PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, executing, and assessing security cooperation activities.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the US, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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Vice Admiral, USN
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COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Presents Security Cooperation in Strategic Context
• Describes Security Cooperation Relationships
• Covers Security Cooperation Planning
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Security Cooperation in Strategic Context

Security cooperation (SC) provides ways and means to help achieve national security and foreign policy objectives.

Security cooperation (SC) encompasses all Department of Defense (DOD) interactions, programs, and activities with foreign security forces (FSF) and their institutions to build relationships that help promote US interests; enable partner nations (PNs) to provide the US access to territory, infrastructure, information, and resources; and/or to build and apply their capacity and capabilities consistent with US defense objectives. It includes, but is not limited to, military engagements with foreign defense and security establishments (including those governmental organizations that primarily perform disaster or emergency response functions), DOD-administered security assistance (SA) programs, combined exercises, international armaments cooperation, and information sharing and collaboration.

SC Purposes

SC helps develop partnerships that encourage and enable PNs to act in support of aligned US strategic objectives. SC activities often complement other United States Government (USG) foreign assistance to provide stability, help mitigate drivers of conflict, and assure key partners and allies. Additionally, SC supports US military campaign and contingency plans with necessary access, critical infrastructure, and PN support and enables the achievement of strategic objectives, such as deterring
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adversaries, preventing conflict, and enhancing the stability and security of PNs.

### SC and the Instruments of National Power

SC programs and activities are normally integrated and synchronized with the other instruments of national power depending upon how other interagency partners implement the national strategy (e.g., national security strategy) to achieve strategic objectives.

### Security Sector Assistance and United States Foreign and Defense Policies

In accordance with foreign policy direction established by the Department of State (DOS), DOD leads on defense policy issues that involve national security interests with military or defense equities. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-23, *Security Sector Assistance*, details the USG effort to implement security sector assistance (SSA) more efficiently, including the strategy to build security relationships, partner capacity, and capabilities to achieve national security objectives. PPD-23 establishes the integrated country strategy (ICS) as the core organizing document for USG foreign assistance activities supporting a particular PN. ICSs link goals for the PN to US national security priorities, SSA objectives, and if appropriate, to regional security objectives.

### Theater Strategy and Estimate

Theater strategy outlines a geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) vision for integrating resources and synchronizing military activities and operations in conjunction with the application of other instruments of national power to achieve theater objectives and Guidance for Employment of the Force-directed strategic objectives. GCCs’ theater strategies, as reflected in their theater campaign plans (TCPs), typically emphasize military engagement, SC, and deterrence through routine shaping activities. The strategic estimate, which is continually updated, helps to determine the missions, objectives, and potential activities required in the campaign plan.

### Internal Defense and Development

Internal defense and development is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion,
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lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. It focuses on both security and building viable civic, social, and economic institutions that respond to the needs of that nation’s population.

Security Cooperation Relationships

SC Related Activities and Operations

SC uses a combination of programs and activities by which DOD, in coordination with DOS, encourages and enables countries and organizations to partner with the US to achieve strategic objectives. Foreign assistance consists of a number of legally authorized programs that can be grouped into the general categories of development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and SA with the strategic purpose of promoting long-term host nation (HN) and regional stability. SA is a group of programs the USG uses to provide defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales to advance national policies and objectives. SA is generally overseen by DOS, and in many cases administered by DOD as SC. SC is the group of programs or activities employed by DOD in cooperation with PNs to achieve US security objectives, and some SC is foreign assistance, but not all. Security force assistance is the set of DOD SC activities that contribute to unified action by the USG to support the development of the capacity and capabilities of FSF and their supporting institutions, whether of a PN or an international organization (e.g., regional security organization), in support of US objectives. Security sector reform (SSR) is a comprehensive set of programs and activities that an HN government undertakes with USG assistance to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. Defense institution building (DIB) is a primary form of DOD support to SSR. DIB comprises SC typically conducted at the ministerial/department, military staff/service headquarters, and related agency/supporting entity level to develop the
strategic and operational aspects of a PN’s defense institutions. Other SC-related activities and programs include military engagements; joint combined exchange training; Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program; combined exercises for training, train-and-equip initiatives, and international military education and training (IMET); and international armaments cooperation.

**SC and Joint Operations**

A significant number of SC activities are conducted as a part of the GCCs’ TCPs, but limited contingencies, crises responses, or major operations can also involve some form of SC. The foreign internal defense program is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government, or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security. Counterinsurgency (COIN) is the comprehensive civilian and military effort designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. COIN is primarily a political struggle and incorporates a wide range of activities by the HN government of which security is only one, albeit an important one. Counterterrorism are those activities and operations conducted to neutralize terrorists and their organizations and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals. Countering weapons of mass destruction, across the three lines of effort (prevent acquisition, contain and reduce threats, and respond to crises), includes activities conducted across the USG to counter efforts to coerce or attack the US, its Armed Forces, allies, partners, and interests with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Counterdrug operations are those civil or military actions taken to reduce or eliminate illicit drug trafficking. Stability activities include military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the US in coordination with or in support of other
instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. **Foreign humanitarian assistance** consists of DOD activities conducted outside the US and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. **Peace operations** normally include international efforts and military missions to contain conflict, reestablish the peace, shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding between two or more factions within the indigenous population, and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. **Civil-military operations** are the activities of a commander performed by designated civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions, by directly supporting efforts for stability within an HN or a region. **Military information support operations** are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and, ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives. **Countering threat networks** is the aggregation of activities across the USG that identify, analyze, neutralize, disrupt, or destroy threat networks. **Personnel recovery** is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to affect the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel.

**SC Authorities and Programs**

SC activities are conducted with DOD funds, forces, and authorities, and with DOS SA funds and authorities, administered by DOD.

**DOD SC Roles and Responsibilities**

The **Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P])** oversees, integrates, and coordinates DOD policies and plans for coordination of SC policies, goals, and priorities for the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) with the Military Departments (MILDEPs), DOS, and other
interagency partners to enable greater unity of effort in activities that support national security objectives. The **Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)** represents the interests of SecDef and USD(P) in SC matters and is charged to direct, administer, and provide DOD-wide guidance to DOD components and representatives to execute DSCA-managed SC programs. The **Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics** is responsible for establishing and maintaining policies for the effective development of international acquisition, technology, and logistics programs, including international armaments cooperation (e.g., science and technology collaboration, logistics support), to support SC priorities. In conjunction with USD(P), the **Joint Staff** reviews the SC activities included in combatant command (CCMD) campaign plans to ensure the planning guidance has been met. **Geographic CCMDs** are the primary organizations for SC planning and integrating SC activities into their TCPs. **Functional CCMDs** prepare campaign plans that integrate their forces, resources, and funding for SC activities in coordination with the geographic CCMDs, their Service components, international organizations and, when appropriate, the affected security cooperation organizations (SCOs). **US Special Operations Command** coordinates SC activities to be executed by special operations forces (SOF) with the geographic CCMDs through their theater special operations commands, including the deployment of special operations liaison officers, as well as SOF Service components. **MILDEPs and Services** support combatant commander (CCDR) campaign plans and simultaneously pursue Service-specific SC objectives consistent with national and theater strategic objectives. **SCOs** work under the authority of the chief of mission (COM). The SCO is responsible for assessing whether a PN can build and sustain capacity and has the greatest visibility over the execution of SC activities. The **senior defense**
Official/defense attaché (SDO/DATT) serves as the diplomatically accredited defense attaché and chief of the SCO (if an SCO is present). The SDO/DATT, or a designated member of the SCO, is the point of contact for SC planning and development of the country plan with the GCC planners. Subject to COM approval, the SDO/DATT is the lead integrator for SC activities with the PN. The National Guard may appoint an officer to serve at the US mission under the SDO/DATT as the State Partnership Program liaison for the partner state’s National Guard with the GCC and HN.

Department of State SC Roles and Responsibilities

The chief of mission is the personal representative of the President to the country of accreditation, and is responsible to the Secretary of State for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all US Government executive branch employees in that country (except those under the command of a US area military commander).

DOS maintains interagency coordination with respective counterparts in DOD concerning future SA programs and SC activities with PNs. COMs facilitate the coordination of PN security-related requirements that become part of the specific SA programs and SC activities conducted by US military with those PNs. The country team is the senior USG coordinating and supervising body in a foreign country. With guidance from DOS and the COM, the country team develops the ICS regarding the PN, which influences the CCDR’s development of a country-specific security cooperation section (CSCS)/country plan for that PN. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) is DOS’s principal link to DOD. PM provides policy direction in the areas of international security, SA, military operations, defense strategy and plans, and defense trade.

Security Cooperation Planning

While SC activities are conducted primarily for routine shaping as part of the theater campaign plan, SC can be conducted in all phases of an operation and across the range of military operations.

As planners develop all the plans that operationalize the GCC’s strategy, DOD components plan and execute SC activities, such as training, exercises, military engagement, SSR, experimentation, education, personnel exchanges, and armaments cooperation resourced through Services’ SC funds, SA programs, and other funding lines and authorities.
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**SC Planning Characteristics**

**Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (G-TSCMIS)** is the overall collaborative tool and authoritative data source for DOD SC assessment, planning, execution, monitoring, and evaluation. Use of G-TSCMIS enhances visibility of the range of SC activities (completed, planned, and ongoing) across DOD components, facilitates tracking of resources spent on SC, to include operation and maintenance, and promotes the exchange of best practices.

ICSs support SC planning by informing the CCDR’s strategy and the development of CSCSs/country plans. The CSCSs/country plans in turn inform the campaign plan and the Service components’ and special operations components’ campaign support plans, which should support CCDR and national objectives. Routine SC planning is conducted through the joint planning process, but also includes a process of “PN requirements planning” and then “mission planning” once funding and authorities are approved. An initial analysis of the PN capabilities should identify specific opportunities and requirements for successful SC with the PN and highlight any PN interdependencies across the security sector as well as the PN’s ability to sustain increased capacity. At some point during the requirements planning, the execution or fragmentary order for the TCP and other approvals for funding and authorities will allow both headquarters and units to begin mission planning for their SC activities. TCP guidance and objectives provide an overarching framework for SC activities, but the CSCS/country plan should assess the PN’s willingness and propensity to support or implement DOD priorities, improve institutional capacity, and build partner capacity, all in the context of the DOD envisioned security role for the PN.

**Theater-Wide SC Planning**

SC planning is required for each PN where the GCC intends to apply resources, and SCOs prioritize their PN’s requirements identified for SC activities/investments. Once coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and DOS authorizes and funds SC activities, SC planning for each PN takes the form of mission planning among the geographic CCMD, DSCA, the applicable SCO and country team, the Service and special operations component(s), and the PN representatives.

**Identifying Resources and Authorities**

CCMD SC planners should be familiar with the various resources available to support the anticipated SC activities with the PNs in their theater. This includes Title 10, United States
Code (USC), funding for which the country may be eligible, such as the various DOD SC programs (e.g., Developing Country Combined Exercise Program) and other resources provided by MILDEPs through their theater Service components. Title 22, USC, funding, such as foreign military financing and IMET, is another key resource.

**Interagency Coordination**

While neither the COM nor DOS have formal approval authority over CCMD CSCSs/country plans, the plans should be consistent with the objectives and priorities of the ICSs developed by the COMs for DOS and should align with the country plans of DOS, US Agency for International Development, and other government agencies working in the security sector of the PN.

**Security Cooperation Execution**

**General**

The theater campaign order may be considered the beginning of the execution phase of the TCP, which includes the CSCSs/country plans and supporting components’ plans, but that order does not necessarily authorize execution of all SC activities. Collaborative planning among the SCO, PN, DOD component(s), OSD, DSCA, COM, DOS, and geographic CCMD results in the timely release of authorities and orders for synchronized execution of the approved and funded SC activities throughout a GCC’s theater.

**Services**

Various Service-to-Service memoranda of understanding and memoranda of agreement govern, inform, or shape Service SC activities with PNs. Service SC activities may follow established timelines known years in advance, such as recurring Service-to-Service staff talks, or may present more extemporaneously, such as office calls, port visits, or Service chief or senior leader attendance at trade shows or regional conferences.

**Combatant Commands**

Throughout the execution of SC activities, CCDRs and their staffs continually direct,
assess, monitor, evaluate, and adjust the SC activities when possible and the CSCSs/country plans as required, while the component commands do the same with their supporting plans. The CCMD issues annual orders and fragmentary orders to inform its subordinates and force providers of the desired objectives and the assigned tasks that have been identified to achieve TCP SC objectives.

**Service Component Commands**

Depending on the resources available, the DOD components, in collaboration with the CCMD, decide which activities to conduct in the following year and which activities to modify, postpone, or cancel.

**Security Cooperation Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation**

Assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of SC activities inform decision makers as to precisely where to continue, cut, or change the allocation of SC applied resources, and why. Moreover, they inform strategic prioritization by identifying areas of greatest SC effectiveness in areas and ways that best serve US interests.

**Assessment**

Assessment informs decision making by helping to establish information about the conditions present within a PN that are relevant to planning a successful SC initiative. Assessments serve at least two critical functions: providing relevant information to inform the design of SC activities, programs, or initiatives; and providing baseline information to enable accurate measurement of progress as an activity, program, or initiative progresses.

**Monitoring**

Monitoring enables planners to understand changes in the operational environment (OE) based on the implementation of SC initiatives, and it further informs a commander’s intent, guidance for planning, prioritization, and execution. This includes monitoring individual tasks, normally using measures of performance and measures of effectiveness, and functional evaluation at the strategic level. Task monitoring includes tracking whether tasks are
completed as planned, whether tasks are completed according to the planned timeline, whether costs are as projected, and other indicators used to determine whether planned activities are being executed successfully, and it informs leaders and decision makers at all levels.

**Functional Evaluation**

Functional evaluations allow planners to examine the effectiveness of SC activities, programs, or initiatives at the tactical or operational level, recognizing that impact may be difficult to judge in light of broader USG security-sector efforts and complex variables associated with PN actions, and at the strategic level. They are performed to understand the impact and effectiveness of SC initiatives at the strategic level and generate lessons learned to inform future SC planning. Functional evaluations at all levels should be linked to clearly stated defense objectives and should be integrated into program or initiative design from the outset.

**Operation Assessment**

Similar to functional evaluation, operation assessment is a continuous process that evaluates changes in the OE and measures the progress of executing tasks, creating effects, and achieving objectives toward attaining the desired end state of a particular military operation. Operation assessment informs planning; decision makers continuously analyze the OE and the progress of operations, compared to their initial assessment, understanding, visualization, and intent; and operation assessment helps them adjust planning and operations to make efficient use of limited resources.

**CONCLUSION**

This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, executing, and assessing SC activities.
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CHAPTER I
SECURITY COOPERATION IN STRATEGIC CONTEXT

“The US military strengthens regional stability by conducting security cooperation activities with foreign defense establishments. Such activities support mutual security interests, develop partner capabilities for self-defense, and prepare for multinational operations. Strengthening partners is fundamental to our security, building strategic depth for our national defense.”

National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015

1. Introduction

The basic nature of war has not changed, but the character of conflict has evolved to include increasingly transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional (TMM) threats. Security cooperation (SC) activities are as likely to be conducted as an element of contingency operations as they are in a combatant command’s (CCMD’s) daily operations. TMM challenges will cut across multiple CCMDs, across land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace. The strategic environment is fluid, with changing alliances, partnerships, and national and transnational threats that rapidly emerge, disaggregate, and reemerge. These factors will demand efficient planning efforts and the sound application of intelligence in concert with the other joint functions to address the uncertainty and ambiguity of future strategic and operational environments (OEs) and will significantly affect how the joint force conducts SC. SC strengthens and expands the existing network of US allies and partners, which improves the overall warfighting effectiveness of the joint force and enables more effective multinational operations.

a. SC provides ways and means to help achieve national security and foreign policy objectives. Department of Defense (DOD) strategic guidance emphasizes the importance of defense relationships with allies and partner nations (PNs) to advance national security objectives, promote stability, prevent conflicts, and reduce the risk of having to employ US military forces in a conflict. SC activities, many of which are shaping activities within the geographic combatant commanders’ (GCCs’) theater campaign plans (TCPs), are deemed essential to achieving national security and foreign policy objectives. Accordingly, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5132.03, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, requires SC activities to be planned, programmed, budgeted, and executed with the same high degree of attention and efficiency as other DOD activities.

b. SC encompasses all DOD interactions, programs, and activities with foreign security forces (FSF) and their institutions to build relationships that help promote US interests; enable PNs to provide the US access to territory, infrastructure, information, and resources; and/or to build and apply their capacity and capabilities consistent with US defense objectives. It includes, but is not limited to, military engagements with foreign defense and security establishments (including those governmental organizations that primarily perform disaster or emergency response functions), DOD-administered security assistance (SA) programs, combined exercises, international armaments cooperation, and information sharing and collaboration. Rather than a hierarchical relationship, SC, in its
numerous forms, has an overarching functional relationship with all other associated programs, activities, and operations.

c. SC activities are the products of strategic guidance and certain PN requirements determined through collaboration among the combatant commanders (CCDRs), their components, the Military Departments (MILDEPs), and applicable chiefs of missions (COMs). The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) disseminates the Secretary of Defense’s (SecDef’s) SC guidance, which has been coordinated with the Department of State (DOS). USD(P) also leads the review of GCCs’ TCPs, including their country-specific security cooperation sections (CSCSs)/country plans, to ensure that they are aligned with policy, objectives, and priorities, and are resource-informed. SC programs and activities are integrated into the TCPs and executed through the CCMDs, Services/special operations forces (SOF), and the security cooperation organizations (SCOs), and with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) providing certain management, accounting expertise, and delegated oversight. SC activities are coordinated with DOS and other applicable interagency partners at the department level and through their country team members. SC planning is discussed in detail in Chapter III, “Security Cooperation Planning.”

2. Security Cooperation Purposes

a. As summarized above, SC helps develop partnerships that encourage and enable PNs to act in support of aligned US strategic objectives. SC activities often complement other United States Government (USG) foreign assistance to provide stability, help mitigate drivers of conflict, and assure key partners and allies. Effective execution of SC enables PNs to carry out missions in lieu of, or alongside, US forces. Additionally, SC supports US military campaign and contingency plans with necessary access, critical infrastructure, and PN support; and enables the achievement of strategic objectives, such as deterring adversaries, preventing conflict, and enhancing the stability and security of PNs. SC also benefits the US military through theater and sociocultural orientation that improves readiness for training and advising FSF.

b. SC resource investments in programs and activities are driven by scoped and prioritized campaign objectives and guidance in SecDef’s Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP), and certain objectives in each COM integrated country strategy (ICS). Those objectives are consolidated in the TCP and the CSCSs/country plans nested within the TCP. The TCP and CSCSs/country plans implement that strategic guidance and articulate the desired PN roles in one or more of three categories.

(1) **Apply Capacity and Capabilities.** As our national policy acknowledges, the US will rarely conduct unilateral military operations. Capability refers to the PN’s ability to execute a given task while capacity refers to the PN’s ability to self-sustain and self-replicate a given capability. Building partner capacity and capabilities through SC requires a long-term mutual commitment to improve PN capacity and capabilities in support of US strategic objectives. For example, the PN:
(a) Joins a US-backed multinational force.

(b) Deploys a peacekeeping force to support a United Nations (UN) or another international organization mission.

(c) Builds counterterrorism (CT) capacity to counter local and transnational terrorist networks.

(d) Conducts personnel recovery (PR) or foreign disaster relief (FDR) with regional neighbors to include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incident response activities.

(e) Counters the ability of transnational criminal organizations and their associated networks to conduct illicit activities through the country.

(f) Pursues mutually beneficial objectives and/or increased interoperability with the US and multinational forces (e.g., increase capacity for ballistic missile defense, develop undersea warfare capability, or expand irregular warfare capabilities).

(g) Supports US countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) efforts.

(2) **Provide Access.** National security requires the US to maintain operational access across the globe. Operational access promotes flexibility in the US defense posture, provides freedom of movement, and supports freedom of action during military operations. Access also facilitates other means of support to include information/intelligence sharing and technology. SC activities promote the PN’s willingness to provide various types of military access that supports US strategic requirements in a theater. For example, the PN:

(a) Provides a forward basing agreement, including access, permissions, and overflight to sovereign territory, airspace, territorial waters, bases, and facilities (e.g., a secure port or airfield) to include enabling host nation (HN) reception and onward movement distribution processes.

(b) Shares information on internal security challenges.

(c) Provides permission for entry of US forces through a defense cooperation agreement, diplomatic note, or status of forces agreement with USG.

(d) Shares resources and technology via DOD international armaments cooperation programs.

(e) Supplies intelligence in support of US intelligence requirements.

(f) Provides access to a training facility for US military forces.

(g) Coordinates the use of HN electrical power, fuels, and other sources of energy in support of US SC activities and joint operations.
(h) Signs an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) to enable logistics process integration and interoperability.

3. **PN Support of US Interests.** The US requires a wide range of security relationships with PNs and allies across the globe to shape the security environment and protect US interests. SC activities should encourage and enable certain PNs to provide tangible diplomatic-related activities in support of US objectives. Because building PN support for US interests is primarily a diplomatic mission, the application of SC activities for such purposes should be rare, but there are circumstances when SC activities may help a PN support specific DOD interests, or at the direction of DOS, broader USG interests. For example, the PN:

   (a) Supports US in UN and regional forums or bilateral relationships.

   (b) Leadership publicly condemns acts of violent extremism.

   (c) Leadership publicly champions civilian control of the military, human rights, rule of law, and law of war.

   (d) Supports US to reduce conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation.

3. **Security Cooperation and the Instruments of National Power**

   a. SC represents an application of the military instrument of national power in coordination with the other instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, and economic) through which the USG shapes the theater and global OEs and helps prevent conflicts. SC programs and activities are normally integrated and synchronized with the other instruments of national power depending upon how other interagency partners implement the national strategy (e.g., national security strategy [NSS]) to achieve strategic objectives. DOS leads USG efforts in foreign affairs while DOD shares a primary responsibility for implementing national security policy and strategy. At the PN level, the COM, who is the senior US diplomat and represents the President of the United States, coordinates all USG activities (including SC activities) in that country, supported by the country team, which includes the senior defense official/defense attaché (SDO/DATT) who represents DOD.

   b. SC by itself generally cannot prevent conflict, but it provides a security aspect that complements the reduction of other drivers of conflict (e.g., social, informational, economic, and political factors). TMM threats require adaptive planning to integrate allies and partners as an element of national strategy. SC strengthens the US network of allies and partners that can improve the overall warfighting effectiveness of the Joint Force and enable more effective coalition operations. This may necessitate key leader engagement with foreign dignitaries; application of effective information-related capabilities (IRCs) as part of commander’s communication synchronization; encouragement to leverage capital and economic investment for growth or utilization of sanctions; and, when necessary, application of military force, including SC activities with a PN. Therefore, it is important
to understand the strategic direction and guidance (and statutory authorities) applicable to SC, which will be discussed in later paragraphs.

c. Often, prerequisite improvements in a nation’s security sector, which comprises those military and civilian partners and institutions responsible for safety and security of the state and its population at home or abroad, enable the effective use of US instruments of national power to advance the stability of the PN through foreign assistance. Security sector reform (SSR) and defense institution building (DIB), discussed later in Chapter II, “Security Cooperation Relationships,” may involve restructuring these institutions or require only building capacity within the security sector. Requirements for collaboratively planned, budgeted, and coordinated whole-of-government efforts to improve the security sectors of PNs led to the establishment of Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-23, Security Sector Assistance, which will be discussed in paragraph 5, “Security Sector Assistance and United States Foreign and Defense Policies.”

For additional details regarding the application of the instruments of national power, see Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

4. Strategic Direction and Guidance

a. The GEF issues Presidential and SecDef politico-military guidance that serves as the basis for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (CJCS’s) JSCP. The GEF and JSCP provide principle source guidance to planning efforts by all DOD components. The GEF translates strategic priorities into policy guidance and strategic objectives essential to the planning of CCMDs’ campaign and contingency plans, as well as theater distribution plans (TDPs). Contingency plans tasked by the President in the Contingency Planning Guidance are considered branches to the JSCP-guided campaign plans that integrate CCMD activities, which include ongoing operations, SC, and other shaping or preventive activities. CCMD campaign plans should include all activities and requirements to achieve US objectives, as well as those associated with shaping for contingency plans for which the CCMD is responsible. GCCs develop TCPs to satisfy those requirements, and Service component commands develop their campaign support plans (CSPs) for the GCCs.

b. CCDRs may participate in strategy discussions with the President and SecDef, as well as the CJCS, and may engage with PNs through coordination with the COMs. A CCDR’s guidance relates to both the US national strategy and operational-level activities within a theater. Based on theater and functional objectives and anticipated resources, CCDRs provide SC requirements to USD(P) through the CJCS. DOS joint regional strategies and ICSs inform, and are informed by, the various CCDRs’ theater strategies, TCPs, and CSCSS/country plans, thus influencing planned SC activities.

c. DOS produces two key documents, derived from national-level guidance (e.g., NSS and PPDs), that indirectly influence CCDRs’ planning and SC activities. The Strategic Plan, developed jointly by DOS and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), contains the strategic-level framework that guides all planning and budgeting throughout both organizations, and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review defines the strategic and institutional priorities, provides a
framework for allocating DOS resources, and directs improvements to interagency collaboration among other things.

d. Through the above interactions and influences, campaign plans operationalize CCDR strategies (i.e., strategic direction and guidance).

5. Security Sector Assistance and United States Foreign and Defense Policies

a. DOD and DOS share primary responsibility for several of the goals outlined in the NSS, including security and international order. On behalf of the President, DOS conducts and coordinates foreign affairs, which refers to actions the USG takes abroad on behalf of its national interests to ensure the security and well-being of Americans and the strength and competitiveness of the US economy. In accordance with foreign policy direction established by DOS, DOD leads on defense policy issues that involve national security interests with military or defense equities. PPD-23, *Security Sector Assistance*, details the USG effort to implement security sector assistance (SSA) more efficiently, including the strategy to build security relationships, partner capacity, and capabilities to achieve national security objectives. As defined in PPD-23, SSA should not be confused with SSR, which is the assisted operational application of programs and activities to improve the way an HN provides safety, security, and justice from ministerial level down to tactical units. Per PPD-23, SSA refers to the strategic policies, programs, and activities the USG uses to:

1. Engage with foreign partners and help shape their policies and actions in the security sector;

2. Help foreign partners build and sustain the capacity and effectiveness of legitimate institutions to provide security, safety, and justice for their people; and

3. Enable foreign partners to contribute to efforts that address common security challenges.

b. Security sector actors include nation-state governmental agencies and social institutions, as well as international organizations that may be tasked to provide justice and security in a failing/recovering nation-state. PPD-23, *Security Sector Assistance*, requires a collaborative approach aimed at strengthening the ability of the US to help PNs build their security capacity. Unity across the USG is essential and requires multiyear investments and a targeted approach to the PN to ensure assistance is in line with USG broader foreign policy and national security objectives.

c. DOS is the lead agency responsible for the policy, supervision, and management of USG SSA, as well as the congressional appropriations that fund programs used for SA, with the exception of those appropriations that fund DOD programs used for SA. PPD-23, *Security Sector Assistance*, provides an approach to align strategic goals and guidelines with comprehensive strategic planning and budgeting across the USG, primarily enabled through the collaborative efforts of DOS and DOD with the other interagency partners.
d. DOD ensures defense strategies and policies are synchronized with US foreign policy and overall SSA efforts and may provide assistance in coordination with the DOS. DOD assumes the lead SSA integrator role in specific cases that are appropriate and consistent with authority granted by Congress, particularly when related to strategic planning, assessment, program design, and implementation of SSA programs.

e. SSA provides the process for the USG to strengthen its own capacity with an effective and deliberate whole-of-government approach to planning and budgeting for activities, develop resources, and help to achieve national security objectives. According to PPD-23, Security Sector Assistance, with DOS as the lead federal agency, DOD and the Department of the Treasury, Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and USAID will participate in interagency coordination at the department level to approve SSA strategic objectives and to ensure collaborative planning, assessment, program design, and implementation processes. DOS convenes the Interagency SSA Oversight Board, co-chaired with DOD, on a biannual basis to review the USG SSA processes, coordination, authorities, resourcing, and reporting, as well as to ensure SSA is executed in a timely and effective manner. See Figure I-1 to understand the level of interagency coordination required in the whole-of-government approach to SSA and developing ICSs.

