

# Joint Publication 3-28



## Civil Support



14 September 2007



## PREFACE

### 1. Scope

This publication provides overarching guidelines and principles to assist commanders and their staffs in planning and conducting joint civil support operations.

### 2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in civil support operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination during domestic civil support operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

### 3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



WALTER L. SHARP  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Director, Joint Staff

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Describes the Civil Support (CS) Framework**
  - **Covers the Department Of Defense CS Operational Environment**
  - **Discusses CS Operations**
- 

### General

*A secure US homeland is the Nation's first priority, and is a fundamental aspect of the national military strategy.*

The military will continue to play a vital role in securing the homeland through the execution of **homeland defense (HD) and civil support (CS) missions**. CS capabilities are derived from Department of Defense (DOD) warfighting capabilities that could be applied to foreign/domestic assistance or law enforcement support missions. CS focuses in a domestic context, but extends beyond the standard domestic definition. DOD contributes to homeland security (HS) by conducting HD operations overseas and in the approaches to the US, and by providing CS for disasters and declared emergencies, to designated law enforcement agencies, and to other activities. DOD emergency preparedness contributes to HD and CS missions since it includes all measures to be taken by DOD in advance of an emergency to reduce the loss of life and property and to protect our nation's institutions.

*The Department of Defense protects the homeland through two distinct but interrelated missions — homeland defense and civil support.*

While the HD and CS missions are distinct, some department roles and responsibilities overlap, and operations require extensive coordination between lead and supporting agencies. **The HD, CS, and HS missions are separate, but have areas where roles and responsibilities may overlap and/or lead and supporting roles may transition between organizations.** DOD serves as the federal department with lead responsibility for HD, which may be executed by DOD alone or include support provided to DOD by other agencies. CS is the overarching term for DOD's support to civilian authorities. DOD's role in the CS mission consists of support to US civil authorities (Department of Homeland Security [DHS] or other agency) for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities. HD and CS operations may occur in parallel and require extensive integration and synchronization. In addition, operations may transition from HD to CS to HS and vice versa with the lead depending on the situation and US Government's desired outcome.



## Management of Domestic Incidents

*Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, sets forth roles and responsibilities of the Federal government for domestic incident management by establishing a single incident management system.*

The National Response Plan (NRP) was a result of Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, Management of Domestic Incidents: a single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident management built on the template of the National Incident Management System (NIMS). The NRP is an all-hazards plan that provides the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy and operational direction for incident management to ensure timely and effective federal support. The NRP is applicable to all federal departments and agencies that have primary jurisdiction for or participate in operations requiring coordinated federal response. The NRP identifies how federal departments and agencies will respond to state, tribal, and/or local requests for assistance (RFAs). A basic premise of both the NIMS and the NRP is that incidents are generally handled at the lowest jurisdictional level possible. The NRP is coordinated and managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The overall coordination of federal incident management activities is executed through the Secretary of Homeland Security. NIMS is a consistent doctrinal framework for incident management at all jurisdictional levels. It includes a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and technologies covering the incident command system; multiagency coordination systems; unified command; training; identification and management of resources (including systems for classifying types of resources); qualifications and certification; and the collection, tracking, and reporting of incident information and incident resources.

## Department of Defense Operational Environment

*Introducing federal forces into an otherwise civil response situation requires a clear understanding of authorities and their limits.*

Because the public, media, and perhaps local and state officials, may not clearly understand Constitutional limits, expectations must be managed and communicated. Military units tasked to support civil authorities during domestic disasters enable rapid and effective response operations that limit loss of life, mitigate suffering, and curtail further significant property damage. The challenge remains integrating military and civil capabilities within a disaster stricken operating environment with little intact infrastructure while urgently and efficiently executing relief operations. **Authority over and control of DOD forces/capabilities shall be maintained by the President**, as Commander in Chief, through the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and the chain of command as established by law. When emergency conditions dictate, and when time does not permit approval from higher headquarters, local military commanders and responsible DOD component officials are authorized to respond to requests from local authorities and to

initiate immediate response actions to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions.

*Requests for assistance.*

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law 93-288) (Title 42 US Code, Section 5121), authorizes the Federal government to help state and local governments alleviate the suffering and damage caused by disasters. Requests for DOD assistance may occur under Stafford Act or non-Stafford Act conditions. A Stafford Act incident is one in which state and local authorities declare a state of emergency and request federal assistance. This type of emergency is an incident of national significance for which the Stafford Act establishes programs and processes for the Federal government to provide major disaster and emergency assistance to states, local governments, tribal nations, individuals, and qualified private nonprofit organizations. A non-Stafford Act incident is essentially all of the other emergencies that occur each year and do not necessarily overwhelm state and local authorities, and where the event would benefit from federal assistance and coordination. The Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for overall coordination of Federal Stafford and non-Stafford incident management activities.

*Request for assistance process.*

Federal agencies or state governors request DOD capabilities to support their emergency response efforts by using a **formal RFA process**. How DOD handles RFAs depends on various factors, such as: Stafford Act or non-Stafford Act situation, urgency of the incident, establishment of a joint field office, if a defense coordinating officer (DCO) or joint task force has been appointed, and originator of the request (incident command, state, regional, or national).

In general, the federal coordinating officer at the incident site receives RFAs from civil authorities and submits them to the Office of the Executive Secretary of the Department of Defense, who forwards them to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs (ASD[HD&ASA]) and the Joint Director of Military Support for validation and order processing, respectively. When a DCO is at the incident site, RFAs are submitted directly to ASD(HD&ASA). Once the SecDef approves the request, an order is issued to combatant commands, Services, and/or agencies to accomplish the mission.

*Immediate response.*

Under imminently serious conditions, when time does not permit approval from higher headquarters, any local military commander, or responsible officials of other DOD components may, subject to any supplemental direction provided by their higher headquarters, and in

response to a request from civil authorities, provide **immediate response** to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage. Immediate response is situation-specific and may or may not be associated with a declared or undeclared disaster, civil emergency, or attack.

### Categories and Types of Civil Support Operations

CS operations are divided into three broad categories of **domestic emergencies, designated law enforcement support, and other activities**, based on the CS definition. These categories, in many cases, can overlap or be in effect simultaneously, depending on the particular circumstances of the incident. Under the categories, there are broad types of CS missions which are discussed below.

#### *Disasters and Declared Emergencies.*

DOD support in a domestic disaster or a Presidential declaration of emergency is in support of the primary or coordinating agency(ies). Military commanders and responsible DOD civilians may, under certain conditions, respond under immediate response authority in order to save lives, prevent suffering, and mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions. Without a disaster declaration, the President may also direct DOD to support the response to a disaster or emergency for a period not to exceed 10 days.

#### *Support and/or Restore Public Health and Services, and Civil Order.*

DOD support and/or assistance in restoring public health and services, and civil order may include augmentation of local first responders and equipment. It may include law enforcement support, continuity of operations/continuity of government measures to restore essential government services, protect public health and safety, and provide emergency relief to affected governments, businesses, and individuals. Responses occur under the primary jurisdiction of the affected state and local government, and the Federal government provides assistance when required. When situations are beyond the capability of the state, the governor requests federal assistance through the President.

#### *National Special Security Events.*

Special events are categorized by the DHS Special Events Working Group (SEWG). Usually, other military operations will have priority over these missions, unless directed otherwise by the SecDef. These events will be assigned a priority by the SEWG and will normally be monitored by the combatant command responsible for the area of responsibility in which they are conducted. National special security event (NSSE) is a designation given to certain special events that, by virtue of their political, economic, social, or religious significance, may be the target of terrorism or other criminal activity. The Secretary of

Homeland Security, after consultation with the Homeland Security Council, shall be responsible for designating special events as NSSEs.

*Periodic Planned Support.*

Periodic planned support is conducted to enhance civil military relations within local communities. Military involvement could include: sensitive support operations; military training exchanges; community relations; military laboratory support and or testing and evaluation in DOD facilities; military working dog support; support provided to the US Secret Service; Civil Air Patrol/Air Force Auxiliary support; aerial damage assessment; and, civilian critical infrastructure protection.

**CONCLUSION**

This publication provides overarching guidelines and principles to assist commanders and their staffs in planning and conducting joint CS operations.

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## CHAPTER I FRAMEWORK

*“This government will learn the lessons of Hurricane Katrina. We are going to review every action and make necessary changes so that we are better prepared for any challenge of nature, or act of evil men, that could threaten our people.”*

**President George W. Bush  
Jackson Square, New Orleans, Louisiana,  
September 15, 2005**

### 1. General

a. A secure US homeland is the Nation’s first priority, and is a fundamental aspect of the national military strategy. It is also essential to America’s ability to project power, sustain a global military presence, and honor its global security commitments. The military will continue to play a vital role in securing the homeland through the execution of homeland defense (HD) and civil support (CS) missions. CS capabilities are derived from Department of Defense (DOD) warfighting capabilities that could be applied to foreign/domestic assistance or law enforcement support missions. DOD support of civil authorities such as the Department of State (DOS) for foreign assistance is addressed in another joint publication (JP). CS focuses in a domestic context, but extends beyond the standard domestic definition.

b. DOD contributes to homeland security (HS) by conducting HD operations overseas and in the approaches to the US, and by providing CS for disasters and declared emergencies, to designated law enforcement agencies (LEAs), and to other activities. DOD emergency preparedness (EP) contributes to HD and CS missions since it includes all measures to be taken by DOD in advance of an emergency to reduce the loss of life and property and to protect our nation’s institutions.

### 2. Homeland Defense, Civil Support, and Homeland Security Framework

a. **Threats.** The homeland is confronted by a spectrum of threats and hazards. Some can be difficult to categorize as either a traditional military threat requiring only a DOD response capability or a purely law enforcement threat requiring a nonmilitary response from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DOJ), or other civilian agency. For example, a transnational threat can present a challenge in assigning lead responsibility to a particular agency. The characterization of a particular threat may, ultimately, rest with the President, but US Government (USG) efforts are ongoing to develop specific protocols and response options that address the coordination, integration, and responsibilities of the federal agencies in responding to the full spectrum of threats and hazards. These new strategies, processes, and procedures are emerging out of documents such as the National Strategy for Maritime Security and National Strategy for Aviation Security, and their respective supporting plans (e.g., Maritime Operational Threat Response [MOTR] and Aviation Operational Threat Response Plans). These processes aid both the warfighter and civil authorities in identifying which agency or agencies are best suited to achieve the USG’s desired outcome given the unique circumstances of the event.

b. **Homeland Security.** HS, as defined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS), is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist acts within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerabilities to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. However, the NSHS addresses HS beyond this definition and includes law enforcement, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives consequence management (CBRNE CM), and disaster preparedness and relief missions. Either DHS or DOJ will usually be the federal agency with lead responsibility, supported by DOD when requested. The NSHS addresses a very specific and uniquely challenging threat — terrorism against the United States — and provides a comprehensive framework for organizing the efforts of federal, state, tribal, local, and private organizations whose primary functions are often unrelated to national security. The NSHS complements the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States and provides a framework for creating and seizing opportunities that strengthen our security and prosperity. The Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for ensuring the preparedness of the Nation to prevent, respond to, and recover from threatened and actual domestic terrorist attacks, non-terrorist security threats (e.g., drug and migrant smuggling), major disasters, and other emergencies.

#### CIVIL AUTHORITIES

**“Those elected and appointed officers and employees who constitute the government of the United States, the governments of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, United States possessions and territories, and political subdivisions thereof.”**

c. **DOD Role in Homeland Security.** DOD protects the homeland through two distinct but interrelated missions — HD and CS. While these missions are distinct, some department roles and responsibilities overlap, and operations require extensive coordination between lead and supporting agencies. Figure I-1 illustrates a notional relationship between HD, CS, and HS with examples of the types of operations that can take place for each mission. The HD, CS, and HS missions are separate, but have areas where roles and responsibilities may overlap and/or lead and supporting roles may transition between organizations. DOD serves as the federal department with lead responsibility for HD, which may be executed by DOD alone (e.g., ballistic missile defense) or include support provided to DOD by other agencies such as DHS or Department of Transportation (e.g., Federal Aviation Administration support to DOD/North American Aerospace Defense Command). CS is the overarching term for DOD’s support to US civil authorities (DHS or other agency) for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities. HD and CS operations may occur in parallel and require extensive integration and synchronization. In addition, operations may transition from HD to CS to HS and vice versa (e.g., maritime security) with the lead depending on the situation (annotated by the arrows in Figure I-2) and USG’s desired outcome. **While the lead may transition, a single agency has the lead at any given time for a particular activity.** However, in the areas of overlapping responsibility, the designation of federal agency with lead responsibility may not be predetermined. In time-critical situations, on-scene leaders are empowered to conduct appropriate operations in response to a particular threat. For example, the MOTR protocols provide guidance for maritime security which can transition between HD, CS, or HS.



## NOTIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HOMELAND DEFENSE, CIVIL SUPPORT AND HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS




Figure I-1. Notional Relationship Between Homeland Defense, Civil Support, and Homeland Security Missions






Figure I-2. Relationships for Homeland Defense and Civil Support

d. **Emergency Preparedness.** EP is considered a part of DOD’s overall preparedness activities. It spans HD, CS, and HS and includes DOD’s lead, support, and enabling functions. Mobile command centers and DOD aviation support to the US Secret Service are just two examples of how DOD prepares for and supports EP operations.

*For further information on the overarching Homeland Security framework, see JP 3-26, Homeland Security.*

### 3. The Civil Support Operational Framework

a. The DOD organizational construct to support the HS mission, through its warfighting and CS missions, is characterized by: prepare, detect, deter, prevent, defend, respond and recover. While DOD’s CS focus is on preparation and response, DOD may provide critical support to US civil authorities in all areas of this framework. The following paragraphs address the CS focus under the HS framework.

(1) **Prepare.** DOD prepares to respond across a range of activities by developing, sustaining, and improving operational capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from domestic

incidents, whether HD, HS, or CS. It is a continuous process to identify threats, determine vulnerabilities, and identify required resources.

(2) **Detect.** Although DOD does maintain a statutory responsibility under Title 10 US Code (USC), Section 124 to serve as the lead agency of the USG for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States, DOD supports civil authorities in the detection of all transnational threats desiring entry to the homeland by land, maritime, or air conveyance. DOD routinely supports federal LEAs' efforts to detect transnational threats on all borders using unique military capabilities. However, a federal LEA will always be the primary agency for efforts to detect transnational threats along the borders.

(3) **Deter.** DOD may support civil authorities' efforts to deter threats to the homeland. Overt support to DHS or other federal and state LEAs may have a deliberate or inadvertent deterrence effect. DOD conducts missions in support of, and at the request of, LEAs to deter threats along the borders and within the homeland. The mere presence of DOD assets operating in support of law enforcement along the borders or in the airspace adjacent to our public lands can deter transnational threat actors such as foreign terrorist organizations, drug trafficking organizations, and alien smuggling organizations from attempting entry into the United States or from pursuing illegal cultivation or processing of narcotics on our public lands. Even the presence of DOD engineers on the southwest border — whose principal engineering support task might be to construct roads or bridges to enhance LEA mobility on the border — can deter illegal trafficking in that area.

(4) **Prevent.** In certain cases DOD performs CS to assist LEAs to prevent threats to the homeland. Ideally, this will occur as far forward as possible, prior to any threat reaching the homeland. An example in the Commander, US Northern Command's (CDRUSNORTHCOM's) area of responsibility (AOR) is DOD's support to LEAs as members of the US country teams in Mexico and Canada. Primarily through intelligence analytical support, DOD is assisting supported LEA by detecting threats, which can then be prevented through interdiction by US and partner nation law enforcement and/or military assets. DOD also supports civil authorities' efforts to prevent threats by providing similar analytical support to key law enforcement centers within the continental US (CONUS) such as the joint terrorism task forces, field intelligence groups, and high intensity drug trafficking areas headquarters. The Civil Air Patrol (CAP) (as Air Force Auxiliary) assists the US Customs Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the US Forest Service in their counterdrug (CD) efforts by flying air reconnaissance and providing transportation and communications support.

(5) **Defend.** Both passive and active actions may be taken to weaken or stop a threat. Passive actions may include creating barriers, obstacles, or hardened sites. Active measures would be shorter-range, close or immediate in time. Defend also includes individual, crew, and facility protective measures to block out damage from an incident, to include taking medicines and antidotes promptly upon being attacked.

(6) **Respond and Recover.** Response, as it relates to CS activities, is the ability to rapidly and effectively support civil authorities in providing appropriate support to LEAs, and assistance in managing the consequences of disasters and catastrophes, including natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents. DOD provides CS as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to provide

support to civil authorities. DOD provides CS in order to reduce suffering, save lives, prevent or mitigate the destruction of property, manage the consequences of an attack or a disaster, or prevent terrorist incidents by supporting law enforcement. Civil authorities are more likely to request DOD support when civilian response capabilities are overwhelmed or exhausted, or when DOD's unique capabilities and operations can offer an essential, decisive, time-critical contribution in order to achieve the USG's desired outcome to threat or incident.

b. Although the leads for HD (DOD) and CS (e.g., DHS and DOJ) are different, the distinction between the two operational activities may not easily be defined or discerned. There may be cases where HD and CS events take place concurrently, or the main threat and therefore the agency lead, transitions from one agency to the other. Therefore, the need to establish workable and effective interagency relationships and partnerships, in advance of a crisis or contingency, is critical. For example, DOD may support DHS activities in the maritime domain, requiring continuous coordination between department-level, operational, and tactical organizations conducting operations. The MOTR Plan acts to mitigate overlap issues between HD and HS activities by providing a method for interagency integration. To fully develop and verify such relationships and partnerships, an active interagency coordination program, backed-up by annual joint and interagency exercises or operations, is required.

#### 4. Homeland Security Directive

Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, *Management of Domestic Incidents*, sets forth roles and responsibilities of the Federal government for domestic incident management by establishing a single incident management system.

a. **National Response Plan.** The National Response Plan (NRP) was a result of HSPD-5: a single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident management built on the template of National Incident Management System (NIMS) (see below). The NRP is an all-hazards plan that provides the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy and operational direction for incident management to ensure timely and effective federal support. The NRP is applicable to all federal departments and agencies that have primary jurisdiction for or participate in operations requiring coordinated federal response. The NRP identifies how federal departments and agencies will respond to state, tribal, and/or local requests for assistance (RFAs). The NRP and the NIMS are designed to improve the Nation's incident management capabilities and overall efficiency. During incidents of national significance or other incidents requiring significant federal support, the NRP (based on the NIMS) works to integrate the capabilities and resources of various governmental jurisdictions, incident management and emergency response disciplines, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector into a cohesive, coordinated, and seamless national framework for incident management. A basic premise of both the NIMS and the NRP is that incidents are generally handled at the lowest jurisdictional level possible. In the vast majority of incidents, local resources and local mutual aid will provide the first line of emergency response and incident management.

(1) The NRP provides the framework for most, but not all DOD support to civil authorities and describes the policies, planning assumptions, concept of operations, response and recovery actions, and responsibilities for 31 federal departments and agencies, and the American Red Cross (ARC). DHS is the executive agent for the NRP coordination, management and maintenance. The NRP is

always in effect and is supported by all departments and agencies within the Federal government. Actions range in scope from ongoing situational reporting and analysis through the National Operations Center (NOC), to the implementation of NRP incident annexes and other supplemental federal contingency plans, to full implementation of all relevant NRP coordination mechanisms outlined in the base plan. Some departments and agencies have larger roles due to the amount of resources they can bring to bear. DOD has a large role in supporting the NRP. The NRP applies to all incidents requiring a coordinated federal response as part of an appropriate combination of federal, state, local, tribal, private sector, and nongovernmental entities. CS operations may occur after a Presidential declaration of a major disaster or an emergency. However, such a declaration is not mandatory to initiate DOD support operations. CS operations are consistent with the NRP in that they aim to supplement the efforts and resources of other federal agencies in support of state, local, tribal governments, and voluntary organizations. **Unless otherwise directed by the President, the US military will provide CS in support of another federal agency that is coordinating the federal response.**

(2) The NRP is coordinated and managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA is an operational component of DHS.

(3) The overall coordination of federal incident management activities is executed through the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Secretary of Homeland Security utilizes multiagency structures at the headquarters, regional, and field levels to coordinate efforts and provide appropriate support to the incident command structure. The NRP establishes a NOC and its component elements, the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), the Incident Advisory Council, the Domestic Readiness Group, and the designation of a principal federal official (PFO) who may be appointed to represent the Secretary of Homeland Security at the local incident site. At the federal headquarters level, incident information-sharing, operational planning, and deployment of federal resources are coordinated by the NOC.

(4) The NRP contains 3 types of annexes. These annexes are: emergency support function (ESF) annexes; support annexes; and incident annexes. Each annex identifies and describes missions, policies, structures, and responsibilities of federal agencies for providing resource and operational support.

#### **b. National Incident Management System**

(1) The NIMS provides the template for incident management regardless of size, scope, or cause of the event. It is a consistent doctrinal framework for incident management at all jurisdictional levels. It includes a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and technologies covering the incident command system; multiagency coordination systems; unified command; training; identification and management of resources (including systems for classifying types of resources); qualifications and certification; and the collection, tracking, and reporting of incident information and incident resources.

(2) The incident command system (ICS), multiagency coordination systems, and public information systems are the fundamental elements of the NIMS that direct incident operations; acquire, coordinate, and deliver resources to incident sites; and share information about the incident with the public, respectively.

(3) When both local and state resources and capabilities are overwhelmed, governors may request federal assistance; however, the NIMS is designed so that local jurisdictional authorities retain command, control, and authority over response. Adhering to the NIMS will allow local agencies to better utilize incoming coordinated resources.

*A detailed discussion of the NRP and NIMS is contained in Appendix D, “Overview of the National Response Plan and National Incident Management System.”*

## 5. Incident Management

The definition of the term “incident,” as used in this publication, is provided below:

### INCIDENT

**“An occurrence, caused by either human action or natural phenomena, that requires action to prevent or minimize loss of life or damage to property and/or natural resources.”**

**SOURCE: Department of Homeland Security Lexicon  
September 13, 2006**

#### a. Responsibilities

(1) The Federal government provides assistance when requested. When situations are beyond the capability of the state, the governor requests federal assistance from the President. The President may also direct the Federal government to provide supplemental assistance to state and local governments to alleviate the suffering and damage resulting from disasters or emergencies. One of the key objectives of the Department of Defense Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support is to support civil authorities in minimizing the damage and recovering from domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) mass casualty attacks. The strategy affirms DOD’s primary responsibility for protecting the US homeland from attack, and establishes that the second priority is to support civil authorities in minimizing the damage and recovering from domestic CBRNE mass casualty attacks.

(2) Emergencies, disasters, and terrorist attacks may be of national importance, but they always occur locally. The initial response to such circumstances is by citizens and nongovernmental entities, local authorities, and state governments. Law enforcement entities have critical authorities and responsibilities concerning potential and actual terrorist attacks and incidents. As affirmed and clarified by The Homeland Security Act of 2002: primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting acts of terrorism shall be vested not in DHS, but rather in federal, state, and local LEAs with jurisdiction over the acts in question. At the federal level, the principal law enforcement investigation and prosecution agency is the DOJ.

(3) Incidents are managed at the lowest level possible. Federal support is provided in response to requests from state or local officials through the state coordinating officer (SCO) to the federal coordinating officer (FCO). The FCO coordinates for DOD support through the defense coordinating

officer (DCO). DOD may provide support to DHS which has the lead in managing the federal response to a domestic incident. Domestically, DHS has responsibility for overall incident management and the NRP provides the framework for federal interaction with state, local, and tribal governments; the private sector; and NGOs in the context of domestic incident prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery activities. DOD support to this response will be initiated through a formal RFA or mission assignment process.

b. **Requets for Assistance.** Initial requests for assistance are made to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Executive Secretariat. If approved by the SecDef, DOD designates a supported combatant commander (CCDR) for the response. The supported CCDR determines the appropriate level of command and control for each response and usually directs a senior military officer to deploy to the incident site. The DCO serves as DOD's single point of contact in the joint field office (JFO). Requests will be coordinated and processed through the DCO with the exception of requests for United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) support, National Guard (NG) forces operating in state active duty or Title 32 USC status (i.e., not in federal service), or, in some circumstances, DOD forces in support of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

c. **Crisis and Consequence Management.** The HSPD-5 and the NRP adopt the concept of incident management as including both consequence management (CM) and crisis management (CrM), while DOD continues to categorize CS operations using these two terms. The application of CrM and CM is unique and separate in the context of planning and conducting military operations. Non-DOD actors, including local civil authorities and first responders, are generally not familiar with US military terms, definitions, and doctrine. When working with non-DOD actors/partners, especially in an emergency situation, clear, effective, and mutually understandable communication is essential. DOD elements will be able to work much more seamlessly, efficiently, and productively by employing operational concepts and terms that other departments, agencies, and authorities already understand. The main sources of these concepts and language include the NRP, NIMS, and other federal and national standards.

(1) CrM is predominantly a law enforcement response, normally executed under federal law. DHS is responsible for preventing terrorist attacks, reducing the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, minimizing the damage, and assisting in the recovery, from terrorist attacks.

(2) The NRP defines CM as an emergency management function which includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism.

(3) Historically, much of DOD's CS mission set has involved CM operations. This is due to legal restrictions which generally preclude DOD from participating in CrM law enforcement investigations and operations. The Space Shuttle disaster which involved a single Service task force (TF), and Hurricane Katrina which involved a large joint task force (JTF) were both DOD CM operations in support of another agency. In a catastrophic situation, if significant DOD forces are requested, DOD would likely provide a JTF or multiple JTFs, which command and control (C2) Title 10 USC forces that are conducting CS operations in support of civil authorities.

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## CHAPTER II

### DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

*“Although the national response to Hurricane Katrina was the largest of its kind in US history, the delay of several days in providing large scale assistance to New Orleans — and the initial absence of a unified strategy for dealing with the disaster — contributed to the suffering of the people left in the city and caused considerable anguish throughout the country. When a catastrophic event occurs, the effort required of policemen, firemen, emergency management workers, and other first responders skyrockets. However, at the point of impact these first responders often become victims or lose the capability to effectively respond.”*

**Hurricane Katrina, National Response to Catastrophic Events:  
Applied Lessons for Consequence Management  
Joint Center for Operational Analysis  
United States Joint Forces Command  
21 August 2006**

#### 1. General

a. Introducing federal forces into an otherwise civil response situation requires a clear understanding of authorities and their limits. Because the public, media, and perhaps local and state officials, may not clearly understand Constitutional limits, expectations must be managed and communicated. This distinction is especially important because both federal and NG forces wear the same uniform. Military units tasked to support civil authorities during domestic disasters enable rapid and effective response operations that limit loss of life, mitigate suffering, and curtail further significant property damage. The challenge remains integrating military and civil capabilities within a disaster stricken operating environment with little intact infrastructure while urgently and efficiently executing relief operations.

b. Authority over and control of DOD forces/capabilities shall be maintained by the President, as Commander in Chief, through the SecDef and the chain of command as established by law.

c. When emergency conditions dictate, and when time does not permit approval from higher headquarters, local military commanders and responsible DOD component officials are authorized to respond to requests from local authorities and to initiate immediate response actions to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions. Higher headquarters must be informed promptly.

d. DOD resources are normally used only when state and local resources are overwhelmed and/or non-DOD resources of the Federal government are insufficient or unable to meet the requirements of local and state civil authorities.

e. All DOD actions shall be performed consistent with the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) (Title 18 USC, Section 1385), the Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order (Title 10 USC, Chapter



15), and Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5525.5, *DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials*.

