or illegally seized personnel or citizens through diplomatic, military, or civil means.

(4) The seizing of hostages is a violation of international and domestic law.

(5) The USG will work with its multinational partners to address the threat of hostage taking that threatens our collective security.
d. **Planning and Execution.** The themes, messages, images, and activities are implemented through the operational planning and execution of IO, PA, and targeting, which is directed toward:

1. Affecting the center of gravity of adversaries who hold captive, detain, or illegally seize US and multinational persons.

2. Preventing adversaries from achieving their strategic goals by mitigating the effects from exploiting captive, detained, or illegally seized personnel.

3. Reinforcing the USG position on “no concessions” as described in NSPD-12, *United States Citizens Taken Hostage Abroad*.

4. Encouraging the humane treatment of isolated personnel should they become captured, detained, or illegally seized.

5. Ensuring all diplomatic, military, and civil efforts in a PR response are coordinated and synchronized across the USG.

6. Unifying PR education and prevention efforts among all USG departments and agencies.

*For further information on national strategic guidance and SC, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.*

*For further information on the CCDR’s communications strategy, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.*

*For further information on IO, refer to JP 3-13, Information Operations.*

4. **The Basic Plan**

The OPLAN and supporting subordinate plans establish the joint force PR command authorities and responsibilities, coordination and communication architecture, force placement, force posture, and force response. The PR planner coordinates with and assists other staff planners in developing the basic plan to ensure it establishes the foundation for the scope, authorities, and priority for PR. Appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery) to annex C (Operations) of the basic plan will expand on this foundation. Guidelines for intelligence support to PR, including products and processes, should be included in annex B (Intelligence) and referred in appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery) to annex C (Operations). The basic plan should:

a. Incorporate the JFC’s priority for isolated personnel, accomplishing the five PR execution tasks and CONOPS for PR in support of the joint force.

b. Specify subordinate commanders’ responsibility to establish and disseminate the criteria that designates personnel as isolated and to accomplish the five PR execution tasks.
c. Include the JFC’s CONOPS for integrating all PR capabilities within the operational area, to include support requirements outside the operational area.

d. Establish the command and coordinating relationships for PR. (See Chapter III, “Command and Control.”)

e. Design the PR architecture to facilitate timely, efficient, and effective PR mission planning at all levels of the joint force.

5. The Personnel Recovery Appendix in the Operation Plan

a. **Personnel Recovery Appendix.** The basic plan’s operational situation, the JFC’s overall CONOPS and intent, the mission analysis and ongoing joint planning, and the collaboration with other operation planners become the foundation of information that focuses the development of the “PR operations plan,” in appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery) to annex C (Operations) of an OPLAN (see Figure V-1). Appendix 5 contains the JFC’s PR CONOPS for a specific campaign or operation. It tasks commanders and staffs, isolated personnel, and forces with actions that, when completed, will develop the PR capability envisioned by the JFC.

*Detailed planning considerations and other guidance to develop appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery) is in CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II, Planning Formats.*

(1) **Search and Rescue (Tab A).** Plan for the use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, ground forces, and specialized rescue teams and equipment to support SAR for distressed persons on land or at sea in a permissive environment. Tab A should include coordinated procedures or agreements with HN, multinational partners, and other organizations. It should discuss all other capabilities and activities, plans, and operations pertinent to SAR missions. Finally, it should list the specific tasks assigned to each subordinate commander required to implement SAR in the operational area and include any coordination required to deconflict recovery efforts if necessary.

(2) **Nonconventional Assisted Recovery (Tab B)**

   (a) NAR capabilities are developed to recover isolated personnel in areas where conventional recovery capability does not exist, is not feasible, is not acceptable, or where complementary PR coverage is required. NAR planning should be a coordinated effort of joint force PR planners, component recovery planners, and NAR planners. NAR requires pre-conflict planning, training, exercise of C2, and ISR support to develop credible NAR capabilities for employment.

   (b) The employment of, and processes to properly use, NAR capabilities is critical to mission success. Initial PR planning will identify conventional recovery capabilities. Analysis of these capabilities will reveal the gaps where conventional capabilities do not exist, are not feasible, or are not acceptable. PR planners should take into consideration UAR (NAR conducted by SOF) capabilities. If PR gaps still exist, they serve
as a basis for NAR planning and identifying NAR requirements for submission to the Joint Staff. These identified gaps serve as the basis for NAR planning.

(c) It is DOD policy to complement its PR capabilities with NAR to recover isolated personnel in those instances when the use of conventional recovery forces in adversary-held or hostile areas is not feasible or acceptable, or is nonexistent. NAR is PR conducted by indigenous/surrogate personnel trained, supported, and led by SOF, UW
Planning

NAR operations involve the employment of recovery teams (RTs) and recovery mechanisms (RMs). NAR operations may be covert or clandestine. Although NAR supports the five execution tasks of PR, the tactical execution of NAR focuses primarily on the recover task. NAR relies on the capability of NAR forces to conduct five specified tasks: contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate isolated personnel to friendly control. These specified tasks, more fully discussed in Chapter VI, “Execution,” remain constant regardless of the mission profile. The specified tasks are separate but may be conducted concurrently or sequentially; however, all specified tasks should be conducted to complete the mission. The TTP employed to accomplish them may be many and varied, allowing for a unit’s or an individual’s particular training strengths, equipment, or employment criteria. During the recovery process, rally points should be planned in the event the isolated person becomes separated from the recovery force. These rally points will facilitate re-contact with the isolated person at a later time. During all phases of the recovery process, the isolated person should be briefed on pertinent procedures, restrictions, and re-contact plans while in the custody of the NAR recovery force. NAR capabilities are especially advantageous in areas where adversary air or ground threat prevents recovery by conventional forces. IAW Title 10, United States Code (USC), DODI 2310.6, USSOCOM Directive 525-21cc, FM 3-05.220, Advanced Special Operations (Secret document), UAR is NAR conducted by SOF, specifically US Army special forces and US Navy SEALs. UAR is a subset and integral component of UW. Further discussion of NAR is in Appendix H, “Special Operations Forces Personnel Recovery.”

(3) Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (Tab C)

(a) Document Preparation and Review. The plan should include detailed guidance for loading survival radios and navigational equipment. Individuals who have cell phones should consider adding emergency contact information such as unit operations centers, US embassy consulates, or regional security offices. Individuals should review their ISOPREPS and EPAs, authentication information such as challenge and passwords, procedures such as isolated Soldier guidance (ISG) or “Lost Marine” plans should they become isolated, and procedures when radio, phone, or GPS is not an option (signals).

1. Evasion Plan of Action. All individuals, units, and organizations operating in hostile or uncertain territory will develop an EPA and review it prior to each mission. The EPA is one of the critical documents for successful recovery planning. It is the vehicle by which personnel at risk of isolation document their evasion plan. They can facilitate their recovery by giving recovery forces a planned direction to follow as well as signs or signals to look for. It should be based on a thorough knowledge of current theater briefings, risk of isolation guidance, instructions like those found in the ATO SPINS, LL, IPGs, SERE updates, etc., or other distress notification documents, as well as the operational environment where isolation may occur. Guidance on preparing EPAs should include consideration of both open and urban terrain. The signals instruction of both the EPA and the deception plan should include procedures to direct isolated persons toward recovery forces if radio communications are not possible. Personnel are responsible for ensuring the information in their EPA complies with JFC’s policies and the contact procedures outlined in
their commander’s isolation notification policy. If isolated, they should follow their EPA as closely as possible. Because extended unassisted recovery or being in a situation where technical communications devices are unavailable is always a possibility, EPAs should address such contingencies. Accurate EPA data, and the evader’s subsequent adherence to the EPA once isolated are the principal factors in successful contact and recovery operations. When possible, EPAs should be developed and filed in PRMS, which would facilitate rapid transmission during contingencies. See Annex D, “Evasion Plan of Action,” to Appendix K, “Evasion,” for details on the content of an EPA.

2. Isolated Personnel Report. All military members, DOD civilians, or DOD CAAF should complete an ISOPREP before deploying or going on temporary duty as required by the GCC. The data in the ISOPREP is used to verify the identity of the individual who may later become isolated, missing, or captured. Specific information is necessary to positively authenticate isolated personnel during a recovery mission. Information is collected by a process that directs the user to provide statements containing personal information known only to them. These statements should be durable, able to be protected, and easily remembered by the individual. It is an important source of authentication data when communicating with US (and some allied) forces. Proper completion, use, and archiving of authentication information could be critical to a successful recovery. As a permanent record, it is a vital part of long-term POW or MIA authentication and accountability. IAW DOD and Joint Staff guidance, ISOPREPs should be stored electronically in PRMS to facilitate rapid transmission during contingencies. The PRMS automated DD Form 1833, ISOPREP, provides the standardized data elements, export data, and order format to collect individual information and should be used by all personnel IAW theater entry requirements. Detailed procedures for completing, maintaining, and controlling ISOPREPs can be found in Annex F, “Guidance for Completing and Controlling DD Form 1833, Isolated Personnel Report,” to Appendix K, “Evasion.”

(b) ROE/Legal Aspects. Coordinate, as required, to ensure ROE address unique PR requirements (e.g., status of isolated personnel: evader vs. escapee, use of forces during recovery operations, access to potential recovery sites, HN restrictions). See Appendix K, “Evasion.” Identification of rules for “what if” situations in the planning process may represent a time-critical element in a decision process that will save a life during a crisis situation.


(c) Contact Procedures. A critical aspect of the recovery is the moment the isolated personnel and the recovery force initially make contact. That moment of contact is very tense because it requires two parties, unknown to each other and located in hostile territory, to meet without being detected by either adversary forces or elements of the local population, and without compromising either party’s security. Consequently, the JPRC, assisted by component representatives, joint and unit intelligence personnel, and recovery operations specialists will develop appropriate contact procedures for use in the operational area and include them in the SERE tab. When developing contact procedures, recovery planners should adhere to JFC’s policies to ensure operational consistency throughout the joint force, and should address various recovery methods because
each involves different considerations. Ground forces should adhere to the near and far recognition signals and treat this operation in the same manner as a link up with friendly force operation. The JPRC also will ensure that joint force components, commanders, personnel at risk of isolation, recovery forces, mission planners, and briefers are familiar with contact procedures by publishing them in broadly disseminated operation instructions. General contact procedures for NAR operations should be published in appropriate instructions as well. To facilitate contact with NAR forces, potential isolated personnel should articulate contact procedures with and without communications in their EPA. Procedures should be passed by the UARCC to NAR and UAR assets, when required.

For detailed information on signaling, see Annex C, “Signaling Techniques and Procedures,” to Appendix K, “Evasion.”

(4) **Reintegration (Tab D).** GCCs are responsible for the initial processing of recovered isolated personnel.

(a) Reintegration planning should be coordinated with all components, agencies, national forces, and others whose members are at risk of isolation. The plan should address the following objectives:

1. Attend to the medical needs of the recovered isolated person(s).
2. Conduct operational debriefing and capture time-sensitive intelligence.
3. Protect and treat the mental health of the isolated person(s).
5. Protect sensitive PR sources and methods.
6. Collect SERE information.
7. Provide SERE psychologist oversight to ensure proper decompression.
8. Attend to personal and family needs.
9. Enable the decompressed isolated person(s) to return to duty as soon as possible.

(b) Reintegration plans will be formatted as described in Tab D, Reintegration, to Appendix 5, “Personnel Recovery,” to Annex C, “Operations,” of CJCSM 3122.03C, *Joint Operation and Planning and Execution System, Volume II, Planning Formats,* and should:

1. Establish procedures that ensure the proper care for recovered isolated personnel, the collection of SERE and intelligence information, and the recovered isolated personnel’s return to duty or family. The procedures will be specific for each location phase as detailed in Chapter VI, “Execution.”
2. Ensure procedures exist to notify promptly the Service organization responsible for coordinating reintegration activities, the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO), JPRA, and the Service casualty offices of the initial release and of subsequent information, including medical information, on recovered isolated personnel.

3. Establish procedures to take custody of returned isolated personnel from an HN, in cases where DOS is the lead USG organization.

4. Establish teams and procedures for reintegration of isolated personnel. Normally, reintegration is conducted at three locations that are referred to as phases. Phases I and II are the responsibility of the CCDR. Phase III is usually in the United States and is the responsibility of the isolated person’s Service. The JFCs coordinate, through the JPRC, with the PRCCs to establish phase I and II reintegration locations and teams. A more detailed discussion of reintegration activities and phases is in Chapter VI, “Execution,” Section E, “Reintegrate.” The plan should be as detailed as possible for phase I and II reintegration teams and team chiefs, and outline their authorities and responsibilities. Team composition is dependent on circumstances; circumstances may also dictate adjustments to the amount and type of reintegration activities conducted during phases I and II.

(5) Accounting (Tab E). Commanders should implement timely and effective procedures to accurately determine the status of those who are isolated and coordinate that information through command, PR, and personnel channels.

b. PR Capabilities. With the direction and authority of the basic plan, PR planners can expand on the responsibilities for, and use the five PR capabilities (i.e., isolated individual, component, joint, multinational, and OGA). (See Figure I-2, “Personnel Recovery Options, Capabilities, and Methods.”)

(1) Isolated Individual

(a) Unassisted. Evaders independently exercise their capability to make their way back to friendly control or travel toward a point where contact with friendly forces can be accomplished based on an EPA. However, in many instances the best technique is to find a hide site and wait for recovery forces to arrive. From the enemy’s perspective, watching for movement is one of the best techniques for hunting. Evasion and recovery takes as long as it takes. Being patient and maintaining SA can be a valuable tool in maintaining freedom. The plan should promulgate the component and Service responsibility to identify personnel at risk of isolation and prepare them to survive, evade, or escape to effect their own recovery if it becomes necessary. This may be necessary when friendly forces are not aware that an isolation event has occurred, it is not possible to execute a recovery or support mission, or it is a backup option to a failed recovery mission. In addition, to the extent possible and depending on the operational requirement, the JFC should place the same responsibility on DOD contractors, other agencies, and multinational partners.

For further information on evasion, refer to Appendix K, “Evasion.”

(b) Opportune. Planning guidance will address responsibilities for theater SERE briefs and the preparation of potential isolated personnel’s capability to facilitate
opportune situations. Opportune situations are those where isolated personnel make a conscious decision to take advantage of an opportunity to approach a potentially neutral individual and ask for assistance (e.g., medical, sustenance, and directions). The SERE brief and IPG will provide potential isolated personnel knowledge of individuals, groups, and organizations in the area of operations that will enhance their ability to successfully negotiate opportune situations. Plans should also ensure potential isolated personnel have the equipment, such as blood chits and pointee-talkees, to enhance the success of an opportune situation.

(2) **Component.** Components are responsible for PR planning that encompasses the accomplishment of the five PR execution tasks within their operational area. Component commanders should coordinate PR plans with the joint force plans. Components may not be organized, trained, or equipped to accomplish all aspects of the five PR execution tasks. Shortfalls in capabilities should be reported to the JFC and JPRC. NAR capabilities are developed to recover isolated personnel in areas where conventional recovery capabilities do not exist, are not feasible, or are not acceptable.

(3) **Joint.** JFCs should exploit all available appropriate component resources to develop the optimum PR capability. Unity of effort and the integration of capabilities are the JFC’s major challenges in joint recovery operations, and require planning, training, and rehearsal to develop synergistic mission-capable skills.

(4) **Multinational.** JFCs should address their intent to work with and support multinational partners for PR. A PR relationship with multinational forces may be the deliberate intent of the JFC or it may be directed from higher authority. In most cases, the JFC will have to consider the PR coordination between US forces and the HN military. As in the previous capabilities discussions, multinational PR capabilities may offer the JFC leverage (force multiplier) that entails gaining, maintaining, and exploiting advantages in combat power. The JFC’s PR CONOPS should address the multinational PR architecture to promote detailed planning, coordination, and the implementation of legal agreements to affect a multinational PR effort and recognize constraints. Achieving balance and unity of effort among multinational forces is a major challenge that can be mitigated by planning, training, and rehearsing.

(a) **Host Nation Capabilities.** The HN can provide capabilities for PR prevention and response. Coordination between the GCC and the COM, who may be the USG lead, ensures a cohesive response between the HN, DOS, and DOD. HN security force and emergency response personnel may not always possess the capabilities required to respond effectively to an isolating incident involving US personnel. The US may need to partner with an HN to build upon or supplement their capabilities for a given mission.

For more information on the importance of building partner capacity to perform those functions, see Annex 1 to NSPD-12, “United States Policy on Personnel Recovery and the Prevention of US Hostage-Taking and Other Isolating Events (U)—(Confidential document).”
(b) As with any multinational engagement, the emphasis should be on developing trust, incentives, mutual benefit, and ensuring proper alignment of incentives for all. PR activities in multinational operations are complex, typically involving units and personnel from many different organizations. The example below highlights a PR operation involving DOD contractors, multinational partners, and several different US organizations.

(5) **Other Government Agencies.** The JFC may be directed to provide PR support to OGAs in the operational area or incorporate their PR capabilities into military recovery operations. Directed or not, JFCs should investigate the activities of OGAs and determine the possibility of those personnel becoming isolated in hostile or uncertain areas within the operational area. OGA personnel operating over, in, or near the operational area can be at risk of becoming isolated. JFCs should take the initiative to request these organizations plan PR with the use of organic PR capabilities in support of their own personnel to mitigate the use of combat forces. Should military support be required, taking the opportunity to do advance planning is a better choice than confronting a crisis during operations. As in joint and multinational considerations, unity of effort and integration of capabilities are the JFC’s major challenges in recovery operations involving OGA capabilities, and require planning, training, and exercise.

(a) The DOS and US missions abroad are most likely to have resources to support recovery operations, especially when diplomatic options are required or HN laws and agreements or internationally recognized territorial sovereignty rights have to be considered. The CIA and Department of Justice also may offer capabilities or need military PR assistance. In most countries, the DOS will lead the USG’s efforts while the HN retains the responsibility for all PR events occurring within their borders. US forces would provide support as required and capable.

(b) In many areas of the world, the joint force will not have freedom of action to unilaterally respond to isolating incidents. Instead, US authority to respond to an incident may be limited to that which is granted by the sovereign nation. Available resources are similarly limited by sovereign nation prerogatives.

1. The COM continues to represent US interests in an HN. The country team, RSO, security cooperation organization (SCO), legal attaché, and DATT coordinate with resident interagency and HN assistance in support of the country team’s PR plan. The GCC will designate the commands lead for recovering the isolated personnel IAW the established plan.

2. Every US embassy is affected somewhat differently—by the ambassador, the foreign policy initiatives of the country’s head of government, the embassy staff, the operational environment, and the relationship between the US and the particular country. For PR to be successful, the country team, especially the SCO, RSO, SDO/DATT, and the HN government, should work together. Since the HN government usually has primacy over resolving isolating events, it is incumbent upon all concerned to continuously work toward common goals of interoperability and understanding. The GCC engages the country team through the COM to work with a partner nation and offers PR expertise and assistance in crafting a workable country PR plan that satisfies all concerns. An approved
PR annex to the embassy’s emergency action plan sets the stage for the relationship between the RSO, the military, and the partner nation.

3. DOD’s relationship with the country team may change from supporting to supported and back again. DOD receives support from the country team via established relationships with HN military/diplomatic/law enforcement personnel, gains indirect physical access via country team personnel, and benefits from country team influence and situational/cultural awareness. DOD supports the country team when a COM requests DOD
assistance for an isolating incident. DOD may have capabilities that the country team can use to help locate, support, recover, or reintegrate an isolated person.

4. If relationships and written agreements are established between the GCC and country team (prior to events), mutual support actions should occur more rapidly. COMs should include PR in their emergency action plans and establish agreements between the GCC and country team to clarify roles, expectations, and instances during which mutual support can be provided without use of the lengthy formal executive secretary process.

5. While each country PR plan should be tailored to a particular HN, it may be possible to develop a regional approach, where several smaller countries of like circumstances cooperate and leverage their resources to recover isolated personnel.

6. Long term cooperative relationships take time to develop. The GCC may start, with the approval of the COM, by appointing a PR representative to assist the RSO. The RSO, using his contacts with and knowledge of the capabilities of the local police or security forces, begins paving the way for further cooperation. Year by year, cooperation expands between the US and the partner nation, perhaps to the point both militaries are cooperating during isolating events, even leveraging loaned equipment from one party with another’s first-hand knowledge of the local geography and political situation to affect a recovery. This may extend operational reach indirectly into otherwise denied or sensitive areas.

7. Where necessary, US effort and resources should be applied to building the partner nation capacity to support and perform PR. These efforts should enhance the quality of response to isolating incidents and also serve important irregular warfare objectives if taken as part of well-integrated theater and/or country security cooperation plans.

8. The goal is to recover US isolated personnel while respecting the sovereignty of the partner nation. As the elements of NSPD-12, United States Citizens Taken Hostage Abroad (U)—(Confidential document), Annex 1, United States Policy on Personnel Recovery and the Prevention of US Hostage-Taking and Other Isolated Events)—(Confidential document), are implemented, these kinds of cooperative relationships will become more and more important.

c. Other Planning Considerations. The following are additional planning factors to be incorporated in the PR appendix to the OPLAN.

(1) Interoperability. Successful PR depends on the accurate identification of interoperability requirements and shortfalls, including those of multinational organizations and OGAs. Interoperability concerns are always a relevant consideration when executing a recovery. Interoperability between the isolated person, the forces, and the C2 is essential. Interoperability issues are usually identified when PR planning and operations involve forces from two or more joint force components. Since PR missions normally require an urgent response, an understanding of potential interoperability requirements is essential to successful and timely PR planning and execution. Interoperability is essential to joint
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shipboard helicopter operations, communications equipment, ISR assets, intelligence automated data processing, fuel and refueling, and maps and charts.

(a) **Ship-helicopter interoperability** should be considered during recovery operations in the maritime domain (which includes the littorals). The extended range of some helicopters (with or without inflight refueling) makes the use of shipboard support facilities feasible in many inland PR scenarios. Generally, US Coast Guard and Navy flight-deck-equipped vessels are capable of recovering, supporting, and launching US Army and United States Air Force (USAF) helicopters operated by deck-landing qualified aircrews. Specific procedures and requirements for operating helicopters on flight-deck-equipped vessels should be employed for safe execution. Procedures for Coast Guard and Navy vessels, to include hospital ships, are contained in JP 3-04, *Joint Shipboard Helicopter Operations*; Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 00-80T-122, *Helicopter Operating Procedures for Air-Capable Ships*; NAVAIR 00-80T-105, *CV Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) Manual*; NAVAIR 00-80T-106, *LHA/LPH/LHD NATOPS Manual*; and Commandant, United States Coast Guard Instruction (COMDTINST) M3710.2, *Shipboard-Helicopter Operational Procedures Manual*. Physical dimensions and flight-deck clearance information are contained in Naval Air Engineering Center—Engineering (NAEC-ENG)-7576, *Shipboard Aviation Facilities Resume*.

(b) **Communications Equipment.** Interoperability of communications equipment in recovery operations is essential, particularly when a personnel recovery task force (PRTF) is employed. Adequate, secure communications that support the timing and coordination necessary for successful recovery operations become considerably more difficult as additional resources are added to the PRTF. Depending upon the composition of the joint force, specific communications interoperability considerations should include the potential for PR-related air-to-air, surface-to-air, and/or surface-to-surface communications. Communications equipment that is not interoperable could preclude the effective usefulness of a PRTF and may be a factor for assigning the PR mission to a single component as a mission-type order.

1. Communications equipment interoperability issues will typically challenge multinational forces.

2. **TDLs** provide a standardized communication link capability suitable for transmission of digital information. This is a key communication capability for effective PR C2 and successful accomplishment of the PR execution tasks. Without data links, the user would be required to revert to voice systems, possibly compromising recovery operations or the location of isolated personnel, due to the substantial difference in transmission times. Data link network capacity should take into consideration the number and variance of terminals (US and multinational) in a geographic area, and the gateways should allow interoperability among new, emerging gateways to/from other communications networks.

(c) **Fuel and Refueling.** Interoperable fuel and refueling equipment should be considered during PR planning. Cross-tasking of PR assets, particularly helicopters, may result in unanticipated fuel requirements. Refueling interoperability requirements include
both ground and aerial refueling considerations. Nozzles, fittings, and couplings vary among Service helicopters. Cross-tasking of helicopters for PR may also require cross-tasking of refueling support (ground and/or aerial) for these aircraft. Various ground vehicles also have different fuel and lubricant requirements that should be considered.

(d) Maps and Charts. Maps and charts play a key role in the planning and execution of recovery operations. The necessity for PR planners, isolated personnel, and operators to use the same map or chart series or geodetic datum (i.e., World Geodetic System-84, digital point positioning database) is particularly crucial to effective and timely operations coordination, aircrew flying safety, and a successful PR mission. With a search capability already limited by scarce resources and probably further debilitated by hostile capabilities and intent, it is essential that forces use the same reference points and same reference system (e.g., grid or latitude and longitude, to include coordinate format) for ingress, recovery, and egress.

(2) Assets and Availability. Planners should identify the PR resources, delivery date, and employment location that will be required for a particular operation and ensure these requirements are supported by the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). Integration of Service and component warfighting requirements with PR requirements avoids duplication of effort, establishes complementary systems, and exploits unique and specialized resources. Interoperability of dissimilar joint force assets is essential to safe and successful recovery operations. Commanders should ensure the force flow includes mission capable PR forces commensurate with the risks of incurring an isolating event. Commanders should efficiently employ a broad range of PR abilities that may consist of forces that:

(a) Are specifically organized, trained, and equipped for PR and identified to the JFC by their component commander as the PR force for planning purposes. Identified forces should include dedicated component PR coordination elements, if established.

(b) Have not been designated as primary PR assets but, because their capabilities can be applied to PR situations, have been identified as the assets to be tasked, if required.

(c) Are not specifically organized, trained, or equipped for PR, but have a recognized ability to perform some elements of the five PR execution tasks.

(3) Force Placement. Precautionary planning involves the pre-positioning of PR aircraft, ships, or ground forces and facilities close to an area most likely to have a PR incident before an operation commences. The planning of precautionary PR is usually done by the JPRC, PRCC, or operations staff with PR expertise and background. Precautionary PR planning may also be conducted concurrently with mission planning or as a corollary planning effort when one joint force or component is tasked to provide PR support to another joint force or component. Options should also be established to support an unsuccessful recovery that requires an additional PR mission. Precautionary postures include the following:
(a) **Lifeguard.** Naval vessels may be pre-positioned along ingress and egress routes for rescue purposes when the mission indicates a potential need for waterborne assistance or the PR function is compatible with, or becomes the primary assigned mission of, a submarine or surface vessel. Maritime vessels, when involved with recovery operations, maintain the vessel voice call sign “Lifeguard.” Aircraft providing cover for a Lifeguard vessel should establish contact immediately upon arriving on station and then, when practical, search the area around the Lifeguard’s position for adversary vessels. An aircraft commander involved with recovery operations who wants to establish communications with an unknown Lifeguard vessel will maintain the aircraft voice call sign “Rescue.” A Lifeguard vessel commander who wants to establish communications with an unknown PR aircraft should use the voice call sign “Rescue.”

(b) **Duckbutt** is a precautionary PR procedure normally used in environments where the risk from adversary threats is low. Aircraft are positioned along or over a water route to provide a recovery resource if required, support deployment of single-engine aircraft, or meet other specialized situations. Duckbutts often are used as a precaution when single-engine aircraft, or aircraft with certain very important persons aboard, have to cross large bodies of water, in the event the pilot has to ditch the aircraft. Duckbutts should be multi-place aircraft with sufficient endurance and refueling, communication, airdrop, and navigational capabilities to support recovery requirements. If unable to effect the extraction of isolated personnel, duckbutt aircrews should be prepared to locate isolated personnel; airdrop survival equipment, medical supplies and pararescue jumpers (PJs) or equivalent; and coordinate additional PR assets. Commanders are responsible for coordinating duckbutt support with the component PRCC or JPRC.

(c) **Airborne Alert.** Suitable fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters when practicable, may be tasked to provide PR airborne alert in support of operations. These aircraft should monitor operating frequencies and may function as the mission coordination platform to coordinate recovery operations. Supporting PR aircraft should establish radio contact with the JPRC or PRCC immediately upon departure from their home stations. If extraction is not imminent, recovery forces should avoid compromising the isolated personnel’s position. Airborne alert locations should be outside the threat area and should not compromise PR mission intentions. Recovery helicopters may land in a permissive area and maintain a listening watch through airborne platforms or SATCOM networks. Planners using air recovery assets should consider the feasibility of establishing clandestine forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) when aerial refueling might be too hazardous to risk.

(d) **Quick Response Posture (QRP).** Suitable combat and support forces may be fueled, armed, and positioned (strip alert, maneuver force) for rapid employment in support of PR missions. A QRP can be accomplished from main operating bases or with forces pre-positioned at forward operating locations (e.g., FARP, forward operating base) near combat operations. This may include staging the forces physically in their vehicles or aircraft with the engines running. Though response time is decreased, a QRP can adversely impact force endurance over extended periods of time.
(4) IO assists in implementing the PR SC and supports the PR support and recovery execution tasks. Information-related capabilities integrated by IO include MISO, MILDEC, OPSEC, computer network operations (CNO), electronic warfare (EW), civil-military operations (CMO), PA, combat camera, and defense support to public diplomacy. Planning and execution of PR should consider the following aspects of these capabilities:

(a) MISO forces conduct information activities to influence relevant populations to report information about isolated personnel, support PR activities, and deny support to adversaries. These forces provide commanders a means to communicate with local populations and isolated personnel. These forces inform the populace on the benefits of noninterference with PR efforts and providing support and protection of isolated personnel. The staff planners coordinate with the joint rescue center to ensure information activities are integrated into PR plans.

For further information, see JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.

(b) MILDEC may be used to deny adversaries knowledge of recovery activities.

(c) OPSEC may be used to deny adversaries knowledge of PR plans and recovery activities.

(d) CNO may be used to monitor adversary computer activities for PR related information.
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(e) Combat camera may be used to document recovery missions and sensitive site exploitations.

(f) EW consists of electronic attack and electronic protection (EP). Electronic attack may be used to deny the adversary use of the electromagnetic spectrum to detect and locate isolated personnel and recovery forces. EP guarantees the use of the electromagnetic spectrum by isolated personnel, coordinating agencies, and recovery forces. EW may also be employed to determine if the adversary is discussing the isolated event or isolated person in their communications.

(g) CMO may be used to gain the support of influential HN leaders and encourage the local population to aid isolated personnel and report their location. The civil-military operations center (CMOC) can provide immediate contact and coordination with NGOs, IGOs, and indigenous populations and institutions, working within the operational area. These established relationships can be leveraged for an immediate and critical response to assist in certain PR operations, reducing the time to respond to the situation. The civil information compiled by the civil information cell at the CMOC can provide detailed information on the infrastructure, cultural composition, and networks that can support the commander’s course of action (COA) in response to a PR operation. The CMOC can be used as an alternate meeting location with influential HN leaders if the PRCC/JRPC is not an acceptable place for the meeting site by HN officials. The CMOC can provide anonymity to a meeting of this nature.

(h) PA may garner support for PR activities by negating adversarial propaganda through the reporting of actual facts. PA is used to educate friendly forces on PR activities and prevent individual isolation. The PAO develops guidance for media release of information that protects against inadvertent disclosure of information that could increase the risk to the lives of isolated personnel or negatively affect the national will. The JPCC, PRCCs, and the PAO should collaborate to ensure information about PR activities is released in a deliberate, controlled manner that will not bring harm to isolated personnel. Consider the ramification of a well-meaning friend immediately notifying the isolated person’s family by cell phone. The family will probably request confirmation from authorities, which may alert the media and in turn alert adversarial forces in the objective area. Specific identifying information on isolated personnel or events will not be released to the media while planning or conducting recovery operations. IAW the DOD Personnel Recovery Strategic Communication Guidance, Annex D, “Quick Reference Guide for National Capital Region Decision Makers during an Isolating Event,” the agent responsible for PR is also responsible for the public release of information. Information may be released to the media after recovery is complete, and then only when approved by the appropriate commander, JPCC, and PAO.

(5) Operational Limitations. Typical PR operational constraints include a limited capability of airborne assets to conduct searches in uncertain or hostile operational environments. Although ground force search capabilities are not as limited, PR-dedicated resources in forces, to include shortages of personnel knowledgeable in PR to staff the JPCC, PRCCs, and PR liaisons are. Alternate COAs should be developed to overcome these operational limitations. The use of ground forces can serve to overcome some of them.
Armored vehicles increase survivability and have extensive “loiter” time. The exact location of the isolated personnel is not always an absolute requirement for ground forces as they can move into, or through, an area searching for an isolated person and can stay until they are withdrawn, depending on the nature of the threat.

(a) Search Capabilities. Sensor searches or monitoring for radio and beacon transmissions by standoff airborne platforms, UASs, intratheater aircraft engaged in ongoing air operations, and/or satellites should be considered and planned, as appropriate. In some cases aerial, ground, or sea search cannot be conducted; increasingly sophisticated weapons, especially air defense weapons available to military forces worldwide, including insurgents and terrorists, make extended searches by aircraft for isolated personnel in adversary-held territory highly prohibitive. However, ground combat forces can greatly increase the search capabilities of an organization. For example, a Bradley, Stryker, or Abrams battalion conducting a movement to contact to link up with isolated personnel has robust firepower, survivability, and staying ability. Time constraints for a successful rescue should be weighed against the risk of sending valuable personnel or assets into a hostile environment.

(b) PR-Dedicated/Capable Resources. The ability of the Services to deploy PR-dedicated/capable forces and PR coordination elements may be constrained by the combination of time and priorities to meet all mission requirements, synchronizing force deployment with other competing interests in a TPFDD, PR-dedicated/capable forces engaged in other operations, and readiness conditions. To mitigate these constraints, JFCs may consider coding PR requirements on the TPFDD to enable the extraction of that data for comparison to the flow of the other forces and scheduling PR deployments to properly support the force.

(6) Intelligence

(a) Determining and Managing Intelligence Requirements. The JIOC, JISE, or component intelligence support element should establish procedures with the JPRC, PRCCs, and UARCC to promptly satisfy their standing or ad hoc intelligence requirements. Many situations may require external resources (e.g., satellite imagery collection or other national-level capability). Commanders, their staffs, and recovery forces should be aware of the national organization’s intelligence capabilities and how to request support from them to enhance PR planning and decision making. A comprehensive PR-focused intelligence collection and production plan gives the JIOC and JISE the framework to produce relevant finished intelligence prior to commencement of combat operations. Intelligence organizations maintain sensor SA and have procedures in place to cross-cue or dynamically re-task collection and support assets during PR mission execution.

1. Connectivity. Intelligence personnel supporting the JPRC, PRCC, and UARCC need direct access to dedicated intelligence communications systems with connectivity among intelligence entities from national to unit level.

a. Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) and Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS). All-source intelligence dissemination in support of joint operations at the national, theater, and
subordinate joint force levels will be primarily via JWICS and SIPRNET. Security and facility constraints permitting, a JDISS terminal should be colocated with, or in close proximity to, the JPRC, PRCC, or UARCC.

b. **SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network.** Because JWICS is a dedicated intelligence network operating at the sensitive compartmented information level, much of the information carried on it is not available to operational users reliant on SIPRNET systems. Regardless of the proximity of JWICS terminals to PR C2 nodes, intelligence personnel should act as a bridge between the two networks and ensure that commanders and forces have the information they need. Intelligence products and analysis disseminated via JWICS should be replicated on SIPRNET, within security restrictions, to afford maximum utility to the end users.

2. **Collection Plan.** Collection managers should be familiar with PR planning and operational needs, enabling them to match requirements to appropriate collection platforms and intelligence disciplines. In addition to providing SA and support to general intelligence analysis, collection carried out under each intelligence discipline has its own unique role in satisfying PR requirements. Collection managers, in conjunction with the combatant command PR OPR and the JPRC, should plan for and exercise intelligence collection management in response to a PR incident.

a. **Human Intelligence.** When there is no existing source, the establishment of a HUMINT capability may require a long lead time to develop sources. However, when a source is available, HUMINT can provide PR information unreachable or unobtainable by other sources. Assessment of the mind-set of a country’s population and their attitude toward friendly PR activities relies heavily on HUMINT reporting. HUMINT plays a significant role in NAR planning. However, HUMINT operational matters that involve NAR support are handled separately from routine intelligence collection management channels.

b. **Signals Intelligence (SIGINT).** SIGINT can be used to assess adversary threats to forces and isolated personnel communications and navigation systems, and to perform direction finding (DF) and geolocation of distress signals. SIGINT analysis of the available frequency spectrum can provide channel selection recommendations for PR forces’ communications to reduce the risk of interference or adversary exploitation.

c. **Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT).** GEOINT consists of imagery, imagery intelligence (IMINT), and geospatial information. GEOINT support for PR missions and for the creation of geospatial products such as EVCs is essential. IMINT can provide detailed characteristics of potential detention facilities, recovery sites, and other operationally significant features. Properly cued, imagery collection assets can be used to detect, locate, and analyze possible visual signals. The use of GEOINT can provide increased appreciation and understanding of the area as viewed and perceived by the isolated personnel. This capability can prove helpful in understanding the situation as being experienced by the isolated person; can identify structures and terrain that can be used for orienting the recovery force and isolated personnel; and can identify features helpful in
SERE (water sources, depressions, etc.) that might not be visible to the isolated person from their hide site.

d. Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT). Advanced MASINT technologies and analytic methods using various types of imagery can complement other intelligence disciplines by detecting PR-related items that other sensors might miss. In large areas, the capability to discern aircraft wreckage and other man-made objects from background clutter and vegetation, identify potential mass grave locations, or determine whether a prison camp is occupied, are examples of possible PR applications for MASINT.

e. Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT). Openly available materials from an adversary’s own government or press services can be used to confirm that a missing person is in captivity, provide insight into the thoughts and beliefs of the nation’s people and leaders, and help gauge the potential use of persons in captivity for propaganda purposes. OSINT complements the other intelligence disciplines and can be used to fill gaps and provide accuracy and fidelity to classified information. However, caution should be exercised when using OSINT in that open sources may be susceptible to adversary use as a mode of deception (e.g., incorrect information may be planted in public information).

f. UASs are capable of providing multi-intelligence sensor streaming video in real time of an objective area. Depending on system capabilities this can range from a few to thousands of miles from home base with short to long loiter times. This resource and other ISR capabilities could provide PR mission planners with key information on the adversary, shape planning and decision making, and pinpoint the location of isolated personnel.

g. Surveillance and Reconnaissance. The JPRC should be prepared to coordinate with appropriate elements, such as the joint collection management board, and JAOC (if established), to conduct air, ground, amphibious, electronic, surveillance, reconnaissance, etc., as dictated by the threat, environment, and time requirements to locate isolated personnel.

For further guidance regarding intelligence support to joint operations, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

3. While specific intelligence requirements will vary depending on the nature of an operation, fundamental PR intelligence needs are fairly constant. The following are some generic PR-related intelligence requirements:

a. Adversary order of battle, to include disposition, strength, capabilities, and activities of air, ground, maritime, special operations (SO), paramilitary, and security forces. While order of battle information is already a standard requirement for operating forces, adversary capabilities to threaten recovery forces, especially rotary-wing aircraft and ground RTs, should be given special emphasis.

b. Adversary electronic capabilities to detect, locate, track, jam, or deceive recovery forces or survival communications equipment.
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c. **Adversary resources** used to find isolated personnel or recovery forces (DF equipment, helicopters, dogs, infrared [IR] trackers, night vision goggles, etc.).

d. **Policy, practices, and intentions** of adversary or neutral countries and non-state actors toward friendly isolated personnel, hostages, detainees, POWs, and recovery forces.

e. **Attitude of the populace** toward isolated personnel, including their susceptibility to adversary pressure to provide information about, or assist in the search for, isolated personnel. This includes information about minority or opposition groups that may assist, or at least not oppose, isolated personnel and the report, locate, support, and recover execution tasks.

f. **Information about the physical environment** pertinent to isolated personnel and recovery forces to include terrain, climate and weather, food and water sources, flora and fauna, concealment, lines of communications, and avenues of approach.

g. **Location and characteristics** of potential detention, interrogation, and medical treatment facilities where isolated personnel may be held.

4. **Requests for Information (RFIs).** The intelligence organizations supporting the command PR OPR, the JPRC, component PRCCs, UARCC, and PR-capable units submit formal RFIs to higher echelons to satisfy intelligence requirements that exceed local capabilities and resources. Responses should be tailored to the needs of the requestor and be timely, accurate, and in a usable format. Formal RFIs will be submitted and tracked using the community on-line intelligence system for end-users and managers (COLISEUM) to facilitate visibility at all levels of command. Critical, time-sensitive RFIs in support of an emergent PR incident may require temporary suspension of formal RFI procedures. Direct point-to-point exchanges of information should be followed up with record communications and documented in COLISEUM as soon as time permits.

*For further information regarding RFIs from national agencies and NISTs, refer to JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.*

5. **Skip-Echelon Intelligence Support.** If the first indication of a possible PR incident is obtained through intelligence means, intelligence personnel should be able to transmit that information immediately and securely to all participating units, agencies, and command centers to facilitate deconfliction and parallel planning. Commanders should consider authorizing procedures for “skip-echelon” direct intelligence support for forces preparing to conduct recovery operations. Command authorization of skip-echelon intelligence support does not negate the requirement to provide the same intelligence to intermediate commands through the chain of command and to supporting commands and organizations. Nor should skip-echelon measures be used to circumvent the chain-of-command or transmit operational information outside of proper channels.

(b) **Intelligence Plans.** The combatant command or subordinate joint force J-2 that produces the intelligence annex to OPLANS and OPORDs should address PR-specific requirements and support architecture. Annex B (Intelligence), to OPLANS and OPORDs
will provide a foundation for the procedures for intelligence support, identify intelligence gaps, establish standing collection and production requirements, and task theater intelligence resources to support PR. It should clearly address specialized communications and reporting procedures tailored to the unique nature of recovery operations. LL should be continuously applied throughout the planning process to improve intelligence support to PR. Appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery) to annex C (Operations) should reflect the guidance in annex B (Intelligence), and provide the concept of intelligence support to PR.

(c) **Intelligence Products.** A variety of off-the-shelf resources are available to support PR activities. However, finished products are intended for planning and are not a substitute for dynamic operational or tactical level intelligence support for recovery operations. Most existing products are available in electronic form on INTELINK, the principal electronic means for intelligence product dissemination. Requests for new production should be submitted via COLISEUM through the command validation chain.

1. **Joint Personnel Recovery Support Product (JPRSP).** The JPRSP is the primary reference document for PR-specific information on a particular country or region of interest. JPRSP is designed to facilitate combatant command and PR support staff planning for potential recovery missions in countries where US forces may conduct joint operations. JPRSPs address essential elements of information (EEIs) required for PR planning. EEIs include the geo-political disposition, military capabilities, threat to rescue vehicles, and the physical, cultural, and security environment which impact the ability of isolated personnel to survive and evade capture. The JPRSP supersedes several previously available intelligence products (e.g., selected area for evasion, selected area for evasion area intelligence descriptions, and SERE contingency guides). GCC production of the JPRSP is a collaborative process among multiple intelligence centers and PR subject matter experts. For additional information on JPRSP products, refer to the SIPRNET website: [http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:JPRSP](http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:JPRSP).

2. **Special Assessments.** When standardized references such as a JPRSP are insufficient, special assessments can be produced. Country, region, or operation-specific assessments can provide information such as an adversary government’s policies for handling POWs or hostages, unique technologies that can threaten recovery forces, or other topics.

3. The IC POW/MIA Analytic Cell provides a variety of pre-capture and post-capture intelligence products that address PR threats, captive and hostage TTP, assessed detention locations, intelligence support products for NAR, and other tailored products in support of planning and operations. These products are aligned with the POW/MIA Analytic Cell’s congressional, Director of National Intelligence, and DOD mandates.

4. **Legacy Products.** Although the JPRSP supersedes previously used hardcopy and digital PR support products, archived materials available in intelligence libraries or via INTELINK contain useful background information for general planning and study. However, care should always be taken to supplement information contained in legacy...
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products with current intelligence when conducting evasion planning or PR mission preparation.

5. Other Products. The following supplemental publications may assist personnel at risk of isolation, recovery forces, and intelligence personnel: EVC's, pointee-talkees, IPGs, PR update messages, and joint and component standardized notification system (e.g., ATO SPINS).