For additional details regarding SSA, see PPD-23, Security Sector Assistance.

f. ICSs. PPD-23, Security Sector Assistance, establishes ICS as the core-organizing document for USG foreign assistance activities supporting a particular PN. The ICS promotes unity of effort and a more proactive and efficient strategic approach to meeting USG objectives. At DOS, the multi-year ICS, the joint regional strategy, and the functional bureau strategy collectively frame and inform the two components of the DOS and USAID annual budget request: the mission resource request and the bureau resource request, which focus on resources required to implement the priorities outlined in these strategies. The ICS also provides the foundation for US mission-level performance management and informs each individual agency’s SSA planning to orchestrate the overall USG SSA effort in countries with significant SSA programming. The SSA portions of ICSs follow a common framework and include, at minimum: overall SSA goals and subordinate objectives; assumptions; potential programs, activities, and action plans; key partners and opportunities for collaboration with other stakeholders; and measures of success. ICSs link goals for the PN to US national security priorities, SSA objectives, and if appropriate, to regional security objectives. The ICS articulates priorities for a given country such as SA as part of a foreign assistance program. The primary audiences for each ICS are the country team, DOS bureaus, DOS resource and policy analysts, and senior leaders in the USG. However, SSA engenders strategic-level collaboration between DOS and DOD that drives integration of DOS planning (ICSSs) with DOD planning (CSCSs/country plans) for activities and resources at the country level. This interagency coordination enables identification of specific PNs for which to develop an ICS. Tailored interagency country assessments for each PN precede planning or implementation of programs through SSA and may enable a PN to better understand its own capacity shortfalls and capability gaps. Ultimately, the country team, with participation from relevant agencies and both CCMD and Service component subject matter experts (SMEs), conducts SSA planning at the
country level; the DOS’s ICS support team facilitates the ICS planning process; and, following a formal Washington review that specifically includes DOD, the COM approves an ICS. Based on the ICS and coordination with the PN, SCOs and Service component SC planners support development of the CCODR’s country plan for each PN.
6. Theater Strategy and Estimate

Theater strategy bridges national strategic guidance and joint planning. It outlines a GCC’s vision for integrating resources and synchronizing military activities and operations in conjunction with the application of other instruments of national power to achieve theater objectives and GEF-directed strategic objectives. The GCC’s analysis of changing events in the OE influences theater strategy. Theater strategy must be adaptable and flexible to react to the changing environment; prepare for, prevent, or mitigate contingencies; seize opportunities; and mitigate risk. GCCs’ theater strategies, as reflected in their TCPs, typically emphasize military engagement, SC, and deterrence through routine shaping activities. SC activities are specifically suited for building partnerships and partner capacity in coordination with DOS and other interagency partners through COMs and country teams. See Chapter III, “Security Cooperation Planning,” for additional information about the effects of theater strategy on SC planning and activities.

a. The Policy-Strategy Dynamic. Strategy is shaped by and subordinate to policy, and SC is not a strategy. There is a three-way functional relationship with policy, strategy, and SC. To accomplish the mission, the US military inherently relies on the commander’s guidance and intent, based on a dynamic between policy aims and a strategy that provides a clear, attainable, and flexible military objective that can be modified with changes in policy. US policy may change in reaction to unanticipated opportunities or challenges. The policy may evolve as the strategy is implemented and may be influenced by effects created by SC activities and programs. The functionality of SC is that it can provide both ways and means in accordance with policy to reach strategic objectives and end states that are based on strategy and policy. For example: USG strategy is to build partnerships and build partner capacity using SC, complemented by stability activities, with a strategic objective of stability in the region, while avoiding any violent conflicts.

b. Coordination and Collaboration. In addition to DOD coordination and approval processes for campaign plans, CCDRs coordinate their strategies and synchronize implementation activities with those of other stakeholders, to include other interagency partners, multinational partners, international organizations, and select nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). DOS provides guidance and resources (e.g., SA) to implement and support GCCs’ theater strategies and the SC activities with PNs. DOS also coordinates, supports, and maintains situational awareness of similar activities between US allies and their foreign partners. With PPD-23, Security Sector Assistance, emphasis on the whole-of-government approach to collaborative processes for planning, budgeting, and programming for SSA, CCDRs coordinate with COMs, their country teams, and other appropriate stakeholders during the DOS development of ICSs and DOD development of CSCS/country plans to ensure compatibility of objectives between DOS and DOD for PNs. Similarly, other agencies, such as USAID, routinely conduct developmental activities worldwide, sometimes in conjunction with SC activities so CCDRs have to maintain situational awareness of those activities affecting their areas of responsibility (AORs) or functional responsibilities. SC activities that include SA authorized by DOS and administered by DOD normally require coordination through DSCA as a primary manager within the SCO, which is discussed in Chapter II, “Security Cooperation Relationships.”
c. **Elements of a Theater Strategy.** A theater strategy is a broad statement of the GCC’s vision for the AOR that aligns and focuses efforts and resources to mitigate and prepare for conflict and contingencies, advance US interests, and support achievement of national strategic and theater objectives. A theater strategy consists of a description of key factors of the OE that provide context for the strategy and could affect the attainment of the desired objectives. It includes a description of the desired objectives and strategic end state (ends), a strategic approach that may include some sequence of activities and lines of effort (LOEs) to apply military power in concert with the other instruments of national power to attain the desired ends (ways), a description of the resources needed to accomplish the strategic approach (means), and a description of the risks in implementing the chosen strategic approach.


d. **Strategic Estimate.** The CCDR and staff (with input from subordinate commands and supporting commands and agencies) prepare a strategic estimate by assessing and describing the broad political, military, economic, and social factors, as well as threats and opportunities, that determine strategic objectives and, ultimately, facilitate or hinder attainment of the strategic end state. This estimate, which is continually updated, helps to determine the missions, objectives, and potential activities required in the campaign plan.

*For additional information on the strategic estimate, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.01, Campaign Planning Procedures and Responsibilities.*

7. **Internal Defense and Development**

Internal defense and development (IDAD) is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. It focuses on both security and building viable civic, social, and economic institutions that respond to the needs of that nation’s population. Ideally, IDAD represents a preemptive strategy. A foreign nation establishes an IDAD strategy in collaboration with the USG to combine internal defense with other needed developmental efforts and then implements that strategy through an IDAD program. US involvement may vary from simple military engagement and routine SC activities up to a complex foreign internal defense (FID) program. For example, SC activities for security force assistance (SFA) to build a PN’s capacity for CT support the US global campaign against transnational terrorists or SC activities for SSA to build capacity for counterinsurgency (COIN) developing a PN’s executive, generating, and operating functions in anticipation of an identified insurgency. If SC activities are not enough and the threat to a PN becomes overwhelming, then a USG FID operation may be required. In any case, execution of an IDAD program requires a collaborative effort by the US and PN governments. Likewise, foreign assistance can support routine SC activities or a FID program for HN IDAD.

*For more information regarding an IDAD and FID, see JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.*
8. Information Sharing and Foreign Disclosure

SC programs and activities may require the release of controlled unclassified or classified information to PNs.

a. The release of classified information to multinational partners is governed by the national disclosure policy (NDP). Detailed guidance must be provided to the senior US commander by the chain of command in accordance with National Security Decision Memorandum 119, Disclosure of Classified United States Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations, and NDP-1, National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations. Detailed written guidance may be supplemented with limited delegation of disclosure authority where appropriate (e.g., combined force protection purposes). Early in the SC planning process, SC planners must ensure there is a common understanding with the SDO/DATT, Service components, and CCMD foreign disclosure officers of all anticipated information sharing and intelligence disclosure requirements for their SC programs and activities.

b. The NDP is implemented within DOD by DODD 5230.11, Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5221.01, Delegation of Authority to Commanders of Combatant Commands to Disclose Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations. Other participating interagency partners may implement disclosure policies that are similar, but different, so each partner should follow their principal disclosure authorities.

*JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, contains a detailed discussion of sanitization and foreign disclosure procedures.*
1. Introduction

a. SC supports the implementation of national and theater strategies and is a key element of global and theater shaping activities that support stabilization, as well as building security relationships, building partner capacity, and providing access. SC activities typically include DOS-funded and authorized SA programs administered by DOD, SFA activities, joint combined exercises for training, and other Service training opportunities with PNs and other friendly FSF. SC is a primary tool for shaping activities for all GCCs’ TCPs.

b. Services have Title 10, United States Code (USC), responsibilities to organize, train, and equip US forces to maintain readiness and support GCC theater objectives, which include funds for SC activities by the Services. Service components posture forces to conduct SC activities and to execute theater campaigns and operations, as directed. These activities help shape the OE and produce the conditions necessary for a joint force commander (JFC), when directed, to seize the initiative, dominate, and establish stability within the operational area during a joint operation/campaign. Conducting sustained SC activities in an AOR typically requires a combination of assigned and attached forces, composed of conventional forces (CF) and SOF. Those forces may include DOD civilian personnel and contractors. A number of permanent and temporary funding authorities are used for SC and are briefly discussed in paragraph 4, “Security Cooperation Authorities and Programs.” Provisions of Title 10, USC, are permanent authorities, while annual authorities (e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015) are often used for temporary authorities and funding. The two can be used to authorize certain military engagements, multinational exercises, military-to-military exchanges, advising defense institutions, and similar SC activities.

2. Security Cooperation Related Activities and Operations

SC uses a combination of programs and activities by which DOD, in coordination with DOS, encourages and enables countries and organizations to partner with the US to achieve strategic objectives. SC involves an overarching functional relationship rather than a hierarchical relationship with its associated activities/programs. The definition of SC deliberately encompasses a multitude of actions, programs, and missions. Many SC activities are functionally related and dependent upon DOD-administered and DOS-funded SA as part of DOS foreign assistance, in addition to Service funds.

a. SC can be conducted across the range of military operations and during all phases of an operation or campaign. DOD policy supports SC activities that enable building security relationships, building partner capacity, and gaining/maintaining access.
(1) **Building Security Relationships.** An initial step in building a security relationship includes some form of partnership. Also characterized as building partnerships, it involves developing long-term security and defense relationships with selected countries, designated as PNs, around the globe. With rare exception, building a security relationship should be considered a way to achieve other objectives, rather than an objective unto itself. The implementation of SSA refines the USG processes and programs for building security relationships with PNs. Essential to international armaments cooperation activities and SC activities (especially SA programs), security relationships help CCDRs support shaping of the strategic security environment by:

(a) Strengthening USG global network of partner relationships.

(b) Promoting PN stability, and in turn, theater and global stability.

(c) Demonstrating USG support for PN sovereignty.

(d) Providing compelling messages for stabilization and deterrence.

(e) Influencing partners to support US foreign policy objectives and, when appropriate, military operations/campaigns. For example, the PN:

1. Supports US interaction to affect national perceptions; behavior; and will to build effective, legitimate, interoperable, and self-sustaining partner.

2. Leadership publicly condemns violent extremist organizations.

3. Refrains from committing human rights violations, especially during military operations.

4. Likely supports US positions in UN and regional forums such as reducing arms proliferation, CWMD, and supporting US-sponsored multinational force.

(2) **Building Partner Capacity.** Developing specific PN capabilities and capacity for security and defense addresses their internal security and their participation or coordination in operations with US forces or multinational operations. Building partner capacity in the security sector includes FSF and their supporting institutions. When directed, DOD can also support appropriate PN civilian authorities to strengthen civil-sector capacity at the local and national levels. Building partner capacity can range from individual education and training to ballistic missile defense, dependent upon the USG-PN relationship. Partner capacity can be described as an extant yet limited capability (e.g., forces, skills, or functions) within a PN’s security or civil sector that can be improved and employed on a national level. Building partner capacity requires a long-term, mutual commitment to improve capacity, interoperability, and when necessary, the employment of that PN capacity in support of USG strategic objectives. For example, the PN:

(a) Accepts SA and SFA for some aspect of SSR.
(b) Shares expense with USG for updating PN ballistic missile defense forces.

(c) Provides support to control, defeat, disable, or dispose of WMD in a neighboring country.

(d) Shares resources and technology via DOD international armaments cooperation programs.

(e) Updates and sustains a credible CT force to support USG CT efforts.

(f) Shares information with the US to deny, disrupt, destroy, or defeat finance systems and networks that negatively affect US or PN security interests.

(g) Effectively protects classified and export-controlled information technology.

(3) **Gaining/Maintaining Access.** Access facilitates US defense posture, provides for freedom of movement and supports freedom of action during military operations by enabling US forces to access PN territory, resources, or leadership. It provides USG forces with peacetime and contingency access to permanent or temporary forward staging or basing facilities, airports, or seaports; the ability to obtain overflight rights, passage through territorial waters, shared information, intelligence, or other resources; and opportunities for forward stationing of forces. It also enhances DOD distribution, reception, and retrograde capabilities. For example, the PN:

(a) Provides contingency access to a secure port.

(b) Supplies actionable intelligence in support of US operations.

(c) Provides a site for a forward US military base.

(d) Provides electrical power and other essential fuels and utilities as host-nation support (HNS) of a US contingency operation.

(e) Provides overflight or free passage through territorial waters or exclusive economic zone.

b. SC activities can be executed discretely or overtly by US forces and members of the DOD civilian expeditionary workforce (CEW) or in support of joint operations. The GEF contains DOD guidance for resource prioritization, theater posture planning, and SC activities for specific theaters and regions. The JSCP guides both campaign and contingency planning to integrate SC activities into GCCs’ TCPs with other stabilizing activities. SC activities generally provide the means (resources) and the ways (methods) for routine shaping efforts as part of TCPs, potentially complementing other USG foreign assistance. SC activities can also support joint operations during a limited contingency or crisis response such as specific SA and SFA activities to build partner capacity for operations with joint forces such as FID, CT, COIN, counterdrug (CD), foreign
humanitarian assistance (FHA), PR, and other stability activities. SC also can be used by the USG to help PNs develop or sustain capabilities to operate with the US and other partners in multinational operations (e.g., Operation DESERT STORM). In cases where the SC effort is large-scale and enduring, the GCC may establish an additional subunified command or joint task force in a particular country or region. Examples include Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa and the Combined Joint Task Force One. Other interagency partners normally focus on improving/reforming those PN forces assigned to other ministries (or their equivalents) such as interior, justice, or intelligence services. However, DOD maintains capabilities for these other requirements, in addition to SFA, should the security environment limit participation of other interagency partners.

c. **Foreign Assistance.** Foreign assistance consists of a number of legally authorized programs that can be grouped into the general categories of development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and SA with the strategic purpose of promoting long-term HN and regional stability. DOD supports the DOS lead in stabilization, which includes a whole-of-government approach to minimizing economic and sociopolitical drivers of conflict, establishing sustainable development and growth of responsive civic, social, and economic institutions in selected “priority” PNs around the globe. In general, DOS and USAID manage the programs for development assistance and humanitarian assistance, while DOS manages the SA programs. In many cases, DOD administers SA programs managed by DOS. DOS receives an annual appropriation for foreign assistance (also referred to as foreign aid), and those funds are normally allocated each year by program and by country (e.g., $5.0 million of development assistance funds to Country X). Foreign assistance is normally based on agreements mutually concluded between the USG and the assisted nation. Other countries, including US adversaries, and international organizations such as the UN may also provide forms of assistance to selected recipients. Important for theater and campaign planning, an awareness of these other sources of aid can prevent duplication of efforts, interference, and false claims of credit, which could negatively affect US partnerships. Many SC activities are directly dependent upon SA.

*For data on US foreign assistance and foreign assistance-related programs available to the public, see [www.foreignassistance.gov](http://www.foreignassistance.gov).*

d. **SA.** SA is a group of programs the USG uses to provide defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales to advance national policies and objectives. SA includes programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 (Title 22, USC, Chapter 32), as amended; the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 (Title 22, USC, Chapter 39), as amended; and other related authorities and statutes such as Title 22 (Foreign Relations and Intercourse), USC. SA programs and funding are coordinated by DOS and, as authorized by DOS, some SA programs are administered by DOD. Those SA programs that are administered by DOD or DSCA for DOD are considered part of SC by DOD.

(1) SA includes foreign military sales (FMS), foreign military financing (FMF), international military education and training (IMET), peace operations (PO), and excess defense articles (EDA). DOS also provides financial support to international peacekeeping operations (PKO), a subset of PO, through a PKO fund. The US uses these tools, combined
with the Economic Support Fund and commercial sales licensed under the AECA, to further its national interests. They may also be used to complement, or be complemented by, development assistance. Generally, SA is subject to legal and funding authorities, through which the US provides articles, training, and other defense-related services such as those provided through SFA activities; and in many cases, the funding authority may require a PN to pay for SA, so it is not always an expense to the USG.

(2) Those SA programs named above, that are administered by DOD for implementation through DSCA, are summarized as follows:

(a) FMF is an annual program of congressionally appropriated grants and loans administered by DSCA that enables selected, eligible PNs to purchase US defense articles, services, and training through either FMS or direct commercial sales. FMF may be used in lieu of, or in addition to, other PN funds. FMF is one of the largest USG SA (and foreign assistance) programs.

(b) FMS is the sale of defense articles, military training, and defense-related services to eligible foreign governments and international organizations. The majority of FMS cases are paid with national funds from the PN. The FMS program is measured in billions of dollars of sales annually and is the largest of the SA programs under DOS direction that are administered by DSCA.

(c) IMET provides training to selected foreign military and defense-associated civilian personnel on a grant basis. Training occurs at US military facilities in the US and overseas, as well as through the use of mobile training teams. Contract technicians and contractors may also provide training, including instruction at civilian institutions or via correspondence courses. The IMET Program is authorized by the FAA.

(d) Defense articles can also be leased to friendly governments and international organizations for up to five years (renewable). Leased articles must not be needed for US public use during the lease period, and the US retains the right to terminate the lease at any time.

(e) EDA involves the transfer, either on a grant basis or by FMS, of defense articles no longer needed by the USG. EDA may allow for the transfer of USG articles to countries at no cost. Transfer of EDA occurs on an “as is, where is” basis and the recipient nation typically pays for any associated costs, including transportation, repair, refurbishment, spares, and training, through an FMS case.

e. SSR. SSR is a comprehensive set of programs and activities that an HN government undertakes with USG assistance to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. The objective is to promote an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public. SSR improves or develops institutions, processes, and forces to provide security under the rule of law. This includes the military, police, intelligence services, border guards, and services responsible for the security of ports of entry. SSR assists an HN government in appropriately responding to threats within and from outside its borders.
Unless directed otherwise, DOD’s primary role in SSR is supporting the reform, restructuring, or re-establishment of the armed forces and defense and security institutions within the security sector, from the highest ministerial/department level, down to the tactical unit level. Other interagency partners assist in the reform of institutions of justice and safety. DOD can support SSR using SFA activities and SA as part of routine SC for shaping as part of a TCP or, for example, through FID as a contingency operation supporting an HN IDAD program. Normally, SFA activities and SA are used in any unified action for SSR. SFA activities can support an SSR program by creating effects for a PN to achieve transformational objectives and sustain them. As noted in Chapter I, “Security Cooperation in Strategic Context,” SSR should not be confused with the term SSA. SSA refers to the overarching USG policy, processes, programs, and activities that integrate and synchronize DOS and DOD strategies, planning, programming, and budgeting for foreign assistance involving the security sectors of PNs. The development, restructuring, or reform of a PN’s defense institutions at the ministry/department or joint/Service military headquarters level is more specifically characterized as DIB, whether conducted as part of a larger SSR effort, or not.

For additional information regarding SSR, see JP 3-07, Stability.

f. DIB. DOD policy states that defense institutions include the people, organizations, policies, rules, regulations, values, and behaviors that enable oversight, governance, management, and the functioning of the defense establishment within a nation-state’s security sector. DIB comprises SC typically conducted in the form of SFA activities focused on building capacity at the ministerial/department, military staff/service headquarters, and related agency/supporting entity level to develop the strategic and operational aspects of a PN’s defense institutions. DIB may be conducted through routine SC activities or as part of a more comprehensive program for SSR. DIB may complement building partner capacity and capability at tactical and operational levels as delivered through SFA and SA-supported SC programs including train-and-equip and military-to-military exchanges performed by CCMDs, Services, and their component organizations/headquarters.

**DEFENSE INSTITUTION BUILDING**

Department of Defense (DOD) policy defines defense institution building (DIB) as security cooperation activities that empower partner nation defense institutions to establish or re-orient their policies and structures to make their defense sector more transparent, accountable, effective, affordable, and responsible to civilian control. DIB improves defense governance, increases the sustainability of other DOD security cooperation programs, and is carried out in cooperation with partner nations pursuant to appropriate and available legal authority. It is typically conducted at the ministerial, general, joint staff, military service headquarters, and related defense agency level, and when appropriate, with other supporting defense entities.

Department of Defense Directive 5205.82, Defense Institution Building (DIB)
(1) DIB empowers PN defense institutions to establish or reorient policies and structures to be more transparent, accountable, effective, affordable, and responsive to civilian control. The result improves defense governance and increases the sustainability of other DOD SC programs in full coordination with interagency partners, and when applicable, multinational partners. DIB may include developing or increasing a PN’s military capacity to support and work in coordination with civilian agencies responsible for disaster management and response.

(2) DIB is conducted pursuant to appropriate legal authority. GCCs are required to annually prioritize DIB requirements to the USD(P) through the Joint Staff (JS) to ensure DIB efforts align with current defense and foreign policy strategies for efficient and effective use of relevant DIB resources. DIB mentors, trainers, and advisors should be of sufficient rank, position, and experience to be a credible and positive influence on the PN’s defense institutions. GCCs are responsible for recording all DIB activities in the Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (G-TSCMIS).

For additional information on DIB, see DODD 5205.82, Defense Institution Building (DIB).

g. SFA. SFA is the set of DOD activities that contribute to unified action by the USG to support the development of the capacity and capabilities of FSF and their supporting institutions, (i.e., building partner capacity and capabilities), whether of a PN or an international organization (i.e., regional security organization). SFA offers a means by which SC activities support shaping as part of a GCC’s TCP or a means of building capability and capacity of FSF while conducting crisis response or a contingency operation in support of a PN. DOD policy describes SFA as a subset of SC initiatives designed to build capacity and capability; SC activities that only serve to gain access, or influence other actions that do not enhance the FSF capacity or capabilities, or that are outside the security sector fall outside the scope of SFA. Other interagency partners focus on improving/reforming PN forces assigned to non-defense ministries (or their equivalents) such as interior, justice, or intelligence services. If the OE limits participation of other interagency partners, DOD may be required to develop capabilities of non-defense PN forces as part of SFA. For example, a FID operation includes the FSF and other HN government and civilian institutions; the focus of SFA activities is just with the FSF, and the other interagency activities support specific FID objectives shared by the HN and the USG. See Figure II-1 for the role of SC activities, which include SFA, among notional operations across the conflict continuum. SFA can be used during all military operations and during all phases of an operation/campaign. Normally, SFA activities are part of any unified action by the USG to include multinational or international organization forces conducting SFA-equivalent activities.

(1) FSF are all organizations and personnel under PN control with the mission of securing the PN’s population and protecting its sovereignty from internal and external threats. FSF generally include military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces such as border police, coast guard, and customs organizations, as well as prison guards and correctional personnel and their supporting institutions. SFA activities may occur in situations not immediately recognizable as SC, such as ad hoc arrangements made by local
US military commanders with nearby PN forces. Institutions that support FSF include government ministries or departments, academies, training centers, logistics centers, and similar local through national-level activities. These institutions provide the supporting doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) for the FSF.

(2) SFA activities are conducted to organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise (OTERA) FSF from the ministerial/department level down to the tactical unit level. DOD maintains capabilities for SFA in SOF, CF, the DOD CEW and, when necessary, contractor personnel. SFA activities are most effective when conducted by carefully selected, properly trained, and well experienced personnel (as trainers or advisors). In addition to being SMEs, they should also have the sociocultural understanding, language skills, and seasoned maturity to relate more effectively with and train FSF. Ideally, SFA activities help build the FSF’s capacity to manage and maintain their own forces independent of sustained USG efforts.

With, through, and by. Describes the process of interaction with foreign security forces (FSF) that initially involves training and assisting (interacting “with” the forces). The next step in the process is advising, which may include advising in combat situations (acting “through” the forces). The final phase is achieved when FSF operate independently (act “by” themselves).

Department of Defense Instruction 5000.68, Security Force Assistance (SFA)

(3) GCCs incorporate SFA requirements into plans and must maintain a record in the G-TSCMIS of all subordinate commands and DOD entities conducting SC activities in their respective AORs. GCCs forecast their annual SFA requirements based on collaborative assessments of the needs of FSF and in coordination with the JS.
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) considers these requirements to prioritize, coordinate for funding as applicable, and meet priority global requirements.

*For additional information on SFA, see Appendix B, “Security Force Assistance.”*

3. Security Cooperation and Joint Operations

A significant number of SC activities are conducted as a part of the GCCs’ TCPs, but limited contingencies, crises responses, or major operations can also involve some form of SC. For example, an HN reforming or upgrading its security and defense institutions with SC activities supporting SSR could discover a significant and emerging internal threat, which could lead the USG to determine that a contingency FID operation is warranted. In situations that have deteriorated to the point of potentially overwhelming the HN, US forces committed in the third category of FID (US combat operations) for a US COIN operation could continue training and equipping (indirect support) the HN security forces until they are fully capable of taking over all combat operations. The following represent the most likely US joint operations in an affected HN that could also require concurrent and related SC support.

a. **FID.** FID is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government, or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security. USG conducts FID through a whole-of-government approach to enhance an HN’s IDAD strategy and program by focusing specifically on an anticipated or existing internal threat. There are three categories of FID: indirect support, direct support (does not include combat), and US combat operations with or in place of HN forces. The COM in the HN typically leads the FID effort on behalf of DOS and in coordination with the designated JFC. Depending on the severity of the threat(s), the JFC may have to lead the unified action for the FID effort until the COM is able to assume the USG lead within the HN. The HN, in coordination with the US country team and the JFC, will determine if multinational partners can participate. Of those multinational force partners that do participate, not all will make a military contribution; some may be more inclined to support development of sociopolitical or economic institutions.

(1) While FID is a legislatively mandated core activity of special operations, CF should be capable of conducting SFA to support a FID operation. SFA support to FID focuses on training and advisory assistance to HN security forces including collaborative planning with interagency and multinational partners, as well as HN authorities. Also, if an HN has an SSR requirement as part of its IDAD program, SFA activities can support SSR as part of FID or routine SC. FID requires a whole-of-government approach which involves interagency partners providing various forms of security and developmental assistance; SFA provides many, but not necessarily all, of the activities through which FID can be accomplished.

(2) Other SC initiatives dedicated to the security sector that may support FID, such as bilateral meetings or civil affairs activities, fall outside the scope of SFA.
b. **COIN Operations.** COIN is the comprehensive civilian and military effort designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. COIN is primarily a political struggle and incorporates a wide range of activities by the HN government of which security is only one, albeit an important one. Unified action is required to successfully conduct COIN operations and should include all HN, US, and multinational partners. The HN government, in coordination with the COM and the designated JFC, should lead the COIN efforts. When the OE is not conducive to a civilian agency lead for the COIN effort within a specific area, the JFC must be cognizant of and able to lead the unified action required for effective COIN. Also, in addition to local anarchists, terrorists, and violent criminal enterprises, certain insurgents will solicit, or be offered, external support from state or non-state actors, which can include transnational terrorists and criminal organizations. A major COIN operation may require SC activities to enable or enhance the HN’s COIN capabilities and to enable the transition and transfer of all internal security responsibilities from the JFC and COM to the HN government and to a new routine SC relationship with the affected HN. During US COIN operations in support of an HN, the efforts to build HN security forces occur through FID using SFA activities.

For additional information regarding COIN operations, see JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

c. **CT.** CT are those activities and operations conducted to neutralize terrorists and their organizations and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals. If necessary for national defense, the President or SecDef may approve a unilateral CT operation by US forces against transnational violent extremist organizations and their associated terrorist organizations in other countries. Improving a PN’s CT capacity and capabilities will enable a PN to ultimately defeat terrorism within its borders with minimal, if any, US assistance. Ultimately, the goal is to make countries more self-sufficient and reduce the need for US intervention in support of US interests.

For additional information regarding CT, see JP 3-26, Counterterrorism.

d. **CWMD Operations.** CWMD, across the three LOEs (prevent acquisition, contain and reduce threats, and respond to crises), includes activities conducted across the USG to counter efforts to coerce or attack the US, its Armed Forces, allies, partners, and interests with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. This includes efforts against WMD actors of concern to curtail the conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of WMD, as well as related expertise, materials, technology, and means of delivery. SC activities to build a PN’s CWMD capacity enhance collective regional and national capabilities to receive timely warnings, track materiel of concern, secure illicit WMD materials and stockpiles, respond to and defeat WMD threats and, when necessary, respond to effects of an attack using WMD. CWMD SC-related activities, programs, and training promote common threat awareness; develop CWMD self-sufficiency, military interoperability, military and civilian preparedness; mitigate WMD risk; and assist PN forces to conduct CWMD operations, alone or with the assistance of...
US forces. Examples include training PN forces to use CBRN detection equipment at ports of entry (e.g., airfields, border crossings, seaports); participating in maritime, land, and air interdiction exercises; and CBRN response tabletop exercises.

*For additional information regarding CWMD, see JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.*

e. **CD Operations.** CD operations are those civil or military actions taken to reduce or eliminate illicit drug trafficking. In addition to routine support for federal, state, and local (including territorial and tribal) law enforcement agencies in their efforts to disrupt the transport and transfer of illegal drugs into the US, DOD, as part of a whole-of-government effort, continuously assists our PNs in their CD efforts. Close financial, political, and operational linkages connect illicit drug trafficking with smuggling, and the regional and global movement of violent extremists. Although DOD manages only a small portion of the overall federal CD effort, DOD’s responsibilities encompass a broad and vital array of support activities, many of which are conducted as SC activities under DOS foreign assistance or DOD funding. This includes training and equipping PN security forces to counter illicit trafficking. Illicit drug traffickers and terrorists often use the same methods to smuggle money, people, information, weapons, and substances, and in many cases, illicit drug traffickers and terrorists are one and the same. Looking beyond terrorism, the illegal drug industry fuels violence and corruption to levels which are overwhelming governments, threatening the stability of countries, or creating ungoverned spaces.

*For additional information regarding CD operations, see JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations.*

f. **Stability Activities.** Stability activities include military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the US in coordination with or in support of other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Stability activities typically occur during all phases of an operation/campaign in balance with offensive and defensive operations. Normally, civil-military operations (CMO) and civil affairs operations are essential to stabilization efforts, especially for larger and more complex operations.

(1) Led by DOS, and normally coordinated within each HN through the COM and country team, the USG conducts stabilization efforts worldwide. Military support of routine USG stabilization efforts is normally part of the shaping activities of a CCDR’s campaign plan for security sector issues to prevent conflict and may occur as SC activities or joint combined exercises for training conducted by Service/SOF component units.