### 2. Requests for Assistance

a. **General.** Requests for DOD assistance may occur under Stafford Act or non-Stafford Act conditions. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law 93-288) (Title 42 USC, Section 5121), authorizes the Federal government to help state and local governments alleviate the suffering and damage caused by disasters. A non-Stafford Act incident is essentially all of the other emergencies that occur each year and do not necessarily overwhelm state and local authorities. However, the NRP recognizes that state and local governments experiencing a non-Stafford Act event would benefit from federal assistance and coordination. For instance, while Hurricane Katrina was an incident of national significance, an accidental airline crash may not be an incident of national significance. However, an airline crash may create circumstances for which state and local authorities may benefit from the use of federal resources.

(1) At the regional level, interagency resource coordination and multiagency incident support are provided by the regional response coordination center (RRCC). The RRCC coordinates regional response efforts, establishes federal priorities, and implements local federal program support until a JFO is established.

(2) The Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for overall coordination of Federal Stafford and non-Stafford incident management activities. An FCO is appointed to manage and coordinate federal resource support activities related to Stafford Act disasters and emergencies.

(3) When requested, DOD normally will deploy a regionally-assigned DCO to the JFO in order to assist the FCO in coordinating DOD support, as required. A defense coordinating element (DCE) consisting of appropriate staff elements and military liaison officers (LNOs) may also be requested to assist the DCO in facilitating and coordinating potential DOD support.

b. **Stafford Act Assistance.** A Stafford Act incident is one in which state and local authorities declare a state of emergency and request federal assistance. This type of emergency is an incident of national significance for which the Stafford Act establishes programs and processes for the Federal government to provide major disaster and emergency assistance to states, local governments, tribal nations, individuals, and qualified private nonprofit organizations.

(1) The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act authorizes the Federal government to establish programs and processes for the Federal government to provide major disaster and emergency assistance to states, local governments, tribal nations, individuals, and qualified private nonprofit organizations.

(2) In some circumstances, Stafford Act requests may originate from the state emergency operations center (EOC), FEMA RRCC, or the FEMA NRCC and pass directly to the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS) or the DOD Office of the Executive Secretary, rather than routing through a DCO. These RFAs are processed the same as non-Stafford Act requests, with JDOMS and the

operational headquarters conducting parallel coordination and providing a recommendation to Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs (ASD[HD&ASA]) and the SecDef for approval or disapproval. In all these cases, the supported CCDR and the affected DCO must be notified to limit redundant coordination of resources.

c. **Non-Stafford Act Assistance.** A non-Stafford Act incident is essentially all of the other emergencies that occur each year and do not necessarily overwhelm state and local authorities, and where the event would benefit from federal assistance and coordination.

(1) In non-Stafford Act situations, a federal department or agency acting under its own authority may request the assistance of the Secretary of Homeland Security to obtain support from other federal departments and agencies. DHS may designate a federal resource coordinator (FRC). Support in those situations may be requested and reimbursed under the authority of the Economy Act. DHS may establish a JFO for "federal-to-federal" support when an incident is managed by one or more federal agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security is represented by the PFO and/or the FCO. The PFO/ FCO is normally positioned at and coordinates through the JFO.

(2) In non-Stafford Act requests, the RFAs are processed with JDOMS and the operational headquarters conducting parallel coordination and providing a recommendation to ASD(HD&ASA) and the SecDef for approval or disapproval. In all these cases, the supported CCDR and the affected DCO must be notified to limit redundant coordination of resources.

d. **Request for Assistance Process.** Federal agencies or state governors request DOD capabilities to support their emergency response efforts by using a formal RFA process. How DOD handles RFAs depends on various factors, such as: Stafford or non-Stafford Act situation, urgency of the incident, establishment of a JFO, if a DCO or JTF has been appointed, and originator of the request (incident command, state, regional, or national). It is important to note that not all CS is provided via the RFA process. Other processes for obtaining and/or providing support are covered in more detail in Chapter III, "Operations."

(1) Civil authorities may request other CS activities in writing through various means established by the appropriate DOD policy documents. For example, support for military fly-overs may be requested using DD Form 2535 as described in DODD 5410.18, *Public Affairs Community Relations Policy*.

(2) In general, the RFA process is conducted as shown in Figure II-1. The FCO at the incident site receives RFAs from civil authorities and submits them to the Office of the Executive Secretary of the Department of Defense, who forwards them to the ASD(HD&ASA) and to the JDOMS for validation and order processing, respectively. When a DCO is at the incident site, RFAs are submitted directly to ASD(HD&ASA). Once the SecDef approves the request, an order is issued to combatant commands, Services, and/or agencies to accomplish the mission. The decision process differs significantly for approving Stafford and non-Stafford RFAs (see Figure II-2). Requests are validated at all levels within the chain of command. JDOMS prepares an order and coordinates with necessary force providers, legal counsel, and ASD(HD&ASA) to ensure asset deconfliction and recommendation concurrence. DOD evaluates all requests by US civil authorities for military assistance against six established criteria, including:




Figure II-1. Request for Assistance

- (a) Legality. Is the support in compliance with laws, Presidential directives?
- (b) Lethality. Is use of lethal force by or against DOD personnel likely or expected?
- (c) Risk. Safety of DOD forces. Can the request be met safely, or can concerns be mitigated by equipment or training?
- (d) Cost. Who pays, and what is the impact on DOD budget?
- (e) Appropriateness. Is the requested mission in the interest of DOD to conduct? Who normally performs and is best suited to fill the request?
- (f) Readiness. What is the impact on DOD's ability to perform its primary mission?




Figure II-2. Request for Assistance Process Decision Matrix

(3) The DCO and supporting DCE assigned to the FEMA regional office may function as part of the RRCC or the JFO (when established). Upon receipt of the RFA, the DCO evaluates the request to determine if it meets DOD's screening criteria using the same criteria shown above.

(4) The DCO should ensure the RFA is readily understandable and clearly describes the requirement and necessary support. Agencies should not make requests for specific capabilities, as they may not be available within DOD at the time and a similar capability may be able to satisfactorily provide the requested support. If the RFA does request a specific capability, the DCO, with the support of the DCE, should coordinate with the requesting agency and recommend appropriate language to fulfill the request on a timely basis. If the DCO determines the RFA does not meet the evaluation criteria or is unable to support the request, the RFA should be returned to the requesting agency with an explanation as to why it is not being supported.

(5) After the DCO validates the RFA, a copy of the RFA is forwarded to the supported headquarters' operations center along with a recommendation for action if the requested support has been previously approved, or, to be forwarded to the JDOMS and ASD(HD&ASA) for assessment and approval/disapproval. This recommendation is also provided to the FCO who will ultimately decide if the request must be forwarded to the RRCC and NRCC, as required.

(6) The DCO and DCE will coordinate with the NG joint force headquarters (JFHQ) or state JTF headquarters element and federal military operational headquarters (JTF, contingency support group, operational command post, joint force commander [JFC], etc.), supporting the response effort to determine if non-federalized and federal military forces already deployed are capable and available to provide the assistance requested. The requested support should be within the scope of the original mission statement, as well as cost allocations. Upon validation and if approved by SecDef, if forces are available, and the RFA is going to be approved, they may be directed to immediately provide the requested support while the RFA is being processed through the operational headquarters to JDOMS. Normally JDOMS will coordinate the RFA with the supported combatant command, supporting combatant commands, Military Departments and applicable combat support agencies. Once coordination is complete, JDOMS sends the RFA to ASD(HD&ASA) where it undergoes a final review and, if recommended, the action is coordinated with the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to ensure that there is no duplication of effort between them and the Active Component (AC). The ASD(HD&ASA) then passes the RFA to the SecDef for decision (a separate execute order (EXORD) will not be issued for this).

(7) In some circumstances, Stafford Act requests may originate from the state emergency operations center (EOC), FEMA RRCC, or the FEMA NRCC and pass directly to the JDOMS or the DOD Office of the Executive Secretary, rather than routing through a DCO. These RFAs are processed the same as non-Stafford Act requests, with JDOMS and the operational headquarters conducting parallel coordination and providing a recommendation to ASD(HD&ASA) and the SecDef for approval or disapproval. In all these cases, the supported CCDR and the affected DCO must be notified to limit redundant coordination of resources.

(8) Upon SecDef approval, the JDOMS releases an EXORD to designate supported and supporting CCDRs, and to task force providers to provide the necessary support.

(9) The operational headquarters will provide a supporting operation order (OPORD), implementing a concept plan (CONPLAN), if available, and establish command relationships to provide task, purpose, and coordinating instructions to the supporting force.

(10) Since CS missions may involve lifesaving responses, this process will be rapidly executed to expedite the prompt movement of forces and support. DOD cannot provide support without SecDef approval of an official request from state or federal agency or direction from the President, or unless specifically authorized in existing policy or regulation.

(11) If a disaster is of such proportions to generate mass casualties in need of evacuation, DOD supports the primary agency(ies) for this function under the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) (once the NDMS has been activated and an official request for patient evacuation has been submitted by proper state authorities).

(12) The CCDRs responsible for CS (CDRUSNORTHCOM; Commander, US Pacific Command [CDRUSPACOM]; and Commander, US Southern Command [CDRUSSOUTHCOM]) incorporate plans for CS by task organizing their commands to accomplish CS missions as well as other assigned missions. DOD is a signatory to numerous response plans as well as various memoranda of understanding and memoranda of agreement with other agencies; therefore, DOD may play a critical role in CS and may be relied upon by many agencies.

(13) The response measures taken by DOD will be in accordance with (IAW) the unmet demands of the incident, its capabilities, current laws, Presidential directives, executive orders (EOs), and DOD policies, directives, and orders.

### **3. Immediate Response**

a. Under imminently serious conditions, when time does not permit approval from higher headquarters, any local military commander, or responsible officials of other DOD components may, subject to any supplemental direction provided by their higher headquarters, and in response to a request from civil authorities, provide immediate response to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage.

b. In the case of a requirement for an immediate federal response to a serious situation in the maritime domain, the MOTR plan allows rapid response to short-notice threats and directs interagency partners to begin coordination activities (MOTR conference calls) at the earliest possible opportunity. It also provides guidance in predesignating federal agencies with lead responsibilities, clarifying interagency roles and responsibilities, and establishing protocols and procedures that are utilized for a coordinated response to achieve the USG's desired outcome. MOTR lead and supporting roles are developed from the following criteria:

- (1) USG desired outcome.
- (2) Agency authorities.
- (3) Agency capabilities.
- (4) Agency capacities.



(5) Magnitude of the threat.

c. Immediate response is situation-specific and may or may not be associated with a declared or undeclared disaster, civil emergency, or attack.

d. While civilian authorities are marshalling the necessary relief assets to respond to the emergency, the local military commander, who is ready and capable of rapidly responding on a no-notice basis, can immediately begin the relief effort following receipt of a RFA. This participation should be of a short duration, lasting only until sufficient local and state assets arrive on the scene and assume control. Consequently, immediate response authority is not a blanket authority to provide unlimited military assistance any time and any where for any length of time.

e. As soon as practical, the military commander, or responsible official of a DOD component or agency rendering such assistance, shall report the request, the nature of the response, and any other pertinent information through the chain of command to the National Military Command Center.

#### 4. Roles and Responsibilities

a. **The Department of Defense.** Principal and supporting DOD participants involved in the execution of CS missions may include SecDef; ASD(HD&ASA); Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD[HA]); Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD[RA]); Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS); CDRUSNORTHCOM; CDRUSPACOM; Commander, US Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM); CDRUSSOUTHCOM; Commander, US Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM); Commander, US Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM); and Commander, US Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM).

(1) **Secretary of Defense.** SecDef has overall authority for DOD and is the President's principal advisor on military matters concerning CS. SecDef retains approval authority for the use of forces, personnel, units, and equipment. SecDef has the primary responsibility within DOD to provide the overall policy and oversight for CS in the event of a domestic incident. SecDef retains sole authority to waive reimbursement for DOD assets.

(2) **Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs.** ASD(HD&ASA) serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on CS matters. ASD(HD&ASA) coordinates all CS mission matters with other executive departments and federal agencies. ASD(HD&ASA) ensures that DOD strategy is consistent with and fully supports the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* effort. ASD(HD&ASA) assists SecDef in providing guidance (through the Joint Staff) to CCDRs for supporting civilian LEAs and conducting coordination with DHS.

(3) **Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs.** ASD(HA) is a critical component in the Services' activation of the federal coordinating centers (FCCs). FCCs are DOD and Veterans

Affairs medical facilities responsible for locating civilian medical facilities willing to provide disaster support in their geographic location. They are also responsible for arranging the reception and staging of arriving patients, followed by their distribution to those supporting facilities.

(4) **Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.** ASD(RA) is responsible for monitoring Reserve Component (RC) readiness. ASD(RA) provides policy regarding the appropriate integration of RC forces into CS response efforts.

(5) **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.** CJCS has numerous responsibilities relating to CS. These include advising the President and SecDef on operational policies, responsibilities, and programs; assisting SecDef in implementing operational responses; and translating SecDef guidance into OPORDs to provide assistance to the federal agency with lead responsibility. CJCS ensures that CS plans and operations are compatible with other military plans. Within the CS mission, CJCS serves as the principal military advisor to the President and SecDef in preparing for and responding to CBRNE incidents, ensures that military planning is accomplished to support the federal agency with lead responsibility for CrM and CM, and provides strategic guidance to the CCDRs for the conduct of CD operations. CJCS also assists CCDRs in meeting their operational requirements for providing CS that has been approved by SecDef.

(6) **CDRUSNORTHCOM** is responsible for conducting CS operations (including CM operations) IAW US laws within the established AOR. CDRUSNORTHCOM is also responsible for the creation and maintenance of plans to provide CS, as directed. Within the US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) AOR, CDRUSNORTHCOM is the DOD designated planning agent and the supported commander for CS missions. USNORTHCOM organizes and executes its missions through assigned Service components, designated functional components, and subordinate standing JTFs.

(a) **Standing Joint Force Headquarters North (SJFHQ-N).** A standing joint force headquarters is a full-time joint C2 element within USNORTHCOM's headquarters. It provides the commander with a trained and equipped standing joint C2 capability specifically organized to conduct planning and develop enhanced situational understanding in support of CS operations in the USNORTHCOMAOR. When directed by SecDef to conduct a CS mission, CDRUSNORTHCOM can deploy SJFHQ-N to enable the rapid stand-up of a JTF headquarters.

(b) **Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS).** JTF-CS is a standing JTF assigned to CDRUSNORTHCOM dedicated to planning and integrating DOD domestic CBRNE consequence management support for incidents or accidents. When directed by SecDef, CDRUSNORTHCOM deploys JTF-CS as a CBRNE CM headquarters to establish C2 of designated DOD forces at the CBRNE incident site and to provide CS to save lives, prevent injury, and provide temporary critical life support. If the CBRNE event occurs outside the USNORTHCOMAOR, JTF-CS may be attached to CDRUSPACOM or CDRUSSOUTHCOM to provide domestic CBRNE support.

(c) **Joint Task Force North (JTF-N).** As directed, JTF-N employs military capabilities to support LEAs and supports interagency synchronization within the USNORTHCOMAOR in order to deter and prevent transnational threats to the homeland.



(d) **Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR).** JFHQ-NCR plans, coordinates, and maintains situational awareness, and as directed, employs forces for HD and CS in the National Capital Region's (NCR's) operational area to safeguard the Nation's capital.

(e) **Joint Task Force Alaska (JTF-AK).** JTF-AK is comprised of forces from Alaskan Command, a subunified command of US Pacific Command (USPACOM), and is under the operational control (OPCON) of USNORTHCOM for HD and CS missions to assist federal, state, local, and tribal authorities within the Alaska joint operations area (JOA).

(f) **US Army North (ARNORTH) JTFs.** ARNORTH, the Army Service component command of US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), has two deployable TFs and dual JTF capability. The TF/JTFs have the mission to deploy anywhere in the USNORTHCOMAOR for C2 of Title 10 USC forces in HD and CS missions. Commander, ARNORTH and Commander, US Marine Forces North have the mission to serve as a joint force land component commander for USNORTHCOM.

(7) **Commander, US Pacific Command.** CDRUSPACOM is responsible for CS within the USPACOMAOR, and is also responsible for the development and maintenance of plans to provide CS within the assigned AOR. CDRUSPACOM organizes and executes its missions through Joint Task Force Homeland Defense (JTF-HD), assigned Service components, and designated functional components. JTF-HD is a standing JTF, established by USPACOM, which synchronizes, plans, and executes CS missions within the domestic portion of USPACOMAOR.

(8) **Commander, US Southern Command.** CDRUSSOUTHCOM provides CS within the AOR to include Puerto Rico and US Virgin Islands. However, CDRUSNORTHCOM will provide defense support of civil authorities for Puerto Rico and US Virgin Islands.

(9) **Commander, US Strategic Command.** CDRUSSTRATCOM is responsible for planning, integrating, and coordinating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support of strategic and global operations. CDRUSSTRATCOM is also responsible for integrating and synchronizing DOD-wide efforts in support of the combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) mission. CDRUSSTRATCOM also serves as the supporting commander to USNORTHCOM, USPACOM, and US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) for CS missions within their AORs.

(10) **Commander, US Special Operations Command.** CDRUSSOCOM serves as a supporting commander to CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRUSPACOM, and CDRUSSOUTHCOM within their respective AORs when requirements exceed a CCDR's forces' capabilities and additional special operations forces expertise is needed. When directed by the President or SecDef, CDRUSSOCOM conducts special operations and provides special operations forces as required in support of CS operations. CDRUSSOCOM may also provide LNOs and other assistance to the supported CCDRs as required.

(11) **Commander, US Transportation Command.** CDRUSTRANSCOM is responsible for providing transportation and common-user port management for the DOD as well as non-DOD agencies upon request. United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) coordinates the efforts of its three subordinate transportation component commands (Air Mobility Command, Military Sealift Command, and Surface Deployment and Distribution Command) with the supported and supporting combatant commands. The integration of the intertheater and intratheater movement control systems is the shared responsibility of USTRANSCOM and the supported combatant command.

(12) **Commander, US Joint Forces Command.** CDRUSJFCOM's role in CS is to provide support to other combatant commands as the joint force provider, joint force integrator, and joint force trainer.

(13) **US Army Corps of Engineers.** USACE conducts its emergency response activities under two basic authorities: the Flood Control and Coastal Emergency Act and the Stafford Disaster and Emergency Assistance Act. Under the Flood Control and Coastal Emergency Act, USACE provides disaster preparedness services and advanced planning measures designed to reduce the amount of damage caused by an impending disaster. Under the Stafford Act, USACE supports DHS/FEMA in executing the NRP, which calls on 30 federal departments and agencies to provide coordinated disaster relief and recovery operations. Emergency responses usually involve cooperation with other federal agencies in support of state and local efforts. Within the NRP, DOD designated USACE as the primary agency for planning, preparedness, and response under the ESF #3, "Public Works and Engineering." ESF #3 provides lifesaving or life protecting assistance to augment efforts of the affected state(s) and local response efforts following a major or catastrophic disaster. Public works and engineering support includes technical advice and evaluations, engineering services, construction management and inspection, emergency contracting, provision of emergency power, emergency repair of wastewater and solid waste facilities, and real estate support.

b. **Reserve Component.** NG and reserve forces are collectively referred to as RC forces. They are also an essential part of the CS operational force when mobilized and consist of the Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), the US Army Reserve (USAR), the US Navy Reserve (USNR), the US Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR), the Air National Guard of the United States (ANGUS), the US Air Force Reserve (USAFR), and the US Coast Guard Reserve. Guidelines for the utilization of RC forces when called to federal active duty are found in Title 10 USC.

(1) **Reserve Forces.** Each member of the RC is structured and operated in a manner similar to its respective AC counterpart. Unlike the ARNGUS and ANGUS, the remaining four RC organizations (USAR, USNR, USAFR, USMCR) operate under the same C2 relationships in both peacetime and wartime and do not have state-specific relationships. When called to active duty, RC forces conduct HD and CS missions under Title 10 USC guidelines exactly as AC forces. While on active duty, members of the USAR, USNR, USAFR, and USMCR are subject to the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Reserve forces are called to active duty through the mobilization/demobilization process. Title 10 USC reserve forces are able to execute CS missions in involuntary annual training if the unit has not completed this training during the fiscal year. Reserve forces can also serve on CS missions in a volunteer status.

(2) **National Guard.** The NG is both part of the RC of the United States military and a constitutionally authorized organized militia. Traditionally the NG serves its states, and local communities, under the militia clause and serves as a strategic, and operational, reserve of the United States. The Army National Guard (ARNG) and the Air National Guard (ANG) of the United States (ARNGUS and ANGUS respectively) are federal reserve components and are federally funded to meet federal service specific training requirements. Every National Guardsman belongs to both their respective State ARNG or ANG and the corresponding federal component as well (ARNGUS or ANGUS.) The NG is a critical resource in domestic emergencies and is an effective force multiplier to civil authorities in responding to disasters or acts of terrorism at the state and local level.

(a) The Army and Air NG are established in 54 states and territories, including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Territory of the US Virgin Islands, the territory of Guam, and the District of Columbia. With the exception of the District of Columbia whose head is the “Commanding General” and reports through channels ultimately to the President of the United States, the head of the NG in each state is the adjutant general (TAG), who reports to the governor.

(b) Unlike the federal reserve, a member of the NG may serve in one of three statuses:

1. Title 10 USC status – federal active duty. The member is ordered to active duty under various sections of Title 10 USC. Pay and allowances are federally funded, and the member is under federal command and control and subject to the UCMJ.

2. Title 32 USC status. This status is used for both training and certain operational missions. A member’s pay and allowances are federally funded, but the member is under state C2 and subject to the state military code versus the UCMJ. For training, this status includes weekend drills, annual training, and certain other types of training paid out of reserve force appropriations. Operationally, this status is used for CD missions, HD activities, and the WMD CS teams. Title 32 USC status has also been used to secure strategic facilities, such as airports, pharmaceutical labs, nuclear power plants, and border crossings.

3. State Active Duty status. Under provisions of state law a member can be ordered to state active duty under the C2 of a governor. Pay and allowances are state funded and the member is subject to the state military code versus UCMJ. This status is typically used for state responses to natural and man-made disasters and civil disturbances.

(c) Unless activated in federal service (Title 10 USC), the NG is under state or territorial control. Title 32 USC confirms the state or territorial control over the NG in peacetime without the restraint of the PCA and is the preferred status for domestic employment and is consistent with the NRP for CS operations.

(d) The NG in state active duty or Title 32 USC status is likely to be the first military force to provide support for a CS incident. Under the command of a governor, NG actions are closely coordinated with those of state agencies, state political subdivisions, tribal governments, neighboring and supporting states, NGOs, and federal agencies, to include DHS and DOD. In many states, TAG

is the state Director for Emergency Management and Director of HS, and as such, not only directs the response of the state's NG forces, but also directs the state's response to CM. Figure II-3 depicts the various TAG roles.

(e) The NG, along with the rest of the US Armed Forces is transforming to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. It is vital to recognize the NG capabilities that will interact with and be operating in a disaster area during CS operations. The following NG initiatives highlight the major programs DOD should be familiar with because state and federal military forces will work closely together to coordinate support, minimize the duplication of effort, and establish unity of effort. Pursuant




Figure II-3. The Adjutant General Roles

to recent changes to Title 32 USC, Section 502(f), the NG can also perform operational missions authorized by the President or SecDef.

1. Joint Force Headquarters State (JFHQ-State). Each state has a JFHQ-State, which integrates Army and Air NG resources. The JFHQ-State provide a focal point to operate jointly with combatant commands and any federal JTFs that may perform HD or CS missions within a state's boundaries.

2. Joint Task Force State (JTF-State). The NG of each state is capable of establishing a JTF-State to facilitate the joint employment of state NG resources under the JFHQ-State for operational missions in support of a civil emergency in either a state active duty or Title 32 USC status. These JTFs are tailored to the operational requirements and NG JTF commanders will be certified by DOD to simultaneously command both federal and state military forces.

3. National Guard Reaction Force (NGRF). The NGRF provides rapid reaction forces to each state that, at the request of the governor or the President, is capable of supporting local or state LEAs in support of missions such as securing critical infrastructure.

4. Weapons of Mass Destruction – Civil Support Team (WMD-CST). The WMD-CST provides specialized capabilities designed to support civil authorities at a domestic CBRNE terrorist incident site by identifying CBRNE agents/substances, assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response measures, and assisting with appropriate requests for state support.

5. CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP). The NG CERFPs provide a regional response capability comprised of existing traditional NG units task organized to respond to WMD attacks and are capable of performing search and extraction, casualty/patient decontamination, mass medical triage, and treatment at a CBRNE incident.

### c. **Combat Support Agencies**

(1) **Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).** DTRA provides services and support to DOD components for combating threats to national security. DTRA offers a range of capabilities relating to CBRNE.

(a) DTRA's Operations Center maintains situational awareness and serves as a point of contact for access to a variety of support including:

1. Secure communications.

2. Technical reach-back for warfighters and first responders, on a 24-hour, 7-day per week basis, in the form of subject matter experts on DTRA computational tools.

3. Liaison and coordination of assistance from CCDRs and other federal agencies in response to an accident or incident.

4. Data on effects of radiation on electronics.

5. Modeling/simulation for CBRNE analysis and hazard/consequence prediction. DTRA has the Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability and Consequence Assessment Tool Set to forecast damage such as blast, heat, radiation, and hazardous material release and the effects of unpredictable phenomena such as natural or man-made disasters.

**Note:** The Interagency Modeling and Assessment Center provides atmospheric hazard predictions in support of the federal response.

6. Information on location and capabilities of specialized DOD and Department of Energy assets capable of responding to accidents or incidents involving radioactive materials.

7. Nuclear forensics for domestic nuclear event attribution.

8. Support to law enforcement investigations.

(b) DTRA has the capability to deploy the following kinds of support assets:

1. **Liaison Officers.** While already on-site at certain combatant commands, additional LNOs could be dispatched to other commands as required.

2. **CM Advisory Teams.** Teams of two to nine experts, including planners, modelers, lawyers, public affairs (PA) specialists, CBRNE specialists, radiation physicians, and health physicists.

3. **Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment Teams.** Assess mission, personnel, and installation vulnerability to terrorist attack.

4. **Balanced Survivability Assessment Teams.** Assess essential mission systems and critical infrastructure survivability.

5. **Technical Support Teams.** Provide on-site and direct technical support of DTRA computational tools to warfighters supporting their full spectrum of mission areas.

## (2) **National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)**

(a) NGA is a combat support agency which provides geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) in support of DOD, the national intelligence community and federal decision makers. GEOINT is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. GEOINT consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. Combatant commands directly task NGA to provide GEOINT for planning and crisis and consequence management. GEOINT also supports civil authorities in their ability to rapidly respond to threats by providing geo-referenced visual and data products that serve as a foundation and common frame of reference for any operation. NGA also support national special security events (NSSEs) and man-made or technological disasters. NGA provides direct analytical support through the lead federal agencies and/or combatant commands primarily through the deployment



of team specialists in response to natural disasters, to include earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and wildfires. The standard production includes imagery-derived initial damage or recovery mitigation assessments, analytical reporting through NGA intelligence briefs and geospatial situational awareness products. Analytical support and reachback capability is also supplemented by NGA specialists embedded within the combatant command's intelligence center.