(d) Intelligence Support. Current intelligence briefings, situation displays, and intelligence documents should be available to recovery forces early in the mission planning process. Planned PR mission go/no-go criteria should be developed based upon an assessment of adversary capabilities and weather effects in order to characterize the environment and to formulate measures that mitigate the threat. PR procedures published in the PR portion of operating instructions should incorporate intelligence to establish effective communications/signaling procedures and recommendations that avoid adversary exploitation. With respect to the five execution tasks, the following is provided.

1. Report. Intelligence organizations should ensure that possible PR event information obtained through intelligence collection assets is securely transmitted, IAW proper reporting procedures, to appropriate operational PR coordination nodes as quickly as possible.

a. Intelligence units with SIGINT collection capabilities can preemptively monitor friendly distress frequencies and beacons, report on possible PR incidents, and monitor adversary reactions.

b. Intelligence staffs of operational units may obtain initial or follow-up information regarding isolated personnel through tactical reporting or debriefs of unit personnel.

2. Locate. The ability to ascertain the location of isolated personnel and assess the adversary threat in the mission area will have the greatest impact on the recovery force. Use of intelligence resources to recognize friendly signals and detect adversary deception efforts and other false reports is a critical part of the authentication process. Intelligence collection tasking should commence immediately upon confirmation of a PR incident to refine and characterize the location of the isolated personnel. Timeliness and effectiveness of collected information varies widely depending on platform and intelligence discipline applied; therefore, collection managers should have plans in place that can be tailored for each PR incident.

a. IMINT and MASINT collection platforms, properly cued using other information, can help pinpoint the location of isolated personnel and obtain details about surrounding terrain and adversary activity. Broad area searches conducted without cueing information from other sources can be time consuming, and are reliant on significant visual signals or signatures for there to be any reasonable probability of detection. Tactical or theater-controlled airborne imagery platforms are likely to be more flexible and responsive than space-based national systems for short notice collection in support of
locating isolated personnel. Collection managers should select the platform most readily available for dedicated tasking that performs nearest to real time.

**b. SIGINT** collectors can supplement the DF capabilities of other reconnaissance, search, or recovery forces. Continuous monitoring can provide indications and warnings of exploitable opportunities for friendly action and adversary action or obstacles.

**c. HUMINT** collection teams operating in areas where a PR event is declared should be notified to focus collection efforts on locating the isolated person. HUMINT collectors utilize human sources to identify information on possible locations of the isolated individual. HUMINT collection can also provide information on local perceptions of US and multinational forces. Knowing local perceptions and atmospherics helps identify potential threats to the isolated individual and also aids in determining the likelihood of local nationals to provide aid to the isolated individual.

For further information on national PR support capabilities, refer to NSA and National Reconnaissance Office Information Memorandum, Personnel Recovery/Combat Search and Rescue Concept of Operations for National SIGINT Support, (Secret).

3. **Support.** Commanders should be kept abreast of the intelligence situation surrounding all ongoing PR events. Intelligence should continue to evaluate the adversary situation and assess the potential threat to isolated personnel and support forces. Adversary forces should be constantly monitored to detect and disrupt hostile search efforts. Intelligence personnel involved in targeting should ensure that ongoing combat missions are deconflicted from isolated personnel locations to avoid fratricide. Mission planners will require current intelligence on adversary detection capabilities to avoid revealing an isolated person’s position during support or resupply missions.

4. **Recover.** Recovery forces require detailed mission planning information on adversary disposition, threat environment, en route and objective/terminal area terrain, and adversary detection, deception, and disruption capabilities. Whenever possible, JIOC or JISE collection managers should stage collection assets before mission execution to monitor adversary reactions to recovery forces and to provide rapid warning of emerging threats once a mission is under way.

5. **Reintegrate.** Intelligence personnel will perform debriefs of recovery force members and recovered personnel. Intelligence will be reported via established channels IAW command guidance. Under no circumstances will intelligence debriefers seek information pertaining to sensitive or covert PR activities unless properly cleared for those activities and specifically designated to do so.

(7) **Authentication.** There are multiple ways to authenticate the friendly status/identity of an isolated individual such as challenge and password; numbers, letters, and words of the day; far and near recognition signals; specific code words; and ISOPREPs and biometric data. Each system for authentication has specific TTP and should be reviewed by individuals and recovery forces as part of mission preparation.
(a) **Using ISOPREP for Authentication.** Effective authentication procedures require creativity and standardization among joint forces. Guidelines for using ISOPREP data and other authentication methods should be clear and properly sent to subordinate unit personnel. The following techniques have been used effectively:

1. **ISOPREP information should be durable, providing usable authentication during multiple or future recovery attempts.** This is best accomplished by initially providing recovery forces with only two facts from the ISOPREP leaving the remaining information for future missions. Isolated personnel should not provide, nor be asked to provide, any full ISOPREP item during a given recovery. Recovery forces in contact with an isolated person, but unsure of the individual’s identity, should ask a question derived from a portion of the four-digit number, or a portion of one of the two authentication statements being used. The best methods are adding, subtracting, multiplying, or dividing two of the digits, or asking a question using a single element from one of the statements. Examples: If the evader’s ISOPREP number is 8147, then a question is “Subtract your third digit from your first digit,” and the evader should respond with “4.” If the evader’s first ISOPREP statement reads, “My first dog was a three-legged, yellow, Labrador retriever named Lucky,” then a question is “What color was your first dog?” and the response should be “yellow.” This allows for maximum use of the ISOPREP information, while minimizing the compromise of that information.

2. **During initial contact, forces may need to validate their own authenticity to the isolated person prior to obtaining further information.** Forces can do this by using the personal authentication statement. This method allows the recovery force to identify itself by providing information from the isolated person’s ISOPREP. Using the statement above, the recovery force could authenticate themselves to the isolated person by saying “Your first dog had three legs.” Another method is to use the isolated person’s authentication number. For example, “Jack one zero, this is Jolly five zero. The sum of your first and third numbers is 12.”

3. **ISOPREP data can be used effectively to validate instructions to the isolated person.** If adversary forces are attempting to deceive the isolated person with false radio calls, the PR force can instruct the individual to follow only instructions accompanied by valid combinations of the authentication number. For example, “Pop smoke when I say the sum of your first and third number.”

(b) **Theater Code Words.** The JPRC should develop **standardized operational codes and symbols** for PR purposes. These usually are in the form of a PR word, letter, duress number, color of the day, week, or month; challenge and password; or near and far recognition signals, and are published in the operation and mission orders and instructions throughout the operational area. The JPRC should coordinate with PRCCs and multinational liaisons to ensure mechanisms are in place to provide published PR information to all forces. Consideration should be given to classification, releasability, and dissemination of this information to multinational forces that have a need to know. The use of these daily or frequently changed codes can provide immediate authentication of isolated personnel. When using a word of the day, using just one of the letters can extend durability of the code. For example if the word of the day is “BOXER,” a quick authentication can be
made by the recovery force asking the evader, “The third letter of the word of the day is X-RAY, what is the second letter?” The evader should respond, “OSCAR.” This authenticates the recovery force to the evader while having the evader authenticate back.

(c) **Local Authentication Codes.** This authentication method is often used by forces when codes are not disseminated through operating instructions. JFCs should recognize the potential for confusion when local authentication codes are implemented, and should pursue a policy that standardizes the use of ISOPREPs and codes published in operational instructions. If local authentication codes are absolutely necessary, they should be passed by the originating unit to the component PRCC and JPRC. Local authentication codes for long-term evaders should be kept on file with the parent unit and component PRCC.

(8) **Communication Plan.** An effective communication plan is an important part of a successful recovery operation. A generic recovery communication plan should be developed for the operational area and distributed through the ATO SPINS or other appropriate mechanism. To the maximum extent possible, all recovery forces should be secure voice capable (see Figure V-2).

(9) **Contractors**

(a) All CAAF are subject to individual personnel accountability standards; are required to meet specified deployment preparation requirements; and will be provided requisite government furnished support as identified in the contract. US citizens and third country national contractor employees, who are not normal residents of the operational area, will normally be afforded CAAF status. It is also possible, depending on command guidance, selected mission essential local national contractor employees may also be afforded CAAF status.

(b) GCCs should identify specific PR related contractor policies and requirements in the OPLAN/OPORD for selected CAAF personnel.

*For further information on CAAF, refer to JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.*

(10) **Host Nation.** HNs generally have “first right of refusal” for operations occurring within their sovereign borders, requiring close coordination between the JFC and each HN. Typically, this coordination is accomplished through the COM. COMs have authority over, and responsibility for, all USG elements in country, other than those under the authority of the GCC. The SDO/DATT and chief of the SCO is the COM’s principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, the senior diplomatically accredited DOD military officer assigned to a US diplomatic mission, and the single POC for all DOD matters involving the embassy or DOD elements assigned to or working from the embassy. Limitations such as ROE, sharing of information with HN agencies, language differences, equipment differences, and cultural differences can further complicate a JFC’s effort to recover isolated personnel. During PR planning, planners incorporate a number of factors into their PR staff estimates.
(a) What non-DOD personnel will require PR coverage? During a foreign humanitarian assistance mission, for example, the pool of potential isolated personnel increases from primarily military members to include IGO/NGO American citizens and citizens from other nations.

(b) What authorities does the CCDR have to execute PR? In some instances, HN governments may allow limited PR operations. In other cases, the HN may insist that its
own capabilities act as the primary responders for isolated personnel (e.g., law enforcement, military).

(c) What authorities does a JFC have to contact HN government capabilities directly? Typically, a PRCC/JPRC will coordinate HN law enforcement capabilities through the COM’s RSO, while the SDO/DATT can provide coordination with HN military capability. In some instances, a JFC may be granted DIRLAUTH to coordinate directly with HN PR capabilities.

(d) What information will be shared? Information over classification could inhibit the ability to coordinate PR with HN and interagency partners. In some instances, military personnel may be conducting operations in a foreign nation without the umbrella of a JTF. In these cases, preplanning with the embassy becomes paramount. Prevention of isolating events by incorporating a robust FP effort is a critical factor in PR planning. Coordination with the local RSO and SDO/DATT can establish both a FP plan to prevent PR as well as preplanned COAs in the event of an isolating event.

(11) Nongovernmental Organizations. Although a part of the civil option, exploitation of NGOs’ capabilities may offer the JFC a PR force multiplier. PR planning should include NGO considerations and the coordination processes and responsibilities for diplomatic support to PR. Diplomacy can emphasize agreements that can affect isolated personnel (e.g., Geneva and Hague Conventions) and implement negotiations that directly accomplish the recovery of isolated personnel. Members of NGOs are also susceptible to isolation, and planners should consider the effect of their isolation and/or capture, especially if depending on the NGO for assistance with US or multinational isolating events. Remember that many NGOs are reluctant to conduct business with, or ask for assistance from, military organizations, fearing a compromise to their neutrality or impartiality.

6. Personnel Recovery Mission Planning and Execution

a. PR Mission Decision Making. Commanders and staffs from the JPRC and PRCCs to unit levels need to develop a systematic process to enhance decision making during a PR mission (i.e., save time) and develop a “battle-rhythm” between C2 nodes. The decision process will be improved as PR missions are completed and updated as personnel, resources, environmental, and other factors change. A decision process tool, whether it is a flow chart (e.g., go/no-go) or procedure document, will guide decision makers from the time a report of isolated personnel is received through the reintegration of those personnel. A decision process allows some criteria to be decided in advance and provides a reminder (checklist) of other items that should be remembered during times of crisis. See Figure V-3 for an example of a decision flow chart. This preplanned decision map assists commanders in developing and delegating launch and execute criteria. Recovery forces normally are not committed until after successful authentication. Further, recovery forces normally will not enter a hostile operational environment until the location and authentication of isolated personnel has been verified and recovery is feasible.
Figure V-3. Sample Personnel Recovery Decision Flow Chart
(1) **Essential Information**

(a) **Communication.** To permit interaction and coordination with available recovery forces, JFCs should ensure all personnel at risk of isolation have access to appropriate contacts, communications procedures, and survival equipment. Commanders should also ensure these personnel are updated in a timely manner as changes occur in the operational recovery environment. This element includes information on how and when isolated personnel are communicating, their ability to communicate with recovery forces (secure or nonsecure), present situation, and other essential data. For example:

1. Contact radio frequency, call sign, and date/time group of call.
2. Day and time of incident.
3. Cause of the isolation event.
4. Type/number/color of downed aircraft or disabled/hijacked vehicle to include last known location, speed, and course/direction.
5. Number of isolated personnel.
6. Departure points, rally points, traffic control points, phase lines, and last known location.

(b) **Authentication.** Authentication will continuously assure the decision maker and recovery forces that isolated personnel are an identifiable friendly target not under duress. This is an important element when identifying adversary ruses or tactics using isolated personnel as bait. Authentication information can be acquired using ISOPREP data or, if not available, other information provided by isolated personnel’s organization.

(c) **Location.** Accurate information on the location and physical condition of isolated personnel prior to launching a recovery mission is critical. The degree of accuracy required will depend on the threat or other risk to search/recovery forces; planners can better task organize the recovery force composition, identify special equipment and personnel requirements, and plan ingress and egress routes. There are many ways to determine the isolated person’s location, with varying degrees of accuracy. They are discussed in detail in Section B, “Locate,” of Chapter VI, “Execution.”

(d) **Intentions.** An EPA or contingency plan such as ISG or lost Marine plan may provide an indication of what the isolated personnel will do in an isolating incident. Isolated personnel may not follow their EPA for many reasons, such as confusion, enemy, threat, stress, etc., and therefore should not be used exclusively. Direct communications with isolated personnel are preferred, whenever possible.

(e) **Condition.** Planners should identify requirements for special equipment and personnel and considerations for recovery force egress routes conducive to ambulatory or non-ambulatory isolated personnel. The isolated personnel’s ability to move to meet recovery forces should also be considered.
(f) **Situation.** This includes adversary activity, OPSEC concerns, terrain, climate and weather information, and astronomical conditions.

1. **Climate and weather information** including temperature, precipitation, humidity, visibility at ground level, predicted winds, fog, cloud cover, dust storms, radio frequency propagation, and other hazards to survival and recovery will have a great effect on PR mission planning and execution. The decision maker will use this information to determine the impact on the conduct, timing, and tempo of PR missions.

2. **Astronomical conditions** including sunrise, sunset, moonrise, phases of the moon, predicted ambient light, and hydrographic data affect recovery operations much the same as weather and also play an important role in the timing and tempo of PR missions.

(2) **PR Operational Risk Management.** Recovery operations should not normally risk isolating additional combat personnel, preclude execution of higher priority missions, routinely expose certain unique assets to unduly high risk, divert critically needed forces from ongoing operations, or cause loss of operational initiative. Commanders at all levels should carefully evaluate these factors before ordering or authorizing a PR effort.

(3) **PR Threat Decision Matrix.** PR threat decision matrices (see Figure V-3) provide commanders with a framework for identifying, assessing, and mitigating risks arising from operational factors and make informed decisions about recovery operations that balance risk with mission benefits. Recovery forces may consist of individual or a combination of components including airborne, surface, and/or subsurface resources. Recovery forces can be affected by multiple operational factors and threats such as geography, adversary weapons systems and tactics, weather, etc. However, the operational factors and threats will not affect all components of a recovery force equally. Therefore, each component will develop a PR threat decision matrix tailored to the current threat analysis and type of resource used for identifying go/no-go and abort decision points. The components forward their PR threat decision matrices to the JPRC to help PR planners understand the interrelationships of the various component resources.

b. **Considerations During Development of Recovery Courses of Action**

(1) **Recovery Force Selection.** Commanders and their staffs should be knowledgeable of the type and characteristics of the resources that can be used for recovery operations, and their unique capabilities and limitations in order to properly employ them. This in-depth knowledge also enables commanders and recovery planners to quickly develop alternative COAs in response to changing scenarios. In addition, the following considerations could affect the selection of an appropriate recovery force:

(a) **Activate Alert Forces.** Alert forces can be activated to execute the preplanned PR mission if decision makers are satisfied that the appropriate execute criteria have been met (i.e., communication, authentication, location, intentions, condition, and situation [CALICS] and the results of the decision process).

(b) **Divert Forces from Other Missions.** In some cases, forces assigned to other missions may be diverted to effect an immediate recovery. This option can be applied
when the diverted forces are familiar with PR TTP and/or have conducted PR plan briefings as part of their primary mission, or the risk (decision process) associated with an ad hoc mission is considered acceptable.

(c) The tactics, training, capabilities, and limitations of available recovery or supporting forces.

(d) Capacity. Recovery forces and assets are based or pre-positioned in locations where they are expected to most effectively facilitate recovery operations. Since individuals are often isolated in unexpected areas and numbers, in some cases the capacity of available recovery forces may be inadequate for the number of isolated personnel. Commanders should be prepared to reallocate recovery assets to compensate for this imbalance or to establish priorities to determine which categories of isolated personnel will be recovered.

(e) Other Combat Operations. Other ongoing combat operations often contribute to a PR mission by diverting adversary activity from the area of the PR incident or by providing on-scene resources that may either complement a PR effort or conduct the recovery. Examples include aircraft returning with unexpended ordnance, airborne C2 platforms, Bradley-equipped brigade combat teams, and surface supporting arms within range of the PR objective.

(f) Location of orbits for support aircraft such as EW, aerial refueling, and airborne C2 platforms are often required for PR missions. Because these assets are normally employed in a standoff role, range and altitude capabilities of threat systems will affect the usefulness of these support platforms.

(g) Supporting Arms. The development of supporting arms requirements and subsequent supporting arms coordination are often factors in PR mission planning. Units capable of conducting recovery operations will develop appropriate fire support coordinating measures to safeguard friendly forces and provide responsive support to recovery operations.

For further guidance on supporting arms, refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.

(2) Selection of Recovery Site. Local conditions should be considered as exploitable, surmountable factors rather than absolute barriers to success. Considerations in the selection of a recovery site include whether there is air, land, or maritime access to the site, the location of the site from friendly, neutral, or adversary controlled territory, and the need to get diplomatic clearance to gain access.

(3) Airspace and Ground Operation Deconfliction. The PRTF commander, in coordination with the JPRC and PRCC, should deconflict both ground and airspace activities with PR mission plans to ensure safety and prevent adverse effects on other combat operations. JPRC and PRCC planners can prepare some deconfliction actions in advance by considering artillery fire zones, amphibious objective areas (AOAs), strike aircraft airflow patterns, no fire zones, restricted fire zones, altitude restrictions, and unit boundaries in ground recoveries. Coordination with the airspace control authority and reference to the airspace control order is essential to deconflicting joint air operations. The JPRC and
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component PRCCs normally visualize spatial relationships by including the following on their situation maps:

(a) Adversary threat order of battle, disposition of friendly forces, and locations of future targets.

(b) Information from the airspace control order, to include planned PR mission routes or waypoints, bullseye, and search and rescue point (SARDOT).

(c) Location of orbits for support aircraft such as EW, aerial refueling, and airborne C2 platforms often required for PR missions.

(d) Location of ground force established FARPs.

*For further guidance on airspace deconfliction, refer to JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control.*


(5) **PR Mission Execution Decision.** Based on the PR command authorities established, a commander’s awareness of the situation, and level of confidence in CALICS, recovery forces can be launched and/or given an execute order at any time after a PR incident report is received.

(a) **Immediate.** Immediate PR mission responses generally use available assets that are in the immediate vicinity of the isolated person’s location, on alert, or can be expediently diverted from other missions.

(b) **Deliberate.** The threat, asset availability, current operations, and isolated personnel situation may preclude using an immediate PR response option in favor of more detailed planning and real-time intelligence information. Consequently, the PR mission coordinator will need to plan and organize a deliberate PR response that could involve the creation of a recovery force comprised of assets from a single component, joint or multinational forces, or multi-agency organizations.

(c) **Hold.** A PR mission placed on “hold” status typically reflects a lack of confidence in the accuracy of, or amount of, data collected on CALICS, and/or the outcome of the decision-making process does not meet the criteria to execute the mission (e.g., the location of isolated personnel is unknown and there is no contact). Missions also may be placed in a “hold” status by the CCDR due to overriding political concerns, or to preclude compromise of strategic or operational objectives. Every incident placed in this category should remain open and be continuously reviewed until the isolated personnel have been recovered or declared dead by the appropriate authorities. It is possible for isolated
personnel to survive for long periods of time, or escape captivity, before finally making contact with friendly forces.

(6) **PR Mission Closure.** A PR mission is closed when the death of an isolated person is confirmed or when the recovered isolated person has been reintegrated. A report of “no chute seen” or “duty status-whereabouts unknown” is not justification for closing the PR mission. If the JFC has exhausted all means to locate and recover an isolated person and the case is still open, the JPRC should formally transfer it to DPMO for final resolution IAW established procedures normally developed by DPMO for transferring POW or unaccounted for personnel information. If a recovered isolated person is returned to duty at the end of reintegration phases I or II, or once a JFC transfers the person back to their Service for phase III, the JPRC will close the case folder and transfer it to the JPRA, when no longer needed in theater by JPRC, or operations cease, whichever is sooner. The JFC provides a copy of the file to the Service personnel or casualty branch. The JPRA will continue to monitor and assist the Services with phase III reintegration of returned isolated personnel from theater.

(7) **Mission Reports.** All data connected with a specific mission will be consolidated into one full-spectrum PR mission package and sent to the JPRA for archival purposes. The AAR and LL will be provided to joint and Service LL databases by the JFC.
CHAPTER VI
EXECUTION

“In critical and baffling situations, it is always best to return to first principle and simple action.”

Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill
(1874–1965)

1. Introduction

Successful execution of PR missions requires creativity, improvisations, and real-time intelligence, even when forces are well-trained, prepared, and pre-positioned. Commanders and staffs, forces, and personnel at risk of isolation should use the following validated procedures and techniques to accomplish the five PR execution tasks.

SECTION A. REPORT

2. Distress Notification

a. The report task begins with the recognition of an isolation event and ends when appropriate C2 authorities are informed. JFCs may be notified of a PR requirement through any means within the joint or component force C2 structure. A receiving entity should confirm a distress notification. The distress indicator may be detected by multiple assets, each relaying the incident directly to the PRCC or JPRC, causing multiple reports of the same incident. Be aware that adversaries may employ counter-PR techniques to lure assets to an ambush. Confirmation of actual reported PR events is essential to protect recovery forces. The report task may be accomplished by the JPRC or PRCC as a result of active coordination with other staff sections. For example, reports may come through personnel or logistical channels that suggest that a member of the organization is missing.

b. Determining Method of Notification. The communication method or device used to generate the notification, either by the observer or the isolated personnel, is an important piece of information and can be an important element of the locate task and the recovery planning. It can let the recovery force know what kind of communication capability the individual does or does not have, affecting their actions once the individual is located.

3. Notification Methods and Procedures

a. Methods. Notifications fall into two general categories: observer reported and self-reported.

   (1) Observer Reported. Any ground or maritime unit, agency, aircrew, or individual observing an isolation event, making contact with isolated personnel, or recognizing a potential isolating event is about to occur should immediately notify their appropriate C2 elements. An observer report is either a positive action such as a radio call or a negative activity such as the failure to return from a mission. A report should be made by
potential isolated personnel, for example, when aircrews detect significant aircraft problems, or bailout, ejection, crash landing, or ditching appear imminent; or when ground personnel sense being lost or cut off from other friendly forces. The opportunity to report after the event has happened may be hindered by lost or damaged communications equipment or because of incapacitation or capture.

(a) The observer should attempt to establish radio contact with isolated personnel by using established radio procedures on the frequency of last contact, an established common frequency, or the international emergency frequencies.

(b) When communication is established, obtain and retransmit essential information such as location, call sign, number of individuals, and health status. These elements of information help establish an accurate location of the isolated personnel, their status, and their environment. All transmissions with the isolated personnel should be as brief as possible.

(2) Self-Reported. The ideal method to validate the occurrence of an isolation event and to convey the accurate location and physical health of the isolated person is through self-reporting by the isolated person. All personnel should attempt to report their situation as soon as possible after an isolation event occurs with consideration given to the environment, avoiding adversary threats, and not compromising the security of the contact area. Isolated personnel should attempt to establish radio contact with any friendly forces in the area (wingman, squad, unit, aircraft, vessel, etc.). Mission orders and instructions dictate local notification methods and procedures. Transmissions should be brief to avoid detection or localization by hostile forces. Isolated personnel should generally not display international distress signals or transmit blind distress calls unless pre-briefed to do so or if forces in the immediate vicinity are known to be friendly (e.g., permissive environment).

(a) Signaling. Isolated personnel should attempt to report their situation by any means available. However, radio transmissions, visual signals, or other predetermined methods should only be employed after assessing the adversary’s ability to intercept and the ability of friendly forces to receive the distress signal. In some circumstances (i.e., radio silence procedures), visual signals may be the best (or only) way to communicate with friendly forces. Information on ground-to-air signals (GTAS) should also be available in common signaling instructions.

(b) Emergency Personal Locator Beacon. Some personnel may possess an emergency PLB. The PLB should only be used as directed, as it is susceptible to adversary DF. Personnel should register all PLBs in the Joint Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking Electronic Tracking System (JSETS) before use in any operational area. Additionally, personnel should annotate their ISOPREP/EPA with the PLB unique ID number and inform their PRCC that they are deploying with the device. During the months prior to a deployment into theater, PRCC directors should begin accounting for and registration of the numerous PLBs that will be or are active within their operational area. The JSETS PLB registration site is [https://prmsglobal.prms.af.mil](https://prmsglobal.prms.af.mil).
b. Responsibilities

(1) **Emergency Frequency Monitoring.** If equipped, all forces should monitor emergency frequencies and acknowledge, record, and relay distress transmissions. The forces receiving isolated personnel emergency transmissions should transmit their location to the C2 nodes at time of receipt.

(2) **Communications Relay.** Any friendly force receiving information about potential isolating events or isolated personnel should forward the details (by secure means if possible) to the nearest C2 authority (e.g., Airborne Warning and Control System [AWACS], local unit, E-2C, control and reporting center, component PRCC, or the JPRC). Extreme care should be taken to ensure the isolated personnel’s situation is not compromised, and that relay transmissions do not interfere with distress calls.

(3) **On-Scene Commander.** Reporting forces may assume the role of the OSC and should remain in the area as conditions permit or until relieved or replaced by the rescue mission commander (RMC) or other forces. (See OSC responsibilities in Section D, “Recover.”) Forces should be sensitive to compromising the isolated person’s position to adversary forces. The reporting/supporting forces, if capable, should:

   (a) Keep personnel or equipment in sight.

   (b) Note the current location of, or last known location of, the isolation site. In case of pilot ejection, note the approximate ejection site and winds at altitude so PR planners can compute the isolated person’s probable landing position.

   (c) During radio communication with the isolated person, recommend switching the isolated individual to a discrete frequency. Aircraft should consider switching ID, friend or foe to EMERGENCY and transmitting “MAYDAY” on GUARD frequency. This technique should be carefully weighed against the probability of adversary detection.

   (d) Provide communications relay and defensive cover, if possible.

   (e) Provide necessary updates, using CALICS, to include possible isolated personnel injuries, disposition and movement of hostile forces, terrain factors, and potential recovery sites.

4. **Notification Responses**

a. **Unit.** When notified of a subordinate element or individual’s isolation, the unit commander confirms the identity of the isolated personnel, notifies the parent PRCC of the incident, decides if immediate support using nearby forces is appropriate, designates an OSC and/or RMC accordingly, and forwards ISOPREP and EPA data, as required. Unit commanders also need to keep their higher HQ appraised of their capability to conduct recovery operations and the status of ongoing activities in support of their own operations. **History shows that acting quickly and using all immediately available resources improve the chance of successful recovery.** When immediate recovery is not possible, the unit commander expeditiously requests assistance from the parent joint force component,
using the most secure communications system available. Such requests should be followed by appropriate message traffic (e.g., SARIR, SARREQ). Specific procedures should be annotated in the PR CONOPS or OPLAN.

b. The PRCC assumes responsibility for coordinating the response initially and reports the incident to the JPRC by the quickest and most secure means. Such reports should be followed up using the applicable AMHS or other electronic means as directed. The component PRCC then initiates PR mission planning, continuously updates CALICS, determines the isolated person’s location, notifies JPRC and the recovery force, receives an intelligence briefing on the threat surrounding the objective area (if known), tasks subordinate forces when authorized, and informs the JPRC if component recovery forces will attempt recovery. The component PRCC reports to the JPRC the status of the component’s capabilities to conduct the PR mission and may request additional PR support to be arranged for by the JPRC. The JPRC may request additional support from the JTF, or may request that the mission be reassigned to a more capable recovery force within another component. The component PRCC will be the vital link between the OSC and joint force support that may be available within, or adjacent to, the operational area. The component PRCC obtains ISOPREP and EPA data from the isolated person’s unit, or retrieves the information from PRMS.

c. The JPRC forwards PR incident reports and information to higher authority, as directed, and alerts all forces operating in the area of the isolation event to report any evidence of isolated personnel. The JPRC also provides follow-up PR incident reports and information to higher authority, adjacent JPRCs, and component PRCCs, as appropriate. Depending on the situation, the JPRC also should:

(1) Notify theater and national-level intelligence agencies to initiate collection efforts to refine the location of the isolated personnel and assess the adversary threat in the objective area.

For further information on national PR support capabilities, refer to Concept of Operations for National Overhead SIGINT Support to Personnel Recovery. Also refer to Appendix B, “Classified Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery (published separately).”

(2) Direct component(s) parallel planning, as required.

(3) Coordinate JFC tasking of another component(s) (per the PR CONOPS) to execute the PR mission when notified that a component is unable to do so or requires support.

(4) Coordinate with the components, as needed, for use of PR resources.

(5) Coordinate development of a PRTF.

(6) Coordinate with the UARCC to alert NAR forces.

(7) Continuously update CALICS.
d. **Documentation Requirements.** Documentation is used during all PR tasks to include reintegration and development of PR LL. Accurate reporting and tracking of each PR incident and mission is essential. The following documentation should be completed and forwarded by the JPRC and maintained on file until no longer needed. When the files are no longer needed, they should be forwarded to the combatant command PR OPR, who in turn forwards them to JPRA for final disposition. **Incident logs, mission folders, or case files will not be destroyed.**

(1) The controller’s log maintains a chronological record of all incidents and daily activity.

(2) Mission folders are prepared each time an incident receives mission status. A PR incident transitions to mission status when the available information reasonably validates the need for a PR effort. Mission folders should include:

   (a) Authentication information in effect at the time of isolation, the isolated personnel’s evasion plans and ISOPREP, and any other specific information or SPINS about, or briefed to, isolated personnel before their departure. This type of information becomes more important the longer a person is isolated and becomes increasingly more difficult to gather as time progresses.

   (b) The JPRC mission tracking number.

   (c) Participating PR units or assets.

   (d) Date mission opened, suspended, and closed.

   (e) Mission results.

(3) The ELT and emergency position-indicating radio beacon (EPIRB) worksheet documents all ELT and/or EPIRB incidents received by the JPRC.

(4) The aircraft incident log documents awareness and the response to aviation PR incidents.

(5) The non-aircraft incident log records the receipt and response to all non-aircraft, non-ELT incidents.

**SECTION B. LOCATE**

5. **General**

The locate task involves the effort taken to precisely find and authenticate isolated personnel. It starts upon recognition of an isolation event and continues until the isolated person is recovered. An accurate location and positive authentication are normally required prior to committing recovery forces.
6. Determine and Maintain Location

a. A successful recovery generally depends on the accuracy and reliability of the coordinates or description of the isolated personnel’s location. Ideally, an isolated person would be under direct friendly visual contact from the time of the isolating event until recovered. Accurate and reliable location coordinates and the ability to communicate those coordinates between the force elements in a secure manner are necessary to ensure proper support to, and recovery of, isolated personnel. However, some ground force maneuver units can conduct searches of large areas using their movement techniques (e.g., movement-to-contact to link up with friendly forces or isolated personnel). The preferred device or technique to be used by isolated personnel to communicate their location is dependent on the situation in which they find themselves and the recovery force dispatched to find them. The environmental situation or the individual’s SA may be an impediment to finding an exact, accurate location. The JPJC/PRCC, working with employed forces, supporting functions, and when possible, the isolated personnel, should continue to refine the accuracy and reliability of location information (coordinates and description) until the isolated person is recovered. Based on risk and the probability of success, the methods and TTP in searching for isolated personnel should be evaluated prior to employment. For instance, the risk of conducting an overt search could highlight the isolated person’s location to the adversary. This should be weighed against the potential benefit of a rapid recovery before enemy forces have time to mount an organized response. Appropriate forces should be employed to mitigate all risks while meeting mission requirements. For example, a UAS could minimize the risk to forces but may not be able to provide needed protection to the isolated personnel.

b. Using Information Sources. Commanders should consider devising signals that can be recognized by isolated personnel not equipped with communications equipment. The commander’s analysis and planned exploitation, integration, and interoperability of all capabilities available (see Chapter I, “Introduction”) should pay large dividends in accomplishing the locate execution task. All agencies, nations, and military, governmental, nongovernmental, and external (outside the operational area) organizations form an operational area network with enormous capability to assist in locating isolated personnel. Adequate charts, route overlays, patrol reports, and available photos or imagery of the objective area can assist in determining the isolated personnel’s last known location, physical condition, direction of travel, and proximity to population centers or threats. EPA information, recorded contact information, the last known direction of travel, and other pertinent information should be superimposed on a chart of the objective area to provide the recovery force with an isolated personnel movement pattern. Note natural boundaries and features such as hills, foliage, streams, or lakes that may enhance or restrict isolated personnel movement.

c. Search methods include electronic, ground force reconnaissance, and/or visual search methods specifically tailored for each isolation incident. The operational environment, adversary activity, weather, time of day, terrain, and available resources all play an important role in selection of the search area and method.

(1) Electronic searches require an electronically permissive environment. Current radio systems are all subject to some degree of adversary jamming, deception, monitoring, or
DF intrusion. Initial radio contact with isolated personnel usually occurs on an emergency (Guard) frequency, but subsequent transmissions should be on a pre-designated PR frequency. Standoff electronic support aircraft and satellites should be used. Electronic searches involving use of DF or homing equipment may be limited initially by the sending (i.e., emergency locator beacon) and receiving (i.e., homing adaptor) capabilities of isolated personnel and recovery forces and subsequently by adversary activity. Some additional isolated personnel radio and electronic equipment limitations and capabilities to consider are:

(a) The adversary can intercept its signal, so isolated personnel should limit radio transmissions and use code words until the recovery phase.

(b) Some radios are limited to LOS capability, thereby presenting a major concern for helicopters operating in a threat environment at low altitudes.

(c) Final authentication should still be ascertained to ensure the radio operator is indeed friendly personnel.

(d) For GPS equipped radios, the PR mission coordinators should always check time of GPS fix against transmission time stamp and coordinates to ensure accuracy of information prior to relay to recovery forces.

(e) Similar to US and multinational forces, adversary forces also employ DF techniques to locate isolated personnel. Adversary DF and intelligence-gathering methods should be understood by all recovery mission participants prior to utilizing DF locating methods. Use of aircraft with high speed, accurate DF equipment will minimize required transmissions by the isolated personnel and reduce the probability of adversary detection.

(f) Radios have limited battery life making it critical that monitoring and transmission times be controlled by PR forces to maximize communication time with the isolated personnel. Transmitting uses battery life much more rapidly than monitoring, another factor to be considered by PR forces during the recovery process. Alternatively, some isolated personnel may not be equipped with radios but may have a 406 megahertz PLB with a 24-hour battery life.

(g) SARSAT and associated ground systems are capable of monitoring interference signals and transmitters that malfunction on Guard frequencies. Malfunctioning transmitters could adversely affect the location process or compromise unit or aircraft locations. The JPRC should ensure that SARSAT visibility and availability schedules are published in the applicable instructions. They should also ensure that procedures are established to disseminate SARSAT visibility periods and ground station data to PR organizations and support agencies. Placing a SARSAT downlink station in the JPRC and/or PRCC and coordinating for national support can greatly reduce delays in notifying recovery staffs and forces of an isolating event.

(2) Visual Searches. Manned reconnaissance flights over hostile areas are a viable option when the isolated personnel’s location has not been refined, however it incurs risk. The JPRC or PRCC should be prepared to coordinate with appropriate elements of the operations center and the JAOC for reconnaissance flights over threat areas. Again, the
decision process will assist the mission coordinator in assessing threats, isolated personnel training, equipment capabilities, etc., to develop a plan that has fully considered, to the extent possible under unique conditions, the risks and options (e.g., day or night operations and passive or suppressive threat neutralization). Communications plans and frequency emission control procedures should be kept as simple and as streamlined as possible without decreasing the SA of the search force. Another visual search technique is to employ ground forces in this role. Ground combat forces are robust and have staying power; employing armored forces can increase the survivability of the reconnoitering assets.

(a) **Airborne Search.** Recovery planners may be able to define an air search pattern if the operational environment allows. Otherwise, the only viable airborne search option may be the use of unmanned or stand-off platforms. Searching along the isolated personnel’s intended flight or surface route, areas offering concealment, and pre-briefed locations should be considered. Search patterns should avoid major lines of communications such as roads, railroads, large rivers, or open valleys. These areas are normally frequented by people and often pose the greatest threat to recovery forces and isolated personnel. Combat reconnaissance assets and, in some situations, other aircraft can conduct modified visual searches of specific areas in all operational environments. However, their effectiveness is best if used once the search has been narrowed, as the evasion or concealment site of isolated personnel may be some distance from initial contact or the point of loss. Night vision device (NVD) or forward-looking IR-capable assets are preferred for night searches.

(b) **Ground Search.** If terrain, vegetation, isolated personnel condition, or the threat makes an airborne search unfeasible, a ground search may be required. A ground team or a ground combat unit with a secure communications capability is highly recommended. Recovery planners also should investigate the possibilities of using HUMINT assets and other resources (IGOs, NGOs, etc.) in the area to locate isolated personnel and to determine their status (i.e., health, captured, evading, direction of movement).

(c) **Maritime Search.** An open ocean or littoral search may be required. When planning a maritime PR operation, due consideration must be given to international versus territorial waters, international law, proximal nation-state or terror organization capabilities and practices, operation-specific ROE, and FP.

(3) **Search Areas and Patterns.** Electronic and visual searches may be conducted in **inland** and **maritime** areas using the listed search patterns. Repeated searches of the same area are almost always necessary. The grid pattern is unique to inland searches and the following are some of the methods that may be used in inland or maritime searches.

(a) Boundary method.

(b) Corner point method.
On 1 September 1968, Lt Col William A. Jones III, commander of the 602nd Special Operations Squadron at Nakhon Phanom (NKP), Thailand, launched in an A-1H Skyraider on a combat rescue mission. The Navy had retired the Skyraider from combat service the previous April…but the United States Air Force continued to employ the prop-driven machine for the Sandy mission, the perilous job of escorting helicopters on combat rescue missions. On this day, with the call sign Sandy One, Lt Col Jones was flight leader and on-scene commander of an attempt to rescue the crew of an F-4D Phantom, downed by anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) fire the previous day. Lt Col Jones’ wingman was Captain Paul A. Meeks in Sandy Two.

Entering North Vietnam from Laos, Lt Col Jones heard Phantoms talking to the downed pilot. The second crew member had apparently already been captured. Though the downed pilot remained in voice contact, his exact location was not clear.

As Jones and Meeks turned toward the scene, an explosion shook Jones’ aircraft and the cockpit began to fill with smoke. He had been hit but the tough, durable Skyraider was not ready to go down yet.

Lt Col Jones’ mission now depended upon two factors: fuel and time. Jones in the injured Sandy One led Meeks in Sandy Two beneath the overcast, provoking enemy fire, still trying to pinpoint the survivor’s exact position. Finally, the downed pilot reported on voice radio that two Skyraiders were directly over-head. While trolling for fire (Jones was so low that an AAA gun was actually firing down at him from a slope) and taking damage, Lt Col Jones had pinpointed the survivor.

More gunfire ripped into his Skyraider and pierced its thin metal skin…the rocket motor for the Skyraider’s ejection system had been ignited by the AAA fire…he decided that there was no choice but to bail out…the ejection seat didn’t work!

In excruciating pain, choking, but with a functioning radio, Lt Col Jones struggled to transmit the location of the downed pilot and the AAA batteries. The familiar screeching, as the airwaves again were overloaded with pilots in the area as they shouted at Bill to get out of his burning Skyraider. Just when he thought he had broken through to pass the vital information to the rescue force, his transmitter gave off electrical smoke and died.

Somehow, with Meeks helping on his wing, (Jones could still receive), Lt Col Jones coaxed the mortally damaged A-1H back toward NKP. His eyes were rapidly swelling from the burns when he set up for a bad-weather approach to NKP. After he landed the “totaled” aircraft, the survivor still foremost in his mind, Lt Col Jones debriefed the mission from an ambulance stretcher, giving vital information, which led later to a successful “save” of the downed F-4D pilot.

**SOURCE:** Excerpted from Dorr, Robert F., *Air War-Hanoi*, Blandford Press, 1988
(c) Center point method.
(d) Trackline method.
(e) Counter method.

For further guidance on visual searches and search area designation methods, refer to United States National Search and Rescue Supplement (NSS) to the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual.

(4) **Objective Area Search.** The objective area is the designated vicinity surrounding the isolated personnel’s expected position. Once in the objective area, it may be difficult to visually obtain the isolated personnel’s exact location. A visual search in the objective area can increase the risk to the recovery force, other assets, and isolated personnel. A limited visual or electronic search employing radio DF capability may be employed. Every effort should be made to minimize highlighting recovery assets and isolated personnel. The recovery force should be prepared to use the isolated personnel to signal their location and, if possible, direct the recovery vehicle(s) to their selected extraction location.

(a) A **terminal area search** is normally conducted by the OSC. The **objective/terminal area** is the immediate vicinity around the extraction site, which becomes the primary focus for FP and recovery activities. Recovery vehicles remain at a holding point with some escort assets, if available, while the OSC locates and authenticates isolated personnel. Extraction site location and ingress and/or egress routes will be relayed to the recovery vehicles.

(b) **Electronic Search.** All recovery force participants should be prepared to establish communications with isolated personnel. Radios should be preset to PR mission channel frequencies. Unless a radio silent recovery is required and planned, a transmission with the isolated personnel’s call sign should be made when LOS/OTH communications are expected. When communications are established, the recovery vehicle can be vectored to the precise extraction location. The recovery force may be able to “home-in” on the isolated personnel’s radio transmission or receive an encrypted data burst transmission, if the equipment and systems are available. If no response is received (isolated personnel may be able to receive but not transmit), the recovery force should continue to monitor and transmit on designated frequencies, or attempt contact with the isolated personnel on other PR frequencies. Some survival radios have the capability to transmit authentication and GPS location. These advanced survival radios include not only voice and beacon capability but the ability to send/receive secure voice and data through both LOS and OTH methods. There are also current technology solutions such as blue force trackers, which are constantly adapting and evolving, that offer capabilities to accomplish the locate execution task. Once contacted and authenticated, isolated personnel should be asked to identify, within acceptable risks, their position using established procedures.

7. **Protracted Recovery Cases**

   a. Generally speaking, a case becomes protracted when:
1. The frequency or value of intelligence, information, or search results decreases to a point that it is no longer helpful in reducing the area of uncertainty in the isolated personnel’s location to a manageable level.

2. All logical leads have been exhaustively pursued with negligible (isolated personnel not found) results.

3. The heightened risk to forces involved in performing searches outweighs potential gains in information.

b. At this point, the commander develops a strategy for a protracted situation. It may be helpful to perform a global review of all information received up to that point to provide a holistic view, using a separate team, if available, to allow for a fresh perspective. In this respect, PR activities in protracted cases share equities with intelligence collection and law enforcement investigative procedures, which may be useful in providing insight or new approaches to the case. However, the focus must remain on the isolated personnel, and the lead for coordination of investigative and intelligence activities should remain with the PR cell.