(2) Leading up to and during transitions from a US lead to an HN lead through the stabilize and enable civil authorities phases of a joint operation, SC activities may become more prominent to facilitate the seamless transfer of responsibilities and authorities from the military to DOS and the HN. For example, SC, as part of SSR, may provide equipment and training to FSF as well as the supporting ministerial-level institution, which would enable the HN to accept security responsibilities.
(3) Post-conflict, after the required transfers of authorities and responsibilities to the HN, stability activities also facilitate the transition back to a new SC relationship between the HN and the USG.

_For additional information regarding stabilization and stability activities, see JP 3-07, Stability._

g. **FHA.** FHA consists of DOD activities conducted outside the US and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Various statutes and policies govern these activities, which range from routine military engagements to limited contingency operations. US forces normally conduct FHA operations in support of another USG department or agency, including FDR operations and international CBRN response. US forces also conduct FHA activities as part of a GCC SC program and/or to achieve specific TCP objectives. SC activities can be used to support USG efforts to build partner capacity of FSF to conduct or support humanitarian assistance activities, with a focus on civilian institutions.

_For additional information regarding FHA, see JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance._

h. **PO.** PO are crisis response and limited contingency operations that can involve all instruments of national power. PO normally include international efforts and military missions to contain conflict, reestablish the peace, shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding between two or more factions within the indigenous population, and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. The UN or another international organization typically sponsors PO, but a coalition or unilateral US mission may also conduct PO. Examples of SC activities in PO include establishment of an indigenous security force to help enforce peacekeeping and other PO, or development of a third-party nation’s military capacity and capabilities to participate in a multinational PO force. Upon completion of the PO mission, and with reasonable certainty of stabilization, the USG may choose to enter a new routine SC relationship with the established HN government as part of the TCP.

_For additional information regarding PO, see JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations._

i. **CMO.** CMO are the activities of a commander performed by designated civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions by directly supporting efforts for stability within an HN or a region. CMO not only enables and enhances the integration of US, HN, multinational, or international organization capabilities and forces, but also the interaction of the military forces with NGOs, civilian authorities, the private sector, and the indigenous population in general. CMO are key to joint force engagement in all forms of irregular warfare and the conduct of stability activities in all joint operations. Whether conducted in a joint operation or in support of SC activities under foreign assistance, CMO, with integrated civil affairs operations, include a wide range of activities such as civil administration support, populace and resources control, civil information management, and FHA. SC may also be used for civil affairs to train PN forces to conduct CMO.
For additional information regarding CMO, see JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

j. **Military Information Support Operations (MISO).** MISO are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and, ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives. MISO can be used to amplify or publicize the effects of the application of diplomatic, military, economic, and other informational instruments of national power. MISO apply to a wide range of military operations such as stability activities, PR, maritime interdiction, FHA, CD, force protection, counter-trafficking, counter-propaganda, FID, COIN, and CT operations. MISO may support the COM and country team by facilitating the conduct of US embassy programs when properly requested. Service members who specialize in MISO can advise and assist HN personnel with civil programs (e.g., health and sanitation awareness, ethnic tolerance, and reconciliation), that align with USG objectives or build partner capacity in the effective conduct of MISO when specifically authorized. Disciplined employment of other IRCs can complement the effectiveness of MISO. Whether conducted in a joint operation or in conjunction with another activity, MISO can significantly impact the achievement of the objectives of SC activities by shaping the information environment in all phases.

For additional information regarding MISO, see JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.

k. **Countering Threat Networks (CTN).** CTN is the aggregation of activities across the USG that identify, analyze, neutralize, disrupt, or destroy threat networks. These activities may occur continuously and simultaneously at multiple levels (tactical, operational, and strategic) and may employ capabilities in a direct or indirect manner. Threat networks are those human networks that present a threat to stability in the operational area or the theater approaches. The underlying informational, financial, logistical, and political sub-networks enable these networks to function. These networks are a primary adversary target against which commanders can use SC activities to support CTN. Based on coordination with appropriate interagency partners, CCMD planners should incorporate SC program considerations within their campaign plan for CTN capabilities. Within their planning process, SC planners should conduct rigorous assessments of partner capacity and trustworthiness to inform SC programs that support CTN. Also, adequate security and vetting must be conducted to ensure transferred knowledge and capabilities do not weaken DOD operational advantages in current and future operations. Throughout the development of SC programs that support CTN, SC planners should conduct continuous, active, and robust coordination with interagency partners (e.g., DOS, Department of the Treasury, and DOJ). They also should consider US- and HN-applicable laws that affect collection, data retention, and access, as well as network disruption (e.g., prosecution) early in the planning process.

For more information on CTN, see JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks.

l. **Counter Threat Finance (CTF).** CTF activities and capabilities are employed to deny, disrupt, destroy, or defeat finance systems and networks that negatively affect US
interests in compliance with all existing authorities and procedures. It includes those activities and capabilities undertaken with other USG departments and agencies or PNs. DOD CTF counters financing used to enable terrorist activities and illicit networks that traffic narcotics; WMD; improvised explosive devices; other weapons, persons, precursor chemicals; and related activities that support an adversary’s ability to negatively affect US interests.

m. PR. PR is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to affect the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. Commands conducting SC activities within a PN should ensure appropriate coordination with the supported CCMD, their Service component command, and the SCO within the HN to facilitate PR of deployed individuals. SC activities also present opportunities to establish relationships with HN forces that could facilitate PR mechanisms for future situations.

For additional information regarding PR, see JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

4. Security Cooperation Authorities and Programs

Legal authority to propose certain SC activities/programs is not necessarily the funding authority required to actually conduct those activities/programs.

a. SC activities are conducted with DOD funds, forces, and authorities, and with DOS SA funds and authorities, administered by DOD. In many cases, SC activities complement foreign assistance of other USG departments and agencies and those efforts of multinational partners in support of a friendly nation. Thus, multiple sources may support the planning, coordination, funding and other authorities that link USG strategy to SC activities. Examples include:

(1) Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET). The primary purpose of the JCET authority (Title 10, USC, Section 2011) is to foster the training of US SOF in essential skill sets by training with FSF in their indigenous environments. JCET uses SOF Major Force Program 11 funds to build the capability of US SOF by conducting combined operations in unfamiliar environments in order to develop language, instructional, and advisory skills, as well as familiarity with PN geography and sociocultural factors. JCET must clearly link the training provided to the PN with the SOF unit’s mission-essential task list. Although JCET usually provides some benefits to PN forces, it does not fall within the scope of SFA because the intent is not to develop an enduring FSF capacity or capability, but to provide training for US SOF. However, since JCET improves interoperability between the US and PN forces and supports both CCDR campaign plan and COM ICS objectives, it should be recognized during campaign and country planning for its coincidental benefit to SC.

(2) Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP). CTFP is a program managed by DSCA to assess, plan, and develop an enterprise for training and educating mid-to-senior-level defense and security officials of PNs to combat transnational terrorism and counter ideological support for terrorism. Funded through annual appropriations, CTFP builds and strengthens a global CT network of PNs with
capabilities to collaborate on combating terrorism. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD[SO/LIC]) provides oversight.

(3) **Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF).** The CJCS may use the CCIF (Title 10, USC, Section 166a) to provide the CCDR funds for a wide variety of activities, including joint exercises (including participation by PNs or other foreign countries), humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA), IMET to foreign military and related civilian personnel (including transportation, translation, and administrative expenses), and personnel expenses by defense personnel for bilateral or regional cooperation programs.

*For further details, see CJCSI 7401.01, Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF).*

b. **Legal Authorities for SC.** The primary statutory authorizations for SA are the FAA of 1961, as amended (Title 22, USC, Section 2151), and the AECA of 1976, as amended (Title 22, USC, Section 2751), which are typically used for SC activities. Additionally, the *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017* consolidated multiple SC authorities into a single, dedicated chapter (Title 10, USC, Chapter 16) on SC. Various sections therein provide authorizations spanning military-to-military engagements, training with foreign forces, support for operations and capacity building, and educational and training activities, among other limitations, administrative, and miscellaneous matters. These statutory authorities are subject to changes in USC and through subsequent national defense authorization act (NDAA) adjustments related to SC (similarly the annual DOS, foreign operations, and related programs appropriations acts may adjust SA authorizations). DOS has the primary responsibility, authority, and funding to conduct foreign assistance, including SA programs that may be administered by DOD as a part of SC, on behalf of the USG.

*For more specific information about SC programs and authorities, see Appendix A, “Security Cooperation: Related Programs and Authorities.”*

5. **Security Cooperation Roles and Responsibilities**

SC involves planning and interagency coordination by a myriad of organizational entities from the departmental level down to the SCO in an HN, as well as participating US military units. The following have significant roles and responsibilities for SC activities:

a. **DOD.** The USD(P) oversees, integrates, and coordinates DOD policies and plans for coordination of SC policies, goals, and priorities for SecDef with MILDEPs, DOS, and other interagency partners to enable greater unity of effort in activities that support national security objectives. DODD 5132.03, *DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation*, details USD(P) responsibilities for SC. USD(P) and DOS counterparts are responsible for the approvals, the funding, and other authorities required by CCDRs and the Services for planning and executing SC activities in support of PN requirements and US security objectives. USD(P) typically designates/delegates certain responsibilities for SC to assistant or deputy assistant secretariat levels. USD(P) also oversees the development of policy governing the use of the G-TSCMIS to support the resourcing, assessment, planning, and monitoring of SC activities.
(1) **DSCA.** DSCA is a separate agency of DOD under the direction, authority, and control of USD(P). DSCA represents the interests of SecDef and USD(P) in SC matters and is charged to direct, administer, and provide DOD-wide guidance to DOD components and representatives to execute DSCA-managed SC programs. DSCA serves as the resource sponsor for G-TSCMIS and oversees the development and continued sustainment of the enterprise system. DSCA conducts SC and sales negotiations with foreign countries in accordance with USD(P) and DOS guidance and negotiates and concludes SC-related international programs. DSCA delegates the administration of SC programs, as appropriate, to either the MILDEPs, CCMDs, DOD agencies, or DOD field activities. DSCA establishes appropriate agreements and procedures with CCMDs and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for the respective SDOs/DATTs, to provide guidance and oversight of SC programs for which DSCA is responsible. DSCA advises the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) of proposed transfers of significant new technologies and/or weapons systems and determinations of whether significant items or specific sales must be sold exclusively through FMS.

(2) **DTSA.** DTSA is a DOD field activity under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P) that serves as the point of contact for development and implementation of DOD policy concerning technology security, export controls, and certain non-proliferation for military and dual-use items. DTSA identifies and mitigates national security risks associated with the international transfer of advanced technology and critical information. DTSA provides new and emerging partners with technological awareness via bilateral and multilateral engagements and negotiations, thereby ensuring applicable PNs have the agreements and security mechanisms in place to properly protect US technology. This assistance facilitates DOD objectives to build partnership capacity and capability and enhance interoperability. Additionally, DTSA responsibilities include managing the Space Launch Monitoring Program; DOD’s patent security review process; the development of DOD policy on technology security and foreign disclosure processes; and advising DOD leadership on the development of policy and procedures governing the disclosure and protection of classified military, and controlled unclassified information, to international partners.

(3) **Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L])** is responsible for establishing and maintaining policies for the effective development of international acquisition, technology, and logistics programs, including international armaments cooperation (e.g., science and technology collaboration, logistics support), to support SC priorities. In coordination with USD(P), USD(AT&L) supports the development of policies and procedures for foreign transfer of defense-related articles, services, and technologies. In coordination with USD(P) and DOS, USD(AT&L) identifies, prioritizes, and pursues defense agreements required to facilitate the transfer of defense-related articles, services, and technologies to partners.

(4) In coordination with USD(P), the **Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I])** provides guidance for and oversight of intelligence-related SC, including programs and resources, to build PN intelligence capabilities in support of SC priorities. USD(I) also ensures defense intelligence collection and analysis is sufficient to support SC planning, execution, and assessment, monitoring, and evaluation efforts.
(5) **JS.** The JS assists the CJCS regarding statutory responsibilities for the unified strategic direction of the US Armed Forces. However, the JS exercises no executive authority. The JS represents CJCS’s implementation guidance for military plans and programs and provides the CJCS with military advice concerning SC. In conjunction with USD(P), the JS reviews the SC activities included in CCMD campaign plans to ensure the planning guidance has been met. The JS also reviews allocation recommendations prior to SecDef approval of forces and other resources for the execution of military activities in campaign plans and operation orders. The JS produces the annual DOD campaign plan assessment template in consultation with USD(P) to integrate and coordinate Service support of CCMD campaign plans, as required. The JS recommends force and activity designators for priorities in the distribution of defense articles, defense services, and military education and training between and among PNs, organizations, and the US Armed Forces and recommends priorities for allocation of materiel and equipment for PNs when competing needs cannot be resolved by Director, DSCA. The JS collects and reviews the CCDRs’ campaign plans and the CCDRs’ assessments and evaluations, and advises the CJCS on the effectiveness of DOD SC efforts.

(6) **CCMDs.** Geographic CCMDs are the primary organizations for SC planning and integrating SC activities into their TCPs. Functional CCMDs prepare campaign plans that integrate their forces, resources, and funding for SC activities in coordination with the geographic CCMDs, their Service components, international organizations and, when appropriate, the affected SCOs. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) coordinates SC activities to be executed by SOF with the geographic CCMDs through their theater special operations commands (TSOCs), including the deployment of special operations liaison officers, as well as SOF Service components. US Transportation Command coordinates movement within the Defense Transportation System, including integration of DOD and PN cargo distribution into existing force flow and global synchronization activities, as well as TDPs. CCMD planners should coordinate with COMs, through the SDO/DATTs, during the development of ICSs. These ICSs should, in turn, inform CCMD SC planners in the development of their required CSCSs/country plans. SC planning is typically led by the plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5) and supported by the other directorates (e.g., logistics directorate of a joint staff [J-4] for building PN logistic capacity). CCMD desk officers often lead country planning and work directly with the SDO/DATTs in their AORs and their counterparts in the Service component commands to develop country-level plans and identify forces and resource requirements. These desk officers are also the principal link between DOD-level staffs (OSD and JS) and the SDO/DATTs and their applicable country teams. CCMDs review their campaign plans by objectively and subjectively assessing, monitoring, and evaluating the effects of their SC activities in achieving desired objectives relative to attaining the intended end state. CCDRs must prioritize and approve the SC requirements of PNs established through coordination by the SDO/DATTs (as DOD members of COMs’ country teams) and Service component commands. CCMDs integrate SC activities into their CSCSs/country plans and campaign plans as necessary.

(7) **TSOC.** TSOCs are subordinate unified commands established by USSOCOM to plan, coordinate, conduct, and support joint special operations. These commands, and SOF, are under the combatant command (command authority) of
USSOCOM, and under the operational control of the GCCs. Normally, GCCs exercise operational control of SOF through the TSOCs when operating within their AORs. TSOCs coordinate SOF integration and Service component support of SOF for FID, SFA, COIN, CT, FHA, unconventional warfare, and other special operations core activities in all campaigns and operations. TSOCs support SOF conducting SFA activities and other SC activities in support of the GCCs’ TCPs.

(8) **MILDEPs, Services, and Service Component Commands.** MILDEPs and Services support CCDR campaign plans and simultaneously pursue Service-specific SC objectives consistent with national and theater strategic objectives. MILDEPs, Services, and USSOCOM, in its Service-related responsibilities, support the CCMDs in shaping of the strategic security environment by enabling security conditions favorable to US objectives and interests. The Services may prepare Service CSPs at the discretion of the Service chief. Service CSPs integrate Title 10, USC, programs to support CCMD campaign and Service institutional objectives. If developed, and when appropriate, Services may synchronize CSPs with CCMD campaign plans through their respective component commands. The US Marine Corps and the US Navy each submit independent Service CSPs via the Department of the Navy. The US Army and the US Air Force submit their CSPs via their respective MILDEPs. Services are also responsible for executing sales made through SA. The Service component commands prepare supporting objectives and plans at the discretion of the component commander, CCDR, or Service chief to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander’s plan. Supporting plans should be coordinated with the MILDEPs and may include organize, train, and equip responsibilities such as exercises, readiness, interoperability, augmentation, joint enablers, and capabilities development. Service components should also coordinate with SDO/DATTs on the country teams to determine potential military capabilities that could be made available to PNs through SC.

(9) **SCO.** This organization includes all DOD elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out SA/SC management functions. An SCO works under the authority of the COM. SCOs may be referred to as military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel who have been designated to perform SA/SC functions. Military units conducting SC activities in an HN normally work closely with and coordinate with the SCO, but their lines of authority are through their Service components and the supported CCDR, not through the SDO/DATT to the COM. The SCO is responsible for assessing whether a PN can build and sustain capacity and has the greatest visibility over the execution of SC activities. Generally, the SCO is responsible for evaluating the results of SC activities and investments for the COM and GCC. Title 22, USC, Section 2321i (FAA) outlines the seven legislated SCO SA functions as follows:

(a) Equipment and services case management (i.e., FMS case management).

(b) Training management.

(c) Program monitoring.
(d) Evaluation and planning of the host government’s military capabilities and requirements.

(e) Administrative support.

(f) Promoting rationalization, standardization, interoperability, and other defense cooperation measures.

(g) Liaison functions exclusive of advisory and training assistance.

(10) **SDO/DATT.** The SDO/DATT serves as the diplomatically accredited defense attaché and chief of the SCO (if an SCO is present). As the COM’s principal military advisor on defense and national security issues and the senior DOD military officer assigned to a US diplomatic mission, the SDO/DATT serves as the single point of contact for all DOD matters involving the US mission or DOD elements assigned to or working from the US mission. All DOD elements under COM authority are within the coordinating authority of the SDO/DATT, except for the Marine security guard detachment and naval support units. The SDO/DATT operates under the authority of the COM and is the key figure within the US mission for establishing and fostering an SC relationship with the HN. The SDO/DATT, in collaboration with the GCC and other DOD components, provides DOD input to the ICS. The SDO/DATT, or a designated member of the SCO, is the point of contact for SC planning and development of the country plan with the GCC planners. Subject to COM approval, the SDO/DATT is the lead integrator for SC activities with the PN. For SC purposes, the SDO/DATT normally maintains coordination with Service/SOF components and their SMEs when assessing the HN for building partner capacity. The SDO/DATT, in coordination with the supported GCC, serves under the joint oversight and administrative management of the USD(P) and USD(I) through the Directors of DSCA and the DIA.

(11) The National Guard may appoint an officer to serve at the US mission under the SDO/DATT as the State Partnership Program (SPP) liaison for the partner state’s National Guard with the GCC and HN. The National Guard officer is nominated by the partner state’s adjutant general, approved by the National Guard Bureau (NGB), and accepted by the supported GCC. The National Guard officer coordinates all SPP events and activities among the NGB, US partner state, the specific country team, and the HN to facilitate the supported GCC SC policies, plans, and objectives. Also, the National Guard officer may assist in coordinating required support for bilateral and/or multilateral military engagements between the US and the HN, including activities not under SPP.

b. **DOS.** DOS maintains bureaus and offices (e.g., Office of US Foreign Assistance Resources, Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs) functionally and/or geographically aligned with interagency partners (especially DOD), international organizations, and foreign nations to coordinate effective execution of the diplomacy, development, and defense aspects of US foreign policy. DOS analyzes the requirements for security-related assistance as part of USG foreign assistance. DOS maintains interagency coordination with respective counterparts in DOD concerning future SA programs and SC activities with PNs.
(1) **COM.** The COM, typically the US ambassador, is the principal officer in charge of a US diplomatic facility abroad. The COM is the personal representative of the President to the country of accreditation, and is responsible to the Secretary of State (SECSTATE) for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all USG executive branch employees in that country (except those under the command of a US area military commander). As statutorily mandated, the COM directs and supervises all activities in country and coordinates the resources and programs of the USG through the country team. COMs approve the ICSs developed through their country teams in coordination with DOS and through interagency coordination with DOD and other interagency partners at the national level. COMs, through the SDO/DATTs on their country teams, coordinate on the CCDRs’ CSCSs/country plans that will become part of the campaign plans. COMs facilitate the coordination of PN security-related requirements that become part of the specific SA programs and SC activities conducted by US military with those PNs.

(2) **Country Team.** The country team is the senior USG coordinating and supervising body in a foreign country. Headed by the COM, it includes the SDO/DATT, heads of all US embassy sections, and the senior member of each of the other represented USG departments or agencies, as desired by the COM. The country team issues directives to consulates, tasks action items for DOS offices and bureaus, and works to deconflict/balance all agency programs and priorities within the context of the COM’s ICS for that country. Depending on the size of a US embassy and the nature of US interests in a country, each country team may be configured differently—and some may include more than 40 interagency representatives, in addition to section chiefs and the head of the local USAID mission. With guidance from DOS and the COM, the country team develops the ICS regarding the PN, which influences the CCDR’s development of a CSCS/country plan for that PN.

(3) **Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM).** PM is DOS’s principal link to DOD. PM provides policy direction in the areas of international security, SA, and defense trade. PM’s primary counterpart in DOD is the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities. Joint force and Service planners may coordinate with PM through OSD and the JS.
CHAPTER III
SECURITY COOPERATION PLANNING

“Principles and rules are intended to provide a thinking man with a frame of reference.”

Carl von Clausewitz
1780-1831
Prussian General

1. Introduction

This chapter provides planners with an approach to planning SC activities through the development and execution of TCPs and CSCSs/country plans, subordinate and supporting plans, and posture plans. As planners develop all the plans that operationalize the GCC’s strategy, DOD components plan and execute SC activities, such as training, exercises, military engagement, SSR, experimentation, education, personnel exchanges, and armaments cooperation resourced through Services’ SC funds, SA programs, and other funding lines and authorities. While SC activities are conducted primarily for routine shaping as part of campaign plans, SC can be conducted in all phases of an operation and across the range of military operations. Conducting SC activities in the midst of an insurgency or major combat operation has proven a difficult challenge for US forces and other interagency partners. The inherent cultural, political, leadership, and other complexities associated with any SC activity demand careful and deliberate attention from planners, especially at the component level. SC activities should be an essential consideration of strategic and operational level contingency planning from the beginning, including OE shaping during GCC’s theater strategy and theater campaign and contingency planning. SC should be integrated into the specific operation or campaign plans in all phases, not just as an afterthought for the stabilize and enable civil authority phases following combat operations. Early planning should involve all relevant interagency partners, whenever possible, to marshal and focus US and HN capabilities. Military oversight and administration of SC during routine activities (as part of a campaign plan) and in initial phases of an operation (such as deploying flexible deterrent or flexible response options) are normally conducted by the SCO in the HN, or a designated JFC. A JFC, or a designated Service or functional component commander, typically conducts military oversight and administration of SC activities during combat operations and through the transitions and transfers of authorities. As the transition progresses, oversight and administration transfers back to the SCO. This chapter will not discuss how to develop ICSs, TCPs (or other campaign plans), country plans, component support plans, posture plans, or contingency plans, but will discuss how some of those strategies and plans relate to SC planning and activities.

a. Theater Strategy. A theater strategy prioritizes the GCC’s efforts to satisfy functional, theater, and global responsibilities. It also considers all authorities, means, and capabilities available for the planning of the operations, activities, and investments to achieve DOD objectives and complement related USG efforts. Informed by ICSs, functional strategies, other forms of strategic guidance, and the CSCSs/country plans, a
GCC’s TCP operationalizes the theater strategy, as do the supporting plans of all DOD components. **NOTE: The term “all DOD components” means: OSD, the MILDEPs, CJCS and the JS, CCMDs, the Office of the Inspector General of DOD, DOD agencies, DOD field activities, and all other organizational entities in DOD.**

(1) USAID missions prepare a country development cooperation strategy for each country in which a USAID mission is posted. These development strategies are integrated with the ICSs and influence a GCC’s theater strategy, and in turn, the TCP and CSCSs/country plans.

(2) During strategy and plans development, GCCs coordinate with country teams to integrate the COM’s guidance for each country involved. In the case of a conflict between guidance by the COM and the GEF/JSCP, SecDef, normally through USD(P), facilitates further coordination between DOD and DOS and may provide additional or clarifying guidance to the GCC. Complementary strategies among interagency partners are key to planning effective interactions with PNs that include SC activities.

(3) The initial strategic estimate is a prerequisite to preparing theater strategy that provides an understanding of the factors and trends that influence the CCMD’s strategic environment and informs the ends, ways, means, and risk involved in pursuit of GEF- and National Military Strategy-directed objectives. The operational approach outlines the missions, operational concepts, tasks, and activities needed to achieve TCP objectives and describe the priorities for shaping, force posture and access, building partner capacity, and routine operations support. This process may also identify intermediate objectives and the milestones that must be met over time to reach the strategic end state and introduce LOEs.

b. TCPs

(1) The CJCS directs deliberate preparation of campaign plans, as well as contingency, posture, and supporting plans via the JSCP, which translates broad guidance in the GEF into specific strategic and operational planning directives to CCDRs, Service chiefs, and select DOD agency directors. Strategic objectives outlined in the GEF are broad in scope, prioritized to inform resourcing decisions, and focus two to five years into the future. The JSCP provides direction for developing campaign plans and expands on global defense posture, force management, and SC guidance found in the GEF. Annually, GCCs must forecast SFA requirements to the CJCS and the Services to ensure those requirements can be met or to assess the risk. The TCP includes a discussion about the resources—especially forces and funding—assigned to and required by the CCMD, and addresses the impact of resource shortfalls in terms of strategic and operational risk on achievement of theater objectives.

(2) TCPs, with their nested CSCSs/country plans, are the primary documents used to plan, organize, integrate, and execute SC activities in the GCCs’ AORs. TCPs implement the GCCs’ theater strategies and provide a comprehensive framework for integrating SC activities for routine shaping (“setting the theater”) to achieve US national objectives and as required by the GCC’s contingency plans and other military stabilizing activities that complement ongoing DOS diplomacy and USAID development efforts in
support of USG foreign policy. TCPs have a programmatic dimension and articulate the GCC’s rationale for sufficient resources to fund and authorize SC activities. TCPs provide LOEs to the objectives that establish SC activities and resource investments as well as to integrate and synchronize operations throughout the theater. When applicable, lines of operation (LOOs) may also be established in the TCP for specific objectives. The joint planning process guides the development of TCPs. The SC aspect of a TCP requires a planning process that is iterative and often requires assembling various resources and funding streams into a coherent, actionable plan. TCPs provide an important link to the resources necessary to implement the theater strategy; they should anticipate threats and assess risks associated with limited resources to execute the TCP. SC planning and execution are conducted in four stages and are conducted concurrently as part of the TCP. Unlike joint planning, SC planning and execution follow programmatic timelines for USG budget cycles and are based on US-assessed PN requirements presented as SC activities and investments that must be approved and resourced (i.e., funds and forces) before mission planning by the tasked DOD components.

(3) A CSCS is nested with the TCP for each PN where the GCC intends to apply significant time and resources. At a minimum there should be a CSCS/country plan for each ally and PN identified in campaign objectives in the GEF. The CSCS/country plan provides PN focused objectives and resources and should be linked to the campaign plan objectives, which directly link to the GEF-directed prioritized objectives, as well as resources that should be outlined in the TCP. Accordingly, geographic CCMD planners and desk officers should coordinate each CSCS/country plan and associated resource requirements to reflect inputs from applicable DOD components.

(4) Resourcing SC. TCPs require a strong programmatic dimension that articulates the GCC’s rationale for sufficient resources to conduct the SC activities necessary to achieve the campaign’s SC objectives. TCPs also provide an important link to the other resources necessary to implement the theater strategy. The TCP should highlight what can be accomplished within existing resources and what will require additional resources over time. GCCs sponsor SC, but they control very few of the resources applied in conducting SC activities in their AORs. DOD components are responsible for the vast majority of SC activities, which are not conducted as joint operations. The TCP is a reference for the Services and other agencies to justify their funding and resource requirements to include development of their program objective memorandums (POMs). See paragraph 4, “Identifying Resources and Authorities.”

c. Posture Plan. USD(P) manages the global defense posture that supports DOD activities worldwide. SecDef provides posture planning direction to the CCDRs in the GEF; the CJCS implements planning guidance specified in the GEF via the JSCP and tasks CCDRs to submit annual theater posture plans to include pending overseas force structure changes, which require coordination with DOS and the affected COMs. The CCDR’s posture strategy links campaign objectives with the means to achieve them and identifies posture requirements and initiatives (i.e., forces, footprints, and agreements). Posture planning includes an analysis of how force structure will affect access arrangements and the values and relative risks with respect to operation planning and warfighting capability, SC activities/presence, force management, force protection, and PR. Posture plans align
basing and forces to ensure theater and global security, respond to contingency scenarios, and provide strategic flexibility. Theater posture planning is an important consideration as CCMD planners determine the resources their command has available and begin to develop the operational approach to a TCP. Posture initiatives may also alter the requirement for certain kinds of forces and increase the need for others. Annually, GCCs submit theater posture plans; integrated into TCPs, they support contingency plans and influence SC planning. SC planners within the theater CCMDs and theater Service/SOF component commands should be involved in the coordination of theater posture planning.

d. **CSCSs/Country Plans.** Developed by the CCMD, a CSCS/country plan, also known as a country cooperation plan or country SC plan, provides the roadmap of specific military objectives a CCDR intends to achieve over a minimum of one to three years. It describes how the CCMD will work with the country team to conduct SC with the PN to achieve both US and PN security objectives. A CSCS/country plan must articulate the security roles envisioned for the PN and describe how the PN has agreed to pursue its objectives with the US consistent with the bilateral security agreements that govern the US-PN relationship. CSCSs/country plans must also articulate country-specific defense objectives in a manner that is specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound. ICSs and applicable USAID country development cooperation strategies inform CSCSs/country plans, and the SDO/DATT in the applicable PN coordinates them. Analyses of PN requirements that will stimulate specific SC activities/investments also inform the development of the CSCS/country plan. The TCP implements the CSCS/country plan, including integration and synchronization of anticipated SC activities. These activities include day-to-day presence missions, military-to-military exchanges, and combined exercises. As appropriate, reviewing a CSCS/country plan with the PN during development of the TCP facilitates alignment of US and PN goals.

e. **Contingency Plans.** Contingency plans are branches of campaign plans deliberately planned for designated threats, catastrophic events, and contingent missions without a crisis at hand. TCPs may provide support for shaping for contingency plans. Per strategic guidance, contingency plans are nested within an overarching TCP by planning the campaign to contribute to the prevention, preparation, and mitigation of the contingency by using SC activities. Analysis of risks and challenges associated with contingency plans should inform SC planning. Examples involve developing the capabilities of multiple PNs to help deter an emerging or near-peer competitor, building the capacity of a PN to support stabilization by generally preventing conflict and promoting good governance or building partner capacity and capabilities to provide logistics support or intelligence to mitigate risk to a contingency plan. SC programs and activities that support USG stabilization efforts to mitigate a potential contingency normally are complemented by some form of developmental or humanitarian assistance by DOS or USAID.

f. **DOD Component Support Plans.** Appropriate DOD components may develop supporting plans to a CCDR’s campaign plan and other campaign and contingency plans. Service components and TSOCs use their supporting plans to develop and identify the details regarding forces and resources, to include funding for tasked SC activities and their need to anticipate and gain CCMD and DOD support for SC funding through their POMs.
for the out-years. See paragraph 5, “Timeline for Funding and Authorities,” regarding the “SC planning timeline” on the importance of DOD components projecting SC requirements for the future.