(b) NGA also provides support in the form of the Domestic Mobile Integrated Geospatial-Intelligence System (DMIGS). DMIGS is a mobile self-contained vehicle that integrates GEOINT analysis hardware and software with a robust communication system, enabling deployed analysts to receive and send data instantaneously to NGA facilities, allowing other NGA analysts to collaborate remotely on analysis and products. The DMIGS allows NGA analysts to work directly at the site of the crisis or special event and provide time critical information on demand.

d. **Civil Air Patrol/Air Force Auxiliary.** The CAP is a nationwide voluntary organization supported by the Air Force that serves as the Air Force Auxiliary. CAP is ideally suited to perform a variety of CS tasks such as air and ground search and rescue, disaster relief, and CD. Its members fly more than 95 percent of the inland search and rescue missions directed by the Air Force Rescue and Coordination Center. CAP assists the US Customs Service, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Forest Service in their CD efforts. CAP aircraft fly CS missions such as surveillance of critical infrastructure, airborne communications relay, and airlift of critical cargo. During Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, CAP provided near real time aerial imagery of flood damaged areas for civil authorities as well as ground missions such as house to house searching of neighborhoods and passing out emergency supplies. CAP has 52 wings — one wing for each state, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. Wings are subdivided into groups and squadrons.

e. **The Department of Homeland Security.** DHS leads the unified national effort to secure America. They prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation and will ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful immigrants and visitors, and promote the free-flow of commerce.

*For more information on DHS, see Appendix E, “Department of Homeland Security.”*

f. The **US Coast Guard (USCG)** is a Military Service within the DHS dedicated to protecting the safety and security of the United States. As such, it operates globally; on the high seas and in US territorial waters, and has certain federal law enforcement authorities ashore. It is a federal LEA and an Armed Force of the United States whose Service secretary is the Secretary of DHS. It is the lead agency for maritime drug interdiction and the co-lead agency for air drug interdiction operations, along with US Customs and Border Protection. The USCG defends the United States' seaward frontier against illegal drugs and illegal immigrants. The USCG is also the lead agency for maritime search and rescue. The USCG is the lead agency for coordinating all maritime security planning and operations in the ports and inland waterways, including all efforts to prevent attacks and to mitigate the consequences of an attack should one occur. The USCG's counterterrorism teams are ready to intercept terrorists before they ever reach the homeland. In time of war, the USCG could be transferred to the Department of the Navy for operations. **In its maritime law enforcement role, USCG has jurisdiction in both US waters and on the high seas.** In this capacity, the USCG may make inquiries, examinations,

inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the US has jurisdiction, for prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of laws of the US. **It is unique among the Services in that it has statutory law enforcement authority.** DOD through the US Navy provides CS to DHS(USCG) in the maritime domain through existing EXORDs and the *Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security for Department of Defense Support to the United States Coast Guard for Maritime Homeland Security.*

g. **Interagency Partners.** CS missions require detailed planning and interagency coordination to develop operational relationships with other federal departments and agencies. In certain circumstances DOD's dependence on non-DOD organizations, information, assets and infrastructures could be critical in the accomplishment of CS missions.

(1) **Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).** EPA serves as the ESF #10, "Oil and Hazardous Materials Response," Coordinator and as a support agency to the FBI for technical operations, and a support agency to DHS/FEMA for CM. EPA provides technical personnel and equipment to the federal agency with lead responsibility during all aspects of WMD incidents. EPA assistance may include threat assessment; domestic emergency support team (DEST) and regional emergency response team deployment; federal agency with lead responsibility advisory requirements, technical advice, and operational support for chemical, biological, and radiological releases; agent identification; hazard detection and reduction; environmental monitoring; sample and forensic evidence collection and analysis; identification of contaminants; feasibility assessment; clean-up; and on-site safety, protection, prevention, decontamination, and restoration activities. EPA and USCG share responsibilities for response to oil discharges into navigable waters and releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants into the natural and physical environment. EPA provides the predesignated federal on-scene coordinator for inland areas while USCG coordinates resources for the containment, removal, and disposal activities and resources during an oil, hazardous substance, or WMD incident in coastal areas.

(2) **Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).** DHHS serves as the ESF #8, "Public Health and Medical Services," Coordinator. DHHS assistance supports threat assessment, DEST deployment, epidemiological investigation, and lead federal agency advisory requirements, and technical assistance requirements. DHHS serves as a support agency to the FBI for technical operations, and a support agency to DHS/FEMA for CM. DHHS provides technical personnel and equipment to the federal agency with lead responsibility during all aspects of an incident. DHHS can also provide regulatory follow-up when an incident involves a product regulated by the Food and Drug Administration. Operational support to DHS/FEMA may include mass immunization, mass prophylaxis, mass fatality management, pharmaceutical support operations (Strategic National Stockpile), contingency medical records, patient tracking, and patient evacuation and definitive medical care provided through the NDMS.

(3) **United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).** USDA serves as the ESF #4, "Firefighting," and ESF #11, "Agriculture and Natural Resources," Coordinator, a support agency, and a primary agency to DHS/FEMA by identifying food assistance requirements, and securing and arranging for the transportation of food assistance to affected areas. USDA/Forest Service manages and coordinates firefighting activities by providing personnel, equipment, and supplies in support of firefighting operations.



(4) **General Services Administration (GSA).** GSA serves as the ESF #7, “Resource Support,” Coordinator and primary support agency to DHS/FEMA during disaster relief and CM operations. GSA provides emergency supplies, space, office equipment, telecommunications, contracting services, transportation services, and security services.

(5) **American Red Cross.** The ARC serves as a primary agency for coordinating mass care support during disaster relief and CM operations. Support may include shelter, feeding, emergency first aid, disaster welfare information, bulk distribution, supportive counseling, blood, and blood products.

(6) **Department of State.** DOS serves as the primary agency for coordinating support and donations from foreign sources (including intergovernmental organizations). DOS established the “US Entry Guide” website ([www.useg.org](http://www.useg.org) or [www.useg.net](http://www.useg.net)) which identifies US diplomatic clearance and landing authorization requirements for foreign state aircraft entering the US and lists DOS and Service requirements, and clearance requirements for international and domestic civil aircraft to use DOD installations in US territory. In coordination with the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance and/or the United States Agency for International Development, DOD may be required to establish locations to receive international in-kind donations (including foreign military donations).

### 5. Command and Control

a. **Supported Combatant Commander.** For CS operations, SecDef designates a supported CCDR. Ordinarily, this will be CDRUSNORTHCOM for CS missions in CONUS and Alaska; CDRUSSOUTHCOM in Puerto Rico or the US Virgin Islands; or CDRUSPACOM for Hawaii and the Pacific region. JDOMS publishes an EXORD to further delineate support relationships, available forces, end state, purpose and SecDef approved scope of actions.

b. **Joint Task Force.** The supported CCDR designates a C2 headquarters to execute the CS operations. Based on the severity of the situation the supported CCDR may deploy a JTF to the JOA for CS operations in support of a primary or coordinating agency.

(1) Deployment of a JTF is not contingent on a request from the primary or coordinating agency.

(2) A catastrophic event may dictate the deployment of multiple JTFs.

(3) The NRP states that if a JTF is established, consistent with operational requirements, its command and control element will be collocated with the PFO at the JFO to ensure coordination and unity of effort. The collocation of the JTF command and control element does not replace the requirement for a DCO/DCE as a part of the JFO coordination staff and it will not coordinate request for assistance for DOD. The DCO is the DOD single point of contact at the JFO.

(4) Either a standing JTF or one configured for specific missions provides emergency assistance across all lines of support. The JTF may require greater proportions of support units and capabilities than required in a combat deployment.

(5) The JTF will usually exercise OPCON/tactical control of DOD forces attached in support of the federal effort within the JOA.

(6) All classes of supply and all types of services may be required. Close coordination between the JTF and ESF coordinator is required. Interface for coordination is through the DCO.

c. **Defense Coordinating Officer.** The DCO is the DOD single point of contact at the JFO. RFAs are validated through the DCO and forwarded through designated DOD reporting chain.

(1) DCOs, assigned to ARNORTH, are permanently stationed in the ten FEMA regions, at or near the FEMA RRCCs. Additional DCOs may be required for multiple JFOs.

(2) C2 of DCOs is directed by the supported CCDR in an EXORD for CS missions. They may report directly to the supporting CCDR or to a TF/JTF.

(3) The DCO is supported by the DCE, an administrative and support staff consisting of five permanently assigned personnel.

(4) Augmentation to DCE within a JFO is generally required from a defense coordinating unit consisting of emergency preparedness liaison officers (EPLOs), specialty staff augmentees, and additional personnel from the Services.

(5) A DCO can also have limited C2 of DOD forces that are operational in the JOA for CS missions, based on the EXORD. A TF or JTF would likely be deployed for C2 of larger numbers of DOD forces.

d. **Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers.** EPLO positions are authorized in each FEMA region and state (see Figure II-4). Regional EPLOs provide DOD liaison with FEMA regional organizations and agencies; facilitate planning, coordination, and training for military support to civil authorities and national security emergency preparedness; advise federal agencies and organizations on DOD capabilities and resources; advocate mutual support required by DOD; and, on order, augment DOD response for CS.

(1) They are administered by and report to program managers within their respective Services who ensure EPLOs are trained, equipped, and maintain current proficiency on the NRP, NIMS, CS procedures and readily available Service capabilities.

(2) They are activated and employed by their Services at the request of the supported CCDR. They are trained in disaster preparedness and CS operations. EPLOs advise civil authorities on military resources and capabilities and facilitate coordination between civil authorities and DOD during state or federal exercises or CS operations.

(3) Once activated, EPLOs are assigned/attached to the supported combatant command and then could be directed by the DCO upon the DCO's arrival in the area. Support of the DCO operation in each region is a priority for all of the Services. Army EPLOs will be assigned/attached to ARNORTH and will most likely be directed by the DCO and assigned wherever needed.

(4) State emergency preparedness liaison officers (SEPLOs). SEPLOs habitually support the DCO, but can be located pre-event at the RRCC and then move forward to the JFO once established with the DCO. SEPLOs primarily support the DCO but are oriented towards the state EOCs and NG JFHQs. SEPLOs also work with the DCO in the JFO as required. EPLOs of all types and Services have historically demonstrated a vast aptitude at making significant contributions in a wide range of CS operations and they can be found working in the DCO operation, as LNOs to the ESFs, state EOCs, NG JFHQs, JTFs, ARNORTH operational command posts (1 and/or 2), base support installation (BSI), JDOMS and other places where their services are required.




Figure II-4. Federal Emergency Management Agency Regional Chart

*For more information on EPLO, refer to DODD 3025.16, Military Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) Program.*

## **6. Interagency Coordination**

a. For CS operations, DOD must coordinate with a variety of other government agencies (OGAs), including LEAs. Agreements between DOD and OGAs may help in defining the scope of support to be provided either routinely or in an emergency. However, these agreements may not constitute SecDef preapproval of DOD support for all CS missions.

b. Synchronization, coordination, and integration of all instruments of national power are required to ensure the successful execution of CS missions. The challenges facing the Nation are increasingly complex and will require the skills and resources of many organizations. Some guidelines for interagency coordination are listed below:

(1) Identify CS mission capabilities compliant with NIMS Incident Command System and governing federal statutes, policy, guidelines, and best practices.

(2) Identify DOD agencies and organizations potentially involved in the operation.

(3) Identify key elements of information that various agencies can share.

(4) Identify required resources.

(5) Establish interagency assessment teams.

c. Challenges of Interagency Cooperation and Coordination during CS Operations.

(1) CS is conducted in a complex environment with literally thousands of different jurisdictions and agencies (federal, state, tribal, and local). CS may at times involve neighboring countries due to the proximity of an event to national borders and the interconnectedness of nations. This complex environment necessitates coordinated and integrated operations with agency partners to enable rapid mutual aid, in response to natural or man-made disasters or during national emergencies.

(2) DOD actions in CS operations may require rapid response to mitigate the impact of a disaster on US domestic population and critical infrastructure. Legal and policy constraints, guidelines, intensive media coverage, multiple jurisdictions, and the competing demands by various levels of political authorities may complicate the effectiveness of DOD response. This environment necessitates an effective interagency and PA process and program.

(3) Interagency coordination can at times be a significant challenge and take considerable effort, yet it also provides numerous benefits and “force multipliers” for DOD and its CS partners. Expanded information sharing and the interaction with agency liaison personnel prior to and during CS

exercises and operations significantly enhance real-time information sharing and coordination activities and improve CS related response capabilities.

(4) US military forces performing CS missions will work through the primary agency in support of state, local, and tribal governments and agencies. Interagency cooperation and coordination is essentially a USG construct, and state, local and tribal partners may be unfamiliar with its structure and processes, or even constrained on how they can participate by their own laws, regulations, and/or political direction. Commanders must exercise flexibility and ingenuity in order to achieve unity of effort in this complex domestic environment.

d. The combatant command interagency process complements and supports the higher level or strategic interagency process, and may involve such key elements as joint interagency coordination groups (JIACGs); theater security cooperation programs, plans and initiatives; country team interaction and coordination; and annex V (Interagency Coordination) to formal operation plans and CONPLANS; all designed to enhance information sharing, effective joint and interagency planning, and maximize coordinated operations.

### e. Elements for Interagency Coordination

(1) **Joint Interagency Coordination Group.** The JIACG is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the CCDR and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported CCDR, the JIACG provides the CCDR with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments. It is the CCDR's primary interagency forum to share information, analyze ongoing activities, and anticipate future interagency actions, implications, and/or consequences.

(2) **Agency Representatives and Command Representatives.** Subject matter experts (SMEs) and LNOs from key partner agencies and commands facilitate effective two-way communication, coordination, and cooperation. A formally established liaison and representative link between the combatant command and the partner agency is beneficial to both organizations. Specific focus should be on agency or command LNOs whose organizations play a key part in successful and seamless execution of CS operations. Regardless of mission, having key partner agency and command representatives will be essential for the CCDR conducting operations on US territory. Equally important, combatant commands may locate a command representative or LNO at key partner agencies commensurate with their operational requirements. Agency representatives or command LNOs are more effective when they have access to command leadership, key staff, and key working groups. "On-the-ground" agency representatives and command LNOs located at a combatant command should typically be located where they will be most usefully engaged, supportive of command activities, and beneficial to their parent agency or command. However, they also need to have an ongoing interface with the combatant command JIACG. This maximizes their participation in and support of the interagency process and benefit to their particular agency or combatant command.

(3) **Interagency Coordination Group (IACG)/Interagency Planning Cell (IPC).** Within the JIACG, some commands can create an IACG/IPC. The IACG is the interagency incident management group for the JIACG during contingencies, and provides a 24x7 capability if required. The IACG is formed by members from the JIACG (which provides people, resources, and reach-back capability for additional subject matter expertise) and is augmented by available and required agency representatives and command LNOs. These personnel collaborate to provide the CCDR and staff a clear picture of interagency activities and their implications. The IACG mission is to integrate and synchronize interagency activities to ensure mutual understanding, unity of effort, and full spectrum support. A group similar to the IACG is the IPC, which is activated upon receipt of CJCS's warning or alert order or at the direction of the CCDR. The IPC is established to provide timely advice to the CCDR about the capabilities/resources of other agencies in the CS effort. An IPC will enable coherent and efficient coordination through the participation of interagency SMEs. Whether an IACG or an IPC, this element provides the CCDR an interagency action cell focused on contingencies that can assist and enhance the command's execution of the CS effort.

*For further reference, see JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations (Vols. 1 & 2).*

## 7. Information Environment

The “information environment” is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information, and the information itself. CS missions require combatant commands to share data and information among DOD and non-DOD mission partners. One of the challenges is to ensure DOD systems can accommodate this operational necessity, able to interface and interoperate with communications systems that exist outside of DOD, in a secure and seamless manner. Three components of providing an available and effective information environment are a reliable, robust communications system, information sharing among mission partners, and assuring and defending our critical information infrastructure against threats and aggression.

a. **Communications System.** A reliable, robust communications system enables centralized planning and the coordinated and mutually supporting employment of forces and assets. It includes command centers, operations centers, processing and distribution centers and associated systems, deployed systems, and data sources. Sharing systems, information and the decisions generated by them among mission partners ensures a synchronized effort and facilitates decentralized execution in a dynamic environment.

(1) **Traditional Communications.** Traditional communications systems will serve as the backbone in support of CS operations. They must be interoperable, mobile, secure, and capable of supporting voice, data, and video to most effectively contribute to C2. Planning for the integration of spectrum resource allocation will enable the DOD, federal, state, tribal, and local responders to interoperate.



(2) **Nontraditional Communications.** Infrastructure may be damaged, thus DOD must identify capabilities to bridge the gap until infrastructure is restored. Nontraditional systems that are scalable, interoperable, and complementary with those used by coalition and civilian partners may be essential and should also support the dissemination of voice, data, and video information.

(3) **Network Operations.** The combatant command communications system directorate is responsible for providing the communication system needed to support reliable and timely information flow in support of joint operations by providing theater guidance and priorities. Theater guidance and priorities are executed through the theater network operations control center which monitors status of critical communications systems and coordinates with communities of interest within the AOR.

b. **Information Sharing.** The need to share information is an operational necessity to minimize the potential for operational gaps. The overall goal is seamless access to trusted information throughout the response effort.

(1) To ensure flexibility and interoperability with mission partners, information must be shared to the maximum extent possible.

(2) An information synchronization group enables the collaborative environment by employing information liaisons who fuse operationally relevant information across all levels of command. This organization is vital to effective information sharing and must transcend organizational, policy, and technical barriers.

c. **Critical Information Infrastructure Protection.** HSPD-5, *Management of Domestic Incidents*, and HSPD-7, *Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization and Protection*, establish national policy for managing threats and incidents in cyberspace. The NRP implements policy to eliminate vulnerabilities and strengthen capabilities to prevent/mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from the consequences of cyberspace incidents.

(1) The DHS National Cyber Response Coordination Group (NCRCG) is the principal interagency mechanism for managing cyberspace incidents of national significance or having significant cyberspace consequences. The NCRCG, of which DOD is a member, facilitates federal coordination of response to a cyberspace incident. DOD has a statutory role to protect critical information infrastructure and key assets.

(2) When directed by the President or SecDef, DOD will provide protection of DOD and non-DOD critical networks against threat and aggression.

(a) The Defense Critical Infrastructure Program supports physical protection efforts of DOD components and non-DOD mission partners.

(b) CDRUSSTRATCOM uses network operations (NETOPS) to support the NCRCG and to operate and defend the Global Information Grid (GIG). NETOPS operators perform functions to sustain operational readiness of the GIG, provide integrated network visibility

and end-to-end management of networks, global applications and services in support of DOD's warfighting, intelligence, and business missions. The scope of NETOPS includes infrastructure, organization, personnel, procedures, and components that collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information.

## 8. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-yield Explosives Environment

a. The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support identifies as one of its priorities CM support of civil authorities for domestic CBRNE mass casualty attacks.

b. CBRNE incidents may be deliberate or unintentional. Not all domestic CBRNE incidents will necessitate a federal or military response. The potential for multiple simultaneous CBRNE attacks on US territory that would result in mass casualties must be considered in operational CS planning and training.

c. Individual characteristics, effects, and planning considerations of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, toxic industrial materials, and detonation of high-yield explosives must each be approached separately. Each of these has unique physical characteristics, specific target sets against which they would be most appropriate from a terrorist point of view, and different CS requirements.

## 9. Legal and Policy Considerations

a. **Legal Considerations.** The legal authorities governing the employment of US military forces in CS operations consist of federal laws, executive directives, DOD plans and policies, and other directives, instructions, and regulations, making a comprehensive legal review of CS plans essential. Commanders will ensure that the application of military capabilities and resources is within the constraints of the law. Accordingly, commanders will seek legal advice regarding CS plans, policies, and operations from their staff judge advocates to ensure conformity with legal requirements.

*For more information on authorities see Appendix F, "Key Civil Support Legal and Policy Documents."*

b. **Policy Considerations.** Military commanders ensure that DOD resources are used judiciously while conducting CS operations by adhering to the evaluating criteria discussed earlier and IAW the following supporting principles:

(1) DOD resources are provided only when response or recovery requirements are or will be beyond the capabilities of local, state, and federal civil authorities, and when they are requested by a federal agency with lead responsibility and approved by SecDef. An exception to this is in the case of immediate response authority (see DODD 3025.15, *Military Assistance to Civil Authorities*). When requested by civil authorities, or as outlined in the MOTR Plan for all maritime threats regardless of type or location, local commanders can respond to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions.



(2) SecDef retains control of assigned Title 10 USC military forces providing CS.

(3) The NG, due to local presence, will likely be the first military responder during a civil emergency. The early employment of NG will usually be in either a state active duty status or Title 32 USC status, both are under the supervision of the adjutant general and the direction of the governor. There are many advantages associated with employment of the NG in either state active duty or Title 32 USC status. Most notably are the ability to assist law enforcement without Posse Comitatus restrictions, quicker reaction times, established community and interstate emergency management relationships, and an in-depth understanding of the operating environment. To ensure operational continuity, most, if not all, deployed NG forces engaged in supporting a response will remain in state active duty or Title 32 USC status throughout an event. Therefore, the military response to extraordinary events that requires DOD CS will be a coordinated effort between the NG in state active duty or Title 32 USC status and Titles 10 and 14 USC forces.

(4) DOD components do not perform any function of civil government unless authorized.

*Refer to DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, for DOD policy on providing military support to LEAs, including personnel and equipment.*

**c. Intelligence Support to Law Enforcement Agencies and Intelligence Oversight.**

Commanders and staffs must carefully consider the legal and policy limits imposed on intelligence activities in support of LEAs, and on intelligence activities involving US citizens and entities by intelligence oversight regulations, policies, and EOs. See Chapter III, “Operations,” regarding intelligence support to law enforcement, and Chapter IV, “Supporting and Sustaining Activities,” for guidance on intelligence oversight.

## CHAPTER III OPERATIONS

*“Our job will be to preserve the Nation’s security by defending the American people where they live and work, and support civilian authorities as needed. We will also prepare for the inevitability of uncertainty and surprise. This will be a team effort from start to finish.”*

**General Ralph Eberhart, USAF  
Commander, US Northern Command, (2002-2004)**

### 1. Categories and Types of Operations

CS operations, for the purposes of this publication, are divided into the three broad categories of domestic emergencies, designated law enforcement support, and other activities, based on the CS definition. These categories, in many cases, can overlap or be in effect simultaneously, depending on the particular circumstances of the incident. Under the categories, there are broad types of CS missions, with examples illustrated in Figure III-1. This figure provides the structure for discussion and understanding of CS.

a. **Disasters and Declared Emergencies.** DOD support in a domestic disaster or a Presidential declaration of emergency is in support of the primary or coordinating agency(ies). Military commanders and responsible DOD civilians may, under certain conditions, respond under immediate response authority in order to save lives, prevent suffering, and mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions. Requests for support could come with some advance notice (weather forecasts and hydrology surveys), with short notice (intelligence indicators and geological activity indicators), but may also occur without notice.

(1) **Presidential Declarations.** Under Stafford Act authority, two types of actions may be taken, summarized as follows.

(a) **Major Disaster.** The President issues a major disaster declaration after receiving a request from the governor of the affected state. Major disaster declarations may be issued after a natural catastrophe or, “regardless of cause, fire, flood, or explosion.” A declaration authorizes DHS to administer various federal disaster assistance programs for victims of declared disasters. Each major disaster declaration specifies the type of incident covered, the time period covered, the types of disaster assistance available, the counties affected by the declaration, and the name of the FCO.

(b) **Emergency.** The declaration process for emergencies is similar to that used for major disasters; the President may, however, issue an emergency declaration without a gubernatorial request if primary responsibility rests with the federal government. An emergency declaration may be issued on “any occasion or instance” in which the President determines that federal assistance is required. Under an emergency declaration, the federal government funds and undertakes emergency response activities, debris removal, and individual assistance and housing programs. Disaster relief fund expenditures




Figure III-1. Civil Support Operation Categories and Operational Types

for an emergency are limited to \$5 million per declaration unless the President determines that there is a continuing need; Congress must be notified if the \$5 million ceiling is breached.

- (2) Operation types under this category could include:

(a) **Natural Disasters.** As a signatory to the NRP, DOD may be asked to provide assistance to DHS/FEMA in an attempt to save lives, protect property, and lessen the threat of a catastrophe in the US. When natural disasters occur and military assistance is anticipated, DHS/FEMA will request a DCO who serves as the DOD point of contact. Capabilities with a global focus, such as airlift and space assets, will normally be provided in support rather than the SecDef authorizing a change in OPCON. Events of this type could include wildland fires, tornadoes, earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, typhoons, cyclones, tidal waves, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, landslides, mudslides, avalanches, blizzards, drought conditions, etc.

(b) **Man-made Disasters.** A technological disaster threatens the viability of the technological system, causes massive loss of life or property, and may endanger the social environment in which it occurs. Technological disasters can have a global impact, such as the Chernobyl nuclear power plant explosion. Events of this mission type could include accidental or intentional releases of oil or other hazardous materials, power grid outage, terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure, etc.

(c) **CBRNE Incidents.** The implications of a deliberate or unintentional large release of a CBRNE are potentially catastrophic. A CBRNE event or attack may occur with little or no warning and may overwhelm the response capabilities and resources of local and state jurisdictions requiring a federal response. Therefore, specific attention has been focused on task-organizing within DOD to plan for and integrate its support to the NRP primary or coordinating agencies to manage the consequences of a domestic CBRNE event. An installation's CBRNE CM response under DOD Instruction (DODI) 2000.18, *Department of Defense Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines*, is primarily force protection and continuity of operations, but may transition to a CS mission depending on the scale and nature of the incident and level of support provided. Events of this type could include the use of high-yield explosives, biological attack or accidental release, chemical attack or accidental release, nuclear power plant explosion or malfunction, etc.

*For further reference, see JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management.*

(3) Non-declared emergencies are those emergencies that may require a response by DOD, but for which a Presidential disaster declaration has not been issued. These may include situation-specific emergency conditions that require support under existing agreements or laws such as flood control, wildland fires, and hazardous materials spills. DODI 6055.6, *DOD Fire and Emergency Services Program*, provides specific guidance disaster preparedness for the fire and emergency services aboard installations. Military involvement under this category might include:

(a) Presidential direction of DOD support with Title 10 USC forces. Without a disaster declaration, the President may also direct DOD to support the response to a disaster or emergency for a period not to exceed 10 days.

(b) Local commanders providing "immediate response."

(c) Installation commanders supporting and assisting US civil authorities in CM activities under the guidance of DODI 2000.18, *Department of Defense Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines*.

(d) USACE responding per ESF #3, “Public Works and Engineering,” or per ESF #6, “Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services,” or operating under the authority of Public Law 84-99 (Title 33 USC, Sections 467n and 701n).