8. Extended Searches

a. There are occasions during hostilities when isolated personnel cannot be located in a timely manner and all investigative avenues have been pursued. The effort to locate them continues, but evidence and information arrive much more slowly, and may be of little value. Complicating this is the need to continue concentrating limited resources and efforts of the JPRC or PRCC on more current isolating events. JFCs may establish an organization that supports the JPRC or PRCC by handling these long-term cases. Once hostilities are over and depending upon the US military presence, the GCC will seek guidance on the disposition of unresolved cases. Personnel accounting operations typically require specialized teams operating in a permissive environment and trained in sensitive site exploitation, forensic investigation, history, regional affairs, archival methods, interview techniques, and foreign languages to carry out the personnel accounting processes. Until that time, internal accountability of the evidence remains a responsibility of the CCDR or JFC, and continuous efforts need to be made to bring the case to closure.

b. Elements of the Extended Search

1) Investigate Cases to Locate Isolated Personnel. When investigating hostage taking, kidnapping, and other cases whose location resolution is not immediately forthcoming, a commander may need to establish an investigative team using a standing cell integrated into the local or regional joint/interagency operations center to assist the investigation of these longer-term, “cold cases” while hostilities continue. Manning for the investigative cell will vary depending on the number of cases, extent of territory covered, and variables in the nonpermissive operational environment. Assigned personnel may include all-source intelligence analysts with experience in human network analysis (counterterrorism or similar experience), and personnel with experience investigating and managing cases (like criminal cases). The cell should coordinate with and establish
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PERSONNEL RECOVERY DIVISION, IRAQ

In Iraq, US Central Command created an organization called the Personnel Recovery Division (PRD) that collaborated with Department of Defense (DOD) and non-DOD agencies to provide intelligence fusion to assist in locating missing DOD personnel and non-DOD American citizens, coalition members, and other designated individuals. US Government agencies such as US Embassy Baghdad’s Office of Hostage Affairs, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other intelligence and law enforcement agencies, as well as representatives of coalition forces, were synchronized through a Joint Interagency Personnel Recovery Working Group (JIAPRWG) to ensure coordination, collaboration, and synergy. Additionally, the Government of Iraq and its agencies often were the best source of intelligence and support for personnel recovery (PR) operations, due to their local knowledge, as well as their understanding of the operational environment. The PRD and the JIAPRWG were also prepared to provide PR planning and intelligence support to commanders, as requested, to facilitate the rapid recovery of military personnel, especially in cases in which the location continued to be unknown.

SOURCE: Joint Personnel Recovery Agency

relationships that include DOD, interagency, multinational, and HN partners. The network supporting this function may include (but is not limited to) theater forensics organizations, mortuary affairs representatives, military investigative and intelligence Services, DOS, Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), national intelligence agencies, other government organizations, HN law enforcement and intelligence assets, and multinational PR, intelligence, and law enforcement assets if appropriate. HN liaison is especially critical as these individuals will often have the best understanding of the area, local affiliations, and local hostage-taking attitudes and TTP.

(2) In addition to investigatory techniques, many tasks and techniques associated with personnel accounting (traditionally conducted to recover remains of Service members from previous wars) may become viable. Personnel accounting operations typically require specialized teams operating in a permissive environment that are trained in sensitive site exploitation, forensic investigation, history, regional affairs, archival methods, interview techniques, and foreign languages to carry out the personnel accounting processes. Such capability may help in a recovery.

(3) Select and Evaluate Site for Exploitation. Sensitive sites rarely fit a standard template, and the size, nature, and complexity of the site is often not readily apparent. The unit conducting the exploitation directs reconnaissance to determine the enemy defenses, extent of the site, and terrain factors. Normally, the unit requests additional surveillance means, particularly aerial surveillance and reconnaissance, to gain an accurate, three-dimensional picture of the site. Reconnaissance continues until the site is secured. In some cases, the sensitive site operation will combine hasty operations with a deliberate response.
(a) **Collect, Preserve, and Transport Evidence from Site.** Under the direction of forensics and other experts, or if directed to do so by higher HQ, the tactical unit or sensitive site exploitation team searches the scene for evidence—documenting, processing, collecting, and preserving the evidence that is found. The search may unearth fragile items of evidence that should be processed and collected as they are found, rather than after the preliminary search is completed.

(b) The FBI and HN law enforcement may accompany recovery forces in order to preserve evidence that will support future criminal prosecutions.

(c) **Conduct Forensic Investigation and Associate Collected Evidence with Isolated Personnel.** Forensic specialists evaluate available data and determine identity supported by a preponderance of evidence. This effort often is facilitated by the collection of family reference DNA [deoxyribonucleic acid] samples and other evidence from families to narrow the field of possible IDs. Proper excavation and handling of remains IAW appropriate scientific and legal guidelines is critical for removing doubt about the validity of ID. The ID process is lengthy, and efforts to identify a particular set of remains may require additional data or newer technologies.

(d) **Conduct Investigation (Interviews, Records Collection/Review)**

1. The tasks included in a long-term case investigation, in its most basic form, consists of planning, collecting factual data, documenting collected data, assessing all data, and taking measured and prudent actions to resolve the event. Focused investigations may require the collection of information from a variety of sources, such as US and foreign archives, witness interviews, field research, forensics, private individuals and groups, military units, intelligence organizations, and many others. Analysts evaluate and correlate this information to identify potential captivity locations or/burial sites. Given the scope of incoming data and the diversity of sources, information sharing among analysts within the PR and accounting communities is critical to the comprehensive evaluation of data.

2. The investigatory techniques simply represent another method of determining location and status of isolated personnel—information should be accessible to all members of the network, and network members should be able to contribute case information that is accessible to the rest of the network.

3. Access to a complete collection of information related to a particular case is particularly important to investigation-oriented PR efforts. Without ability to review and analyze all the data collected by the various members of the network, the case event manager and investigators are limited in their ability to solve the case.

4. A subset skill of investigating is the ability to properly interview persons to obtain information of value and develop sources for locating isolated personnel. Investigators and intelligence collectors supporting PR missions should be sufficiently trained or experienced. In addition, the investigators should have access to information from a variety of persons, to include witnesses, and then collate and connect that data with forensic information (e.g., biometric information of the isolated personnel and perpetrators of
the isolating event, latent prints, computer messages, messages left behind, behavioral analysis of the last known location of the isolated personnel, soil samples, tool marks, or casts of impressions).

9. Authenticate

Every effort will be made to authenticate isolated personnel prior to committing recovery forces in a threat environment. The recovery force may follow detainee handling procedures to minimize risk to the recovery force and the isolated person, whether or not authentication has occurred. The authentication systems, as discussed in Chapter V, “Planning,” should be attempted when feasible. Where reference biometric files for isolated personnel or methods of transmitting biometric data are not available, other effective authentication methods include use of ISOPREP data, theater code words, challenge and password, and visual signals discussed earlier. The recovery force should conduct a face-to-face authentication once isolated personnel are in custody. It may be necessary to conduct multiple authentications of isolated personnel during various stages of the recovery effort.

“*This morning our family joins America in rejoicing over the news of the safe return of seven brave heroes to US military custody in Iraq…This is certainly an answer to our prayers and—we’re certain—the prayers of literally millions of other concerned citizens.*”

*Family of Private First Class Jessica Lynch, 12 April 2003*

SECTION C. SUPPORT

10. General

The support task involves providing support to both the isolated person and to the isolated person’s family, with specific objectives for each. The forces used to support the isolated personnel should know the objectives and be capable of executing the TTP to achieve them. Decision makers should properly assess and mitigate risks in order to successfully execute the support task. There are several aspects of support.

11. Support to Isolated Personnel

The support to the isolated person may begin upon reporting that an individual is isolated and ends when the individual is recovered, once reintegration begins. There are five objectives in supporting isolated personnel:

a. Communication. Establishing communication with the isolated person will facilitate all other tasks. Two-way voice communication would be ideal, but any type of overt or covert communication can increase the likelihood of a successful recovery. MISO communications platforms can provide loudspeaker commentary that would be understood
by isolated personnel. OTH data transmission capable hand-held survival radios can provide SA and moral support to isolated personnel until a recovery can be accomplished.

b. **Situational Awareness.** Gaining, maintaining, and increasing the isolated person’s SA by providing information on adversary and environmental threats, recovery procedures, and other pertinent information will enable the isolated person to better plan actions and make accurate decisions.

c. **Morale.** All interaction with the isolated person should consider the need to establish, maintain, and enhance their positive attitude. A high morale enhances the isolated person’s ability to focus on proper application of their knowledge and skills to survive, evade, resist, and escape. Communication with isolated personnel can provide positive reinforcement to offset the effects of emotional stress, fear, or injuries. Creative planning, positive messages, imbedding visual signals into plans, and resupply can serve to boost the morale of isolated personnel.

d. **Protection.** Protection activities can range from fire support (close air support [CAS], artillery) to deception techniques designed to make an adversary believe the isolated person is someplace other than the actual location.

e. **Resupply**

(1) **Caches** may be pre-positioned in adversary-controlled territory or in regions subject to being overrun by adversary forces, and their use should be considered in environments where extended evasion is necessary. Evaders and ground recovery forces can use caches as sources of supplies, communications equipment, and other evasion aids. In denied areas, nonconventional forces may emplace caches before and/or after the outbreak of hostilities. Agencies and organizations that direct the establishment of caches to support potential evaders need to keep the JPRC advised of the status and locations of those caches.

(2) **Resupply Operations.** When there are no pre-positioned caches, it is possible to deliver resupply packages to isolated personnel by aircraft. The need for this type of activity should be weighed against the risk to the isolated person and the forces involved, and the capability to mitigate that risk.

12. **Support to Families of Isolated Personnel**

Support to the families begins at a time deemed appropriate by the Service. Such support may be necessitated if and when the isolated person’s situation or name is publicly released or when personnel witnessing or knowing about the isolation might call the family. When deemed appropriate, PR-trained combatant command and Service personnel, assisted as necessary by DPMO and JPRA, should meet with the family members of concern (which may not always be the immediate family or NOK) to update them on the situation, provide points of contact, and establish the means of support for them. The objective is to make them aware of the commitment and capability of the USG to recover the isolated person and to educate them on themes they should project and information they should protect to best support the isolated person. Planners should coordinate with the employer, if the isolated
person is a contractor. The contracting company may have a public relations office and family support program to assist in the support efforts.

a. **Family Awareness.** Informing the family about the USG commitment and, in broad terms, the capability to recover isolated personnel should reduce the frustration experienced by the family. The Service or combatant command (depending on location of the family) should provide a POC that will provide timely, accurate, and pertinent information (consistent with OPSEC and other security concerns) to the family in a sensitive manner.

b. **Media** always seek out family members of isolated, detained, or captured personnel. It is essential that the Services rapidly communicate and coordinate with the families of distressed personnel to aid the survival of the isolated person, including the awareness of intense media interest and possible repercussions to the isolated person from what the families might say or reveal.

(1) **Project.** The following themes can serve to express what most families feel during these situations and should not harm the isolated personnel.

   (a) Confidence that the USG is doing all it can to recover the isolated personnel.

   (b) Expectation that the captors will treat isolated personnel IAW the Geneva Conventions.

   (c) Love/respect/etc., for the isolated person.

(2) **Protect.** Family members should be cautioned about releasing information or visual images that may be harmful to the isolated personnel.

   (a) Specific personal information.

   (b) Professional information of any kind (assignments, qualifications, etc.).

   (c) Negative emotions.

### SECTION D. RECOVER

### 13. General

The **recover** task involves the coordinated actions and efforts of commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel to bring isolated personnel under the physical custody of a friendly organization. The recover task begins with the launch or redirection of forces or the engagement of diplomatic or civil processes, and ends when the recovery element hands off the formerly isolated person to the reintegration team. The recover task is accomplished through PR operation and mission planning, and individual and synergistic actions of commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel. Operational flexibility and multi-system redundancy are the primary factors in successful recovery. No single recovery
system, force, or organization is suitable to all situations or can meet all requirements in any given situation. To cover all contingencies, a mix of conventional and nonconventional recovery capabilities should be available for employment. Failure to establish and test multiple recovery capabilities or to adapt standardized recovery capabilities to local conditions invites failure. The decision-making process, established early during planning and preparation, will greatly assist decision makers and PR mission coordinators to launch and execute a timely and successful recovery effort.

14. Recovery Methods

Isolated personnel have a responsibility to facilitate their own recovery to the maximum extent possible. When this is not possible, each Service has formal doctrine to aid in recovery. Methods that may be employed independently or as part of a joint recovery effort include immediate, deliberate, or external supported recovery (ESR) (US Army), CSAR (US Air Force and US Navy), TRAP (US Marine Corps), NAR (SOF), HR, or any TTP employed for a PR mission. Details for many of these methods are found in Appendices C, “United States Army Personnel Recovery,” through H, “Special Operations Forces Personnel Recovery.”
15. **A Personnel Recovery Task Force**

A PRTF is organized to execute a specific PR mission. A PRTF is capable of locating and authenticating isolated personnel, protecting isolated personnel from adversary threats, providing FP for itself, providing mission C2 systems support, and recovering isolated personnel. A PRTF can be dedicated, put on alert, or designated and tasked when needed by the JFC. It is a cohesive, interoperable force that may consist of any variety of dissimilar aircraft, ground vehicles, or maritime vessels. Its size can range from a single recovery vehicle operating within a joint C2 context, to dozens of air, ground, or sea elements working in concert. Short-notice PRTF operations are extremely dependent on the ability to quickly and effectively marshal the required interoperable forces to effect a recovery.

16. **Recovery Force Elements**

a. **Personnel Recovery Task Force Commander.** Appointed by the JFC or the supported commander for PR, the PRTF commander is responsible for the planning, coordination, and execution of the PR mission, using a force comprised of US and/or multinational military forces and/or US agencies.

b. **On-Scene Commander.** The OSC is an individual in the immediate vicinity of an isolating event, who temporarily assumes command, with the best ability to communicate with C2 nodes, recovery forces, and isolated personnel. Once communications have been established with the isolated personnel, the OSC should continue to monitor the isolated personnel’s radio frequency in case immediate actions are required to prevent capture. Communications on the isolated personnel’s radio frequency should be minimized in order to decrease an adversary’s ability to locate the isolated personnel via radio transmissions. Once a qualified RMC is in position to take control of the recovery effort, the OSC should perform a turn-over to include: isolated personnel’s condition, authentication methods, location, threat, supporting assets, and other applicable information that will affect the recovery. A checklist is located in Annex C, “On-Scene Commander/Rescue Mission Commander Checklist,” to Appendix N, “Sample Checklists.”

c. **Rescue Mission Commander.** The RMC is the individual specifically designated to control recovery efforts in the objective area. The RMC is designated through the JPRC, or by the component commander through the PRCC. The RMC initial actions are to collect essential information in the objective area that is threatening to the isolated personnel or recovery force. The RMC should plan and coordinate with all applicable units (organizations) to develop communication plans, ingress and egress routes, and actions of the objective area. Aircraft with a call sign ‘SANDY’ are specifically trained to conduct RMC duties in support of PR missions. A checklist is located in Annex C, “On-Scene Commander/Rescue Mission Commander Checklist,” to Appendix N, “Sample Checklists.” Depending on mission requirements it may be necessary to coordinate for air support such as assault air support, escorts, combat air patrol, tanker support, etc. The RMC must carefully coordinate all mission requirements, planning, and execution among all ground forces, air forces, and supporting forces.
d. **Airborne Mission Coordinator (AMC).** The primary role of the AMC is to coordinate and control aircraft during a mission. Platforms for an AMC are dependent on aircraft availability, but should contain necessary communication abilities to communicate with air and ground units. The desired AMC aircraft is an airborne platform with the best combination of on-station time and organic communications capability. The AMC coordinates mission activities between the OSC, RMC, other recovery force elements, and the supported commander’s operations center, including the applicable JPRC or component PRCC; monitors the status of all elements; requests additional assets as required; and ensures recovery and supporting forces arrive at designated locations to accomplish the recovery mission. The AMC also ensures safety of flight of airborne recovery assets by providing altitude separation, airspace and ground deconfliction, environmental information, and monitoring fuel states. The crew supports the recovery effort by providing navigation assistance and relaying isolated personnel intelligence and authentication data to appropriate C2 agencies and recovery force elements. The AMC coordinates refueling of air recovery assets; keeps the recovery force elements, PRTF commander, and the RMC informed of all pertinent information such as threats, aborts, and EW information; advises the PRTF commander, RMC, and JAOC of mission support requirements; and coordinates the designation and use of appropriate fire support coordinating measures. The AMC advises the PRTF commander and the recovery force elements of mission progress with predesignated execution calls and weather conditions or any other factors affecting mission progress. A PR mission checklist for the AMC is provided in Annex B, “Airborne Mission Coordinator Checklist” to Appendix N, “Sample Checklists.”

e. **Rescue Escort (RESCORT).** The number and type of RESCORT aircraft may determine the success of a recovery operation. Fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft assigned RESCORT responsibilities should be capable of providing the recovery vehicles with reconnaissance, suppressive fire support, and, if possible, communications relay. RESCORT pilots should be specifically trained for recovery operations. When employed, the RESCORT and recovery vehicles of the task force should operate initially under the mission control of an OSC at a predetermined, prebriefed point and time near the objective area. Recovery operations at night and in high-risk situations require unique weapon system capabilities. Because of the differences in the lethality of threats to helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, knowledge of the threat in the recovery area should be assessed in the risk management analysis and carefully evaluated in the decision process that will include the assignment of RESCORT assets. RESCORT aircraft should have the ability to sweep an ingress route and rendezvous with the escorted asset in the event of a route change or other action. RESCORT aircraft should also be able to respond quickly to all threats en route to, from, and in the vicinity of the recovery location and deliver accurate suppressive fire. Coverage should continue through egress until the recovery vehicles reach a permissive operational environment. RESCORT tactics, routing, potential threat encounters, and countermeasures should be understood by all participants. On other than immediate response missions, recovery element briefings (Annex D, “Personnel Recovery Task Force Checklist” to Appendix N, “Sample Checklists”) are mandatory and should include rendezvous points, communications, navigation points, number of helicopters, number of ground vehicles, number of maritime assets, helicopter landing zone (HLZ) positions, objective rally points, near and far recognition signals, and code words. Typical RESCORT responsibilities may include conducting route reconnaissance of the flight route, ground
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route, maritime route, and area reconnaissance of the objective area and determining the level of adversary activity and suppressing surface threats to, from, and within the objective area. RESCORT also assist recovery helicopters, ground forces, and maritime vehicles in locating (i.e., objective area search) and authenticating isolated personnel, function as the RMC when designated by the PRTF commander, and coordinate and control activities of supporting recovery force elements in the objective area.

f. Rescue Combat Air Patrol (RESCAP). RESCAP aircraft are counterair aircraft assigned to protect the recovery force and isolated personnel from airborne threats. RESCAP forces should be available before committing recovery forces if adversary air activity is forecast along the intended flight route, ground or maritime route, or in the objective area. RESCAP may assist in detecting and establishing communications with isolated personnel due to their higher operating altitudes. Typical RESCAP tasks include the following:

1. Maintaining patrol over and protecting isolated Personnel until other elements of the recovery force arrive in the objective area.
2. Assisting in locating isolated Personnel.
3. Maintaining protection against, and ensuring suppression of, airborne threats.
4. Functioning as OSC until other elements of the recovery force arrive in the objective area.

G. Forward Air Controller (Airborne) (FAC[A]). The FAC(A) can locate and authenticate isolated personnel prior to arrival of the recovery force and provide a current threat assessment near the objective area. Initial on-scene coordination of the PR effort may be assumed by the FAC(A) when no dedicated RESCORT or other (e.g., wingman) assets are available, or until the RESCORT arrives. The FAC(A) is trained in terminal attack control (CAS) and can provide a link between the recovery vehicles and other threat suppression assets. Fast-strike aircraft may require FAC(A) assistance to effectively support the recovery force. FAC(A) requests or diversions should be considered to provide an OSC capability prior to recovery force arrival, or when threats in the objective area require extensive suppression.

h. Support Aircraft. Tankers, AWACS, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), EW, and other aircraft provide vital support to the recovery force. Availability of support aircraft is often the difference between the success or failure of a recovery operation. Air refuelable fixed-wing assets can play a critical role in extending the operational range of refuelable helicopters. While refueling operations in a permissive environment are highly desirable, the depth of the operational environment and the isolated personnel’s location may require such operations be conducted in uncertain or hostile conditions.

i. Electronic Warfare/Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD). SEAD missions are designed to minimize the surface-to-air threat to friendly forces. Joint SEAD operations
can be accomplished through destructive and disruptive means described below, and using combinations of the two can maximize their effectiveness.

(1) **Destructive Means.** Destructive means seek the destruction of the target system or operating personnel. The effects are cumulative and increase aircraft survivability, but destructive means may place large demands on the available combat capabilities/forces. Examples of destructive SEAD capabilities are bombs, air and surface-to-surface missiles, air delivered mines, and artillery.

(2) **Disruptive Means.** Disruptive means temporarily deny, degrade, deceive, delay, or neutralize enemy air defense systems to increase aircraft survivability. Disruptive means may be either active or passive. Active means include electronic attack (anti-radiation missiles, directed energy, electromagnetic jamming, and electromagnetic deception), expendables (chaff, flares, and decoys), and tactics (deception, avoidance, or evasive flight profiles). Passive means include emission control, camouflage, IR shielding, warning receivers, and material design features.

j. Some forces, like USAF GUARDIAN ANGEL and special tactics teams, are specifically trained to provide direct support to isolated personnel. They may be airdropped or inserted via land or sea at an offset location to conduct a limited ground search, link-up, and recovery. PJs provide emergency trauma treatment, field/crash extrication, field medical care, field survival skills, and security and movement of isolated personnel to friendly control or a suitable extraction zone.

17. **Recovery Vehicles and Forces**

a. **Rotary-Wing Aircraft.** Operational experience shows that helicopters with advanced avionics, navigational systems, and terrain following/terrain avoidance radar systems are excellent pathfinders and recovery vehicles. Smaller assets (such as the H-60 variants) generate less dust and debris during landing and reduce the probability of detection in the objective area. Knowledge of PR aircraft capabilities and procedures and improved interoperability between components can best be ensured through PR training and exercises. A variety of helicopter formation and extraction techniques and procedures exist within and between joint force components and subordinate units. Terrain, visibility, high-density altitude limitations, aircraft and component capabilities, and aircrew experience should be carefully considered when selecting these techniques and procedures. Recovery mission briefs should address flight integrity criteria, mission roles, and individual aircraft responsibilities. In certain situations, recovery missions should be conducted with minimal radio transmissions relaying safety of flight, threat, and critical mission data only when required.

b. **Fixed-Wing Aircraft.** Circumstances may warrant using fixed-wing aircraft as the recovery vehicle. The concept of employment would be similar to that of combat delivery aircraft conducting air-land operations. Airfields should be designated and surveyed by special tactics teams or other personnel qualified in landing zone preparation procedures. Fixed-wing aircraft provide greater range and speed, which are invaluable capabilities when transporting critically injured personnel over vast distances. PR planning should identify
suitable locations to transload recovered personnel from rotary-wing to fixed-wing aircraft when appropriate.

c. Ground Forces. Ground maneuver and support units can provide the JFC a viable capability for recovery of isolated personnel when the isolating event is in their vicinity, or in an area to which they can move to or be delivered. Ground forces can fight through adversary forces to reach isolated personnel and provide the PRTF with a survivable recovery vehicle. Ground forces can move into and through an area to search for isolated personnel when the exact location is unknown. Additionally, these forces are trained to establish check points to seal off small urban areas and prevent hostage takers from moving out of the area, and can conduct cordon and search operations to look for isolated personnel.

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THE RECOVERY OF JUMP 42
25 JANUARY 1991

Early one morning during DESERT STORM, as the bad weather lingered over the Kuwaiti battlefields, Captain Scott Walsh launched on the wing of Major Dan Peters out of their base at King Abdul Aziz Airbase, Saudi Arabia. Their first sortie took them to a large enemy column opposing the Marine 2nd Division. Recovering at the forward operating location at Tanjib, they refueled and rearmed their aircraft and took off again to fly another mission in support of their fellow Marines. Entering the target area, Walsh got separated from his flight lead. While staying below the clouds, he attempted to rejoin on another flight of Harriers. As he maneuvered, his aircraft was hit by a heat-seeking missile. The missile impacted the right rear exhaust and severely damaged the aircraft. Initially angered at having been hit, Walsh quickly surveyed the damage. “The blast blew a lot of the right flaps off, put several holes in the wing, and set fire to the fuel in the wing tanks,” he remembered. The Fast Forward Air Controller (FAC) working with him, Combat 13, joined up on him to inspect his aircraft. He was not impressed with the flames streaking behind Walsh’s aircraft and suggested that he eject.

Walsh quickly surveyed the savage ground battle raging below him and decided to stay with the aircraft as long as possible. He jettisoned all of his ordnance to lighten his aircraft. The Fast FAC suggested that he land at the Al Jabbar Airfield which was in the process of being liberated that morning. As the squadron intelligence officer, Scott knew that the airfield was scheduled to be seized that morning by the 1st Battalion of the 7th Marines, which was part of Task Force Ripper. He concurred with the Fast FAC and set a course for the airfield. But as he prepared to land there, Captain Walsh realized that the airfield was not in fact under friendly control. Additionally, his landing gear would not lower. He quickly considered making a vertical landing, but his nozzle control was not responding properly, and the aircraft was barely controllable. All of these factors ruled out landing at Al Jabbar. Walsh shoved his throttle forward and over-flew that airfield. He would try to make it to friendly lines before ejecting. But as he turned to head south, his hydraulic system pressure slowly depleted and his flight controls froze.
d. **Navy Surface Ships and Submarines.** Navy surface ships and submarines can conduct recovery operations directly or can serve as host platforms for recovery insertion operations. The availability and use of naval coastal warfare and expeditionary warfare assets should also be considered when planning recovery missions.

*For additional information, see Appendix E, “United States Navy Personnel Recovery.”*

### e. Recovery by NAR Forces.

NAR missions are conducted in those circumstances beyond the capabilities of conventional forces and in which NAR forces may act with indigenous or surrogate personnel, other elements of DOD, OGAs, or multinational forces to effect a recovery. NAR RTs or RMs are directed and trained to conduct the five specified tasks of NAR: contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate.

1. **Contact.** Contact entails all actions that lead to the positive control of isolated personnel. This may include locating the isolated personnel, use of technical and nontechnical communications, and employment of various conventional and unconventional PR techniques and procedures.

   a. **Process.** NAR force TTP employed to locate isolated personnel should maximize and exploit the opportunities for success. TTP should be tailored to the operational environment, NAR force training and equipment, and the applicable recovery considerations (availability of resources, capabilities and limitations, task organizing, recovery criteria, location and physical condition of the isolated personnel, access, time, movement, capacity, and risk assessment). A NAR force should be able to locate isolated personnel in all weather and light conditions and in both rural and urban environments.

   b. **Guidelines.** When developing standards and guidelines for contact procedures, several factors should be considered. These include, but are not limited to, the

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No longer able to control the aircraft, he was forced to eject. As the F-18 capped him from above, he floated to the ground in sight of forward elements of the task force. Immediately, the pilot in Combat 13 called the Marine tactical air command center and reported that Jump 42 had been shot down and the pilot was alive on the ground. They quickly began to form a helicopter task force to get him out. Simultaneously, commanders in Task Force Ripper called their forward elements and directed that a patrol be sent out to recover the pilot.

Landing near an abandoned Iraqi bunker just west of the runways, Walsh oriented himself and quickly took shelter in an old trench. He took out his pistol and radio. Then he called the aircraft above to let them know that he was okay. When they acknowledged, he started moving south. Within a few minutes he encountered one of the Marine infantry teams who had been dispatched by the task force. They rescued him and took him back to the rear. There, he gave their intelligence section a quick briefing on what he had seen and then got on a helicopter which took him back to his base.

**SOURCE:** Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm

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**VI-23**
type of terrain in the operational or recovery area, the equipment and evasion aids that may or may not be available to isolated personnel, and enemy capabilities (e.g., air superiority, reconnaissance, and DF capabilities). The JPRC coordinates and disseminates the theater-specific policies that will guide isolated personnel and RTs conducting a mission, to the contact and recovery of an isolated person. These policies need to be widely available to ensure commanders, potential isolated personnel, recovery forces, and mission planners understand their respective roles in the operation. The isolated person should initiate a series of specific actions leading to successful contact.

(c) **Contact Considerations.** Whenever an isolated person is recovered with the assistance of a NAR force, the most critical aspect of the recovery is the moment the isolated person and the RT first meet. This period is very dangerous because it requires two parties, unknown to each other and located in hostile territory, to meet without being detected by either enemy forces or elements of the local population and without compromising either party’s security. Contact between isolated personnel and an RT requires comprehensive preplanning. The JPRC, assisted by component intelligence and operations specialists, should ensure the appropriate contact procedures are developed and provided in appropriate operating instructions (e.g., SPINS and communication or signal instructions) and other operational procedures for authentication. The JFC should ensure that joint force components are familiar and comply with these procedures to preclude placing recovery forces at great risk, and avoid significant recovery delays or the capture of the isolated person by enemy forces.

(d) **Intent.** All measures should be taken to keep the procedures for contact as simple as possible, while still affording the requisite security measures essential to the protection of both the NAR force and the isolated person. The isolated person should make a conscious decision to deviate from the planned evasion routine in order to initiate actions that will signal their intent to make contact with a NAR force. The isolated person is no longer evading from all unknown persons; the individual is now looking for someone that will carry out a specific act indicating the intent to assist. There are two basic scenarios for coordinating contact:

1. **Technical communications with isolated personnel.** This situation requires the isolated person to establish technical communications (e.g., radio communications) with friendly forces. The NAR force will be alerted to service a coordinated contact point by the UARCC. All contact procedures are coordinated at the JPRC and UARCC and then passed to both the isolated person and the NAR force. The isolated person would know when to expect contact, and the NAR force would know the isolated person is in place prior to initiating contact procedures. Technical communications with the isolated person affords the NAR force greater flexibility and greatly increases its ability to make contact.

2. **Absence of technical communications with isolated personnel.** This situation requires the isolated person include in his or her EPA potential contact procedures with a recovery force without the use of technical communications. For example, the isolated person would describe in his or her EPA how they will emplace the signals that would assist a recovery force in finding his or her location and the procedures for making
contact. The isolated person should consider both day and night signals as well as urban versus rural signals. Operating instructions serve as a comprehensive guide to signals an isolated person should consider to facilitate their recovery.

(e) EPA Application. The unit’s PR coordinator is responsible for ensuring potential isolated personnel provide a comprehensive EPA that complies with theater policies. Adherence to, and skill in execution of, EPA activities are crucial to successful contact and recovery operations.

(2) Authenticate. As soon as tactically feasible, the NAR force will initiate the authentication process to determine that the isolated person is in fact the person it has been tasked to recover.

(a) Control. Once an isolated person has been located, contacted, and taken into the custody of the NAR force, control of the isolated person should be maintained throughout the remainder of the operation, and the isolated person should be authenticated. Until the authentication is complete, the isolated person is safeguarded not only from the enemy, but also to protect the OPSEC of the NAR force. While the level of control exerted over the isolated person will be much more stringent prior to authentication, it should be proportional to the situation. Sensory deprivation and physical restraints should be used only if commensurate with the level of perceived risk, not as a matter of SOP. Once the isolated person is authenticated, the control measures exerted over the individual may be relaxed; but control should be maintained throughout the isolated person’s association with NAR forces. Due to significant physical, emotional, or mental stress, exposure and/or deprivation, or injuries sustained, safeguarding isolated personnel also means protecting them from their potential impaired judgment and decision-making abilities.

(b) Authentication Management. Within an operational area, the JPRC manages and establishes thresholds for authentication. In the conduct of NAR operations, the NAR force facilitates the process. The UARCC is the linkage between the two. The JPRC forwards the isolated person’s ISOPREP and EPA information to the UARCC. Only the minimum amount of information required to perform authentication is forwarded to the NAR force, usually in the form of questions. Definitive authentication may be based on the information contained in operating instructions, the ISOPREP card or EPA, a detailed physical description, a digital photo, digital fingerprint information, or any combination thereof. The NAR force conveys to the UARCC the isolated person’s responses to the authentication questions. The JFSOCC has the authority to positively authenticate the identity of an isolated person under the control of NAR forces, which the JFSOCC may delegate to the UARCC director. The UARCC confirms or denies authentication. Since the NAR force, or parts thereof, may only have access to nontechnical, clandestine communications, the process of authenticating some isolated personnel may take days or weeks. This potential time lag needs to be factored into the considerations for control and support of the isolated personnel.

(3) Support. Support includes all actions taken to provide sustainment to the isolated person, and ensure their well-being. Isolated personnel may not be in the best physical, mental, or emotional condition upon making contact with NAR forces. The NAR
force will provide the greatest degree of support possible without compromising OPSEC. NAR forces may provide the following support:

(a) **Sustain.** When possible, NAR forces will provide sufficient nourishment, clothing, shelter, safeguarding, and medical care to restore and sustain the isolated person’s health and physical condition.

(b) **Monitor and Assess.** Isolated personnel should be continually monitored and assessed throughout the duration of the recover task. It is important that isolated personnel not deteriorate physically and mentally. It may be beneficial to reassure them occasionally to help maintain morale and focus on the successful return to friendly control.

(c) **Procedures and Contingencies.** The NAR force should inform recovered isolated personnel, as soon as possible, on procedures, restrictions, and recontact plans.

(d) **Security.** Direct interface between recovered isolated personnel and the NAR force should be strictly limited to preserve OPSEC and the future viability of the NAR force. The logistic support to sustain an injured person while moving, or waiting to move, without violating OPSEC is one of the primary planning considerations of the NAR force.

(4) **Move.** The movement phase of the recovery process consists of all actions taken to transport isolated personnel from a contact point to an exfiltration site. The movement may include multiple segments, multiple methods, or multiple elements. To ensure the future viability of the NAR force and the safety of the isolated person, OPSEC procedures practiced by the NAR force will impact the speed at which the isolated person is moved from place to place. The logistical austerity of both the environment and the NAR force, and the distance over which the isolated person should be transported will also affect the movement process. There may be occasions when the recovery force that made the initial contact with the isolated person cannot, for operational, security, or other reasons, deliver the isolated person safely to friendly control. In such cases, the isolated person may be turned over to another NAR asset or to a conventional recovery force to complete the extraction from hostile territory. The UARCC is responsible for coordinating all turnovers of isolated personnel recovered by a NAR force.

(5) **Exfiltrate.** Exfiltration is the final action to remove isolated personnel from hostile territory to definitive USG control in a permissive environment. Exfiltration will occur by the most secure means available, be it an exfiltration point serviced by a PRTF, by clandestine aircraft or watercraft, by ground movement crossing an international border, or through the passage of friendly lines.

18. **Isolated Personnel Responsibilities Prior to Recovery**

a. **General.** Isolated personnel are an integral part of any recovery effort. Consequently, they should perform their portion of each PR task successfully to aid their own recovery. During recovery, isolated personnel should:

(1) Respond quickly and accurately to authentication procedures and requests for ISOPREP information.
(2) Provide positional assistance to recovery forces to the greatest extent possible.

(3) Properly use all issued signaling devices and improvise signals, as needed, to improve the chances of being sighted.

(4) Provide pertinent information about the dispersal of other group members, if applicable.

(5) Inform recovery forces if operational developments require altering their EPA and hence, the recovery plan.

(6) Be prepared to receive and follow instructions from the recovery force that require EPA alterations to adapt to operational exigencies.

(7) Pay close attention to, and explicitly follow, instructions of recovery forces to the maximum extent possible given the tactical situation (including adversary positions and medical condition).

(8) Continue to communicate with inbound recovery forces, as required, to ensure their authentication and location is understood and retrieval is efficiently executed.

(9) Remember the word/letter/number (of the day/week/quarter), challenge/password, near and far recognition signals.

(10) Do not run toward the recovery vehicle until or unless directed. Weapons should not be held in a manner that could be perceived as threatening.

(11) Be prepared to be treated as a captive until authenticated. Authentication might not occur until hand-over by the recovery forces.

b. **Recovery by Helicopter or Tilt Rotor.** Isolated personnel should reposition near an HLZ large enough to accommodate at least one helicopter. The HLZ should provide concealment, be fairly level and free of major obstacles (particularly high tension lines or telephone wires), and allow easy identification by the aircrew. The use of chemical lights or other visual markings can aid in identification. If the recovery helicopter cannot land, the isolated personnel will have to be hoisted aboard or moved to another location. Isolated personnel should be aware that a hoist recovery greatly increases exposure and risk to the recovery helicopter and may adversely affect the timeliness of their recovery. Therefore, HLZ suitability should be determined as early in the recovery process as possible, so this information can be passed to the recovery helicopter prior to entering the objective area. Isolated personnel should turn away from the landing helicopter to avoid flying debris and hold their position in sight of the cockpit or side door until signaled or instructed to enter the helicopter.

c. **Recovery by Ground Forces.** Isolated personnel should follow their EPA until contacted by ground forces. The isolated personnel should not make any threatening moves. They should assume a passive position (e.g., drop to one knee) and explicitly follow the
ground force instructions. Recovery by ground forces could be employed in four general scenarios:

1. **The isolated person is not in communications with friendly forces, and an exact location is unknown.** Ground forces may conduct a movement to contact or hasty attack in uncertain or hostile terrain, to secure an objective and link up with friendly forces. The isolated person should be prepared to use the far recognition signal to alert the ground force of their presence. As the ground force responds and moves closer, the forces will use the near recognition signals for the final link up.

2. **The isolated personnel may or may not be in communication, but their location is known.** The ground force may fight through to link up with isolated personnel in contact with the enemy. The isolated personnel will be escorted by ground forces and returned to friendly control.

3. **The location (or general vicinity) of the isolated personnel is known, but they are already captive.** Ground forces can conduct a raid to release the isolated personnel.

4. **The general location of the isolated personnel is known, but they are presumed captive, and the adversary is expected to transport the isolated personnel to another location.** Ground forces can establish checkpoints around an urban area and conduct a cordon and search mission to find the isolated personnel. This would probably be used if the isolating event had just occurred, and the unit involved determines that personnel are missing during an accountability check. This unit or a nearby unit would cordon the area to ensure the captives are not transported out of the area and begin a systematic search of the buildings and vehicles.

19. **Physical Custody**

   a. **Initial Actions of Recovery Force.** Recovered isolated personnel should be searched and secured pending confirmation of their identity. Any weapons will be confiscated. Recovered isolated personnel should be quiet, avoid resisting, and carefully follow all instructions to avoid compromising the security of the recovery force. If the recovered isolated person is incapable of answering or responding, the recovery force will follow accepted detainee handling procedures as described in existing ROE and operations procedures. The status of the recovered isolated personnel can change once their identity has been ascertained and the recovery force commander has evaluated the situation. The recovered isolated person(s) could be held as an unarmed detainee. Recovered isolated personnel may or may not be briefed on what to expect during the remainder of the recovery operation.

   b. **Conduct while in Custody of Recovery Force.** Recovered isolated personnel should never appear as a threat to the recovery force, and they should make no movements that could be interpreted as hostile. While in a RM or under the control of a foreign force, recovered isolated personnel should project a favorable image of the US and its values, avoid acts that violate international law or discredit the US, avoid expressing ideas that could be
misconstrued as official US policy or popular American attitudes, and refrain from making any agreements contrary to the interests of the US.

c. **Transfer of Custody.** The recovery force should pass all pertinent information on, and possessions taken from, the recovered personnel to the reintegration team. Pertinent information includes authentication status, significant information passed by the recovered isolated personnel, and physical status. There may be occasions when the recovery force that made the initial contact with the recovered isolated personnel cannot, for operational reasons, deliver the individual safely to friendly territory. In such cases, the recovered isolated personnel may be handed over to another group or PR force to complete the extraction from hostile territory. The recovered isolated personnel should be kept informed (as much as necessary). At no time will isolated personnel be abandoned. The recovered isolated personnel are kept under positive control at all times by either the delivering force or the receiving force, according to prior arrangements made by the two forces. Cooperation, trust, and discipline by all are essential for mission success.

**SECTION E. REINTEGRATE**

“*Today is a great day for the families, comrades, and loved ones of the seven MIAs [missing in actions] who are now free…It’s a good way to start the morning, to be notified that seven of our fellow Americans are going to be home soon in the arms of their loved ones.*”

President George W. Bush, 13 April 2003

“We feel like we won the lottery of life.”

Chief Warrant Officer Two Ronald Young
Upon his return from Iraq, April 2003

20. **General**

Reintegrate is a critical task that allows DOD to gather necessary intelligence and SERE information while coordinating multiple activities and protecting the health and well-being of returned isolated personnel. In their planning, CCDRs establish a reintegration process, to include locations, teams, and responsibilities. The reintegration process should also be included in combatant command PR directives. Two key components of this process are qualified SERE and intelligence debriefers who gather information from recovered isolated personnel and SERE psychologists and others who assist the recovered isolated personnel to decompress and reintegrate to their unit, family, and society. It is important for planners to include provisions for the recovery of DOD civilians and contractors.

21. **Process**

a. **General.** The combatant command’s PR directive, the policy, guidance, plans, and orders specify the reintegration process and required teams, to include their composition and responsibilities (see Chapter V, “Planning”). The JFC usually coordinates all reintegration
procedures through the JPRC, which executes the reintegration plan and the oversight of, and assistance to, component reintegration teams. The JPRC should coordinate all joint requirements necessary to conduct reintegration at phase I and II locations, and to transition to phase III when necessary (as described below). Latitude and flexibility should remain with the component commander to conduct reintegration procedures within the context of on-going military operations, allowing for sequential, concurrent or, if necessary, delayed conduct of reintegration procedures. The scope and complexity of the process will vary depending on the classification of the recovered isolated personnel (e.g., survivors and evaders may require less debriefing and psychological attention than captives, detainees, and POWs).

b. Decompression Protocols. An inherent and critical part of the reintegration process is the decomposition protocols. The long-term successful reintroduction of recovered isolated personnel into military and social/civil environments is directly affected by proper decompression. Protocols have been established to maximize the benefit of decompression. At the very least, under “normal” conditions, they require a minimum of 72 hours to be effective. Deviating from established protocols can have a severe impact and, under certain circumstances, create permanent psychological trauma to the recovered isolated personnel. From past detention incidents, this trauma has manifested itself in recovered isolated personnel separating themselves from military Service, having dysfunctional family relationships, and, in severe cases, committing suicide. Some of the decompression protocols include: normalizing physical and emotional reactions to their isolation experience; providing an opportunity to predict and control their environment; allowing them to repeatedly tell their story in a positive manner; allowing a group of recovered isolated personnel from the same event to have time together to recount their experience in a positive manner; allowing individual down time to come to grips with the whole event; assisting them in developing an action plan for dealing with the media, integrating into family, returning to duty, etc.; providing access to Service chaplains and opportunities to receive religious support at the request of the returned isolated personnel; and offering and providing follow-up care after the formal reintegration process is over. A key to successful decompression is creating an environment where isolated personnel feel they are safe and can relax.

c. Debriefing. The debriefs are designed to obtain specific information regarding the experience of recovered isolated personnel. Intelligence and SERE debriefing should occur in all three phases of reintegration. SERE and intelligence debriefs may run separately or concurrently as dictated by mission circumstances, but should be coordinated with one another. The SERE debrief should be allowed to follow accepted protocols to produce verbal and visual recordings essential to the SERE analysis and development of LL. Before the debriefing begins, the debriefing team chief should notify the theater special operations commander (SOC) or other NAR C2 element of inbound recovered isolated personnel to determine if sensitive capabilities were used or exposed during the recovery. Advanced notification allows the SOC or NAR representative to be present for the debriefing in a timely manner. All debriefers should be made aware of the possibility of the use of NAR capabilities being raised during the debriefings. The local staff judge advocate (SJA) or appropriate law enforcement personnel should instruct debriefers on required legal rights advisements in advance of conducting interviews. Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), rights are required if the returnee is suspected of committing an offense.
under the UCMJ. Miranda rights, which include the right to speak to an attorney, are required only if the returnee is in official custody for an offense or suspected offense.

1) **Intelligence Debrief.** The intelligence debrief should occur as soon as possible pending the approval of medical personnel caring for the recovered isolated personnel. It should be conducted by a qualified and trained intelligence debriefer.

   (a) The intelligence debrief seeks specific time-sensitive and perishable information related to the circumstances leading to the isolating event and, if applicable, the eventual capture, the presence of other isolated personnel, the physical and security characteristics of the detention facilities, observed adversary tactics, force disposition, equipment, or other information of value to ongoing operations. Information collected helps the IC update its overall evaluation of the detaining or adversary organization, as well as determine the extent of possible compromise of US information, methods, and/or materials.

   (b) Intelligence gained during the debrief is quickly reported via established dissemination channels IAW standard intelligence reporting procedures. All information collected is assigned proper security classification based on its content prior to dissemination to appropriate IC recipients.

2) **SERE Debrief.** The SERE debrief should occur as soon as possible, pending the approval of medical personnel caring for the recovered isolated personnel, and should be conducted by a trained SERE debriefer. To ensure cooperation and full disclosure of information by the recovered personnel, SERE debriefs will be disseminated on a need to know basis, protected from public disclosure according to The Privacy Act and other legal protections, and primarily used to develop LL to adapt joint and Service-level SERE training products and TTP. The initial debrief material is normally classified secret until the subsequent analysis determines a more appropriate classification. In addition, the SERE debriefer, in coordination with the SERE psychologist, focuses on mental and psychological health and well being of the recovered isolated personnel, and provides an avenue for isolated personnel to decompress and come to terms with the circumstances encompassing the time in isolation. The SERE debrief focuses on the isolation experience in an effort to evaluate the adequacy and usefulness of:

   (a) SERE operational guidance, education, and training.