2. Security Cooperation Planning Characteristics

SC planning is the process by which planners understand the USG’s security strategy and the relationship with a PN, where they want that relationship to lead, and how to get there. The willingness and ability of the PN to cooperate with the US shapes the objectives the CCMD pursues with that country—and with countries in the region and theater as a whole. SC planning determines mutually agreed-upon PN capabilities for which assistance is required, then applies the necessary resources (e.g., funding, materiel, and training) that will be provided through SC.

a. SC Planning. ICSs support SC planning by informing the CCDR’s strategy and the development of CSCSs/country plans. The CSCSs/country plans in turn inform the campaign plan and the Service components’ and special operations components’ CSPs, which should support CCDR and national objectives. The CCDR’s contingency plans normally support specific objectives, and the campaign plan includes the shaping activities that support those contingency plans. Campaign plan objectives, priorities, LOEs, etc., sometimes informed by other strategic or statutory guidance, identify PN requirements (i.e., desired capabilities) for potential support by specific SC activities. Those PN requirements, determined through collaboration among the SCO, Services/SOF, and the PN, and approved by the COM, become the basis for specific SC activities that must be planned. In the case of conflict between COM and GEF/JSCP guidance, SecDef, normally through USD(P), may provide additional or clarifying guidance to the CCDR. Typically, the cycle for PN requirements resulting in executed SC activities can require up to five years. Routine SC planning is conducted through the joint planning process, but also includes a process of “PN requirements planning” and then “mission planning” once funding and authorities are approved. SC planning directly supports the strategies of building security relationships, building partner capacity and access; it also supports USG stabilization efforts within a PN. SC supporting execution of a limited contingency or major operation would be planned and executed as part of that operation without the lengthy programming and budgeting aspects.

b. TCP Characteristics. The TCP (and other plans) should identify the ends-ways-means-risk questions that help structure the planning for the respective campaign or operation. The TCP establishes a known point of departure with agreed-upon objectives. SC planners must understand the differences in US-PN relationships for all countries in theater that are covered by the TCP objectives. As a mechanism for SC planning, the TCP typically addresses various levels of conflict that involve operations, activities, and investments that may include the following:

   (1) Contingency shaping or deterrence conducted unilaterally.

   (2) SC activities—whether bilateral or multinational; require planning with the PN(s) or international organization, and may have shaping or deterrent effects.
(3) Ongoing operations or crisis response, conducted as part of a joint operation, with possible SC activities (e.g., advising, equipping, and training).

(4) Other operations, activities, and investments conducted unilaterally without SC characteristics.

c. **Organizing SC Planning.** The country plan for each PN is based on an analysis of a PN’s capabilities, sustainability, and security objectives, and how they correlate with USG objectives. Once determined through a collaborative assessment, the PN requirements for building partner capacity (or partnership or access) must be vetted and funded before investments are made and/or tasked units can mission plan and execute SC activities.

(1) **SC Guidance and Objectives.** A TCP, with nested CSCSs/country plans supports the achievement of theater objectives and the GCC’s share of responsibilities for achieving national security objectives through shaping activities with the intent to prevent, prepare for, or mitigate contingencies. Normally conducted out of urgent necessity, contingency and crisis response plans generally have more focused objectives with LOOs and LOEs designed to achieve them. The operational approach for the TCP should provide a clear and logical explanation of how the CCMD will use the available ways and means (especially SC) to move toward its objectives over a five-year period that informs and shapes the Future Years Defense Program. The importance of achieving objectives and supporting objectives should be delineated in terms of time, resources, and military necessity. GCC-sponsored CSCSs/country plans, developed in coordination with the SCOs, align objectives and LOEs with PN requirements and capabilities. TCP guidance and objectives provide an overarching framework for SC activities, but the CSCS/country plan should assess the PN’s willingness and propensity to support or implement DOD priorities, improve institutional capacity, and build partner capacity, all in the context of the DOD-envisioned security role for the PN. PN requirements and objectives also help DOD components if they develop support plans for the TCP and other plans. Generally speaking, year-to-year, short-term SC objectives are based on the longer-term GCC and national objectives. Similarly, agreements between the USG and PNs facilitate planning and execution of SC activities. As such, strategic guidance requires the TCP to identify objectives rather than an end state as the “ends” in the ends-ways-means-risk analysis.

(2) **SC Initial or Baseline Assessment.** Planners at each echelon need to assess the current level of operational and institutional capacity and capabilities against what is required by the PN to perform each desired role. Initial or baseline assessments should be accomplished by personnel with expertise in the functional areas being assessed. This is especially important at institutional levels that generally fall outside of CCDR and SCO expertise. The CCMD assesses the theater wide and country specific strategic and political environment to plan for the achievement of GEF objectives. At the DOD component (execution) level, the baseline assessment depends more on technical and tactical considerations: the required (or desired) PN capacity, the capability gaps, and the tasks the DOD component can execute to bridge the two. An initial analysis of the PN capabilities should identify specific opportunities and requirements for successful SC with the PN and highlight any PN interdependencies across the security sector, as well as the PN’s ability
to sustain increased capacity. SCO analysis, in collaboration with the Service/SOF components’ and other relevant SMEs, and coordinated with other members of the country team and the COM, as appropriate, facilitates development of the country plan. Also, it should account for the sociocultural, economic, and politico-military factors in the OE to include regional threats and influences (e.g., transnational terrorists, and adversarial, friendly, or benign neighbors). Similarly, the SCO should provide an assessment of third-party activities with the PN to inform DOD planning. A third partner or ally may be better suited to build a PN’s capacity. The SCO must coordinate with the CCMD planners responsible for the CSCS/country plan to leverage their expertise and perceptions, and, as necessary, facilitate coordination between those planners, the country team, Service/SOF component, and other relevant SMEs. As discussed in Chapter V, “Security Cooperation Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation,” subsequent assessments should reference the baseline assessment as further SC activities are planned and executed. Normally, the SCO is central to any SC assessment of the PN on behalf of the COM and GCC.

(3) **Plan Implementation.** As part of SC planning, plan implementation can be described as moving from understanding USG objectives and identifying PN security requirements to planning specific SC activities to be conducted with the PN. With a shared understanding of objectives, normally articulated through the TCP, and knowledge of PN requirements, the SCO, Service/SOF components, and other applicable stakeholders in the joint planning and execution community can collaboratively develop, list, and prioritize SC activities (and SC investments) as approved by the COM. The proposed SC activities must be vetted by the GCC for further coordination and programming action. The CCMD will vet each SCO’s requested (and collaborated) SC activity and investment, and coordinate with the JS and OSD for funding and other authorities. Concurrently, the planning team identifies required forces and capabilities necessary to accomplish the specified and implied tasks of the SC activities. Once an SC activity is approved and execution planning is initiated, specific units are identified to fill those force requirements. DOD components program for funds and resources to support their SC activities and should also endorse funding of DOS SA programs. DOD components’ support plans to the TCP and CSCSs/country plans are typically more detailed to facilitate synchronizing the SC activities and the required forces and resources in conjunction with the formal budget programming timelines for Title 22, USC (Foreign Relations and Intercourse); Title 10, USC (Armed Forces); and other funding authorities. Identifying resources and authorities will be discussed later in the chapter.

(4) **SC Monitoring.** A critical part of implementation of SC is monitoring for the purpose of evaluation. Monitoring involves collecting and reporting data as programs are implemented and SC activities are executed, and enables DOD to track progress toward stated objectives. SC monitoring may be focused at different levels, including output of specific deliverables such as goods and services to document progress as well as outcome SC monitoring to assess whether desired results are occurring in the timeframe anticipated. SC monitoring, which may also include site visits, should also review and identify any changes in the OE since the initial assessment and identify any unforeseen challenges that impact execution and implementation. Each level of authority from OSD down to the employed military unit that expects a qualifying evaluation (or follow-on assessment)
should clarify their requirements to the subordinate entity and develop an evaluation (or follow-on assessment) plan during SC planning.

(5) **Mission Planning.** At some point during the requirements planning, the execution or fragmentary order for the TCP and other approvals for funding and authorities will allow both headquarters and units to begin mission planning for their SC activities. Mission planning requires predeployment interorganizational coordination and establishment of working relationships to finalize most of the details before the SC activities are executed. Mission planning also requires certain authorities to expend funds for site surveys and meetings with the SCO and PN counterparts, coordinate for logistics, establish contracts and agreements, etc. In all cases, SC is executed subject to the bilateral agreements that govern the US-PN security relationship. The individuals, units, and organizations, especially those certified for SFA, and identified SA programs provided for mission planning provide the means aspect of the SC part of the planning process.

d. **G-TSCMIS.** G-TSCMIS is the authoritative data source for DOD SC. G-TSCMIS is a collaborative tool that can be used to comprehensively track, plan, forecast, monitor, assess, and evaluate SC resources, programs, and activities around the globe. It enables US under secretaries of defense, CCDRs, combat support agencies, Service chiefs, and directors of DOD agencies/field activities to prioritize, support, and synchronize SC activities with defense strategy objectives. It also provides commands the ability to link associated SC activities through the use of key SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) or Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network databases to foster transparency, prevent duplication, and drive DOD toward greater SC activity-strategy alignment. In addition, G-TSCMIS enables users to identify gaps in SC authorities, programs, and resources. DOD guidance mandates G-TSCMIS as the system of record for DOD SC reporting requirements. Each organization using G-TSCMIS should establish business rules consistent with USD(P) and Joint Staff J-5 [Strategic Plans and Policy] business rules and policy guidance.

e. **SC Planning Framework.** Figure III-1 depicts a summary of the SC planning framework with the following actions that correspond to their number (1–12) in the figure:

(1) The country team (including the SCO) develops an ICS for a PN from national and DOS strategies and policies with COM guidance. Upon approval by COM and following coordination at the department level (DOS-OSD), DOS approves the ICS.

(2) CCMD develops CSCSs/country plans for PNs based on ICSs and other strategic guidance (e.g., GEF, JSCP, and theater strategy) in coordination with the SCOs and DOD components (e.g., Services/SOF components and other relevant SMEs).

(3) CSCSs/country plans are nested within TCP, which also is informed by ICSs and other national and defense strategies and policies.

(4) TCP provides objectives and priorities with LOEs that include SC activities and investments.
(5) SCO and Service/SOF component SMEs develop PN requirements, expressed as specific SC activities, in coordination with CCMD planners and DSCA. They must support USG objectives in conjunction with the CSCS/country plan and TCP.

(6) DOD components develop TCP supporting plans and anticipate their force, resource, and funding requirements to plan and execute specific SC activities with PN based on requirements planning. Components support parts of their POMs, based on SC planning requirements.

(7) SCO and Service/SOF components coordinate with CCMD to vet and forward SC activities to OSD and DOS for authorities and funding.

(8) Geographic CCMD coordinates with OSD for authorities and funding and with DSCA for management and administration of certain SA and other statutory authorities and funding.

(9) OSD coordinates with DOS for SA authorities and funding.
(10) DOS provides certain authorities and funding (Title 22, USC) to OSD for administration by DOD/DSCA.

(11) OSD provides authorities and funding to CCMD and Service/SOF components and provides planning support to CCMDs on the appropriate and effective uses of such authorities (Titles 10 and 22, USC, and other statutory authorities).

(12) Service/SOF and other DOD components complete mission planning and, upon approval by the President or SecDef, execute SC activities in coordination with SCO (and PN) and DSCA; CCMD and OSD monitor and evaluate SC activities.

3. Theater-Wide Security Cooperation Planning

SC planning requires an understanding of the strategic security environment and the role the USG expects the PN to play in the theater. SC planning is required for each PN where the GCC intends to apply resources, and SCOs prioritize their PN’s requirements identified for SC activities/investments. The geographic CCMD SC planners must justify the prioritization of SC activities for the collective group of PNs in the AOR. Some PNs may receive more SC assistance than others across the theater. The funding process is the more challenging aspect of long-term SC planning since most SC funding is short term by statute. Once coordination with OSD and DOS authorizes and funds SC activities, SC planning for each PN takes the form of mission planning among the geographic CCMD, DSCA, the applicable SCO and country team, the Service and special operations component(s), and the PN representatives. Of note, the disclosure of classified military information to international partners is a factor for planning and execution of all SC activities. It is critical for the planning of any SC activities to take foreign disclosure considerations into account as early as possible.

For more information on foreign disclosure, see NDP-1, National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations, and DODD 5230.11, Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.

a. Analyze OE. To gain insight into the OE, geographic CCMD planners use their strategic estimate, the annually produced Joint Intelligence Estimate, biennially produced Joint Strategic Assessment, intelligence estimates produced through the joint intelligence preparation of the OE process, and relevant reports and sources to analyze the OE of the AOR. They may also request and utilize DIA-produced theater intelligence estimates. Additionally, for each country considered for PN status and SC, the CCMD and Service/SOF component planners should develop specific information in coordination with the SCO and, when possible, with PN representatives. At a minimum, planners should identify:

(1) Current and projected threats to US interests.

(2) Current and projected threats to PN interests and neighboring countries as well as the operational demands the threats impose on their national security capabilities.
(3) USG departments and agencies on the country team and how their efforts impact the CSCS/country plan.

(4) Treaties and agreements with a PN such as the status-of-forces agreement, general security of military information agreement, HNS agreement, and ACSA that affect the CSCS/country plan.

(5) The willingness and capability of the PN to support US interests and objectives as a regional partner or regional leader.

(6) The capabilities and resources of the PN, such as force structure, defense budget, and expenditures on weapon systems; the ability to absorb and sustain building capacity and capabilities efforts; and institutional ability to sustain and retain USG efforts.

(7) The PN’s role in an international organization or in a multinational force.

(8) Anticipated PN changes in governance and participation, and risks of instability, corruption, and other factors which may undermine the success of the SC program.

(9) Friendly and neutral actors who may mitigate the actions of those opposed to USG efforts.

(10) Security, diplomatic, and economic actors with interests and strategic goals in the country and their relationships.

(11) Transportation and logistics infrastructure, particularly limitations and vulnerabilities.

(12) Adversarial or competitive actors who may counter, oppose, or otherwise interfere with USG efforts.

(13) Potential effects on regional balance of power.

(14) Opportunities for international organization or multinational support for a regional approach to building capacity of one or more PNs.

b. **Framing PN Requirements.** At the theater level, the JFC initially assesses the PN’s strategic and political situation in coordination with the SCO and component commands. At the operational level (component commander or subordinate JFC), the initial or baseline assessment by Service/SOF SMEs depends more on technical and tactical considerations: the required (or desired) capability, the capability gaps, and the tasks the components can execute to mitigate those gaps. Any initial CCMD-led collaborative assessment efforts should identify a PN’s capability gaps in the context of an institutional perspective, that is, from the ministerial/department level down to the tactical unit level. This process should use a recognized methodology to analyze PN DOTMLPF-P, and it will serve as a baseline assessment for all follow-on assessments.
(1) **Political Will and Capability for Partnership.** Upon the identification of a PN’s security role (i.e., the particular behavior or activity required of the PN), additional analysis is performed to assess the PN’s political will and capability required to perform the desired role(s). Planners should answer three main questions: Does the PN have enough popular support for partnership with the US, and is the necessary degree of consensus among the political leadership and, more broadly, among civil society, available for the country to perform these roles? What operational capacity and capabilities does the PN require for it to perform their role efficiently? What institutional capacity is needed to sustain the required operational capability and capacity? Specific institutional factors to consider include degree of legitimacy and legal status; capability of planning and leadership; effectiveness of decision making; quality of resource management; availability of human resources; status of equipment and logistics; consistency of essential services such as clean water, waste management, electrical power generation, and availability of fuels; and local civilian-military and integrating mechanisms.

(2) **PN Institutional Capacities.** The following are examples of institutional capacities that should be considered and assessed:

(a) Constraints and restraints associated with PN security sector institutions, legal framework, and individual political actors, and whether they can be narrowed to a specific part of that sector (e.g., military forces, border forces, provincial police, or justice). This may require determination of the extent of, if any exists, civilian control of the military, and to what levels of accountability checks and balances exist in the PN security sector.

(b) Strengths and weaknesses of existing security and justice sector institutions and actors as well as relevant civil society organizations.

(c) The extent to which the PN is capable of defense strategic planning and resource management processes (e.g., processes to convert resources to military capability, evidence of a national defense strategy and the role of the PN defense ministry in resource allocation, separation of branches of Service and their roles, role of the legislative branch in the government.)

(d) Relationships between security forces and communities and the responsiveness of the security and justice sectors to the distinct needs and perspectives of the population.

(e) Complicity of security forces in past human rights abuses, manner and extent to which past abuses have been addressed, and degree to which the human rights of the population are currently respected and protected.

(f) Status of the PN’s defense sector human resource processes and efficacy of military education and training programs; source of military manpower, volunteer or conscripted; quality of life for military members (barracks, food, pay, medical care); existence of a noncommissioned officer corps; provisions for systematic career
advancement and retirement; effectiveness of personnel accountability system; and ability of manpower management system to get the right person to the right place at the right time.

(g) Macroeconomic and financial management capacity of the PN to absorb sustained assistance in the security sector.

(h) Procurement policies and practices—the PN’s ability to plan, program, budget, and implement FMS, security and military assistance programs (e.g., FMF), and direct commercial sales. For example, this includes the country’s ability and willingness to plan for and implement measures to protect sensitive technologies.

(i) PN’s logistics capacity to sustain and support current military technologies and platforms, including status of maintenance for major end items, as well as maintenance training programs and life cycle management programs.

(j) Other third-party donor activity in the security sector.

3. Access Considerations. Questions to consider regarding access include, but are not limited to, the following:

(a) Does the US desire continued access to the region or country?

(b) Will the PN provide access to US personnel, and what restrictions are imposed on them?

(c) What is the current state of security in the country?

(d) Is there popular support within the PN for US access with or without meeting certain conditions?

4. A qualifying analysis of the will, capacity, and access should be done for all PNs to begin or continue SC activities and likely would be addressed with each iteration of an ICS (every three years by DOS), or with a change to the CSCS/country plan or TCP by the COM.

c. Determine Potential SC Activities. SC activities must be based on DOD strategic requirements, as well as a PN’s capability gaps and capacity to absorb and sustain new/additional capabilities. Through the application of appropriate defense guidance and with a shared understanding of a PN’s capacity, a SCO and CCMD identify potential PN capabilities for provision or enhancement. Should a PN desire such capabilities, the SCO, in collaboration with Service/SOF component and other relevant SMEs, will assess the inputs required to develop the capabilities, the potential for specific SC activities to address those inputs, the supportability of providing those inputs given available Service/SOF capabilities and resources, and how those activities would advance the role of the PN with regard to US national security interests. Those potential SC activities (and investments) will be prioritized as part of the list of PN requirements recommended by the SCO to be approved by the COM. PN requirements (as potential SC activities) will be further prioritized with other PN requirements from across the AOR and within the context of the
TCP objectives and available forces and resources. Concurrently, GCC’s CSCSs/country plans will summarize PN requirements and detail the GCC’s approach to addressing the prioritized gaps assessed across four areas of concern: political will, institutional capacity and capabilities, operational capacity and capabilities, and access.

d. Service/SOF components plan their direct support of SC activities iteratively (and some may also develop CSPs) in collaboration with their counterparts at the CCMD, SCO, TSOC, Service component command, USSOCOM, and DSCA. LOEs in TCPs with nested CSCSs/country plans and any completed component support plans and TSOC theater strategy should cover the potential SC activities. DOD components work to match PN requirements with their capabilities in the following categories of SC activities, many of which have formal SC or SA programs of the same or similar titles that may be funded:

(1) **Defense contacts and familiarization**, especially military engagement, whether a single event or on a periodic basis with PN personnel, facilitate the exchange of best practices, the development of combined operating concepts, and the conduct of planning discussions. Activities in this category include military staff talks, SME exchanges, conferences, planning workshops, and similar events.

(2) **Personnel exchange** involves the assignment of defense personnel, reciprocal or not, to PN defense ministries, military units, and other organizations. Activities include exchange of civilian and military personnel and may be used to advance a range of objectives, such as promoting interoperability or contributing to capacity-building.

(3) **Combined exercises and training** involve bilateral or multilateral exercises and/or training of US forces in tandem with PN forces, and unlike most SC activities, the primary purpose of combined exercises and training is generally to enhance or maintain US force readiness. As an example, programs such as JCET, primarily a training venue for SOF, have a cumulative effect of improving interoperability between the US and PN forces that may coincidentally support both CCDR campaign plan and COM ICS objectives when conducted in priority countries. CCMD planners should consider the manner by which SOF authorities for JCET, or similar exercises or training, complement other DOD and DOS activities, authorities, and funds.

(4) **Train-and-equip/provide defense articles** allows the USG to provide PN militaries with training, defense articles, and defense services through a variety of Title 22, USC, SA and Title 10, USC, SC programs. Availability of such articles and services is generally subject to foreign disclosure and technology security review, and should be planned to address both these concerns and the absorptive capacity of the intended recipient PN. While all categories of SC should be integrated in order to maximize impact, it is particularly important that planners integrate the provision of defense articles with other activities, such as DIB and education, in order to enhance prospects for the sustainability and effective deployment of the articles.
(5) **DIB** comprises SC typically conducted at the ministerial/department, military staff/service headquarters, and related agency/supporting entity level to develop the strategic and operational aspects of a PN’s defense institutions.

(6) **Operational support** entails the provision of defense articles, services, and logistical support to PN military forces to enable them to conduct or sustain active military operations. Operational support may include activities such as the provision of fuel, maintenance of aircraft, or resupply of munitions, or may involve rapid capacity-building to enable PN forces to operate within a coalition. In many cases, operational support is provided under the auspices of a bilateral ACSA.

(7) The USG facilitates the participation of FSF personnel in US **professional military education** institutions through both Title 22, USC, SA and Title 10, USC, SC programs. Such programs provide for PN personnel participation in US Service academies, senior military colleges, special programs such as the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation and the Aviation Leadership Program, and targeted education programs at public and private universities. For example, the Regional Defense CTFP is a program managed by DSCA to assess, plan, and develop an enterprise for training and educating mid-to-senior-level defense and security officials of PNs to combat transnational terrorism and counter ideological support for terrorism. Funded through annual appropriations, CTFP builds and strengthens a global CT network of PNs with capabilities to collaborate on combating terrorism.

(8) **International armaments cooperation** entails activities with PN defense sectors involving cooperative research, acquisition, development, test, and evaluation of defense technologies, systems, or equipment; joint production and follow-on support of defense articles or equipment; and procurement of foreign technology, equipment, systems or logistics support. Such cooperation may include government-to-government coordination, as well as activities between nongovernment stakeholders, such as industry organizations and scientific communities. International armaments cooperation is often guided by PN-focused objectives (such as improving interoperability), as well as US-focused objectives (such as reducing acquisition costs).

*For more information, refer to Department of Defense Guidance for Security Cooperation.*

e. Not always military in nature, SC objectives may be oriented to the security sector or defense support to civilian authority, to support law enforcement, justice, emergency management, disaster response, and other PN security reforms. Any SC objective must support the TCPs and nested CSCSs/country plans. In such cases, other interagency partner involvement and support are essential to making progress. CCMD planners should focus on the role of DOD organizations and document what needs to be done by non-DOD organizations. It is possible to have a CCMD SC objective that depends heavily (or totally) on DOS—or other government agency—resources (e.g., Title 22, USC, funding and authority) and also for DOD efforts to complement those of other government agencies that are working toward the same goal. However, DOD involvement in some law enforcement-related activities requires specific direction through statutory or Presidential/SecDef authority and may require strict DOD/DOS oversight.
f. CCMD and component planners document the campaign’s SC activities in the campaign plan, the posture plan, or the CSCS/country plan. The output of SC planning manifests in the ways and means of those plans. An iterative process provides the Services/SOF component commands the ability to articulate their priorities and rationale for Service-centric activities within the AORs and integrate those activities with the CCDR’s overall strategy implementation objectives.

g. CCMD and component planners identify how they expect the actual SC activity to support theater and national objectives. They define assessment, monitoring, and evaluation criteria that identify both how they will determine if the event results in the expected outcome (e.g., trained PN forces) and how that outcome supports the broader theater and national objectives.

4. Identifying Resources and Authorities

SC requires a commitment of USG resources and funds to execute SC activities that benefit PNs and the US in their achievement of mutual foreign and defense policy objectives. DOD should expect Congress, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and others to ask where and for what purpose the SC funding is being spent, the risk incurred in the absence or shortfall of funding, and whether the projected return on investment justifies the expenditure. This requires CCMD-level analysis and cooperation with DSCA and other DOD components to capture DOD-wide resourcing by country and region and the manner in which that funding supports achievement of a GCC’s theater objectives.

a. Planning for SC activities should inform global force management (GFM), program and budget review (PBR), the Annual Joint Assessment (and CJCS’s Risk Assessment), CCMD integrated priority lists, and the DOD Legislative Program.

(1) SC planning should integrate the CCMD’s directorates and offices when developing and submitting CCMD inputs into DOD resource allocation processes. For example, the operations directorate of a joint staff may be the lead for submitting rotational and emergent force requirements through the GFM process; the force structure, resource, and assessment directorate of a joint staff may be the lead for developing funding requirements in the PBR; and the J-4 or J-5 may develop posture requirements.

(2) As planners develop a TCP, they identify discrepancies between current or projected resource availability and what is needed to implement the plan. CCMDs should then communicate the need for additional resources, and the risks associated with resource shortfalls, through appropriate venues. These include in-progress reviews and department and interagency resourcing processes, such as GFM, the DOD Legislative Program, Service POM development, and DOS SA (e.g., FMF). Shortfalls in the projected budget can be integrated into submissions such as the GCC’s integrated priority list.

b. Authorities and Funding

(1) One of the most significant aspects of SC planning involves gaining the funding and authorities to identify resources for mission planning and execution of SC
activities. CCMD SC planners should be familiar with the various resources available to support the anticipated SC activities with the PNs in their theater. This includes Title 10, USC, funding for which the country may be eligible, such as the various DOD SC programs (e.g., Developing Country Combined Exercise Program) and other resources provided by MILDEPs through their theater Service components. Theater Service components and TSOCs normally have knowledgeable SC planners for their levels of participation. Title 22, USC, funding, such as FMF and IMET, is another key resource. Other interagency partners and other countries may also provide resources that support CSCS/country plan implementation coordinated through the TCP. Planners should also take into account defense spending and other resources allocated by the PN toward its national security.

(2) SC authorities and funding of potential SC activities (and investments) for PN SC requirements enable CCMDs, SCOs, and Service/SOF components to conduct SC mission planning activities, including conferences, site surveys, seminars, formal SA training, and pay for certain expenses associated with executing these activities. Funding sources have certain intended purposes. Most Title 10, USC, funds are meant for DOD missions. Special funds, such as CD and counterproliferation, address objectives specific to the act that authorized the programs. Funding cannot be directed to uses not covered by the authorization, but can be redirected within the scope of the authorization. Statutory implications of SC funding and authorities typically require trained SC personnel in offices throughout OSD, the JS, DOD agencies, DSCA, and the Services to manage these SC programs, often with counterparts at the CCMD headquarters.

c. Forces. Posture planning influences force availability. The assignment tables contained in the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) and, in years the GFMIG is not updated, the Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum convey the SecDef’s direction for the assignment of forces from the Secretaries of the MILDEPs to the CCRDs. When appropriate, SecDef provides allocated forces and resources not already assigned to a CCRD for the execution of an approved military activity and according to the Global Force Management Allocation Plan.