(e) Response directed by SecDef in response to a governor or primary agency RFA. Directed response may range from providing a DCO to providing a single or multiple TFs or JTFs depending on the situation and level of requested support. When possible, assessment elements from USNORTHCOM, USPACOM, or USSOUTHCOM will deploy to the anticipated operational area prior to the event.

(f) Response from Civil Air Patrol (Air Force Auxiliary). The CAP/Air Force Auxiliary provides emergency services including air and ground search and rescue, disaster relief, aerial reconnaissance, light airlift, and communications support to civil authorities. Unlike Title 10 USC forces, Air Force policy allows for CAP/Air Force Auxiliary employment supporting civil authorities without SecDef approval.

**b. Support and/or Restore Public Health and Services, and Civil Order.** DOD support may include augmentation of local first responders and equipment. It may include law enforcement support, continuity of operations/continuity of government measures to restore essential government services, protect public health and safety, and provide emergency relief to affected governments, businesses, and individuals. Responses occur under the primary jurisdiction of the affected state and local government, where the Federal government provides assistance when required, or support to Federal law enforcement agencies in the execution of their own responsibilities. When situations are beyond the capability of the state, the governor requests federal assistance through the President. The President may also direct the Federal government to provide supplemental assistance to state and local governments to alleviate the suffering and damage resulting from disasters or emergencies. Requests for DOD support to restore civil order, restore public services, or reestablish a “normal” state to meet societal expectations may be received with short or no notice. Military involvement under this category might include the following types of operations.

(1) **Civil Disturbance Operations.** The President has the authority to deploy troops within the United States to enforce the laws. The Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order, Chapter 15 of Title 10 USC (formerly Insurrection Act) authorizes the President to employ the Armed Forces of the US, including the NG, within the United States to restore order or enforce federal law after a major public emergency (e.g., natural disaster, serious public health emergency, or terrorist attack) when requested by the state governor or when the President determines that the authorities of the state are incapable of maintaining public order. The President normally executes his authority by ordering the dispersal of those obstructing the enforcement of the laws. The President may act unilaterally to suppress an insurrection or domestic violation without the request or authority of the state/governor and to exercise his “major public emergencies” authority to direct the SecDef to provide supplies, services, and equipment necessary for the immediate preservation of life and property. Such supplies, services, and equipment

may be provided: only to the extent that the constituted authorities of the state or possession are unable to provide them; only until such authorities and other departments and agencies of the United States charged with such responsibilities are able to provide them; and only to the extent that their provision, in the judgment of the SecDef, will not interfere with the preparedness of ongoing military operations or functions. Responsibility for the coordination of the federal response for civil disturbances rests with the Attorney General. Any DOD forces employed in civil disturbance operations shall remain under military authority at all times. Forces deployed to assist federal and local authorities during times of civil disturbance follow the use-of-force policy found in CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01B, *Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces*.

(2) **Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Support.** DOD provides support to other federal agencies in border security and in the event of a mass migration emergency. Historically, this law enforcement support is in the form of technical assistance, services, and facilities and only on a temporary basis. Geographic CCDRs can expect to be designated as the supported commander for the provision and management of installations and services associated with housing migrants while US Citizenship and Immigration Services screens them for admission and other administrative requirements. DOJ may also be involved as it retains the lead status for any law enforcement response or action associated with immigration emergencies. Additionally, the National Guard has an ongoing Title 32 USC operational support mission, called Operation Jump Start, providing significant assistance to securing the US borders. In support of US Border Patrol efforts, National Guard members assist with surveillance, installing fences and vehicle barriers, and providing training.

(3) **Equipment and Other Support to Law Enforcement.** Most of these requests are for loan, maintenance and occasionally the operation of military equipment, or the information obtained from use of the equipment. The use of the military in civil law enforcement roles is strictly regulated by statute and implementing DOD authorities. Military forces performing in this role will normally work in support of a primary agency (e.g., DHS or DOJ/FBI). Depending on the circumstances, and with SecDef approval, units providing this support may be armed. When armed, forces will adhere to the standing rules for the use of force (SRUF) found in CJCSI 3121.01B, *Standing Rules of Engagement/ Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces*, unless SecDef has approved mission-specific rules for the use of force (RUF). Military support to civilian LEAs may include, but is not limited to, support for combating terrorism, CD operations, maritime security and training, and the loan of equipment, personnel, facilities, or expertise (e.g., ISR capabilities). Requests for loans of equipment, facilities, or personnel made by LEAs, shall be made and approved IAW DOD policy and instructions for requesting civil support, and require approval by the SecDef.

(4) **Counterterrorism Operations.** The Attorney General, acting through the FBI and in cooperation with the heads of other federal departments, agencies, and military criminal investigative organizations (MCIOs), coordinates domestic intelligence collection and the activities of the law enforcement community to detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist attacks, and to identify the perpetrators and bring them to justice in the event of a terrorist incident. If there is a credible threat, DOD may also be requested to support LEAs in a pre-positioning of forces, or in the case of an imminent threat to life or severe property damage, take direct action until responsible authorities (DOJ, DHS, etc.) can respond (in the maritime domain it is likely to be directed by a MOTR action). Under this type of support, specific RUF must be established and approved. In the absence of preexisting



RUF, requests for RUF for CS missions will be sent through the supported CCDR and JDOMS for development and to the SecDef for approval. Mission-specific RUF may be required depending on the situation. **Military responses to a credible threat and acts of terrorism may require both CrM and CM operations, which often overlap.** DOJ/FBI is the primary agency in preventing or resolving threats involving terrorism and for crisis response throughout a terrorist threat or act. DHS/FEMA leads CM operations and is the coordinating agency with overall responsibility for emergency response actions to lessen or mitigate the consequences of attacks or incidents. In some situations, CM may include pre-event planning for one incident while conducting post-event operations for another. DOD direct support for CM is provided to DHS/FEMA or an NRP primary agency. Under these circumstances, supporting elements should coordinate, integrate, and synchronize their activities and operations.

(5) **Counterdrug Operations.** CD/counternarcotics operations are conducted under the authority delegated in CJCSI 3710.01B, *DOD Counterdrug Support*.

(6) **Postal Services.** During postal work stoppages or natural disasters and disruption of mail service on a national, regional, or local basis, DOD may be required to provide assistance. This may take the form of **materials, supplies, equipment, services, and personnel sufficient to permit the United States Postal Service to safeguard, process, and deliver the mail** in those areas in which normal mail service has been impaired.

(a) Legal authority for the employment of military resources to reestablish and maintain essential postal service is found in Title 39 USC, Section 411. **DOD provides postal augmentation under an interdepartmental transfer of services.** The declaration of a national emergency is a sufficient condition for the selective mobilization of RC forces to support the US Postal Service.

(b) Task organization, operations, logistics, personnel, PA, command relationships, alert notification procedures, and reports are set forth in DOD Postal Augmentation Plan GRAPHIC HAND.

(7) **Animal/Plant Disease Eradication.** DOD may provide assistance to USDA to contain and eradicate an actual or imminent outbreak of plant diseases or any menacing animal diseases. USDA's Administrator for Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) may request DOD assistance if an emergency arises from the introduction of a foreign animal or plant disease and/or pest.

(a) USDA, DOD, and GSA signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that provides a mechanism for USDA to request and receive priority support if the presence of animal or plant diseases or pests constitutes an emergency, as declared by USDA.

(b) Through a federal TF, USDA's APHIS coordinates, directs, and conducts the federal response to control and eradicate animal and plant diseases and pests, reimbursing DOD for actual costs incurred. GSA provides supplies and equipment. Given SecDef approval where required, JDOMS designates appropriate commanders, Services, or agencies to conduct the operation and coordinates Service and other federal agency support. The Services and other supporting commanders may provide installations for bases of support, provide resources, and identify and provide technically qualified personnel to assist USDA as directed by JDOMS. DOD Veterinary Support Activity may appoint a veterinary support officer to coordinate with the regional animal disease eradication officer TF for any required



veterinary support. When directed by the appropriate supported commander, US Army Health Services designates and deploys military specialists trained in foreign animal disease diagnosis, epidemiology, microbiology, immunology, entomology, pathology, and public health.

(8) **Assistance to District of Columbia in Combating Crime.** The employment of DOD military resources to civil authorities in combating crime in the District of Columbia will be limited to:

- (a) Military and civilian technicians to perform non-law enforcement functions.
- (b) Training facilities, such as classrooms, rifle ranges, and pistol ranges.
- (c) Military equipment and supplies.
- (d) Such other assistance, as directed by the President.

c. **National Special Security Events.** Special events are categorized by the DHS Special Events Working Group (SEWG). Usually, other military operations will have priority over these missions, unless directed otherwise by the SecDef. These events will be assigned a priority by the SEWG and will normally be monitored by the combatant command responsible for the AOR in which they are conducted. NSSE is a designation given to certain special events that, by virtue of their political, economic, social, or religious significance, may be the target of terrorism or other criminal activity. The Secretary of Homeland Security, after consultation with the Homeland Security Council (HSC), shall be responsible for designating special events as NSSEs. When a special event is designated as an NSSE, the United States Secret Service, as part of DHS, assumes the role of primary agency for the design and implementation of the operational security plan. Events in this category are normally large events, generally with sufficient time for planning (except state funerals). Multiple federal and state agencies may be involved, and will have well-defined situation and operational areas. Planning for possible transition to disaster support is inherent in these operations. Special events requiring DOD support could include the following types of operations (note that any of these special events could be designated as NSSEs): World's Fair, Super Bowl, Olympics, World Series, and NASCAR events. Special events that will likely be designated as NSSEs include: Presidential inaugurations, State of the Union addresses, Group of Eight summit meetings, World Trade Organization Meetings, United Nations General Assembly meetings, Democratic and Republican Party national conventions, and State funerals.

d. **Periodic Planned Support.** Periodic planned support is conducted to enhance civil military relations within local communities. Examples of military involvement are listed following request guidelines.

(1) All requests for periodic planned support should adhere to the following guidelines:

(a) Responsible agency should request support from NG first. All states have established processes for community relations support requests, generally through their public affairs offices.

(b) DOD capabilities requests should be submitted to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Attn: Directorate for Community Relations and Public Liaison as Community Relations/Public Affairs support (DODD 5410.18, Public Affairs Community Relations Policy) using

DD Form 2535, Request for Military Aerial Support, or DD Form 2536, Request for Armed Forces Participation in Public Events. Either form can also be submitted to Army, Navy, Marine, or Air Force public affairs offices for processing.

(2) **Sensitive Support Operations.** Sensitive support to special activities provided under DODD S-5210.36, *Provision of DOD Sensitive Support to DOD Components and Other Departments and Agencies of the US Government*.

(3) **Military Training Exchanges.** This support can be provided incident to training as innovative readiness training under DODD 1100.20, *Support and Services for Eligible Organizations and Activities Outside Department of Defense*. Military training support can also be provided to local first responders by military mobile training teams, installation personnel, or exercises preparation and conduct. Civil authorities can request local installation commanders to provide combat service support (CSS) (medical, transportation, supply, maintenance) or combat support (engineering or security). Installations can provide support when it meets the requirements of innovative readiness training/support as incidental to military training. (Title 10 USC, Section 2012).

(4) **Community Relations.** This support is provided under DODD 5410.18, *Public Affairs Community Relations Policy*. This includes military bands, marching units, static displays as well as requests for fly-overs, rotary wing support, Golden Knights, Blue Angels, or Thunderbirds aerial demonstration support, and military support to ceremonies in the NCR. This support may cover voluntary participation in community and civic activities by DOD personnel when they participate in a personal capacity in an off-duty status. See DOD 5500.7-R, *Joint Ethics Regulation*, for additional guidance regarding off-duty or personal capacity activities. All requests for periodic planned support should adhere to the following guidelines:

(a) Responsible agency should request support from NG first. All states have established processes for community relations support requests, generally through their public affairs offices.

(b) DOD capabilities requests should be submitted to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Attn: Directorate for Community Relations and Public Liaison as Community Relations/Public Affairs support (DODD 5410.18, *Public Affairs Community Relations Policy*) using DD Form 2535, Request for Military Aerial Support, or DD Form 2536, Request for Armed Forces Participation in Public Events. Either form can also be submitted to Army, Navy, Marine, or Air Force public affairs offices for processing.

(5) **Military laboratory support** and/or testing and evaluation in DOD facilities can be provided to civil authorities by agreement and is categorized as CS.

(6) **Military working dog support** provided per DODI 5525.10, *Using Military Working Dog Teams (MWDTs) to Support Law Enforcement Agencies in Counterdrug Missions*.

(7) **Support provided to the US Secret Service** under Title 18 USC, Section 112, “protection of foreign officials, official guests and internationally protected persons” which authorizes the Attorney General to request the assistance of the armed forces to perform this function.

(8) **Civil Air Patrol/Air Force Auxiliary support** provided to Civil Authorities. Requests for this support are submitted to and approved by Commander, Air Force North (AFNORTH).

(9) **Aerial Damage Assessment.** Aerial damage assessment (ADA) should be performed by DOD assets only when such actions cannot be performed by local entities or other federal agencies in a timely manner. Yet if tasked, ADA asset use should be efficient, effective, and utilize the least intrusive, least costly means to accomplish the support mission within necessary timelines. Use of DOD intelligence component capabilities in conjunction with aerial reconnaissance may be subject to intelligence oversight for intelligence activities (foreign intelligence or counterintelligence collection), or may be subject to operational parameters and limitation specified by the SecDef, if used for a mission other than an intelligence activity, such as search and rescue, damage assessment, or incident awareness and analysis.

(10) **Civilian Critical Infrastructure Protection**

(a) America's critical infrastructure includes a number of interrelated sectors that provide the goods and services essential to the Nation (see Figure III-2). Our institutions of government guarantee our national security and freedom and administer key public functions. Our defense industrial base provides essential resources for military capabilities to help safeguard our population from external threats and support force projection and sustainment. Our information and telecommunications sectors




Figure III-2. Examples of Critical Infrastructure

enable economic productivity and growth, and are particularly important because they connect and help control many other critical infrastructure assets. Our energy, transportation, banking and finance, chemical industry, agricultural, and postal and shipping sectors help sustain our economy and touch the lives of Americans daily. Because many of the assets associated with the critical infrastructure of the US are interrelated or part of an integrated system (see Figure III-3), a successful attack on one critical node could have a devastating impact on others and the country overall. While DOD is responsible for the defense critical infrastructure, there may be instances where the President and SecDef will instruct DOD to provide support to another agency. This support can take many forms but is normally associated with disasters, emergency relief, and CrM and CM activities.

(b) The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act defines critical infrastructure as those “systems and assets,




Figure III-3. Critical Infrastructure Protection Framework

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whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.” Critical infrastructure protection framework is detailed in Figure III-3. In addition to our critical infrastructure, our country must also protect a number of key assets — individual targets whose destruction would not endanger vital systems, but could create local disaster or profoundly damage our Nation’s morale or confidence. Key assets include symbols or historical attractions, such as prominent national, state, or local monuments and icons. In some cases, these include quasi-public symbols that are identified strongly with the United States as a nation, and fall completely under the jurisdiction of state and local officials or even private foundations. Key assets also include individual or localized facilities that deserve special protection because of their destructive potential or their value to the local community.

*See DODD 3020.40, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP), for additional information on roles and responsibilities for DOD components to assure DOD’s critical assets and infrastructures are identified and managed.*

## 2. Domestic Incident Management Response Operations and Considerations

The NRP identifies prevention, preparation, response, and recovery as the four stages of incident management operations.

a. **Prevention.** CS missions require commanders to consider, within their legal limits, what prevention and preparation activities can be undertaken prior to an incident. Increasing public awareness of DOD countermeasures, elevating the national Homeland Security Advisory System, and assessing intelligence are some of the ways to help with prevention.

b. **Preparation.** DOD’s focus for CS missions is to prepare, as much as possible, prior to an incident occurring, and when practical, stage assets to facilitate a rapid response.

c. **Response.** DOD CS operations will normally be conducted during the response stage of domestic incident management. Response operations focus on those lifesaving and sustaining functions required by the population in the disaster area. Military forces normally redeploy as operations transition from the response to the recovery stage. Transition planning is based on completion of those CS tasks being accomplished by DOD forces, or unfinished mission assignments being transferred back to civil agencies at the federal or state level. This practice allows the military to return to its defense roles as soon as practicable.

d. **Recovery.** Recovery operations begin the process of returning the community infrastructure and services (both municipal and commercial) to a status that satisfies the needs of the population. The extent to which DOD CS operations remain involved in this process requires careful consideration.

## 3. Operational Phases

CS operations are generally conducted in five (5) phases: shaping, staging, deployment, civil support operations, and transition (see Figure III-4). During planning, the JFC establishes conditions,




Figure III-4. Five Phases of a Civil Support Operation

objectives, or events for transitioning from one phase to another. Phases are designed to be conducted sequentially, but some activities from a phase may begin in a previous phase and continue into subsequent phases. A civil support operation may be conducted in multiple phases simultaneously if the JOA has



widely varying conditions. For instance, the commander may begin the *transition* phase in areas where military support is no longer required, while remaining in the *civil support operations* phase in other areas.

a. **Phase I, Shaping.** Shaping is continuous situational awareness and preparedness. Actions in this phase include interagency coordination, exercises, and PA outreach. Shaping activities continue through all phases.

b. **Phase II, Staging.** Phase II begins with the identification of a potential CS mission, or when directed to provide CS by the SecDef. Actions in this phase include identifying force capabilities for response and placing them on increased alert, identifying materials and supplies (rations, medical items, tents, cots, etc.) for response and preposition, coordinating with OGAs for a mutually supporting response, and coordinating with NGB and state NG JFHQ elements to ensure DOD unity of effort. The Staging Phase ends with the issuance of a prepare to deploy order.

c. **Phase III, Deployment.** Phase III begins with response force deployment. However, force deployment can occur at any time in any phase, except phase I (Shaping). Forces are phased into and out of the JOA based on requirements to meet federal agency requests for federal assistance, the changing operational focus (crisis response to stabilization, then to sustainment operations), and as specialized capability requirements are identified. The deployment phase ends when response forces are ready to conduct operations in the JOA.

d. **Phase IV, Civil Support Operations.** Phase IV begins when the CS response commences. This phase includes the rapid employment of DOD capabilities in support of civil authorities. There will be considerable overlap between this phase and the previous deployment phase as units arrive in the operational area and begin providing support. Phase IV ends when supported ESFs no longer require DOD support.

e. **Phase V, Transition.** This final phase begins when DOD support to ESFs is no longer required. The transition phase ends when DOD response forces begin redeployment and are transferred back to their respective parent organizations.

#### 4. Civil Support Planning Considerations

a. **Environmental Considerations.** Environmental considerations are an integral part of the mission planning and operational decision-making process. All joint operations within the US and US possessions and territories shall be conducted in compliance with applicable federal, state, and local environmental regulatory guidance. Adverse environmental impacts should be avoided or mitigated when practicable, based on mission requirements and response to emergency situations.

*For further information, see JP 3-34, Joint Engineering Operations.*

b. **Force Protection (FP).** FP efforts in support of CS operations is central to achieving DOD mission assurance. It includes actions taken to prevent or mitigate dangerous conditions that could harm DOD personnel, resources, facilities, and critical information in an all-hazards environment. FP measures



can be defensive in nature, such as those used to reduce force and installation vulnerability to terrorist attacks or protect against CBRNE effects, or offensive, such as those taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. By conserving the force's operating capabilities so that they can be applied at the decisive time and place, FP ensures the effective employment of the joint force in CS operations.

c. **Operations.** Ongoing military operations and HD requirements have priority over CS operations unless otherwise directed.

d. The duration and scope of DOD involvement will be related to the severity and magnitude of the event, and the requirements for DOD CS operations.

e. Facility requirements will first be met through existing local facilities, preferably government owned, organic portable or relocatable substitute facilities, or field construction.

f. DOD forces will rely on DOD facilities for support to the maximum extent possible. Short-term leasing may be a necessary option depending on location and duration. No occupation of private land or facilities is authorized without specific legal authority. Real property support may be obtained from the GSA, USACE, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, or other government agencies.

*For information on BSI/joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) refer to Appendix C, "Base Support Installation/Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration," and JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations.*

## CHAPTER IV SUPPORTING AND SUSTAINING ACTIVITIES

*“In response to Hurricane Katrina, the Naval Operational Logistics Support Center (NOLSC) took immediate action to support coordination of the logistics relief efforts. Time was critical in providing basic relief such as medical supplies, food, and water to prevent further loss of life in the affected Gulf Region.”*

**Robert L. Dodson**  
**Comments on Hurricane Katrina Relief Operations**  
**Navy Supply Corps Newsletter, Nov-Dec 2005**

### 1. General

Most CS operations are support intensive. In planning for CS, support planners face ambiguities about how to prepare for and predict types of contingencies military forces will confront. US military forces are organized with personnel and equipment to perform specific functions, but also to support their own units. For instance, the C2 system inherent in military units provides a significant advantage when deployed in the potentially bare base environment created by a catastrophic incident.

### 2. Public Affairs

During CS operations, military PA activities, public information actions, and news media access to the CS operational area, are subject to approval of the primary agency. The primary agency may establish a joint information center (JIC) to coordinate PA and public information actions. The military must coordinate all PA activities and comply with PA guidance from the JFO.

a. Media Access. News media access to CS operational areas is subject to the approval of the federal agency with lead responsibility; however the public’s impression of the assistance depends to a great extent on the media. This perception also influences the cooperation and coordination between military and civilian leaders. Positive public support facilitates mission accomplishment. Lack of public support, on the other hand, can seriously impede the effectiveness of military forces during the execution of CS operations. Additionally, the ability of today’s media to transmit instantaneous reports can shape the way the general populace views the role, use, value, and success of the military.

b. DOD Support. There are measures that DOD forces can employ to assist CS authorities. DOD may emphasize that forces stand ready to support and assist CS authorities in a variety of capacities. Emphasis will be placed on DOD capability to save lives, prevent suffering, and mitigate great property damage. Services may act unilaterally by updating force posture changes, readiness, and training. However, throughout any crisis or consequence management scenario, civil authorities will remain in charge and DOD participation will be in support of a federal agency with lead responsibility.

c. Military PA. In fulfilling its CS role, the combatant command will be an active member of the federal response community. Military PA officers operate in an interagency environment, with emphasis on cooperation, coordination, and unity of effort. Complete integration of PA personnel in all staff planning is essential to ensure an effective PA operation. The PA staff must be included in the planning

and conduct of CS operations, particularly for those conducted within the homeland, to ensure that the plan is enriched by the communicators who contribute to the process and to ensure that the plan is explained and communicated properly during execution. The PA strategy will have three main points of effort aligned with the traditional PA functions: public information, command information, and community relations.

*See JP 3-61, Public Affairs, for additional information.*

### 3. Religious Support

a. **General.** Religious support (RS) is defined as the full spectrum of professional duties performed by chaplains in their dual role as religious leaders and military staff officers. RS in joint operations is dedicated to meeting the personal free exercise of religion needs of military and other authorized members and providing commanders with professional advice regarding the dynamic influence of religion and religious belief in the operational area. The purpose of a religious support team (RST) is to provide for, develop, and strengthen the spiritual and moral well-being of all members of the command. Chaplains, assisted by enlisted support personnel, provide for religious worship, rites, sacraments, ordinances, and ministrations. The RST deploys during CS operations for the primary purpose of providing RS to authorized DOD personnel. In this context, authorized DOD personnel is defined as military members, their families and other authorized DOD civilians (both assigned and contracted) as determined by the JFC. The Establishment Clause of the US Constitution generally prohibits chaplains from providing religious services to the civilian population. However, following certain rare and catastrophic large-scale disasters, local and state capabilities of all types, to include spiritual care, may be overwhelmed. In these situations RSTs may serve as liaison to NGOs (including faith-based organizations [FBOs]) when directed by the JFC. In addition, the primary agency, in coordination with local and state authorities, may determine that additional caregivers are needed and may request DOD chaplains to provide care, counseling, or informational services to non-DOD civilians. These requests may be coordinated through the DCO, commander, JTF (CJTF) and/or CDR, and must be validated by JDOMS and approved by SecDef. This ministry support will be limited to the designated disaster control area and will cease with the termination of emergency operations. Moreover, the primary focus of military chaplain ministry will remain DOD personnel. Military chaplains will follow command direction, joint doctrine, supervisory chaplain guidance, and legal counsel regarding permissible chaplain activities while assisting during CS operations.

#### b. The Religious Support Team during Civil Support

(1) The RST has a vital supporting role in achieving CS operational objectives. At the tactical level, chaplains provide for the free exercise of religion, impart ethical guidance, advise commanders on religious issues affecting military operations, and provide RS to authorized DOD personnel. When directed, the RST may serve as liaison to NGOs or FBOs and assist in coordination of CS.

(2) DOD and NG chaplains are religious ministry professionals with training, education, and experience comparable or equivalent to the certification standards of organizations active in disaster response such as the ARC and national volunteer organizations active in disasters.

(3) RST Capabilities. RS includes many duties and responsibilities such as grief counseling and coping with stress that are secular or nonreligious and have the intended ultimate effect of providing comfort and stability to authorized DOD personnel. Moreover, chaplains and their enlisted assistants, as members of the military, also have training such as suicide prevention and awareness, first aid, and survival training which can be beneficial during a crisis situation.

**c. Principles for RS during CS**

(1) Chaplains serve a religiously diverse, pluralistic population. During CS operations, military units operate in religiously diverse civilian communities. As such, chaplains must be willing to support, directly and indirectly, the free exercise rights of all authorized DOD personnel regardless of their religious beliefs.

(2) Joint area RS will be employed when necessary. Joint area RS may include coordinating RS coverage across command and Service component lines to accommodate the religious needs of all authorized DOD personnel. As a primary mission, the RST will support the command to which assigned. Pursuant to a commander's orders or religious support plan (RSP), the RST may also be responsible for providing joint area RS to units without assigned chaplains and to personnel from low density faith groups. An AC RST, when directed, may provide RS to NG personnel serving in state active duty or Title 32 USC status during emergency or exigent circumstances. Likewise, IAW state law and when directed, an NG RST in state active duty or Title 32 USC status may provide RS to AC personnel during emergency or exigent circumstances. Commanders will coordinate joint area RS consistent with the RSP and legal counsel.

**d. RS Coordination.** Coordination and collaboration between DOD chaplains and civilian clergy, religious ministry professionals (RMPs), and caregivers enhances mission success, the recovery process and situational awareness. Response and recovery following disasters and catastrophic events will require all local, state, tribal, federal, and nongovernmental resources working in a cooperative partnership.

*“Local, county, and state resources, including National Guard forces under Title 32, normally constitute the first line of response to crisis management and consequence management events. Therefore, as a general rule, chaplains in Title 10 status will not be the first to respond to a natural or man-made disaster.”*

**JP 1-05, Religious Support in Joint Operations**

**(1) National Guard**

(a) Except when a military installation is directly affected, DOD forces and chaplains in Title 10 USC status will not generally be the first to respond to a natural or man-made disaster. The NG, under the command of the governor or adjutant general may respond first. The JFHQ-State staff chaplain is responsible for coordinating RS for NG forces serving in state active duty or Title 32 USC

status. NG forces coordinate disaster response with the NGB-Office of the Chaplain (NGB-OC). States may invoke emergency management assistance compacts (EMACs) to request assistance from other states.