   (b) SERE equipment to include evasion aids and radios.

   (c) The PR processes that either assisted or hindered their isolation. Focus on processes to report, locate, support, and recover the isolated person.

3) **Other Debriefings.** Depending on the nature of the mission performed by the person before they were isolated, the nature of the isolation, and the recovery means employed, some debriefing will be sensitive. The primary debriefing team will either be augmented by personnel to deal with select issues or a nondisclosure agreement (Standard Form [SF] 312, *Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement*), will be signed by all participants in the debriefing session. The circumstances surrounding the isolating event may be of interest to the IC, FBI, or CIA, Service criminal investigation organizations, even
safety investigation boards. They may all need access to the recovered individual. Debriefings are coordinated with the reintegration team chief and SERE psychologist.

(4) **Debrief Team.** Intelligence and SERE debriefing teams are normally established as part of a reintegration team to focus on obtaining accurate and complete intelligence and SERE information to be forwarded to JPRA for further analysis. The SERE debriefer will be experienced and trained in correct elicitation of SERE information. The ideal ratio of debriefers to debriefees is one-to-one. It is difficult for a debriefer to track and encourage the story of more than one debriefee, especially if the debriefees experienced the same event together. The JPRA or JPRC may provide a SERE debriefer or SERE psychologist if required to maintain oversight of the debrief process.

(5) **Debrief Team Preparation.** Intelligence and SERE debriefers should meet in advance to compare information requirements and deconflict interview questions to avoid duplication. All available information pertaining to the recovered isolated personnel should be obtained from the JPRC and reviewed when refining debrief checklists and developing questions. Visual aids such as maps and photographs should be available to assist the recovered isolated personnel in providing a chronicle of their experiences.

(6) **Sequence of Events.** The SERE debriefer will coordinate with the intelligence debriefer and agree upon a sequence of events for interview sessions. Because they have different uses, the team should ensure the recovered isolated personnel clearly understand the distinction between intelligence and SERE debrief sessions. If possible, intelligence and SERE debriefers may attend the other’s debrief sessions to monitor the information exchange and develop follow-up questions to be covered in subsequent sessions provided the terms of Personnel Recovery Debriefing Statement (DD Form 2810) are not violated. The intelligence and SERE debriefs will take place in a sequence decided among the debriefers and approved by the reintegration team chief. The sequence will be heavily influenced by the physical/mental stability as determined by the SERE psychologists of the recovered isolated personnel, availability of debriefers, and other limiting factors. A possible debriefing sequence of events is as follows:

(a) Recovered isolated personnel provide a narrative account of their experience while both debrief team components monitor and build an understanding of the incident.

(b) The SERE debriefer, in collaboration with the other debriefers and SERE psychologist, asks a series of structured questions during sessions that are orchestrated for duration and attendees. The structured questions are designed to elicit the most accurate details from the debriefee based on their story and other information available. The maximum total hours of debriefing should not exceed four hours per day.

(c) Both debrief teams, SERE and intelligence, conduct follow-up interviews, as required.

(d) The SERE psychologist assists the debriefer and interacts with the recovered isolated personnel as they feel necessary.
(e) The SERE debriefer should ensure the SERE debrief recordings and all other pertinent information is forwarded to JPRA who will then forward to JPRA for processing immediately upon completion of the debriefing process.

d. SERE Psychologist. The SERE psychologist is primarily focused on the decompression and long-term welfare of the recovered isolated personnel. Decompression is a critical activity that can prevent psychological damage to recovered isolated personnel and the loss of accuracy in recalling critical intelligence and operational information. The activities of the SERE psychologist should support the debriefing process. The SERE psychologist:

1) Provides an explanation of the reintegration procedures to include the behavioral assessment.

2) Conducts a behavioral assessment and addresses critical elements of long-term evasion, capture, detention/captivity, and liberation in terms of their impact on the adjustment of recovered isolated personnel.

3) Monitors the recovered personnel and advises the reintegration team leader regarding the coordination of all aspects of the reintegrate task, to ensure the health, welfare, and stamina of recovered isolated personnel are maintained.

4) Provides the behavioral assessment of the recovered isolated personnel to the reintegration team leader who makes the recommendation on disposition (i.e., return to duty or continue to next phase) to the component commander.

e. Phases. The reintegration process consists of three phases, whose activities and levels of intensity are based on their location. The first two phase locations are directed by the GCC in coordination with the components, and the third phase is located in the US, at a site selected by the respective Service. The JFC coordinates through the JPRC, with the component commanders (PRCCs) to determine the location(s) of phase I and II, the composition of the phase I team (or other process if a team is not required), the transition process from phase I to phase II, the phase II location reintegration process, and team and the transition process to phase III. Phase I encompasses the process of transporting the recovered isolated person to a safe area to conduct initial medical/psychological assessment and debriefings. Phase I will end with the recovered isolated personnel being returned to duty or recommended for phase II. Phase II encompasses the transition from phase I to a theater treatment and processing facility and further SERE and intelligence debriefings and decompression. Phase II will end with the recovered isolated personnel being released to duty or recommended for phase III. Phase III begins with the transition of recovered isolated personnel to the phase III team of the appropriate Service. Phase III does not have a prescribed time limit and depends on the needs of the recovered isolated personnel in coordination with the concerns of the Service, SERE and intelligence debriefers, and the SERE psychologist.

1) Phase I. All recovered isolated personnel should undergo, at a minimum, an initial reintegration assessment, which is normally accomplished at a phase I location.
Before recovered isolated personnel can be returned to duty, they should be medically cleared, complete a SERE/intelligence debrief, and have some form of decompression. With proper support, all of these essential activities can occur at phase I and, when appropriate, the recovered isolated personnel can be returned to duty within 48 hours. In some cases, a more comprehensive SERE debrief, and other LL activities, can be accomplished at a later date. Based on the reintegration assessment and theater guidance, the component commander has the authority to reintegrate isolated personnel to their DOD duties or transfer them to the next phase. Phase I begins as soon as the recovered isolated personnel are in the care of the phase I team, or other established process, and should be accomplished as soon as possible. The JPRC, in coordination with the PRCCs and the reintegration team chief, will determine the most appropriate place and means to accomplish phase I. Based on the CCDR’s guidance, and component requirements, phase I will normally consist of:

(a) Immediate medical attention.

(b) An intelligence debrief to collect any appropriate tactical or perishable intelligence and/or any appropriate isolated personnel identification and status information.

(c) Information debriefs necessary to collect perishable SERE and intelligence information and determine whether recovered isolated personnel can be returned to duty or require additional time for decompression and medical treatment. Questions will be composed to ascertain the following:

1. Name, rank, Social Security number, organization, and health and physical condition.

2. Recovery details such as location, date, time, and method.

3. Did isolated personnel make contact with an RM? If yes, the recovered isolated personnel will be advised not to disclose details of this information except to a specific NAR representative.

4. Were isolated personnel held captive or detained at anytime?

5. Other information that will give the SERE psychologist anecdotal or defined evidence that further decompression may, or may not, be needed.

(d) Providing the recovered isolated personnel information about the reintegration process and events before they occur. This is an essential element of decompression for phase I, giving back to the recovered isolated person their ability to predict and control the world around them, thus giving them the ability to make some decisions about phase I activities.

(e) The phase I team chief or other responsible organization, based on an assessment of debrief requirements, and consultation with the SERE psychologist regarding the mental and physical condition of the isolated personnel, will make a recommendation to the appropriate commander and PRCC about their further continuation in the reintegration process. The PRCC keeps the JPRC informed. If the recovered isolated personnel can be
returned to duty, they will remain under the auspices of the parent command. If it is
determined that additional time is required for debriefing and decompression, the recovered
isolated personnel will be recommended for phase II and all records, to include the personnel
processing file (PPF), will be transferred to the designated JFC phase II reintegration team
chief.

(2) Phase II will be conducted at the theater designated facility where the
recovered isolated personnel will receive more structured SERE and intelligence debriefings
and decompression. Phase II is executed by the JFC’s designated reintegration team and
includes medical treatment services rendered by a SERE psychologist who will be available
to address any recovered isolated personnel psychological concerns or problems.

(a) The reintegration team chief will ensure coordination with members of the
JFC’s staff, components, Services, and other agencies who should be involved in the
reintegration processing of the recovered isolated personnel or require proprietary
debriefings. The reintegration team chief will be charged with prioritizing and monitoring,
in coordination with the SERE psychologist, all reintegration processes to prevent confusing,
or adversely affecting the mental or physical health of the recovered isolated personnel. To
fully meet its responsibilities, an ideal reintegration team would consist of:

1. **Team chief.** An individual familiar with reintegration and SERE
debriefing processes and procedures, the combatant command’s requirements for
administrative processing (personnel, financial, legal, accident investigations, etc.) of
personnel, and theater joint coordination processes. Team chiefs, faced with a large number
of joint force returnees (and corresponding increase in reintegration team members), may
consider requesting a deputy team chief of a sister Service to assist in addressing Service
unique reintegration issues and to share the workload. The team chief should be in the grade
of O-6, with the authority to coordinate with component commanders.

2. **SERE and intelligence debriefers.**

3. **SERE psychologist.**

4. **Medical officer.** Will advise the team on the physical condition of the
returned isolated personnel as it impacts their ability to undergo the reintegration process.

5. **Legal representative.** This person can assist with the reintegration and
debriefing procedures especially when there are sensitive legal issues to consider, such as
violations of UCMJ.

6. **Chaplain.** Chaplains provide and facilitate religious support to isolated
personnel. Religious support can be beneficial to the immediate spiritual, mental, and
psychological welfare of recovered isolated personnel and contribute to their successful long
term reintegration. Recovered personnel who request pastoral care or counseling from
Service chaplains should be clearly advised that their communications with the chaplain, as a
formal act of religion or matter of conscience, are privileged communications and
confidential under Military Rules of Evidence, Rule 503 (b). In order to ensure this right of
confidentiality for recovered isolated personnel, chaplains will not, at any time, participate in or conduct SERE, intelligence, or other debriefings.

7. **Public affairs officer.** This person is very important to advise on the proper disposition of media inquiries. This assistance is valuable to the team as well as recovered isolated personnel and their families.

8. **Personnel officer.** This person ensures the procedures required by the theater joint personnel center or other personnel procedures are accomplished. This person is also the GCCs key coordination link to the appropriate Service casualty assistance office to initially coordinate the family support requirement.

9. **Service support representative(s).** The Service team member is an individual that can provide for the personal needs of the recovered isolated personnel. This person should have the ability to obtain clothing, hygiene items, Service ID cards, credit cards, and other personal items, as required. If possible, this should be someone known by or familiar to the recovered isolated personnel, and should be available to offer support and be a confidant.

10. **Service casualty assistance representative.** This is a very important team member who ensures the continuation of family support that should have started during the isolating event. They provide the critical SA and coordination among the theater reintegration team chief, the PAO, the SERE psychologist, the Service casualty assistance office in direct support of the recovered isolated person and his family. This casualty assistance representative will also play a key role in family visits and the transition of family support from phase II to phase III.

11. **Other team members,** such as administrative and financial specialists, can be added as deemed appropriate to the situation.

(b) Phase II is where reintegration with family members may begin initially with contact by telephone. Rarely is there any benefit for family members to travel to phase II locations. In fact, until decompression/debriefing is complete, the primary concern of recovered isolated personnel is the objective assessment of how they conducted themselves while isolated—they have a need to know the answer to “did I conduct myself well and with honor?”

(c) The reintegration team chief determines the completion of phase II and recommends to the component commander or the JFC the disposition of the recovered isolated personnel. They can either return them to their DOD duties or transfer them into phase III where the recovered isolated personnel will come under the control of their respective Service in the US. The JFC, JPRC, and respective PRCCs will be informed on all decisions.

(d) If the recovered isolated personnel are returned to duty, the JFC’s reintegration team chief will transfer the PPF and other records as directed in theater guidance. Normally, if the recovered isolated personnel are recommended for phase III, the
PPF and other records will be positively controlled by the reintegration team chief until properly transferred to the phase III team chief or JPRA.

(3) **Phase III.** Phase III begins with the pre-coordinated transition of recovered isolated personnel to the phase III team of the appropriate Service in the US. Ideally, a personal escort, a member of the reintegration team or Service representative, and a SERE psychologist will accompany the recovered isolated personnel during transition from phase II to the phase III location. Other transition team members will be assigned based on the specific requirements of the recovered personnel as determined by the phase II team chief in consultation with the SERE psychologist and the recovered personnel. These arrangements should be coordinated by the teams involved, preferably before an event has occurred. At a minimum, this coordination will consist of an exchange of contact information among the phase II and phase III reintegration team chiefs and the combatant command and Service PR OPRs. Phase III details are described in DODI 2310.4, *Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel.*

(4) **Process Flexibility.** Though conducted by phase, the critical tasks within each phase are not necessarily conducted sequentially or on a rigid time schedule. Latitude and flexibility remain with the Service and Service component commander to accomplish the reintegration process based upon the needs of the recovered isolated personnel and within the context of ongoing military operations.

22. **Challenges**

The challenges faced by formerly isolated personnel depend on the situation. Someone recovered within a few hours or days evading with no contact with the adversary will face different challenges than someone held captive for years. The former may require simple medical treatment and SERE and intelligence debriefings, while the latter will need more in-depth reintegration. The greatest challenge during reintegration is when well-intended actions are implemented without understanding their full ramifications. These actions may negatively impact the reintegration of recovered isolated personnel into a healthy family, social, and professional life. The following are some of the common ways senior military leadership and senior executives have negatively impacted the reintegration process while trying to be helpful.

a. **Overwhelming the recovered isolated personnel with a show of support.** Regardless of how well they performed during isolation, all recovered isolated personnel are in a mild state of shock when they return. They need time to regroup. Parades, bands, media events, ceremonies, and celebrations have their place but not during the early stages of reintegration. These types of activities serve to increase the state of shock of recovered isolated personnel and usually end up overwhelming them and complicating the reintegration process.

b. **Awarding medals too early.** Expediting medal processing is not recommended as it takes time for recovered isolated personnel to work through the intensity of their emotional reactions to the isolating event. Medals given while recovered isolated personnel are still
struggling with intense emotional reactions complicate the reintegration process and, in many cases, isolates/alienates recovered isolated personnel from unit members.

c. **White House and senior-level command presentations/visits.** Attempts to honor recovered isolated personnel with high level visits serve necessary political purposes but are not in the best interest of the recovered isolated personnel if conducted during the early stages of reintegration. Recovered isolated personnel will remember these events as positive if they are conducted at the proper time and IAW the wishes of the recovered isolated personnel. Brief telephone calls may be appropriate during early stages if coordinated with the reintegration team.

d. **Transporting families to phase II locations.** Families are an essential part of reintegration. Introducing families too early not only complicates the reintegration process but it is harmful to long-term family relationships. Recovered isolated personnel try to protect families from the horrors of their ordeal while family members tend to overwhelm recovered isolated personnel and do not allow them time to decompress. Recovered isolated personnel should be allowed to make telephone contact with families during the early stages of the reintegration process. Family reunions are more appropriate when the reintegration process is nearing completion or when recovered isolated personnel return to the US.

e. **Working with Contractors.** PR planners face multiple challenges in coordinating the reintegration of a contractor who has been isolated. Entry into the reintegration process for contractors is voluntary, and the contract company may not provide the level of cooperation anticipated. The family support group that military forces enjoy at home station will not normally be available to the contractor employees’ family. The company may release information to outside sources that the recovery forces or the isolated personnel do not want made public. Developing a close relationship with the contract company can assist the reintegration team in ensuring all aspects of the reintegration run smoothly.

23. **Follow-Up**

SERE psychologists will follow-up with recovered isolated personnel, as needed, for at least one year. Intelligence organizations may require follow-up contact with recovered isolated personnel to pursue additional intelligence requirements, particularly to support investigations of unresolved POW and/or MIA incidents.

24. **Legal and Administrative**

a. **Initial Control**

(1) **Administration.** The command gaining initial control of recovered isolated personnel will ensure that an escort is assigned until the designated reintegration team assumes control of the recovered isolated personnel. Thereafter, recovered isolated personnel normally will complete a nondisclosure agreement and a debriefing statement.

(2) **Personnel Processing File.** The reintegration team chief should coordinate with the designated component commander to obtain each recovered isolated person’s PPF from the appropriate Service or PRCC. This file will be used during the entire reintegration
task as a debrief document and will be disseminated to the Service and JPRA once reintegration has been completed. If the reintegrate task is accomplished prior to receiving the PPF, the PPF will be included in the final disposition of debrief documents.

For further guidance on the minimum requirement for a PPF, refer to DODI 2310.4, Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees, and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel.

(3) Initial Recovery Report. This report will be transmitted by the JPRC as soon as possible to the returned isolated person’s parent Service, with copies to the theater reintegration team chief, JPRA, the appropriate JOC, and the recovered isolated personnel’s commander. Along with critical recovered isolated personnel data, the report will include an assessment of potential support required, a road map for reintegration activities, and a reintegration team chief recommendation to return the individual to duty or proceed to phase II.

b. Debriefs. All debriefs should be focused, timely, and last only as long as the recovered isolated personnel can mentally and physically continue. The maximum total hours of debriefing should not exceed four hours per day. Debriefers will ensure DD Form 2810, Personnel Recovery Debriefing Statement, has been signed before beginning the debriefings. Typically, information obtained in the SERE and intelligence debriefings is immediately disseminated. The verbatim text/transcription of debriefings is statutorily protected and is not releasable until approved by the Commander, JPRA. JPRA is required to analyze raw debrief material, summarize it, and provide synopses of LL to the GCC and all DOD organizations that have a need to know. SERE debriefs are initially classified secret until the information can be further analyzed and reclassified according to the Personnel Recovery Classification Guide and other guidance, as applicable. SERE debriefs are DOD property, and are not to be released to the public without the approval of the classification authority, the DOD document release processes, and in coordination with establish PA guidance.

For further guidance on reintegration, refer to DODI 2310.4, Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel, and Appendix O, “Reintegration Administration.”

25. Medical

Medical personnel play a key role in the successful debriefing and reintegration of returned isolated personnel. The objective of medical support during reintegration is to provide recovered isolated personnel with appropriate and complete medical evaluation and treatment, establish a detailed medical record for future reference, maintain or restore dignity, and facilitate readjustment to society. During reintegration, immediate medical care and mental health issues are addressed first. The medical treatment of returned isolated personnel includes the services of a SERE psychologist to address any psychological concerns or problems.
a. **Medical Triage, Evaluation, and Stabilization.** Recovered isolated personnel should receive a comprehensive medical triage and any medical treatment necessary to medically stabilize their condition. Many recovered isolated personnel have been subjected to physically traumatic experiences and require immediate medical evaluation and treatment for life threatening injuries or conditions. A hands-on medical assessment is necessary to avert missing any serious medical conditions that may go undetected due to shock, ensure medical stabilization, and assure the health and well-being of recovered isolated personnel.

b. **Medical Treatment and Debriefing.** Medical stability and collecting information are the primary focus of the reintegration process. Time sensitive SERE and tactical information have the potential to save other lives during ongoing hostilities. Decompression of the recovered isolated personnel facilitates the collection of information.

c. **Return to Duty Recommendations.** Not all recovered isolated personnel will require phase II and III of reintegration. Often essential medical care will take place at forward locations within the theater. Definitive care is more appropriately addressed during phase III due to a higher level of care available at phase III facilities. The lead medical officer is responsible for consulting with the reintegration team chief and the SERE psychologists in providing return to duty recommendations.

### 26. Support to Families

Family support is important to reintegration. The reintegration team will contact them early in the process and strive to keep them informed.

a. During reintegration, the early stages of support to families involve keeping the family informed and assisting them in coping with a variety of well meaning people or media organizations. In reintegration phase II, families may show up, often against the advice of the reintegration team, when the individual has been moved to a medical facility in a more easily accessible foreign location. Support to families may become more intense and complex during reintegration phase III, when the formerly isolated personnel return to a medical treatment facility within the US. The logistics of family support necessary during reintegration phase III may overwhelm the unprepared. Considerations include:

1. Billeting.
2. Food.
3. Access to morale, welfare, and recreation facilities.
4. Access to restricted areas of the hospital.
5. Who is showing up; how many are showing up; what is their relationship to the isolated person; what if the isolated person does not want them there; how long will they stay?
6. Who’s paying the travel expenses?
(7) What if the isolated person is a contractor; do the rules change?

b. This family support preparation and execution is in addition to the logistics necessary to prepare for receiving the isolated personnel themselves. Ultimately, the reintegration is about the recovered person, and family support issues may need to be adjusted to meet the needs of the recovered person.
APPENDIX A
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPORT TO CIVIL SEARCH AND RESCUE

1. Introduction

Civil SAR is search operations, rescue operations, and associated civilian services provided to assist persons and property in potential or actual distress in a non-hostile environment. DOD support to civil SAR encompasses the full spectrum of SAR operations; from day-to-day routine SAR through mass rescue operations (MROs) to the challenges associated with conducting SAR operations within a damaged/degraded environment following a catastrophic event (catastrophic incident search and rescue [CISAR]). This appendix will attempt to provide a brief overview of the civil SAR system and the roles, responsibilities, and supporting relationships of DOD, as well as the integral relationship DOD maintains with federal, state, tribal, territorial, and local SAR authorities and agencies within the system. It is intended to provide better awareness of the system and help enable an efficient, effective, integrated response when directed (by DOD authority) to conduct support to civil SAR operations from day to day to a large scale incident requiring a unified federal response.

2. Civil Search and Rescue

a. Civil SAR is grounded in and agreed to by international convention and treaty on the fundamental guiding principle toward a duty to assist; a duty to provide assistance to other vessels, aircraft or persons in distress, without regard to location, nationality, or circumstances. The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, and the Convention on International Aviation precipitated civil SAR-related treaties to which the USG is a party. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) sponsors the treaties and the international cooperative effort toward the continued development of an effective, standardized global SAR system. The United States is a principal member of these organizations and the National Search and Rescue Committee (NSARC) represents USG SAR related interests.

b. A national search and rescue plan (NSP) was developed to meet USG SAR domestic needs and international commitments. The plan sets policy and assigns roles and responsibilities to coordinate SAR services to enable the effective use of all available resources in all types of civil SAR missions. Implementing guidance for the NSP is provided in the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) manual, the National Search and Rescue Supplement (NSS) and addenda, and other relevant directives. The DOD is a standing member agency within the NSARC, a signatory to, and a major participant to the NSP and associated documents.

c. Guidance and direction on DOD support to civil SAR can be found with DODD 3003.01, Department of Defense Support to Civil Search and Rescue (SAR).

d. The IMO and ICAO coordinate, on a global basis, member country/states’ efforts to provide SAR services. Through international conventions, a regional approach to worldwide
Appendix A

SAR services was developed and exists in a global framework of search and rescue regions (SRRs), each with associated SAR services prepared to assist persons in distress within a given SRR without regard to nationality or circumstances. A rescue coordination center (RCC) is required within each SRR. An RCC is an operational facility responsible for promoting efficient organization of SAR services and for coordinating the conduct of SAR operations within an SRR. SAR coordinators are assigned, one for each SRR, and are executive-level leaders and managers with the overall responsibility for establishing and providing civil SAR services for a given SRR. There are three United States SAR coordinators responsible for SRRs:

1. **United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM).** SAR coordinator for the US aeronautical SRR corresponding to the continental US other than Alaska. Commander, USNORTHCOM, is the SAR coordinator for the Langley SRR (continental US) and has overall responsibility for establishing and providing civil SAR services within the SRR. The 1st Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC Tyndall AFB) is the RCC for the SRR and provides for and coordinates day-to-day SAR response to include US military assets. Commander, USNORTHCOM, has delegated the federal routine aeronautical SAR coordination authority for the Langley SRR and the authority to coordinate and execute CISAR to Commander, Air Forces North/JFACC.

2. **United States Pacific Command (USPACOM).** SAR coordinator for the US aeronautical SRR corresponding to the inland area of Alaska (the 11th AFRCC is the RCC for this, the Elmendorf SRR).

3. **United States Coast Guard (USCG).** SAR coordinator for all other US aeronautical and maritime SRRs. This includes the Hawaii as well as waters over which the United States has jurisdiction, such as navigable waters of the United States. These SRRs are several and more regional. A USCG district office and regional RCC corresponds to each SRR.

e. State/local authorities designate a person to be the SAR coordinator and are responsible for SAR within their respective jurisdictions. By written SAR agreement or appropriate request, the state/local SAR coordinators are the supported entity for all SAR operations conducted within their jurisdiction, from day-to-day through CISAR.

f. **Civil SAR Services**

1. The NSP covers the following types of civil SAR services:
   a. Maritime (involving rescue from a water environment);
   b. Aeronautical (including civil SAR assistance in the vicinity of airports);
   c. Land (including civil SAR operations associated with environments such as remote areas, swift water, caves, mountains, etc.);
   d. Urban SAR;
(e) Provision of initial assistance at or near the scene of a distress situation (e.g., initial medical assistance or advice, medical evacuations, provision of needed food or clothing to survivors);

(f) Delivery of survivors to a place of safety or where further assistance can be provided, or further transportation arranged if necessary;

(g) Saving of property when it can be done in conjunction with or for the saving of lives;

(h) MROs; and

(i) SAR services, to include CISAR, associated with incidents covered by the National Response Framework (NRF).

(2) The NSP does not cover operations such as:

(a) Air ambulance services which did not result from a rescue or recovery operation;

(b) Rescues from space (although rescue of persons attempting to enter or returning from space can be included);

(c) Military operations, such as combat SAR or other types of recovery by military operations to remove military or civilian personnel from harm’s way;

(d) Salvage operations;

(e) Assistance in cases of civil disturbance, insurrection, or other emergencies which endanger life or property or disrupt the usual process of government; and

(f) Operations and coordination in addition to those covered by the NSP that might be carried out concurrently with civil SAR operations on scene.

g. Unified Federal SAR Response. When an incident occurs, or is anticipated to occur that may result in a request for a unified federal SAR response to an impacted area, DOD support to civil SAR will likely be conducted under the coordination of the Emergency Support Function (ESF) #9 Search and Rescue Incident Annex to the NRF.

(1) In cases where the President declares a disaster declaration or an emergency declaration a number of possible national mechanisms are activated to assist state and local governments in the alleviation of the suffering and damage resulting from a major disaster or emergency. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), becomes the lead response agency in such cases as provided in the NRF. DOD is a signatory to the NRF. The circumstances that exist before and after a disaster or emergency declaration may involve civil SAR operations carried out under the NSP, and may even involve CISAR operations. When a presidential declaration authorizes actions in relation to the NRF, provisions of the NRF supplement rather than replace those of
the NSP. Civil SAR continues to be carried out IAW this publication and other applicable guidance. However, civil SAR activities will need to be coordinated with FEMA and take into account other aspects of the disaster response operations.

(2) DHS/FEMA is the coordinating agency (ESF coordinator) and will activate ESF #9 when required, initiate conversation among ESF #9 primary, as well as other relevant agencies, and commence ESF #9 SAR planning and response actions. An ESF #9 response is scalable to meet the specific needs of each incident, based upon the nature and magnitude of the event, the suddenness of onset, and the capability of local SAR resources. Response resources are drawn from ESF #9 primary and support agencies.

(3) DOD is a full partner and one of four primary agencies within ESF #9. Primary agency designations are assigned based on an individual agency’s SAR specialized capabilities within specific operational environments. DOD shares primary agency responsibility for land SAR with the Department of the Interior/National Park Service. In addition to their responsibility as the ESF #9 coordinator, FEMA is the primary agency for structural collapse (urban) SAR and the USCG is the primary agency for maritime/coastal/waterborne SAR.

(4) ESF #9 policies for all primary and support agencies include:

(a) Federal SAR responders assist and support state, tribal, territorial, and local SAR capabilities in incidents requiring an integrated response. No provision of ESF #9 is to be construed as an obstruction to prompt and effective action by any agency to assist persons in distress;

(b) ESF #9 SAR operations are conducted IAW the NRF, NSP, NSS, CISAR addendum, and other addenda that define SAR responsibilities and provide guidance to federal agencies with civil mandates;

(c) If an affected state, tribe, or territory has guidance or a plan for conducting unified SAR operations, that guidance or plan will take precedence;

(d) State-to-state assistance is requested by the affected state through the emergency management assistance compact. Other local SAR resources would be requested by the affected locality through mutual aid and assistance agreements. Non-federal SAR resources should be incorporated into any/all coordinated SAR operations;

(5) When ESF #9 is activated, FEMA will designate an overall primary agency to coordinate the integration of federal SAR resources including support agency resources, in support of the requesting federal, state, tribal, or territorial SAR authority. Designation is dependent upon incident circumstances and the type of response, specialty, and skills required. All ESF #9 agencies (primary and support) will provide support to the designated overall primary agency as required;

(6) Depending on the nature/environment of the incident and the type of anticipated response, DOD may be designated the ESF #9 overall primary agency. For incidents in
which DOD is designated the overall primary agency, DOD, through USNORTHCOM and USPACOM shall:

(a) Coordinate resolution of conflicting operational demands for SAR response resources;
(b) Manage DOD SAR resources in the affected area;
(c) Coordinate the provisioning of additional support assets;
(d) Coordinate with federal, state, tribal, territorial, and local designated SAR authorities to integrate federal SAR resources;
(e) Coordinate planning and operations between primary and support agencies;
(f) As required, provide representation at the NRCC, joint field office, and state, tribal, territorial, and local emergency operations centers; and
(g) Provide incident reports, assessments, and situation reports (SITREPs) as required.

(7) For national operations, coordination, C2 of DOD forces during an ESF #9 unified federal SAR response will normally be conducted by the United States Northern Command Rescue Coordination Center (NCRCC). The NCRCC encompasses both the JPRC and the AFRCC. Collocated with the AFRCC at Tyndall AFB, the JPRC provides operational coordination of DOD support to civil SAR for a unified federal SAR response such as CISAR within the entire USNORTHCOM AOR. If DOD is designated the overall primary agency, the JPRC will also provide operational coordination of all ESF #9 primary and support agencies in support of state, tribal, territorial, and local SAR authorities. DOD SAR assets already deployed or employed on scene under the provisions of the NSP would continue their support to the state SAR coordinator through coordination with the NCRCC.

3. Authorities and Policy

a. Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the DPMO through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs is the policy lead for civil SAR, and represents DOD interests to SAR as a member of the NSARC. The USCG chairs the NSARC and is the lead for federal matters relating to national and international civil SAR.

b. DOD personnel will provide assistance to persons, ships, and aircraft in distress under US and international law and applicable regulations.

c. IAW policy, DOD resources may be used for civil SAR needs to the fullest extent practicable on a non-interference basis with primary military duties according to applicable directives, plans, guidelines, and agreements; under the authority of and consistent with the provisions of the NSP.
d. DOD, consistent with its capabilities and legal authority under applicable law and regulation, shall support foreign civil authorities performing civil SAR operations. CCDRs shall support civil SAR operations of other countries in territory and international waters beyond recognized US aeronautical and maritime SRRs within their respective geographic AORs.

e. Military forces supporting civil SAR should be aware that significant terminology and procedural differences exist between DOD and the civil SAR system. Civil SAR standards and procedures identified in the NSP, the IAMSAR manuals, and the NSS and its addenda shall be followed to the maximum extent possible when supporting civil SAR activities consistent with applicable law and regulation. Particular attention should be paid to the standards and procedures contained within the CISAR and land SAR addenda to NSS. During recent defense support to civil authority operations, Commander, USNORTHCOM, has directed the mandatory use of the CISAR addendum for military forces conducting DOD support to civil SAR. Strong familiarity with civil SAR terminology and procedures will enhance the DOD effort to achieve synchronization, interoperability, and unity of effort within federal ESF #9 agencies and among state, tribal, territorial, and local SAR authorities. Electronic access to civil SAR publications may be found on the USCG web site at www.uscg.mil.

Amplifying guidance and further direction on DOD support to civil SAR, can be found within DODD 3003.01, Department of Defense Support to Civil Search and Rescue (SAR), or by contacting DPMO.
APPENDIX B
CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO PERSONNEL RECOVERY
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APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES ARMY PERSONNEL RECOVERY

1. General

a. Army PR doctrine is based on leadership and accountability at every level, from the individual Soldier to the largest military organization. It is embodied in the precept in the Soldier’s Creed to never leave a fallen comrade. Army PR doctrine is nested in joint doctrine and consistent with the applicable DOD directives and instructions. PR is both an individual and collective responsibility. It depends on every Soldier, civilian, and contractor to be trained to survive in isolated situations, and to use ISG to know what actions to take during and isolating event. Individual actions are supported by planning and preparing at the unit level to execute PR tasks. Unit commanders and staffs are responsible to synchronize the activities with plans, orders, and SOP.

b. Army PR is a component of the protection warfighting function, those tasks and systems that preserve the force. It combines with the other protection tasks to sustain combat power and enable mission accomplishment. Soldiers have the responsibility to advise, assist, facilitate, train, coordinate—and if required—execute PR tasks.

c. The objective of Army PR operations is to unite the perspective of the PR system and the individual, design the PR structure for each unique operational environment, and identify the training and readiness requirements. This occurs in an operational environment that is typically a mix of enemies known to be hostile, adversaries that may become hostile, supporters, and neutrals. All PR activities are planned and executed with the knowledge that individuals and collections of individuals, such as nation-states, ethnic groups, independent armed forces, or religious movements, are free to move from one category to another—and often do.

d. Army PR has its own unique lexicon that is continually evolving to keep pace with changes in doctrine, technology, and PR capabilities. Many of the changes reflect interaction with entities outside the Army. Some basic terms are:

(1) Isolated Personnel (Replaces IMDC [Isolated, Missing, Detained, and Captured]). Any military, DOD civilian, eligible DOD contractor employee, or other designated persons, who are separated from friendly forces, unable to complete their intended mission or activity, and are required to employ the five PR proficiencies (architecture, communicate, navigate, preserve life, and endure hardship) to return to safety or friendly control.

(2) Designated Person. Any military, DOD civilian, DOD contractor, or other individual identified by the President or SecDef.

(3) Personnel Recovery Guidance (PRG). Direction to the force with regards to PR operations developed during the Army operations process that defines the PR concept for the operation, allocates resources, describes control measures, and identifies specified PR tasks.
Appendix C

(4) Isolated Soldier Guidance. Mission-specific direction to each Soldier on the circumstances that constitute being isolated and what actions the isolated person should take during an isolating event.

2. Personnel Recovery Roles and Responsibilities

a. Roles and responsibilities are different. A role is the part performed in a particular operation. Every role comes with a set of responsibilities. A responsibility is an obligation for which one is professionally, legally, ethically, or morally accountable. Army PR roles are categorized in three focal groups with responsibilities to prepare for, plan, execute, and assess the PR mission.

   (1) Commanders and staff leaders are responsible for the conduct of operations.

   (2) Units of assignment and recovery forces are responsible for accountability and immediate recovery of any isolated unit member.

   (3) Isolated personnel use ISG and basic Soldier skills to regain contact with friendly forces.

b. Army PR is further grouped by echelon based on whether there is a dedicated staff capability available at that echelon.

   (1) Company and Below. Army units with no formal staff exercise their PR responsibilities along with all other individual, collective, and leadership tasks.

   (2) Battalion and Brigade. Units with small staffs exercise PR responsibilities as an additional duty for an officer or noncommissioned officer in the training and operations staff section battalion or brigade operations staff officer (Army; Marine Corps battalion or regiment) (S-3). Brigades include the brigade combat teams (infantry, heavy, and Stryker), functional brigades (engineer, military police, air and missile defense, intelligence, medical, explosive ordnance disposal, signal and CBRN), modular support brigades (combat aviation, fires, sustainment, maneuver enhancement, and battlefield surveillance), and the brigade-size modular elements of theater-level commands (including groups).

   (3) Echelons above Brigade. Army unit HQ at division, corps, and theater levels have trained officers and noncommissioned officers who perform the specific role of PR staff specialist. The Soldiers in the PR element are part of the protection cell and typically have representation on the current operations integrating cell. Because of its subordinate nature to the protection cell, the PR element is called the personnel recovery coordination section (PRCS). Sometimes it is also referred to as the PRCC.

c. The commander’s responsibilities include deciding what the end state should be, determining what to do to reach that end state, deciding how to employ the available resources, and how best to direct the force to influence the action. With regards to PR, Army Regulation 525-28, Personnel Recovery, directs that all commanders:
(1) Develop policies and procedures for their command to report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate Soldiers and others in the event they become isolated.

(2) Ensure those Soldiers and Army civilians who will deploy arrange with their families the actions to take should they become isolated.

(3) Develop policies and procedures to support the families of Soldiers and Army civilians in the event they become isolated.

(4) Provide requirements to the contracting officer concerning PR for incorporation into contracts. At a minimum, commanders identify any training and equipment that a contractor authorized to accompany the force will be expected to operate, carry, and so forth, necessary for PR efforts.

(5) Establish a functioning PRCC for all major exercises and operations at the division and corps level.

(6) Commanders at the brigade level will identify a PR officer or noncommissioned officer.

d. There are staff PR responsibilities associated with each of the joint functions: movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, mission command, and protection. The PR staff has the same general responsibilities whether they are trained PR specialists in echelons above brigade HQ, the PR staff officer or noncommissioned officer serving at the brigade level, or a multifunctional staff officer at battalion. The PR specialist is primarily a coordinator and supports the PR tasks. Responsibilities fall into three broad categories:

(1) **Advisor.** The PR specialist knows joint and Army doctrine and is an expert on PR operations. As such, commanders at every level seek counsel when confronted with an isolating incident. The PR specialist may provide advice when requested, or may even accompany the commander when exercising C2 in response to an isolating event.

(2) **Point of Contact.** By occupying the position of PR specialist—whether as an additional duty for a multifunctional staff officer at battalion or brigade, or in a required and authorized position at large unit HQ—the incumbent becomes the target of inquiries about the doctrine and TTP for PR efforts. Questions and comments may come from within the HQ, outside staff entities, or other commanders. Depending on the situation, this may include skip-echelon contacts where a commander or staff members from lower or higher in the chain of command jumps over the next level—or levels—of command in an RFI and guidance. Frequently, the contact is an attempt to get information about a planned, on-going, or completed PR mission. POC responsibilities include the necessary training to inform the command on its responsibilities.

(3) **Staff Coordinator.** The difference between the POC and the staff coordinator is the level of activity and personal involvement. Whether located within the S-staff of a battalion or brigade or one of the sections or cells at echelon above brigade HQ, the PR specialist is a member of the team that contributes to the successful accomplishment of the
recovery mission. The coordination responsibilities can be routine or exceptional, depending on the situation.

e. The PRCS is a staff organization. It has three primary responsibilities: education and training, routine coordination, and mission support coordination. There are PRCSs at theater army, corps, and division HQ. The location of the PRCS is a command decision, but it is typically located near—or is digitally connected with—the operations center to gain and maintain SA and receive immediate information on isolating incidents and the status of PR operations. Multiple PRCSs can exist at multiple locations, based on the need for staff support for the command at geographically dispersed locations. Whether they report to a senior PRCS or are independent organizations depends on the situation and the direction of the commander. The PRCS specific responsibilities include:

(1) Implement PR policies and programs at the component level.
(2) Serve as subject matter experts and POC for PR operations and issues.
(3) Develop PR SOPs.
(4) Coordinate education and training of subordinate commanders, staffs, and individuals in their PR responsibilities.
(5) Provide staff supervision of PR officers at subordinate echelons.
(6) Participate in the decision-making processes for PR situations.
(7) Coordinate with PR related cells and elements: intelligence, airspace C2, lethal and nonlethal fires, protection, C2, engineer, aviation, judge advocate, and others to enable PR operations.

f. For isolated personnel, recovery is not a leadership or accountability challenge; it is a matter of survival. For the individual, whether a Soldier, DOD civilian, contractors, or other designated person, the situation becomes the answer to a series of basic questions:

(1) How do I know I’m isolated?
(2) What do I do about it?
(3) How do I help with my own recovery?

3. Concept of Army Personnel Recovery Operations

a. Guidance is both general—PRG—and specific—ISG. Recovery forces use the ISG information to support isolation incident response, including identification and authentication. The PRG and the ISG are parts of the same whole. Typically, guidance is a part of the general protection actions relayed to unit members. Commanders may provide guidance to protect the force without formally identifying it as PR guidance. This may change in areas with high risk of isolation, whether from individual decisions, enemy action,
or the environment. As PRG progresses from combined and joint commands, through senior Army HQ to brigade level, it becomes more detailed and prescriptive. The PRG contains the direction unit commanders need to plan for, prepare, execute, and assess mandated PR activities. As a minimum PRG provides this direction:

1. Communicate the commander’s concept for PR.
2. Establish PR command, support, and liaison relationships.
3. Specify subordinate commanders’ PR responsibilities.
4. Discusses the prevention initiatives required to prepare the force.
5. Establish isolated personnel criteria.
6. Direct when and where to establish PRCSs.
7. Designate units to execute PR operations when the risk is deemed high enough to warrant them on-call or in a higher state of readiness.
8. Delegate authority to execute recovery operations.
9. Incorporate PR activities in unit SOPs.

b. There is no fixed format for PRG; it is contained in various parts of the order, including the base order and appropriate annexes, appendices, tabs, and exhibits. PR information is covered in the base order, primarily in paragraph 3f. (Execution: Scheme of Protection), and in 3i. (Execution: Tasks to Subordinate Units), especially in subparagraph 3j(8) (Execution: Coordinating Instruction Personnel Recovery Coordination Measures). Much of the information on PR and the PRG can be consolidated in appendix 2 (Personnel Recovery) of annex E (Protection).

c. At the tactical level of PR, the PRG is translated into specific actions for the Soldier as ISG. As with PRG, there is no set format or content for ISG. ISG can be standardized, but is always mission-specific. ISG normally consists of directions to carry certain equipment such as PLBs and survival radios, or learn the location of rally points, safe recovery zones, or communications frequencies. There will always be ISG during any military deployment to an area with a risk of isolation. ISG is written for all members of the command, not just the Soldier at the lowest echelon. The uncertainties and complexity of military operations across the spectrum of conflict can expose everyone to risk of isolation. A general officer or other senior leader may be as vulnerable to isolation as any other Soldier, perhaps more so given the need to travel long distances to show command presence, coordinate with subordinates, and their value to the enemy for propaganda purposes.

1. ISG should provide basic information on the initial actions to take when isolated. Education and training can reduce the psychological impact of isolation, but it still will remain a condition of the isolation and affect the actions taken by the isolated person. Many of the initial actions taken by an isolated person are those embodied in the Warrior
Ethos and the Soldier combat skills initially taught in Army basic and advanced combat training. Things like the use of cover, concealment, and camouflage; movement; land navigation; first aid; marksmanship; communications; SERE; and CBRN defense and explosive ordnance defense are basic Soldier skills. While they can be reinforced in ISG, they should not be covered in it. Actions to take should be mission-specific and the list of actions to take should be simple and direct, such as stay with your vehicle unless discovered by enemy forces or be prepared to authenticate who you are by use of the daily password and countersign.

(2) Isolation criteria are the circumstances under which a Soldier or other designated individual should execute the ISG. It is mission-specific. It depends on the situation. Isolation criteria should be direct and easy to interpret. They are few in number. Isolation criteria serve as a trigger for ISG. Execute ISG if:

(a) You have no communication with your unit or higher HQ by any means for (specified) hours.

(b) You have no contact with fellow unit members for (specified) hours.

(c) Your aircraft makes a forced or precautionary landing in hostile or suspected hostile territory.

(d) You are ordered to do so by your chain of command.

d. Everyone involved in PR operations cooperate in executing the five PR tasks. Together they provide a logical way to look at the complex actions involved in Army PR.

(1) Report. Personnel accountability, unit location, and unit status are among the bedrock items of information in any Army unit. A prompt report on an isolating incident allows the command and its higher HQ to alert its members, assess the situation, and marshal the necessary support. Isolating incidents are of such operational significance that they should be reported as soon as they are identified. In an area of operations with a high risk of isolation, the commander may direct subordinate organizations to report any potential isolation, even though the opportunity for a “false positive” is high. Expending command resources to find someone who is not actually isolated may be tactically wasteful, but it communicates and reinforces a powerful message to the command—no one unaccounted for will be abandoned.