For additional details regarding GFM, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning, and CJCSM 3130.06, Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures.

d. If CCMDs determine that new or modified authorities are required, they can pursue changes through the DOD Legislative Program. DOD authorities beyond those codified in Title 10, USC, are established each year in the NDAA. OSD’s Office of Legislative Counsel conducts the DOD Legislative Program to develop DOD’s annual request for authorities in the NDAA for the program year (FY3), which is designated in a fiscal planning cycle as FY3 (see paragraph 5, “Timeline for Funding and Authorities”). CCMDs submit legislative proposals for new authorities through this process.

e. Following budget approvals and resources allocations to the CCMDs, CCMD planners, desk officers, and operations officers, as well as the local SCOs need to determine how newly available resources will be apportioned. Thorough documentation of planned and executed SC activities into G-TSCMIS, including resourcing information, facilitates such determinations. Rarely does a CCMD receive resourcing for all its proposed SC
programs and activities. Modified, postponed, or cancelled plans, programs, and activities need to be fed back into the planning process so the CCMD can evaluate the actual resourcing’s impact on its plan and accomplishment of its theater objectives (and possible impact on achieving national objectives).

f. In addition to US statutory authorities, the terms and conditions under which SC can be conducted with a specific PN normally are governed by the bilateral agreements either in place or which may be necessary to establish. In some cases, SC planning requires the consent and settlement of a USG-PN bilateral security agreement, for example.

5. Timeline for Funding and Authorities

Each year, SC planners at all levels work at least four iterations of planning and executing specific SC activities: evaluating and reporting on the last fiscal year (FY), planning and executing SC in the current fiscal year (FY1), developing PN requirements and mission planning for the next budget year (FY2), and coordinating and negotiating DOD-DOS support of FY3. Some SC planners also project PN requirements and desired SC activities through the out years (FY4 and FY5 or longer) to justify a continuing fiscal investment in the approved security strategy and objectives for each PN. Figure III-2 graphically depicts FY1 through FY5 periods with notional SC activities in a simple format. Such a timeline provides a graphic presentation to synchronize SC activities at one or more levels (i.e., strategic, operational, and tactical) that, for example, may correspond with an LOE in a TCP CSCS/country plan.

a. SC planning enables the GCC and staff to articulate the risk associated with resource availability. The long lead times inherent in USG funding cycles mean GCCs must provide funding requirements sufficiently early to influence budget decisions and help direct resources to the GCC’s priorities. CCMDs must focus on establishing clear and compelling narratives for the type of SC activities required to achieve the theater objectives and by extension the resources to do this—at least two to three years ahead of implementation (FY2, FY3, and FY4).

(1) The CCMD has greater influence in the resource picture in FY4 and FY5 when it clearly articulates the essential link between its resource requirements and the implementation of its strategy. It is in the CCMD’s interest to map out a clear long-term, time-phased plan of action with near-term and mid-term objectives so resource providers can understand what the command is attempting to accomplish.

(2) If resource availability is highly constrained in the near-term, the scope of campaign objectives and activities will likely have to be limited. In the mid- and long-term, planners have greater latitude in identifying activities that require additional resources because those resources can be requested. Thus, TCPs and CSCSs/country plans can influence force allocation, authorities, funding, posture, and other resources toward future CCMD activities.

(3) Developing this mid- and long-term framework allows planners to provide the commander with the analytic underpinnings and justification for required resources.
Resource constraints will drive a CCMD to phase its objectives in such a way that succeeding objectives cumulatively build upon preceding ones. Each LOE should tell its own “sub-narrative” that contributes to the broader narrative related in the CCMD’s operational approach.

(4) Planners should be aware that within the planning timeline, future SC activities are dependent on current year execution. As such, planning for anticipated SC activities should be flexible, based on the monitoring and evaluation of activities that require synchronized completion. CCMDs should be prepared to change their SC planning.
and justify proposed changes in FY1 and FY2 programs based on evaluations of previous years’ activities and realize the effects created by SC activities could lag by several years.

b. DOD allocates or re-allocates funding across existing programs and establishes new programs through the PBR. The PBR is a concurrent review of the POM (DOD’s six-year program) and the Budget Estimate Submission (DOD’s two-year budget), conducted annually from August through December. The PBR provides a venue for CCMDs to seek additional funding for FY3.

c. DOS SA programs, such as FMF grants and IMET, that directly support efforts to build the capacity of and strengthen relationships with partners require lead time for programming and planning, thus FY4 and FY5 coordination/negotiation for funding. A process managed by DSCA develops FMF and IMET requirements for FY3. Because of the size and scope of those SC activities, SCOs and CCMD staffs develop specific recommendations for FMF and IMET funding and submit these recommendations to OSD, DSCA, and the JS for coordination and eventual submission to DOS.

d. The availability of DOD resources will vary over time as a result of the Department’s resource allocation processes and political and budgeting decisions. In FY1, a CCMD will have limited ability to obtain additional funds or forces, except what may become available when other commands do not use the resources allocated to them. However, allocation of funding for certain SC programs may occur in FY1 or FY2. Even in such cases, resources may not be identified until late in the year, the amount may be limited, as multiple contenders compete for these resources.

e. Planning for FY3, FY4, and FY5 focuses on identifying forces, resources, and capabilities. The apportionment tables, located on the Joint Staff J-8 [Joint Staff Directorate for Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment] SIPRNET website, inform planning by providing the quantities of forces reasonably expected to be available along general timelines. During planning, forces are input into a time-phased force and deployment list which sequences the forces required to execute the plan. SC planners should collaborate funding issues with the respective stakeholders regarding the PBR; submissions to the DOD Legislative Program; the Future Years Defense Program; and the construction, acquisition, and research requirements of DOD.

f. SC planners should identify all the viable options that could be used to resolve funding requirements and select those that achieve the best balance between being effective and being cost efficient. For example, a PN capability gap may be rooted in a lack of training, sustainment capability, or doctrine rather than an equipment shortfall, but fielding new equipment might be the most expedient solution. Rectifying a training, sustainment, or doctrine shortfall will usually be less expensive than solving a problem with an equipment solution. While this approach may take more time to effect the desired change, it may also provide a more sustainable solution. If the timeline for a PN to gain a capacity is critical to US objectives, planners should consider what a third-party partner, such as an ally or a capable regional PN, might be able to offer as an alternative to US SC. However, there could be significant future interoperability and national policy considerations with this approach, dependent upon the specific type of SA that is required (e.g., buy US Army
g. Planners and resource managers should work together to determine creative ways to plan and execute SC activities, as governed by policy and law. Historically, several funding sources were used to support single events, and several programs were used to support broader initiatives. This required the CCMDs to examine considerable challenges, internally and externally, to planning, resourcing, assessing, monitoring, and evaluating SC activities. The *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017* facilitates DOD

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### EXAMPLE SECURITY COOPERATION CONSIDERATIONS

Example security cooperation elements for consideration regarding the notional provision of a counterterrorism (CT) capability for Country X include, but are not limited to:

**Programs and authorities (not exhaustive):**

(a) Title 22, United States Code (USC), Section 2348 (Foreign Assistance Act, Sections 571-574).

(b) Title 10, USC, Section 127c (Purchase of weapons overseas: force protection).

(c) Title 10, USC, Section 333 (Foreign security forces: authority to build the capacity).

(d) Title 10, USC, Section 345, (Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program).

**Resources (related to above programs and authorities):**

(a) CT assistance funding (Department of State [DOS]/CT).

(b) Multinational partner support funds.

(c) Operations and maintenance training budgets.

**Processes and organizations (examples):**

(a) Foreign military sales case procedures and foreign disclosure processes.

(b) Compliance with published guidance, directives, instructions, etc.

(c) Routine coordination among responsible offices and commands.

(d) The National Security Council, the DOS, the Department of Justice, National Counterterrorism Center, National Joint Terrorism Task Force, Department of Defense components, partner nations, and indigenous or surrogate entities.
planning, resourcing, implementation, and evaluation of SC activities by consolidating DOD’s primary SC authorities into a more streamlined and rationalized set of six authorities and repealing many legacy authorities. Despite improved predictability in SC planning, execution, and assessment, not all SC objectives can be satisfactorily achieved with DOD authorities and resources alone. Often, an interorganizational approach is needed to achieve such objectives. This involves incorporation of SSR authorities and programs (see Appendix A, “Security Cooperation: Related Programs and Authorities”) from DOS, DHS, DOJ, and others to maximize the effectiveness of limited US resources.

6. Interagency Coordination

a. The primary conduit for interagency coordination during SC planning is the country team and its DOD representatives, the SCO. At the country level, DOD is in a supporting role to the COM. While neither the COM nor DOS have formal approval authority over CCMD CSCSs/country plans, the plans should be consistent with the objectives and priorities of the ICSs developed by the COMs for DOS and should align with the country plans of DOS, USAID, and other government agencies working in the security sector of the PN. Ultimately, the CCMD plans and DOS strategies both serve to achieve US strategic objectives for the country and region. DOD’s participation through the SCO in country team planning informs interagency partners’ plans.

b. SCO staff should brief their interagency counterparts on DOD planning guidance, objectives, and priorities for the country. As the SCO and CCMD work to develop a CSCS/country plan, the SCO should conduct targeted interaction with various members of the country team and COM if necessary. For example, when developing elements of the plan that could involve DOD humanitarian assistance or exercise-related construction activities, the SCO should consult the USAID mission director to ensure USAID development objectives, priorities, and activities inform the DOD CSCS/country plan. Similarly, planners should coordinate elements of the CCMD plan related to building PN security capacity with DOS counterparts responsible for SA programs.

c. With regard to future year activities, interagency counterparts should understand that actual execution will likely differ from what is planned. Nevertheless, visibility on planned activities (especially in the FY3+ timeframe) can help inform DOS’s planning and resource allocation processes.

d. Promote cooperation events provide an opportunity for CCMD planners and staff to meet with representatives from interagency partners. Meetings are typically conducted in the Washington, DC area and held at various levels of authority from action officer or planner-level up to general officer/flag officer/senior executive service, and include plenary sessions, panel discussions, and staff visits to individual partner agencies. These events should be viewed as two-way discussions designed to generate synergy and synchronization of activities. CCMDs request these events through the JS J-5, which will organize a promote cooperation event. Promote cooperation events are required for TCPs and can be scheduled at any point in the planning process. A promote cooperation event provides the opportunity to synchronize the theater strategy with US foreign policy for the region, as established by DOS, and obtain interagency input at the beginning of TCP
development. Usually, they are more successful when planned earlier rather than later, in particular after the initial concept development and identification of LOEs/focus areas but before the concept is fully developed. Finally, CCMDs can address country-level issues and plans with interagency partners at a promote cooperation event. Because DOS, USAID, and other interagency partners conduct their overseas activities primarily on a bilateral basis, examining issues with interagency partners at the country level may be easier and more productive than reviewing them at the regional level.

e. Regardless of when a promote cooperation event is conducted, CCMD planners should identify the specific inputs sought from interagency partners in advance of the event and likewise should be prepared to provide inputs to their planning efforts (see the DOS 3D Planning Guide: Diplomacy, Development, Defense). Subsequently, CCMD requests for information should be communicated to interagency partners through the JS J-5. CCMD staff also should make materials available to participating partner agencies well in advance of promote cooperation meetings so representatives are correctly identified and prepared to participate in the events.

f. Many resource streams come from non-DOD agencies other than DOS and USAID. Federal departments and agencies such as the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control; the DOJ’s Drug Enforcement Administration and Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, and United States Coast Guard (USCG) provide specialized functions and capabilities to inform country planning. These agencies routinely have objectives, programs, and resources in the same countries as DOD. The GEF provides consultation procedures for instances when these organizations’ interests, goals, or activities overlap with DOD’s. SSA provides the processes to focus interagency coordination of plans, priorities, objectives, and budgeting affecting the security sector of a PN.

g. All geographic CCMD headquarters normally have resident liaison representatives from DOS, USAID, and other USG departments and agencies. Unlike US military liaison officers, these liaison representatives typically do not have the authority to obligate their organizations; they do provide the capability for reachback to regional or functional SMEs and, in some situations, may be able to speak for their organizations. They can also provide input based on their own expertise and knowledge of their agency’s perspective, policies, and activities, thus making them valuable to SC planning and potential integration with other interagency activities with a PN.

7. Execution Authorities and Approvals

a. OSD, in conjunction with DSCA, coordinates at the department level to introduce policies and determine the specific funding and authorities DOS makes available for SC planning. SecDef, CJCS, CDRs, subordinate JFCs, and the Service chiefs establish procedures to promulgate the approvals and authorities for their components to use funds, forces, and other resources to conduct the mission planning aspect of SC planning for the approved and agreed upon SC activities with PNs. Coordinating instructions should describe the mechanisms to be used among the SC participants (e.g., DOS, USAID, OSD, JS, CCMDs, SCOs, Services, TSOCs, and PNs) and may also describe the authorities,
necessary agreements, operational limitations, and other considerations that govern or influence the cooperation and coordination required to plan and execute SC activities.

b. **Theater Campaign Order.** CCDRs may issue an order initiating the execution of their campaign plans; if issued, this order is called a theater campaign order. A theater campaign order may be issued annually or as deemed appropriate by the CCDR, but all such orders should be issued at a consistent point in time each FY, and up to a year before execution, to allow the CCMD staff, subordinate commands, components, and supporting agencies time to synchronize their planning, execution, evaluation, and assessment cycles and activities with the strategic planning cycles in DOD. For coordination and accountability, orders and authorities must be promulgated to all concerned DOD components, especially DSCA, which has DOD responsibilities for accounting and management of certain statutory programs for SC, to include those Title 22, USC, funds from DOS to be administered by DOD for SC. Thus informed, the SCOs will normally coordinate with their country teams and the PNs in support of the tasked individuals and units, to include facilitation of contracting requirements for US military with PN entities. Normally, execution of specific SC activities requires additional and separate orders or authorities for the individuals and units through their appropriate chain of command in coordination with the SCOs for the participating PNs.

c. **SC Activity Approval.** A CCDR’s theater campaign order (or fragmentary orders) may provide general or specific authorities to plan and execute SC activities and may delegate certain authorities to component commanders who must coordinate with SCOs (and PNs when appropriate) to finalize the execution of tasked SC activities. SC activities may be conducted across the GCC’s theater throughout the calendar year and may require months of lead time for mission planning and coordination with each SCO and PN after a general theater campaign order is issued. Specific SC activity approvals should be controlled and acknowledged procedurally. All planned SC activities must be entered in G-TSCMIS. Because SC activities normally depend upon statutory authorities and accountability, selection and training for designated SC community members, particularly those assigned to SCOs, occurs in accordance with DODD 5132.13, *Staffing of Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs), and the Selection and Training of Security Cooperation Personnel*. MILDEPs, CCMDs, NGB, and Service/SOF components should have procedures for SC requirements planning and mission planning with SCOs and PNs and other supporting organizations.

d. Execution of SC activities follows mission planning and generally begins with deployment of the tasked individual(s), unit(s), and organization(s) to the PN for the SC activity.
CHAPTER IV
SECURITY COOPERATION EXECUTION

“Global engagement is fundamental to US leadership and influence. The US military forward and rotationally deploys forces—which routinely provide presence and conduct training, exercises, and other forms of military-to-military activities—to build security globally in support of our national security interests.”

Quadrennial Defense Review 2014

1. General

This chapter describes execution of the SC plan, which includes combined exercises, joint interoperability training, individual and small unit training of fielded forces, and HCA.

a. The theater campaign order may be considered the beginning of the execution phase of the TCP, which includes the CSCSs/country plans and supporting components’ plans, but that order does not necessarily authorize execution of all SC activities. Collaborative planning among the SCO, PN, DOD component(s), OSD, DSCA, COM, DOS, and geographic CCMD results in the timely release of authorities and orders for synchronized execution of the approved and funded SC activities throughout a GCC’s theater. As stated in the previous chapter, certain aspects of SC planning may be considered part of the execution phase. Planning conferences and site surveys require authorities and funds to finalize plans for deployment and redeployment, movement, sustainment, protection, command and control (C2), and other preparations months before the actual SC activities begin with the PN.

b. Annual fragmentary orders issued by the GCC or a designated component commander can update or adjust execution of a TCP and its supporting component plans. GCCs should work with the other DOD components who provide forces, funds, and other resources, in coordination with the SCO and DSCA. The GCCs provide necessary direction, assessment, monitoring, evaluation, and, when possible, any adjustments to the planned SC activities. The executing component and the SCO keep the supported CCMD and DSCA informed. The COM, JFC, and component commanders normally use the SCO as a point of contact for coordinating with the PN representatives until direct coordination is approved for the US and PN participants. The supported and supporting JFCs and component commanders ensure a chain of command with appropriate command relationships and reporting procedures. Once granted direct liaison authority by the CCMD through the component commands, the forces executing SC activities will normally work directly with the PN and SCO, keeping their parent and/or Service headquarters informed. At the tactical level, forces plan and execute SC under the coordination authority of the SCOs, which will coordinate with the supported CCMD and keep the COM and country team informed. Forces will likely provide situation reports to and through their units and higher headquarters to the component command headquarters and the supporting CCMD, as required. The G-TSCMIS is the mandated system of record for SC and is a tool for collaborative planning, executing, evaluating, and assessing of SC activities.
c. **Institutional Perspective.** The GCC and COMs normally share a common understanding of objectives and priorities, but they have institutional perspectives on how to do things, and that can strain their relationships. The COM focuses primarily on the PN, while the GCC focuses on the entire theater; coordination for the planning and execution of SC activities must consider a balance of these perspectives and interests. The CCMD should coordinate SC efforts, to include planning and execution timelines, at least annually among the country teams with the SCOs, the component commands, PNs, and others who may contribute to SC-related activities (e.g., allies and international organizations).

d. The components’ support plans to the CSCSs/country plans outline plans of action, required resources, milestones, and necessary military engagements to support TCP objectives. Implementing organizations execute SC activities under the direction of the component command plans in support of the TCP objectives. Implementing organizations may be individuals or any component element or combination of elements of a joint force—military forces from the Active Component or Reserve Component, USG civilians, and contractors. While implementing organizations may plan and coordinate their activities with the component command headquarters and/or the CCMD, they will normally work directly with the SCO during execution.

2. **Services**

a. The Services’ Title 10, USC, responsibilities to organize, train, equip, and resource Service component commands enable and support the conduct of SC activities. The Services support Service component commands’ execution of SC activities in support of GCC objectives based on the available Service capabilities and resources and may also support institutional objectives consistent with national strategic and theater objectives. Institutional objectives should align with national strategic and theater guidance, and provide a Service-specific focus that allows for more efficient and effective allocation of resources in support of global SC priorities. The Services and GCCs should work together to ensure Service institutional objectives and priorities are considered in the development of the TCP. These activities include senior leader defense contacts and familiarization, foreign participation or attendance at Service schools, cooperative research and development programs, foreign comparative testing, and equipping activities.

b. Various Service-to-Service memoranda of understanding and memoranda of agreement govern, inform, or shape Service SC activities with PNs. These include agreements governing exchange or liaison officers, charters for Service-led staff talks, or other activities. Service SC activities may follow established timelines known years in advance, such as recurring Service-to-Service staff talks, or may present more extemporaneously, such as office calls, port visits, or Service chief or senior leader attendance at trade shows or regional conferences.

c. Services’ CSPs outline these activities, as well as Service support for theater and global objectives. A Service CSP further explains how the Service, according to their Title 10, USC, responsibilities, organizes, trains, and equips forces to support GCC theater objectives, maintain readiness, and execute SC activities. Service CSPs should be coordinated with CCMDs through the Service component commands and should address
topics such as exercises, readiness, interoperability, and capabilities development, as they may impact the TCPs. Service execution of SC is important in order to shape, build, train, and equip forces capable of operating in coalition environments, as needed, to augment CCDR efforts.

d. Service efforts should be coordinated with the GCCs within whose theater the SC activity is executed, as well as with their respective Service component commands.

3. Combatant Commands

Throughout the execution of SC activities, CCDRs and their staffs continually direct, assess, monitor, evaluate, and adjust the SC activities when possible and the CSCSs/country plans as required, while the component commands do the same with their supporting plans. However, once resourced, execution of specific SC activities occurs as planned unless a crisis affecting US forces and/or the PN precludes completion of those SC activities. SC activities normally take place through bilateral agreements that constitute binding legal obligations for both the USG and PN. As a result, any deviation from the terms of a bilateral agreement likely requires the consent of both governments. Consequently, major changes are unlikely during the execution of a specific SC activity. However, in the absence of a governing bilateral agreement and with several FYs of SC activities at various stages of planning, programming, and budgeting during any given calendar year, this process can make changes for the future.

a. Direct

(1) The supported GCC may use assigned or attached forces for SC activities that require operational forces for training and military exercises. In coordination with the MILDEPs, USSOCOM, and Reserve Component, the CCMD and theater component commands will determine who supports the SC requirements and agrees to the necessary command authorities, relationships, and necessary C2.

(2) The CCMD issues annual orders and fragmentary orders to inform its subordinates and force providers of the desired objectives and the assigned tasks that have been identified to achieve TCP SC objectives. The CCMD aligns and coordinates operations and activities based on the dynamic situation, resources available, assessment, and evaluation.

b. Assess. The Department of Defense Guidance for Security Cooperation involves initial or baseline and follow-on assessment of this DOD-wide process that is not to be confused with the operation assessment framework described in JP 5-0, Joint Planning, which is integral to the execution of any operation or campaign and more functionally supplements the subsequent evaluation of SC. Assessment in SC is a systematic analysis to provide an understanding of the context, conditions, partner capabilities, and requirements to inform SC planning and implementation.

(1) DOD guidance mandates that SC activities be preceded by initial assessments of baseline conditions in PNs, including capability gaps, absorptive capacity, political stability, and other opportunities and risks. Initial assessments provide a baseline against
which to monitor progress and provide detailed analysis to identify and inform requirements, resources, and program planning. Assessment should also be repeated to update analysis and identify mid-course corrections of SC activities.

(2) As long-term SC activities progress, follow-on assessments and mid-cycle functional evaluations may be used to update a CCMD’s understanding of the PN’s environment and the dynamics affecting the implementation of the SC activities.

c. **Monitor.** Monitoring provides situational awareness of the status and progress of SC activities. Monitoring focuses on implementation of the SC activity. It requires continuous participation by the PN’s country team in the PN and CCMD intelligence capabilities and may include information from the COM, DOS, allies, and partners, as appropriate.

   (1) Monitoring is an essential C2 function for the CCDR and staff during the execution of SC activities. CCMD monitoring of SC activities should include:

      (a) Conducting continuous intelligence operations.

      (b) Communicating and maintaining the commander’s critical information requirements.

      (c) Coordinating, controlling, and accounting for the employment of joint capabilities.

      (d) Coordinating, synchronizing, or integrating SC activities with the operations and activities of non-DOD partners.

      (e) Measuring and reporting progress toward accomplishing assigned SC tasks and achieving objectives.

   (2) The CCMD continually monitors the political and military situations relevant to SC activities and other operations in execution and may integrate this information into its common operational picture. CCMD monitoring of SC activities facilitates analysis required for follow-on assessment and functional evaluation.

d. **Evaluate.** Evaluation is a systematic process that analyzes the overall effectiveness of investing USG resources into building a partner’s capacity or capability. Numerous tailored evaluation processes, supplemented by operation assessment where applicable, are planned and conducted for the wide range of activities and operations being planned and executed within the GCC’s AOR. Because of the capacity building nature of many SC activities, evaluation, like follow-on assessment, helps guide planning of future SC activities. Evaluation is conducted through an interagency partnership and framework to support the planning needs of all applicable members of the country team. Evaluation helps determine if effects created by the SC activities will support achievement of desired objectives.
(1) The CCMD functional evaluation process helps determine whether an objective is achievable or warrants reconsideration. At the CCMD level, a single SC activity rarely achieves an objective; SC requires multiple activities executed over time to make progress towards an objective. Often, causal relationships are difficult to discern, making it difficult to determine the extent to which an SC activity influenced a PN. For these reasons, it usually is more practical for component organizations, including those from other applicable interagency partners, to evaluate the effectiveness of an SC activity based on the organization’s incremental goals and measures as one factor contributing to the effectiveness in achieving CCMD objectives. Those evaluations can be forwarded for consolidation and review by the SCO and supported CCMD during their evaluation relative to the achievement of the larger objectives. Service- or functional component-level analysis facilitates evaluating individual SC activities and objectives as part of the larger theater or functional campaign objectives.

(2) CCMD analysis of Service component evaluations should consist of, but is not limited to, the following:

(a) Monitoring the activity for current information.

(b) Evaluating progress towards achieving objectives.

(c) Recommending and directing action for improvement.

For additional information on assessment, monitoring, and evaluation, see Chapter V, “Security Cooperation Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation.”

4. Service Component Commands

a. At the end of the resourcing process, components should know which resource requests were funded and which were not. If all component resource requests were approved, the country plan can be executed without any changes. However, the more likely scenario is that one or more of the resource requests has been denied or only partially funded. In this scenario, the first step in the execution process would be to modify the country plan based on available resources.

b. Depending on the resources available, the DOD components, in collaboration with the CCMD, decide which activities to conduct in the following year and which activities to modify, postpone, or cancel. Modifications may involve combining activities or reducing the scale or scope of the original activity. Examples include combining a US Air Force exercise with a US Navy exercise or turning a face-to-face seminar into a virtual meeting. It is important for component planners to document how the gap between the resources they requested and the resources they received affected the country plan and, specifically, the achievement of component objectives. This is an important part of the processes discussed in Chapter V, “Security Cooperation Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation.”

c. The next step is executing the SC activity. The primary role of the component planner is to ensure appropriate tasking of activities to organizations within the component
and appropriate coordination of activities with organizations outside of the executing component/agency. Early coordination of the SC activity during planning helps facilitate coordination during execution. With the activities properly assigned and coordinated, the component planner monitors execution and can help deconflict activities as necessary. Many components and most SCOs maintain a calendar to help them keep track of activities and other important events in their countries. For example, G-TSCMIS can be utilized to document, track, and synchronize SC events and activities.

See Appendix C, “Notional Security Cooperation Activity Checklist.”
CHAPTER V
SECURITY COOPERATION ASSESSMENT, MONITORING, AND EVALUATION

1. Introduction

SC activities conducted by DOD entities with other nations’ defense organizations range from the very visible—training, equipping, and exercising together—to those less obvious, such as holding bilateral talks, workshops, and conferences and providing education. Often, it is challenging to determine if these activities have contributed to US objectives—whether at the level of national security, department or agency, Service, or CCMD—and if so, by how much or in what ways. Because SC activities are dispersed and generally support long-term objectives, the impacts can be difficult to immediately measure above the tactical and operational levels (i.e., operation assessments and Service or functional component-level evaluations). Those who plan and execute SC intuitively know whether they have gained ground with the respective PNs as a result of individual programs and activities. However, SC can be conducted in conjunction with a larger whole-of-government effort of interrelated activities for the security sector. Therefore, it may be more difficult to validate a general sense of accomplishment empirically, especially to decision makers across several collaborating departments and agencies. For these reasons, a conglomeration of initial interagency assessments should provide the basis upon which to foster a PN’s strategy development (e.g., ICSs), encourage unity of effort by interagency partners, focus resources, and better anticipate a PN’s overall needs. Moreover, monitoring throughout the implementation of an SC activity or initiative enables regular feedback on the extent to which expected objectives are being achieved on expected timelines to inform decisions or corrective actions. Finally, functional evaluations at the strategic level involve systematic collection and analysis of information and evidence about the characteristics and outcomes of an ongoing or completed initiative, its design, implementation, and results. Supplemented by operation assessment where applicable, such evaluations determine the relevance, value, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact of activities, and help planners understand the impacts of tactical and operational activities in the context of broader interagency efforts in the security sector. Progress toward established goals (e.g., one year intermediate objectives or five year objectives) may be updated regularly or at a period defined by a statute, or the CCDR, in coordination with the COM. Recurring assessment, monitoring, and evaluation help determine whether resources have been effectively allocated and used, and allows for program and activity adjustments.

a. Assessment informs decision making by helping to establish information about the conditions present within a PN that are relevant to planning a successful SC initiative. Assessments serve at least two critical functions: providing relevant information to inform the design of SC activities, programs, or initiatives; and providing baseline information to enable accurate measurement of progress as an activity, program, or initiative progresses. JFCs perform assessments of SC activities in close collaboration with participating military units, their Service component commanders and the US country team. Therefore, it is important for SC planners to be involved in assessment working groups to improve the overall effectiveness of SC activities. Initial or follow-on SC assessments should precede all major SC initiatives.
or adjustments by measuring the progress of the three fundamental and interrelated considerations for SC: the level of progress towards building a security relationship; PN capacity and capabilities; and US operational access within the PN, including anticipated freedom of action, that results from a US and PN relationship.

b. Monitoring enables planners to understand changes in the OE based on the implementation of SC initiatives, and it further informs a commander’s intent, guidance for planning, prioritization, and execution. This includes monitoring individual tasks, normally using measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs), which can directly inform both operation assessment at the tactical and operational levels, and functional evaluation at the strategic level. Task monitoring focuses on “are we doing things right,” while operation assessment and functional evaluation focus on “are we efficiently and effectively doing the right things” to create the effects to achieve SC objectives, which typically support theater campaign and other strategic objectives. Task monitoring includes tracking whether tasks are completed as planned, whether tasks are completed according to the planned timeline, whether costs are as projected, and other indicators used to determine whether planned activities are being executed successfully, and it informs leaders and decision makers at all levels.

c. SC activities are incrementally conducted over time and aligned to CCDR objectives to make progress towards strategic end states. Normally, the cause and effect are spread over a long term. Functional evaluations allow planners to examine the effectiveness of SC activities, programs, or initiatives at the tactical or operational level, recognizing that impact may be difficult to judge in light of broader USG security sector efforts and complex variables associated with PN actions and at the strategic level. They are performed to understand the impact and effectiveness of SC initiatives at the strategic level and generate lessons learned to inform future SC planning. Functional evaluations at all levels should be linked to clearly stated defense objectives and should be integrated into program or initiative design from the outset.