*“The Federal response should better integrate the contributions of volunteers and nongovernmental organizations into the broader national effort.” —The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, White House Report, 2006 “Faith-based organizations (FBOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs) have a long tradition of helping Americans in need...FBOs and CBOs have a long tradition of aiding victims of disasters...FBO/CBO and emergency management partnerships could be helpful in disaster mitigation.”*

**Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza,  
Homeland Security Council, 2006**

(b) Policies and procedures will be established to ensure coordination of the activities of all DOD chaplains. Combatant command chaplains and JTF chaplains will coordinate chaplain activities with the NGB-OC and involved JFHQ-State chaplains, to the maximum extent possible, to ensure collaboration and cooperation. In particular, combatant command chaplains coordinate chaplain response with the NGB-OC.

(2) **United States Coast Guard.** During domestic incident with maritime dimensions, the USCG will respond. USCG chaplains provide RS to USCG personnel and also conduct first responder support and liaison with NGOs, FBOs, local clergy, and RMPs. Combatant command chaplains and JTF RSTs will coordinate activities with USCG chaplains to ensure collaboration and cooperation.

(3) **Civil Air Patrol/Air Force Auxiliary.** CAP has nearly 700 chaplains nationwide who meet the same ecclesiastical standards as active-duty Air Force chaplains. Many have been trained in critical incident stress management and are well suited to provide rapid response CS in a variety of scenarios.

(4) **Interagency and Nongovernmental Organizations.** Coordination with federal, state, and local agencies as well as FBOs and community based organizations operating in the AOR is essential for CS mission accomplishment. At disaster sites, DOD and civilian chaplains, clergy, and other RMPs may be present. The JTF chaplain will be responsible for coordinating the activities of DOD chaplains, as well as the activities of civilian chaplains, clergy, and RMPs supporting the DOD community. At the national and theater level, combatant command chaplains will coordinate chaplain activities with OGAs and with national agencies that are operating in the AOR. This coordination can be conducted through the civil-military operations center, or other functionally similar staff section. For example, agreements with civilian agencies and NGOs may facilitate and enable RS to DOD personnel during increased or large magnitude disaster responses. The support of chaplains affiliated with other federal agencies such as the FBI or from localities may be needed to provide RS to DOD personnel of low-density faith groups. Normally, a national agency such as the ARC or the National Association of Chaplains serves as the “gatekeeper” to credential civilian clergy responding to disasters. National coordination efforts are needed to build

partnerships between DOD chaplains and civilian clergy and RMPs and other agencies responding to disasters.

See JP 1-05, Religious Support for Joint Operations, for more information.

#### 4. Logistics

The relative combat power that military forces can bring to bear against an enemy is constrained by a nation's capability to plan for, gain access to, and deliver forces and materiel to the required points of application across the range of military operations. Even though CS operations do not involve "combat power" or an "enemy," this construct holds true for the conduct of CS operations because during times of crisis, DOD provides vital logistic support to civil authorities.

##### a. Authorities and Responsibilities

(1) The authorities and responsibilities for logistic operations in support of CS are largely the same as logistic operations for any other DOD mission set. Some notable exceptions, as indicated in paragraph 4b below, apply to CS operations within the land, airspace, and territorial waters of the United States.

(2) The JP 4-0 series of publications for logistic support applies in CS. However, logistic planners consider both military and civil requirements and capabilities concurrently to avoid duplication. Implementation and execution of logistic functions remain the responsibility of the Services and the Service component commanders. Each Service is responsible for the logistic support of its own forces, except when logistic support is otherwise provided for by agreements with national agencies, allies, or another Service.

(3) In the case where coalition operations are used for CS missions, coalition partners are ultimately responsible for providing logistic support for their own forces. However, the geographic combatant commander (GCC) should strive to negotiate, conclude and integrate the use of acquisition and cross-servicing agreements and associated implementing arrangements and any other vehicle necessary to provide logistics support.

**b. Logistics Disciplines.** The primary focus of the CSS effort is to sustain and assist DOD forces employed in CS operations. In support of CS missions, the Services are responsible for providing CSS to their respective forces, which is consistent with joint logistics doctrine. Responsibilities for the disciplines within logistics as described in existing joint doctrine apply to CS missions, except as noted below:

(1) **Supply.** Supply is the function of acquiring, managing, receiving, storing, and issuing the materiel required by forces. Standard doctrine for supply support in joint logistics states that GCCs will establish policies regarding supply buildup rates or theater stockage levels in their respective AOR. However, when operating in US possessions and territories, forces accomplishing CS missions will receive sustainment support from their respective owning Service, as opposed to the CCDR. The



ability for the Services to use home station stocks and existing contracts make this the most effective method for sustaining the force. However, care must be taken to ensure that any expansion of existing contracts or development of new supply contracts in the operational area do not adversely impact other federal, state, or local contracting efforts. All classes of supply will need to be considered. However, some classes, such as Class I (subsistence), Class II (clothing, tools, and administrative supplies), Class IV (construction material), Class VI (personal demand items), and Class VIII (medical material) will more than likely require close consideration. The DLA may provide commodity support directly to FEMA upon receipt of a funded request to facilitate support for US populations impacted by disasters.

(2) **Maintenance.** Maintenance includes actions taken to keep materiel in a serviceable condition or to upgrade its capability. An effective maintenance program, especially of major end-items and testing and diagnostic equipment, is vital to ensure that the required support is provided. Monitoring equipment must be calibrated and a system established to repair/calibrate on site or to return and replace with a like item. Again, the accessibility to existing contracts and home station capability ensure this is the most expedient method for equipment sustainment.

(3) **Transportation.** Transportation involves the movement of people, equipment, and supplies via ground, water, and air to and within the JOA. The Defense Transportation System is that portion of the global transportation infrastructure that supports DOD common-user transportation needs across the range of military operations. With SecDef approval, DOD may provide transportation support via established processes found in the NRP.

(a) Airlift priorities for CS are outlined in CJCSI 4120.02, *Assignment of Movement Priority*. The national importance of the CS mission is reflected in the elevated movement priorities that can be applied for these missions as directed by the President or SecDef.

(b) The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) will be used to direct and control the movement of forces into and out of a JOA. Force deployments will be time-phased to meet operational mission requirements per validated priorities in JOPES. The respective GCC is the validating authority for JOPES and special assignment airlift missions' movement requirements within the AOR.

(c) The CDR's joint deployment and distribution operations center (JDDOC) is composed of personnel from the combatant command and national partners as required (i.e., US Transportation Command, Defense Logistics Agency, the Services, and other organizations). While the organizational construct will be situational based, it will operate under the direction of the supported combatant command. The JDDOC will implement command movement priorities, anticipate and resolve transportation shortfalls, synchronize force flow and distribution, and provide in-transit visibility.

(4) **Engineering.** General engineering provides the construction, operation, maintenance, damage repair, and reconstitution of facilities, roads, and utilities and logistic infrastructure.

(a) **Purpose, Scope, and Limitations.** The primary focus of the DOD general engineering effort is to sustain and assist DOD forces employed, force bed-down work, emergency



stabilization/repair of damaged critical infrastructure, opening lines of communications (roads/debris clearing) and rendering assistance to the designated BSIs. In general DOD engineer forces will be called upon when local, state, tribal, federal, and contract resources are fully engaged, exhausted, or timely action is necessary to save lives and prevent further human suffering and loss of property.

(b) **Concept of Engineer Support.** DOD engineer forces may be tasked with short notice to assist civil authorities as a result of a natural or man-made disaster. DOD engineer forces may be engaged in CS operations directly by the local commander under immediate response authority or indirectly in support of a primary agency through the NRP. An example of engineer support is the assistance DOD engineer forces may be requested to provide to enhance law enforcement mobility and countermobility efforts by constructing roads, bridges, and vehicular barriers, and by erecting fences and lights.

1. Maximum consideration will be given to the use of locally available commercial services, facilities, and support structures, followed by local tribal, state, and federal resources before DOD engineers are engaged. The federal response will be conducted in accordance with the NRP and NIMS.

2. A broad force perspective for achieving engineering objectives is necessary. Engineer support may be garnered from local, state, and federal resources via a multitude of avenues or agreements. Non-federalized NG engineer forces may be actively conducting CS operations within the JOA along with Title 10 USC engineer forces.

3. USACE is the DOD element, acting as the coordinating agency for ESF #3, “Public Works and Engineering,” and supporting agency for ESF #6, “Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services.” Under Public Law 84-99, USACE authority also includes response to flooding incidents. It is when these resources are fully engaged and unable to accept additional tasks that DOD engineer resources may be required to assist or when a unique DOD engineer capability is needed.

(c) **General Priority of Engineer Actions.** Military engineer capabilities will be requested to provide support to other federal agencies IAW the NRP through the executing JTF. Based on the type of mission, the tasks may differ, but the general priority is:

1. Force bed-down with antiterrorism force protection considerations.

2. Emergency stabilization and repair of damaged critical infrastructure. Repairs/work-arounds to other critical public utilities, services, and facilities that will help restore the ability of the local authority to manage its own recovery efforts.

3. Emergency clearing of debris from streets, roads, bridges, airfields, ports, and waterways in support of recovery and humanitarian needs.

4. Immediate humanitarian needs of the dislocated populace, such as the construction of temporary shelters and support facilities.

5. Demolition of damaged structures and facilities that pose a significant risk to the public.

(d) **Construction Policy.** New construction during CS operations should not be expected. However, when new construction is authorized, adherence to all local, state, and federal codes and standards should be anticipated. Use of Service construction standards, planning factors, development priorities, and cost estimates are encouraged. Expedient construction should be considered. Expedient construction includes several types of rapid construction techniques such as prefabricated buildings, inflatable buildings, and clamshell structures. These construction techniques can be selectively employed with minimum time, cost, and risk and offer deployed forces another source of required temporary facilities. Temporary facilities may be required or requested in certain cases during the initial phase of operations or in support of the federal agency with lead responsibility.

(e) **Contractors.** Contractors will be the primary means used to accomplish engineer/construction requirements in CS. Ample commercial capacity in heavy equipment and materials should be available in the JOA. DOD engineer capabilities coupled with commercial sector and contract capabilities provide virtually unlimited engineering depth and breadth. Coordination between USACE and potential construction contracting agencies at local, state and federal levels must be conducted to ensure efficient resource utilization and economies of scale when possible.

(f) **Allied and Coalition Forces.** The availability and possible use of allied and coalition civil engineering forces should not be considered during mission planning. These forces may be made available to support operations, particularly if a CS event occurs in close proximity to national borders. However, DOD component planners should not plan to rely on international assistance as the basis for response and cannot accept military-to-military assistance to meet a CS RFA.

(g) CS operations are affected by numerous local, state and federal laws and regulations. Most of these laws and regulations are those that civil engineers deal with on a daily basis. The proper flow and authorization of the mission assignments must be accomplished. This will avoid potential issues such as environmental impacts, funding sources, scope, and authorities of work. Close coordination with the staff judge advocate, and the CCDR's staff will help ensure many potential issues are avoided entirely, or are quickly overcome.

(h) **Environmental.** DOD forces employed in CS operations are responsible for protecting our environment. Commanders will employ environmentally responsible practices that minimize adverse impacts on human health and the environment. DOD goals are to initiate actions as soon as possible to curtail further environmental damage, resolve environmental impacts, and comply with all applicable laws to the maximum extent possible.

1. During all operations, strategies will be developed to reduce or eliminate negative impacts on the environment. DOD will be in support of a primary agency, and environmental

responsibilities will remain with the primary agency. However, this does not release DOD from responsibility to plan and conduct operations in a manner responsive to environmental considerations. Timely CS response in crisis circumstances may make it necessary to take immediate action without preparing the normal environmental planning documents. Close coordination with local, state, and federal agencies during CS actions is needed to avoid negative environmental consequences.

2. Documenting conditions and actions as soon as possible before, during, and after operations in the JOA will facilitate resolution and closure of environmental issues. An active environmental review of CS operations should be accomplished to identify possible environmental issues before a negative impact occurs. Close liaison and communication with the applicable DOD regional environmental coordinator will also aid in ultimate resolution of environmental issues with local, state, tribal and federal agencies. Environmental impacts will be addressed as soon as possible once operations have stabilized. Emergency exemptions may be needed for disposal of contaminated and hazardous material. DOD forces should direct their efforts to properly identify, contain, document, and transfer environmental issues to civil authorities as soon as possible.

*For additional information on engineer organizations and assets of DOD Military Services, see JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.*

(5) **Health Service Support (HSS).** Within the NRP, the delivery of public health and medical services falls under ESF #8, “Public Health and Medical Services.” The function’s primary agency is DHHS. This function is the mechanism for coordinated federal assistance to supplement state, local, and tribal resources in response to public health and medical care needs (to include veterinary and/or animal health issues when appropriate). As a supporting agency, DOD through the DCO will coordinate these services. DOD employs and integrates medical response through the capabilities of care; first responder, forward resuscitative care, en route care, theater hospitalization and in some cases definitive care. The focus of DOD medical support is to restore essential health services in collaboration with the state and local health authorities. The scope of the medical response will vary with the type and scale of emergency. However, a clear focus must remain on transition to other medical support organizations, particularly if taking a lead role during the initial stages of the response. The military health system will, in most cases, have a scaled response to CS emergencies; first under immediate response and mutual aid agreements with local and state healthcare systems and then through the NDMS, and finally through CS assigned missions.

(a) **Immediate Medical Response.** Acute situations may require response prior to detailed DOD and HSS coordination. Imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency may require immediate action to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage and is covered under the immediate response provision in DOD policy. When such conditions exist and time does not permit approval from higher headquarters, local military commanders and responsible officials from DOD components are authorized, subject to any supplemental direction that may be provided by their DOD component, to take necessary action to respond to requests of civil authorities. Medical immediate response is usually coordinated locally through NDMS FCCs, of which nearly half are DOD medical treatment facilities (MTFs). Federal, state and local health systems regularly train and exercise disaster preparedness with emergency services as a part of certification and licensing. In

escalating civil emergencies with pending JTF involvement, FCC and MTF representatives can often be valuable sources for situational awareness.

(b) **HSS Operations.** Health services includes patient movement, hospitalization, health service logistics, blood management, vector control, preventive medicine measures, health surveillance, veterinary, and dental services.

*For more details, see JP 4-02, Health Service Support.*

**1. Responsibilities.** The JTF surgeon advises the CJTF on medical issues, medical plans, policies, and procedures for assigned units. The JTF surgeon's cell provides the central location for medical planning and operations. The staff monitors current and future operations and conducts required planning support. The JTF medical staff must maintain close contact with joint regional medical planners office at the combatant command and with the DCO to carry out ESF #8, "Public Health and Medical Services." The JTF medical staff alerts DOD NDMS FCCs (Army, Air Force, and Navy) to activate their patient reception plans, if required. Some of the obstacles operators will face are:

**2. Inappropriate Care Distribution.** Often the first casualties present for care are the least injured. Failure to organize resources in recognition that more seriously injured individuals may not be present until much later may leave the most injured with limited access to lifesaving care they need. To ensure that medical resources are appropriately allocated across the affected area, care delivery must be prioritized at both the local and regional level.

**3. Unequal Distribution of Casualties.** Casualties tend to be concentrated locally and then presented to the nearest health facility. This may overwhelm local facilities, while other facilities in the area are under used.

**4. Multiple Casualty Entry Points.** The emergency medical service (EMS) is the usual route of entry into the health care system for casualties. In mass casualty situations, casualties access the system through non-EMS entry points (e.g., private means, police transport, and search and rescue). This results in multiple, uncontrolled demands for health care and concentrates the demands at nontypical locations. Also, nonlocal responders arrive to help but are not familiar with the local health system, adding to the overall confusion.

(c) **Health Threat.** The purpose of the medical portion of the commander's estimate is to identify the HSS requirements. Because there are so many variables that affect the need for HSS, an up-front analysis of multiple sources of intelligence or information, including information gathered by trained medical personnel on scene is required. Medical personnel need to evaluate the safety and vulnerability of local food and water sources and local medical capabilities, perform an environmental risk assessment and a vector-pest risk assessment and determine the adequacy of hygiene in local billeting and public facilities as early as possible. It is critical to have medical personnel on all survey teams or advance party detachments. Identifying critical health risk factors and short term primary and emergent care along with the magnitude of the disaster's impact and potential health consequences for

military forces and the population at risk are critical elements to developing appropriate courses of action for the commander.

(d) **Damage to the Healthcare Infrastructure.** The level of damage to the healthcare infrastructure and the level of involvement of the other civil medical organizations is a starting point when developing situational awareness for the commander's estimate. Local or regional FCC/MTF may be able to provide initial estimates of the situation based on local health system contacts. In general, requirements depend on population health issues and the impact on local health service capabilities.

(e) **Population at Risk.** Highest priority health services include the most appropriate and effective interventions to reduce death and disease as determined by health estimate. Usually, the same groups who are most vulnerable in normal times are at most risk during emergencies and disasters. They include people whose health is already compromised (e.g., people with preexisting illness, serious chronic diseases, or the elderly). In situations where injuries are high, the elimination of on-scene health hazards along with search and rescue and emergent surgical services, may be the highest priority. This type of support is generally short in duration, due to patient survivability time limitations and the ability to rapidly build appropriate force levels for these tasks. In situations where casualties are low and displaced persons are high, preventive medicine measures will likely be the highest priority health services required (e.g., control of infectious or communicable diseases).

*For more information, see JP 4-02, Health Service Support.*

(6) **Mortuary Affairs.** While the GCCs are responsible for coordinating DOD mortuary affairs operations within their AORs, the local, territorial, or state medical examiner or coroner will most likely maintain jurisdiction over both military and civilian fatalities, including mass casualties events. (Note: a commander's responsibility to ensure casualty assistance services to the unit members and their next-of-kin is different from the authority to engage in the medicolegal death investigation.) Simply put, in the domestic environment the individual with jurisdiction has authority to order and perform an investigation to include an autopsy or an appropriate medicolegal death examination on human remains. Jurisdiction varies depending on geographical area and is dependent upon federal, state, county, or local laws. When there is a death of a Service member, jurisdiction will almost always be either exclusive federal or concurrent. Concurrent jurisdiction means that a local medical examiner or coroner has the authority to conduct the medicolegal death investigation, including autopsy, but may waive jurisdiction to the military or request Armed Forces Medical Examiner (AFME) assistance. Deaths in areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction belong to the office of the AFME. Military bases are not necessarily under exclusive federal jurisdiction, and the local staff judge advocate should identify the base's jurisdiction before an event or be consulted during early stages of the response phase. Federal law (Title 10 USC, Section 1471) ensures that the AFME may conduct its own forensic pathology investigation to determine the cause or manner of death of a deceased active duty DOD person if such an investigation is determined to be justified. However, this activity may or may not occur in conjunction with local medicolegal authorities' investigation. If the AFME believes the local authority's medicolegal investigation was not sufficient for the needs of DOD, the remains may be transferred to the AFME before being released to the legal next-of-kin. Federal law also gives exclusive jurisdiction to the AFME for the President, his/her direct staff, and other key elected officials in the Federal government. Military mortuary affairs units can be deployed in order to search, recover, transport, and temporarily store remains in support of civil authorities. Few



of these units are available in the force structure and they are best utilized to augment existing local and federal capabilities to respond.

*For more information, see JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations.*

(7) **Combat Service Support.** The primary focus of the CSS effort is to deploy, sustain, and assist military forces employed in CS operations and the Services are responsible for providing CSS to their respective forces. Normally, the GCC will retain overall directive authority for logistics in supporting CS missions, but may delegate directive authority for common support capabilities to designated CJTF(s) to the maximum extent practicable.

## 5. Intelligence Support

### a. Introduction

(1) The parameters under which DOD operates are different in the US than they are overseas. For example, the lines between counterintelligence (CI) and force protection information are now blurred. Whereas one typically dealt with foreign information and the other domestic, both now involve elements of foreign and domestic information. Military commanders' need for information and intelligence within the homeland is on the rise — they expect force protection information and counterintelligence to be integrated into domestic and domestic support operations due to a heightened awareness of potential terrorist threats.

(2) These needs and expectations pose unique issues in the information and intelligence gathering arena. DOD intelligence components are subject to one set of rules referred to as intelligence oversight. Everyone else in DOD is subject to a different set of rules governed by DODD 5200.27, *Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations Not Affiliated with the Department of Defense*. Therefore, the commander must direct his need for information or intelligence to the right component — the component with the capability and authority to achieve the commander's intent.

(3) The DOD intelligence component is responsible for intelligence; information comes from non-intelligence DOD components. Figuring out the nature of the data and the right unit to gather it are areas that often require judge advocate input as to legal authorities for information gathering. Commanders and their staffs must carefully consider the legal authorities and policy when planning domestic and domestic support operations. DOD intelligence components have traditionally had limited involvement in domestic and domestic support operations. There are two reasons for this.

(a) One, as mentioned before, until recently DOD itself has not typically conducted many domestic or domestic support operations.

(b) Two, when these types of operations have been conducted, the role of DOD intelligence components has been limited due to its mission to conduct DOD "intelligence activities."

(4) Current DOD policy interpretation is that intelligence activities only include foreign intelligence (FI) and CI. Normally, there is little need for FI or CI in a CS operation. However, when FI or CI is needed for a domestic operation the intelligence oversight rules limit what can be collected. DOD intelligence components are governed by various laws and policy documents. These authorities establish the operational parameters and restrictions under which DOD intelligence components may collect, produce, and disseminate FI and CI. Implicit in this authorization, by the definition of FI and CI, is a requirement that such intelligence relate to the activities of international terrorists or, foreign powers, organizations, persons, and their agents. Moreover, to the extent that DOD intelligence components are authorized to collect FI or CI within the United States, they may do so only in coordination with the FBI, which has primary responsibility for intelligence collection within the United States. When DOD intelligence components are conducting FI or CI, the intelligence oversight rules apply. These rules govern the collection, retention, and dissemination of information concerning US persons. Special emphasis is given to the protection of the constitutional rights and privacy of US persons so the intelligence oversight rules generally prohibit the acquisition of information concerning the domestic activities of any US person.

(5) In the absence of any foreign nexus, DOD intelligence components generally perform non-intelligence activities. A non-intelligence activity would be any activity that is conducted by or with a DOD intelligence component asset or capability, but which does not involve FI or CI. For example, the collection, retention, production, and dissemination of maps, terrain analysis, and damage assessments for a CS mission. When a DOD intelligence component asset or capability is needed for a non-intelligence activity, specific authorization from SecDef is required for both the mission and use of the DOD intelligence component capability or asset. The intelligence oversight rules do not apply to non-intelligence activities so the SecDef authorization must be sure to include any restrictions placed upon the assets or capabilities used in the domestic or domestic support operation.

(6) Whether DOD intelligence components are conducting an intelligence activity or a non-intelligence activity for domestic operations or domestic support operations, certain rules universally apply to data and imagery collected from overhead and airborne sensors. Geospatial data, commercial imagery, and data or domestic imagery collected and processed by the NGA is subject to specific procedures covering the request for geospatial data or imagery and its use. Judge advocates should ensure that injuries are in compliance with NGA policy on requests for geospatial data or imagery and its authorized use. Additionally, DODD 5210.52, *Security Classification of Airborne Sensor Imagery and Imaging Systems*, and Defense Intelligence Agency Regulation 50-30, *Security Classification of Airborne Sensor Imagery*, provide specific guidance on mandatory security classification review of all data collected by airborne sensor platforms to determine whether it can be disseminated.

(7) When determining what types of authorized use of DOD intelligence component capabilities, assets, and the products derived from the data collected are required for a CS mission, planners need to also understand the various intelligence collection platforms, their sensors, and how they operate. Issues to consider include: whether the sensor is fixed or moveable, whether the platform with the sensor can have its course altered during a mission, how is the data collected, transmitted and processed, and the specific purpose of its mission. For example, an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) may transmit data by live feed only to a line-of-sight receiver, or by satellite to a remote location. Evidence of a criminal act “incidentally” collected during an authorized mission using DOD intelligence component capabilities can be forwarded to the appropriate LEA; however, altering the course of an



airborne sensor (such as a UAS) from an approved collection track to loiter over suspected criminal activities would no longer be incidental collection, and could result in a PCA violation unless specifically approved in advance. Certain data contains classified metadata which may need to be stripped at a remote site before it can be disseminated in an unclassified manner. A CS operation using DOD intelligence component capabilities which includes support to LEAs will probably require a separate mission authority approval by SecDef and will need to consider whether the data is to be exclusively transmitted to the LEA, and where the LEA agents are located to control or direct use of the assets. Whether the collection platform and data transmission is wholly owned, operated, and received by a DOD intelligence component, a DOD non-intelligence component, or a combination of both will require careful consideration by judge advocates of the applicable rules and operational parameters and restrictions applicable for the mission.

*For further information, see DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, for more information.*

### **b. Information Handling and the Role of DOD Non-Intelligence Components**

(1) DOD non-intelligence components also have restrictions relating to the acquisition of information concerning the activities of persons and organizations not affiliated with DOD. This type of information is often needed when conducting HD, especially CS. Within DOD, MCIOs have primary responsibility for gathering and disseminating information about the domestic activities of US persons that threaten DOD personnel or property. DOD components, other than the intelligence components, may acquire information concerning the activities of persons and organizations not affiliated with the DOD only in the limited circumstances authorized by DODD 5200.27, *Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations Not Affiliated with the Department of Defense*. DODD 5200.27 provides limitations on the types of information that may be collected, processed, stored, and disseminated about the activities of persons and organizations not affiliated with DOD. Those circumstances include the acquisition of information essential to accomplish the following DOD missions: protection of DOD functions and property, personnel security, and operations related to civil disturbances. The directive is very explicit and should be referred to when determining authority for this type of information. Questions on whether DOD intelligence capabilities may be utilized in a CS operation should be referred to the command judge advocate if the authorities, permissible operational parameters, and or limitations are unclear. The command judge advocate will provide the commander legal advice regarding intelligence law and oversight matters; advising on the permissible acquisition and dissemination of information on non-DOD affiliated persons and organizations; and recommending legally acceptable courses of action.

(2) CS activities may require the disclosing of normally classified information to civilian personnel and/or offices. Disclosure should be made only when it is consistent with US policy and national security objectives concerning the recipient. Disclosure of classified military intelligence will be made only when all of the applicable criteria are met. Since CS operations will require release of the product, intelligence collectors should write the products for release to prevent delays in requesting release or sanitization of a product. Restrictive caveats must be used only when absolutely necessary. Sanitization is a procedure to provide essential elements of information while concealing sensitive information. The lead combatant command intelligence directorate is authorized to sanitize intelligence

in an immediate crisis situation. However, if at all possible, the appropriate national agency representative should be contacted for sanitization of their products.