(2) Locate. The location of the isolation incident may be reported and confirmed by the isolated personnel themselves, by friendly observers, or even by monitoring enemy communications. Location is a critical part of the PR mission because it tells the command about the context of the situation. It may help to answer key questions about the situation and the isolated person, such as the cause of the isolation, the physical condition (wounded, sick, tired, exhausted, unable to move), or capability to signal or otherwise communicate with friendly and recovery forces. Care should be taken to authenticate the report and the precise location of the isolated person or persons. Authentication is not just a one-time action, but should be repeated periodically to establish that the isolated person has not been compromised.
(3) **Support.** The support task involves providing aid to the isolated person, the recovery force, and to the isolated person’s family. Once isolated personnel have been located, the command should provide all assistance necessary to enable that person to survive until recovered. Support operations may require physical security to keep an enemy force from finding and capturing the isolated person. Support items may include food, shelter, clothing, communications equipment, locator beacons and other position locating equipment, medical supplies, protective equipment, weapons, ammunitions, and maps. Support also includes that provided to the recovery force to enhance their readiness to execute the recovery mission. Support extends to the home front. Guided by Army notification policy, the owning unit and supporting home station installation will rapidly provide the NOK with the accurate status of their family member with periodic updates, and the spiritual, morale, medical, financial, and administrative support they need to endure the crisis.

(4) **Recover.** A successful recovery operation results in the end of the isolation and the recovery of the person or persons. The mission to conduct recovery operations can be an operation designed to secure the recovery of a specific individual, or it can be an implied task of another mission. The recovering unit’s mission is complete when the recovered person is returned to friendly control. However, recovery efforts may end with a less than positive outcome when the capture or death of the isolated personnel are confirmed.

(5) **Reintegrate.** All recovered personnel undergo some form of reintegration. The reintegration process includes intelligence and SERE debriefings, medical and behavioral health evaluations, and reconnection with family and unit members. Reintegration processing also attends to the spiritual needs of the returned personnel and provides assistance in dealing with the media. Every effort is made to ensure that the formerly isolated person is returned to normalcy as expeditiously as possible, physically and emotionally fit. Reintegration is the responsibility of commanders and staffs, typically at the division level and above. Reintegration consists of three phases. All personnel who have been isolated go through at least the first phase, but not all personnel require processing through all three phases.

   (a) **Phase I, Return to US Military Control.** The initial action is to transport the returnee to a designated processing facility, normally at a division, corps, or theater army HQ. At the facility, the initial medical, food, rest, and other needs are met. These include a series of evaluations and debriefings to determine the medical and behavioral health of the recovered person. They may undergo intelligence debriefings to add to the situational understanding of their isolation and provide information on the enemy, hostage takers, or the environmental conditions that contributed to the isolation. The responsibilities for this phase are shared by the recovery force, its higher HQ, and the appropriate senior-level HQ—normally the combatant command.

   (b) **Phase II, Intermediate Efforts.** The objective of this phase is to provide the necessary medical and behavioral health care to the formerly isolated individuals in order to restore a level of health that allows the return of these individuals to their assigned unit or organization. Additional intelligence debriefings are possible. The formerly isolated person may contact or be reunited with family members to begin the reintegration with family
members and friends. In this phase, the JTF, theater army, or other Service component has primary responsibility in conjunction with continental United States (CONUS)-based support organizations such as Human Resources Command, Army Medical Command, and Installation Management Command. Public interest in the situation will be handled with the assistance of PAOs.

(c) Phase III, Long-Term Actions. If deemed advisable, the returnee may be returned to CONUS for long-term medical and behavioral health care. If more than one person was isolated, the group may remain at the same location for group therapy and continued debriefings. Responsibility for these actions transfers to CONUS-based Army and military authorities. Soldiers will be returned to their unit of assignment or to a follow-on unit when treatment is complete.

e. The PR proficiencies shown in Figure C-1 contribute to the successful recovery of isolated personnel. All five PR proficiencies are shared to some extent. Structure is a commander and staff responsibility. Communicate is shared by all three focal groups. The recovery force should communicate, navigate, and preserve life. Finally, the individual is responsible for all but structure.

(1) The PR structure is a composite of the doctrine, policy, procedures, people, organizations, equipment, and information systems. It is the intellectual framework used to provide the foundation for prevention of, preparation for, and responses to isolation incidents. Structure is the responsibility of commanders and leaders at all levels. They establish it and direct its use. At every echelon, the PR structure is visible in two activities: maintaining the unit’s link to the chain of command as well as maintaining the PR program within the unit.

(2) Knowledge of how to communicate is a basic Soldier skill. It is the responsibility of all three PR focal groups. Knowledge of, and the capability to use, PR related equipment is a key to a potential recovery. Low-tech communications systems augment electronic systems. Training in these means of information sharing is a command responsibility.

(3) The ability to determine location is an important skill in any military operation and critical in PR operations. Navigation is a basic Soldier proficiency taught and re-taught throughout a Soldier’s service. In a mission with the potential for isolation, all should know how to locate and move to friendly forces. Isolated forces can direct friendly forces to their location only if they accurately know that location. Conversely, PR operations are much more efficient if the unit knows where the isolated personnel were when they lost contact.
Preservation of life is a basic human drive, but not all isolated persons are equally trained or suited to help themselves. They may not possess the skills necessary to stay in a healthy condition long enough to assist in their own recovery. Therefore, preservation of life in an isolation incident is a shared responsibility. The unit and the recovery force should act quickly to locate and recover the isolated individuals without exposing themselves to undo danger from hostile forces or the environment. The chain of command has the responsibility to provide the means for survival, but the command can only succeed if individuals cooperate and make use of their training.

(5) Enduring hardship is a very personal responsibility, but the unit and recovery forces and the higher HQ commanders and staffs share responsibility to prepare the Soldier or other designated individual. The psychological preparation for isolation is as important as other proficiencies. Knowledge that each Soldier or other designated isolated individual will be the object of an immediate recovery effort goes a long way to prepare that individual for isolation. The articles of the Army CoC are a part of initial Army training and are reinforced periodically in units and other organizations, especially those preparing to serve in an environment with a greater risk of isolation. Endurance training and exercises in SERE contribute to the individual’s preparation.
APPENDIX D
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL RECOVERY

1. General

The Marine Corps views PR as an implicit requirement in all combat operations. All elements of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) possess the ability to support PR operations, or participate in the recovery of isolated personnel. The MAGTF commander may, or may not, elect to dedicate forces to perform this mission; however, additional capability to perform self-supporting recovery operations and external PR support is provided through a mission known as TRAP. Aviation, ground, or waterborne assets, or any combination of these may conduct a TRAP mission. The TRAP mission differs from CSAR in that it usually does not involve extended visual search procedures to locate isolated personnel, particularly in a medium- or high-air threat environment. TRAP assets may also be employed in the conduct of other non-recovery missions and called upon to perform a recovery as it becomes necessary. The TRAP mission emphasizes detailed planning and the use of assigned and briefed personnel for the specific purpose of recovering personnel and/or aircraft. The MAGTF commander may utilize the TRAP force when an immediate recovery is impractical, or the tactical situation necessitates the additional capabilities a TRAP force provides. Confirmation of a survivor(s) status and location is required prior to committing a force to a recovery mission.

2. Responsibilities

   a. United States Marine Corps forces deploying to an operational area should be prepared to conduct self-supporting recovery operations.

   b. The MAGTF commander is responsible for the conduct of TRAP operations involving his forces. The MAGTF commander should also be prepared to provide augmentation personnel to the JPRC and component PRCC, if established, as required and directed by higher authority.

   c. The MAGTF commander should ensure all MAGTF personnel committed to a hostile environment are familiar with tactics employed by PR forces during recovery operations.

   d. The MAGTF commander should provide mutual support to PR operations of other joint force components to the greatest extent possible.

   e. MAGTF subordinate commanders should ensure their personnel are familiar with evasion and PR tactics and are capable of meeting individual responsibilities.

   f. MAGTF commanders are responsible to ensure personnel identified to organize, prepare, and conduct PR are functionally trained commensurate with their responsibilities. Likewise, the commander must ensure subordinate commanders are directed to plan and execute their PR specified tasks.
3. Command Relationships

a. **Component.** For military operations, Marine forces are formed into MAGTFs under a single commander. MAGTFs are task organizations consisting of command, aviation, ground, and logistic combat elements. The MAGTF is a self-sufficient, integrated, air-ground combined arms force organized for combat. TRAP is a MAGTF mission. As such, all elements of the MAGTF may participate in the TRAP mission.

   (1) The MAGTF commander should retain OPCON of assigned forces in order to take advantage of the unique and balanced combined arms capability of the force.

   (2) When MAGTF assets deploy in advance of the main body, a MAGTF forward command element (FCE) should be established. OPCON remains with the MAGTF commander and is exercised by the MAGTF’s FCE.

   (3) The MAGTF commander may be tasked with supporting other component PR efforts. When tasked to support these efforts, the MAGTF commander, as a supporting commander, may attach the forces designated by the MAGTF commander to the supported component commander. The command relationship (normally TACON) will be specified in the governing directive.

b. **Joint.** The JFC can task the Marine component commander to establish a JTF, or Marine Corps forces may make up the preponderance of forces within a JTF. In either case, Marine forces should be prepared to establish a capability to coordinate and execute PR missions within their assigned area of operations in support of unilateral or joint PR requests. Marine components will exercise C2 through operations centers and staffs using policies, PR CONOPS, and orders. It is incumbent on the JTF commander to require components to plan, prepare, and provide PR capabilities, PR C2 nodes, PR CONOPS, and conduct exercises and rehearsals.

4. Capabilities and Limitations

a. **General.** Commanders should not presume that only the aviation element of a MAGTF possesses PR capabilities. Units from ground combat, logistic combat, and command elements (CEs) can provide a variety of support including recovery within their local areas, support to recovery forces such as security or medical, or providing C2 for recovery units/forces. Employments of units/forces are based upon mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available dependent.

b. **Report.** The Marine Corps uses various technical means and written formats to report information. Regardless of the means or format, a suspected or known isolated person should be reported through the chain of command and local PR C2 nodes immediately. Without operational visibility of an isolating situation, the prospect of a timely, successful recovery diminishes rapidly. The isolating incident will also be reported to the theater or JFC PR architecture immediately, as the Marine Corps plan and execute both immediate and deliberate recovery measures. Report requirements, including reporting time requirements, will be stated in operational orders or PR CONOPS.
c. **Locate.** The Marine Corps uses technical and nontechnical means to locate isolated personnel. Marine Corps methodology may include air, ground, and maritime search by personnel, sensors, and requests for or planned external support. Unit CONOPS and SOPs should include the planned methodology for commanders and staffs, units/forces, and the general means that isolated personnel will assist in their own recovery.

d. **Support.** Support includes any and all support required by Marine Corps units/forces to conduct recovery, the prepared actions to support isolated personnel, and the coordinated actions to support families of isolated personnel family, as applicable. Support includes the use of all available assets up to and including national level assets, agencies, and organizations.

e. **Recover.** Normally, recovery in an uncertain, hostile, or denied environment requires Marine Corps combat assets to recover isolated personnel. All elements of the MAGTF may be called upon to support or conduct a recovery of an isolated person.

   (1) **Command Element.** The CE is the MAGTF HQ and is composed of the commander; the commander’s staff; and a surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence (SRI) capability. The commander is responsible for the C2 and coordination of all MAGTF elements, including assigning tasks and providing the direction needed to accomplish the TRAP mission. The CE can provide information and intelligence to develop adversary, terrain, and weather databases to be used to plan and execute a TRAP mission. SRI resources have a capability to perform clandestine extracts.

   (2) **Aviation Combat Element (ACE).** Although assault support normally will be the main supporting function executed for the ACE portion of TRAP, all six functions of Marine aviation may be applied in the mission. Antiair warfare assets may be needed to ensure freedom of action for the recovery force (airborne or surface borne); offensive air support may provide deep air support and CAS; RESCORT may be required to ensure safe passage; and EW assets may be employed to support the TRAP mission. Two functions that will always be used are air reconnaissance and control of aircraft and missiles. Air reconnaissance should provide continuous observation of the pickup area.

   (3) **Ground Combat Element (GCE).** The traditional role of the GCE in TRAP has been to provide various types and sizes of teams to provide security at the recovery site. The GCE can be tasked to conduct the TRAP mission by surface means to include rigid raiding craft, light armored vehicles, or organic forces to conduct clandestine extracts. Fire support assets of the GCE may be tasked to support the TRAP mission.

   (4) The **logistic combat element** may be tasked to provide a variety of support, including medical, HLZ (helicopter support teams, slings), explosive ordnance disposal, engineer, and other selected service support (e.g., supply; water; petroleum, oils, and lubricants; utilities).

f. **Reintegrate.** Commanders and staff will ensure this phase is planned, prepared, and rehearsed. This will ensure isolated personnel are properly returned and thoroughly assessed before deciding to either be returned and reintegrated with their units/forces or repatriated.
IAW the Marine Corps Reintegration Plan, theater regulations, and DODI 2310.4, *Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel*. Capabilities to establish facilities and execute procedures for reintegration phases I and II may be available depending on the composition of the MAGTF (Marine expeditionary unit, Marine expeditionary brigade, or Marine expeditionary force).

5. **Concept of Operations**
   
a. **General.** Recovery missions should not supersede assigned mission objectives and resource requirements, but in a typical situation should be accorded a priority level of importance. The prerequisites for conducting a recovery mission are as follows:

   (1) There should be reasonable certainty that isolated personnel are alive.

   (2) The location of the personnel, equipment, or aircraft must be known.

   b. **Planning**

   (1) It is critical that as much recovery mission planning as possible be done before deployment of the MAGTF to minimize confusion at the time of mission execution. Such planning comprises three phases:

   (a) Analysis of theater PR guidance or CONOPS.

   (b) Assault contingency planning.

   (c) Final recovery mission planning.

   (2) The MAGTF CONOPS for TRAP missions should include possible scenarios and geographic areas in establishing basic policy. The CONOPS should also describe the conditions under which other resources external to the MAGTF will be requested. The concept should include a specific decision matrix that will assist in determining basic go/no-go criteria. Figure D-1 is a typical TRAP decision matrix.

   (3) There is no standard TRAP mission because each tactical situation is unique. The key to success is proper attention to the planning process. A simple, concise CONOPS that accurately reflects theater policy, a thorough contingency TRAP plan for each assault, and rapid final planning after each initial loss report will greatly reduce uncertainty and confusion during the recovery mission.

   c. **Execution.** In many cases, isolated personnel will be in a no-go sector. In this situation, other resources may be requested or a clandestine recovery may be employed. In some situations, isolated personnel will have to evade to a viable recovery area. The ultimate goal of a TRAP, or any other means of recovery, is to effect the expeditious return of personnel, equipment, and/or aircraft without further loss of friendly forces.
### Immediate Recovery

Immediate TRAP occurs as soon as commanders or staffs recognize there is an accountability issue with a Marine they own. This can occur as a result of the daily personnel reports, missed checkpoints, overdue aircraft or vehicles, or even during consolidation and reorganization in the middle of combat operations. It is the sum of actions that local or on-site commanders and staff take to immediately report an isolating situation and execute the locate and recover phase within their assigned areas of operation. Immediate TRAP efforts should be tempered by considering the effects an immediate recovery would have on assigned mission accomplishment. Some threat levels will permit a quick reaction effort to conduct a successful recovery. An immediate report is critical to prepare deliberate PR options by vertical or horizontal elements, if an immediate recovery is impossible. The ideal time to execute a TRAP mission is immediately after the

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#### Figure D-1. Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel Decision Matrix

*(Legend)*

- **AAA**: antiaircraft artillery
- **ACE**: aviation combat element
- **GCE**: ground combat element
- **IR**: infrared
- **LCE**: logistic combat element
- **NVG**: night vision goggle
- **RECON**: reconnaissance
- **SOF**: special operations forces
- **STD**: standard
- **TERF**: terrain flight

#### TACTICAL RECOVERY OF AIRCRAFT AND PERSONNEL DECISION MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THREAT</th>
<th>REQUIRED ASSETS</th>
<th>REQUIRED TACTICS</th>
<th>TACTICAL RECOVERY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High and Medium Density (AAA/IR Missile)</td>
<td>ACE/GCE</td>
<td>TERF</td>
<td>GO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Over Land)</td>
<td>STD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Density (AAA/IR Missile)</td>
<td>ACE/GCE/LCE</td>
<td>TERF/NVG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Over Land)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms (Day/Night) (Over Land)</td>
<td>ACE/GCE</td>
<td>TERF/NVG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe (Over Land)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe (Over Water)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend**

- **GO**: Safe
- **NO - GO**: Safe
incident occurs. Immediate recovery is most desirable because friendly forces may still be in the area, adversary forces may not have had an opportunity to react, and required medical treatment can be rendered quickly.

(2) **Deliberate PR.** Deliberate TRAP is the sum of plans and actions that occur across the Marine component capability beginning with an isolating incident report. Deliberate TRAP is the direct use of a particular unit or type of force, such as the TRAP force. It includes a variety of integrated capabilities including air, ground, and maritime. Marine operations centers or PRCCs are responsible to conduct multi-echelon coordination and deconfliction internal and external to Marine forces. This continues until the isolated personnel are recovered successfully regardless of the recovery capability. In many instances, a delayed recovery may be necessary because of assigned mission requirements or the adversary threat. Upon completion of an assigned mission, TRAP-capable resources may then be directed to plan and conduct the delayed recovery. In the face of an overwhelming adversary threat, isolated personnel may be directed to evade to a viable recovery area.

(3) **External Supported Recovery (ESR).** ESR is the sum of coordination and support provided by any entity external to that component. This is the responsibility of the operations center, PRCC, and the commander’s staff. Routinely, components of a joint force have arranged for various national and operational level support to conduct PR. This support should be cited in the joint CONOPS for PR and should be exercised and rehearsed routinely.

6. **Education and Training**

   a. **Commanders and Staffs.** It is critical that all elements of the MAGTF ensure they have personnel functionally trained in PR commensurate with their levels of actions. The lead for PR normally resides within the brigade or higher component operations staff office/S-3, more specifically current operations or plans. It is essential that all staff directorates be familiar with PR and their roles in supporting operations. An example is the Army or Marine Corps component manpower or personnel staff officer (Army division or higher staff, Marine Corps brigade or higher staff) (G-1)/battalion or brigade manpower and personnel staff officer (Marine Corps battalion or regiment) (S-1) could receive a report of isolated personnel. While this normally falls into personnel reports and accountability, it is incumbent with the commander and his or her PR C2 to ensure the whole G/S-1 section realize that this is an isolating situation and operations must be notified immediately. Since this isolating situation triggers planning and preparation for operations, it is equally critical that the intelligence staff officer is involved for providing intelligence and combat information for planning and execution. Likewise, the logistics staff officer and communications staff officer should be included in planning and execution.

   b. **Recovery Forces.** The commander designates units and forces to conduct PR functions. Units/forces are required to plan, prepare, exercise, and rehearse for PR execution. These units or forces are responsible to prepare their SOPs and COAs for execution. Their COAs should include the three phased options cited in this appendix. To properly train units or forces, the commanders should ensure they are educated and trained. To that end, education and training refers to PR specific functional training and specific PR
education regarding the country they are deploying to. The commander and staff may elect to obtain education and training internal to the Marine Corps, send personnel externally to other the Service schools, or coordinate for a variety of education and training provided by Services and JPRA. MAGTF units train for TRAP missions as part of their overall training. TRAP is viewed as an important category of assault support. Assault support and attack aircrews maintain a high level of proficiency by including TRAP and PR in applicable training events.

c. **Isolated Personnel.** Education and training for individuals refers to the preparation of Marines to deploy to a specific country. Theater requirements may set the training level for forces deploying (i.e., SERE). The Marine Corps considers all its deployed personnel at some level of risk. Commanders should ensure all forces are prepared for the deployment to specific environments. Commanders should prepare and implement typical control measures for the accountability and reporting of individuals and rehearse reporting immediately of a suspected or known situation. Commanders and staffs, units/forces, and individuals should repeatedly rehearse isolating situations that require specific actions from all three groups. Commanders and staff plan, disseminate, and rehearse actions taken by individuals in the event they become isolated. The Marine Corps does not plan evasion for every individual Marine nor does it allow every Marine to plan independent evasion and record that on an EPA. The Marine Corps uses centralized planning and dissemination by staffs to all forces to provide for individual actions. PR’s focus is in operations. All staff sections support daily operational plans and SOPs for isolated Marines. During the predeployment program period, Marines are taught skills that are directly related to TRAP, including evasion and recovery TTP, night operations, and rapid planning.
Intentionally Blank
1. General


b. For isolated personnel located in low or medium anti-air threat areas, recoveries are assigned to units specialized in CSAR. Traditionally, CSAR assets have been trained and equipped to rescue forces most likely to be isolated during combat, including downed aviators and distressed SOF. Naval CSAR doctrine can be found in NWP 3-50.22, *Combat Search and Rescue Manual*, and NTTP 3-03.4, *Naval Strike and Air Warfare*. Navy CSAR includes all previous CSAR requirements, but places increased emphasis on integrating rescue planning and coordination into planning and execution of all strike operations.

2. Responsibilities

a. A Navy component commander (NCC) or joint force maritime component commander may establish an RCC as directed by the JFC or in support of component operations. However, the senior member (usually the officer in tactical command [OTC]) of any deployed unit or group of units is directly responsible for conducting unit PR operations. In most cases, the carrier strike group (CSG) or expeditionary strike group commander is the OTC. To ensure effective and expeditious execution of CSAR missions, the OTC...
establishes a rescue coordination team (RCT) as described in NTTP 3-03.4, *Naval Strike and Air Warfare*. The RCT is the Navy’s functional equivalent of a component PRCC. The RCT is the planning and operations nucleus responsible to the strike warfare commander for conduct and execution of all CSAR operations. RCT responsibilities include planning, coordination, control, and recovery of downed aircrews in combat operations.

b. All carrier air wings receive CSAR training during pre-deployment training, and the carrier air wing is responsible for providing assistance in planning and executing all CSAR missions through the RCT. As part of Navy strike planning per NTTP 3-03.4, *Naval Strike and Air Warfare*, trained crews and aircraft are normally allocated to meet potential CSAR requirements. The carrier intelligence center is the central clearing point and storage center for intelligence specific to the CSAR mission. The carrier intelligence center is also directly responsible for information pertaining to planning and executing all CSAR operations.

c. The senior member of the RCT should function as the CSAR mission controller, and be directly responsible to the strike warfare commander for the conduct and execution of CSAR missions.

d. **Amphibious Operations.** During an amphibious operation, the commander, amphibious task force (CATF), is responsible for CSAR in the AOA. CSAR planning is coordinated with the commander, landing force (CLF).

   (1) The CLF staff is not structured to support landing force (LF) CSAR requirements. Consequently, the CATF staff should coordinate CSAR assets or request CSAR support from the JPRC.

   (2) If a CSG is in support of the amphibious operation and not under OPCON of the CATF, the CATF should coordinate with the CSG commander to ensure clarity of CSAR responsibilities.

   (3) Once C2 of the LF has been passed ashore, the CLF is responsible to the CATF for CSAR in the land portion of the AOA until the amphibious operation is terminated.

### 3. Command Relationships

a. **Component.** Figure E-1 shows the Navy’s CSAR command relationships.

b. **Joint.** The Navy forces should relinquish TACON of forces capable of CSAR as directed by the JFC to a JFC-designated component commander or to the JPRC when these forces are committed to a joint recovery operation.
4. Capabilities and Limitations

Determination of assets employed in a CSAR role is affected by the operational area and the threat. Types of assets and capabilities available to the OTC to execute the five PR execution tasks are:

Figure E-1. Navy Combat Search and Rescue Command and Control
a. **Report.** Most naval platforms have inherent reporting capabilities (radio, other signaling devices). Aircraft, combatants, and self-contained units (naval special warfare [NSW], naval construction battalions, etc.) normally have LOS radio and are likely integrated with theater or component C2 systems. Individual personnel who become separated from their unit/platform may or may not be equipped with reporting capabilities depending on their mission and status. Aircrew and SOF, for example, normally employ individual tactical or survival radios and beacons, which may have self-reporting and location capabilities.

b. **Locate.** Most naval aircraft are equipped with direction-finding equipment that can assist in locating isolated personnel. Additionally, carrier air wings deploy with a limited number of Quickdraw interrogators that can derive encoded GPS locations from PRC-112B/G radios. The majority of Navy aircrew employ the combat survivor evader locator radio. HH-60H and MH-60S helicopters can be equipped with the DALS [downed aviator locator system], which can note range/bearing to PRC-112 radios. Finally, all Navy tactical air and embarked helicopter assets deploy with NVDs, which can be integrated with isolated personnel IR signaling devices. The Navy RCC or RCT should be consulted to determine what tools isolated personnel may have in their possession. Navy ships and submarines can also assist in locating isolated personnel via onboard electronic surveillance and direction finding equipment.

c. **Support.** The Navy has no dedicated assets for resupply of isolated personnel. Additionally, Navy helicopter aircrews, while capable of providing some direct fire and medical support to an isolated person, are not specifically trained as combat recovery personnel. Therefore, Navy recovery forces may include SOF for such support if required. The RMC or other tactical aircraft can provide CAS for isolated personnel prior to the recovery phase. For additional information, see paragraph 4d “Recover” and consult NWP 3-50.22, *Combat Search and Rescue Manual*, and NTTP 3-03.4, *Naval Strike and Air Warfare*.

d. **Recover**

   (1) **Helicopters**

   (a) **Direct Recovery.** The types of organic platforms available to the OTC include helicopters of varying size and capability. Only specific helicopter communities are trained and equipped to operate in hostile overland environments.

   1. Organic strike group CSAR assets consist of selected CSAR-trained crews within each carrier-based helicopter antisubmarine (HS) squadron or helicopter sea combat (HSC) squadron. HS squadrons operate the legacy HH-60H helicopter, while HSC squadrons, which will eventually replace HS squadrons, operate the newer MH-60S helicopter. The MH-60S is replacing the older HH-60H with the same CSAR capabilities as the HH-60H. Both squadron types are capable of forming independently operating detachments that can operate from smaller ships and land bases. Squadrons equipped with HH-60H or appropriately configured MH-60S helicopters are trained to conduct day and night CSAR and NSW operations in a hostile small arms and IR missile environment. HH-
60H and MH-60S crews are specially trained in terrain flight, flying in hostile environments, night vision goggles (NVGs), and NSW support. Ingress and egress routes using terrain masking, when combined with suppression of adversary air defenses, facilitate operations in medium-threat levels.

2. If there are no designated joint CSAR assets, organic assets within CSG are prioritized as follows:
   a. Embarked HS/HSC helicopters.
   b. Embarked helicopter strike maritime squadron helicopters (over water only).
   c. Other helicopter (over water only).

3. CSAR assets external to the CSG should be planned for, coordinated, and requested as part of the initial strike planning activities. Requests for support are forwarded via the PRCC. Requests for Reserve forces should be coordinated via the NCC.

4. Helicopters capable of performing night rescues over water are the SH-60B/F, HH-60H, MH-60S, and the MH-60R.

(b) Insert and/or Extract Recovery Force. If a direct airborne recovery is not feasible, helicopters and crews may be used within their threat-level capability in a support role for NSW CSAR operations. Based upon such factors as the size of the recovery force, helicopter range, and threat assessment, helicopters may insert and/or extract recovery forces.

   (2) Special Operations Forces. Because of their inherent capabilities, SOF can provide a viable contingency recovery option. Planners should carefully analyze the threat so the recovery force is not unduly exposed to the adversary.

   (a) NSW Forces. In general, NSW strike and rescue forces use SEAL teams, various nonorganic air assets, and/or organic surface craft, including high-speed SO craft, rigid hull inflatable boats, combat rubber raiding craft, riverine craft, and subsurface craft. These personnel and assets can be pre-positioned aboard, or in the vicinity of, a carrier conducting strike operations, with an amphibious ready group, aboard a submarine for clandestine insertion and recovery, or at other locations in close proximity to the area where rescue operations may be required. These forces are organized to:

   1. Facilitate contact, authentication, security, medical treatment, movement, and exfiltration for recovery of isolated personnel in high-threat areas.
   2. Clandestinely recover evaders to safeguard the integrity of designated evasion areas.
   3. Coordinate naval surface fire support (NSFS) or CAS in support of NSW recovery efforts.
4. Collect data for intelligence support of ongoing or future operations.

(b) **Other SOF.** Based upon the availability of other US or friendly SOF and depending upon the situation and compatibility of forces, SOF other than NSW forces may be employed in support of Navy CSAR operations.

(3) **Surface and Subsurface**

(a) **Direct Recovery.** The Navy uses surface ships and submarines to recover isolated personnel in an open water environment.

(b) **Insert and/or Extract Recovery Force.** Surface and subsurface platforms may be used to support CSAR operations in the event neither direct airborne recovery nor airborne insertion and/or extraction of the recovery force is feasible. Based upon such factors as the size of the recovery force, OTH navigation requirements, and threat assessment, surface and subsurface platforms may insert and/or extract the recovery force. Submarines, because of their ability to clandestinely insert and extract recovery force personnel, are particularly valuable for situations in which local surface and/or air superiority is not assured.

(4) **Other Forces.** The following forces are best suited to support the recovery task as described.

(a) **Tactical Aircraft.** Typical air assets available within a CSG include fixed-wing fighter/attack aircraft; helicopters; surveillance, electronic countermeasures, and command, control, and communications aircraft; and a few tactical aerial refueling aircraft. Also, land-based maritime patrol and reconnaissance (MPR) aircraft may be operating in direct support of a CSG. MPR aircraft include the P-3 and EP-3. Long endurance, multiple sensors, and extensive communications capability make the P-3 an ideal overwater search platform. A Navy-led recovery force will normally include a designated RMC. The RMC is a specially-trained tactical aircrew (normally a FAC[A]-designated F/A-18F crew) who will relieve the OSC and direct the recovery mission. The RMC will authenticate and locate isolated personnel (if required), defeat ground threats in the vicinity of a recovery zone, and ensure the safety of recovery assets. RMC aircraft should be placed in an alert status if assets allow. More specifics on RMC employment can be found in NWP 3-50.22, *Combat Search and Rescue Manual*, and NTTP 3-03.4, *Naval Strike and Air Warfare*. Considerations for using tactical aircraft in a CSAR mission, in order of importance, are as follows:

1. **Fuel Considerations and Time on Station.** Tactical aircraft are heavily dependent upon proximity of the carrier to the isolated personnel’s location and/or availability of in-flight refueling. Because of endurance limitations, it might be feasible to only provide a RESCORT during the last phase of a CSAR pickup (i.e., from initial point to pickup to initial point).

2. **Threat Level.** RESCORT tactics, including threat-suppression tactics, should be thoroughly briefed to all CSAR mission participants and vary based upon location and type of threat.
3. **NightCapabilities.** For night CSAR operations necessitated by elevated daytime threat levels, fixed-wing support aircraft employing NVDS and/or radar terrain avoidance systems should be used. Such equipment greatly enhances the ability of the OSC, RMC, and RESCORT to locate and sanitize, while decreasing their detectability to adversary troop and air defense forces.

4. **Support Ordnance.** Ordnance requirements depend upon threat weapon systems. For any threat level, use of advanced weapon systems for increased standoff and pinpoint delivery would enhance the suppression of adversary capabilities and minimize aircraft exposure.

5. **Weather.** Weather minimums differ for individual elements of the combat search and rescue task force (CSARTF), and are not always adequate to conduct a CSAR mission. Each mission should have planned and briefed minimum weather criteria based on the threat, terrain, and requirements for mission accomplishment. Should the situation require RESCORT in limited airspace and/or adverse weather, extreme vigilance and precision are paramount. The OTC, through the RCT, makes the ultimate mission go/no-go decision.

(b) **C2 Aircraft.** Embarked E-2C Hawkeye aircraft will normally be designated as an AMC for a Navy-led recovery task force. The AMC will coordinate threat-suppression efforts, maintain long-range and SATCOM with the RCC, and assist in locating and authenticating isolated personnel. Normally the AMC will be trained in the airborne battle command, control, and communications role. The AMC should track fuel and weapons states, maintain datalink connectivity to and from rescue forces, and coordinate for the use and release of external assets as the recovery situation dictates. More specifics on E-2C AMC employment can be found in NWP 3-50.22, *Combat Search and Rescue*, and NTTP 3-03.4, *Naval Strike and Air Warfare*.

(c) **Ships.** Ships may be tasked with providing NSFS, lifeguard functions, on-deck refueling, helicopter in-flight refueling (HIFR), and emergency landing decks.

e. **Reintegrate.** The Navy retains a limited number of SERE psychologists and debriefers at the Navy SERE schools to support joint and Service reintegration plans. Should a large-scale reintegation of Navy personnel become necessary, the Navy may request support from JPRA or other Services.

5. **Concept of Operations**

a. **General.** CSAR forces may employ any one of a variety of procedures to recover isolated personnel. The situation and threat will dictate the specific TTP employed. Personnel in nontactical, permissive environments can expect to be recovered using SAR procedures. Independent helicopter operations in conjunction with NSW are an additional option. Recovery methods employed in hostile environments may vary considerably. Plans should be flexible to ensure efficient employment of available resources with respect to the specific level of threat. The OTC should establish a basis for go/no-go criteria to provide the
conditions and circumstances in which the OTC is willing to risk additional assets to conduct CSAR.

b. **Planning**

(1) Planning for the CSAR mission begins during predeployment training. A complete CSAR posture should be developed using an orderly and logical planning process. Planners should apply the following three criteria to each phase of CSAR planning:

   (a) Theater or subordinate joint force PR guidance or CONOPS.

   (b) Strike planning and associated rescue contingencies.

   (c) Final rescue mission planning.

(2) The PRCC and the RCT should make an inventory of organic and external resources available to the strike group. This should include all aviation and non-aviation resources, their respective capabilities and limitations, proper request channels, and the estimated time needed from receipt of CSAR requests to availability on station.

(3) Planning for a CSAR mission requires specialized intelligence. In the preplanning and predeployment phases, the PRCC, the RCT, and carrier intelligence center are responsible for acquiring applicable intelligence publications and developing a database for CSAR mission planning.

(4) The CSAR mission often involves coordinated operations using fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. Because of differences in flight regimes, aircraft-specific threats should be carefully evaluated by the PRCC and the RCT to determine the appropriate rescue vehicle to be used or requested. The threat varies with weapon systems as well as the employment doctrine and tactics of the adversary.

c. **Execution.** The modern battlefield relies heavily on control of the air and immediate reaction for targeting. In a time-sensitive environment, PR missions are allocated resources for an immediate recovery if a survivor’s location is known and valid. In the sea or coastal area, the NCC should have forces that can feasibly execute rapid PR and be able to suppress adversary defenses effectively in small areas for short periods. Recovery of personnel inland requires extensive planning to circumvent air defense and surface threats, localize and authenticate isolated personnel, and coordinate support forces such as tactical aircraft, NSFS, shore-based artillery and ground forces, and SOF. Options include the following:

   (1) Clandestine or supported helicopter recoveries.

   (2) Direct or supported surface recoveries.

   (3) Direct or clandestine subsurface recoveries.

   (4) SOF recoveries.
6. Education and Training

a. Commanders and Staffs

(1) An integral part of CSAR training is training given to air wing intelligence personnel. The Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) at Naval Air Station Fallon, NV, provides classroom and mission planning training to air wing intelligence officers responsible for coordinating the intelligence requirements of the RCT and CSARTF, and integrates them into each CSAR rehearsal conducted with their particular air wing.

(2) Naval force commanders, component commanders, and fleet commanders need a working knowledge of the PR architecture from both the naval and joint perspective. PR planners and RCC staffs should be manned by personnel who have completed PR joint training.

b. Recovery Forces. A limited number of fighter/attack aircrews in each carrier air wing are specially trained as FAC(A)s and to respond to CSAR missions, as a qualified RMC. Currently, a minimum of five crews within each HS/HSC squadron are trained in threat awareness and avoidance, terrain flight, CSAR tactics, NVG flight, and the preparation of ISOPREPs and EPAs during predeployment training. Additionally, NSAWC provides detailed integrated CSAR training that includes all tactical air, airborne early warning, HS/HSC, MPR, and intelligence centers as well as the specific NSW unit that may be part of later battle group operations. This training attains a CSAR capability up to medium threat as defined in NTTP 3-03.4, Naval Strike and Air Warfare, but achieves an overall air wing CSAR capability up to and including the high-threat environment when using the NSW forces.

c. Isolated Personnel. All Navy personnel receive Level A CoC training at their accession point, followed by continuing training during annual general military training. Level B training is conducted by individuals, as required by CCDRs. High-risk-of-capture (HRC) (aircrew and some NSW) personnel receive Level C training at least once during their careers.
1. General

CSAR is the operational capability that enables USAF rescue forces to respond effectively across the range of military operations. It is normally accomplished with a mix of dedicated and augmenting assets. CSAR operational capabilities enable USAF rescue forces to conduct other collateral tasks during varying degrees of crisis with little or no increase in effort. Such examples may include, but are not necessarily limited to, noncombat civil and military SAR, casualty evacuation, noncombatant evacuation operations, National Aeronautics and Space Administration flight operations support, humanitarian relief, international aid, counterdrug activities, and other missions as directed by the GCC and the commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR). For more specific information on USAF PR and CSAR, see Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 3-50, Personnel Recovery Operations.

2. Responsibilities

a. The USAF organizes, trains, and equips dedicated PR staffs, fixed and vertical lift airborne assets, and ground recovery forces. Air Combat Command (ACC) is the lead command and proponent for USAF PR; however, Pacific Air Forces, USAF Europe, Air Force Reserve Command, and the Air National Guard (ANG) all contain USAF rescue squadrons and expertise. In addition, other theater air commands will normally contain rescue squadrons and expertise when PR assets and other aircraft are deployed to their theaters.

b. All joint force requests for Air Force PR assets are made through ACC and provided/presented back through ACC to the JFC. The Air Force presents its forces to a JFC as air and space expeditionary task forces (AETFs). Through effective scheduling, each AETF is provided comparable force capability and a predictable pattern of deployment eligibility.

3. Command Relationships

a. Component. The COMAFFOR should establish a PRCC integrated within the Air Force air and space operations center (AOC) to coordinate all USAF PR activities. The COMAFFOR normally exercises OPCON of assigned and attached USAF CSAR forces through their respective command structure.

b. Joint. When the COMAFFOR is designated the JFACC by the JFC, and is the supported commander for PR, the USAF PRCC and associated communications structure may be colocated with, and form the nucleus of, the JPRC. In this case, the USAF PRCC, when augmented by other members of the joint force, is normally designated as the JPRC and the JPRC director is tasked with coordinating all PR joint activities. Coordination of PR missions employing JFACC assets requires integration with the J-3 and combat operations division.
4. Capabilities and Limitations

a. General. The unique makeup of rescue squadrons and other units provide GCCs a small-footprint package of efficient, full-spectrum PR capability. A GCC can also request a scalable/tailored package to suit a specific capability requirement. USAF PR forces are capable of self-deployment; however, rotary-wing assets and logistic support typically require strategic mobility airlift for intertheater movement. Rotary-wing and fixed-wing PR forces possess a rapid response (rapid on-load and off-load) capability. USAF PR assets provide JFCs a robust capability to affect isolated personnel across the five PR execution tasks.

b. PR Execution Tasks

(1) **Report.** Report is the notification that personnel have or may have become isolated. All reports are usually passed as quickly as possible to the component PRCC or the JPRC, which initiates validation and location procedures. USAF PR assets which aid the report task include: SERE trained isolated personnel, survival radios with PR architecture integration (combat survivor evader location, PRC-112, etc.), robust C2 networks and AOCs, and numerous airborne platforms with communications relay capability.

(2) **Locate.** Locate is the action taken to precisely find and confirm the identity of isolated personnel. It starts as soon as the report of an isolated person is received and continues until the isolated personnel are recovered. An accurate location and positive ID are normally required prior to committing recovery forces; however, forces may be launched to selected air/ground positions closer to the initial reported isolated personnel’s location to save valuable time. The location and ID should be maintained throughout the mission. USAF PR assets which aid in the location task include: well-trained JPRC/PRCC personnel, survival radios with GPS location and data-link capabilities, national asset assistance and liaison teams established within AOCs (e.g., U-2, AWACS, JSTARS, RIVET JOINT, SENIOR SCOUT, GLOBAL HAWK, PREDATOR, REAPER, and global satellites). The concept of “combat search” associated with USAF CSAR is limited in scope. Traditional USAF CSAR forces should only be launched to a known isolated personnel’s location (within 1 mile) and “search” should be minimized in uncertain and hostile operational environments. Regardless of the threat level, friendly forces should first locate and authenticate isolated personnel before committing recovery forces to the actual rescue.

(3) **Support.** Support is the planned effort necessary to ensure the mental, physical, and emotional sustainment of the isolated person. These efforts can include establishing two-way communications, providing morale-building support using all available means, suppressing enemy threats, dropping of subsistence and supplies, or providing directions to a cache. It may also encompass the protection of isolated personnel from capture and, as necessary, the disruption of any adversary response to friendly recovery operations. USAF rescue assets which aid the support task include: survival radios with two-way voice/data capability, rotary-wing and fixed-wing assets with the ability to triangulate, monitor, and communicate with survival radios, combat airdrop platforms for required
resupply which are specifically equipped for PR such as the HC-130P/N and MC-130P (ANG only), CAS platforms (e.g., A-10, AC-130), and SERE psychologists.

(4) **Recover.** Recover is the process of coordinated actions and efforts of commanders and staffs, recovery forces, and isolated personnel to bring isolated personnel under the control of a recovery force. CSAR is the primary USAF recovery method. Prerequisites for recovery force execution of this task are mission planning, a responsive decision process, and command authorization.

(a) **Dedicated Airborne PR Assets.** Although most Air Force resources have the inherent capability to support PR, the air assets normally assigned to perform PR operations consist of HH-60G and HC-130P/N, HC-130J, or MC-130P/N (ANG only) aircraft. A complete description of each system’s capabilities, equipment, and TTP may be found in AFTTP 3-1.24 (HH-60G) and 3-1.33 (HC-130P/N, MC-130E/H/P).

(b) **Dedicated Ground Recovery Assets.** USAF ground recovery forces assigned to support PR or limited/extended surface operations are RTs, normally consisting of combat rescue officers (CROs) and pararescuemen, which are part of GUARDIAN ANGEL. These forces are normally colocated with dedicated airborne assets. A complete description of GUARDIAN ANGEL capabilities, equipment, and TTP may be found in AFTTP 3-1.GA, *Tactical Employment of Guardian Angel and Special Tactics*.

(c) **USAF recovery assets (air and ground)** should be used to the maximum extent possible for dedicated PR, allowing other forces possessing collateral PR capabilities to focus on their primary mission.

(d) **FP assets** augment PR missions as the threat level dictates and cover the combat missions of RESCORT, RESCAP, and SEAD. RESCORT is an FP capability comprised of aircrews trained in PR procedures, isolated personnel location and ID, and helicopter and fixed-wing escort operations. Aircrews performing the role of RESCORT significantly increase the chances of successful recovery operations. RESCORT assets are capable of, and designated to provide, protection to PRTF recovery vehicles from ground based threats. Normally, Air Force aircraft tasked to perform RESCORT operations include the A-10, F-16, F-15E, and AC-130. RESCORT aircraft require voice and data communications capability to/from the isolated person, other RESCORT aircraft, and the recovery vehicle/aerial delivery vehicle/RTs.

(e) **RESCAP aircraft are air superiority assets** assigned to protect recovery forces from airborne threats while en route to and from the objective area. RESCAP aircraft may assist RESCORT aircraft in locating and authenticating the isolated personnel. USAF F-15C and F-16 aircraft are normally assigned as RESCAP. Additionally, US Navy F/A-18s can be assigned as RESCAP platforms.

(f) **SEAD forces** are designed to minimize the surface-to-air threat to friendly forces executing a PR mission. The F-16CJ is currently employed as the Air Force’s SEAD aircraft. Integrated and interoperable communications between SEAD forces, recovery
forces, FP assets, and ISR aircraft are critical. When assigning SEAD platforms, the threat environment should be defined for all forces participating in the mission.

(5) Reintegrate. The PR reintegrate task focuses on gathering time-sensitive essential intelligence and SERE information while protecting the health and welfare of recovered isolated personnel and allowing them to reintegrate into their DOD duties. The intelligence and SERE debriefs are designed to obtain specific information regarding the experience of recovered isolated personnel. Reintegration encompasses the decompression process overseen by a SERE psychologist and focuses on the health and well-being of recovered isolated personnel. USAF PR assets that aid the reintegrate task include: USAF SERE specialists, psychologists, and mental health specialists, PR trained commanders and staffs, CROs, USAF medical treatment facilities and physicians, intelligence specialists, PA personnel, chaplains, family support, and SJA.