2. Initial and Follow-On Assessment

Assessment entails systematic analysis to provide an understanding of the context, conditions, partner capabilities, and requirements to inform SC planning and implementation. Initial assessments should precede all major SC activities or initiatives, and the results should inform planning. Assessments are generally conducted in advance of SC activities, but follow-on assessments may be repeated to update analysis and identify mid-course corrections. Assessments identify potential risks to SC initiative success to help planners develop or adjust risk mitigation strategies.

a. Initial and follow-on assessments describe PN willingness and ability to implement and sustain assistance; improve institutional capacity; build capabilities in the context of country or other relevant objectives; and identify requirements, gaps, and potential risks.

b. For SC activities, the sponsoring CCMD staff, DSCA, Service component commands, and the affected country team may participate in conducting initial
### INITIAL AND FOLLOW-ON ASSESSMENT

Analysis derived from an initial assessment should directly inform an initiative design document and related country plans in appropriate sections. Initial assessments should include the following elements:

1. The extent to which an allied or partner nation shares relevant strategic objectives with the United States, as well as a partner’s current ability to contribute to missions that address such shared objectives, and gaps in partner ability to contribute to shared interests, including capability shortfalls based on detailed and holistic analysis of relevant partner capabilities such as through application of the doctrine, organizational structure, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy framework referenced in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01, *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)*.

2. Analysis of potential risks, including assumptions and possible consequences of implementing and not implementing the initiative, program, or activity.

3. Information to inform initiative design, including available contextual data, baselines, suggested objectives, indicators and milestones, as well as recommendations on what can be achieved within a given timeframe with anticipated resources.

4. Analysis of relevant environmental, economic, political, sociological, cultural, and other conditions that may directly impact the implementation of the initiative in a specific country.

5. The feasibility of achieving objectives based on a partner’s political willingness to pursue them; its absorptive capacity, including the extent to which a partner can support, employ, and sustain assistance independently; its political stability; and its respect for rule of law and human rights.

6. Analysis of other related United States Government, nongovernmental, and international organizations, and other stakeholder efforts that are underway or planned, including how the security cooperation initiative may complement or compete with other programs or activities.

7. Other relevant information, assessments, completed evaluations and related documents that provide context for the initial assessment process.

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Chapter V

CCDR develops an initial assessment supported by inputs from supporting commanders, SMEs, PNs, and other stakeholders.

3. Monitoring

Monitoring is a continuous process of collecting and reporting of data designed to track implementation of milestones and provide regular feedback on the extent to which expected objectives of an SC activity, program, or initiative are being achieved to inform decisions or corrective actions. In general, results measured in monitoring are the direct and near-term consequences of initiative activities, which provide opportunities to validate planning assumptions throughout implementation and an early indication of the likelihood that end state will be attained within anticipated timeframes. Indicators and milestones used for monitoring purposes should be derived from initial assessments.

a. Monitoring may be focused at different levels and be of different types:

(1) At the implementation level, output monitoring of specific deliverables such as goods and services to document progress during initiative implementation (e.g., number of trainings delivered). Output monitoring may use MOPs to determine progress relative to the accomplishment of tasks.

(2) At the leadership or management level, outcome monitoring of the results of SC initiatives to gauge success (e.g., was capacity built based on our training? Did the PN successfully employ the DOD-provided system in support of the intended mission?). Outcome monitoring may use MOEs to determine effects created, objectives achieved, and progress toward end states attained.

b. Monitoring, which may also include site visits, should also review and identify any changes in the OE since the initial assessment and identify any unforeseen challenges that impact initiative execution and implementation. Monitoring should be used for early identification of where plans must be adjusted or canceled.

c. Certain SC activities and monitoring data should be tracked using G-TSCMIS, which is the primary system of record used by DOD and sponsored by DSCA.

4. Functional Evaluation

Evaluations may be conducted at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels and involve systematic collection and analysis of information and evidence about the characteristics and outcomes of an ongoing or completed SC initiative, its design, implementation, and results. They determine relevance, value, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact as a basis for improving effectiveness and to inform decision makers regarding future plans, programs, and activities. Evaluation, distinct from initial or follow-on assessment and monitoring, focuses on documenting the achievement of objectives, the attainment of end states, and in some cases the value of continuing the SC investment. Evaluations at the strategic level should depend on operation assessment as well as component- and unit-level evaluations, which are critical to explain why certain efforts succeed or fail.
a. Functional evaluations should be conducted according to internationally recognized standards in order to ensure the integrity and credibility of results. In line with standards set forth by the American Evaluation Association and the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, evaluation should be conducted in line with the principles of usefulness, independence, methodological and analytical rigor, and cost effectiveness as identified in Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5132.14, *Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise*. 

**PRINCIPLES OF EVALUATION**

1. **Usefulness**: The information, ideas, and recommendations generated by evaluations should serve a need or answer specific strategic questions for the Department of Defense.

2. **Independence**: Evaluators should be able to gather and analyze data and information freely and follow rigorous and scientifically valid methodologies. All evaluations should be free from any interference from the commissioning unit or management.

3. **Methodological and Analytical Rigor**: Evaluations should be evidence-based, relying on verifiable data and information gathered using the standards of professional evaluation organizations. Both quantitative and qualitative methods can be rigorous and are usually required to answer evaluation questions.

4. **Cost Effectiveness**: The expected benefits from an SC evaluation should be of value greater than, or equal to, the resources expended on the evaluation. Cost effectiveness should also be weighed in determining how the evaluation will be used.


b. Evaluations should always result in reports that identify clear observations and recommendations to inform future SC planning. These reports should always be disseminated to all relevant stakeholders, including CDRs, relevant SCOs and country teams, SC program managers, and DSCA. These reports should be uploaded to G-TSCMIS.

**5. Operation Assessment**

Similar to functional evaluation, operation assessment is a continuous process that evaluates changes in the OE and measures the progress of executing tasks, creating effects, and achieving objectives toward attaining the desired end state of a particular military operation. Operation assessment informs planning; decision makers continuously analyze the OE and the progress of operations, compared to their initial assessment, understanding, visualization, and intent; and operation assessment helps them adjust planning and
operations to make efficient use of limited resources. All key participants in a particular activity or operation should be involved in development of the operation assessment plan, collection of relevant data, and reporting.

a. As with initial or follow-on assessment, operation assessment should enable the stakeholders from the sponsoring CCMD staff, DSCA, Service component commands, and the affected country team to identify key factors that can influence tasks and operations to inform functional evaluations and provide the GCC and COM with timely and accurate information needed for decisions. When possible, the commander should leverage operation assessment as part of the communications synchronization plan. Likewise, foreign disclosure procedures and a tailored and responsive information-sharing process should be part of the operation assessment plan for dissemination with interagency partners and a broad PN or multinational audience.

b. While there is no one set formula for developing operation assessments, this chapter provides an approach to qualify them according to commander’s insight. Operation assessment will inform (and be informed by) the commander’s personal assessment and evaluation and supports functional assessment at the CCMD level as to whether or not SC activities and objectives are supporting theater-strategic or campaign objectives (objective-oriented). Based on these determinations, commanders may recommend adjustments to ensure continued progress. DOD, through the GCCs and CJCS, also conducts long-term strategic evaluations focused on SC objectives, PN conditions, and application of available resources to achieve objectives while the operation assessment process begins during mission analysis and continues throughout all phases. Both involve, but are not limited to, the following:

1. Continuously monitoring progress of SC activities.
2. Using MOPs to determine progress relative to the accomplishment of tasks and using MOEs to qualify effects created, objectives achieved, and end states attained.
3. Analyze changes in PN conditions (e.g., overall effectiveness of SC with PN, including specific capacity or capabilities, strengthening or weakening partnership, and PN attitude and will to continue cooperation and sustainment of enhanced capacity).
4. Adjusting plan execution or developing recommendations and seeking guidance for improvement of the plan itself.

c. Operation assessments of joint operations involving SC are different than the initial or follow-on assessments preceding those SC activities, especially with SC activities conducted for shaping as part of a GCC’s TCP. SC activities typically focus on building partnerships and improving the capacity and capabilities of security or civil sectors within PNs for stabilization and to prevent conflict. Because SC requires stringent DOD oversight, some aspects of operation assessments, as well as the functional evaluations they may support, will be qualitative in nature to comply with policy guidance, and funding and other resource accountability. GCCs, in coordination with the CJCS (to assist USD[P] and Director, DSCA), should establish all operation assessment, evaluation, and reporting
requirements through their TCP and theater SC guidance. Service component commanders should establish related guidance in their supporting plans, including guidance as required by their supported GCC; MILDEPs; and Commander, USSOCOM, when applicable.

6. Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Considerations

Assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of SC activities help to inform decision makers as to precisely where to continue, cut, or change the allocation of SC applied resources and why. Moreover, they inform strategic prioritization by identifying areas of greatest SC effectiveness in areas and ways that best serve US interests. Determining the value of what are essentially qualitative activities, and where the correlation among activities is not always apparent, is difficult.

a. CCMDs provide SC through various SC mechanisms according to the capability or purpose against which they are utilized and the activity they help execute. The underpinning military capability or purpose is closely related to the threat or problem a CCMD is trying to solve. Examples include building partner capacity for CT or CWMD. Activities may be grouped as military-to-military contacts, training, equipping, cooperative activities, or military-to-civilian contacts. SC mechanisms are composed of various elements such as programs, resources, authorities, processes, and organizational relationships. A program encompasses a group of activities that has an established set of objectives, resources, and a management structure. Resources refer to the funding, personnel, and facilities associated with the SC activities or programs. Authorities are the rules governing the use of programs and resources. Processes include the management, execution, and oversight functions for planning, resourcing, executing, and assessing SC activities. Finally, organizations and organizational relationships are the entities involved in the planning, resources, execution, and assessment of SC activities. These can fall within DOD and can also involve outside entities such as DOS. CCMDs employ multiple SC mechanisms to achieve a single objective or even to conduct a single activity. Thus, SC professionals assemble multiple mechanisms to enhance a PN’s security through SC activities.

b. Different level headquarters will likely have different focuses for the assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of SC activities. Consider the following:

(1) Tactical-level commanders focus more on task accomplishment and performance management, whether they are performing assigned or implied tasks to standard (using MOPs) answering if they’re “doing things right.” MOPs answer the questions “was the task completed?” and “was it completed to standard?” (e.g., delivery of equipment, construction of contingency bases, construction of a school, or seizure of an objective to specified standards) to assist the unit in improving future performance.

(2) Operational-level headquarters focus on operation assessment, monitoring, and evaluation that addresses whether the command is creating the necessary effects and achieving objectives (MOEs-oriented) within the OE for mission success (e.g., progress in gaining support of populace or decrease in enemy activity) answering if they are “doing the right things.” As distinguished in paragraph 2, “Initial and Follow-on Assessment,”
and paragraph 5, “Operation Assessment,” DOS and other interagency partners that work security sector issues, often use the term assessment when referring to an initial analysis of the OE prior to planning or project execution. This use of assessment should not be confused with the DOD usage of the term operation assessment, which refers to the planned and continuous analysis of the efficacy of activities that are already underway. The following describes four basic considerations:

(a) **Reporting.** SC activities garner continuous scrutiny, often through real-time reporting. CCDRs assess, monitor, and evaluate reports on SC activities, as well as other exercises and operations supported by subordinate commanders and country teams as they individually analyze developments in the OE. For example, the participating military unit(s) at the tactical level may report through the SDO/DATT on the country team (for the COM) and through situation reports through their higher headquarters to the Service component command and the CCMD’s SC office. The SDO/DATT may also send reports to the CCMD and DSCA. Established in coordination with COM and DOS and other SCO members, CCDR and DSCA requirements dictate the formats necessary to evaluate and deliver information, as required. Reports focus on the facts but may also provide a qualitative contextualization of progress.

(b) **Progress Toward Objectives.** CCDRs should develop assessment, monitoring, and evaluation plans concurrently with the development of SC activity, program, or initiative plans and objectives to ensure objectives are **specific, measurable, achievable, results-oriented, and time-bound.** If an objective does not meet these criteria, then it should be redefined. An international best practice for the provision of capacity-building and other assistance is the development of a program or initiative design document at the outset of a program or initiative, which should articulate the objective; the details of the planned program or initiative; and a specific assessment, monitoring, and evaluation plan. The CCDR’s battle rhythm includes periodic review of SC assessment, monitoring, and evaluation outcomes, as well as other exercises and operations progress reports. Information in CCMD assessments, monitoring, and evaluation processes may be derived from interagency and multinational partners, PNs, subordinate commands, international organizations, NGOs, and various intelligence sources, to include open-source reporting. Of note, data limitations severely hinder these efforts.

(c) **Effects on PN Conditions.** The initial assessments that form a baseline for establishing the objectives (and an end state) and that describe expected changes in PN conditions, are likely to be both quantitative and qualitative. MOPs and MOEs will help monitor progress toward objectives and the desired end state, along with evaluation inputs from a variety of organizations, to include the participating military unit(s), SDO/DATT (and other country team members, including the COM), DSCA and other SCO direct-participants, and the sponsoring CCMD. Often tactical-level commanders are well-positioned to identify or evaluate changes in the capacities of specific partnered tactical-level units in addition to PN will, sentiment, and attitude toward participation in SC tasks. DOD and other USG analysts may compile a combination of open and official sources. The changes may range from specific capability changes (the coast guard of Country X is trained to perform littoral patrols) to broad capacity changes (Country X defends its borders) to mutual goals (Country X willingly and effectively participates with US or other
nations to combat transnational terrorist organizations). The assessment, monitoring, and evaluation outcomes must strive to describe the relationship between the status in the country and the CCMD and COM objectives for that country. These outcomes serve as the basis for all decisions regarding a continued USG commitment to SC activities.

(d) Adjust. The CCDR decides when to modify plans and operations, typically based on guidelines in the assessment, monitoring, and evaluation plans, but may also be required by changes in a TCP (or another campaign or contingency plan) driven by changes in the OE or strategic security environment that, in turn, may result in policy or strategy changes. Adjustments do not change end states that are established through policy and strategy. Changes in SC activities should be anticipated, because SC activities are typically associated with an end state that requires a long-term US and PN commitment and eventual sustainment of capacity by the PN.

1. Modify SC Activities. Assessment, monitoring, and evaluation inform the CCDR (and country team) to continue as planned or to make adjustments when tasks are not creating desired effects or objectives cannot be achieved as planned. Changes to SC activities must be coordinated through the SCO and acknowledged through DSCA, which manages the statutory and funding aspects of SC for DOD in coordination with DOS. In this context, such modifications do not necessarily imply the planned objectives are flawed, but that the tasks and desired effects, resources, or associated timelines require adjustment. Considerations should include whether to:

   a. Modify assumptions regarding PN condition.
   b. Adjust priorities.
   c. Reallocate resources within statutory constraints.
   d. Modify specific SC activities.
   e. Adjust timelines and decision points.
   f. Modify operation assessment plan.

2. Plan Changes May Require SC Modification. SC activities with a given PN may have to be changed to accommodate changes to the overarching TCP or another campaign or contingency plan, perhaps despite favorable indications from the assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of ongoing SC activities. Such changes would be coordinated by the supported CCDR with SecDef through the CJCS and would likely include policy/strategy changes based on changes to the OE or strategic security environment. Planners make plan changes based on commander’s intent and guidance; DSCA and the affected CCDRs and COMs will provide appropriate direction to the SCO.
APPENDIX A
SECURITY COOPERATION: RELATED PROGRAMS AND AUTHORITIES

1. Introduction

This appendix describes DOD and DOS programs that have been used to support a variety of SC activities. This appendix is not all inclusive and provides only an overview of the programs. In most cases, planners should consult with legal advisors to identify the proper USC section, regulation, or directive prior to any expenditure of resources. As a matter of fiscal law, funds may only be expended for the purpose for which they were authorized. Consequently, the planners and appropriate commander must ensure any expenditure of funds for an SC activity complies with the associated fiscal mandates. Failure to do so can result in a violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act.

For additional information see the most current version of the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management’s handbook, Security Cooperation Programs.

2. Department of Defense: Security Cooperation Programs and Authorities

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 enacted significant reforms to DOD SC authorities, and established a dedicated chapter within Title 10, USC (Chapter 16, Security Cooperation). Title 10, USC, Chapter 16 contains specific DOD authorities for conducting military-to-military engagements, training with foreign forces, support for operations and capacity building, and educational and training activities. DOD authorities for conducting activities under the category of international armaments cooperation are found elsewhere in Title 10, USC. In addition, Title 10, USC, contains several targeted, niche, or temporary authorities for conducting SC under particular circumstances. These DOD authorities closely reflect the capabilities-based categories of SC activities identified in Chapter III, “Security Cooperation Planning:” defense contacts and familiarization, personnel exchange, combined exercises and training, train-and-equip/provide defense articles, DIB, operational support, education, international armaments cooperation (see Figure A-1 for a partial list of these categories of SC activities alongside their associated SC programs and authorities).

a. Military-to-Military Engagements (Title 10, USC, Sections 311-313)

(1) SecDef is authorized to enter into international agreements for the exchange of US defense personnel and foreign personnel. Under this authority, exchanges may be conducted on a reciprocal or non-reciprocal basis; US personnel may include military or civilian personnel. Exchanges may be conducted with personnel of foreign defense ministries or, with the concurrence of SECSTATE, foreign non-defense security ministries or international or regional security organizations.

(2) SecDef may pay certain personnel expenses of foreign personnel as necessary for theater SC. Eligible expenses include travel, subsistence, and similar personnel expenses, administrative services, and support for foreign liaison officers who are assigned
to any headquarters in the DOD, or travel, subsistence, and medical care for such liaison officers.

(3) This authority is commonly used to support the participation of foreign personnel in conferences, seminars, and similar meetings; such meetings must be
conducted in direct support of enhancing interoperability for planning bilateral or multilateral exercises, training, or operations. The authority may be used to pay the expenses of foreign defense personnel or, with the concurrence of SECSTATE, foreign non-defense government personnel and nongovernmental personnel.

b. **Training with Foreign Forces (Title 10, USC, Sections 321-322).** The US Armed Forces are authorized to train with military forces or other security forces of foreign PN in cases where SecDef determines it is in the national security interests of the US. Under this authority, the US Armed Forces may conduct training with, or bilateral or multilateral exercises with, counterpart forces, and may pay the incremental expenses of a country (except under certain circumstances, a developing country) to participate in such training. Authorized expenses include the travel, subsistence, and other personnel expenses of the developing countries defense personnel. Combined training and exercises may be conducted with nonmilitary security forces only by specialized forces of the US Armed Forces; US CF may only train with the military forces of a PN.

c. **Support for Operations and Capacity Building (Title 10, USC, Sections 331-333)**

   (1) **Support for Operations (Title 10, USC, Section 331).** SecDef, with the concurrence of SECSTATE, may provide support to friendly foreign countries in the context of specifically designated operations. Such support may include logistics support, supplies, and services; procurement of equipment for the purposes of loaning such equipment to enhance capabilities and interoperability; provision of specialized training; and small-scale construction to enable countries to participate or continue participating in designated operations. Under this authority, SecDef may provide support to military forces or, if it directly benefits US Armed Forces, nonmilitary forces who are participating in a combined operation with US forces or in a military operation or stability activity that benefits the US. For operations in which the US is not participating, SecDef and SECSTATE must jointly certify to Congress that the operation is in the national security interests of the US prior to the provision of assistance under this authority.

   (2) **Defense Institution Capacity Building (Title 10, USC, Section 332).** SecDef, with the concurrence of SECSTATE, may provide programs for training and training support programs and may assign DOD civilian employees as advisors to the ministries of defense (or security agencies serving a similar defense function) to provide institutional, ministerial-level advice, and other training in support of stabilization or post-conflict activities or assist in building core institutional capacity, competencies, and capabilities to manage defense-related processes. Programs should enhance civilian oversight; establish responsible defense governance; assess and address shortfalls; and enhance overall ministerial, general, or joint staff or service-level core management competencies. See the DIB policy discussion in Chapter II, “Security Cooperation Relationships,” for further information. DOD applications of this authority include the following programs:

   (a) **Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI).** Effective military capability requires defense and/or security ministries and supporting organizations such as joint or general staffs, capable of organizing, training, equipping, and sustaining armed forces.
appropriate to the national context and within a framework that supports transparency and accountability. Established in 2010, DIRI is one of DOD’s primary SC tools to support a PN’s efforts to develop its defense institutions’ ability to perform these functions and direct their use in a legitimate manner. Ultimately, PNs that are able to maintain their own security and join the US in supporting international peacekeeping and security operations are important to US interests and to international and regional stability. This approach requires close coordination and cooperation between the DOS, DOD, and the PN. The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense directs DIRI in close coordination with CCMDs and country teams. DSCA is responsible for program and fiscal management.

(b) **Wales Initiative Fund (WIF).** In January 1994, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program to increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened security relationships among individual nations in Europe and the former Soviet Union and with NATO. The US established the Warsaw Initiative Fund shortly thereafter to provide support to developing nations that are members of the PfP. The program’s primary objectives are to improve NATO/PfP partner interoperability, advance PfP partner DIB/defense reform, and support PfP partner integration with NATO. During the NATO summit in Wales in September 2014, SecDef renamed the Warsaw Initiative Fund as WIF and opened eligibility for the program to include not just the PfP countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, but all developing NATO partners, including the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative countries. Eligible activities will strengthen partner defense institutions and promote interoperability through military-to-military contacts, exchanges, workshops, conferences, and advisory efforts. This approach requires close coordination and cooperation between DOS, DOD, and the PN. WIF is directed by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation, in close coordination with CCMDs and SDO/DATTs. DSCA is responsible for program and fiscal management. WIF may be used in conjunction with other types of funding, to include CCIF, traditional CCDR activity, Official Representation Funds, Emergency Extraordinary Expense, FMF, IMET, and NATO funds.

(c) **Ministry of Defense Advisor (MODA) Program.** Under MODA, SecDef may assign DOD employees as advisors to ministries of defense (or security agencies serving a similar defense function) of foreign countries in order to provide institutional, ministerial-level advice and other training to personnel of the ministry to which assigned in support of stabilization or post-conflict activities or assist such ministry in building core institutional capacity, competencies, and capabilities to manage defense related processes. Deployment of a MODA requires the approval and support of DOS, OSD, CCMD, the country team, and PN, and close coordination with other DIB programs. The MODA Program is overseen by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation, which reviews/approves/coordinates nominations. DSCA is responsible for program and fiscal management. Advisors are typically assigned to the SCO under coordination authority of the SDO/DATT.

(3) **Building Capacities (Title 10, USC, Section 333).** SecDef, with the concurrence of SECSTATE, is authorized to build the capacity of a foreign country’s national security forces to conduct CT operations, CWMD operations, CD trafficking
operations, counter transnational organized crime operations, maritime and border security operations, military intelligence operations, and other operations or activities that contribute to multinational operations that benefit the national security interests of the US. Programs may include the provision of equipment, supplies, training, defense services, and small-scale military construction. Sustainment support may be provided for a period extending up to five years after the provision of equipment under the authority. Any assistance provided under this authority must be accompanied by parallel assistance programs aimed to address institutional capacity-building and respect for human rights. Assistance will generally be provided to foreign military forces, but may be provided to other security forces under certain circumstances.

d. Educational and Training Activities (Title 10, Sections 341-350)

(1) Regional Defense CTFP (Title 10, USC, Section 345). CTFP seeks to educate and train mid- and senior-level partner defense and security officials in threats, strategies, and operations relating to CT. Through such education, it builds and strengthens a global network of combating terrorism (CbT) experts and practitioners at the operational and strategic levels, and reinforces the CbT capabilities of PNs. CTFP also invests to create new curricula and training modules to address emerging CbT areas of interest to fill gaps in existing academic programming.

(2) Regional Centers for Security Studies (Title 10, USC, Section 342). DOD maintains five regional centers for security studies: the Africa Center for Security Studies, the Near East and South Asia Center for Security Studies, and the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, each located at Fort McNair in Washington, DC; the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, located in Honolulu, HI; and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, located in Garmisch, Germany and co-sponsored by the Government of Germany. Regional centers offer platforms for convening leaders from across assigned regions for training, education, and discussion. These unique academic forums build strong, sustainable international networks of security leaders. The regional centers support defense strategy objectives and policy priorities through:

(a) Offering executive-development strategic-security studies, research, and outreach in rigorous outreach programs that foster long-term collaborative relationships;

(b) Developing and sustaining relationships and communities of interest among security practitioners and national security establishments, especially in defense, throughout the region; and

(c) Enhancing enduring partnerships among the nations of the region. The regional centers accomplish their mission primarily through resident and in-region programs including seminars and courses, as well as through bilateral workshops, alumni outreach events, and research publications.

(3) SPP (Title 10, USC, Section 341). SecDef, with the concurrence of SECSTATE, is authorized to establish a program of activities, known as a “State
Partnership” and described to support the achievement of US SC objectives, between members of the National Guard of a state or territory and any of the following:

(a) The military forces of a foreign country.

(b) The security forces of a foreign country.

(c) Governmental organizations of a foreign country whose primary functions include disaster response or emergency response.

e. International Armaments Cooperation (Title 10, USC, Sections 2350a, 2350, 2358). International Armaments Cooperation encompasses defense-related international research, development, production, and support activities involving cooperation between the USG and governments/industries of allied and friendly nations. These efforts are directly linked to the development and support of urgently needed military capabilities for US and multinational forces. International Armaments Cooperation is intended to strengthen alliances and other relationships with friendly countries; encourage willingness to act collectively; promote international legitimacy in multinational operations; achieve interoperability that facilitates combined operations, reduces operational hazards, and minimizes operations security (OPSEC) compromises; ensure access to the best global technologies; help minimize capabilities gap with multinational partners; share (reduce) costs for new system development; and bolster domestic and allied defense industrial bases. International Armaments Cooperation includes the following programs:

(1) Information Exchange Program.

(2) Engineers and Scientists Exchange Program.

(3) Foreign Comparative Testing Program.

(4) Cooperative research, development, and production.

(5) No-cost equipment loans for research, development, testing, and evaluation.

(6) Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.

(7) Israeli Cooperative Programs.

(8) United States-Israel Anti-Tunnel Cooperation.

(9) International air and trade shows.

f. ACSA (Title 10, USC, Sections 2341-2350)

(1) Purpose. Under this authority, DOD may enter into bilateral agreements for the reimbursable mutual exchange of logistical support, supplies, and services with NATO countries, NATO subsidiary bodies, other designated-eligible countries, the UN,
and other international organizations. The purchase and sale of logistic support does not extend to major end items of equipment (e.g., trucks, weapons systems). Per Title 10, USC, Section 2350, the term “logistic support, supplies, and services” includes temporary use of general purpose vehicles and other nonlethal items of military equipment which are not designated as significant military equipment on the US Munitions List. Examples include vehicles, communications equipment, and training aids. This authority allows DOD to acquire or transfer logistic support outside the AECA channels. This is a limited, DOD-specific authority to both acquire logistic support without resorting to commercial contracting procedures and to transfer logistic support outside of AECA channels. However, pursuant to Title 10, USC, Section 2341, the authority to acquire logistic support, services, and facilities may only be used to support US forces deployed outside of the US. Pursuant to Title 10, USC, Section 2342, cross-servicing agreements may not be used to procure any goods or services from any foreign government or international organization when those are reasonably available from US commercial sources.

(2) Procedures. After consulting with DOS, DOD may enter into agreements with NATO countries, NATO subsidiary bodies, and other designated-eligible countries for reciprocal logistic support, supplies, and services. However, major end items are excluded. Acquisitions and transfers are on a cash, replacement in kind (RIK), or equal value exchange (EVE) basis. RIK or EVE must be accomplished within 12 months after the date of delivery of the logistic support, supplies, or services. After 12 months, reimbursement must be on a cash basis. OSD is the policy and legal authority for the use of ACSA authorities and may only delegate down to the CCMD the authority to negotiate new ACSA orders.

For further details, see CJCSI 2120.01, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements.

3. Department of Defense: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Programs

a. Humanitarian Assistance, Title 10, USC, Section 2561

(1) Purpose. This provision authorizes appropriated funds to be used by DOD for humanitarian assistance (i.e., Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid), and DSCA manages those funds. Funds should be used for Defense Transportation System-managed transportation of USG-procured humanitarian relief supplies on a case-by-case basis (DOD Funded Transportation Program) and for other authorized humanitarian purposes worldwide, such as training, equipping, and/or limited construction to build partner capacity to deliver humanitarian assistance and essential services to the civilian population.

(2) Procedures. The SCO typically forwards requests through the supported GCC for review and approval by DSCA in coordination with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs. Upon DSCA approval, or CCMD approval, if below the “minimal cost” threshold, the CCMD determines if and when to fund approved projects, and execution is typically delegated to the project submitter (e.g., SCO or a civil affairs team). Projects require USAID coordination. For urgent disaster relief, DOD typically proves support after receipt of a DOS Executive Secretariat
request for DOD assistance to further the USG response whereby tasking the affected GCC to provide assistance. DSCA provides funding to the GCC as authorized by SecDef.


b. Transportation of Humanitarian Relief Supplies to Foreign Countries, Title 10, USC, Section 402

(1) Purpose. This statute authorizes military transportation of nongovernmental, privately donated humanitarian relief supplies, subject to certain conditions and on a space-available basis. This section commonly refers to assistance as the “Denton Program,” which is jointly administered by DSCA (for DOD), USAID, and DOS.