## 6. International Support

*“In response to the Hurricane Katrina disaster, 122 countries and international organizations made pledges of money, personnel, equipment, and disaster relief supplies that totaled in excess of \$668 million. With its tremendous resources and capabilities, the US is traditionally among the first countries to respond to international disasters. Following Hurricane Katrina, the US Government found itself in the unfamiliar position of being offered aid from other nations; however, American officials were preoccupied with managing the response to the disaster and did not have a clear process for receiving and distributing foreign assistance.”*

**Hurricane Katrina, National Response to Catastrophic Events:  
Applied Lessons for Consequence Management  
Joint Center for Operational Analysis  
United States Joint Forces Command  
21 August 2006**

a. For domestic disasters with a high degree of international interest, the US may, for diplomatic or national security reasons, accept some international assistance from select countries, even if that assistance is not requested or required for operational purposes. Working together, the primary agencies (FEMA, DOS, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, and the US Agency for International Development) will endeavor to meet such foreign policy objectives while minimizing the obstruction to relief operations.

b. Due to the wide range of resources available within the US, the USG is not likely to require routine international assistance for domestic disasters. Exceptions may include particularly large or simultaneous disasters, for which very specific commodities or technical assistance might be requested, and for which a foreign partner can provide needed goods in a timely manner.

c. Outside the international assistance system, DOD has the authority to accept foreign military assistance in support of its operations. For example, DOD may accept an offer of foreign military medical personnel to backfill at a US military hospital for US military medical personnel who are deployed to a domestic disaster. DOD uses the international assistance system for any international assistance it requests or receives in conjunction with FEMA mission assigned activities.

## 7. Personnel

a. The objective of personnel operations is to maintain employed units at authorized strength and to be ready in all respects to carry out the concept of operations. The core functional responsibilities of a manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff (J-1) are accomplished during CS operations; with some exceptions such as morale, welfare, and recreation; establishing a rest and recuperation program; coordinating military postal operations; and monitoring joint personnel training and tracking activities.

b. **Personnel Support.** The authorities and responsibilities for personnel support to CS operations are largely the same as those for any other DOD mission set. Some notable exceptions, however, apply to CS operations within the land, airspace, and territorial waters of the US due to the unique mission sets assigned to USNORTHCOM.

c. **Personnel Accountability.** Personnel accountability is a command responsibility. Personnel accountability, strength reporting, and manpower management are the focal points for a joint force J-1 during CS operations. CS operations pose specific challenges; one example being that units may deploy from their home stations instead of a designated port of debarkation (POD). Service personnel elements supporting home station deployments must ensure that all processing and reporting requirements are met prior to unit deployment. In specific circumstances, such as operations in a WMD environment, the employing JTF may establish a joint reception center (JRC) to ensure arriving units are ready for employment, but this would be the exception.

(1) Personnel Accountability in Conjunction with Disasters. Attacks on the United States can affect DOD personnel and their dependents. Service components account for and report the status of all DOD-affiliated military and civilian personnel, and all family members immediately following a disaster or attack. Additionally, Service components should be prepared to report the number of Service members, DOD civilians, and their dependents requiring evacuation from an affected area. The Services will provide the necessary level of personnel accountability support to the GCC to ensure the GCC's human resource visibility mission can be efficiently accomplished. See DODI 3001.02, Personnel Accountability in Conjunction with Natural or Man-made Disasters and CJCS Manual (CJCSM) 3150.13, Joint Reporting Structure – Personnel Manual for specific direction.

(2) Joint Personnel Status Report. The joint personnel status report (JPERSTAT) will be used by units supporting USNORTHCOM CS operations to report the number of personnel operationally employed in the GCC AOR. The JPERSTAT is the means by which the GCC reports to the CJCS the number of personnel, by location, unit and Service, permanently assigned, attached, OPCON or ADCON to the GCC. Afloat and ashore personnel will be counted. In addition, US DOD civilians and DOD contractors supporting the joint task force or JTF component commands within the joint operational area will be counted. See CJCSM 3150.13, Joint Reporting Structure – Personnel Manual for detailed direction.

d. **Manning and Augmentation.** USNORTHCOM does not maintain standing CS forces. These forces are task organized when needed, causing a continuing requirement for individual augmentation (see CJCSI 1301.01C) to add specific Service representation or skill sets to an existing organization. This particularly applies to AFNORTH and ARNORTH in cases where they are required to form JTFs. These component commands must prepare joint manning documents listing the specific Service expertise required to meet their mission requirements.

e. **Family Assistance.** In CS operations, family assistance centers and/or emergency family assistance centers may be established by the Services to support DOD families affected by man-made or natural disasters. USNORTHCOM may direct the establishment of an emergency family assistance center to coordinate family support between the Services and installations in the affected area.

*For detailed guidance on Personnel Support, see JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations.*

## **8. Financial Management**

Financial management (FM) units provide the same capabilities during CS operations as they do for other operations. FM capabilities provide the following support: procurement, pay, disbursing, accounting, and banking. Costs incurred during CS operations are incremental and are reimbursable IAW Title 31 USC, Section 1535 (commonly called the Economy Act) and Stafford Act, unless otherwise directed by the President. FM units must have processes in place to capture these incremental costs to facilitate reimbursement.

## **9. Safety Support**

Safety planning and operational risk management is a key factor in the prevention of accidental loss of life and resources used to carry out joint CS operations. Safety plans should be fully coordinated with other agencies and promote mission safety. Safety reporting will be through the owning respective service.

## **10. Legal**

CS operations involve numerous statutory, regulatory, and policy considerations. The commander and the staff judge advocate must be knowledgeable concerning the authority and responsibility of DOD as well as that of the various other federal agencies. Inherent in this event are the relationships between federal, state, tribal, and local authorities, as well as jurisdictional principles, security requirements, environmental requirements, and claims administration. The occurrence of a CS incident presents complex legal problems. Legal issues range from complex questions regarding jurisdiction and authority to exclude the general public from specific areas, to payment of simple personal property claims. The response force organization should include a legal element to advise and assist in resolving these and other local legal issues. Specific tasks include:

- a. Advising the commander and functional staff elements on any matters related to the CS incident.
- b. Organizing and supervising the legal functional element at the site of the incident. This may include establishing and operating a claims processing facility.
- c. Coordinating technical legal matters with a higher authority, when required.
- d. Coordinating legal issues with the principal legal advisors or other participating departments and agencies, as required.
- e. Providing legal advice and assistance to other federal officials upon request, as permitted by the appropriate interagency service agreements.
- f. Reviewing proposed public statements for legal sufficiency and implications.

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## APPENDIX A

### REIMBURSEMENT FOR CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS

#### 1. General

a. Authorities and funding are main issues that impact DOD's ability to respond to and provide CS. All CS is provided on a reimbursable basis unless otherwise directed by the President or reimbursement is waived by the SecDef. Cost reimbursement for CS is usually IAW Title 31 USC, Section 1535 (commonly called the Economy Act), which mandates cost reimbursement by the federal agency requesting support. The Stafford Act sets the guidelines for reimbursements to federal agencies and states from federal funds set aside to support missions in response to a Presidential declaration.

*See JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations, for more information.*

b. DOD components are not funded to train, equip, and exercise specifically for CS operations, and therefore, ordinarily provide CS on a cost reimbursable basis.

c. DOD components shall comply with legal and accounting requirements for the loan, grant, or consumption of DOD resources for CS, as necessary, to ensure reimbursement of costs to the DOD components under the Stafford Act, as amended; the Defense Emergency Response Fund established by Public Law No. 101-165; or other applicable authority.

(1) Reimbursable Activities. Commanders use automatic reimbursements to augment available funds using a special accounting program code. Incremental costs that directly result from disaster relief are considered eligible for reimbursement.

- (a) Pay of personnel hired specifically for disaster relief.
- (b) Overtime.
- (c) Travel and per diem.
- (d) Cost of consumables requisitioned for issue to support disaster operations.
- (e) Transportation of personnel, supplies, and equipment.
- (f) Cost to pack and crate supplies and equipment.
- (g) Cost of petroleum, oils, and lubricants, to include aviation fuel.

(h) Cost of supplies and equipment lost, destroyed, or damaged as a result of CS operations, (except aircraft, motor vehicles, and water craft).

- (i) Cost of aircraft flight hours.
  - (j) Cost of port (air, ocean, inland-waterway) loading, off-loading, and handling.
  - (k) Cost to repair or recondition nonconsumable items returned. Allocate the percentage of repair costs attributable to the support provided.
  - (l) Replacement costs of supplies and equipment furnished and not returned.
  - (m) Cost of parts used to repair end-items used in disaster relief (excluding depot or field maintenance on a time compliance basis).
- (2) Nonreimbursable Activities (except under the authorities of the Economy Act). The following items are not considered reimbursable expenses in the context of providing CS:
- (a) Regular pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel.
  - (b) Charges for use of military vehicles and watercraft.
  - (c) Aircraft, vehicles, or watercraft damaged, lost, destroyed, or abandoned.
  - (d) Administrative overhead.
  - (e) Annual and sick leave, retirement, and other benefits.
  - (f) Cost of telephone, telegram, or other transmissions used to requisition items in a disaster area to replenish depot stocks.

d. DOD components shall not procure or maintain any supplies, materiel, or equipment exclusively for providing CS, unless otherwise directed by the SecDef.

e. DOD components shall not perform any inherently governmental function of civil government unless directed by the President. Any commander who is directed to perform such functions shall facilitate the reestablishment of civil responsibility at the earliest time possible.

## 2. Reimbursement Process

All DOD support is provided on a reimbursable basis, unless otherwise directed by the President or reimbursement is waived by the SecDef. In most cases, state, local, and federal agencies provide reimbursement for assistance provided by DOD. The reimbursement process requires the DOD components to capture and report total and incremental costs IAW applicable DOD financial management regulations. Supported agencies should also maintain records of support received from DOD. To distinguish these costs from those related to training or normal operating expenses, which are not reimbursed, resource managers must maintain accountability throughout an operation for equipment and material costs associated with operational support.



Organizational record keeping needed to support cost-capturing must begin at the start of the operation and at the lowest functional level.

*Additional guidance can be found in DOD 7000.14-R, Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation.*

### 3. Legal Considerations

Some statutes permit federal agencies to seek waiver of reimbursement. For example, federal LEAs may not be required to reimburse DOD for some types of support provided in the normal course of military training or operations. If such support results in a benefit to DOD that is substantially equivalent to that which would otherwise result from military training (Title 10 USC, Section 377), federal LEAs may not be required to reimburse DOD. The SecDef makes this determination.

a. **The Economy Act.** Title 31 USC, Section 1535, the Economy Act, permits federal agencies to provide goods and services to other federal agencies on a reimbursable basis.

b. **The Stafford Act.** While the Stafford Act does not require reimbursement, DOD is usually reimbursed by FEMA for the incremental costs of providing support. Approval authority and reporting requirements vary, depending upon the duration and type of support requested. The President may direct any agency of the federal government to undertake missions and tasks on either a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis.

c. **DOD Guidelines.** DOD 7000.14-R, *Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation*, and the USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, and CONPLAN 3502, *Civil Disturbance Operations*, require operating agencies and supported CCDRs to recover all costs for civil disturbance operations. The operating agency and supported CCDR are responsible for collecting costs for civil disturbance operations of all Service components and DOD agencies, preparing cost reports for the executive agency, consolidating billings, forwarding bills to DOJ, and distributing reimbursements to Service components and DOD agencies.

### 4. Service-Specific Considerations

Service-specific regulations provide financial management guidance governing funding, reimbursement procedures, cost reports, travel entitlements, and finance pay support for military personnel participating in domestic support operations.

a. Reimbursement procedures must conform to the requirements of the legal authority relied on for provision of support.

b. Installations, agencies, and departments providing support must maintain records, receipts, and documents to support claims, purchases, reimbursements, and disbursements.

c. Payment of military and civilian personnel remains a Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) responsibility.

d. Installations should establish separate accounting process codes to record the cost of the operation. Installations use project codes, management decision packages, and functional cost accounts furnished by DFAS-Indianapolis to record the costs of the operation.

e. Planning and warning orders do not automatically authorize fund expenditures for CS operations.

### 5. Disaster Relief Costs

Disaster relief participation is an unprogrammed requirement for the Services for which funds have not been budgeted. Service component commands may be required to initially fund the cost of CS operations. Such operations are undertaken with the understanding that additional operating expenses may be reimbursed by the requesting agencies. Costs should be recorded using unique accounting codes IAW Service regulations and guidance.

### 6. Financial Management - Support

Military financial management units provide finance and resource management support for troops supporting CS. Financial management elements of one Service may provide support to other Services and for the entire CS operation, as directed.

a. **Contracts.** Paying for contracts and other local procurement is a critical function. Financial management personnel should deploy early enough to support logistic contracting elements. This support includes providing funds to paying agents.

b. **Individual Support.** Financial management elements may provide individual support, to include check cashing, casual pay, inquiries, and travel payments.

## APPENDIX B

### STANDING RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE FOR US FORCES

#### 1. Purpose

Although projecting power overseas has been the usual strategy for ensuring national security, the evolution of new threats against the nation has caused DOD to reshape its approach to this important task. In this era of potential domestic terrorism and natural disasters, US military forces may be required to assist civil authorities and to use force in the very heart of the nation. The participation of the military in such scenarios is fraught with legal and political pitfalls that warrant clear and specific guidance on the use of force. Third parties may seek to exacerbate a situation for their own purposes by provoking an excessive use of force. The purpose of this Appendix is to publish fundamental policies and procedures governing the RUF by DOD forces during domestic CS missions. These RUF do not apply to NG forces while in state active duty or Title 32 USC status.

#### 2. Policy

a. CJCSI 3121.01B, *Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces*, establishes fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions to be taken by US commanders and their forces during all DOD CS and routine military department functions occurring within the US territory or US territorial seas. SRUF also apply to land HD missions occurring within US territory.

b. The SecDef approves and the CJCS promulgates standing rules of engagement (SROE) and SRUF for US forces. The Joint Staff, Operations Directorate is responsible for the maintenance of the SROE/SRUF in coordination with OSD. Commanders at all levels are responsible for establishing rules of engagement (ROE)/RUF for mission accomplishment that comply with the ROE/RUF of senior commanders, the law of armed conflict, applicable international and domestic law and the CJCS SROE/SRUF. It is critical that commanders consult with their command judge advocates when establishing ROE/RUF.

c. Unless otherwise directed by a unit commander (IAW CJCSI 3121.01B, *Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces*), military personnel have the right under law to use force that is reasonably necessary under the circumstances to defend themselves against violent, dangerous or life-threatening personal attack. In addition, military personnel are authorized to use force to discharge certain duties.

d. Nothing in this Appendix alters or limits military commanders' inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Unit self-defense includes the defense of other DOD forces in the vicinity.

e. Commanders at all levels are responsible for training their personnel to understand and properly utilize the SRUF. In this regard, it is critical that legal advisers be available to assist in this training and to advise commanders at all levels of the applicable rules.

f. When DOD forces are detailed to other federal agencies, mission-specific RUF will be used. These RUF must be approved by the SecDef and the federal agency concerned.

g. DOD units under USCG control and conducting law enforcement support operations or maritime homeland security support operations will follow the Coast Guard Use of Force Policy, Commandant, United States Coast Guard Instruction 16247.1, *US Coast Guard Maritime Law Enforcement Manual* for employing warning shots and disabling fire, and follow the SROE/SRUF and/or mission specific use of force rules for all other purpose. However, DOD forces under USCG control retain the right of self-defense.

h. When DOD forces under DOD control operate in coordination with other federal agencies, the applicable RUF will be coordinated with the on-scene federal agency personnel.

i. CCDRs may augment these SRUF as necessary by submitting requests for mission-specific RUF to the CJCS, for approval by the SecDef (IAW CJCSI 3121.01B, *Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces*).

*“It is an unbending rule of law, that the exercise of military power, where the rights of the citizen are concerned, shall never be pushed beyond what the exigency requires.”*

**Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Noah Swayne,  
Raymond v. Thomas, 91 US 712, 716 (1875)**

### 3. Procedures

Normally, force is to be used only as a last resort, and should be the minimum necessary. The use of force must be reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude based on the totality of the circumstances to counter the threat. If force is required, nonlethal force is authorized and may be used to control a situation and accomplish the mission, or to provide self-defense of DOD forces, defense of non-DOD persons in the vicinity if directly related to the assigned mission, or in defense of the protected property, when doing so is reasonable under the circumstances. Lethal force is authorized only when all lesser means have failed or cannot reasonably be employed and the circumstances otherwise justify the use of lethal force.

a. General direction regarding the appropriate use of force comes from a conceptual framework known as the “Use of Force Continuum.” The Use of Force Continuum is generally seamless and does not require movement from one level to the next in sequential order. The Use of Force Continuum can be divided into five broad categories related to the goals of the military units providing support and behavior of subject audience. They are: Intimidate/Control, Deny/Obstruct/Impede, Disorient/Distract, Disable/Incapacitate, and Cause Death/Serious Injury (see Figure B-1).

(1) **Intimidate/Control.** In most cases, the subject audience will comply with the verbal instructions or commands. When time and circumstances permit, the individual(s) or




Figure B-1. Continuum of Force Levels

group should be warned and given the opportunity to withdraw with the goal of preventing the escalation of force. Verbal commands used with firmness and tact should be sufficient to control the situation. Additionally, the military unit's resolve can be implied by mere presence, donning protective gear, or forming into riot control formations.

(2) **Deny/Obstruct/Impede.** At this level, the subject audience exhibits usually simple resistance or refusal to obey instructions and there is no immediate danger of a physical confrontation. The use of tactics, techniques and procedures to deny the subject audience presence in or access to an area or to obstruct or impede their movement is authorized. Examples of the methods short of physical contact include the use of concertina, caltrops, or other means to barricade or isolate an area.

(3) **Disorient/Distract.** At this level, actual physical resistance may be encountered. Resistance is commonly manifested by continued refusal to comply with directions coupled with threatening behavior, shouting and open defiance. The use of nonlethal weapons (NLWs) that cause physical disorientation and distraction may be authorized by the appropriate approval authority.

(4) **Disable/Incapacitate.** This is the level at which military personnel are in imminent danger of bodily injury. It is generally characterized by the subject audience using physical attacks or other combative actions to prevent apprehension or otherwise frustrate military operations. The use of Service-approved, unit-issued NLWs that cause physical discomfort, physical incapacitation or blunt trauma are authorized. Detailed guidance for use of riot control agents by DOD personnel is governed by CJCSI 3110.07C, *Guidance Concerning the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense and Employment of Riot Control Agents and Herbicides (S)*. Although the use of NLWs that cause physical discomfort may fall short of inflicting actual trauma, the employment of these weapons requires nevertheless an assessment of reasonableness under the circumstances. NLWs that inflict blunt trauma constitute the most serious of the nonlethal options within the Use of Force Continuum. Care should be exercised in employing such options as they may cause painful or debilitating injuries, and in some rare cases, death.

(5) **Cause Death/Serious Injury.** In the final level of the Use of Force Continuum, the subject audience behaves in a manner that is combative and poses an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm. In such cases, DOD forces may respond with lethal force. While lethal force is to be used only when all lesser means have failed or cannot reasonably be employed, lethal force is authorized under the following circumstances:

(a) Lethal force is authorized when DOD unit commanders reasonably believe there is an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm to their units and other DOD forces in the vicinity.

(b) Lethal force is authorized in defense of non-DOD persons in the vicinity, when directly related to the assigned mission.

(c) Lethal force is authorized when lethal force reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent the actual theft or sabotage of *assets vital to national security*.

(d) Lethal force is authorized when lethal force reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent the actual theft or sabotage of inherently dangerous property.

(e) Lethal force is authorized when lethal force reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent the sabotage of national critical infrastructure.

b. Consequently, when directly related to the assigned mission, lethal force is authorized under the following circumstances:

(1) Lethal force is authorized when lethal force reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent the commission of a serious offense that involves imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm (for example, setting fire to an inhabited dwelling or sniping), including the defense of other persons, where lethal force is directed against the person threatening to commit the offense. Examples include murder, armed robbery and aggravated assault.

(2) Lethal force is authorized when lethal force reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent the escape of a prisoner, provided there is probable cause to believe that such person(s) have committed or attempted to commit a serious offense, that is, one that involves imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm, and would pose an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm to DOD forces or others in the vicinity.

(3) Lethal force is authorized when lethal force reasonably appears necessary to arrest or apprehend a person who, there is probable cause to believe, has committed a serious offense (as defined in the preceding subparagraph).

c. When operating under these RUF, warning shots are not authorized within US territory (including US territorial waters), except when in the appropriate exercise of force protection of US Navy and Naval Service vessels during maritime operations as permitted by CJCSI 3121.01B, *Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces*.

d. Units with assigned weapons may deploy with weapons stored; however, weapons will not be carried during CS operations unless authorized by the SecDef.



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APPENDIX C  
BASE SUPPORT INSTALLATION/JOINT RECEPTION, STAGING,  
ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION

**BASE SUPPORT INSTALLATION**

**A base support installation (BSI) serves as the logistics hub to support military forces conducting civil support operations. BSIs will generally have the following capabilities:**

- (1) Close proximity to the incident site (less than 100 miles).**
- (2) Close proximity to a major airfield.**
- (3) Life support services to include billeting, food service, fuel, contracting, medical support, and force protection.**
- (4) Open and covered areas for staging of supplies and equipment.**
- (5) Adequate transportation network to and from incident site.**
- (6) Communications infrastructure sufficient to meet the surge of forces arriving in the area.**

**A BSI's primary mission is to provide support to Department of Defense forces responding to an incident.**

**1. General**

During CS operations, the supported CCDR will designate BSIs in coordination with the owning Service and approved by the SecDef (or as delegated). A BSI provides common-user logistic support (fuel, food, general supplies, etc.) and assists a JTF with JRSOI of responding DOD forces.

**2. Concept of Operations**

Support concepts are based on the proximity of the designated BSI and its capabilities which are:

- a. **Major Installation.** If a designated BSI is a major installation within a reasonable travel time from the incident area, then that installation will augment TF common user support to all responding forces to the greatest extent possible. This will enable the responding TF to focus on the CS mission. The installation staff should be able to assume responsibility for the majority of the joint reception and staging mission.

b. **Austere Installation.** Depending on the location of the catastrophic incident, the BSI may be required to be established in an area that is not in close proximity to a robust DOD installation. In these instances, the CJTF will complete an estimate of the situation and request either contract support or submit requests for forces in order to mitigate logistic capability shortfalls due to limited personnel, equipment, facilities, or interrupted or extended lines of communications between the BSI and those DOD elements operating at the incident site.

### 3. Base Support Installation Considerations

Commanders and their staffs conduct mission analysis to prepare to meet logistic requirements and to coordinate the potential use of a military installation for base support of DOD forces during CS operations. BSI planning considerations should take into account, at a minimum, the following areas related to the key functions of logistics:

- a. A concise concept of purpose and description of the functions the BSI will support.
- b. Forces required to support the operation and phasing for induction of logistic elements.
- c. A JFO in the affected area for CBRNE.
- d. FEMA mobilization location.
- e. Length of time the BSI will provide support.
- f. Transportation suitability (reception and staging capabilities, condition, maximum on ground, material handling equipment, medical evacuation capability, etc.)
- g. Adequate supply, maintenance, transportation, civil engineering, medical, and other service support at the BSI.

### 4. Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration

#### JOINT RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION

**Joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) is the essential process that transitions deploying forces, consisting of personnel, equipment, and materiel arriving into the operational area, into cohesive forces capable of meeting the commander's operational requirements. For civil support missions, the joint task force providing command and control of the deploying force conducts JRSOI, supported by the designated base support installation.**

a. **General.** JRSOI for CS operations is characterized by three overarching principles: unity of command, synchronization, and balance of unit flow into the operational area in support of CS. While sharing many similarities of conventional JRSOI operations as described in JP 3-35, *Deployment and*

*Redeployment Operations*, the CJTF must plan for some unique considerations when responding to CS missions.

(1) The JTF headquarters will most likely have to perform JRSOI functions primarily with internal resources and assistance from the designated BSI.

(2) Responding DOD units may not necessarily flow into the operational area in a doctrinally prescribed fashion through designated PODs when responding to catastrophic events. Units may have to stage and move directly from their home station installations to the operational area. Multiple lines of communications may be used by units responding to CS operations.

(3) Deploying forces will undergo some form of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. The JTF must have a well-planned, and carefully managed process that has a robust command, control, and communications infrastructure that is able to effectively manage the dynamic flow of prepared and ready forces into the operational area.

b. **Reception operations** include all those functions required to receive and clear unit personnel, equipment, and materiel through the POD. During reception operations, it is essential that the JTF control the deployment flow. Component support plans will address how personnel will report to the CJTF regardless of the POD that units use for reception and staging.

c. **Staging operations** includes the assembling, temporary holding, and organizing of arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel in preparation for onward movement. Staging areas provide the necessary facilities, sustainment, and other required support to enable units to become mission capable prior to onward movement into the JOA. The personnel, equipment, and materiel to be employed for CS operations within the United States may stage within the confines of their respective home installation. Reliable communications and well-understood reporting requirements are essential for the JTF to effectively manage the building of capability for the CJTF.

d. **Onward movement operations** include movement of personnel and accompanying material from reception facilities and staging areas to a designated unit forward operating base (FOB) within the JOA. If units and forces employed in CS missions within the United States are geographically close to the JOA, the unit FOB may be located at the unit's home installation. Depending on the location of the BSI in relation to the incident site, a FOB could also be located at a designated BSI.

e. **Integration operations** encompass the synchronized hand off of units to an operational commander prior to mission execution. CS operations within the United States often combine Title 10 USC, Title 32 USC, and state active duty forces. The CJTF's C2 as well as communication and coordination possibilities are extensive and special attention to integration should be emphasized.

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## APPENDIX D

### OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN AND NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

#### 1. General

a. This appendix provides information about the NRP and the NIMS with a focus on how NIMS provides for multiagency coordination through the JFO. It identifies the key roles, authorities, and structure with explanation about how the JFC integrates into the federal coordinated response. It is important to note that the NRP does not cover all CS operations, e.g., it does not cover periodic planned support or CD, but parts of it can be used for other non-Stafford incidents.

b. The NRP and NIMS are companion documents designed to improve the nation's incident management capabilities and overall efficiency. The NRP represents a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that occur. The NIMS provides a template for incident management regardless of size, scope, or cause. Use of this template enables federal, state, local, and tribal governments and private-sector and NGOs to work together effectively and efficiently to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from actual or potential domestic incidents regardless of cause, size, or complexity. Together, the NRP and the NIMS integrate the capabilities and resources of various governmental jurisdictions, incident management and emergency response disciplines, NGOs, and the private sector into a cohesive, coordinated, and seamless national framework for domestic incident management.

c. The JFO is a temporary federal facility established locally to provide a central point for federal, state, local, and tribal executives with responsibility for incident oversight, direction, and/or assistance to effectively coordinate protection, prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery actions. The JFO utilizes the scalable organizational structure of the NIMS in the context of both pre-incident and post-incident management activities. The JFO does not manage on-scene operations. Instead, the JFO focuses on providing support to on-scene efforts and conducting broader support operations that may extend beyond the incident site.