5. Concept of Operations

a. Planning. USAF PR forces proactively accomplish mission planning tasks to execute the mission based on theater OPLANs and CONPLANs. Effective pre-mission planning is essential due to the unpredictability and time-critical nature associated with PR operations. Pre-mission planning permits PR forces to anticipate multiple responses to common scenarios significantly reducing response times. Planning requirements include, but are not limited to: weather, threat awareness of isolating event and counter-rescue intentions, mission status (ground versus airborne alert), staging/basing, assigned/tasked forces and capabilities, route of flight (preplanned waypoints/spider routes), communications plan, decision matrix for go/no-go, time-sensitive-targeting procedures, insertion/extraction procedures, isolated PR procedures, and roles and responsibilities of assets used for FP. Recovery operations are subject to operational risk assessment and threat analysis in the same manner as other operations.

b. PR planning involves coordination with C2 assets and supporting forces. PR missions have unique planning considerations and requirements. The planning process will be executed at several levels, starting at the component PRCC and in coordination with the JPRC (if established) for missions requiring joint assets, and continuing down to the tasked recovery unit. Mission planning, composite force tactics, unit-level TTP, training, and operational employment should focus on exploiting the unique characteristics of the recovery forces. To leverage effectiveness, actions should be integrated, mutually reinforcing, and clearly focused on compatible objectives. Recovery forces should be pre-positioned to react quickly and minimize mission response time.

c. Execution. Execution includes mission launch, ingress to the objective/terminal area, aerial delivery of RT or supplies, terminal area operations, and combat egress. To gain a better understanding of employment concepts and system capabilities, see AFTTP volumes 3-1.24 (HH-60G), 3-1.33 (HC-130P/N, MC-130E/H/P), and 3-1.GA (CRO/PJ/SERE). These volumes, in conjunction with AFTTP volumes 3-3.24 (HH-60G), and 3-3.33 (HC-130P/N, MC-130E/H/P) should serve as a baseline for current and future employment concepts.
(1) **Launching.** This subtask is normally undertaken when isolated personnel have been located and identified sufficiently (PR execution tasks report and locate) to initiate the recovery phase of the mission being conducted. To reduce the time an enemy has to react and possibly thwart a recovery operation, forces should have timely and accurate reporting/locating mechanisms in place in order to assume appropriate alert postures and enhance SA.

(2) **Ingress to the Terminal/Objective Area.** This subtask accounts for PR operations from the staging point (orbit, airfield) to the terminal/objective area. Threat avoidance tactics include detailed mission planning, low altitude terrain masking, high altitude penetration, and marginal weather/night penetrations. When threat avoidance is not feasible, threat suppression techniques can include the use of countermeasures and jammers, as well as the use of available FP assets. Night missions and crew workload require the use of artificial aids to enable night operations. These include NVGs, IR detection sets, helmet mounted displays, or other sensor fusion technologies. PR forces should be capable of penetration into marginal weather conditions to include moderate icing. Depending on the theater of operation, air-refueling support for rotary-wing assets, in either permissive or hostile/contested environments, may be essential. Air-refueling support for receiver capable fixed-wing assets will normally be conducted in permissive environments.

(3) **Terminal/Objective Area Operations.** Terminal/objective area operations address arrival, confirmation, and fixing of the isolated personnel’s location and their extraction (directly or via employment of a ground RT), their support (via aerial delivery of ground RTs and/or equipment), and protection of PR forces from localized threats. RT employment may be accomplished by landing, alternate insertion/extraction, parachute, amphibious surface/subsurface, ground vehicle, or a combination of employment methods. Fixing of the isolated personnel’s position requires increasingly precise location information to allow ground teams to quickly locate an isolated person, and to allow weapons employment in close proximity to PR forces.

(4) **Egress.** Egress is the return of recovery forces with recovered isolated personnel. It includes en route medical treatment, refueling if necessary, transload operations, and the transition of recovered isolated personnel to reintegration teams at the appropriate medical or predesignated phase I reintegration site.

6. Training

   a. **Commanders and PR Staffs.** PR education for commanders and PR staffs typically consist of joint and Service-specific training programs offered by JPRA, United States Air Force Special Operations School (USAFSOS), and the 505th Training Squadron (TRS) (formerly the C2 Warrior School). Links to available courses are as follows:


      (2) USAFSOS: [https://jsou.socom.mil](https://jsou.socom.mil).

      (3) 505th TRS: [https://505ccw.hurlburt.af.mil/505trg/505trs/](https://505ccw.hurlburt.af.mil/505trg/505trs/).
b. **USAF Aircrew.** Air Force aircrew members can effectively assist rescue forces only if they are familiar with PR doctrine, CSAR TTP, and personal survival techniques. All rescue crewmembers receive combat survival training and threat systems capabilities and limitations training on a recurring basis. Combat air forces (CAF) aircrews are trained to respond to PR incidents when tasked as part of a CSARTF and as their aircraft capabilities permit. A limited number of fighter/attack aircraft pilots receive RESCORT, RECAP, OSC, and RMC training. All Air Force crewmembers receive water survival and SERE training. Aircrews designated as primary “AMC,” such as the AWACS crews, should receive AMC training. HRC personnel should complete a Level C SERE school and receive periodic refresher SERE training IAW DODD 1300.7, *Training and Education to Support the Code of Conduct (CoC)*, and this publication.

c. **Recovery Team.** Air Force RTs are part of GUARDIAN ANGEL. GUARDIAN ANGEL is an Air Force non-aircraft weapon system that provides the ground element of the PR forces and is designed to assist in all five execution tasks of PR. These teams may deploy into uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas. GUARDIAN ANGEL consists of CROs, pararescuemen, and SERE specialists that are specially trained to assist or conduct PR operations from initial training through reintegration.

d. **Isolated Personnel.** All USAF HRC personnel should complete both initial and refresher SERE training. Some USAF support personnel require other levels of SERE training across the spectrum of captivity. Theater entry requirements should specify required SERE training prior to theater entry.

e. **Exercises.** To ensure interoperability and a smooth transition to combat, Air Force PR staffs and forces should exercise regularly with augmentation personnel and forces. Commanders at all levels should participate in these exercises to familiarize themselves with the complexities and details of PR doctrine and operations. The focus should be on exercising the system as a whole, including the JFACC, JAOC, AOC, JPRC, PRCC, CSARTF elements, AMC, OSC, RMC, and the isolated personnel. The top priorities are joint, multinational, interagency, and CAF flag exercises. The second priority is to participate in AOC exercises allowing for JPRC/PRCC employment and emphasizing command, control, communications, and intelligence coordination procedures. These exercises provide invaluable experience for PR staffs. CAF exercises include active duty, ANG, and air reserve component forces. Additionally, rescue forces from foreign militaries often possess unique expertise and experience in the particular area in which they routinely operate. Combined training with these forces can improve USAF PR capabilities.
APPENDIX G
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD PERSONNEL RECOVERY

1. General

USCG cutters, aircraft, and boats, which normally conduct civil SAR missions, are potential PR resources. USCG vessels range from high and medium endurance cutters, which operate offshore for extended periods of time, to coastal patrol and utility boats capable of operating in coastal and local waters for shorter durations. USCG aircraft include fixed-wing aircraft capable of extended long-range PR, and rotary-wing assets for medium-range and short-range operations. Rotary wing assets also have hoisting capability and a deployable rescue swimmer.

2. Responsibilities

a. The NSP designates the Coast Guard as the Federal SAR Coordinator for the conduct of SAR operations within the IMO and ICAO recognized maritime and aeronautical SRRs of the US in the maritime environment. To perform this mission, the Coast Guard maintains command centers/RCCs throughout the US, in addition to rescue sub-centers (RSCs), as follows:

(1) Atlantic Area - Norfolk, Virginia.
   (a) First District - Boston, Massachusetts.
   (b) Fifth District - Norfolk, Virginia.
   (c) Seventh District - Miami, Florida- Sector San Juan (RSC) - San Juan, Puerto Rico.
   (d) Eighth District - New Orleans, Louisiana.
   (e) Ninth District - Cleveland, Ohio.

(2) Pacific Area (no SRR) - Alameda, California.
   (a) Eleventh District - Alameda, California.
   (b) Thirteenth District - Seattle, Washington.
   (c) Fourteenth District - Honolulu, Hawaii- Sector Guam (RSC) - Guam.
   (d) Seventeenth District - Juneau, Alaska.

b. In wartime, Coast Guard RCC/RSCs will continue to function at their present location and retain their RCC/RSC capability and function. Figure G-1 shows the locations and SRRs for each of the Coast Guard’s RCC/RSCs, in addition to those operated by DOD.
in the inland SRRs of the US, and those operated by Canada for their inland and maritime regions.

c. Upon request via all appropriate echelons of command and at the discretion of the respective area commanders (Pacific and/or Atlantic), the USCG may be able to provide qualified personnel who can augment deployable JPRCs or PRCCs operating outside the continental US, to include contingency establishments of JPRCs and PRCCs.

d. The JFC may request additional USCG resources for recovery operations from Commandant, USCG, via all appropriate echelons of command.

Figure G-1. National Search and Rescue System Search and Rescue Regions
3. Command Relationships

a. The Commandant, USCG, as the Service Chief, controls the administrative, managerial, and technical aspects of all USCG functions and reports directly to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. Upon declaration of war it is not automatic that the USCG transfers to the Department of the Navy, as it requires further action. This transfer was last conducted during World War II. The USCG will only transfer to the Department of the Navy when the President so directs under the provisions of Title 14, USC, Section 3, when Congress approves and it is so written in the declaration of war. The Commandant of the Coast Guard will then report directly to the Secretary of the Navy for the continued performance of all USCG missions and tasks assigned by statute.

b. As SAR coordinators, area and district commanders are responsible for establishing and providing civil SAR services within their specific SRR, and ensuring that planning for those services is properly coordinated. For civil SAR operations under the NSP, a search and rescue mission coordinator (SMC) is designated to coordinate the response to an actual or apparent distress situation. For most SAR cases the Coast Guard performs, SMC duties will be coordinated by the responsible Coast Guard sector or group, under the cognizant Coast Guard district command. Depending on the type of case, the extent of a probable search and number of SAR units deployed, the district or area may assume SMC responsibilities and coordinate the SAR case at their respective RCC.

c. When USCG units are made available to a JFC for PR, those USCG organization commanders will attach these units to the appropriate JFC-designated component commander for the duration of the joint recovery operation.

4. Capabilities and Limitations

a. General. The following are the capabilities and limitations, focused on mobility and SA, to accomplish the five PR execution tasks.

b. Ship-Helicopter Compatibility

(1) Procedures and requirements for operating helicopters on flight-deck-equipped USCG cutters are contained in COMDTINST M3710.2, Shipboard-Helicopter Operational Procedures Manual, and NAVAIR 00-80T-122, Helicopter Operating Procedures for Air-Capable Ships. In general, for a non-USCG helicopter to operate from a USCG cutter, current directives require “favorable” conditions such as no more than two degrees pitch and four degrees roll of the vessel (unless otherwise determined by dynamic interface trials); and adequate clearance from vessel structures for the aircraft to land and take off from the flight deck. The pilot of the helicopter should be shipboard qualified IAW parent Service or component directives. Physical dimensions and flight-deck clearance measurement information is contained in NAEC-ENG-7576, Shipboard Aviation Facilities Resume.

(2) Use of USCG helicopters on non-USCG ships and non-USCG helicopters on USCG cutters is authorized for those combinations shown to be acceptable in NAEC-ENG-7576, Shipboard Aviation Facilities Resume. Additionally, for operations on vessels not covered by NAEC-ENG-7576, Shipboard Aviation Facilities Resume, sufficient vessel deck
strength and a buffer distance of at least 10 feet between rotor blades and obstructions above 24 inches in height are mandatory. Requests for waivers and situations not covered in NAEC-ENG-7576, *Shipboard Aviation Facilities Resume*, should be addressed to the Chief of Law Enforcement and Defense Operations, USCG HQ, Washington, DC. Time-critical requests for waivers should be forwarded through the cutter or aircraft commander.

(3) Aviation-capable USCG cutters can provide varying degrees of navigation and communications support, depending on the class of ship. These cutters also carry a supply of JP-5 and have the capability of filtering and testing fuel for water and particulate matter as well as HIFR. Some cutters have hangars but require a rotor blade folding capability for helicopters to be hangared. External electrical power is also available for engine starting and maintenance. Specifications for these systems are expanded on in NAEC-ENG-7576, *Shipboard Aviation Facilities Resume*.

c. **Report.** Communication assets.

d. **Locate.** The USCG’s Search and Rescue Optimal Planning System (SAROPS) is a valuable asset in search planning for extended, open-ocean searches. SAROPS access is available through USCG RCCs.

e. **Support.** Includes isolated personnel, family, and media.

f. **Recover.** The RESCAP and RESCORT capabilities of USCG aircraft are extremely limited. “Intercept and escort” missions in a low-threat environment will be the upper limit of RESCORT capability for USCG aircraft, some of which have sniper weaponry and all have very limited combat survivability. The services provided to the escorted resources generally will be the same as in a nonhostile intercept and escort of a distressed aircraft; specifically, communications and navigation services, potential rescue or aerial delivery of survival equipment, and vectoring of resources capable of accomplishing recovery.

  g. **Reintegrate.** USCG will support phase I and phase II reintegration of personnel recovered by USCG units until such time as those personnel can be returned to their parent Service.

5. **Concept of Operations**

  a. **Planning.** The PR role of the USCG is an extension of its SAR mission. The USCG participates in the joint contingency planning process. When planning military operations, it is prudent to plan for PR as early in the planning phase as possible. Although all OPLANs and OPORDs contain a PR appendix, a PR plan of action and allocation of resources are frequently not identified before they are needed or placed on standby for PR operations. This CONOPS assumes JPRC functionality before the mission begins and that USCG coordination and support efforts and force transfer procedures for USCG units will be identified in the planning phase.

  b. **Execution**
(1) USCG cutters, boats, and aircraft routinely operate in a low-threat maritime environment under the defensive protection of other military forces. USCG cutters, aircraft, and small boats carry little or no defensive capability; most have no offensive weaponry. Offensive capability or increased defensive capability may not be necessary for USCG PR taskings, even though some cutters have the capability to operate in medium- to high-threat scenarios. Planning the PR search phase is quite similar to civil SAR planning and coordination the USCG performs on a daily basis. USCG personnel are well suited to perform in this similar capacity during joint operations. USCG cutters and fixed-wing aircraft are equipped and their crews are trained for, and regularly perform, OSC duties. USCG resources are ideal for low-threat, precautionary PR missions such as duckbutts.

(2) USCG units are accustomed to operating independently and are equally adept at responding to changing missions in mid-sortie. For example, a buoy tender whose primary function is the maintenance of navigation aids may be diverted from that function at any time to perform a higher priority mission. Cutters and aircraft assigned to perform surveillance and interdiction patrols could also be employed as an immediate PR resource. Thus, the multi-mission capability of USCG forces becomes a PR force multiplier. Given the latitude of automatic response, USCG forces will respond to a PR incident and complete it without further guidance.

(3) Large USCG cutters are fully capable of operating as part of a Navy task force. USCG aircraft are fully capable of operating from non-USCG shore-based facilities, military or civilian. Several similar Coast Guard patrol boats (WPBs) may be deployed, using a squadron concept, with additional spare parts and a small cadre of support personnel. When designated, a squadron commander will direct patrol boat employment. These squadrons may be sea-based as an independent force or part of a Navy task force.

(a) USCG small boats (less than 65 feet in length) are normally shore-based and are designed to operate in the coastal environment. Although they could be deployed aboard ships similar to the squadron concept mentioned above for WPBs, these boats are not designed for open-ocean operations.

(b) Some types of USCG helicopters can be deployed with USCG cutters and/or Navy ships, subject to restrictions described in COMDTINST M3710.1, Air Operations Manual; COMDTINST M3710.2, Shipboard-Helicopter Operational Procedures Manual; and NAEC-ENG-7576, Shipboard Aviation Facilities Resume. Normally, the ship commander will task deployed helicopters.

6. Education and Training

The USCG SAR Program Manager is assigned to the Office of Search and Rescue, Response Directorate, USCG HQ, Washington, DC. The SAR Program Manager is responsible for defining the curriculum for all SAR training in the USCG. The USCG hosts the National SAR School at Coast Guard Training Center, Yorktown, VA, and, with the US Air Force, jointly staffs it. The school provides maritime and inland SAR planning and coordination training for USCG, DOD, and foreign students. The school does not teach PR.
A USCG correspondence course for basic SAR plotting and planning is available from the USCG Institute, Oklahoma City, OK.
APPENDIX H
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES PERSONNEL RECOVERY

1. General

SOF provide JFCs with an extremely flexible force. As a result, SOF may be tasked to perform missions for which they are either the best suited among available forces, or the only force available but not necessarily organized, trained, or equipped to conduct. SOF are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct specific core tasks. Each joint force component is responsible for performing PR in support of its own operations. As such, SOF regularly train to conduct PR functions in support of SOF operations. When specifically tasked, SOF may perform PR for other members of the joint force. It is important for commanders to be aware, however, that unlike some other joint force components, SOF do not maintain dedicated PR forces. Since PR taskings often involve forces being placed on alert status awaiting mission execution orders, such taskings would be at the expense of the SOF’s ability to perform their core tasks. Therefore, greatest utility of SOF to the conduct of PR is in SOF recovery operations and UAR.

2. Responsibilities

USSOCOM maintains a Service-like responsibility to perform PR in support of its own operations, consistent with capabilities and assigned functions and IAW the requirements of the supported commander. Because PR and emergency exfiltration planning and operations are an inherent part of every SO mission, SOF should maintain an organic capability to conduct recovery within their core task force structure.

a. Special Operations Commander PRCC. Joint force component commanders are responsible for planning and conducting recovery operations in support of their own operations while executing the JFC’s campaign and OPLANs. The SOC PRCC is the primary SOF component SAR facility. The SOC PRCC is staffed and equipped for coordinating and controlling SOF component recovery operations. It coordinates PR activities with the JPRC and other component PRCCs, as appropriate. If the SOF component commander does not establish a PRCC, another component staff organization, usually the operations section (J-3), coordinates those PR activities and assumes the responsibilities normally assigned to the SOC PRCC. For example, the JFSOCC/joint special operations task force (JSOTF) commander may designate its JOC to coordinate recovery operations that use SOF component forces. Other typical SOC PRCC responsibilities and functions include the following:

(1) Develop and review PR appendices to annex C (Operations) for component supporting plans, CONPLANs, and OPORDs.

(2) Extract planning factors from the theater PR CONOPS and provide them to subordinate units to assist in the development of supportable and feasible EPAs.

(3) Coordinate and develop unit and personal EPAs, as required.
(4) Maintain staff awareness for preparing and maintaining ISOPREPs.

(5) Coordinate for component augmentation personnel to the JPRC.

(6) Develop specific component PRCC procedures.

(7) Notify and coordinate with the JPRC when conducting unilateral PR missions.

(8) Coordinate with the JPRC for PR support (e.g., RESCAP, RESCORT, SEAD provided to, or received from, other components).

(9) Maintain a file on each isolated individual until recovery has been completed.

(10) Forward, but do not destroy, all files and the database regarding isolated personnel, their status, and/or location to the JPRA, via the JPRC, once the recovery mission is complete and the JFC no longer has a requirement to maintain the files.

b. **Unconventional Assisted Recovery Coordination Cell.** The branch of the SOC J-3 normally responsible for compartmented operations forms the nucleus of the UARCC. The mission of the UARCC is to integrate and coordinate all theater NAR capabilities in support of the JFC’s PR operations. The UARCC fulfills similar responsibilities and functions as a component PRCC, but tailors those roles and functions from the perspective of NAR support for the theater. A more complete explanation of the UARCC can be found in Chapter II, “Functions and Responsibilities.”

3. **Command Relationships**

   a. **Component.** SOF components are required to plan and prepare, within their capabilities, to effect the recovery of SOF component isolated personnel during all operations. The SOF component PRCC informs and coordinates with the SOC/JSOTF PRCC. The JPRC monitors the situation.

   b. **Joint**

      (1) The JFSOCC, operating either as a theater SOC or a JSOTF (see note, immediately below), has command responsibility to perform SOF PR consistent with capabilities and assigned functions and IAW requirements of the supported CCDR. The JFSOCC establishes a PRCC, or functional equivalent, as the focal point for interface with the JPRC to coordinate all SOF PR activities. The JFSOCC may choose to task the air operations section within its JOC to coordinate all SOF PR activities (minus NAR). The joint special operations aviation component (JSOAC) is manned, trained, and equipped for PR. The JSOAC is the proponent for SOF recovery TTP and communications infrastructure. As such, the JFSOCC may elect to task the JSOAC to conduct PRCC functions.

      **Note:** In some cases, a JSOTF is established separate from the JFSOCC and is OPCON to a JTF. In this case, the JSOTF would establish a SOF PRCC and perform similar PR functions as the theater SOF PRCC.
(2) The JFSOCC integrates and deconflicts the contingency planning of SOF operations via the SOLE, which is generally located in the JAOC or combined air operations center. The SOLE conducts synchronization of SOF plans within the standard ATO production schedule. Because of time sensitivity during dynamic recovery operations, the SOC PRCC may coordinate directly with the JPRC. When necessary and as directed by the JFC, the JFSOCC may provide TACON of SOF to the JFACC to conduct specific recovery operations in support of a PRTF.

(3) Not only is the JFSOCC/JSOTF responsible for SOF PR, he is responsible to the JFC for all NAR operations in support of the JFC’s comprehensive PR plan. The JFSOCC or JSOTF commander normally exercises OPCON of all SOF UAR forces in the theater. OGAs in support of NAR normally retain C2 of their respective forces. To integrate, coordinate, and synchronize compartmented NAR support to the JFC’s PR plans and procedures, the JFSOCC, on order, establishes a UARCC with established and expeditious lines of communications with the JPRC.

4. Capabilities and Limitations

SOF normally do not dedicate assets solely for PR. However, most SOF elements will have the ‘Be Prepared to’ mission to execute PR in support of other SOF, or in support of the JPRC. SOF possess unique capabilities that compliment the JFC’s ability to conduct PR across the range of military operations. Three SOF core tasks—direct action (DA), UW, and counterterrorism—encompass activities that provide the JFC unique capabilities to accomplish recovery operations outside the capability of other forces.

5. Concept of Operations

a. Planning

(1) SOF view PR from the dual perspective of potential consumer and potential force provider. SOF PR coordinators are responsible for planning, coordinating, and tracking all SOF PR operations. SOF PR coordinators should be formally trained (e.g., the JPRA Personnel Recovery Plans and Operations Course, PR301). SOF PR coordinators should also have a thorough understanding of theater PR architecture, roles and missions, and coordination process. The logistic planner, signal planner, and the operations planners should have periodic meetings to ensure resources are available to meet PR mission requirements.

(2) PR planning such as intelligence preparation of the operational environment and operational preparation of the environment is a continuous process. SOF PR coordinators should be familiar with all aspects of PR, to include SERE, CSAR, joint CSAR, and NAR. PR planning is inherent to FP, and recovery planners should address PR in all missions. All planning should be based on the five execution tasks of PR (report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate). SOF PR coordinators should assume every mission may result in an evasion situation and should prepare SOF forces for unassisted evasion. Plans for both assisted and unassisted evasion should be developed IAW theater PR guidance to ensure a coordinated recovery by PR forces.
b. **Execution**

(1) **SOF Recovery Operations.** DA operations are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by SOF or SO-capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. One of the activities that fall within the DA mission area is SOF recovery operations. These are operations to locate, identify, recover, and return isolated personnel, human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security in areas sensitive, denied, or contested. SO recovery missions are often characterized by detailed planning, rehearsal, and thorough intelligence analysis. These operations may employ unconventional tactics, techniques, clandestine search, indigenous assistance, and frequent use of GCEs. SOF recovery operations offer an additional capability to conduct the recover PR execution task. Historical examples of SOF recovery operations would be the Son Tay Raid in Vietnam, Operation EAGLE CLAW (the Iranian HR mission), and the rescue of Kurt Muse in Operation JUST CAUSE.

(2) **Unconventional Assisted Recovery.** A unique contribution of SOF units to a CCDR’s PR plan is their capability to conduct UAR. UAR is NAR conducted by SOF. These forces operate in uncertain or hostile areas where PR capability is infeasible, inaccessible, or does not exist to contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate isolated personnel back to friendly control. UAR forces generally deploy into their assigned areas before strike operations and provide the JFC with coordinated PR capability for as long as the forces remain viable. The military aspects of UAR are those of UW for which SOF units are specifically organized, trained, and equipped. SOF personnel conduct a thorough analysis of the area before insertion. The theater SOC is normally tasked by the GCC to plan for and execute UAR in coordination with the JPRC in support of the theater PR plan. The intent of UAR is to bring isolated personnel into contact with, and ultimately into the custody of, a recovery force as soon as possible and then move the isolated personnel to an area where exfiltration to definitive USG control can occur.

6. **Training**

a. **Commanders and Staffs.** SOF PR coordinators and personnel assigned in PRCCs should complete appropriate PR courses provided by JPRA. Commanders and staff should also conduct continuation training during unit collective training and joint training exercises.

b. **Recovery Forces.** Units that anticipate being tasked as a recovery force should conduct training on recovery operations during unit collective training exercises and mission rehearsals.

c. **Isolated Personnel**

(1) SOF isolated personnel have the responsibility to assist in their own recovery to the maximum extent possible. Successful unassisted evasion is dependent on effective predeployment and premission preparation and training.

(2) USSOCOM policy requires all operational forces to complete SERE Level C training with the priority going to national mission and major theater of war apportioned forces followed by all remaining personnel, as required. Select USSOCOM units are
required to embed digital photographs and complete set of 10 fingerprints in the individual ISOPREP on PRMS.
APPENDIX J
BLOOD CHIT PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION

1. General

The following procedures have been established for the administration of the DOD Blood Chit Program. The JPRA is the DOD OPR for blood chit policy and for authorizing the production, distribution, and use of blood chits.

2. Program Administration

a. JPRA will maintain a master control record for all blood chits.

b. Each organization, where blood chits are received, held in custody, and issued, will maintain strict accountability by serial number.

c. Units will maintain a record of the blood chit serial number issued to each individual. An individual may be assigned a specific blood chit for the duration of an assignment to a unit. However, to ensure positive control, the chit will only be issued before employment or deployment to areas where the commander has decided the risk of personnel being isolated warrants the issue. Blood chits will be collected immediately after completion of operations or specific missions.

d. The GCC will appoint a theater blood chit program manager or coordinator. This manager will maintain records reflecting which blood chits, by number, have been issued to component organizations. The program manager needs to establish procedures within the theater to maintain positive control of chits, including annual inventories. A copy of the initial inventory, and subsequent annual inventories, should be forwarded to JPRA during the month of December each year.

e. Additional inventories may occur at organizations possessing blood chits whenever there is a change of program manager or custodian; however, inventory results need not be forwarded unless a discrepancy is noted.

f. The loss or theft of blood chits is subject to appropriate investigation as would any controlled item. The report of loss or theft (specifying the blood chit serial number[s]), along with a report of investigation and a determination or reason for the loss or theft will be forwarded to the theater program manager and to JPRA as soon as possible after the loss or theft is discovered.

3. Reporting Use of a Blood Chit

a. Upon notification that an individual possessing a blood chit is isolated in hostile territory, the theater program manager will immediately forward to JPRA and DPMO the individual’s name, rank, Social Security number, organization, location where missing, date missing, and blood chit number. This information will help in processing potential future claims against the government on a particular chit and will provide basic record data on individuals who may subsequently become POWs or hostages. Theater PR guidance should
indicate the notification process involved following the use of a blood chit. Because of the sensitivity of a blood chit that has been used, and the circumstances under which it was used, many of the C2 elements involved may never know, or have a “need to know,” about its use.

b. Any individual who has used their blood chit and received assistance should report the circumstances of the incident upon their return to US control. This information may be provided as part of a SERE debrief IAW existing plans. A copy of the individual’s debrief, along with the blood chit, should be forwarded to JPRA as soon as practicable. These operationally used blood chits will not be reissued but will become part of JPRA’s permanent case files. The organization or organizations responsible for control of the blood chit will be simultaneously relieved of accountability for the particular blood chit by JPRA.

4. Claims for Compensation

The commander, JPRA, makes the final determination of the amount and form of compensation on all blood chit claims. As necessary, JPRA will provide or appoint an individual in-theater as their representative to facilitate the gathering of information about, and the subsequent payment of, the claim. All USG organizations to which claims are presented will forward a report detailing the circumstances surrounding the claim through the JPRA representative to JPRA for final determination. Because claimants, their families, or even their community may be in extreme danger should their identity or the fact they assisted an evader become known, the report will be classified according to the PR Security Classification Guide.

5. Program Classification Guidance

a. While most aspects of the Blood Chit Program are unclassified, under certain circumstances classification rules apply.

For additional information on particular instances that warrant classification, refer to JPRA’s Personnel Recovery Security Classification Guide (http://www.jpra.jfcom.smil.mil/references/classification.htm).

b. Additionally, ensure appropriate security measures are used during SERE or other debriefings when assistance activity is discovered. Limit access to essential personnel only. Classified Information Nondisclosure Statements (SF 312) are appropriate for all who become aware of such activities. Release of such information could seriously jeopardize the lives or well being of those persons who have assisted, are currently assisting, or could assist US personnel. Inadequate protection could result in the compromise of classified tactics, methods, or programs. Identifying specifics of such events will not be used as examples in LL reports or in training courses.
APPENDIX K
EVASION

Annex  A  Legal Aspects of Escape and Evasion
B  Evasion Strategies
C  Signaling Techniques and Procedures
D  Evasion Plan of Action
E  Imminent Capture
F  Guidance forCompleting and Controlling DD Form 1833, Isolated Personnel Report
EVASION

1. General

Evasion is the process whereby isolated personnel avoid capture with the goal of successfully returning to areas under friendly control. This appendix provides factors that may affect, and techniques and procedures of, evasion to assist commanders in planning for and accomplishing the five PR execution tasks. Evasion techniques and procedures, as well as the evader’s status, vary among the types of military operations and the conditions (peace or war) in which they are conducted.

2. Types of Military Operations

a. Military Operations During Peacetime. There may be occasions when individuals will become isolated in a friendly or neutral foreign country as the result of an aircraft mishap, inadvertent border incursion, or similar circumstance. In such situations, the individual’s goal should be to return to friendly control openly and as soon as possible. Individuals isolated under these circumstances should approach local authorities and request assistance in returning to friendly control or, if possible, openly approach a US embassy or consulate or a representative of a friendly government. On the other hand, evasion may be the proper COA when an individual accidentally and unintentionally becomes isolated in a foreign country unfriendly to the US, in an area where there is no effective local government, or when there is reason to believe the local population would mistreat the individual. Whenever “covered persons” operate in or near such areas during peacetime, CCDRs should ensure that appropriate PR plans have been developed, personnel at risk of isolation have been properly trained and briefed, and recovery forces are prepared to execute the plans when appropriate.

b. Support to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. Isolated personnel are faced with contrasting concerns depending on whether the US is supporting an insurgency or counterinsurgency. For example, individuals whose mission is to support an insurgent movement can expect to receive assistance in areas controlled by the insurgents or where the local populace is sympathetic to the movement. They should avoid government forces, government controlled areas, and areas where the population supports the government in power. Evaders can also anticipate that any recovery effort will most likely be conducted in a clandestine manner. On the other hand, personnel isolated while providing support to a counterinsurgency are faced with a completely different scenario. In a counterinsurgency, evaders should move to government-controlled areas, seek out government forces, and expect recovery by a force operating in a more overt manner. Because each situation has unique requirements, personnel at risk of isolation involved in either of these scenarios should be fully briefed prior to the onset of operations on the TTP and resources that will be used to effect their recovery.

c. Combating Terrorism. Isolated personnel who were participating in counterterrorism activities are faced with a dilemma similar to that for insurgencies. The key variables in this situation are the location where the action has occurred and where the individual is evading (e.g., is the country where the individual is evading supportive or
hostile to the US presence and action?). Evasion, even in a country where the government supports the US action, can be dangerous because the evasion area could be populated by elements supporting the terrorist group.

d. **Peacekeeping Operations.** Although a prerequisite for the establishment of a peacekeeping operation is the consent, cooperation, and support of the parties to the dispute (a negotiated truce), the peace operations force is often required to deal with extreme tension and violence. Such conditions could lead to a situation where members of the peace operations force find themselves in an evasion situation. Once again, the territory where the evasion takes place and the controlling power’s political attitude toward the US will influence evader actions. Members of the peace operations force should be well briefed on the current political climate, on the attitudes of the parties to the dispute, and proper evasion guidance that includes various possible evasion scenarios. In addition, planning for quick-response recovery operations should always precede the initial deployment of the force.

e. **Other.** Certain crisis avoidance or consequence-management situations may require the use of military force to enforce or support diplomatic initiatives, respond to emergencies, or protect US citizens. Detailed PR plans should be developed for these operations to the extent allowed by the crisis situation.

f. **War**

   (1) **General.** Evasion may be severely restricted by the large number of adversary forces along the forward line of own troops (FLOT), by combat operations, and by the possibility that adversary forces may possess sophisticated NVDS and various sensors. Evaders along the FLOT should concentrate on hiding and surviving. After the battle has passed over, the evader should try to link-up with other friendly forces without surprising friendly patrols. Isolated personnel should not make fast or threatening moves and allow themselves to be captured. Once contact is made, authentication procedures will identify personnel as bona fide US isolated personnel.

   (2) **CBRN Defense.** Planning should include providing personnel at risk of isolation with education, training, and equipment to survive and operate in CBRN environments. The evader should be trained in TTP to sense, recognize, avoid, and protect against CBRN hazards, and decontaminate themselves, if necessary.

   For additional information regarding SERE planning considerations and actions for isolated personnel and recovery forces, refer to Appendix M, “Classified Planning Supplement” (published separately).

   For additional information regarding planning for and operations in a CBRN environment, see JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.
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ANNEX A TO APPENDIX K
LEGAL ASPECTS OF ESCAPE AND EVASION

1. General

The actions of isolated personnel will be governed by applicable law and policy including US law, international law, the law of armed conflict (e.g., the Hague and Geneva Conventions), and the laws of the nation in which the isolated person is located. Whether a particular body of law or policy applies will depend both on the type of conflict taking place and the status of that isolated individual.

2. During an International Armed Conflict

a. Prisoner of War Status. POW status is an essential characterization as it confers significant protections upon isolated personnel who meet the criteria outlined in Article 4 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW). First, a POW, if a privileged belligerent, will receive combatant immunity (i.e., his warlike acts will not expose him to criminal punishment). Second, the GPW provides for and regulates the humane treatment of POWs. On the battlefield, individual status may determine your survival; it determines if you are a lawful target or not; a POW or a spy, a combatant, a civilian, or a noncombatant. This distinction is essential as unprivileged belligerents are persons not entitled to combatant immunity, who engage in warlike acts during an armed conflict. They may be targeted, or captured and prosecuted under the domestic law of the detaining nation for their warlike acts.

   (1) GPW, in its entirety, applies only when the conflict is an international armed conflict. Under Common Article 2, the “Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more [countries].” Examples include World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Operation DESERT STORM, and the early phases of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

   (2) Once the conflict is determined to be an international armed conflict, Article 4 prescribes the requisite criteria for POW status. POWs include members of the regular armed forces involved in an international armed conflict. They also include members of militias or resistance fighters belonging to a party to the conflict if they meet certain criteria set forth in Article 4. These individuals are lawful combatants.

   (3) In addition, numerous other individuals who are captured are entitled to POW status if “they have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany.” These include contractors, reporters, civilian members of military aircraft crews, and merchant marine and civil aviation crews. Although such persons are entitled to the benefits of POW status, they are not considered lawful combatants, i.e., they are not entitled to fight and they do not have the right to participate directly in hostilities as members of the armed forces do.

b. Pre-Capture (Evasion) versus Post-Capture (Escape). The law of armed conflict makes a distinction between isolated personnel depending on whether they are still evading
initial capture or have escaped after being captured. Members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict and militias, if they meet the requirements set forth above, who are evading capture are still considered lawful combatants. As a lawful combatant, they will continue to have combatant immunity. However, once captured, the individual is now considered hors de combat, or out of combat. If the individual evading capture is a civilian accompanying the armed forces (see paragraph 2a[3]), the civilian is only authorized to use force for individual self-defense. Unless immune from HN jurisdiction by virtue of an international agreement or international law, inappropriate use of force could subject them to US or HN prosecution and civil liability.

c. Although escape attempts are legal under the law of armed conflict, a POW whose escape is unsuccessful may be punished by his captors for the unsuccessful escape. Offenses committed by POWs with the sole intention of facilitating their escape that do not entail any violence against life or limb, such as offenses against public property, theft without intention of self-enrichment, the drawing up or use of false papers, or the wearing of civilian clothing, shall occasion disciplinary punishment only. (See generally GPW, Articles 91 to 94.) Recaptured POWs may be charged with a crime if the escape attempt involves any offense resulting in violence to life or limb, or self-enrichment. (See GPW, Article 93.)

d. An escape is deemed successful once the POW has rejoined their, or an ally’s, armed forces; or the escapee has left the territory of the detaining power or its ally. If the escape is successful, the escapee cannot then be later punished by the captor for offenses committed during the escape, except crimes of violence or self-enrichment. If later recaptured, there is a real possibility that the detaining power might attempt to punish the escapee for such crimes. Accordingly, US policy is not to return successfully escaped POWs to the same theater of operations.

e. Neutral Countries. Instead of being captured by an enemy state who is a party to the conflict, isolated personnel may find themselves in the territory of a country which is not
a party to the conflict. In such a situation, there are rights and duties of that country and issues regarding the status of the isolated personnel.

(1) **Rights and Duties of a Neutral State.** A state which chooses not to take part in an international armed conflict, and treats belligerents in an impartial manner, is called a “neutral state” or a “neutral power.” Rights and duties of a neutral state are governed by a number of treaties, in particular the Hague Convention, *Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Cases of War on Land, 18 October 1907* (Hague V). If isolated personnel cross into a neutral country’s territory and are captured, the neutral state may disarm and intern them, and take such measures necessary to prevent them from rejoining their forces.

(2) **Status of Captured Personnel.** Isolated personnel in neutral states are treated in the same way as POWs under the GPW. Therefore, interned isolated personnel should receive at a minimum, the same treatment as POWs (but they do not have the formal status of POWs). The GPW also adds that the neutral state might give them “more favorable treatment.” This is justified by the fact that neutral countries were not adversaries as far as the internees were concerned. Isolated personnel who enter neutral territory should attempt to successfully return to friendly lines as if in a hostile party’s territory but should not, to the extent possible, do anything that would be considered a criminal act. There is no combatant immunity, or immunity from criminal prosecution (absent a SOFA with the HN), in the neutral state.

(3) **Internment and Repatriation.** Although the detaining power can give more favorable treatment, it cannot escape its obligation under international law to intern troops belonging to the belligerent armies (this implies groups of military forces). They have the obligation to ensure those troops do not perform military acts against the enemy during the conflict. Additionally, internees are protected against the forced return to their original country of origin (repatriation). Finally, the internees should be repatriated at the end of the conflict. With respect to individual isolated personnel, the neutral state that receives escaped POWs will leave them at liberty. If the state allows escaped POWs to remain in its territory, it may assign them a place of residence (see generally, Hague V, Article 13).

f. The law of armed conflict places certain restrictions on isolated personnel, but also provides them with certain latitude in what is considered acceptable conduct. This is particularly true in the case of disguises.

(1) **Wearing of Adversary Uniforms.** It is a violation of the law of armed conflict to “make improper use of” the uniform of the adversary. Persons captured while fighting in the adversary’s uniforms have traditionally been subject to criminal prosecution and possible execution for war crimes and espionage. It is, however, still permissible for personnel isolated in hostile territory to use an adversary’s uniform to evade, as long as no efforts to kill, wound, or capture the adversary are made while so attired. Persons who use the adversary’s flag, uniform, insignia, markings, or emblems solely for evasion are not lawfully subject to disciplinary punishment on that account, as long as they do not attack the adversary, gather military information, or engage in similar operations. However, wearing
an adversary uniform is extremely dangerous because it could result in the mistaken, but likely, treatment as a spy.

(2) **Disguises.** Under certain circumstances during an escape or an evasion, the adoption of varying degrees of disguise may be logical and appropriate. For instance, if the population density is such that movement in uniform is not possible, isolated personnel may be required to adopt some sort of disguise to transit the area. Likewise, if contact with an indigenous assistance group has been established, isolated personnel may disguise themselves to facilitate movement. In these instances, the judgment of the assistance group should be respected. However, isolated personnel need to understand that in the event of capture, they will likely be treated exactly like members of the assistance group, unless they can convince their captors that they are lawful combatants. If the disguise is essentially civilian clothing, they should retain at least some of their uniform or personal ID (e.g., ID tags, US Uniformed Services/Geneva Conventions ID card, blood chit) to use as proof of status in the event of capture.

(3) **Misuse of the Red Cross and Other Protected Emblems.** Protected emblems may not be used as disguises for purposes of escape or evasion in armed conflict. Only bona fide medical personnel, chaplains, and relief agency personnel may wear these emblems during armed conflict. Misuse of these protected emblems could result in undermining the inviolability of these emblems and the credibility of US forces; the perception of the global community that the US does not adhere to the law of armed conflict; and other extremely adverse effects on the organizations and personnel they represent.

3. **During Operations Short of International Armed Conflict**

   a. **General.** Legal considerations for evasion during operations falling short of international armed conflict differ from those during an international armed conflict. Because many military operations involve conflicts of a noninternational nature or situations where the parties to the conflict are not nation states, the national domestic criminal laws of the country in which the operation is taking place and/or the law of armed conflict applicable to noninternational armed conflicts will apply.

   b. Because POW status and combatant immunity are international armed conflict concepts, a participant in an operation short of international armed conflict, upon capture, is not entitled to POW status, nor does combatant immunity apply. Therefore, if captured, isolated personnel operating under such circumstances face the possibility of prosecution by the HN for any warlike acts committed. However, because these operations generally tend to support the HN, the possibility for such an occurrence is reduced. Furthermore, it is also likely that the HN will be a party to an international agreement, such as a SOFA, prior to the operation, which may provide a sufficient degree of immunity from HN laws. Furthermore, if the United Nations (UN) sponsors the operation, the participants may be entitled to “expert on mission” status, and be returned to the UN forces upon capture.

   c. If isolated personnel are captured by an insurgent group, as opposed to the HN, or if captured where there is no functioning HN and the fighting is between warlike clans, practically speaking, isolated personnel should have a reduced expectation for protections
under the law. Although insurgents would be subject to criminal prosecution by the HN, this may have little real impact on their willingness to provide protections to captured isolated personnel.

d. International law does contain some guidance as to the treatment of captured soldiers or others who are *hors de combat*. The minimum treatment is prescribed in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II (the United States has signed but not ratified Protocol II and it is therefore not binding; however, some items of the protocol are considered customary international law). These standards include protection from violence, extra-judicial killing, and “outrages upon personal dignity;” wounded and sick should be cared for and all those who are *hors de combat* should be treated humanely. The minimum humane treatment standards outlined in those documents should be applied to captured personnel in a noninternational (or internal) armed conflict.
ANNEX B TO APPENDIX K  
EVASION STRATEGIES  

1. Threats to Evasion  

   a. **Terrorists, Criminals, and Unfriendly Population.** Areas controlled by terrorist organizations and illegally armed groups of criminals should be considered high threat evasion environments. Personnel may be targeted by terrorist or criminal organizations while in the conduct of their normal business. Several deployment locations are characterized by widespread poverty, ineffective government control, cultures of immunity and corruption, and ineffective/rogue security forces. At these locations, even an allegedly friendly populace or government is a threat to evaders. Evaders should be wary of local residents, including children, who often notice minute changes to their surroundings. If influenced by anti-American propaganda, they may alert others to the location of a stranger. Homeless, displaced, refugee, or mentally ill people are also a threat. In many ways, they live the same lifestyles as an evader and may compete for the same resources. They may see the opportunity for reward from the enemy. A mentally damaged or insane person will be undependable; they may attempt to cause harm without an apparent cause. If evading near or on the border, evaders face the hazardous situation of a hostage taking event when encountering terrorist organizations and criminal elements (smugglers, drug runners, or human traffickers). These elements are mainly interested in their security and protection of smuggling routes.  

   b. **Biometric Threats.** The growing use of automated biometric systems and multimodal search engines by foreign governments and intelligence/security agencies is another threat to the evader, especially in urban areas and at border crossings. As more foreign organizations and governments turn to biometrics to combat identity fraud, the possibility of an evader being compromised or detected will increase. Scores of countries are deploying face-based biometric alias detection systems to help monitor civil identity, driver licensing, immigration and migration, visa, as well as voter registration processes. Intelligence and security services typically have access to the information in these systems as a matter of course, and therefore they have the added capability to easily vet images and identities of subjects they suspect of using aliases. Once personnel have cleared immigration screenings at border crossings, they may still be subjected to biometric interrogation and alias discovery in other situations such as during routine law enforcement stops, transiting other security check-points, or while being detained and questioned by police officers on the street. Law enforcement sectors are becoming large purveyors of facial recognition and other biometric technologies to identify suspects. Law enforcement technology exists that allows authorities to capture photographs/fingerprints, extract biometric templates, and remotely identify, verify, or vet individuals against criminal and identity databases as new intelligence on individuals or organizations is received.  

   c. **Landmines/Unexploded Ordnance (UXO).** In several countries where personnel could potentially become isolated, the land is littered with landmines and UXO as a result of years of armed conflict. Evaders should take this into consideration, especially if traveling in areas near borders where conflicts have taken place, or near facilities requiring protection such as government buildings or power plants. Refer to country specific IPG located on the
d. **Illness/Disease.** The need for illness/disease prevention cannot be overemphasized. Illness during isolation is foremost among the many problems that can compromise the ability to survive. The effects of poor health can add to the stress of isolation by limiting a person’s ability to function. Loss of wellbeing could possibly mean losing the ability to continue to avoid capture or resist the captor.