(2) Procedures. Private aid donors apply for transportation via the web (https://hatransportation.ohasis.org). DOD is also authorized to transport donated supplies from NGOs and international organizations intended for humanitarian assistance purposes. This transportation is authorized without charge but on a space-available basis. Before supplies can be transported, DOD must determine their transportation is consistent with US foreign policy, they are suitable for humanitarian purposes and in usable condition, a legitimate humanitarian need exists for them by the people for whom they are intended, they will be used for humanitarian purposes, and adequate arrangements have been made for their distribution in the destination country by the NGO or international organization. DSCA manages the program and the funds. Requests should be forwarded by the supported CCDR to the JS for approval by DSCA.

c. HCA Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations, Title 10, USC, Section 401

(1) Purpose. This authority allows the Service components to carry out HCA activities abroad. Projects must promote US and HN security interests, as well as enhance readiness skills of the US forces that participate. These projects are to be conducted in conjunction with authorized military operations and can complement, but not duplicate, other assistance provided by the USG. HCA is confined to four general areas which are defined by statute: medical, dental, surgical, and veterinary care provided in rural or underserved areas of a country, including education, training, and technical assistance related to the care provided; construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. HCA projects cannot benefit any individual or organization engaged in military or paramilitary activity.

(2) Procedures. HCA projects must be approved by the HN government and must be supported by the US embassy, DOS, USAID, and DOD. Indirect costs of Section 401 activities such as the temporary duty expenses of DOD personnel completing the HCA project are funded from the Services’ operation and maintenance accounts. Any direct costs of providing HCA must be paid from funds specifically appropriated for the provision of humanitarian assistance. ASD(SO/LIC) provides oversight within DOD.
(3) Unless expressly authorized in an appropriations act, the Defense Health Program (DHP) appropriation may not be used to fund HCA activities. The purpose of the DHP appropriation is to create and maintain high morale in the uniformed Services by providing an improved and uniform program of medical and dental care for members and certain former members of those Services and for their dependents (Title 10, USC, Section 1071). Further, sums appropriated to the DHP account may be obligated or expended for purposes of conducting programs and activities under Title 10, USC, Chapter 55. From time to time, Congress will authorize limited DHP amounts be expended on specific HCA efforts.

d. Foreign Disaster Assistance, Title 10, USC, Section 404

(1) Purpose. This section provides the President with the authority to direct SecDef to provide disaster assistance outside the US to prevent loss of lives or serious harm to the environment. It enables DOD to utilize its unique airlift and rapid deployment capabilities to address humanitarian problems caused by natural or man-made disasters worldwide. Assistance provided under this section may include transportation, supplies, services, and equipment, and possibly humanitarian daily rations, which are managed by DSCA. Foreign disaster assistance requirements are validated by USAID, Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance. The military mission should be clearly defined, as military assets are provided primarily to supplement or complement the relief efforts of the affected country’s civil authorities or humanitarian relief community. Any assistance provided under this section must be reported to Congress within 48 hours of commencement of the assistance activities. As appropriate, DOD may also support USG FDR efforts under Title 10, USC, Section 2561.

(2) Procedures. Typically, DOD support to USG FDR efforts is provided in response to a DOS Executive Secretariat request for assistance. DOD will provide a response to DOS advising of the actions DOD will take in response to the request and the affected CCDR tasked to provide assistance. DSCA provides funding to the CCMD, in accordance with the funding authorized by SecDef.


e. Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) Program, Title 10, USC, Section 407

(1) Purpose. The HMA program assists countries in developing an indigenous mine action capability while promoting US interests. HMA activities include the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance to a PN, with respect to detection, clearance, and physical security and stockpile management of land mines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). ERW includes landmines, unexploded ordnance (i.e., mortar rounds, artillery shells, bomblets, rockets, sub-munitions, rocket motors and fuel, grenades, small arms ammunition), and abandoned ammunition storage and cache sites. In support of national security interests, the goal of the HMA program is to relieve human suffering and the adverse effects of landmines and ERW on noncombatants. By law, DOD personnel may not engage in the physical detection, lifting, or destruction of landmines or
other ERW (unless the member does so for the concurrent purpose of supporting US military operations). To a limited degree, supplies, services, and equipment are provided to assist in the conduct of training. Total cost of supplies, services, and equipment provided to foreign governments may not exceed 10 million dollars per FY (all participating countries).

(2) Procedures. SCO identifies, plans, coordinates, and submits HMA requests through the supported GCC for review and approval by DSCA in coordination with Deputy Assistance Secretary of Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs. All projects must be coordinated with the PM’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement. Additional information on HMA can be found in DSCA Manual, 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual; CJCSI 3207.01, Department of Defense Support to Humanitarian Mine Action; JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance; and JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations.

f. Excess Property (EP) Program, Title 10, USC, Section 2557

(1) Purpose. Allows for the provision of surplus DOD equipment (excluding weapons, ammunition, or other equipment or material that is designed to inflict serious bodily harm or death) for the purpose of building partner capacity to deliver essential services to the civilian population in support of TCP objectives. The EP program supports the same areas as humanitarian assistance activities executed under Title 10, USC, Section 2561, and may be used to provide equipment that improves a PN’s ability to respond to disasters or deliver health or education services. The EP program is designed for civilian use. However, EP may be provided to an HN military unit by exception, as long as the unit is responsible for performing a humanitarian mission and the HN’s civilian population remains the ultimate beneficiary.

(2) Procedures. EP projects are generally identified, planned, and coordinated by DOD personnel in country (i.e., SCO), via the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System project nomination module and submitted to the DSCA for approval, via the appropriate geographic CCMD. Upon DSCA approval, the CCMD determines if and when a project will be executed, in coordination with the SCO, or other country-level DOD entity, and the assigned EP Warehouse. EP is normally shipped via Defense Transportation System surface modes, so transportation timeframes vary. Alternate Defense Transportation System shipment modes may be considered based on funding considerations and the urgency of the requirement. All EP must be transferred to a DOS or USAID representative prior to donation to the recipient country. All projects require USAID coordination.


4. Department of State Programs

a. FMS Authorizations (Title 22, USC, Sections 2761-2767)
(1) **Purpose.** FMS is the primary authority to sell and lease defense articles and services (procured with DOD appropriations) to foreign allies, friendly nations, and international organizations; the other authority comes through ACSAs.

(2) **Procedures.** The international organizations or another country can enter into an FMS contract with DOD through a letter of request. Ordinarily, the contracting country pays DOD in advance for all costs plus an administrative surcharge. Leases are generally processed on a reimbursable basis. However, leases of defense articles may be made on a non-reimbursable basis if the article has passed three quarters of its normal service life. The leases only cover rental charges. Any additional costs, including transportation, refurbishment, spares, and training, must be reimbursed on an FMS case.

b. **IMET (FAA, Sections 541-545 and Title 22, USC, Sections 2347-2347h)**

(1) **Purpose.** The IMET program provides training and education opportunities, on a grant basis, to students from allied and friendly countries. It is a key component of US SA that is an investment in ideas and people and has an overall positive effect on the numerous foreign military students educated and trained under the program. For a relatively modest investment, it presents democratic alternatives to key foreign military and civilian leaders.

(2) **Procedures.** DOS obtains a request for training from the PN government and passes the request to DOD. If the GCC desires to provide military education or training to countries in the AOR, usually this is arranged through the country team at the embassy. The GCC may also submit the proposal to the JS J-5 for interagency review. Once approved by DOS, DOD through DSCA will attempt to provide the services directly. If DOD is unable, then DSCA will authorize the use of contracted training to meet the requirement.

c. **FMF Program (FAA Section 503; AECA, Section 23 [Title 22, USC, Section 2763]; and appropriated under DOS Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Act: Title IV)**

(1) **Purpose.** This program provides grants for non-reimbursable military assistance to friendly foreign countries or international organizations for the purchase of defense articles or services through either FMS or direct commercial sales.

(2) **Procedures.** DOS’s PM initiates the annual budget development process for the FY plus three future years. Annual FMF strategic budget guidance is issued to US embassies and DOD stakeholders to develop program requests which are based on established national and country-specific SA objectives. CCMDs forward their prioritized and consolidated submissions to the JS. The JS then forwards the consolidated input to DSCA, for coordination with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and DOS. Accompanying OSD policy and JS, the CCMDs also have the opportunity to defend their recommendations to DOS staff during the annual SA roundtable meetings. The Office of US Foreign Assistance Resources will then develop and compile the final DOS budget request to the White House OMB and Congress and approves the release of all foreign
assistance funds. The program requests are reviewed by the OMB and Congress. Once approved through the President’s budget, DOS PM will process execution notifications to Congress and funding releases from the Department of the Treasury to DSCA.

d. **EDA (Title 22, USC, Section 2321j)**

(1) **Purpose.** EDA authority provides for the sale or no-cost transfer of EDA no longer needed by DOD, which is deemed excess and includes property of the USCG. Delivery priority is given to eligible NATO members, major non-NATO allies on the southern and southeastern flank of NATO, and to the Philippines. This excess equipment is offered at reduced or no cost to eligible foreign recipients on an “as is, where is” basis. EDA recipients are responsible for packaging, crating, handling, and transportation costs, as well as refurbishment work and follow-on support. The EDA program works best for assisting friends and allies to augment current inventories of like items with a support structure already in place. Numerous statutory authorizations govern the transfer of EDA. A summary of the legal references can be found in Chapter 11 of DSCA Manual 5105.38-M, *Security Assistance Management Manual*, (http://www.samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-11#C11.3).

(2) **Procedures.** The PN, or an international organization, identifies their requirements by responding to a survey message, submitting a letter of request, or locating items via a Defense Logistics Agency website. SCO coordinates for an EDA transfer consideration by the COM and GCC. SCO responses should include a transfer justification, as well as an assessment of the proposed recipient’s capabilities to fund follow-on operational, maintenance, and training requirements. The SCO must ensure the country understands the receipt of EDA is not a promise for future support of any sort, and any modification or transportation expense for the EDA must be reimbursed to the USG. The MILDEPs determine if EDA exists. DSCA coordinates with DOS and Department of Commerce to determine eligibility and allocation among the requirements. DSCA completes Congressional notification for grant EDA, transfer of significant military equipment, or any transfer of any equipment whose original acquisition value exceeding seven million dollars. EDA sale transfers are reported to Congress per Section 516(f)(1) of the FAA, but if the support case for the EDA transfer breaches the notification thresholds, then EDA notifications are in accordance with AECA Section 36(b) (Title 22, USC, Section 2776), with the FMS letter of offer and acceptance process used for the transfer by sale. USD(P)/DSCA approves the transfer for implementation by the applicable MILDEP or DOD agency. The President is provided the authority to transfer EDA based on an annual justification to Congress for military assistance, and a myriad of statutory limitations to transfers based on an annual aggregate value, total annual military aid, funding, weight, transportation, and an assessment on the effect of the transfer based on technology and the industrial base versus the sale of new or used equipment. There are statutory limitations outside of Title 22, USC.

5. **Drawdown Authorities**

This authority provides DOD articles, equipment, military education, and training to respond to unforeseen emergencies or requirements. It can also provide DOD services.
Examples include military transportation and military personnel offloading ships. This authority cannot be used for new contracting or procurement. It can be cited by DOD to contract for commercial air- or sealift if more economical. However, it cannot be used to provide housing and food under a logistic civil augmentation program contract to members of a foreign country or an international organization. There are three drawdown authorities contained within the FAA of 1961. All three require a Presidential determination and report, in advance, to Congress that it is in the national interest to execute the drawdown. They are available for use within each FY up to a specified dollar amount. The calculation of costs for all goods and services provided under these authorities, and reported to Congress, is on the basis of “full cost to the government.” The calculation of costs includes the full cost of all military and civilian labor associated with the drawdown. Although these authorities are limited to existing defense stocks, a reduction of items from inventory below the reorder point may cause a new procurement action to replenish stocks. Such authority generally does not have funding attached. Drawdown authority does not draw a distinction between stocks that are at the retail or wholesale level. When drawdown authority is granted, there are very specific statutes that require the President to report to Congress the extent that stocks and services are drawn down. DSCA is the DOD agency responsible for reporting this information. DSCA must account for how much drawdown authority has been used and establish the reporting requirements for this type of support. Using this authority, DSCA normally directs the provision of supplies in two ways. First, DSCA may assemble a push package to be sent to the appropriate foreign contingent. Second, DSCA may direct, through an execute order, that certain stocks be provided to a specific foreign contingent.

a. **Drawdown for an Unforeseen Emergency (FAA, Section 506[a][1] and Title 22, USC, Section 2318[a][1])**

   (1) **Purpose.** Under Section 506(a)(1) of the FAA, military assistance (defense articles and defense services, and military education and training) can be furnished to a foreign country or international organization on a non-reimbursable basis due to an unforeseen emergency. It requires a Presidential determination and report in advance to Congress that an unforeseen emergency exists that cannot be met under the AECA or any other law. Peacekeeping is a recognized purpose for use of this drawdown authority.

   (2) **Procedures.** Normally, requests are initiated by the US embassy in the concerned country and forwarded to DOD. The CCDR may also identify needs to the J-5 for forwarding to DOS or the National Security Council. Once the concept is approved, DOS initiates documentation for the President to approve and to notify Congress. Once drawdown authority has been approved, DSCA manages the program for DOD and provides detailed accounting procedures.

b. **Drawdown in National Interests (FAA, Section 506[a][2] and Title 22, USC, Section 2318[a][2])**

   (1) **Purpose.** The President can draw down DOD stocks for CD, disaster relief, antiterrorism, nonproliferation assistance, and refugee and migrant assistance purposes. This authority provides articles, equipment, and military equipment and training. It can
also provide DOD services. Examples include military transportation and military personnel offloading ships.

(2) Procedures. The same as Drawdown for an Unforeseen Emergency.

c. Drawdown for PKO (FAA, Section 552[c] and Title 22, USC, Section 2348)

(1) Purpose. The President can drawdown commodities and services from any USG department or agency for unforeseen emergencies to support peacekeeping activities. This authority can be used for new contracting or procurement and it can be cited by DOD to contract for commercial air- or sealift if more economical. However, it cannot be used to provide housing and food. It requires a Presidential determination and report, in advance; to Congress that an unforeseen emergency exists that requires the immediate provision of assistance.

(2) Procedures. The same as Drawdown for an Unforeseen Emergency.

APPENDIX B
SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

1. Overview of Security Force Assistance

   a. SFA activities are often used to shape the OE or assist a PN in defending against internal and transnational threats to security or stability (i.e., supporting FID, CT, COIN, or other stability activities). SFA activities may be used to assist a PN to defend against external threats or help contribute to multinational operations and help develop or reform another country’s security forces or supporting institutions. SFA also contributes to DOD’s role in USG efforts to support PN SSR, whether through routine SC activities or a FID operation.

   b. The Range of Military Operations

      (1) SFA activities are conducted across the range of military operations and across the conflict continuum (i.e., from peace through war) supporting Service and joint operations/missions. Significant SC activities and military engagements are routinely conducted worldwide for peacetime theater and global shaping through the GCCs’ TCPs. Some of those SC activities are likely to include, for example, SFA activities or an SSR effort in the lower range of the conflict continuum. Timely and effective execution of relevant SFA activities as part of SC for shaping in the theater campaign may contribute to stabilization and perhaps a measure of deterrence to prevent the requirement for US forces having to conduct a contingency operation. These activities can develop effective PN security forces supporting US or US-led multinational operations.

      (2) Joint forces must have the ability to conduct SFA and associated OTERA tasks throughout the conflict continuum. Planners should address SFA requirements throughout all phases of an operation/campaign.

      For more information on the range of military operations, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

2. Organization and Responsibilities

   Congress provides oversight of SFA activities and allocates resources under strict guidelines and implementation instructions. CCDRs are required to provide annual estimates to SecDef for SFA requirements. As a result, the funding authorities for SFA activities must be prioritized within each theater and then for global application by DOD in coordination with DOS. For contingencies, funding for SFA would be made available based on the priority of the requirement. Figure B-1 depicts SFA coordination.

3. Planning Considerations for Security Force Assistance

   a. SFA Activities. Typically planned and executed like other SC activities in support of a GCC’s TCP, or in conjunction with a contingency plan, SFA activities will generally focus on building the capacity or capability of PN military forces. However, under certain conditions, SFA activities may have to support the development of nonmilitary security
forces and their supporting institutions; and to the extent authorized by law, DOD shall be prepared to provide capabilities to do the following:

(1) Support and coordinate with other USG departments and agencies that are leading USG efforts to support non-defense ministry security forces and their supporting institutions.

(2) Advise and support the training of foreign paramilitary security forces such as border and coastal control forces, counterterrorist forces, and paramilitary or special police forces at all levels, in conjunction with other USG departments and agencies.

(3) Support the training of PN civil police in individual and collective tasks in hostile or uncertain environments when other USG department or agency trainers and advisors are unable to do so. Coordinate the transition of responsibilities for such training and advisory duties to other USG departments and agencies as conditions allow.
b. **SFA Imperatives.** SFA activities strive to create FSF that are competent, capable, sustainable, committed, confident, and support the security of the PN and regional stability. The following imperatives enable SFA activities and have universal application for the numerous SC activities and larger-scale Service/joint operations and missions supported by SFA activities.

(1) **Understand the OE.** Understanding the OE is fundamental to operations and SC, and essential to SFA activities. An in-depth understanding of the OE includes the size, organization, capabilities, disposition, roles, functions, and mission focus of PN forces, threats, and especially the sociocultural factors of the indigenous and other relevant populations. Identifying all actors influencing the environment and their motivations will help planners and practitioners define the goals and methods for developing PN security forces and their institutions. To prioritize and focus the SFA effort, it is equally important to understand the regional players and transnational actors who may influence the OE. The basis for a holistic view and understanding of the OE are products of the joint intelligence preparation of the OE process, integrated with the separate intelligence preparation of the battlespace products of the component commands and Service intelligence centers. Joint/Service planners can employ a number of processes and tools to evaluate environmental factors such as areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people and events, and political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure. 

See JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, for additional details.

(2) **Ensure Unity of Effort.** The SFA effort may include multinational partners or an international organization. Effective command organizational and stakeholder relationships warrant special consideration. Unity of command is typically preferable, but often impractical. Unity of effort is imperative to successful SFA efforts. Command relationships and organizational relationship agreements may range from simple to complex and military commanders may answer to nonmilitary personnel such as a COM. Regardless of the relationship, clear delineation and understanding of authorities is essential to avoid confusion. Additionally, establishing coordinating boards or centers assists unity of effort among US and multinational partners.

(3) **Leadership.** SFA should consistently provide and instill leadership qualities and capabilities as part of training and advisory activities at all appropriate levels of the FSF organization. Depending on the circumstances, the US may execute an SFA mission unilaterally or as part of a multinational force. In any case, leadership is especially important in the inherently dynamic and complex environment associated with SFA. SFA normally requires the personal interaction of trainers/advisors and trainees, military, and civilians, from the tactical level to the strategic level, so a high premium is placed on effective leadership at all levels. Leadership must fully comprehend the OE and be prepared, fully involved, and supportive for SFA activities to succeed. Productive SFA requires leadership on both the provider and the recipient sides throughout the operation or campaign.
(4) **Support Legitimacy.** SFA develops FSF that should contribute to the legitimate governance of the PN population. This is done by developing FSF that are competent, capable, committed, and confident, not only in the eyes of the US, other countries, and PN governments, but more critically, in the eyes of the PN population.

(a) Legitimacy of the PN government and of the forces providing SFA may be tenuous during some phases of a complex operation, but it is an essential consideration for achieving the SC or contingency objective(s). A PN’s security policies and practices should be founded upon the rule of law and linked to the broader justice sector to facilitate resolution of potential conflict drivers. SFA should aim to ensure all FSF operate within the bounds of domestic and international laws, respect human rights, and they support wide-ranging efforts to enforce and promote the rule of law, thus supporting legitimacy and transparency. Legitimacy fosters transparency and confidence among PN government, FSF, PN population, and USG departments and agencies. Another aspect of legitimacy is supporting PN ownership in the SFA effort, because it facilitates sustainability for building a capacity or security reform through acceptance and expectation by the PN population. SFA should put a PN face on all forms of success and positive reinforcement and properly mitigate any negatives, so the FSF appears righteous even when mistakes are made.

(b) The police in particular should operate as an integral part of the justice system and directly support other parts of the justice sector, including the courts and corrections institutions. This is particularly important in rebuilding countries where legacy of abuse by security personnel may have eroded public confidence in the sector overall. SFA programs should include accountability and oversight mechanisms, including thorough direct collaboration with civil society, to prevent abuses of power and corruption, and to build public confidence. Assistance to the police and other state security providers may need to be complemented with other efforts to strengthen these institutions, to avoid unintended consequences, and to ensure the security forces operate according to the law. In addition, although the tendency may be to focus on criminal justice systems, civil justice reform may have important implications for law and order, particularly with respect to the resolution of potential conflict drivers, such as land disputes, and provides another avenue for the redress of government malfeasance. Leaders, planners, and practitioners at all levels who integrate SFA activities into SC planning efforts must consider how each action may affect popular perceptions, and focus activities that enable the legitimacy of the PN government and FSF, not just make them technically competent. While it is important to assist PN forces to develop professionally, a mirror image US model may not be the optimum solution for some FSF, because of sociocultural or other factors. Legitimacy may be difficult to measure objectively.

(5) **Manage Information.** Information is a powerful enabler and weapon in the complex and dynamic OE normally involving SFA activities. Forces conducting SFA are integrated as part of the overarching operation or campaign (e.g., FID, COIN, or stability activities), but they may be physically separated through distributed operations with FSF. Unit commanders, or the SDO/DATT, must ensure an appropriate information management plan is developed for SFA in coordination with interagency partners, whether through a country team, a joint force, or component headquarters. SFA advisors/trainers must work with the FSF to give a positive context and narrative to the FSF’s
professionalization efforts and capacity to secure the population. Coordination of the
information themes and messages among the US, FSF, and the PN government, and the
presentation or availability of information to the indigenous population can limit or
mitigate the propaganda efforts of insurgents or hostile forces. This may serve to mitigate
the potential for destabilizing influences of hostile forces or criminal elements to
propagandize SFA efforts and damage the PN government’s credibility and legitimacy.

(6) **Sustainability.** Providing sustainability consists of two major components:
the ability of the US and other partners to sustain the SFA activities successfully through
all phases of the operation or campaign and the ability of PN security forces to sustain their
capabilities independently over the long term. The first component may be predicated on
the PN maintaining legitimacy while the second component should be considered
holistically when working with the PN to build their security forces. It is important to
consider the sociocultural factors, infrastructure, and education levels of prospective FSF
when fielding weapons systems and maintaining organizations.

(7) **“Do No Harm.”** In complex operations, SFA, as part of a unified action by
the USG, can become a part of the conflict dynamic serving either to increase or reduce
tension. As with any activity that involves changes to the status quo, and risks, SFA
planners and trainers/advisors must be sensitive to and maintain an awareness for adverse
effects in the security sector and on the local population and community institutions and
structures. Periodic assessment and collaboration with interagency partners (e.g., the
country team) should provide situational awareness of the wider political, social, and
economic effects. This includes not only the immediate effects created by SFA activities,
but also any second- and third-order effects. The supported JFC and COM should agree
on the responsibilities for maintaining and sharing information for situational awareness of
various actors and activities. A shared understanding of the security sector for which
change is sought, and the actual needs that exist, are prerequisites for the success of any
SFA activity, and to avoid, minimize, or mitigate any harmful effects. Practitioners should
conduct a complete assessment prior to implementation and, based upon continuous
follow-on assessments, be prepared to adjust SFA activities over the duration of the joint
operation or SC activities.

c. **Security Force Functions**

(1) Security forces perform three generic functions: executive, generating, and
operating. The executive function includes strategic direction that provides oversight,
policy, and resources for the FSF generating and operating functions. FSF generating
forces refer to the capacity and capabilities of the FSF to organize, train, equip, and build
operating force units. FSF operating forces form operational capabilities through the use
of concepts similar to the US joint functions to achieve FSF security objectives. Of note,
specific generating and operating forces will likely have some overlap of requirements and
responsibilities. In some FSF, a single organization may perform all three functions.

(2) The SFA planners require knowledge of how their own organization
distributes these functions as well as how the FSF implement them in their system in order
to identify the SFA tasks that will support the FSF’s model rather than simply importing a
US model to the FSF organization. Figure B-2 shows the primary duties of each function and identifies the relationship of the OTERA tasks.

(3) **Executive Function.** All security forces apply some level of executive function which empowers the generating and operating functions. The entities that perform this function direct and develop national policy and resources for their security forces. The executive organization justifies, authorizes, and directs parameters for the generating and operating forces. The OSD, the JS, and the Service staffs perform this function for the US. The duties associated with the executive function are:

(a) **Formulate Policy.** The executive organization establishes the regulation of SFA in the context of the political purpose that department, agency, organization, Service, or unit serves. This includes forecasting and budgeting for current and future requirements in both the operating and generating functions and requests or allocating resources to meet the anticipated priorities.

(b) **Advise Political Leadership.** The executive organization provides an understanding of problems and solutions in relation to security force issues. These may

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**Executive, Generating, and Operating Functions**

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<th>Generating Functions</th>
<th>Operating Functions</th>
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<tr>
<td>Formulate policy.</td>
<td>Organizing</td>
<td>Direct subordinates and forces for military operations, training, and logistics.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Advise political leadership.</td>
<td>Reciting</td>
<td>Prescribe the chain of command.</td>
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<td>Strategic planning.</td>
<td>Administering</td>
<td>Assign command functions to subordinate commanders.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assess readiness.</td>
<td>Recruiting</td>
<td>Task organize the command and forces.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Review and analysis.</td>
<td>Administering</td>
<td>Employ the command’s forces.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordinate with other departments.</td>
<td>Demobilizing</td>
<td>Coordinate and approve administration, support, and discipline.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supervise force intelligence activities.</td>
<td>Servicing</td>
<td>Select command staff, subordinate commanders; suspend subordinates and convene courts-martial.</td>
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<td>Equipping</td>
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<td>Repairing military equipment</td>
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| Rebuilding/Building                                      |                                           |                                        |
| Buildings, Structures, Utilities, Real Property          |                                           |                                        |
| Constructing real property                               |                                           |                                        |
| Maintaining real property                                |                                           |                                        |
| Repairing real property                                  |                                           |                                        |
| Acquiring real property                                  |                                           |                                        |

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**Figure B-2. Executive, Generating, and Operating Functions**
include, but are not limited to, force employment options, operational requirements, or military and political consequences of pending decisions.

(c) **Strategic Planning.** The executive supports formulation of security force plans to develop an understanding of a desired political end state and then determine the objectives that should be achieved to attain that end state. Strategic planning encompasses not only the delivery and employment of operational forces, but also considers the required capabilities that should be generated and sustained to create the effects to achieve those objectives, as well as the associated second and third order effects that may be created. Objectives should be within a reasonable strategic planning horizon while some end states may be well into the future.

(d) **Assess Readiness.** The executive organization identifies the gaps in capacity or capabilities as they relate to the functions, roles, and missions that security forces and their organizations and institutions should successfully perform to achieve the strategic objective(s) required to reach an envisioned end state normally related to a political purpose.

(e) **Review and Analysis.** The executive provides insights into current or future capability and capacity gaps as they relate to fulfilling known or anticipated roles and missions for the security force. As a function, it requires the capability to collect and process relative information from operations, exercises, or experiments and then package and distribute the analysis in a manner useful to decision makers.

(f) **Coordinate with Other Departments.** The executive coordinates with departments, agencies, ministries and organizations that are external to the security organization to ensure effective, efficient, economical administration and to reduce duplication.

(g) **Supervise Force Intelligence Activities.** Military organizations have intelligence capability. The executive function controls these efforts to ensure they support the objectives of national security.

(4) **Generating Function.** The generating function develops and sustains the capabilities of the operating forces. In the US, the generating function is primarily performed by the Services and is performed by military schools, training centers, and arsenals. The duties associated with the generating function are:

(a) **Organizing.** Supports recruiting, mobilization/demobilization, force management, resourcing, distribution, or other efforts to form or reform units and supporting organizations required to generate and sustain capabilities that meet operational requirements.

(b) **Training and Education.** Supports the development and sustainment of systems that provide the resources (e.g., doctrine, materiel, funds, terrain, time, personnel, regulations) required to identify, achieve, and sustain a level of training readiness to meet operational requirements.
(c) **Equipping.** Develops, tests, fields, distributes, and maintains the materiel required for security force personnel and organizations to train and execute those tasks associated with their roles and missions.

(d) **Rebuilding/Building.** Develops and maintains the physical infrastructure required to generate forces. This may include installations, ranges, buildings, road networks, airfields, shipyards, or other security force-related infrastructure.

(5) **Operating Function.** The operating function employs military capabilities through application of joint functions of movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, force protection, sustainment, and C2 during actual operations. Operating, as it applies to police security forces, may include training and actual operations with the integration of patrolling, forensics, apprehension, intelligence, investigations, incarceration, communications, and sustainment. Operating forces are responsible for collective training and performing missions assigned to the unit. In the US, operating forces are normally employed by the CCDRs to achieve US security objectives.

(a) US operating forces are typically better suited to develop FSF operating forces or operational capabilities than they are to developing FSF generating forces or generating capabilities. Typically, they are tasked to train and/or advise FSF operating forces.

(b) Employing operational forces to fill SFA capabilities associated with developing the FSF’s generating function (FSF tasks such as “develop FSF doctrine” or “stand up a staff officer’s college”), and possibly in the FSF’s executive function (e.g., ministries), would likely be beyond the inherent capability of the operating force and would likely require special training or augmentation by SMEs drawn from US generating organizations.

d. **FSF Development Tasks.** SFA activities normally use the tasks of OTERA to develop the functional capabilities required by the FSF. OTERA tasks are a tool to develop, change, or improve the capacity and capabilities of FSF. Through a baseline assessment of the subject FSF, and considering US interests and objectives, planners can determine which OTERA tasks will be required to build the proper capability and capacity levels within the various units of the FSF. Assessments of the FSF against a desired set of capabilities will assist in developing an OTERA-based plan to improve FSF. The following are basic descriptions of the OTERA tasks:

(1) **Organize.** All activities taken to create, improve, and integrate doctrinal principles, organizational structures, capability constructs, and personnel management. This may include doctrine development, unit or organization design, command and staff processes, and recruiting and manning functions.