#### 2. National Response Plan Basics

a. As required by HSPD-5, the NRP establishes a single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident management to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The NRP is an all-hazards plan built on the template of the NIMS. The NIMS provides a consistent doctrinal framework for incident management at all jurisdictional levels regardless of the cause, size, or complexity of the incident.

b. The NRP, using the NIMS, provides the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy and operational direction for domestic incident management. The NRP can be partially or fully implemented in the context of a threat, anticipation of a significant event, or in response to an incident requiring a coordinated federal response. This includes events with potential national or long-term implications



such as a public health emergency or a cyberspace incident. Selective implementation through the activation of one or more of the NRP elements allows maximum flexibility to meet the unique operational and information-sharing requirements of any situation and enables effective interaction among various federal, state, local, tribal, private-sector, other civilian entities, and NGOs.

c. The NRP applies to all incidents requiring a coordinated federal response as part of an appropriate combination of federal, state, local, tribal, private-sector, and nongovernmental entities. The NRP is applicable to all federal departments and agencies that have primary jurisdiction for or participate in operations requiring a coordinated federal response. The NRP also applies to the ARC, which functions as an ESF primary organization in coordinating the use of mass care resources. For incidents requiring a coordinated federal response, but of lesser severity than an incident of national significance, the NRP includes a comprehensive network of incident annexes and supplemental federal contingency plans that may be implemented by the departments and agencies with established authorities in coordination with the NRP framework.

d. The NRP is always in effect; however, the implementation of NRP coordination mechanisms is flexible and scalable. Actions range in scope from ongoing situational reporting and analysis, through the implementation of NRP incident annexes and other supplemental federal contingency plans, to full implementation of all relevant NRP coordination mechanisms outlined in the NRP base plan.

### **3. Overview of Disaster Response and Incident Management**

a. This overview illustrates actions federal agencies will likely take to assist state and local governments that are overwhelmed by a major disaster or emergency. Figure D-1 provides a graphic display of a federal response under the Stafford Act.

b. The DHS NOC continually monitors potential major disasters and emergencies. When advance warning is possible, DHS may deploy and may request other federal agencies to deploy LNOs and personnel to a state EOC to assess the emerging situation. An RRCC may be activated, fully or partially. Facilities, such as mobilization centers, may be established to accommodate personnel, equipment, and supplies.

c. Immediately after an incident, local jurisdictions respond using available resources and notify state response elements. As information emerges, they also assess the situation and the need for state assistance. The state reviews the situation, mobilizes state resources, and informs the DHS/Emergency Preparedness and Response/FEMA regional office of actions taken.

d. The governor activates the state emergency operations plan, proclaims or declares a “state of emergency,” and requests a state/DHS joint preliminary damage assessment (PDA) to determine if sufficient damage has occurred to justify a request for a Presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency. Based upon the results of the PDA, the governor may request a Presidential declaration, and define the kind of federal assistance needed. At this point, an initial assessment is also conducted of losses avoided based on previous mitigation efforts.



**Figure D-1. Federal Response**

e. After the major disaster or emergency declaration, an RRCC, staffed by regional personnel, coordinates initial regional and field activities.

f. Depending on the scope and impact of the event, the NOC, supported by ESF representatives and DHS/FEMA support staff, carries out initial activation and mission assignment operations and supports the RRCC.

g. A FCO, appointed by the Secretary of Homeland Security on behalf of the President, coordinates federal support activities. The FCO works with the SCO to identify requirements. A PFO also may be designated as the Secretary's representative to coordinate overall federal interagency incident management efforts. When required, a JFO will be established.

h. ESF primary agencies assess the situation and identify requirements and help states respond effectively. Federal agencies provide resources under DHS/FEMA mission assignment or their own authority.

i. The incident advisory council convenes when needed to provide strategic-level coordination and frame courses of action regarding various operational and policy issues. The NOC supports the incident advisory council and coordinates with the JFO.

j. As immediate response priorities are met, recovery activities begin. Federal and state agencies assisting with recovery and mitigation activities convene to discuss state needs.

#### **4. National Response Plan Roles and Responsibilities**

a. A basic premise of the NRP is that incidents are generally handled at the lowest jurisdictional level possible. In the vast majority of incidents, state and local resources and interstate mutual aid will provide the first line of emergency response and incident management support. The NRP provides the framework for federal interaction with state, local, tribal, private-sector and nongovernmental entities in the context of domestic incident management to ensure timely and effective federal support.

b. Just as a lead or primary agency is designated at the federal level; a lead agency is usually designated at the state level.

(1) Typically, states have established state emergency management agencies as executive agents to manage incident response.

(2) State LEAs can include investigative bureau personnel and state patrol officers (which in some states are distinctly different from state police officers).

(3) The NG may be the first military force to respond to support first responders when organic capabilities are exhausted, and the incident response is elevated to the state level. In this capacity, the NG will be in state active duty or Title 32 USC status under the governor's command. As an integrated and supporting organization of a state's emergency management response, the NG supports the incident commander in accordance with the incident command system.

(4) The EMAC is a Congressionally ratified interstate agreement among all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands and is administered by the National Emergency Management Association to provide assistance from one state to another. Generally, when a state requires assistance beyond its organic resources, it generates an EMAC RFA that is sent out to the other

member states. Under EMAC, the requesting state reimburses the supporting state(s) for all costs associated with the assistance. EMAC support depends entirely on voluntary assistance. There is no provision within EMAC whereby one state can be compelled to support another state with its organic capabilities and resources. EMACs provide the framework for states to rapidly assist each other with resources during emergencies, to include NG personnel in state active duty or Title 32 USC status.

c. The state governor has the final commitment authority over state capabilities in any disaster response effort short of a federal response. Governors have the unique authority to issue a state emergency declaration, mobilize the state NG, and redirect state resources to emergency response. A governor can request federal assistance from the President when state capabilities prove insufficient. This request brings the resources of the Federal government to bear on the disaster and can involve DOD.

d. The private sector's role is to be a key partner in domestic incident management, particularly in the area of critical infrastructure protection and restoration. Private-sector entities are also called upon to contribute necessary items and services to the impacted area. These sources are important to aid in the lifesaving and recovery efforts. DHS and other federal departments and agencies coordinate with the private sector to effectively share information, formulate courses of action, and incorporate available resources to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from incidents of various types. For coordination with the owners and operators of the nation's critical infrastructure, DHS and federal agencies utilize the mechanisms established under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, including the critical infrastructure protection advisory committee. Further, the Secretary of Homeland Security utilizes private-sector advisory groups with broad representation to provide advice on incident management and emergency response issues impacting their stakeholders. The NRP includes an annex on private-sector coordination.

e. Federal government roles and responsibilities derive from HSPD-5, which assigns specific responsibilities to DHS and delineates the roles and responsibilities of certain other federal departments.

(1) The President is the chief executive authority regarding incidents. Under the authority of the Stafford Act, he declares incidents to be disasters or emergencies. He can delegate authority to others to act as executive agents in matters of incident response.

(2) Pursuant to HSPD-5, the Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for coordinating federal resources within the US to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. HSPD-5 further designates the Secretary of Homeland Security as the "principal federal official" for domestic incident management.

(3) The Attorney General has lead responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats by individuals or groups inside the US, or directed at US citizens or institutions abroad. Generally acting through the FBI, the Attorney General, in cooperation with other federal departments and agencies engaged in activities to protect our national security, shall also coordinate the activities of

the other members of the law enforcement community to detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist attacks against the US.

(4) DOD has significant resources that may be available to support the federal response to terrorist attacks, major disasters or other emergencies. The SecDef authorizes CS operations for domestic incidents as directed by the President or when consistent with military readiness operations and appropriate under the circumstances and the law. The SecDef retains command of military forces providing CS.

(5) DOS has international coordination responsibilities. The Secretary of State is responsible for coordinating international prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery activities relating to domestic incidents, and for the protection of US citizens and US interests overseas.

### **5. National Response Plan Concept of Operation**

a. The NRP, as the core plan for national incident management, also establishes national-level coordinating structures, processes, and protocols that will be incorporated into certain existing federal interagency incident- or hazard-specific plans (such as the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan) that are designed to implement the specific statutory authorities and responsibilities of various departments and agencies in particular contingency scenarios. These plans, which incorporate the coordinating structures and mechanisms of the NRP, provide detailed protocols for responding to incidents of lesser severity normally managed by federal agencies without the need for the Secretary of Homeland Security to manage the federal response.

b. ESFs are the primary means through which the Federal government provides assistance to state, local, and tribal governments or to federal departments and agencies conducting missions of primary federal responsibility. ESFs are an effective mechanism to group capabilities and resources into the functions that are most likely needed during actual or potential incidents where coordinated federal response is required (e.g., transportation, firefighting, public health). ESFs may be selectively activated for both Stafford Act and non-Stafford Act incidents by the Secretary of Homeland Security. They may also be activated by the ESF coordinators. The ESF structure provides a modular structure to identify the precise components that can best address the requirements of the incident. For example, a large scale natural disaster or significant terrorist incident may require the activation of all ESFs. A localized flood or tornado might only require activation of a few ESFs. Figure D-2 provides each ESF's scope of responsibility.

(1) The ESF structure provides coordination of federal interagency support of a federal response to an incident. The ESF structure includes mechanisms used to provide federal support to states and federal-to-federal support, both for declared disasters and emergencies under the Stafford Act and for non-Stafford Act incidents. The ESF structure provides mechanisms for interagency coordination during all phases of incident management. Some departments and agencies provide resources for response, support, and program implementation during the early stage of an event, while others are more prominent in the recovery phase. ESFs are activated based on the scope and magnitude of the

<b>EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS DESCRIPTIONS</b>	
Emergency Support Function	Scope
ESF# 1 - Transportation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Federal and civil transportation support</li> <li>● Transportation safety</li> <li>● Restoration/recovery of transportation infrastructure</li> <li>● Movement restrictions</li> <li>● Damage and impact assessment</li> </ul>
ESF #2 - Communications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Coordination with telecommunication industry</li> <li>● Restoration/repair of telecommunications infrastructure</li> <li>● Protection, restoration, and sustainment of national cyberspace and information technology resources</li> </ul>
ESF #3 - Public Works and Engineering	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Infrastructure protection and emergency repair</li> <li>● Infrastructure restoration</li> <li>● Engineering services, construction management</li> <li>● Critical infrastructure liaison</li> </ul>
ESF #4 - Firefighting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Firefighting activities on Federal lands</li> <li>● Resource support to rural and urban firefighting operations</li> </ul>
ESF #5 - Emergency Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Coordination of incident management efforts</li> <li>● Issuance of mission assignments</li> <li>● Resource and human capital</li> <li>● Incident action planning</li> <li>● Financial management</li> </ul>
ESF #6 - Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Mass care</li> <li>● Disaster housing</li> <li>● Human services</li> </ul>
ESF #7 - Resource Support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Resource support (facility space, office equipment and supplies, contracting services, etc.)</li> </ul>
ESF #8 - Public Health and Medical Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Public health</li> <li>● Medical</li> <li>● Mental health services</li> <li>● Mortuary services</li> </ul>
ESF #9 - Urban Search and Rescue	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Life-saving assistance</li> <li>● Urban search and rescue</li> </ul>
ESF #10 - Oil and Hazardous Materials Response	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Environmental safety and short- and long-term cleanup</li> </ul>
ESF #11 - Agriculture and Natural Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Nutrition assistance</li> <li>● Animal and plant disease/pest response</li> <li>● Food safety and security</li> <li>● Natural and cultural resources and historic properties protection and restoration</li> </ul>

Figure D-2. Emergency Support Functions Descriptions

<b>EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS DESCRIPTIONS (cont'd)</b>	
Emergency Support Function	Scope
ESF# 12 - Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Energy infrastructure assessment, repair, and restoration</li> <li>● Energy industry utilities coordination</li> <li>● Energy forecast</li> </ul>
ESF# 13 - Public Safety and Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Facility and resource security</li> <li>● Security planning and technical and resource assistance</li> <li>● Public safety/security support</li> <li>● Support to access, traffic, and crowd control</li> </ul>
ESF# 14 - Long-Term Community Recovery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Social and economic community impact assessment</li> <li>● Long-term community recovery assistance to states, local governments, and the private sector</li> <li>● Mitigation analysis and program implementation</li> </ul>
ESF# 15 - External Affairs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Emergency public information and protective action guidance</li> <li>● Media and community relations</li> <li>● Congressional and international affairs</li> <li>● Tribal and insular affairs</li> </ul>

**Figure D-2. Emergency Support Functions Descriptions (cont'd)**

threat or incident. Each ESF annex identifies the ESF coordinator and the primary and support agencies pertinent to the ESF. Several ESFs incorporate multiple components, with primary agencies designated for each component to ensure seamless integration of and transition between preparedness, prevention, response, recovery, and mitigation activities. ESFs with multiple primary agencies designate an ESF coordinator for the purposes of pre-incident planning and coordination. Following is a discussion of the roles and responsibilities of the ESF coordinator and the primary and support agencies.

(2) ESF Coordinator. The ESF coordinator has ongoing responsibilities throughout the prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation phases of incident management. The role of the ESF coordinator is carried out through a “unified command” approach as agreed upon collectively by the designated primary agencies. Responsibilities of the ESF coordinator include:

- (a) Pre-incident planning and coordination.
- (b) Maintaining ongoing contact with ESF primary and support agencies.
- (c) Conducting periodic ESF meetings and conference calls.
- (d) Coordinating efforts with corresponding private-sector organizations.



(e) Coordinating ESF activities relating to catastrophic incident planning and critical infrastructure preparedness as appropriate.

(3) Primary Agencies. A federal agency designated as an ESF primary agency serves as a federal executive agent under the FCO or (FRC for non-Stafford Act incidents), to accomplish the ESF mission. When an ESF is activated in response to an incident, the primary agency is responsible for:

(a) Orchestrating federal support within their functional area for an affected state.

(b) Providing staff for the operations functions at fixed and field facilities.

(c) Notifying and requesting assistance from support agencies.

(d) Managing mission assignments and coordinating with support agencies, as well as appropriate state agencies.

(e) Working with appropriate private-sector organizations to maximize use of all available resources.

(f) Supporting and keeping other ESFs and organizational elements informed of ESF operational priorities and activities.

(g) Executing contracts and procuring goods and services as needed.

(h) Ensuring financial and property accountability for ESF activities.

(i) Planning for short-term and long-term incident management and recovery operations.

(j) Maintaining trained personnel to support interagency emergency response and support teams.

(4) Support Agencies. When an ESF is activated in response to an incident, support agencies are responsible for:

(a) Conducting operations, when requested by DHS or the designated ESF primary agency, using their own authorities, SMEs, capabilities, or resources.

(b) Participating in planning for short-term and long-term incident management and recovery operations and the development of supporting operational plans, standard operating procedures, checklists, or other job aids, in concert with existing first-responder standards.

(c) Assisting in the conduct of situational assessments.

(d) Furnishing available personnel, equipment, or other resource support as requested by DHS or the ESF primary agency.

(e) Providing input to periodic readiness assessments.

(f) Participating in training and exercises aimed at continuous improvement of prevention, response, and recovery capabilities.

(g) Identifying new equipment or capabilities required to prevent or respond to new or emerging threats and hazards, or to improve the ability to address existing threats.

(h) Nominating new technologies to DHS for review and evaluation that have the potential to improve performance within or across functional areas.

(i) Providing information or intelligence regarding their agency's area of expertise. When requested, and upon approval of the SecDef, DOD provides CS during domestic incidents. Accordingly, DOD is considered a support agency to all ESFs.

(5) ESF designations and relationships. Figure D-3 shows the designation of coordinator and primary and support agencies for each ESF. All ESFs are supported by multiple agencies and several have more than one primary agency.

c. **Support Annexes.** The support annexes provide guidance and describe the functional processes and administrative requirements necessary to ensure efficient and effective implementation of NRP incident management objectives.

(1) When the functions of a particular support annex are required to assist in the management of an incident of national significance, the **agency serving as the coordinator** is responsible for:

(a) Orchestrating a coordinated delivery of those functions and procedures identified in the annex.

(b) Providing staff for the operations functions at fixed and field facilities.

(c) Notifying and subtasking cooperating agencies.

(d) Managing any tasks with cooperating agencies, as well as appropriate state agencies.

(e) Working with appropriate private-sector organizations to maximize use of all available resources.

(f) Supporting and keeping ESFs and other organizational elements informed of ongoing annex activities.

## DESIGNATION OF EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS COORDINATOR AND PRIMARY AND SUPPORT AGENCIES

Agency	Emergency Support Functions														
	#1 - Transportation	#2 - Communications	#3 - Public Works and Engineering	#4 - Firefighting	#5 - Emergency Management	#6 - Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services	#7 - Resources Support	#8 - Public Health and Medical Services	#9 - Urban Search and Rescue	#10 - Oil and Hazardous Materials Response	#11 - Agricultural and Natural Resources	#12 - Energy	#13 - Public Safety and Security	#14 - Long-Term Community Recovery	#15 - External Affairs
USDA			S		S	S		S		S	C/P	S		P	S
USDA/FS	S	S	S	C/P	S	S	S	S	S	S			S		
DOC	S	S	S	S	S		S		S	S	S	S	S	P/S	S
DOD	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
DOD/USACE			C/P	S	S	S		S	S	S	S	S	S	S	
ED					S										S
DOE	S		S		S		S	S		S	S	C/P	S	S	S
HHS			S		S	S		C/P	S	S	S			P/S	S
DHS	S	S	S		S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	C
DHS/FEMA		S	P	S	C/P	C/P			C/P	S				C/P	P
DHS/IAP/NCS		C/P										S			
DHS/USCG	S		S	S			S	S	P			S			
HUD					S	S								P	S
DOI	S	S	S	S	S	S				S	P	S	S	S	S
DOJ	S				S	S		S	S	S	S		C/P		S
DOL			S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S			S
DOS	S				S			S		S	S	S			S
DOT	C/P		S		S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S			S
TREAS					S	S									S
VA			S		S	S	S	S					S	S	S
EPA			S	S	S			S		C/P	S	S	S		S
FCC		S			S										S
GSA	S	S	S		S	S	C/P	S		S	S				S
NASA					S		S		S				S		S
NRC			S		S					S		S			S
OPM					S		S								S
SBA					S	S								P	S
SSA					S	S							S		S
TVA			S		S							S		S	S
USAID								S	S						S
USPS	S				S	S				S			S		S
ARC			S		S	P		S							

C= Emergency Support Function Coordinator      P= Primary Agency      S= Support Agency

**Figure D-3. Designation of Emergency Support Functions Coordinator and Primary and Support Agencies**

<b>DESIGNATION OF EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS COORDINATOR AND PRIMARY AND SUPPORT AGENCIES (cont'd)</b>	
ARC	American Red Cross
DHHS	Department of Health and Human Services
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DHS/FEMA	DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency
DHS/IAIP/NCS	DHS/Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection/National Communications System
DHS/USCG	DHS/US Coast Guard
DOC	Department of Commerce
DOD	Department of Defense
DOD/USACE	DOD/US Army Corps of Engineers
DOE	Department of Energy
DOI	Department of the Interior
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOL	Department of Labor
DOS	Department of State
DOT	Department of Transportation
ED	Department of Education
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
FCC	Federal Communications Commission
GSA	General Services Administration
HUD	Department of Housing and Urban Development
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OPM	Office of Personnel Management
SBA	Small Business Administration
SSA	Social Security Administration
TREAS	Department of the Treasury
TVA	Tennessee Valley Authority
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USDA	US Department of Agriculture
USDA/FS	USDA/Forest Service
USPS	US Postal Service
VA	Department of Veterans Affairs

**Figure D-3. Designation of Emergency Support Functions Coordinator and Primary and Support Agencies (cont'd)**

(g) Planning for short-term and long-term support to incident management and recovery operations.

(h) Maintaining trained personnel to execute their appropriate support responsibilities.

(2) When the procedures within a support annex are needed to support elements of an incident, the coordinating agency will notify cooperating agencies of the circumstances.

**Cooperating agencies** are responsible for:

(a) Conducting operations, when requested by DHS or the coordinating agency, using their own authorities, SMEs, capabilities, or resources.

(b) Participating in planning for short-term and long-term incident management and recovery operations and the development of supporting operational plans, standard operating procedures, checklists, or other job aids, in concert with existing first-responder standards.

(c) Furnishing available personnel, equipment, or other resource support as requested by DHS or the support annex coordinator.

(d) Participating in training and exercises aimed at continuous improvement of prevention, response, and recovery capabilities.

(e) Nominating new technologies or procedures that have the potential to improve performance within or across functional areas to DHS for review and evaluation.

**Note: DOD is considered a cooperating agency for the majority of support annexes.**

d. **Incident Annexes.** The **incident annexes** address contingency or hazard situations requiring specialized application of the NRP. The incident annexes describe the missions, policies, responsibilities, and coordination processes that govern the interaction of public and private entities engaged in incident management and emergency response operations across a spectrum of potential hazards. These annexes are typically augmented by a variety of supporting plans and operational supplements.

(1) **Each coordinating agency** is responsible for:

(a) Orchestrating a coordinated delivery of those functions and procedures identified in the annex.

(b) Providing staff for operations functions at fixed and field facilities.

(c) Notifying and subtasking cooperating agencies.

(d) Managing tasks with cooperating agencies, as well as appropriate state agencies.

(e) Working with appropriate private-sector organizations to maximize use of available resources.

(f) Supporting and keeping ESFs and other organizational elements informed of annex activities.

(g) Planning for short-term and long-term support to incident management and recovery operations.

(h) Maintaining trained personnel to provide appropriate support.

(2) **Each cooperating agency** is responsible for:

(a) Conducting operations, when requested by DHS or the coordinating agency, using their own authorities, SMEs, capabilities, or resources.

(b) Participating in planning for incident management and recovery operations and development of supporting operational plans, standard operating procedures, checklists, or other tools.

(c) Furnishing available personnel, equipment, or other resource support as requested by DHS or the incident annex coordinator.

(d) Participating in training and exercises aimed at continuous improvement of prevention, response, and recovery capabilities.

(e) Nominating new technologies or procedures to improve performance.

**Note: DOD is considered a cooperating agency to the majority of incident annexes.**

## 6. Understanding National Incident Management System

*“This system will provide a consistent nationwide approach for federal, state, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. To provide for interoperability and compatibility among federal, state, and local capabilities, the NIMS will include a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and technologies covering the incident command system; multiagency coordination systems; unified command; training; identification and management of resources (including systems for classifying types of resources); qualifications and certification; and the collection, tracking, and reporting of incident information and incident resources.”*

**HSPD-5**

a. DOD implements NRP policies and procedures as appropriate and consistent with departmental authorities and responsibilities. IAW DOD policy, DOD organizations will adopt and implement procedures consistent with the NIMS and the ICS at all DOD domestic installations. Additionally all DCOs, DCEs, EPLOs, DOD incident commanders under the NIMS/ICS structure, and CS CJTF and JTF senior staff must be knowledgeable of the NRP prior to participating in CS operations. NIMS provides a framework for managing incident response and support activities as depicted in Figure D-4.

b. Concepts of “command” and “unity of command” have distinct legal and cultural meanings for military forces and operations. For military forces, command runs from the President to the SecDef to the commander of the combatant command to the commander of the forces. The “unified command” concept utilized by civil authorities is distinct from the military chain of command. NIMS acknowledges that incident command is exercised through a chain of command, defined as an orderly line of authority within the ranks of the incident management organization. A distinct difference between the military and civilian first responder designation of “commander” is that the formal military designation of “commander” carries UCMJ authority. The relationship between military forces and the civilian incident commander can be understood/explained in terms of “supporting and supported” with the incident commander being the supported commander.

c. The ICS is a management system designed to enable effective and efficient domestic incident management by integrating a combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and




Figure D-4. National Incident Management System Framework




communications operating within a common organizational structure, designed to enable effective and efficient domestic incident management. A basic premise of ICS is that it is widely applicable. It is used to organize both near-term and long-term field-level operations for a broad spectrum of emergencies, from small to complex incidents, both natural and man-made. ICS is used by all levels of government — federal, state, local, and tribal — as well as by many private-sector organizations and NGOs. ICS is also applicable across disciplines. It is normally structured to facilitate activities in five major functional areas: command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance and administration.

d. Unified command is an application of the NIMS/ICS used when there is more than one agency with incident jurisdiction or when incidents cross political jurisdictions. Agencies work together through the designated members of the unified command to establish their designated incident commanders at a single incident command post (ICP). In the unified command, entities develop a common set of objectives and strategies, which provides the basis for a single incident action plan. The structure for NRP coordination is based on the NIMS construct: ICS/unified command on-scene supported by an area command (if needed) and multiagency coordination entities. The JFO provides resources in support of the unified command and ICP(s). Acts of biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear terrorism or other catastrophic events represent particular challenges for the traditional ICS structure. Events that are not site specific, are geographically dispersed, or evolve over longer periods of time will require extraordinary coordination between federal, state, local, tribal, private-sector, and NGOs.

### 7. National Incident Management System Command and Coordination

a. There are four major components of NIMS: command and management; preparedness; resource management; and communications and information management. This section focuses on the three NIMS standard incident command structures making up command and management to identify how they work together as a system to provide the national framework for preparing for, preventing, responding to, and recovering from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. NIMS distinguishes between command authority and coordination authority. Command authority is vested in the incident commander, whether a single incident commander or an area commander, and is exercised through the ICS. Coordination authority is vested in coordinating officers such as the FCO and DCO. Each coordinating officer has the authority to make coordinating decisions within his or her jurisdiction, whether federal, state, or local.

b. **The Incident Command System.** The ICS defines the operating characteristics, interactive management components, and structure of incident management and emergency response organizations engaged throughout the life cycle of an incident. Direct tactical and operational responsibility for conducting incident management activities rests with the incident commander. The incident command organizational structure develops in a top-down, modular fashion that is based on the size and complexity of the incident, as well as the specifics of the hazard environment created by the incident. The ICS organization has five major functions, as described in Figure D-5. These are: command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance and administration. When needed, separate functional elements can be established, each of which may be further subdivided to enhance internal organizational management and external coordination. Responsibility for the establishment and expansion of the ICS modular organization ultimately rests with the incident commander, who bases these on the requirements of the situation. As incident complexity increases, the organization expands from the top down as functional responsibilities



**Figure D-5. Typical Incident Command System Structure**

are delegated. Concurrently with structural expansion, the number of management positions expands to adequately address the requirements of the incident. Incident command may be transferred from one commander to a succeeding one. Transfers of incident command must include a transfer of command briefing (which may be oral, written, or both). A transfer of command occurs when a more qualified person assumes command; the incident situation changes over time, resulting in a legal requirement to change command (e.g., multijurisdictional or multiagency involvement); there is normal turnover of personnel on extended incidents; or the incident response is concluded and responsibility is transferred to the home agency.

c. **Multiagency Coordination Systems.** The primary functions of multiagency coordination systems are to support incident management policies and priorities; facilitate logistic support and resource tracking; inform resource allocation decision using incident management priorities; coordinate incident related information; and coordinate interagency and intergovernmental issues regarding incident management policies, priorities, and strategies. These define the operating characteristics, interactive management components, and organizational structure of supporting incident management entities engaged at the federal, state, local, tribal, and regional levels through mutual-aid agreements and other assistance arrangements. When incidents cross disciplinary or jurisdictional boundaries, or involve complex incident management scenarios, a multiagency coordination entity, such as an emergency management agency, may be used to facilitate incident management and policy coordination. The situation at hand and the needs of the jurisdictions involved will dictate how these multiagency coordination entities conduct their business, as well as how they are structured. Multiagency coordination entities typically consist of principals (or their designees) from organizations and agencies with direct incident management responsibility or with significant incident management support or resource responsibilities. These entities are sometimes referred to as crisis action teams, policy committees, incident management groups, executive teams, or other similar terms. As stated earlier, direct tactical and operational responsibility for conducting incident management activities rests with the incident commander. Command authority does

not reside in coordinating officers or coordinating entities although coordinating officers may be designated with command authority. In some instances, EOCs may serve a dual function as a multiagency coordination entity; in others, the preparedness organizations may fulfill this role. Regardless of the term or organizational structure used, these entities typically provide strategic coordination during domestic incidents. If constituted separately, multiagency coordination entities, preparedness organizations, and EOCs must coordinate and communicate with one another to provide uniform and consistent guidance to incident management personnel. The JFO is the multiagency coordination center of primary interest to the CCDR or the JFC.