1. In many countries, the local food and water sources (including ice) are heavily contaminated with pathogenic bacteria, parasites, and viruses to which most personnel have little or no natural immunity. Consumption of water contaminated with raw sewage, or runoff containing fecal pathogens, or one-time exposure to fecal contamination in food may cause a variety of infections, to include bacterial diarrheal diseases, giardiasis, hepatitis A, and typhoid. Aside from water and food-borne illnesses, other maladies could be caused by vector-borne arthropods (malaria, human/bubonic plague, pneumonic plague, yellow fever, rift valley fevers, spotted fever, etc.), animal contact (anthrax, Q fever, rabies, etc.), or soil contact (hookworm, cutaneous, larva migrans, etc.). Evaders could be debilitated for a week or more with any of these diseases; in some cases, such as rabies or pulmonary anthrax, the fatality rate is near 100 percent, absent a post-exposure treatment.

2. **Illness/Disease Preventive Measures.** The best way to deal with illnesses is for personnel to prevent them from happening in the first place. Evaders should observe basic field sanitary practices as much as practical; prevent insect and animal bites with proper clothing, defensive actions, repellants, and netting. Certain environments may expose captives to high-risk local nationals and their diseases. The best preparation against infectious diseases is to maintain current immunizations. To prevent water-borne illnesses, consider all surface water biologically contaminated. Purify all water before consuming. If purification is not possible, use water from plant sources or non-stagnant, running water obtained from a location upstream from habitat or contaminations sources.

e. **Psychological Attitude**

1. Do not become discouraged. The will to survive, training in survival and evasion TTP, and equipment, coupled with an ability to withstand hardships and overcome obstacles, are essential to staying alive and successfully evading.

2. Value clothing and equipment. Items such as shoes, clothing, and supplies are not likely to be replenished behind the lines; therefore, maintenance may be vital to survival.

3. Focus on the situation and the EPA. Develop a physical and mental pace and be methodical. The entire journey to friendly or neutral areas may require living off the land and traveling on foot.

4. Patience and knowledge of the adversary’s population controls and internal security measures such as patrols, travel restrictions, security checkpoints, rationing, etc., may be key to a successful evasion.
(5) Understand that delay of a recovery effort is likely due to recovery force capabilities, threats, or environmental conditions.

f. Modification to the evader’s EPA will be dictated by the situation; however, changes should be considered carefully, since recovery forces expect execution as promulgated. For example:

(1) Travel plans may change due to restrictions such as unexpected enemy action, curfews, checkpoints, and roadblocks.

(2) Unanticipated local customs may need to be imitated to avoid being conspicuous.

g. Equipment. The evader may be forced to decide what equipment to keep and how and where to dispose of the remainder (preparation, based on training and experience, will facilitate making the appropriate decisions for a given situation). Evaders should presume an adversary has observed the isolation event. The important thing is to avoid capture, even if it means leaving the scene of initial isolation and leaving valuable equipment behind. Breaking visual contact with the enemy is essential for evasion success.

2. When Forward Line of Own Troops is Known

a. Static FLOT. Evasion along the FLOT is always difficult, especially along a relatively static FLOT. While evaders with radios may find friendly assistance close at hand and within radio range, the capability of enemy forces in the immediate area may prevent a quick recovery. Evaders should prepare themselves for a worst-case situation. Evaders without radios will have to decide on their own unassisted COA. All should guard against fratricide. If evaders near the FLOT feel sure that friendly forces are moving in their direction, they could seek concealment and allow friendly forces to overrun their position. Evaders can expect to face stiff opposition from both sides. Authentication procedures may assist evaders to safely make contact in or around the FLOT and when approached by friendly forces. Evaders may also be able to move away from the FLOT to a safer area and use a visual signal as indicated in the EPA. Contact with friendly reconnaissance elements is dangerous and should be done carefully.

b. Advancing FLOT. Evaders in front of advancing friendly units should immediately take cover and wait for the friendly units to overrun their position. In these situations, the evader’s primary goal is to seek protection from friendly and adversary fire while trying to avoid capture. In some cases, the evader may be able to assist the friendly forces by reporting on key adversary elements. Evaders should not engage the adversary unless they have been appropriately trained and equipped and the probability of success outweighs the risks involved.

c. Retreating FLOT. Attempting to catch up with retreating friendly units dangerously exposes the evader. Evaders between opposing forces should immediately take cover and wait for adversary units to pass over their position. After most adversary units have moved on, evaders should try to link up with other isolated friendly elements and return to friendly forces.
3. Assistance from the Local Population

Under some circumstances, especially when seriously injured in such areas as the Arctic or desert, it may become necessary to seek assistance from local people in order to survive. However, this should be done only as a last resort. Even when evaders do not require emergency assistance and are doing everything possible to avoid contact with local people, unplanned contacts may occur. While all such contacts are risky, if handled properly, they could result in life-saving assistance during evasion. Assistance will normally occur in one of the following situations:

a. Contact with **opportunists** may occur when an individual or a group of people seek financial or political gain by assisting or apprehending a US evader. The blood chit may be useful in this situation.

b. **Accidental** contact occurs when a local person and an evader accidentally encounter one another. Neither is comfortable with the situation and both are apprehensive about the outcome. Pre-mission study of the local people may make the evader aware of local attitudes toward Americans and provide some guidance as to how to communicate. A pointee-talkee or blood chit may also assist in communication and soliciting aid. This aid may range from the local person not sounding an alarm, to providing directions, survival assistance or information, to the best-case scenario where the evader is returned to friendly control. Generally speaking, the best COA for an evader subsequent to accidental contact is to clear the contact area as covertly as possible since the inclinations and resources of the local person are unknown.

c. Evaders in danger of dying because of environmental extremes or injuries may elect to seek an **act of mercy** from an individual in the local populace. This contact is very dangerous and may result in death or capture. The blood chit may be useful in communicating and convincing an individual to engage in an act of mercy.

d. Potential isolated personnel should receive specific cultural training to prepare them for the above situations. Assistance to the evader might be improved if the evader can represent himself as a polite fellow human being and empathize with the assistor’s position of being accused of aiding and abetting a criminal or the enemy. Cultural preparation can also be provided through theater IPG and briefings. Potential isolated personnel receive training in evasion aids through Service SERE schools, unit or mission-specific training, and theater briefings. This training enhances the capability of an individual to take advantage of an opportune situation and may provide the capability a commander is seeking, as discussed in Chapter V, “Planning.” CCDRs can ensure their personnel at risk of isolation possess the required knowledge and skill levels by publishing minimum SERE skill requirements in OPLANs, OPORDs, and theater entry requirements.

See Appendix M, “Classified Planning Supplement” (published separately), for recommended contact procedures.
4. Evasion in an Urban Area

The likelihood of being isolated in an urban area is increasing. With so few available HLZs and the high vulnerability of recovery vehicles or forces in any given urban area, it is likely that isolated personnel will need to evade for a substantial amount of time, avoiding observation and contact. The evader should always be ready to fight, if necessary, and travel extended distances to get to a feasible recovery site or friendly forces. Conducting recovery in an urban environment poses a unique challenge and can place a heavy demand on the isolated person(s), the recovery force, and operational planners. Individuals who can avoid immediate capture should be familiar with urban evasion. The challenges of urban evasion are mitigated through realistic training and a prepared evader. Generally, successful evasion in an urban area requires an in-depth knowledge of the local area and the attitude of the populace, as well as a detailed map/diagram of the urban area. Isolated personnel should leave urban areas as quickly as possible.
1. General

   a. The most important action the evader can take to assist in the recovery effort is to periodically provide evidence to friendly forces that they are alive, where they are located, and some information on their physical and mental state. This action can be best accomplished by effective signaling. Radios are the best form of signaling and communication, but are not always viable. The evader can also indicate his or her location to overhead assets via GTAS IAW the individual’s EPA and theater and unit PR instructions. Signaling can be electronic, visual, or acoustic.

   b. Pre-Mission Signaling Considerations. Personnel at risk of isolation should know how to use issued communications and signaling equipment, including radio silence procedures, for a specific contingency. Issued equipment should include primary and alternate signaling devices that facilitate detection in both day and low-light conditions. Further, environmental factors, the chance of discovery by local civilians, and the adversary threat should be major considerations when determining which particular signaling devices to utilize within the operational area.

   For a detailed discussion of signaling, refer to Appendix M, “Classified Planning Supplement” (published separately).

   c. Evaders who are trained in various SERE tactics and techniques can decrease the risks to themselves and the recovery force by being able to:

      (1) Overcome signaling problems associated with terrain, weather, medical status, capabilities of the signaling devices, and adversary activity.

      (2) Improvise and use signals to improve their chances of being sighted by friendly forces.

      (3) Select signaling sites that enhance signaling efforts and the likelihood that it will be detected by friendly forces (i.e., use the terrain to maximize radio transmissions to friendly forces). The signal site should also have materials readily available for immediate use in the construction of visual signals. Materials may be either natural, man-made, or a combination. Consideration should be given to being recovered from or near that site (e.g., large enough for a helicopter, no flying hazards, terrain masked to reduce the potential of adversary observation/ground fire).

      (4) Employ clandestine TTP to avoid disclosing their position to any unintended people while signaling (i.e., use the terrain to mask radio transmissions from the adversary).

   d. The evader, as a minimum, should be prepared to use many types of signals: ground to air, strip, and load (discussed at subparagraph 2b, “Visual”).
2. Signals

a. **Electronic.** Radio transmitters, beacons, and text messaging devices may be used to attract recovery forces to a specific or general location and to authenticate the evader’s identity using the DD 1833 ISOPREP data.

b. **Visual**

   (1) **GTAS** can assist recovery forces in the objective area to determine the evader’s exact location.

      (a) A **strip signal** (sometimes called a pattern signal) is a pre-coordinated GTAS from an evader to a receiving or observing source. The strip signal could be issued in theater PR instructions or developed by the individual and in either case should be annotated in the EPA.

      (b) **Patterns.** Parachute panels, signal tarpaulins, space blankets, and other man-made or natural materials set in specific patterns and configurations may provide excellent visual signals. Natural material includes sticks, logs, snow, grass, leaves, brush, and rocks.

   (2) **Signal mirrors** can sweep the horizon to attract aircraft or naval craft along a coast during daylight or moonlit nights. Inland, they are meant to be a directional signaling device and should only be used on ground or air targets. They should be covered when not in use. Caution should be taken to avoid inadvertent flashes to unintended observers.

   (3) **Infrared chemical lights,** used in a pre-briefed manner, are an effective and readily discernible visual signal.

   (4) **Strobe lights,** with IR or colored shields, and pyrotechnic signals should be used only as pre-briefed and annotated in the EPA or requested by recovery forces.

   (5) **Fireflies** are IR light emitting diodes powered by a 9-volt battery. Multiple fireflies can be used like strip signals and should be annotated in the EPA.

   (6) **Additional Methods.** In combat situations, most hand-held, nondirectional visual signals are best used with radio communications during final approach of a recovery asset, or when prescribed in the individual’s EPA. Use of a visual signal without pre-coordination may be suspected as hostile activity. Use before coordination with the recovery asset may pinpoint the evader’s location to the adversary and result in death or capture of the evader. The evader will necessarily weigh the risk of losing the “first chance may be the only chance” to be located with the possibility that delay may allow an adversary time to set up an ambush for the recovery asset.

      (a) **Pyrotechnics** (e.g., flares, tracers, smoke grenades) are best used with radio communications during final approach of a recovery asset or when prescribed in the individual’s EPA. Fire and/or smoke fire generators are dangerous to the evader and should
only be used in peacetime situations, extremely remote areas, or as a desperate act when death is the only other alternative.

(b) **Improvised.** Alternative, multiple-use visual signaling devices (e.g., laser pointers, flashlights with colored lenses, foil reflectors) are best used with radio communications during the final approach of a recovery asset or when prescripted in the individual’s EPA.

(c) **Sea marker dye** may be used during daylight in any body of water (e.g., open seas, lakes, ponds, swamps, streams, rivers) or to color snow.

(d) **Load signal** is a pre-coordinated, close proximity signal that indicates the evader is positioned and prepared to make direct contact with recovery forces. This type of signal is classified and articulated in the individual’s EPA.

(e) **Glint tape** is a very sensitive IR reflecting cloth that is lightweight, durable, and very reliable. It is very useful as an emergency night signaling device (e.g., a one-inch square piece of tape is detectable by airborne systems).

3. **Authentication Procedures**

Once an evader is detected, the recovery force will require ID authentication to confirm that an adversary attempting to entrap a recovery force has not replaced the evader. Recovery may not be immediate and depends on the situation. After an evader has been out of contact, even for a short time, re-authentication may be required and could occur multiple times. Definitive authentication will be based on the information contained in the ISOPREP, which contains questions the evader should recognize. Generally, the recovery force does not carry the ISOPREP with them on the mission, to preclude loss or compromise; they should contact the JPRC or unit holding the ISOPREP to obtain the information. If the evader is unable to respond to questioning, the ISOPREP (blocks 6, 7, 10, 11, and 24) contains information on the individual’s physical attributes that may assist in confirming an identity. If identity is in doubt, the recovery force will follow accepted detainee handling procedures pending authentication or return to friendly territory.
1. Minimum Information

   a. General. EPAs should contain at least the minimum information required IAW theater instructions, and be tailored appropriately for the scope of the operation and mission of the unit. Individuals completing EPAs should not use the statement “PER ATO SPINS” as substitute information. Such a statement fails to provide recovery forces with the information required and provides no concrete data with which to plan a recovery operation. Inclusion of this prescribed information into one document, or an electronic database (e.g., PRMS), enhances operational effectiveness and precludes the possibility that critical information might not be available in a time-sensitive situation. Before beginning EPA preparation, the planner should have a thorough understanding of the friendly and adversary situation at the time of the mission. EPAs should be classified to at least the level of the OPLAN/OPORD for the mission they support. Paragraphs should be individually classified to the appropriate level. The information should be completed with assistance from appropriate communications and/or signal, intelligence, SERE, and support/life support personnel, as needed.

   b. A standardized EPA format can be found on PRMS. Following is a sample for organizing the information needed in an EPA, divided into three parts. The information can be easily manipulated and updated, depending on the situation. Because it is only an example, it can also be used as the start of a checklist of items to be considered when developing an individual EPA. Although the information in parts one and three are applicable to both urban and field environments, part two is dependent on the circumstances of the mission and needs to be customized accordingly. Smaller elements of SOF and conventional ground forces may develop a single SOP-type of EPA applicable to most missions, since all will be generally operating together under the same set of circumstances. It is important that all individuals be thoroughly familiar with the elements of this pre-established EPA.

   c. This sample EPA is organized in three parts:

      (1) **PART I—PERSONAL ACTION PLAN**—information common to every mission. This portion contains basic TTP that an individual plans on using if isolated. It is designed to be basic to all evasion situations. For some, this may take more time to complete initially; however, once developed, this portion would become somewhat repetitious, remain on file, and generally would not be required to be redeveloped for subsequent missions. This portion of the document could be reviewed weekly, monthly, pre-mission, or as the situation or theater PR manager dictates.

      (2) **PART II—MISSION SPECIFIC PLAN**—quick sketch of the intended goals or general direction of travel for each leg of each specific area, target, or mission. This may be accomplished with graphics, sketches, text, or a combination. The effort should be practical and depend on the breadth of the mission. Sketches and maps should have reference points annotated. The ever-changeable part of an EPA is the planned ingress and
egress routes. This may be sketched on a map, with each turn point labeled with a letter, number, or color. Any last minute changes (equipment, signals, etc.) to the Part I personal action plan should be annotated here. Surface forces may require more detailed, specific plans based on command/unit prerogative; what are outlined here are the desired minimums.

(3) **PART III—REQUIRED OTHER SOURCE DATA**—additional information that would be helpful to recovery forces and may be supplied by others to the Service PRCCs:

(a) Unit level intelligence briefing and instructions that were provided.

(b) Unit level mission specific briefings provided and equipment lists of issued items carried by the isolated individual.

(c) Unit level operations: mission brief, instructions, and other data.

(d) Location of emergency action data for the isolated individual.

d. Common to all situations is a high likelihood of injury, but each type of entry into evasion has its own set of problems, to include:

(1) Ejection or bailout with parachutes—visible for miles, enemy positions unknown; may be concealed and observed at a distance; evader may not know their own location once on the ground.

(2) Damaged rotary winged aircraft—high visibility in decent and possibly smoke; damaged aircraft provides a vector for the enemy to the evasion starting point; leaving footprints may indicate a direction of travel.

(3) Engaged surface forces—close proximity of the enemy; possible mass confusion; decisions: communicate now or later? Stealth or speed? Dissuade pursuit?

### 2. Sample Evasion Plan of Action Format

Following is a set of examples for different types of evaders. These represent broad examples only and should be tailored to the needs of the individual and the mission.

Legend: (if no annotation, presume it applies to all types of evaders)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FWA</td>
<td>Fixed wing aircraft with chutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GF</td>
<td>Ground forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>Rotary wing aircraft (or fixed wing without chutes)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EVASION PLAN OF ACTION

Name:
Rank:
Service:
SSN:
Unit and Location (in pencil, if not electronic):
Date of this record:

PART I - PERSONAL ACTION PLAN - On file and common to every mission; change as situation dictates. It should contain basic TTP the individual plans on using if isolated on any mission.

Pre-mission personal preparation checklist

- Dress for the ground environment
- Dog tags, ID/Geneva Convention card
- Sanitize pockets and uniform - combat wallet
- Personal pocket survival/evasion items
- Issued items to support evasion
- Attached sketch or map - (YES) - (NO)

NOTE: The individual should create and memorize his/her own personal TTP. They may be pre-printed and standard for the individual, with same general plan for every mission. However, the equipment used may change with season or location.

a. I consider the following to be not essential to my evasion, and plan to conceal and/or leave the following:

(1) FWA - Harness, helmet, G-suit, personal flotation, canopy (less 6 cords and GREEN gores).

(2) GF - Rucksack, entrenching tool, mortar tube and base plate, extra M-60 ammo.

(3) RWA - M-60s and ammo (make inoperative) if not wounded and travel is possible, med kit if not in-use, flight helmet, 5 gallon water can.

b. I consider the following top priority items, in order, and plan to keep them if at all possible:

(1) FWA - Vest, hit and run kit, seat kit, beacon, 6 chute cords, 16P black raft (only if within 3 miles of the coast).

(2) GF - Weapon, water, ammo, web gear, camelback, radio, Gore-Tex jacket, PVS-7, VS 17 panels, 2 claymores.

(3) RWA - Vest, MP-5 w/4 mags, web gear, survival gear, rucksack, extra water jug.

c. I will carry the following personal survival/evasion kit items in my pockets on every mission:
(1) **FWA** - Mirror, multi-blade pocketknife, fishing kit, fire kit, 3-color lens flashlight, space blanket.

(2) **GF** - light emitting diode (LED) light (blue, green, and red lens), mirror, glint tape patch, 5-IR Fire Flies, laser pointer, Leatherman, 2 large leaf bags, 3 Ziploc bags, 50 iodine tabs, 2- 4x7 battle dressings, metal match, 20 ft 550-nylon cord, dental floss, needles, hooks.

(3) **RWA** - Sheath knife, reflector kit, glint tape, mirror, red laser pointer, 4 flashing IR LEDs, fire kit, 6 power bars, Ziploc bag, 50 iodine tabs, pen gun, 7 flares, 5 small (3x3) S-17 signal panels.

**EVASION ACTIONS**

**NOTE**: The level of detail in the plan will be determined by the theater/unit guidance or directive, mission requirements, and, if no other planning guidance, the individual's own assessment of the need for detail, e.g.:

a. In all cases, I will communicate upon starting evasion using “MAYDAY” (or applicable code word) call sign, and approximate location using search and rescue numerical encryption grid (SARNEG) for coordinates, or position and distance from SARDOT, or other encoded references in EPA, presuming it does not compromise security.

b. COMM - OUT - Assume evasion has started if four communication windows are missed.

**If not seriously injured:**

**INITIAL ACTIONS - (1st 30-60 Min - Approximately) (FWA)**

a. If possible, steer aircraft or parachute away from action and to a location conducive to evasion and recovery.

b. I plan initial movement from the landing site to the nearest feasible land form or vegetation and conceal equipment and myself.

c. Understood - If the enemy is in very close proximity - no time to conceal equipment - I will move 15 minutes, away from my direction of flight, change direction 90 degrees; move approximately another 30 min and hide.

d. I plan to hide by burrowing into the duff/forest litter, feet first, lay still, and stay put for three days - unless forced to move.

**EVASION COMM-PLAN THROUGHOUT**

a. I will monitor my radio and key the mike as specifically indicated in the EPA or as briefed in the comm-plan.
b. My duress word is ___________. Duress action ___________. At close approach, I will display one or more specific visual signals in a specific manner, as described in my EPA.

c. At night, I will use standard IR devices as indicated here in my EPA, or unit guidance, at recognizable US aircraft sound.

d. Authenticate IAW recovery asset direction, using personal information and number found in the ISOPREP. I will keep transmissions as brief as possible to avoid enemy direction finding (DF). If the transceiver is inoperative, I will utilize visual signals appropriately.

**EXTENDED PLAN**

a. If no contact in 3 days, I will travel at times of low light or moonlit nights for 3 nights or over the first ridgeline/elevation and attempt radio contact one hour after sundown.

b. Movement will be toward the landmark(s) referenced in Part II of my EPA. I will use the briefed ground-to-air signal, made from natural materials, after day seven and hide 1,000-1,500 yards away in the best concealment available.

**INITIAL ACTIONS - (1st 30-60 Min - Approximately) (GF)**

a. Fire last AT-4 or green smoke as signal to break contact and start evasion plan. Dump unnecessary gear quickly where they are.

b. Use rally points to regroup, if necessary, IAW times in Part II.

c. Will counter enemy pursuit efforts by applying counter-tracking techniques - radically changing direction - zigzag repeatedly, and employ anti-pursuit munitions/grenades and booby traps with remaining mortar rounds.

**EVASION COMM-PLAN THROUGHOUT**

a. If radio is available, will report initial situation as soon as possible with word “SAWDUST.” If no positive contact, I will communicate “in-the-blind” IAW the unit communication plan. Will initially attempt contact on sight/sound of any friendly aircraft. Authenticate as briefly as possible IAW ISOPREP. Duress word “Rations.”

b. Any signaling device that I may use will have appropriate specifics on exactly what the device is, when, where, how many, and how the individual device or technique will be used, will be recorded here in the EPA. I realize that details such as specific numbers, spacing, shapes, colors, orientation and pattern, and movement actions are important in the EPA for recognition by the rescue force.

**EXTENDED PLAN**

a. Maneuver to a hide site after maximum of 2 hours movement.
b. Lay still for 24-36 hours depending on periods of light and enemy activity.

c. After initial 48 hours, will move in low light - at dusk, dawn to allow for finding food and water.

d. If celestial light and terrain allows, movement in the middle of the night and sleep in the day time. Night vision device batteries will be saved for movement when enemy activity/population density requires night movement.

e. Movement will be generally away from the mission line of travel, with regular “dog legs.”

f. If forced to select my own improvised signal and recovery site other than stated elsewhere and have no radio, my personal emergency GTAS will be: “-X>” unless otherwise directed in theater plans - annotated in Part II of this EPA.

h. Any signaling device that I may use will have appropriate specifics on exactly what the device is, when, where, how many, and how the individual device or technique will be used, will be recorded here in the EPA. I realize that details such as specific numbers, spacing, shapes, colors, orientation and pattern, and movement actions are important in the EPA for recognition by the rescue force.

INITIAL ACTIONS - (1st 30-60 Min - Approx) (RWA)

a. Communicate upon realization of a problem.

b. Put aircraft down placing one or more landforms (river, ridge, canyon) between crew and enemy as far from enemy action as possible. Available cover and concealment and results of the last communication drives actions.

c. Remove useful gear as soon as possible. If enemy is in close proximity, remove all weapons, ammo, water, and medical kits into cover and concealment; assess situation. Prepare to defend in place, only with immovable casualties and/or if recovery is imminent.

d. If travel is desirable due to superior enemy activity, move as soon as possible to avoid contact with the enemy being initially drawn to the aircraft. Display a “V” of local materials at/near the crash site with the open end of the “V” indicating our initial general direction of travel. Move 2-4 hours and select concealed positions that are defendable. Consider waiting for low light to mask movement. Move in rough terrain or heavy vegetation, using areas of solid soil, to avoid leaving tracks.

e. If no contact with the enemy, decide to stay put or move to a better position. If we move, it will be toward a locally developed, predetermined recover site annotated in PART II. We will try to leave as little evidence of direction of travel as possible.
EVASION COMM-PLAN THROUGHOUT

a. Radio and visual signals to any passing US aircraft. Will vector overhead if feasible, and use one small VS-17 signal panel and mirror to pin-point our location.

b. If the radio is inoperative, we will display three small VS-17 signal panels in a straight north-south line 20 feet apart and will use mirror flashes to gain attention.

c. Any signaling device that I may use will have appropriate specifics on exactly what the device is, when, where, how many, and how the individual device or technique will be used, will be recorded here in the EPA. I realize that details such as specific numbers, spacing, shapes, colors, orientation and pattern, and movement actions are important in the EPA for recognition by the rescue force.

d. Duress word: “Dog” - Duress visual signal - triangle instead of straight lines, laser light up and down.

EXTENDED PLAN

a. If recovery is not possible, move in low light until survival radio contact can be made or a ground-to-air signal and recovery site is found.

b. Any signaling device that I may use will have appropriate specifics on exactly what the device is, when, where, how many, and how the individual device or technique will be used, will be recorded here in the EPA. I realize that details such as specific numbers, spacing, shapes, colors, orientation and pattern, and movement actions are important in the EPA for recognition by the rescue force.

INJURED/UNABLE TO MOVE:

I will move the injured from immediate danger, conceal nearby if possible, avoiding and/or concealing tracks, with defense in place the only likely option. If injured, very sick, or incapacitated I will provide for specific signals listed here in my EPA to maximize recovery assets potential of locating my position. If unable to speak due to thirst or injury and recovery asset is close, I will use a specific number and pattern of mike clicks, taps on the mike with a rock, or mirror flashes to prove life and assist in locating my position.

PART II - MISSION SPECIFIC PLAN (Insert Hyper-link annotated map)

Developed by: SFC Rock. H K
Time and date: 1 MAR 2005
Call sign: GLOCK-21
Radio Frequency: 123.4 MHz
Mission start date: TBD
Planned completion date: 9 days from start +/- 8 hours
Ranking Person on Mission: Capt. Marvel. I. B.
Unit: PDA 700
POC not on mission: Maj. Flagg Phone: DSN 555-1234
Number in group: 12
Attached list: Yes/No – Y

<table>
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<tr>
<th>SARNEG:</th>
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</table>

Duress word: SNAKE
Word of Day: REDSKIN
Letter: "L"
Number: 14
Unit authenticator: 7123
Close proximity challenge: “APPLE”
Response “JACK” -- back-up: “WORM”

NOTE: Radioed location references will be distance and headings from lettered rally points in lieu of SARDOTs. Visual signal - No Radio - GTAS: “- - X” (dash, dash X) using your foot. Insert evasion plan specific to this particular mission; may be a modification of plans laid out in Part I.

ADD ANY CHANGES TO PART I - FILE PLAN (add sheets if necessary)

PART III - REQUIRED OTHER SOURCE DATA - Information that would be helpful to recovery forces - supplied by isolated personnel’s unit to component PRCC or JPRC:

a. Intelligence briefings received. Unit level, and any instructions that were provided. (Insert Hyperlink to intelligence briefing and SPINS)

b. Equipment list of issued survival/signaling items provided to the isolated personnel by unit level Aircrew Flight Equipment/ALCE/Para-Rigger—any and all mission specific briefings. (Insert Hyperlink of issued life support equipment list)

c. Mission brief - mission operations instructions. Unit level operations, and other data. (Insert Hyperlink of pre-mission operational briefing as related to PR)
ANNEX E TO APPENDIX K  
IMMINENT CAPTURE

1. Members of the Armed Forces may never surrender voluntarily. Even when isolated and no longer able to inflict casualties on the adversary or otherwise defend themselves, it is their duty to evade capture and rejoin the nearest friendly force. Surrender is the willful act of members of the Armed Forces turning themselves over to adversary forces when not required by utmost necessity or extremity. Surrender is always dishonorable and never allowed. When there is no chance for meaningful resistance, evasion is impossible, and further fighting would lead to their death with no significant loss to the adversary, members of Armed Forces should view themselves as “captured” against their will versus a circumstance that is seen as voluntarily “surrendering.” They should remember that capture was dictated by the futility of the situation and overwhelming adversary strengths. In this case, capture is not dishonorable.

2. There are many potential actions that could assist the “about to be captured” evader. Preparation activities should be performed clandestinely to not draw the adversary’s attention. Even when the situation looks insurmountable, the adversary could make a mistake and miss finding an evader, even one that is not well hidden. This is a situation where maintaining patience and flexibility may result in continued freedom—not panicking is critical. The individual weapon the evader has is for self-defense and not for starting a new front in the war. Possible steps to consider when capture looks imminent include:

   a. Communicate with friendly forces or broadcast in the blind, for as long as possible, your situation, health, and, if applicable, status of other members of your team or crew if known; inform them of possible capture. Theater procedures normally will dictate the disposition of radio, GPS, and other signaling and communication devices.

   b. Sanitize for any information you may have such as knee boards, authentication books/tables, cryptological items, marked maps, survival radios, GPS, pocket litter, etc.

   c. Note the time and your location for future reference.

   d. Consume all the water and food available.

   e. Scatter small survival/medical items within the clothing. These items may make it through a search. Initial searches concentrate on weapons, maps, watches, and wallets.

   f. Disable your weapon(s).

   g. Zeroize and disable/destroy radio equipment.

For further information regarding SERE planning considerations and actions for isolated personnel while detained or captured, refer to Appendix M, “Classified Planning Supplement” (published separately).
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ANNEX F TO APPENDIX K
GUIDANCE FOR COMPLETING AND CONTROLLING
DD FORM 1833, ISOLATED PERSONNEL REPORT

1. Completion

   a. As PR mission management software applications are developed, information and storage is transitioning from paper format to electronic data. The guidance below will need to be adapted to the circumstances present at the time of the operation, and the capabilities of the individuals, units, and recovery assets involved. Regardless of the medium in which the data is maintained, what will not change are the security classification and forwarding/archival requirements of the ISOPREP.

   b. Digital preparation is the preferred method for creating an ISOPREP. However, the data may be entered on a paper DD Form 1833 if electronic means are not available. If ISOPREPs are handwritten, they should be printed legibly. All data fields should be done in ink.

   c. When choosing numeric codes, use a number that can be easily remembered. This number should not be in the individual’s military records or be public information. The number should not be sequential (1234, 9876, etc.), have repeated numbers (7777, 2299, etc.), or have zeros.

   d. Personal authentication statements require declarative sentences, not questions and answers. They should involve personal details that are easily remembered and not subject to change. Details of friends, relatives (other than immediate family), pets, vehicles, vacations, and other such details would be appropriate (e.g., “My first car was a blue, 4-door, 1979 Trans Am.”). Recovery forces will be able to derive several questions from each statement to authenticate the individual. Some simple guidelines are listed below:

      (1) Do not invent stories that may not be remembered during an actual recovery due to the stress of the situation.

      (2) Do not use preferences, memories, or favorites subjected to change, (e.g., My favorite ice cream is…, My current dog is…, The last time I went out with my brother…).

      (3) Do not use slang or jargon that may not be understood by the recovery forces. If the recovery force cannot understand the statement, they cannot formulate a question.

      (4) Avoid referencing information (e.g., dates, ages) that can be found in the individual’s military records or is readily accessible public information (i.e., available on capture).

      (5) Avoid using culturally sensitive information.

      (6) Avoid using information that would cause embarrassment if disclosed.
e. Additional data entered, as a minimum, should provide SERE/CoC training courses and year attended, known medical conditions (e.g., allergies, medications), and other information as directed for local use, or as stated in theater guidance.

f. Provide current front and right side head and shoulders digital photographs of the individual in the appropriate uniform without headgear.

2. Maintenance and Control

a. ISOPREPs are CONFIDENTIAL once the authentication data is filled in, per combatant command guidance and the PR Security Classification Guide, subject to change.

b. Per DOD and Joint Staff guidance, all personnel completing an initial ISOPREP are required to utilize PRMS. PRMS can facilitate the immediate transmission of ISOPREP information to the parent/component PRCC or JPRC when an isolating event occurs. During military operations, ISOPREPs should be stored with the individual’s EPA.

c. Individuals should review their ISOPREP IAW combatant command requirements.

d. The individual should never carry a copy of the ISOPREP or the information with them on a mission. PRMS digital ISOPREPs are accessed using secure means.

e. Theater or joint force PR plans will establish guidelines for ISOPREP data transfer timeliness and methods. ISOPREP data may be released to multinational recovery forces with authorization. The JFC operations staff routinely requests authorization from the CCDR foreign disclosure office.

f. Unit commanders should establish and periodically exercise procedures to ensure accurate ISOPREP data can be immediately provided through secure means. They should also ensure the parent component PRCC and the JPRC have been provided 24-hour access to PRMS to obtain ISOPREP information.

g. ISOPREPs used in successful recoveries will remain classified and forwarded to JPRA as part of the mission folder. Stringent control of ISOPREP information necessitates recovery forces and PRCC transmit ISOPREP usage to the JPRC. Should the formerly isolated person require a new ISOPREP in the future, only the uncompromised authentication information may be reused.

h. As long as the recovery mission is open and an active search is still being conducted, the printed PRMS digital ISOPREP will be maintained at the PRCC managing the recovery.

i. Upon notification that a recovery mission has been unsuccessful and/or terminated, the authentication information on the ISOPREP will remain classified, and it will be retained within the mission folder at the PRCC. The JPRC will transmit copies of the ISOPREP and other pertinent information to the theater PR OPR and JPRA for permanent archiving. Upon the cessation of hostilities and redeployment of US forces from the theater of operations, all open mission files will be forwarded to JPRA for archiving. These files remain classified per theater and PR classification guidance.
j. If the death of the isolated person has been verified, the ISOPREP may be declassified and maintained in the archival mission folder. The information will continue to be afforded protection under the Privacy and Missing Persons Act.

k. Upon separation from government service, or when no longer needed by the individual, the PRMS digital ISOPREP is archived in PRMS.

l. Individuals identified to maintain and provide oversight of ISOPREP filed in PRMS conduct training of program capabilities and management.
APPENDIX L
PERSONNEL RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS

1. General Instructions

PR instructions which are appropriate to all participants in a joint operation should be included in OPORDs and remain applicable for the duration of the operation. PR guidance should be included in the coordinating instructions to alert commanders to more detailed responsibilities and guidance in the appendices per formats in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.

2. Specific Mission Personnel Recovery Instructions

a. PR guidance for a specific mission will be included as part of mission tasking orders. The PR instructions should address specific PR plans unique to that mission (e.g., PR call signs and frequencies, PR air and ground methods, and preplanned tactical prepositioned locations [ground and air]).

b. PR Information

(1) The JFACC publishes an ATO to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and C2 agencies projected sorties, capabilities, and/or forces for targets and specific missions. For PR operations, the ATO will contain tasking for dedicated or designated PR air assets by country, Service, and unit, to include call signs, number/type aircraft, alert periods, response times, etc.

(2) Published along with the ATO are SPINS used to disseminate information not available in the ATO otherwise, but needed to execute the ATO missions. The initial SPINS, normally called the “standing SPINS,” will be developed during operational planning for a contingency operation. During the course of the operation, these standing SPINS will be revised and/or updated on a weekly basis. Additionally, SPINS, not affecting the standing/weekly SPINS, will be published which contain information such as changing call signs, codes, challenge and password, near and far recognition signals, frequencies, etc.

(3) The JPRC director is the functional OPR for the PR section of the ATO SPINS. PR information may also be contained in other sections of the SPINS (e.g., commander’s guidance, ROE, communications plan, EW plan). The JPRC should coordinate approval of changes to PR information contained in those sections with the applicable OPR. JPRC and component PRCC personnel need to be familiar with the format and contents of the ATO and SPINS.

(4) Many ground forces, especially small tactical units, will not be able to access or store the SPINS information due to physical security limitations, lack of classification access, or constant force maneuvering in the operational area. Often these elements will create their own operational instructions, including authentication or password codes, or predesignated escape and evasion procedures. It is imperative that this information be documented locally and forwarded to the component PRCC. Should an isolating event
occur, this information, combined with the ISOPREP, will be readily available to the recovery planners and forces at the PRCC and JPRC.

3. Personnel Recovery Instructions Template

The following are PR elements of information that should be considered for inclusion in operation and fragmentary orders. Some information remains current for a month or more, while others are changed weekly and daily. The information contained in each item would be determined by theater requirements.

a. PR General Information

   (1) JPRC.

   (2) Pre-mission preparation.

   (3) Brevity codes.

   (4) SARDOTs.

   (5) Search and rescue numerical encryption grid.

   (6) Departure points.

   (7) Phase lines.

   (8) Rally points (en route, objective, etc.).

   (9) Duress word.

   (10) PR word, number, and letter.

   (11) Challenge and password.

   (12) Near and far recognition signals.

b. Communication/Navigation Procedures

   (1) PR communications plan.

   (2) Tactical checkpoints or navigation waypoints.

   (3) Communications check times.

c. Isolated Personnel

   (1) Initial actions.

   (2) Immediate actions for isolated personnel.
(3) Radio communications.

d. **Extended Evasion**
   (1) Support procedures.
   (2) Procedures when radios are not available.

e. **Recover Task Procedures**
   (1) General.
   (2) Signaling devices and procedures.

f. **Personnel Recovery Task Force**
   (1) General.
   (2) Air/ground navigation.
   (3) Mission execution checklist.
   (4) Radio interrogation procedures.
   (5) PRTF checklist.
   (6) OSC/RMC checklist.
   (7) AMC immediate action checklist.
   (8) AMC changeover procedure.
   (9) Multinational force member ID card formats (if any).
   (10) Medical report.
   (11) PRC-112B and combat survivor evader locater radio canned databurst messages.
   (12) Abbreviations and acronyms.
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APPENDIX N
SAMPLE CHECKLISTS

B Airborne Mission Coordinator Checklist
C On-Scene Commander/Rescue Mission Commander Checklist
D Personnel Recovery Task Force Checklist
E Joint Force Staff Considerations for Personnel Recovery
F Typical Combatant Command Personnel Recovery Office of Primary Responsibility Functions and Responsibilities
G Typical Service and United States Special Operations Command Personnel Recovery Office of Primary Responsibility Functions and Responsibilities
ANNEX A TO APPENDIX N
PERSONNEL RECOVERY TASK FORCE MISSION PLANNING CHECKLIST

_____ 1. Date-time group notified:____________

_____ 2. Pre-mission:

______ a. Record event on appropriate incident form.

______ b. Plot isolated personnel on situation map.

______ c. Determine PR plan of action.

______ d. Complete PR worksheet:

______(1) Obtain current intelligence brief.

______(2) Obtain ISOPREP, authentication data, and EPA.

______(3) Determine threat level.

______(4) Obtain weather brief.

______(5) Study terrain/obtain sea conditions.

______(6) Determine survival equipment.

______(7) Determine CBRN contamination.

______(8) Determine medical status.

______(9) Special considerations.

______ e. Complete PR planning:

______(1) PR plan (forces, timing, locations).

______(2) Communications plan including backups.

______(3) Recovery forces informed.

______(4) Support forces requested (as required).

______(5) OSC/RMC appointed/notified.

______ f. Coordination complete with all PR forces.
3. Mission progress:
   a. Monitor mission progress:
      (1) Start times.
      (2) Keep component PRCC/JPRC advised of actions.
      (3) Arrival times at scene.
   b. Arrange for transport of injured (as required).
   c. Obtain additional recovery forces (as required).
   d. Complete reports (as required).

4. Closing actions:
   a. Rescue forces/personnel debriefed.
   b. Intelligence debriefed (as required).
   c. Component PRCC/JPRC notified of mission results.
   d. Recovered personnel entered into the reintegration process; status confirmed.
   e. Mission file completed, log updated, SARSIT message transmitted.
   f. Mission file forwarded to JPRC and/or JPRA, accordingly.
   g. Results of recovery force and intelligence debriefing passed to follow-on teams.
ANNEX B TO APPENDIX N
AIRBORNE MISSION COORDINATOR CHECKLIST

Checklist based on air recovery; may need to be modified to be applicable to a ground recovery where air assets are assisting.

**PR Information**

PR A: _____  PR B: _____

PR Primary: _____  PR Secondary: _____

PR Bullseye: _____  Elevation: _____  SARDOT and Location: _____

PR Code word: _____  Number: _____  Letter: _____  Color: _____

**Checklist**

1. Downed A/C or isolated vehicle type: _____  Notified by: _____  Time: ______

2. Notify PRCC/JPRC. Relay following information as available:
   a. C/S of downed A/C:
   b. Type of A/C/souls on board/# chutes:
   c. Location of survivor(s)/qualifier (GPS, estimated, last known, ground, water):
   d. Physical status of survivor(s):
   e. OSC C/S/fuel state/load out:
   f. Authentication status:
   g. Cause of loss/time/notified by:
   h. Weather/terrain:
   i. Threats (ground/air):
   j. Assets available in area:
   k. Recommended spider route:

3. Designate OSC (air-to-ground ordnance availability preferred), if required by the tactical situation. Switch to PR primary and survivor’s frequency.
4. Request alert or support forces if required.

5. Establish communications with recovery force on PR primary. Control radio discipline.

- **OSC/RMC:** Number/Type A/C: Station:
- **FAC (A):** Number/Type A/C: Station:
- **RESCORT:** Number/Type A/C: Station:
- **RESCAP:** Number/Type A/C: Station:
- **SEAD:** Number/Type A/C: Station:
- **CAS:** Number/Type A/C: Station:
- **Helo:** Number/Type A/C: Station:
- **ELINT:** Number/Type A/C: Station:
- **Tanker:** Number/Type A/C: Station:
ANNEX C TO APPENDIX N
ON-SCENE COMMANDER/RESCUE MISSION COMMANDER CHECKLIST

1. INITIAL ACTIONS
   a. Authenticate.
   b. Number of isolated personnel.
   c. Establish order of communication.
   d. Determine injuries.
   e. Determine isolated personnel intentions.
   f. Determine adversary activity.
   g. Check all assets on station time, ordnance, and other relevant factors.

2. LOCATION
   a. Attempt location via electronic means (PRC-112, GPS and/or chart position passed over radio by survivor, high-speed DF).
   b. Determine signal devices.
   c. Request general terrain description.
   d. Request isolated personnel give vectors to their position.
   e. Locate isolated personnel position within 1 nm.

3. THREAT
   a. Neutralize threats detrimental to rescue.
   b. Note all other adversary positions.
   c. Determine ingress and egress routes.

4. RECOVERY
   a. Brief recovery vehicle and remainder of recovery force on:
      (1) Number and condition of isolated personnel.
(2) Distance to isolated personnel from initial point.

(3) Describe terrain.

(4) Isolated personnel location.

(5) Elevation of recovery area.

(6) Wind speed and direction.

(7) Describe isolated personnel signal devices.