(2) **Train.** All activities taken to create, improve, and integrate training, leader development, and education at the individual, leader, collective, and staff levels. This may include task analysis, the development and execution of programs of instruction, implementation of training events, and leader development activities.
(3) **Equip.** All activities to design, improve, and integrate materiel and equipment, procurement, fielding, accountability, and maintenance through life cycle management. This may also include fielding of new equipment, operational readiness processes, repair, and recapitalization.

(4) **Rebuild or Build.** All activities to create, improve, and integrate facilities. This may include physical infrastructures such as bases and stations, lines of communication, ranges and training complexes, and administrative structures.

(5) **Advise/Assist.** All activities to provide subject matter expertise, guidance, advice, and counsel to FSF while carrying out the missions assigned to the unit or organization. Advising may occur under combat or administrative conditions, at tactical through strategic levels, and in support of individuals or groups.

4. **Security Force Assistance Activities**

   a. **General**

      (1) Discussion of SFA in the previous sections has generally centered on strategic and operational levels. This section transitions to a more focused examination of employment principles, techniques, and procedures used in conducting SFA activities.

      (2) SFA activities that are part of unified action by the GCC require interagency coordination. Even small tactical operations usually require interagency coordination, most often through the SCO with the country team as a part of the CCMD’s routine activities (as part of a campaign plan) and in initial phases of an operation (such as deploying flexible deterrent or flexible response options) campaign and through a joint/multinational force or Service component headquarters organization during combat operations and again through the SCO as operations transition back to civilian control.

      (3) Interagency coordination for SC such as SFA activities is led by the COM and coordinated through the country team. In the rare circumstance there is a complete absence of a COM, the senior USG official may be the JFC who would lead the interagency coordination, and if required, interorganizational coordination for all participants. Civilian-military teaming is a product of interagency coordination, and an example is the provincial reconstruction teams used in Iraq and Afghanistan. The strategic and operational level coordination results in planning and resources for effective tactical level application. SFA activities may be conducted with FSF through large joint/Service task forces, as well as through smaller civilian-military teams. Figure B-3 depicts a model for SFA activities.

   b. **Employment Factors.** As in planning, several areas deserve special attention when discussing employment of US forces in SFA activities.

      (1) **Intelligence Support.** Intelligence provides an assessment of PNs’ and potential adversaries’ capabilities, capacities, and shortfalls. It involves understanding sociocultural factors, information and intelligence sharing, and intelligence training. Information sharing between the US and PNs must be an early consideration for planners.
A continuous intelligence effort will gauge the reaction of the local populace and determine the effects on the infrastructure of US efforts, as well as evaluate strengths, weaknesses, and disposition of opposition groups in the area. Ultimately, intelligence supports the US
and PN leaders’ decision-making processes and supports the protection of friendly forces and assets.

(2) **Force Selection.** US forces have some inherent ability to assess, train, advise, and assist foreign forces. The degree to which they can be tasked depends on their preparation in terms of cultural knowledge, language, functional skills, and the ability to apply these skills within the OE. Employing operational designs that provide a combination of CF while leveraging the unique capabilities of SOF will assist in achieving objectives. The planning for and selection of the appropriate mix of CF, SOF, CEW, and/or civilian personnel and contractors should be a deliberate decision based on thorough mission analysis and a pairing of available capabilities to requirements. Important factors to consider in these decisions include the nature of the PN force, the nature of the skills or competencies required by the PN force, and the nature of the situation and environment into which US forces will deploy.

(a) USC\(G\) training teams, personnel, and platforms are well suited to support the development of stable, multi-mission maritime forces to respond to many transnational threats. USC\(G\) SFA activities reach beyond normal military to military relations to a broader maritime audience, including, but not limited to, law enforcement agencies, maritime administrations, and transport ministries.

(b) **SFA for non-defense ministry security forces and their supporting institutions.** If required to support the development of the capacity and capabilities of non-defense ministry security forces, such as the police and their supporting institutions, and to the extent authorized by law, DOD is prepared to employ the requisite task-organized capabilities to affect the following:

1. Support and coordinate with other interagency partners leading and supporting USG efforts to support development of the capacity and capabilities of non-defense ministry security forces and their supporting institutions.

2. Advise and support the training of foreign paramilitary security forces such as border and coastal control forces, counterterrorist forces, and paramilitary or special police forces at all levels.

3. Support the training of PN civil police in individual and collective tasks in hostile or uncertain OEs when trainers and advisors from other interagency partners are unable to do so.

4. Coordinate the transition of responsibilities for such training and advisory duties to other interagency partners when conditions allow.

(3) **OE and Employment Tasking of SFA-Qualified Forces.** A key element of planning and employment of forces addresses the environment in which DOD is directed to conduct SFA activities. Regardless of the operational context, there are three potential environments that GCC’s planners should consider when integrating SFA activities into strategy and plans to determine the optimal force capabilities and the proper combinations of SOF, CF, CEW personnel, and contractors.
(a) **Diplomatically/politically sensitive environments where a large-scale, highly-visible US presence is unacceptable to the PN government.** This environment traditionally lends itself to a primarily SOF solution. The GCC’s planners should assess the specific skills and competencies required to accomplish the mission and tailor the force using the appropriate combination of personnel and contractors.

(b) **Environments where a limited, overt US presence is acceptable to the PN government.** This condition lends itself to either a SOF or CF-led combination, based upon the capabilities required and the purpose of the operation. A small to mid-sized team or element composed of a mix of SOF, CF, CEW personnel and contractor capabilities may be optimum. The balance of US capabilities required, operational footprint, and duration of the activity, as well as the availability of US resources should be considered to determine the most effective operational and strategic solution.

(c) **Environments where a large-scale US presence is considered necessary and acceptable by the PN government.** In this case, the solution may be a CF activity, with SOF integrated to accomplish specific tasks or work with PN SOF. The GCC’s planners should direct their assessments toward those capabilities and requirements that are, or may be, CF- or SOF-specific and consider the FSF to develop options for the integration of forces. The primary considerations are the PN requirements, type of FSF assisted, CF- or SOF-unique expertise required, and the strategic priorities and objectives of the supported JFC.

(4) **Public Information.** Public information is key during all phases of any mission with SFA activities. While it is important to support the USG effort through IRCs such as MISO, it is also important to employ effective public affairs (PA) programs, coordinated with the COM and PN, to inform the US and PN populations of current SFA activities and USG objectives. Without popular support it may be impractical to fully develop and sustain missions that require USG support for FSF. The supported JFC’s PA activities will seek to disclose the appropriate amount of information in accordance with USG PA guidelines and applicable security restrictions. Coordination is important between the PA staff and the media, the country team, the MISO unit, and other information agencies within the PN and region.

(5) **Logistics Support.** Logistics support of SFA activities might include support of both US and PN forces to conduct operational missions (e.g., supporting PN civilians or military forces with medical, construction, power generation, maintenance, supply, or transportation capabilities). There are several general guidelines for logistic issues in support of US forces conducting SFA activities.

(a) There may be a ceiling imposed on the number of US military personnel authorized in the HN for agreed upon SFA activities. Commanders should determine how external or sea-basing of some forces affects that situation. Maximum use should be made of HNS capabilities, but where reliance on the HN is not feasible, minimizing logistic support requirements is essential. SFA and supporting activities may include contractor personnel, which could complicate legal, diplomatic, administrative, budgetary, and logistical issues. Efficient use of throughput of supplies (an average quantity that can pass
through a port on a daily basis), airlift resupply, and inter-Service support agreements should also be considered.

(b) Commanders should carefully balance the advantages of using HNS with the risks of establishing dependency on potentially unreliable sources.

(c) The type of mission determines logistics operations. Services’ logistics support elements may be integrated into the overall joint force. However, logistics support for deployed forces, remains a Service responsibility.

(d) Other supporting multinational forces may require support beyond their organic logistic capabilities. Accordingly, if there is a need for the USG to establish logistic support agreements with multinational partners providing SFA-like capabilities that—should occur during the planning phase and be finalized—prior to beginning SFA activities. ACSAs negotiated with multinational partners are beneficial, as they allow US forces to exchange most common types of support. SecDef typically delegates authority to negotiate these agreements to the supported GCC.

For further information on multinational logistics, refer to JP 4-08, Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations.

(6) Force Protection

(a) It is incumbent upon the commander to fully understand the threat environment in the operational area. By having access to fused intelligence from local, regional, and national resources, commanders can accurately assess threats and employ measures to safeguard SFA personnel and facilities. Force protection planning considerations should address additional support requirements for quick reaction forces, emergency procedures, PR, or the requirement to integrate SFA personnel into the PN protection plan.

For further information on PR, refer to JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

(b) Insider attacks are a threat in any operational area. Commanders should ensure personnel are trained to identify behavioral indicators of possible insider threats and understand the means to apply prevention tools to mitigate this threat. Cultural awareness yields situational awareness and leads to increased force protection for SFA personnel.

(7) OPSEC. A significant challenge during SFA activities is the need to deny critical information about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities to hostile elements. The nature of SFA implies that many PN officials and the populace will know of certain US activities as they occur. Criminal and insurgent groups may have members or sympathizers within PN institutions acting as informants. US and foreign personnel involved in SFA activities and programs should be provided extensive OPSEC training to ensure effectiveness of their operations.

For further information on OPSEC, see JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.
(8) **Communications Security.** Communications security is essential throughout planning and execution of SFA activities. SFA personnel should be trained in the protection of sensitive communications equipment and cryptographic materials.

*For further information on communications security, see JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.*

(9) **Lessons Learned.** Document lessons learned from previous SC activities so the commander knows what processes and procedures to modify for more effective programming, planning, and execution of future SC activities involving SFA activities. It is also important to conduct comprehensive after action reviews and prepare reports, focusing on the specifics of the SFA activities, to gather this information as soon as possible after mission execution. The Joint Staff J-7 [Directorate for Joint Force Development], Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Branch, CJCS’s Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, the Services, and other USG departments and agencies maintain lessons learned programs, which provide readily available sources of information to SFA planners and operators. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) may provide solutions to planning problems and identify specific tasks to evaluate. In particular, JLLIS possesses a significant amount of SOF resources providing additional information on peacetime SFA missions.

*For further information for specific reporting procedures, refer to CJCSI 3150.25, Joint Lessons Learned Program.*

c. **Human Rights.** Absent a waiver for extraordinary circumstances, units of an FSF may not receive any training, equipment, or other assistance from DOD if there is credible evidence that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights (Title 10, USC, Section 2249e). Foreign personnel must also be vetted prior to training to ensure no members of the training audience have violated human rights. Title 22, USC, Section 2304, prohibits the USG from providing funds to a foreign country if DOS has credible evidence the foreign country or its agents have engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, unless SECSTATE determines and reports the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible FSF unit to justice. To comply with the requirements of Title 22, USC, Section 2304 (Leahy Amendment), prior to training, FSF trainees must be vetted through affected COM and DOS human rights compliance mechanisms. Once a unit or a group of individuals has been identified to be trained, a request for human rights vetting will be submitted to the appropriate country US embassy. Per *A Guide to the Vetting Process*, the DOS reference guide for human rights vetting, a minimum of 10 working days is required for DOS to vet. However, more lead time raises the probability of successfully vetting candidates. If there are derogatory results, DOD will then make its own determination whether or not to proceed with the training. This language also may be found in the annual DOD appropriations acts and prohibits such funding unless all necessary steps have been taken or SecDef, in consultation with SECSTATE, decides to waive the prohibition due to extraordinary circumstances. A site survey team may assist in gathering this information.
d. Countering Insider Threats. Nontraditional threats, such as the insider threat, can undermine SFA activities, as well as the cohesion of US forces and FSF. Strategically, they can undermine the overall efforts of the international community. Tactically, the breakdown of trust, communication, and cooperation between PN and US forces can affect military capability. Eliminating and/or minimizing the insider threat, especially by proper preparation and training of forces, is critical to mission success. However, more stringent force protection controls and measures that are overtly heavy handed must be well balanced yet culturally sensitive enough to not send the wrong message to the very people and organizations the US is trying to assist. Adversaries may view attacks against US forces as a particularly effective tactic, especially when using PN forces to conduct these attacks. While these types of “insider” or “green on blue” attacks may be context-specific to a particular theater, JFCs should nevertheless ensure their force protection plans take into account the potential for these types of attacks and plan appropriate countermeasures. To reduce the potential for insider attacks, FSF should be further vetted to identify individuals whose motivations toward the PN and USG are in question.

e. Defense and Non-Defense SC Activities

(1) Defense Activities That Are Not SFA. US forces may also conduct other activities in the security sector that do not clearly provide a direct contribution to the capacity and capabilities of the FSF and therefore are not SFA activities. These might include military-to-military contacts whose purpose is simply to negotiate access or status agreements. Many key leader engagements, wherein senior US military leaders meet with senior officers of the PN military, ministry of defense (MOD), or other officers of the PN government, are military engagement or SC activities, but not SFA activities, because they establish or reaffirm relationships or enhance US access to PN ports, airfields, or infrastructure. Despite their classification as something other than SFA activities, it is important to understand other SC activities are part of comprehensive USG effort to achieve the military objectives and reach the end state expressed in the TCP, CSCS/country plan, or a contingency plan.

(2) Non-Defense Security Sector Activities. DODI 5000.68, Security Force Assistance (SFA), has a provision that “DOD, if required, and to the extent authorized by law, supports the development of the capacity and capabilities of non-defense ministry security forces and their supporting institutions.” In general, existing US statutes prohibit DOD participation in developmental activities. Not all PNs have chosen to organize themselves in accordance with US organizational structures. Some PNs do not have a MOD, yet they field security forces. Examples of these non-MOD security forces include paramilitary police (gendarmerie, carabinieri), border guards, state and national police, coast guard-type forces or coastal defense forces, customs agents, CD force, and ministry of interior.

(a) DOD has several capabilities that may be of significant value in developing the capacity and capabilities of these non-MOD security forces. As GCCs develop TCPs and CSCSs/country plans to support their theater strategy and objectives, and, in coordination with the applicable COMs and country teams, GCCs should identify capacity and capabilities gaps in these non-MOD PN forces and include proposals to
address them. However, DOD will not execute or support such activities without proper authority.

(b) In most cases, another interagency partner will have primary responsibility and legal authority to work with HNs to develop capacity and capabilities of these non-MOD security forces. With proper coordination and approval, the GCC can provide DOD personnel and units with unique skill sets not available to other departments and agencies to assist the lead USG department or agency in this development activity. In some situations, other interagency partners may have specific skills to develop non-MOD security force capacity and capabilities, but do not have sufficient personnel available to meet requirements.

(c) In some situations, other interagency partners may have the appropriate skills and personnel, but existing security conditions may prevent their use. In those environments, subject to proper coordination and authorization, DOD may be required to develop those non-MOD security capabilities or capacity. The GCC should make provisions for transition of responsibilities to other interagency partners as the security situation allows.

5. Assessing the Capabilities of a Foreign Security Force

a. **FSF Capabilities Assessment.** As with any SC baseline assessment, initial assessment of the FSF should precede development to determine FSF capability gaps and FSF ability to sustain increased capacity and other changes. Appropriate SMEs should assess FSF capabilities and capacity based on the USG anticipated objectives. From the baseline, assessment continues throughout FSF development to measure the effectiveness of SFA efforts and levels of FSF developmental efforts. FSF assessments are generally focused on the organizational, operational, environmental, and institutional levels to establish an understanding of the capabilities, needs, and environment. The MOE for the generating forces is how well the operating forces perform their assigned tasks. In order for the generating force to serve its purpose, the operating forces should communicate their requirements back to the generating forces. Assessments should include all FSF generating and operating functions in relation to the executive direction function; each provides insight as to the will and capability of the FSF to generate, employ, and sustain itself.

*For additional details regarding FSF assessments, see Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-07.10/Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-33.8A/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-07.5/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.76, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Security Forces.*

b. **FSF Assessment Workflow.** The FSF assessment enables the SFA organization to establish the correct developmental objectives. Individual unit specific FSF assessments of individual FSF units allow for effective alignment of feasible developmental tasks. The comprehensive FSF assessment provides a thorough understanding of the FSF and presents a baseline in FSF capability requirements within the context of the OE. The FSF assessment task workflow consists of five steps (see Figure B-4).
c. Planners and advisors can apply this FSF assessment process as a primary developmental tool in day-to-day activities, as well as broader program development to synchronize development objectives of FSF generating and operating forces. Finally, when standardized among SFA organizations, the FSF assessment workflow provides a collective understanding of trends and progress across the FSF.

d. The initial site assessment refines information or mission parameters developed during previous assessments in the planning process. Site survey and assessment teams should include a counterintelligence representative, a strategic planner, a force protection element, and a foreign area officer.
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APPENDIX C
NOTIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION ACTIVITY CHECKLIST

1. Enter planned event into G-TSCMIS.

2. Read SC guidance (most likely on SIPRNET).
   a. Service component guidance/Service headquarters guidance.
   b. Command guidance.
   c. Country specific guidance for PN.
   e. Relevant program guidance.
   f. Relevant section(s) of the current NDAA.

3. Identify and read relevant operational doctrine and directives for SC activity.

4. Obtain higher headquarters activity guidance.
   a. Activity objectives.
   b. MOEs and MOPs.
   c. Strategic guidance.
   d. PA guidance.

5. Review lessons learned from previous operations and exercises.
   a. JLLIS.
   b. Component lessons learned.

6. Submit request for and obtain unit diplomatic/country clearance.

7. Conduct mission analysis to answer the questions:
   a. What tasks must the unit do for mission accomplishment?
   b. What is the purpose of the activity?
   c. What limitations have been placed on own force’s actions?
   d. What forces/assets are available to support the activity?
8. Develop mission analysis outputs.

9. Identify SC activity funding source.
   a. Review associated legal constraints.
   b. Identify reporting requirements for expenditures.

10. Identify personnel requirements.
    a. Passport/visa/military identification, theater and country clearance, and customs policy.
    b. Required medical screening and immunizations.
    c. Complete isolated personnel report, as required.
    d. Ensure government charge card authorizations and policies of use are promulgated.
    e. Ensure proper uniforms for geography, weather, and activity.

11. Request staff judge advocate assistance in identifying memorandums of understanding/status of forces agreements/visiting forces agreements that exist with HN. (Policy on weapons and uniforms.)

12. Identify HN, interagency, international organizations, and NGO points of contact for coordination.

13. Arrange for HN liaison officers and interagency/international organization/NGO representatives to augment tactical/operational units, as appropriate.

14. Contact component/CCMD country desk officer for advisement and coordination.

15. Establish contact with SCO at US embassy in the PN for advisement and coordination.

16. Contact country team (SCO) for advisement and coordination.

17. Obtain HN licensing/credentialing requirements if required, e.g., medical, construction.

18. Identify logistics requirements and support.

19. Arrange for cultural awareness training.
a. Schedule specific training on customs, cultural sensitivities, and norms for unit leaders and those who will interact with HN.

b. Ensure language and translation requirements are identified and met by embassy support and/or augmented personnel.

20. Identify communications requirements.

a. Obtain communications resources for austere locations.

b. Ensure redundant and backup systems are available and tested.

21. Obtain format of situational reports to higher headquarters, frequency of reporting, and means of reporting. Develop data collection plan to support MOE, MOP, operation and assessment monitoring, and evaluation.


23. Depending on time constraints conduct predeployment site survey or advance command element team to prepare for activity.

24. Draft lessons learned during activity planning and execution. Submit upon completion or as directed.

25. Draft after action report per higher headquarter direction and update G-TSCMIS event entry to lessons learned as applicable.
APPENDIX D
REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-20 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Law

   a. Title 10, USC.
   b. Title 22, USC.

2. Strategic Guidance and Policy

   e. NSS.
   h. Strategic Plan.

3. Department of Defense Publications

   a. DODD 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare (IW).*
   b. DODD 5105.65, *Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).*
   c. DODD 5132.03, *DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation.*
Appendix D

d. DODD 5205.75, *DOD Operations at US Embassies*.

e. DODD 5205.82, *Defense Institution Building (DIB)*.

f. DODD 5230.11, *Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations*.

g. DODD 5240.02, *Counterintelligence (CI)*.

h. DODI 1100.22, *Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix*.

i. DODI 2205.02, *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities*.

j. DODI 5000.68, *Security Force Assistance (SFA)*.

k. DODI C-5105.81, *Implementing Instructions for DOD Operations at US Embassies (U)*.

l. DODI 5132.13, *Staffing of Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) and the Selection and Training of Security Cooperation Personnel*.


n. DODI 5205.14, *DOD Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Policy*.

o. Memorandum of Agreement Between DOD and DHS on the Use of the US Coast Guard Capabilities and Resources in Support of the National Military Strategy.


r. *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

4. **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications**

a. CJCSI 3110.01, *2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)*.


c. CJCSI 3150.25F, *Joint Lessons Learned Program*.

d. CJCSI 3520.02B, *Proliferation Security Initiative Activity Program*.

e. CJCSI 3710.01B, *DOD Counterdrug Support*.
f. CJCSM 3130.01A, *Campaign Planning Procedures and Responsibilities*.

g. CJCSM 3130.06A, *Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures*.

h. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*.

i. JP 1-0, *Joint Personnel Support*.

j. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*.

k. JP 2-01.2, *Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence in Joint Operations*.

l. JP 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*.

m. JP 2-03, *Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations*.

n. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.

o. JP 3-05, *Special Operations*.


r. JP 3-07.4, *Counterdrug Operations*.

s. JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation*.


w. JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*.

x. JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*.

y. JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*.

z. JP 3-26, *Counterterrorism*.

aa. JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*.

bb. JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*.


ee. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*.

ff. JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*.

5. **Multi-Service Publications**


6. **United States Army Publications**

   a. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*.

   b. ADP 3-05, *Special Operations*.

   c. ADP 3-07, *Stability*.

   d. ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*.


7. **United States Navy Publications**


   b. Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-05, *Naval Special Warfare*.

   c. NWP 3-07.20, *Navy Support to Security Cooperation*.

   d. NWP 5-01, *Navy Planning*.

   e. NTTP 3-06.1, *Riverine Operations*.

   f. NTTP 3-54M, *Operations Security (OPSEC)*.

8. **United States Marine Corps Publications**


APPENDIX E
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Change Recommendations

   a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication, please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil.

   b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

4. Lessons Learned

   The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in DOTMLPF-P. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations, events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at https://www.jllis.mil (NIPRNET) or http://www.jllis.smil.mil (SIPRNET).

5. Distribution of Publications

   Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, DOD Information Security Program: Overview,


Classification, and Declassification, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, DOD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information.

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications


b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies.
GLOSSARY
PART I—ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACSA</td>
<td>acquisition and cross-servicing agreement</td>
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<td>ADP</td>
<td>Army doctrine publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>AECA</td>
<td>Arms Export Control Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFTTP</td>
<td>Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASD(SO/LIC)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict</td>
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<td>ATP</td>
<td>Army techniques publication</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear</td>
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<td>CbT</td>
<td>combating terrorism</td>
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<td>CCDR</td>
<td>combatant commander</td>
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<td>Combatant Commander Initiative Fund</td>
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<td>CCMD</td>
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<td>CD</td>
<td>counterdrug</td>
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<td>civilian expeditionary workforce</td>
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<td>CF</td>
<td>conventional forces</td>
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<td>CJCS</td>
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<td>CJCSI</td>
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<td>CJCSM</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual</td>
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<td>chief of mission</td>
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<td>country-specific security cooperation section</td>
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<td>CSP</td>
<td>campaign support plan</td>
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<td>CTFP</td>
<td>Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program</td>
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<td>CWMD</td>
<td>countering weapons of mass destruction</td>
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<td>DHP</td>
<td>Defense Health Program</td>
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<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<td>DIA</td>
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<td>DIB</td>
<td>defense institution building</td>
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<td>DIRI</td>
<td>Defense Institution Reform Initiative</td>
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<td>Department of Defense instruction</td>
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### Glossary

- **DOTMLPF-P**: doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy
- **DSCA**: Defense Security Cooperation Agency
- **DTSA**: Defense Technology Security Administration
- **EDA**: excess defense articles
- **EP**: excess property
- **ERW**: explosive remnants of war
- **EVE**: equal value exchange
- **FAA**: Foreign Assistance Act
- **FDR**: foreign disaster relief
- **FHA**: foreign humanitarian assistance
- **FID**: foreign internal defense
- **FMF**: foreign military financing
- **FMS**: foreign military sales
- **FSF**: foreign security forces
- **FY**: fiscal year
- **FY1**: current fiscal year
- **FY2**: budget year
- **FY3**: program year
- **FY4**: out year
- **FY5**: out year
- **GCC**: geographic combatant commander
- **GEF**: Guidance for Employment of the Force
- **GFM**: global force management
- **GFMIG**: Global Force Management Implementation Guidance
- **G-TSCMIS**: Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System
- **HCA**: humanitarian and civic assistance
- **HMA**: humanitarian mine action
- **HN**: host nation
- **HNS**: host-nation support
- **ICS**: integrated country strategy
- **IDAD**: internal defense and development
- **IMET**: international military education and training
- **IRC**: information-related capability
- **J-4**: logistics directorate of a joint staff
- **J-5**: plans directorate of a joint staff
- **JCET**: joint combined exchange training
- **JFC**: joint force commander
- **JLLIS**: Joint Lessons Learned Information System
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<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<td>JS</td>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
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<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Campaign Plan</td>
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<td>LOE</td>
<td>line of effort</td>
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<td>LOO</td>
<td>line of operation</td>
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<td>MCRP</td>
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<td>MISO</td>
<td>military information support operations</td>
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<td>ministry of defense</td>
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<td>MODA</td>
<td>ministry of defense advisor</td>
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<td>MOE</td>
<td>measure of effectiveness</td>
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<td>MOP</td>
<td>measure of performance</td>
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<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>national defense authorization act</td>
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<td>national disclosure policy</td>
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<td>national security strategy</td>
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<td>operational environment</td>
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<td>Office of Management and Budget</td>
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<td>OTERA</td>
<td>organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>public affairs</td>
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<td>Partnership for Peace (NATO)</td>
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<td>partner nation</td>
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<td>peace operations</td>
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<td>POM</td>
<td>program objective memorandum</td>
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<td>PPD</td>
<td>Presidential policy directive</td>
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<td>RIK</td>
<td>replacement in kind</td>
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<td>SA</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDO/DATT</td>
<td>senior defense official/defense attaché</td>
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<td>State Partnership Program</td>
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<td>TCP</td>
<td>theater campaign plan</td>
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<td>theater distribution plan</td>
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<td>TMM</td>
<td>transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional</td>
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<td>theater special operations command</td>
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<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
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<td>USCG</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
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<td>USD(AT&amp;L)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics</td>
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<td>USD(P)</td>
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<td>WIF</td>
<td>Wales Initiative Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
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PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

defense institution building.  Security cooperation conducted to establish or reform the capacity and capabilities of a partner nation’s defense institutions at the ministerial/department, military staff, and service headquarters levels. Also called DIB.  (Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

foreign military sales. That portion of United States security assistance for sales programs that require agreements/contracts between the United States Government and an authorized recipient government or international organization for defense articles and services to be provided to the recipient for current stocks or new procurements under Department of Defense-managed contracts, regardless of the source of financing. Also called FMS.  (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

international military education and training.  Formal or informal instruction provided to foreign military students, units, and forces on a nonreimbursable (grant) basis by offices or employees of the United States, contract technicians, and contractors, and the instruction may include correspondence courses; technical, educational, or informational publications; and media of all kinds. Also called IMET.  (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

partner nation.  1.  A nation that the United States works with in a specific situation or operation. (JP 1)  2.  In security cooperation, a nation with which the Department of Defense conducts security cooperation activities. (JP 3-20) Also called PN.  (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

security assistance.  Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended; or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives, and those that are funded and authorized through the Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency are considered part of security cooperation. Also called SA.  (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

security cooperation.  All Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. Also called SC.  (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

security cooperation organization.  A Department of Defense element that is part of the United States diplomatic mission located in a foreign country to carry out security assistance and cooperation management functions under the supervision and coordination authority of the senior defense official/diplomatic attaché. Also called SCO.  (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
security force assistance. The Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. Also called SFA. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 3-20 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #4 - Maintenance**
- JP published and continuously assessed by users
- Formal assessment begins 24-27 months following publication
- Revision begins 3.5 years after publication
- Each JP revision is completed no later than 5 years after signature

**STEP #1 - Initiation**
- Joint doctrine development community (JDDC) submission to fill extant operational void
- Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-end analysis
- Joint Doctrine Planning Conference validation
- Program directive (PD) development and staffing/joint working group
- PD includes scope, references, outline, milestones, and draft authorship
- JS J-7 approves and releases PD to lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant command, JS directorate)

**STEP #2 - Development**
- LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first draft (FD)
- PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
- FD comment matrix adjudication
- JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system
- Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment matrix
- FC joint working group

**STEP #3 - Approval**
- JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7
- JS J-7 prepares publication for signature
- JSDS prepares JS staffing package
- JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for signature

**STEP #5 - Maintenance**
- JP published and continuously assessed by users
- Formal assessment begins 24-27 months following publication
- Revision begins 3.5 years after publication
- Each JP revision is completed no later than 5 years after signature