(8) Known or suspected adversary activity.

(9) Describe ingress and egress routes.

(10) Emergency safe landing area.

b. Direct isolated personnel to:

(1) Prepare signaling devices for use and/or ignition, but use only as prebriefed or when directed by authenticated rescue forces.

(2) Call threatening adversary positions.

(3) Vector helicopter, if necessary.

(4) Approach the helicopter, ground force recovery assets, or maritime recovery vehicles only when directed, and follow instructions.
amp;quot;ANNEX D TO APPENDIX N
PERSONNEL RECOVERY TASK FORCE CHECKLIST amp;quot;

Items 1 through 7 are required to be briefed to the rescue mission commander prior to mission execution. All other information should be provided to the PRTF as applicable.

___ ISOLATED PERSONNEL INFORMATION

1.____ Tactical call sign(s).
2.____ Number of isolated personnel.
3.____ Location(s) (latitude/longitude, grid, range/bearing to/from SARDOT).
4.____ Condition/injuries: Walking? YES NO UNKNOWN
5.____ Equipment (communications/signal).
6.____ Authentication complete? NO/YES When ____________ METHOD:

___ RECOVERY AREA INFORMATION

7.____ Threats (air/ground/missile).
8.____ Elevation ______ (nearest 1,000 feet, mean sea level).
9.____ General terrain description.

___ RESCORT PLAN

10.____ Initial point.
11.____ Link up point (if not at initial point).
   (a)____ Ingress.
   (b)____ Egress.

12.____ Ordnance.
13.____ RESCORT tactics.

___ RECOVERY VEHICLE PLAN

14.____ Rescue tactics.
15. ____ Communications/signaling procedures.

____ REFUELING PLAN

16. ____ Fixed-wing assets.

17. ____ Rotary-wing assets.

18. ____ Ground force assets.

19. ____ Maritime assets.

____ ADDITIONAL ITEMS/QUESTIONS
ANNEX E TO APPENDIX N
JOINT FORCE STAFF CONSIDERATIONS FOR PERSONNEL RECOVERY

The following considerations are a starting point for considering actions to be taken in support of a PR event, and for integrating with and supporting the PR portion of the OPLAN (i.e., appendix 5 to annex C of the OPLAN). They do not constitute a checklist of tasks that are the responsibility of joint staff section(s) to accomplish in support of a PR event.

1. Manpower and Personnel Directorate of a Joint Staff Considerations

   a. Notify appropriate offices and begin preparations to support isolated personnel per DODI 2310.4, *Repatriation of Prisoners of War, Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Mission or Isolated Personnel*. The respective Service or agency prepares a PPF in coordination with the respective Service casualty office when notified that an individual is isolated, missing, or captured. The same procedure applies in the case of DOD civilians and is accomplished by their parent Service or agency. In the case of DOD contractor employees, the contractor’s company, working in conjunction with DOS and the DOD, provides the required information to JPRA to prepare the PPF. These files need to be pre-positioned outside the CONUS and are used as an aid to initial processing.

   b. If activated, augment JPRC with manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff (J-1) PR representative.

   c. Identify, coordinate, and provide component PRCC personnel to augment United States military group (USMILGP)/major subordinate command and support of recovery operations.

   d. Source components with augmentees for the JPRC/component PRCC, as required.

   e. Be prepared to initiate reintegration plan, if required.

   f. Ensure factual information is provided to PAO.

   g. Assist JPRC with sourcing personnel to support designated component commander responsible for the reintegration of isolated personnel.

   h. Obtain PPF from isolated person’s respective Service, agency, or company and forward to the JPRC.

   i. Monitor recovery mission and return of isolated personnel to US control.

   j. In conjunction with SJA, determine legal rights the individual is entitled to, and convey those rights, as well as information regarding any applicable benefits for which the recovered person may be eligible through the reintegration team/designated component commander.
k. Submit after action and LL to JPRC/component PRCC.

l. Notify the Service and Joint Staff immediately upon notification of an isolating event. If fingerprints are needed and not included in the ISOPREP, request a copy from the FBI. The Service can access photos and an index fingerprint from Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System/common access card records.

2. Intelligence Directorate of a Joint Staff Considerations

a. Prior to the onset of hostilities, establish communications with combatant command PR OPR and the JPRC/component PRCC. Ensure J-2 PR representative coordinates with the combatant command PR OPR and the JPRC/component PRCC for briefing, threat assessment, and development of intelligence and information requirements.

b. Augment JPRC with J-2 PR representative to coordinate PR support.

c. Conduct initial threat assessment (using joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment criteria) and intelligence update and immediately forward information to the JPRC/component PRCC.

d. Identify all available national assets and task/request national support to assist in locating and recovering the isolated individual(s).

e. Facilitate coordination of national intelligence support to PR and ensure information is pushed to the JPRC/component PRCC.

f. Obtain and provide to the JPRC/component PRCC updated terrain, vegetation, and threat information in the vicinity of isolated personnel.

g. Update national intelligence systems/agencies when isolated personnel location is known. **Send requirements to queue national systems/agencies /theater assets if location is unknown.**

h. Through the JPRC/component PRCC, provide the PRTF with updated intelligence SITREPs.

i. Determine the threat to recovery force capabilities.

j. Continue to provide intelligence updates to the PRTF through the JPRC/component PRCC.

k. Evaluate threat level at recovery sites when the JPRC/component PRCC or PRTF provides location(s).

l. Monitor recovery mission and support return of isolated personnel to US control. Identify any threat counter-recovery trends and pass to theater and national level.
Joint Force Staff Considerations for Personnel Recovery

m. Stand down national intelligence systems when JPRC/component PRCC transmits final PR SITREP.

n. Submit after action and LL to JPRC/component PRCC.

3. Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff Considerations

In many combatant commands this function is conducted in a JOC with the assistance from the PR OPR.

a. Coordinate PR planning activities with HN and COM representatives, IAW GCC procedures.

b. Establish JPRC and implement crisis action planning procedures/battle drills. Augment JPRC with J-3 PR representative to coordinate PR support.

c. Through the JPRC/component PRCC director, designate a PRTF to direct, coordinate support, and assist in planning the PR mission.

d. Through the JPRC/component PRCC director, task components and request other agencies and HN (through JOC/USMILGP) to identify and report availability of their recovery capabilities to the JPRC/component PRCC.

e. Review and authorize release of JPRC/component PRCC’s PR incident report.

f. Activate the IO cell, and implement the IO plan.

g. Alert theater airlift to plan and prepare for airdrop of emergency supplies to isolated personnel and coordinate with the PRTF.

h. Request JPRA provide support to isolated personnel’s families and reintegration effort through the PRCC.

i. Through the JPRC/component PRCC director and PRTF, designate a recovery force commander to evaluate the probability of success, and plan and execute the recovery mission.

j. In conjunction with PRCC and JOC/USMILGP, alert designated initial reception point facilities to prepare for the returnee’s initial medical evaluation, stabilization, and debriefing.

k. In coordination with JPRC/component PRCC, determine task force composition requirements. (on scene-immediate, maneuver force, joint)
l. Prepare to deploy debriefing team to initial reception point. (May involve requesting JPRA assistance.)

m. Assist the JPRC/component PRCC director with identifying requirements/capability to support search operations if necessary.

n. Authorize reintegration team to deploy to initial reception point to assist in reintegration activities (if not already deployed).

o. Coordinate and obtain approval for supplemental ROE required to accomplish recovery operations. (A copy of supplemental ROE needs to be on-hand during the recovery operation.)

p. Through the PRCC, designate a component commander that will support the return and reintegration of isolated personnel and be responsible for the returnees initial processing.

q. Through JPRC/component PRCC director, task components to support the PRTF in planning and executing recovery mission.

r. In conjunction with the JPRC/component PRCC and J-2, review and validate PR COAs.

s. Monitor recovery mission and support return of isolated personnel to US control.

t. Review and authorize release of JPRC/component PRCC’s PR SITREPs.

u. Submit after action and LL to JPRC/component PRCC.

4. Joint Operations Center Considerations

a. Receive report of isolated personnel IAW Initial PR Response Notification Checklist:

   (1) Notify JPRC/component PRCC of PR incident.

   (2) Notify staff.

   (3) Transmit an operational report.

   (4) Coordinate with JPRC/component PRCC.

b. Forward all incoming PR information to the JPRC/component PRCC.

c. Assist the JPRC/component PRCC with transmission of SARIR.

d. Monitor recovery mission and return of isolated personnel to US control.
5. Logistics Directorate of a Joint Staff Considerations

   a. Identify and request logistics support for recovery operations from the appropriate staff elements.

   b. Identify possible intermediate staging base/forward operating location to be used in support of recovery operations.

   c. Augment JPRC with logistics directorate of a joint staff (J-4) PR representative to coordinate PR support.

   d. Coordinate support for pre-positioned PR forces or other PR support assets.

   e. Identify theater air assets to load and drop survivor support kits.

   f. Identify transport requirements for personnel and equipment into and throughout theater to include aeromedical evacuation for returnees.

   g. Notify the JPRC/component PRCC of all actions and any available support.

   h. Monitor recovery mission and support return of isolated personnel to US control.

   i. Ensure returnee’s transportation requirements to phase III location are in place.

   j. Assist in coordinating the return of deployed PR forces and equipment.

   k. Be prepared to coordinate and provide mortuary affairs support, as required.

   l. Submit after action and LL to JPRC/component PRCC.

6. Plans Directorate of a Joint Staff Considerations

   a. Coordinate with US embassy to obtain foreign nation diplomatic clearances for entry and over flight by US aircraft/personnel in support of recovery operations. Consistent with the Electronic Foreign Clearance Guide and the DOD Foreign Clearance Manual, located at https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil/fcg.cfm, information ensure clearances are obtained from all nations affected by the recovery operation, as appropriate.

   b. Augment JPRC with plans directorate of a joint staff PR representative to coordinate PR support.
c. Through the JPRC/component PRCC, update the PRTF when diplomatic clearances are approved.

d. Assist JPRC with identifying and coordinating an in-theater treatment and processing facility.

e. Coordinate through JOC/USMILGP to obtain partner/HN approval of cross border operations in support of isolated personnel.

f. In conjunction with JPRC, identify, coordinate, and plan for the initial reintegration point.

g. Monitor recovery mission and return of isolated personnel to US control.

h. Coordinate diplomatic clearances for flights supporting redeployment missions. (Memorandum of agreement in place).

i. Submit after action and LL to JPRC/component PRCC.

7. Communications System Directorate of a Joint Staff Considerations

a. Ensure PR communications (SATCOM, SIPRNET, etc.) are operational.

b. Augment JPRC with communications system directorate of a joint staff PR representative to coordinate communications support.

c. Coordinate with JPRC/component PRCC to determine if additional radio frequencies are required.

d. Monitor status of PR communications channels to ensure C2 is not degraded or interrupted.

e. Assist in identifying and locating equipment required by deploying recovery and support forces.

f. Identify communications equipment and/or cryptographic keying material which may have been compromised, contact the appropriate communications security manager, and ensure widest dissemination across the joint force.

g. Monitor recovery mission and return of isolated personnel to US control.

h. Submit after action and LL to JPRC/component PRCC.
8. Public Affairs Office Considerations


b. Notify the Office of the Secretary of Defense PAO of isolated personnel situation and coordinate for information flow to isolated personnel’s family members through Service survivor assistance officer.

c. Augment JPRC with PAO PR representative to coordinate PR support.

d. Manage command PR information to media, higher HQ, and through the Services to the isolated personnel’s family.

e. Manage command PR information to media and higher HQ in coordination with subordinate commands and other organizations, as required. (Ensure integration with IO plan.)

f. Coordinate with JPRC/component PRCC to ensure no compromise of sensitive information or isolated personnel status.

g. In conjunction with JPRC, coordinate with the respective military Service or agency to ensure NOK receive timely and accurate information concerning their isolated family member.

h. Coordinate and provide support to recovery forces, as required.

i. Make periodic releases to keep the public updated on mission progress, and a final release summarizing the entire mission when the case is concluded.

j. Monitor recovery mission and return of isolated personnel to US control.

k. Submit after action and LL to JPRC/component PRCC.

9. Staff Judge Advocate Considerations

a. Assist as needed in determining status of isolated personnel.

b. Augment JPRC with SJA PR representative to coordinate PR support.

c. Assist with the coordination and publication of appropriate ROE for potential isolated personnel. Review ROE for legal accuracy.

d. Assist in monitoring recovery mission and return of isolated personnel to US control.

e. Identify and task legal representative for recovered personnel.
f. Submit after action and LL to JPRC/component PRCC.

10. Medical Support Considerations

a. Be prepared to request forensic capability as required to support recovery operations.

b. Augment JPRC with medical PR representative to coordinate PR support.

c. Validate/confirm capabilities of appropriate in-country/theater hospitals and determine required medical capability for the return of isolated personnel.

d. Reassess required medical capabilities after communication is established with the isolated personnel and their medical status is confirmed.

e. Be prepared to provide recommendations to J-3 and J-4, if medical supplies will be air dropped to isolated personnel.

f. Monitor recovery mission and return of isolated personnel to US control.

g. Submit after action and LL to JPRC/component PRCC.

11. Chaplain Considerations

a. Provide for or facilitate the religious support to recovered personnel.

b. Coordinate religious support team (RST) activities to provide religious support to families.

c. Augment JPRC with RST PR representative to coordinate PR support.

d. Advise the JPRC regarding the delivery of religious ministry to recovered personnel.

e. Submit after action and LL to JPRC/component PRCC.
ANNEX F TO APPENDIX N
TYPICAL COMBATANT COMMAND PERSONNEL RECOVERY OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Ensure a coordinated PR program for the assigned operational area is developed and that all assigned forces possessing PR capabilities and assets are prepared to execute component PR responsibilities and contribute to PR joint efforts, if required.

2. Assist in developing the command joint mission essential task list, and training and exercise scenarios, ensuring PR equities are sufficiently represented.

3. Develop combatant command PR policies, directives, and SOPs to provide command guidance on staff and component PR responsibilities, coordination procedures, requirements, etc. Develop policy, plans, and exercise tasks that outline component operating procedure construct requirements. Policy tasks should address planning, preparation (to include exercise and rehearsal), and execution tasks to ensure joint interoperability.

4. Develop an integrated PR CONOPS, across the range of military operations, in coordination with the component commands.

5. Develop appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery), to annex C (Operations), of OPLANs and OPORDs. Ensure appendix 5 and associated tabs are complementary to related annexes or appendices for personnel; intelligence; medical services; processing of formerly captured, missing, or detained US personnel; mortuary affairs; PA; and reports. Ensure the PR appendix and relevant supporting plans are properly distributed to all required agencies.

6. Maintain direct and continuous liaison with all combatant command PR coordination elements and other designated recovery assets, as required.

7. Act as liaison for local/HN forces capable of PR. Assist in establishing procedures between forces and establish formalized relations at the tactical and operational level for future planning. This liaison will be important if the JPRC is not established initially and the PR OPR must act as the primary POC until a JPRC is operational.

8. Coordinate with the components, Services, USSOCOM (for NAR), JPRA (for theater support), BIMA (for biometric support), and other pertinent combatant commands and DOD agencies to meet PR requirements and responsibilities.

9. Establish procedures to provide support to recovery forces and monitor mission progress and status of recovery assets.

10. Establish procedures to locate and communicate with isolated personnel.

11. Determine requirements for JPRA intelligence support, IPG, evasion aids, support team assistance, and training. Coordinate with JPRA for the production of evasion aids as appropriate.
12. Develop a reintegration plan for processing returned isolated personnel; ensure coordination with Service reintegration plans.

13. Recommend supplemental ROE to support PR.

14. Coordinate and deconflict component PR plans and review them for supportability.

15. Develop the PR portion of communications plans.

16. Establish reporting requirements for the JPRC and component PRCCs.

17. Ensure JPRC and component PRCCs are capable of accomplishing their assigned duties and meeting their functional responsibilities.

18. Organize and conduct PR mission training exercises for the joint force. Ensure PR scenarios during field and command post exercises are realistic, adequate, and reflect the theater environment and operating conditions.

19. Develop a plan to transition from peacetime to combat operations, and back to peacetime to include:
   
   a. Developing augmentation personnel requirements.
   
   b. Establishing additional communications support requirements.

20. Designate a NAR OPR. Plan, coordinate, and prepare to execute NAR. Coordinate with the theater SOC, and with USSOCOM as necessary, for all command NAR requirements.

21. Coordinate with combatant command PA agencies for establishment and dissemination of specific guidance on the release of PR information to media by DOD personnel.

22. Develop a PR communications plan and coordinate with the GCC or JFC to ensure inclusion and cohesion of the PR communications efforts.

23. Be prepared to serve as the combatant command or JTF JPRC to facilitate civil SAR efforts during humanitarian and disaster relief operations.
ANNEX G TO APPENDIX N
TYPICAL SERVICE AND UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND PERSONNEL RECOVERY OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Develop PR policies, directives, and SOPs to provide guidance on PR responsibilities, coordination procedures, requirements, etc. Develop policy, plans, and exercise tasks that outline component operating procedure construct requirements. Policy tasks should address planning, preparation (to include exercise and rehearsal), and execution tasks to ensure joint interoperability.

2. Assist in developing the Service mission essential task list and training and exercise scenarios, ensuring PR equities are sufficiently represented.

3. Coordinate PR training, equipment, intelligence, and product requirements to support PR mission readiness.

4. Develop appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery), to annex C (Operations) to plans and orders as required.

5. Establish and maintain direct liaison with combatant command PR OPR, coordination elements, and other designated recovery assets, as required. (See CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II (Planning Formats), for content and format.)

6. Develop a reintegration plan for processing returned isolated personnel; ensure synchronization with combatant command/JTF reintegration plan.

7. Coordinate and deconflict component PR plans with combatant command/JTF PR plans and review them for supportability.

8. Coordinate with appropriate PA agencies for establishment and dissemination of specific guidance on the release of PR information to media.
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APPENDIX O
REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-50 is based upon the following primary references:

1. Presidential Directives
   b. NSPD-12, *United States Citizens Taken Hostage Abroad (U)*—(Confidential document).

2. Department of Defense Publications
   b. DODD 1300.7, *Training and Education to Support the Code of Conduct (CoC)*.
   c. DODD 2310.07E, *Personnel Accounting – Losses Due to Hostile Acts*.
   d. DODD 3002.01E, *Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense*.
   e. DODD 3003.01, *Department of Defense Support to Civil Search and Rescue (SAR)*.
   f. DODD 4500.54E, *Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Program (FCP)*.
   g. DODD 5105.75, *Department of Defense Operations at US Embassies*.
   h. DODD 5110.10, *Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO)*.
   i. DODD 5132.03, *Department of Defense Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation*.
   j. DODD 8521.01E, *Department of Defense Biometrics*.
   k. DODI 1300.21, *Code of Conduct (CoC) Training and Education*.
   m. DODI 2310.4, *Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel*.
   n. DODI 2310.05, *Accounting for Missing Persons-Boards of Inquiry*.
   o. DODI 2310.6, *Non-Conventional Assisted Recovery in the Department of Defense*.
   p. DODI 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces*.
Appendix O

q. DODI 3115.10E, Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery.


3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

a. CJCSI 3150.25D, Joint Lessons Learned Program.

b. CJCSI 3270.01A, Personnel Recovery Within the Department of Defense (U), (Secret/NOFORN document).

c. CJCSI 5120.02B, Joint Doctrine Development System.

d. CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II, Planning Formats and Guidance (Limited release).

e. CJCSM 3500.04E, Universal Joint Task Manual.

f. Director Joint Staff, Memorandum-1103-92, DOD US POW/MIA Program.

4. Joint Publications

a. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

b. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

c. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.


e. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

f. JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.

g. JP 3-04, Joint Shipboard Helicopter Operations.

h. JP 3-05, Special Operations.

i. JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.

j. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.

k. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

l. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.

m. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.
n. JP 3-52, *Joint Airspace Control*.

o. JP 4-10, *Operational Contract Support*.

p. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.

5. Multi-Service Publications


6. US Navy Publications

   a. COMSUBLANT/COMSUBPAC OPLAN 2137, *Submarine Search, Escape, and Rescue (Rev A)*.


   c. OPNAVINST 3130.7A, *Naval Aviation Combat Search and Rescue Program*.

   d. OPNAVINST C3505.1A, *Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) Program; Doctrine and Policy Concerning (U)*.


   a. AFDD 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*.

   b. AFDD 2, *Operations and Organization*.

   c. AFDD 2-1, *Air Warfare*.


   f. AFI 14-101, *Intelligence Contingency Funds*.

   g. AFI 14-105, *Unit Intelligence Mission and Responsibilities*.

   h. AFTTP 3-1, *Mission Employment Tactics*.

8. US Army Publications

   a. FM 1-100, *Army Aviation Operations*.
b. FM 1-564, *Shipboard Operations*.

c. FM 3-0, *Operations*.

d. FM 3-04.111, *Aviation Brigades*.

e. FM 3-04.113, *Utility and Cargo Helicopter Operations*.

f. FM 3-05.60, *Army Special Operations Forces Aviation Operations*.

g. FM 3-05.70, *Survival*.

h. FM 3-05.231, *Special Forces Personnel Recovery*.

i. FM 3-14, *Space in Support of Army Operations*.


k. FM 4-02.2, *Medical Evacuation*.

l. FM 5-0, *The Operations Process*.


9. **US Marine Corps Publications**


   b. MCWP 3-2, *Aviation Operations*.

   c. MCWP 3-23, *Offensive Air Support*.

   d. MCWP 3-25, *Control of Aircraft and Missiles*.

10. **US Coast Guard Publications**

   a. COMDTINST M16130.2E, *US Coast Guard Addendum to the National Search and Rescue Supplement*.


11. **Allied Publications**

   a. ATP-10(D), *Search and Rescue*.

   b. ATP-33(B), *NATO Tactical Air Doctrine*. 
c. ATP-40, *Doctrine for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis and War*.

d. ATP-57(B), *The Submarine Search and Rescue Manual*.

e. ATP-62, *Combat Search and Rescue*.

12. Other Publications


APPENDIX P
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Joint Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Support Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is US Joint Forces Command. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Supersession


4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO:   CSA WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-FDQ//
INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD//

b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Support Division and info the lead agent and the Director for Joint Force Development, J-7/JEDD.

c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

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6. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis.index.jsp (NIPRNET), and

b. Only approved JPs and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified JP to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA, Defense Foreign Liaison/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands and Services.
GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAR after action report
ACC Air Combat Command
ACE aviation combat element
AETF air and space expeditionary task force
AFDD Air Force doctrine document
AFI Air Force instruction
AFRCC Air Force rescue coordination center
AFTPP Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
AMC airborne mission coordinator
AMHS automated message handling system
ANG Air National Guard
AOA amphibious objective area
AOC air and space operations center (USAF)
AOR area of responsibility
ATO air tasking order
ATP allied tactical publication
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

BIMA Biometrics Identity Management Agency

C2 command and control
CAAF contractor personnel authorized to accompany the force
CAF combat air forces
CALICS communication, authentication, location, intentions, condition, and situation
CAS close air support
CATF commander, amphibious task force
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCDR combatant commander
CE command element (MAGTF)
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CISAR catastrophic incident search and rescue
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CLF commander, landing force
CMO civil-military operations
CMOC civil-military operations center
CNO computer network operations
COA course of action
CoC Code of Conduct
COLISEUM community on-line intelligence system for end-users and managers
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COM</td>
<td>chief of mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMAFFOR</td>
<td>commander, Air Force forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMDTINST</td>
<td>Commandant, United States Coast Guard instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMSUBBLANT</td>
<td>Commander Submarine Force, United States Atlantic Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMSUBPAC</td>
<td>Commander Submarine Force, United States Pacific Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>concept of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>concept plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRO</td>
<td>combat rescue officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSAR</td>
<td>combat search and rescue</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSARTF</td>
<td>combat search and rescue task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSG</td>
<td>carrier strike group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>direct action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATT</td>
<td>defense attaché</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>Department of Defense (form)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF</td>
<td>direction finding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRLAUTH</td>
<td>direct liaison authorized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DODI</td>
<td>Department of Defense instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPMO</td>
<td>Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSN</td>
<td>Defense Switched Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEI</td>
<td>essential element of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELT</td>
<td>emergency locator transmitter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>electronic protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>evasion plan of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPIRB</td>
<td>emergency position-indicating radio beacon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>emergency support function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESR</td>
<td>external supported recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVC</td>
<td>evasion chart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>electronic warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC(A)</td>
<td>forward air controller (airborne)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARP</td>
<td>forward arming and refueling point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCE</td>
<td>forward command element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLOT</td>
<td>forward line of own troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual (Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>force protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>G-1</td>
<td>Army or Marine Corps component manpower or personnel staff officer (Army division or higher staff, Marine Corps brigade or higher staff)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>geographic combatant commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCE</td>
<td>ground combat element (MAGTF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEOINT</td>
<td>geospatial intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global Positioning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPW</td>
<td>Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTAS</td>
<td>ground-to-air signals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIFR</td>
<td>helicopter in-flight refueling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLZ</td>
<td>helicopter landing zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>hostage rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRC</td>
<td>high-risk-of-capture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS</td>
<td>helicopter antisubmarine (Navy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSC</td>
<td>helicopter sea combat (Navy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>human intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAMSAR</td>
<td>International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAW</td>
<td>in accordance with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBS</td>
<td>integrated broadcast service</td>
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<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>intelligence community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICAO</td>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>identification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>intergovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMINT</td>
<td>imagery intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMO</td>
<td>International Maritime Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>information operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPG</td>
<td>isolated personnel guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>infrared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISG</td>
<td>isolated soldier guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISOPREP</td>
<td>isolated personnel report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-1</td>
<td>manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-2</td>
<td>intelligence directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-3</td>
<td>operations directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-4</td>
<td>logistics directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-7</td>
<td>operational plans and interoperability directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAOC</td>
<td>joint air operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDISS</td>
<td>joint deployable intelligence support system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFACC</td>
<td>joint force air component commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFSOCC</td>
<td>joint force special operations component commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIACG</td>
<td>joint interagency coordination group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIOC</td>
<td>joint intelligence operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JISE</td>
<td>joint intelligence support element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIOC</td>
<td>joint operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOPP</td>
<td>joint operation planning process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPRA</td>
<td>Joint Personnel Recovery Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPRC</td>
<td>joint personnel recovery center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPRSP</td>
<td>joint personnel recovery support product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSETS</td>
<td>Joint Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOAC</td>
<td>joint special operations aviation component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOTF</td>
<td>joint special operations task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSTARS</td>
<td>Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JWICS</td>
<td>Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LF</td>
<td>landing force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LL</td>
<td>lessons learned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOS</td>
<td>line of sight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGTF</td>
<td>Marine air-ground task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASINT</td>
<td>measurement and signature intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCWP</td>
<td>Marine Corps warfighting publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>missing in action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILDEC</td>
<td>military deception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISO</td>
<td>military information support operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPR</td>
<td>maritime patrol and reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRO</td>
<td>mass rescue operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAEC-ENG</td>
<td>Naval Air Engineering Center - Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAR</td>
<td>nonconventional assisted recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVAIR</td>
<td>Naval Air Systems Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>Navy component commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCRCC</td>
<td>United States Northern Command Rescue Coordination Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGA</td>
<td>National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIPRNET</td>
<td>Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIST</td>
<td>national intelligence support team</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NOK  next of kin
NRF  National Response Framework
NSA  National Security Agency
NSARC  National Search and Rescue Committee
NSAWC  Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center
NSFS  naval surface fire support
NSP  national search and rescue plan
NSPD  national security Presidential directive
NSS  National Search and Rescue Supplement
NSW  naval special warfare
NTTP  Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
NVD  night vision device
NVG  night vision goggle
NWP  Navy warfare publication
OGA  other government agency
OPCON  operational control
OPLAN  operation plan
OPORD  operation order
OPR  office of primary responsibility
OPSEC  operations security
OSC  on-scene commander
OSINT  open-source intelligence
OTC  officer in tactical command
OTH  over the horizon
PA  public affairs
PAO  public affairs office
PJ  pararescue jumper
PLB  personal locator beacon
POC  point of contact
POW  prisoner of war
PPF  personnel processing file
PR  personnel recovery
PRCC  personnel recovery coordination cell
PRCS  personnel recovery coordination section
PRDO  personnel recovery duty officer
PRG  personnel recovery guidance
PRMS  personnel recovery mission software
PRTF  personnel recovery task force
QRF  quick reaction force
QRP  quick response posture
RCC  rescue coordination center
RCT  rescue coordination team (Navy)
RESCAP  rescue combat air patrol
RESCORT  
rescue escort

RFI  
request for information

RM  
recovery mechanism

RMC  
rescue mission commander

ROE  
rules of engagement

RSC  
rescue sub-center

RSO  
regional security officer

RST  
religious support team

RT  
recovery team

S-1  
battalion or brigade manpower and personnel staff officer
    (Marine Corps battalion or regiment)

S-3  
battalion or brigade operations staff officer (Army;
    Marine Corps battalion or regiment)

SA  
situational awareness

SADL  
situation awareness data link

SAR  
search and rescue

SARDOT  
search and rescue point

SARIR  
search and rescue incident report

SAROPS  
Search and Rescue Optimal Planning System

SARREQ  
search and rescue request

SARSAT  
search and rescue satellite-aided tracking

SARSIT  
search and rescue situation summary report

SATCOM  
satellite communications

SC  
strategic communication

SCO  
security cooperation organization

SDO  
senior defense official

SEAD  
suppression of enemy air defenses

SecDef  
Secretary of Defense

SERE  
survival, evasion, resistance, and escape

SF  
standard form

SIGINT  
signals intelligence

SIPRNET  
SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network

SITREP  
situation report

SJA  
staff judge advocate

SMC  
search and rescue mission coordinator

SO  
special operations

SOC  
special operations commander

SOF  
special operations forces

SOFA  
status-of-forces agreement

SOLE  
special operations liaison element

SOP  
standing operating procedure

SPINS  
special instructions

SRI  
surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence
    (Marine Corps)

SRR  
search and rescue region
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>tactical control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDL</td>
<td>tactical data link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPFDD</td>
<td>time-phased force and deployment data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAP</td>
<td>tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (Marine Corps)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAR</td>
<td>unconventional assisted recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAS</td>
<td>unmanned aircraft system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UARCC</td>
<td>unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCMJ</td>
<td>Uniform Code of Military Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAFSOS</td>
<td>United States Air Force Special Operations School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMILGP</td>
<td>United States military group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNORTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Northern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>United States Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>unconventional warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>unexploded ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPB</td>
<td>Coast Guard patrol boat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS**

**act of mercy.** In personnel recovery, assistance rendered to evaders by an individual or elements of the local population who sympathize or empathize with the evaders’ cause or plight. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**airborne mission coordinator.** The designated individual that serves as an airborne extension of the component commander or supported commander responsible for the personnel recovery mission. Also called AMC. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**area search.** Visual reconnaissance of limited or defined areas. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-50 as the source JP.)

**authenticate.** A challenge given by voice or electrical means to attest to the authenticity of a person, message, or transmission. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**authentication.** 1. A security measure designed to protect a communications system against acceptance of a fraudulent transmission or simulation by establishing the validity of a transmission, message, or originator. 2. A means of identifying individuals and verifying their eligibility to receive specific categories of information. 3. Evidence by proper signature or seal that a document is genuine and official. 4. In personnel recovery missions, the process whereby the identity of an isolated person is confirmed. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**automatic resupply.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**bearing.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**blood chit.** A small sheet of material depicting an American flag and a statement in several languages to the effect that anyone assisting the bearer to safety will be rewarded. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**bona fides.** 1. In personnel recovery, the use of verbal or visual communication by individuals who are unknown to one another, to establish their authenticity, sincerity, honesty, and truthfulness. (JP 3-50) 2. The lack of fraud or deceit: a determination that a person is who he/she says he/she is. (JP 2-01.2) (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**cache.** A source of subsistence and supplies, typically containing items such as food, water, medical items, and/or communications equipment, packaged to prevent damage from exposure and hidden in isolated locations by such methods as burial, concealment, and/or submersion, to support isolated personnel. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**call sign.** Any combination of characters or pronounceable words, which identifies a communication facility, a command, an authority, an activity, or a unit; used primarily for establishing and maintaining communications. Also called CS. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-50 as the source JP.)
**civil search and rescue.** Search and/or rescue operations and associated civilian services provided to assist persons in potential or actual distress and protect property in a non-hostile environment. Also called civil SAR. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**code word.** 1. A word that has been assigned a classification and a classified meaning to safeguard intentions and information regarding a classified plan or operation. 2. A cryptonym used to identify sensitive intelligence data. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-50 as the source JP.)

**combat search and rescue.** The tactics, techniques, and procedures performed by forces to effect the recovery of isolated personnel during combat. Also called CSAR. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**combat search and rescue task force.** All forces committed to a specific combat search and rescue operation to locate, identify, support, and recover isolated personnel during combat. Also called CSARTF. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**combat survival.** Those measures to be taken by Service personnel when involuntarily separated from friendly forces in combat, including procedures relating to individual survival, evasion, escape, and conduct after capture. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-50 as the source JP.)

**contact point.** 1. In land warfare, a point on the terrain, easily identifiable, where two or more units are required to make contact. (JP 3-50) 2. In air operations, the position at which a mission leader makes radio contact with an air control agency. (JP 3-09.3) 3. In personnel recovery, a location where isolated personnel can establish contact with recovery forces. Also called CP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**contact procedure.** Those predesignated actions taken by isolated personnel and recovery forces that permit link-up between the two parties in hostile territory and facilitate the return of isolated personnel to friendly control. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**contact reconnaissance.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**contact report.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**countersign.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**decompression.** In personnel recovery, the process of normalizing psychological and behavioral reactions that recovered isolated personnel experienced or are currently experiencing as a result of their isolation and recovery. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**diplomatic authorization.** Authority for overflight or landing obtained at government-to-government level through diplomatic channels. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-50 as the source JP.)
**distressed person.** An individual who requires search and rescue assistance to remove he or she from life-threatening or isolating circumstances in a permissive environment. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**ditching.** Controlled landing of a distressed aircraft on water. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-50 as the source JP.)

**emergency locator beacon.** A generic term for all radio beacons used for emergency locating purposes. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**escapee.** Any person who has been physically captured by the enemy and succeeds in getting free. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**escape line.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**evader.** Any person isolated in hostile or unfriendly territory who eludes capture. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**evasion.** The process whereby isolated personnel avoid capture with the goal of successfully returning to areas under friendly control. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**evasion aid.** In personnel recovery, any piece of information or equipment designed to assist an individual in avoiding capture. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**evasion and escape.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**evasion chart.** A special map or chart designed as an evasion aid. Also called EVC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**evasion plan of action.** A course of action, developed prior to executing a combat mission, that is intended to improve a potential isolated person’s chances of successful evasion and recovery by providing the recovery forces with an additional source of information that can increase the predictability of the evader’s action and movement. Also called EPA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**exfiltration.** The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-50 as the source JP.)

**handover/crossover.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**helicopter support team.** A task organization formed and equipped for employment in a landing zone to facilitate the landing and movement of helicopter-borne troops, equipment, and supplies, and to evacuate selected casualties and enemy prisoners of war. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-50 as the source JP.)
**holding point.** A geographically or electronically defined location used in stationing aircraft in flight in a predetermined pattern in accordance with air traffic control clearance. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-50 as the source JP.)

**homing.** The technique whereby a mobile station directs itself, or is directed, towards a source of primary or reflected energy, or to a specified point. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**homing adaptor.** A device which, when used with an aircraft radio receiver, produces aural and/or visual signals that indicate the direction of a transmitting radio station with respect to the heading of the aircraft. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**hostage rescue.** A personnel recovery method used to recover isolated personnel who are specifically designated as hostages. Also called HR. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**identification friend or foe personal identifier.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**initial contact report.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**initial reception point.** In personnel recovery, a secure area or facility under friendly control where initial reception of recovered isolated personnel can safely take place. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**inland search and rescue region.** The inland areas of the continental United States, except waters under the jurisdiction of the United States. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-50 as the source JP.)

**isolated personnel.** US military, Department of Defense civilians and contractor personnel (and others designated by the President or Secretary of Defense) who are separated from their unit (as an individual or a group) while participating in a US sponsored military activity or mission and are, or may be, in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**isolated personnel report.** A Department of Defense Form (DD 1833) containing information designed to facilitate the identification and authentication of an isolated person by a recovery force. Also called ISOPREP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**joint personnel recovery center.** The primary joint force organization responsible for planning and coordinating personnel recovery for military operations within the assigned operational area. Also called JPRC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**joint personnel recovery support product.** The basic reference document for personnel recovery-specific information on a particular country or region of interest. Also called JPRSP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**left (right) bank.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
**listening watch.** A continuous receiver watch established for the reception of traffic addressed to, or of interest to, the unit maintaining the watch, with complete log optional. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-50 as the source JP.)

**load signal.** In personnel recovery, a visual signal displayed in a covert manner to indicate the presence of an individual or object at a given location. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**locate.** In personnel recovery, the task where actions are taken to precisely find and authenticate the identity of isolated personnel. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**magnetic bearing.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**maritime search and rescue region.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**mayday.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**mission-capable.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**mission type order.** 1. An order issued to a lower unit that includes the accomplishment of the total mission assigned to the higher headquarters. 2. An order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**movement to contact.** A form of the offense designed to develop the situation and to establish or regain contact. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-50 as the source JP.)

**neutral state.** In international law, a state that pursues a policy of neutrality during war. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-50 as the source JP.)

**nonconventional assisted recovery.** Personnel recovery conducted by indigenous/surrogate personnel that are trained, supported, and led by special operations forces, unconventional warfare ground and maritime forces, or other government agencies’ personnel that have been specifically trained and directed to establish and operate indigenous or surrogate infrastructures. Also called NAR. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**on-scene commander.** 1. An individual in the immediate vicinity of an isolating event who temporarily assumes command of the incident. 2. The federal officer designated to direct federal crisis and consequence management efforts at the scene of a terrorist or weapons of mass destruction incident. Also called OSC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**on-station time.** The time an aircraft can remain on station, that may be determined by endurance or orders. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**orbit point.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**pararescue team.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
**personal locator beacon.** An emergency device carried by individuals, to assist locating during personnel recovery. Also called PLB. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**personal locator system.** A system that provides rough range and bearing to isolated personnel by integrating the survival radio (if equipped with a transponder) with an airborne locating system, based on an encrypted communications homing system. Also called PLS. (Approved for replacement of “personnel locator system” in JP 1-02.)

**personnel locator system code.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**personnel recovery.** The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. Also called PR. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**personnel recovery coordination cell.** The primary joint force component organization responsible for coordinating and controlling component personnel recovery missions. Also called PRCC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**personnel recovery task force.** A force comprised of US or multinational military forces and/or other US agencies formed to execute a specific personnel recovery mission to locate, support, and recover isolated personnel. Also called PRTF. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**phonetic alphabet.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**pointee-talkee.** A language aid containing selected phrases in English opposite a translation in a foreign language used by pointing to appropriate phrases. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**precautionary personnel recovery.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**preliminary communications search.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**prisoner of war.** A detained person (as defined in Articles 4 and 5 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949) who, while engaged in combat under orders of his or her government, is captured by the armed forces of the enemy. Also called POW or PW. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**radio silence.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**recognition signal.** Any prearranged signal by which individuals or units may identify each other. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-50 as the source JP.)

**recovery.** 1. In air (aviation) operations, that phase of a mission that involves the return of an aircraft to a land base or platform afloat. (JP 3-52) 2. The retrieval of a mine from the location where emplaced. (JP 3-15) 3. In personnel recovery, actions taken to
physically gain custody of isolated personnel and return them to friendly control. (JP 3-50) 4. Actions taken to extricate damaged or disabled equipment for return to friendly control or repair at another location. (JP 3-34) (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**recovery activation signal.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**recovery force.** In personnel recovery, an organization consisting of personnel and equipment with a mission of locating, supporting, and recovering isolated personnel, and returning them to friendly control. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**recovery mechanism.** Designated indigenous or surrogate infrastructure that is specifically developed, trained, and directed by US forces to contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate designated isolated personnel from uncertain or hostile areas back to friendly control. Also called RM. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**recovery operations.** Operations conducted to search for, locate, identify, recover, and return isolated personnel, human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**recovery site.** In personnel recovery, an area from which isolated personnel can be recovered. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**recovery team.** In personnel recovery, designated US or US-directed forces, who are specifically trained to operate in conjunction with indigenous or surrogate forces, and are tasked to contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate isolated personnel. Also called RT. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**recovery vehicle.** In personnel recovery, the vehicle on which isolated personnel are boarded and transported from the recovery site. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**reintegrate.** In personnel recovery, the task of conducting appropriate debriefings and reintegrating recovered isolated personnel back to duty and their family. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**rescue combat air patrol.** An aircraft patrol provided over that portion of an objective area in which recovery operations are being conducted for the purpose of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft. Also called RESCAP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**rescue coordination center.** A unit, recognized by International Civil Aviation Organization, International Maritime Organization, or other cognizant international body, responsible for promoting efficient organization of search and rescue services and coordinating the conduct of search and rescue operations within a search and rescue region. Also called RCC. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**safe area.** A designated area in hostile territory that offers the evader or escapee a reasonable chance of avoiding capture and of surviving until he or she can be evacuated. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)
search. A systematic reconnaissance of a defined area, so that all parts of the area have passed within visibility. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

search and rescue. The use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, and specialized rescue teams and equipment to search for and rescue distressed persons on land or at sea in a permissive environment. Also called SAR. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

search and rescue alert notice. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

search and rescue incident classification. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

search and rescue numerical encryption grid. A predesignated ten-letter word without repeated letters used exclusively by recovery forces or isolated personnel to encrypt numerical data such as position, time, headings, etc., in a covert manner. Also called SARNEG. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

search and rescue point. A predesignated specific location, relative to which isolated personnel provide their position to recovery forces. Also called SARDOT. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

search and rescue region. An area of defined dimensions, recognized by the International Civil Aviation Organization, International Maritime Organization, or other cognizant international body, and associated with a rescue coordination center within which search and rescue services are provided. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

search mission. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

search radius. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

situation report. A report giving the situation in the area of a reporting unit or formation. Also called SITREP. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-50 as the source JP.)

survival, evasion, resistance, and escape. Actions performed by isolated personnel designed to ensure their health, mobility, safety, and honor in anticipation of or preparation for their return to friendly control. Also called SERE. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

tactical call sign. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel. A Marine Corps mission performed by an assigned and briefed aircrew for the specific purpose of the recovery of personnel, equipment, and/or aircraft when the tactical situation precludes search and rescue assets from responding and when survivors and their location have been confirmed. Also called TRAP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

terrain avoidance system. A system which provides the pilot or navigator of an aircraft with a situation display of the ground or obstacles which project above either a
horizontal plane through the aircraft or a plane parallel to it, so that the pilot can maneuver the aircraft to avoid the obstruction. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-50 as the source JP.)

**training pipeline.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**unconventional assisted recovery.** Nonconventional assisted recovery conducted by special operations forces. Also called **UAR.** (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell.** A compartmented special operations forces facility, established by the joint force special operations component commander, staffed on a continuous basis by supervisory personnel and tactical planners to coordinate, synchronize, and de-conflict nonconventional assisted recovery operations within the operational area assigned to the joint force commander. Also called **UARCC.** (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-50)

**unconventional assisted recovery mechanism.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**unconventional assisted recovery team.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**United States message text format.** A program designed to enhance joint and combined combat effectiveness through standardization of message formats, data elements, and information exchange procedures. Also called **USMTF.** (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 3-50 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1 - Initiation**
- Joint doctrine development community (JDDC) submission to fill extant operational void
- Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-end analysis
- Joint Doctrine Planning Conference validation
- Program directive (PD) development and staffing/joint working group
- PD includes scope, references, outline, milestones, and draft authorship
- JS J-7 approves and releases PD to lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant command, JS directorate)

**STEP #2 - Development**
- LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first draft (FD)
- PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
- FD comment matrix adjudication
- JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system
- Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment matrix
- FC joint working group

**STEP #3 - Approval**
- JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7
- JS J-7 prepares publication for signature
- JSDS prepares JS staffing package
- JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for signature

**STEP #4 - Maintenance**
- JP published and continuously assessed by users
- Formal assessment begins 24-27 months following publication
- Revision begins 3.5 years after publication
- Each JP revision is completed no later than 5 years after signature

**STEP #5 - Maintenance**
- JP published and continuously assessed by users
- Formal assessment begins 24-27 months following publication
- Revision begins 3.5 years after publication
- Each JP revision is completed no later than 5 years after signature

**JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY**

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