**d. Public Information Systems.** These refer to processes, procedures, and systems for communicating timely and accurate information to the public during crisis or emergency situations. Under the ICS, the public information officer (PIO) is a key staff member supporting the incident command structure. The PIO represents and advises the incident command on all public information matters relating to the management of the incident. The PIO handles media and public inquiries, emergency public information and warnings, rumor monitoring and response, media monitoring, and other functions required to coordinate, clear with appropriate authorities, and disseminate accurate and timely information related to the incident, particularly regarding information on public health and safety and protection. The PIO is also responsible for coordinating public information at or near the incident site and serving as the on-scene link to the joint information system (JIS). In a large-scale operation, the on-scene PIO serves as a field PIO with links to the JIC, which is typically collocated with the federal, regional, state, local, or tribal EOC tasked with primary incident coordination responsibilities. The JIS provides the mechanism for integrating public information activities among JICs, across jurisdictions, and with private-sector and NGOs. During emergencies, the public may receive information from a variety of sources. The JIC provides a location for organizations participating in the management of an incident to work together to ensure that timely, accurate, easy-to-understand, and consistent information is disseminated to the public. JICs include processes for coordinating and clearing public communications. The JIC develops, coordinates, and disseminates unified news releases. News releases are cleared through the JFO coordination group to ensure consistent messages, avoid release of conflicting information, and prevent negative impact on operations. This formal approval process for news releases ensures protection of law enforcement-sensitive information or other sensitive but unclassified information. DOD supports the national-level JIC and contributes to the overall unified message. DOD and other agencies may issue their own news releases related to their policies, procedures, programs, and capabilities; however, these should be coordinated with the JIC.

## 8. The Joint Field Office

a. The JFO is a temporary federal facility established locally to provide a central point for coordinating federal, state, local, and tribal response to the incident. When incidents impact multiple states or localities, multiple JFOs may be established. In these situations, one of the JFOs may be identified (typically in the most heavily impacted area) to serve as the primary JFO and provide strategic leadership and coordination for the overall incident management effort, as designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security. The JFO organizational structure is built upon NIMS, but does not impede, supersede, or impact the ICP ICS command structure. See Figure D-6 for a typical JFO established for a natural disaster.

b. **JFO Coordination Group.** Utilizing the NIMS ICS principles of unified command, JFO activities are directed by a JFO coordination group, which may include the PFO, senior

federal law enforcement official (SFLEO), FCO/FRC, or other senior officials with primary jurisdictional responsibility or functional authority for the incident. It also includes a limited number of principal state, local, and tribal officials (such as the SCO), as well as NGO and private-sector representatives. The JFO coordination group functions as a multiagency coordination entity and works jointly to establish priorities (single or multiple incidents) and associated resource allocation, resolve agency policy issues, and provide strategic guidance to support federal incident management activities. Generally, the PFO, in consultation with the FCO and SFLEO, determines the composition of the JFO coordination group. The exact composition of the JFO depends on the nature and magnitude of the incident, and generally includes the personnel described in the following subsections.

(1) **Principal Federal Official.** The PFO is personally designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security to facilitate federal support to the established ICS unified command structure and to coordinate overall federal incident management and assistance activities across the spectrum of prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. The PFO ensures that incident management efforts are maximized through effective and efficient coordination. The PFO provides a primary point of contact and situational awareness locally for the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Secretary of Homeland Security is not restricted to DHS officials when selecting a PFO. In certain scenarios, a PFO may be predesignated by the Secretary of Homeland Security to facilitate federal domestic incident planning and coordination at the local level outside the context of a specific threat or incident. A PFO also may be designated in a pre-incident mode for a specific geographic area based on threat and other considerations. In the event of a single incident with national implications or in the case of multiple incidents, a national-level PFO may be designated to coordinate federal response activities. The PFO may delegate duties to a deputy PFO, the FCO, or other designated federal official as appropriate after an event transitions to long-term recovery and/or cleanup operations.

(2) **Federal Coordinating Officer.** The FCO manages and coordinates federal resource support activities related to Stafford Act disasters and emergencies and non-Stafford Act incidents. The FCO assists the unified command and/or the area command. The FCO works closely with the PFO, SFLEO, and other senior officials. In situations where a PFO has not been assigned, the FCO provides overall coordination for the federal components of the JFO and works in partnership with the SCO to determine and satisfy state and local assistance requirements. During national or geographically widespread incidents such as a catastrophic hurricane impacting several adjacent states, the Secretary of Homeland Security may, in other than terrorism incidents, choose to combine the roles of the PFO and FCO in a single individual to help ensure synchronized federal coordination. In instances where the FCO has also been assigned the role of the PFO, deputy FCOs may be designated to support the PFO/FCO.

(3) **Senior Officials.** The JFO coordination group may also include officials representing other federal departments or agencies with primary statutory responsibility for certain aspects of incident management. Senior officials utilize existing authorities, expertise, and capabilities to assist in management of the incident working in coordination with the PFO, FCO, SFLEO, and other members of the JFO coordination group. When appropriate, the JFO coordination group may also include US attorneys or other senior officials or their designees to provide expert legal counsel.




Figure D-6. Joint Field Office Established for a Natural Disaster

(4) The CJTF may serve as a senior official. Based on the magnitude, type of the incident, and the anticipated level of resource involvement, DOD may utilize a JTF to coordinate military activities in support of the incident. If a JTF is established, its C2 element should be collocated with the JFO to ensure a single common operating picture for the entire federal response that increases situational awareness and eliminates redundancy. A CJTF exercises operational control of all allocated DOD resources (excluding USACE resources, NG forces operating in state active duty or Title 32 USC status, and, in some circumstances, DOD forces in support of the FBI). The collocation of the JTF command element will not replace the requirement for a DCO/DCE as part of the JFO coordination staff and the JTF command element will not coordinate requests for assistance. Rather, the JTF command element will work with JFO coordination group members to ensure that there is a clear understanding of the locations and roles of military resources involved in the operation.

c. **JFO Coordination Staff.** In accordance with NIMS, the JFO structure normally includes a coordination staff. The JFO coordination group determines the extent of staffing based on the type and magnitude of the incident.

(1) **Safety.** The safety coordinator ensures that the chief of staff and the PFO receive coordinated, consistent, accurate, timely safety and health information and technical assistance to ensure the safety of the personnel in the JFO.

(2) **Legal Affairs.** Serves as the primary legal advisor to the JFO coordination group and may also work with each section chief to support programmatic, logistical, and personnel matters as required.

(3) **Security Officer.** The security officer is responsible for safeguarding JFO personnel and JFO facility security. When not assigned elsewhere, the security officer also is responsible for information security and operational security, ensuring that sensitive information of all types (e.g., classified information, sensitive law enforcement information, proprietary and personal information, or export-controlled information) is handled in a way that not only safeguards the information but also ensures that it gets to those who need access to it so that they can effectively and safely conduct their missions.

(4) **Infrastructure Liaison.** Designated by DHS/Infrastructure Protection, serves as the principal advisor to the JFO coordination group regarding all national- and regional-level critical infrastructure/key resources (CI/KR) incident-related issues. The infrastructure liaison acts as liaison between the national- and regional-level CI/KR, the private sector, and JFO activities.

(5) The **DCO** is appointed by DOD and serves as DOD's single point of contact at the JFO, with the exception of US Special Operations Command and USACE assets. Generally, requests for CS originating at the JFO will be coordinated with and processed through the DCO. The DCO may have a DCE consisting of a staff and military LNOs in order to facilitate coordination and support to activated ESFs. Specific responsibilities of the DCO (subject to modification based on the situation) include processing requirements for military support, forwarding RFAs to the appropriate military organizations through DOD designated channels, and assigning military liaisons, as appropriate, to activated ESFs. Requests for CS originating at the JFO will be coordinated and processed through the DCO



with the exception of requests for USACE support, NG forces operating under state active duty or Title 32 USC (i.e., not in federal service), or, in some circumstances, DOD forces in support of the FBI.

(6) **External Affairs Officer.** The external affairs officer provides support to the JFO leadership in all functions involving communications with external audiences. External affairs includes PA, community relations, congressional affairs, state and local coordination, tribal affairs, and international affairs, when appropriate. Resources for the various external affairs functions are coordinated through ESF #15, “External Affairs.” The external affairs officer also is responsible for overseeing operations of the federal JIC established to support the JFO.

### d. JFO Sections Organization and Responsibility

(1) **JFO Sections.** The JFO organization adapts to the magnitude and complexity of the situation, and incorporates the NIMS principles regarding span of control and organizational structure. This structure includes the following sections: operations, planning, logistics, and finance and administration. Although the JFO uses an ICS structure, the JFO does not manage on-scene operations. Rather, incidents are managed at the scene through the ICP.

(a) **Operations Section.** The operations section coordinates operational support to on-scene incident management efforts. Branches may be added or deleted as required, depending on the nature of the incident. The operations section also is responsible for coordination with other federal command posts that may be established to support incident management activities. For NSSEs (see Figure D-7 for display of a JFO for an NSSE), the security operations branch may be added to coordinate protection and security efforts. During terrorist incidents, the FBI JOC is incorporated as the law enforcement investigative branch within the operations section (see Figure D-8 for display of a JFO for a terrorist incident). For all other events, a law enforcement investigative branch or security operations branch may be established based on the specific requirements of the incident.

(b) **Planning Section.** The planning section provides current information to the JFO coordination group to ensure situational awareness, determine cascading effects, identify national implications, and determine specific areas of interest requiring long-term attention. The planning section also provides technical and scientific expertise. The planning section may also include a NOC representative who aids in the development of reports for the NOC and incident advisory council.

(c) **Logistics Section.** This section coordinates logistic support that includes: control and accountability for federal supplies and equipment; resource ordering; delivery of equipment, supplies, and services to the JFO and other field locations; facility location, setup, space management, building services, and general facility operations; transportation coordination and fleet management services; and information and technology systems services, administrative services such as mail management and reproduction, and customer assistance.

(d) **Finance and Administration Section (Comptroller).** The finance and administration section is responsible for the financial management, monitoring, and tracking of all federal costs relating to the incident and the functioning of the JFO while adhering to all



federal laws, acts, and regulations. The position of the finance and administration chief will be exclusively held by a comptroller who serves as the senior financial advisor to the team leader (e.g., FCO) and




Figure D-7. Joint Field Office for a National Special Security Event




Figure D-8. Joint Field Office for a Terrorist Incident

represents the coordinating agency's chief financial officer (CFO) as prescribed by the *Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990* (Public Law 101-576).


(2) **ESF Operations in the JFO Sections.** Based on the requirements of the incident, federal departments and agencies that serve as ESF coordinators execute their roles and responsibilities defined in the ESF annexes, including providing the interagency staff to support operations of the JFO. Depending on the incident, deployed elements of the ESFs may also participate in the staffing of the ICP; however, they more typically organizationally fall within the operations section of the JFO, and other sections as required. Under the NRP, each ESF is structured to provide optimal support of evolving incident management requirements. Current procedures require integration of the ESFs into the JFO sections rather than as stand-alone entities. Figure D-9 is a sample mapping of ESF positioning within a JFO.

e. **Federal-to-Federal Support.** Federal-to-federal support refers to the circumstance in which a federal department or agency requests federal resource support under the NRP that is not addressed by the Stafford Act or other mechanisms (e.g., EOs, MOUs, memoranda of agreement). This support is coordinated by DHS using the multiagency coordination structures established in the NRP and IAW the NIMS. Federal agencies participating in the NRP will request and provide federal-to-federal support by executing interagency or intra-agency reimbursable agreements, IAW the Economy Act (Title 31 USC, Section 1535) or other applicable authorities. Federal agencies providing mutual aid support may request reimbursement from the requesting agency for eligible expenditures. DHS will use the ESFs as the mechanism for coordinating required support from other agencies. When such DHS assistance is provided, DHS coordinates federal resources under the authority provided in HSPD-5. In these situations, DHS designates a FCO to perform the resource coordination function. See Figure D-10 for a sample federal-to-federal support JFO.

## 9. Proactive Federal Response and Catastrophic Events

a. The NRP establishes policies, procedures, and mechanisms for a proactive federal response to catastrophic events. A catastrophic event is any natural or man-made incident, including terrorism, which results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic event could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to state, local, tribal, and private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that national security could be threatened. The Secretary of Homeland Security will declare all catastrophic events as incidents of national significance.

b. The NRP Catastrophic Incident Annex and the NRP Catastrophic Incident Supplement (FOUO) address resource and procedural implications of catastrophic events to ensure the rapid and efficient delivery of resources and assets, including special teams, equipment, and supplies that provide critical lifesaving support and incident containment capabilities. These assets may be so specialized or costly that they are either not available or are in insufficient quantities in most localities. The Secretary of Homeland Security may choose to activate and deploy assets prior to or immediately following any



**Figure D-9. Sample Mapping of Emergency Support Function Positioning within a Joint Field Office**

incident, to include those with catastrophic ramifications. For no-notice or short notice catastrophic events when there is little or no time to assess the requirements of the state and local authorities, all federal departments and agencies and the ARC initiate actions to mobilize and deploy all resources as planned for in the NRP-Catastrophic Incident Supplement.

c. Agencies responsible for these assets will keep DHS apprised, through the NOC, of their ongoing status and location until the JFO is established. Upon arrival at the scene, federal assets will coordinate with the unified command, the SFLEO, and the JFO (or its forward elements) when




Figure D-10. Joint Field Office for Federal-to-Federal Support

established. Demobilization processes, including full coordination with the JFO coordination group, are initiated either when the mission is completed or when it is determined the magnitude of the event does not warrant continued use of the asset.

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## APPENDIX E

### DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

#### 1. Introduction

DHS provides a unifying core for the vast national network of organizations and institutions involved in efforts to secure our nation. DHS prevents and deters terrorist attacks, protects against and responds to other threats and hazards to the homeland, ensures safe and secure borders, manages the immigration process, and preserves the free flow of commerce. Figure E-1 shows the organizational structure of DHS.

#### 2. Directorates

a. **FEMA** leads DHS preparedness efforts for all hazards, and manages federal response and recovery efforts following any national incident. FEMA also initiates proactive mitigation activities, trains first responders, and manages the National Flood Insurance Program. FEMA works in partnership with other organizations that are part of the nation's emergency management system including state and local emergency management agencies, 27 federal agencies and the ARC.

b. The **Management** Directorate is responsible for the DHS's budgets and appropriations, expenditure of funds, accounting and finance, procurement, human resources, information technology systems, facilities and equipment, and the identification and tracking of performance measurements. The office of the CFO also serves as a direct report component of DHS.

c. The **National Protection and Programs Directorate** works with state, local, and private sector partners to identify threats, determine vulnerabilities, and target resources where risk is greatest, thereby safeguarding our borders, seaports, bridges and highways, and critical information systems.

d. The **Science and Technology** Directorate has the primary responsibility for research, development, test and evaluation efforts in support of DHS's mission.

#### 3. Other Operational Components (besides Federal Emergency Management Agency)

a. **US Citizenship and Immigration Services** is responsible for administering immigration and naturalization functions and establishing immigration services policies and priorities.

b. **US Customs and Border Protection** is responsible for protecting our Nation's borders in order to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States, while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel.

c. **US Immigration and Customs Enforcement** is the largest investigative arm of DHS and is charged with investigating immigration violations and preventing terrorist and criminal activity by targeting the people, money, and materials that support terrorist and criminal organizations.






Figure E-1. Department of Homeland Security Organizational Chart

d. The **Transportation Security Administration** protects the Nation’s transportation systems (which includes a complex system comprised of aircraft, ships, rail, motor vehicles, airports, seaports, and transshipment facilities, roads, railways, bridges and pipelines) to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce.

e. **USCG** protects the public, the environment, and US economic interests — in the Nation’s ports and waterways, along the coast, on international waters, or in any maritime region as required to support national security. The USCG operates globally, on the high seas and the US territorial waters. As a federal law enforcement component and armed force for the United States, it leads in maritime drug interdiction and co-leads in air drug interdiction operations. The USCG leads in coordinating all maritime security planning and operations in the ports and waterways, as well as maritime search and rescue.

f. The **US Secret Service** protects the President and other high-level officials and investigates counterfeiting and other financial crimes, including financial institution fraud, identity theft, computer fraud, and computer-based attacks on our Nation’s financial, banking, and telecommunications infrastructure.

#### 4. Support Components

a. The **Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman** provides recommendations for resolving concerns with US Citizenship and Immigration Services in order to ensure national security and the integrity of the legal immigration system.

b. The **Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties** helps shape policies that are mindful of civil rights and civil liberties, and serves as an information and communications channel with the public regarding these issues.

c. The **Office of Counter Narcotics Enforcement (CNE)** is the principal coordinating office for all department CD policy matters. CNE develops and coordinates CD policy within the department and between the department and other federal, state, local, and tribal departments/agencies.

d. The **Domestic Nuclear Detection Office** works to enhance the nuclear detection efforts of federal, state, territorial, tribal, local governments, and the private sector to ensure a coordinated response to such threats.

e. The **Office of the Executive Secretary** supports the Secretary of Homeland Security with accurate and timely dissemination of information and written communications throughout the department and with our HS partners and facilitates communications among the 28 DHS components. Communications managed by the Executive Secretariat also include coordination with other federal agencies, the HSC, and National Security Council .

f. The **Federal Law Enforcement Training Center** provides career-long training to law enforcement professionals to help them fulfill their responsibilities safely and proficiently.

g. The **Office of the General Counsel** provides legal advice to the Secretary of Homeland Security and department leadership, oversees the regulatory process, reviews legislative proposals, and addresses issues that arise in litigation.

h. The **Recovery and Rebuilding of the Gulf Coast Region Recovery** office coordinates federal support for the Gulf Coast recovery efforts.

i. The **Office of Health Affairs** serves as DHS's principal agent for all medical and public health matters, working to establish a scientifically rigorous, intelligence-based, medical and biodefense architecture that ensures the health and medical security of our Nation.

j. The **Office of the Inspector General** is responsible for conducting and supervising audits, investigations, and inspections relating to the programs and operations of DHS, recommending ways to carry out responsibilities in the most effective, efficient, and economical manner possible.

k. The **Office of Intelligence and Analysis** is responsible for using information and intelligence from multiple sources to identify and assess current and future threats to the United States.

l. The **Office of Legislative Affairs** provides executive direction and coordination for all communications and relationships between DHS and Congress.

m. The **Office of Operations Coordination** is responsible for monitoring the security of the United States on a daily basis and coordinating activities within the department and with HS advisors, law enforcement partners, and critical infrastructure operators in all 50 states and more than 50 major urban areas nationwide. One component of this office is the **NOC**.

n. The **Office of the Military Advisor to the Secretary of Homeland Security** provides counsel to the Secretary and department leadership to ensure a collaborative, cooperative, and coordinated approach to HS, HD, and incident management.

o. The **Office of Policy** is the primary policy formulation and coordination component for DHS.

p. The **Office of the Chief Privacy Officer** works to minimize the impact of DHS's activities on the individual's privacy.

q. The **Office of Public Affairs** is responsible for oversight and management of external and internal communications for DHS.

## APPENDIX F

### KEY CIVIL SUPPORT LEGAL AND POLICY DOCUMENTS

#### 1. Key National Guidance

a. **HSPD-5, *Management of Domestic Incidents***. Assigns the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security as the principal Federal official for domestic incident management to coordinate the Federal government's resources utilized in response to, or recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies. The Federal government assists state and local authorities when their resources are overwhelmed, or when Federal interests are involved. Nothing in the directive impairs or otherwise affects the authority of SecDef over DOD, including the chain of command for military forces. HSPD-5 directs that SecDef shall provide support to civil authorities for domestic incidents as directed by the President or when consistent with military readiness and appropriate under the circumstances and the law. SecDef retains command of military forces providing CS. Additionally, HSPD-5 directed the development of the NIMS to provide a consistent nationwide approach for federal, state, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents. HSPD-5 also directs the development of the NRP, including classified annexes if required. The NRP, using NIMS, provides the structural mechanisms, national level policy, and operational direction for federal support to state and local incident managers

b. **HSPD-8, *National Preparedness***. HSPD-8 established policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threats and actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal, establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of federal preparedness assistance to state and local governments, and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of federal, state, and local entities.

c. **The National Strategy for Homeland Security**. Prepared for the President by the Office of Homeland Security, this document lays out the strategic objectives, organization and critical areas for HS. The strategy identifies critical areas that focus on preventing terrorist attacks, reducing the nation's vulnerabilities, minimizing the damage and recovering from attacks that do occur. These critical areas are compatible with the DOD framework for HS that is discussed in this publication.

d. **The Homeland Security Act of 2002**. This Act established the Department of Homeland Security to coordinate all federal HS activities to protect the Nation against threats to the homeland. To better facilitate the overarching HS mission, Congress established DHS by merging numerous agencies into a single department.

e. **The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act**. This Act set the policy of the Federal government to provide an orderly and continuing means of supplemental assistance to state and local governments in their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage that result from major disasters or emergencies. It is the primary legal authority for federal participation in domestic disaster relief. Under the Stafford Act, the President may direct federal agencies, including DOD, to

support disaster relief. DOD may be directed to provide assistance in one of three different scenarios: a Presidential declaration of a major disaster, a Presidential order to perform emergency work for the preservation of life and property, or a Presidential declaration of emergency.

f. **The Economy Act (Title 31 USC, Section 1535).** The Economy Act permits one federal agency to request the support of another provided that the requested services cannot be obtained more cheaply or conveniently by contract. Under this act, a federal agency with lead responsibility may request the support of DOD without a Presidential declaration of an emergency as required by the Stafford Act.

g. **Posse Comitatus Act (Title 18 USC, Section 1385).** This federal statute places strict limits on the use of federal military personnel for law enforcement. Enacted in 1878, the PCA prohibits the willful use of the US Army (and later, the US Air Force) to execute the laws, except as authorized by the Congress or the US Constitution. Although the PCA, by its terms, refers only to the Army and Air Force, DOD policy extends the prohibitions of the Act to US Navy and Marine Corps forces, as well. Specifically prohibited activities include: interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or similar activity; search and/or seizure; arrest, apprehension, “stop-and-frisk” detentions, and similar activities; and use of military personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as undercover agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators. Additionally, federal courts have recognized exceptions to the PCA. These common law exceptions are known as the “military purpose doctrine” and the “indirect assistance” exceptions. Exceptions and/or circumstances not falling under PCA include:

(1) Actions that are taken for the primary purpose of furthering a military or foreign affairs function of the United States.

(2) Federal troops acting pursuant to the President’s Constitutional and statutory authority to respond to civil disorder.

(3) Actions taken under express statutory authority to assist officials in executing the laws, subject to applicable limitations.

(4) CD operations authorized by statute.

The PCA does not apply to NG forces operating in state active duty or Title 32 USC status, nor to the USCG, which operates under Title 14 USC authority.

h. **Title 10 USC (Armed Forces).** Title 10 USC provides guidance on the Armed Forces. Guidance is divided into 5 subtitles. One on general military law and one each for the US Army, US Navy and US Marine Corps, the US Air Force and the RC. Chapter 18 (sections 371-382) of Title 10 USC is entitled and governs Military Support for Civilian LEAs.

i. **Title 32 USC (National Guard).** Title 32 USC authorizes the use of federal funds to train NG members while they remain under the C2 of their respective state governors. In certain limited instances, specific statutory or Presidential authority allows for those forces to perform operational missions funded

by the Federal government, while they remain under the control of the governor. Examples of those exceptions include the employment of WMD-CSTs, CD missions, and operations authorized by the President or SecDef under 32 USC 502(f) (i.e., Airport Security Mission in 2001 and Southwest Border Security Mission in 2006).

## 2. Key Department of Defense Guidance

a. **Unified Command Plan (UCP).** The UCP provides basic guidance to all unified CCDRs; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographical AORs for GCCs; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional CCDRs.

b. **Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG).** The CPG reflects SecDef's written policy guidance to the CJCS for contingency planning. It is issued with the approval of the President after consultation with the CJCS, provides the focus for the guidance in the NSS and Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG). The SPG is the principal source document for CJCSI 3110.01, *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*.

c. **Strategic Planning Guidance.** The SPG provides direction for DOD components to develop the future years defense program and the President's budget submission. The four defense policy goals are to assure, dissuade, deter, and decisively defeat. The goals are articulated in a planning construct of deterring forward and winning decisively while defending at home. The SPG additionally lists the priorities of SecDef: winning the Global War on Terrorism, strengthening combined/joint warfighting capabilities, transforming the joint force, optimizing intelligence capabilities, counterproliferation, improving force manning, developing and implementing new concepts for global engagement, strengthening our ability to fulfill our responsibilities in HS, streamlining DOD processes, and reorganizing DOD and USG to deal with prewar opportunities and postwar responsibilities.

d. **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Concept Plan 0500, *Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosives Situation*.** This plan provides SecDef with a wide range of military options to assist in the domestic CM operations in response to a CBRNE incident. It also informs GCCs of the full range of their CM responsibilities and it provides information and guidance for the conduct of domestic CM operations.

e. **CJCSI 3110.16, *Military Capabilities, Assets, and Units for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Operations*.** This instruction identifies and describes specific military capabilities, assets, and units potentially available to support military CM operations in response to CBRNE incidents. Although an actual CBRNE incident would involve a large array of DOD assets, this instruction primarily focuses on CM technical support and capabilities that are not generally found throughout the force. This instruction lists selected CBRNE CM capabilities, assets, and units by Service.

f. **CJCSI 3121.01B, *Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces*.** SRUF provide operational guidance and establish fundamental policies and procedures

governing the actions taken by DOD forces performing CS missions (e.g., military assistance to civil authorities and military support for civilian LEAs) and routine Service functions (including antiterrorism/FP duties) within US territory (including US territorial waters). The SRUF also apply to DOD forces, civilians and contractors performing law enforcement and security duties at all DOD installations (and off-installation, while conducting official DOD security functions), within or outside US Territory, unless otherwise directed by the SecDef. Additional examples of these missions, within the US, include protection of critical US infrastructure both on and off DOD installations, military assistance and support to civil authorities, DOD support during civil disturbance and DOD cooperation with federal, state and local law enforcement authorities, including CD support.

g. **CJCSI 3125.01, *Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosives Situation***. This instruction provides operational and policy guidance and instructions for US military forces supporting domestic CM operations in preparation for responding to a CBRNE situation. This instruction only applies to domestic CM operations. This instruction is of specific importance to the geographic combatant commands with domestic CBRNE responsibilities.

h. **CJCSI 3710.01B, *DOD Counterdrug Operational Support***. This instruction promulgates SecDef delegation of authority to approve certain CD operational support missions. It also provides, IAW each fiscal year's national defense authorization act, instruction on authorized types of DOD (Title 10 USC) CD support to the federal agency with lead responsibility, other government agencies, and foreign nations.



## APPENDIX G REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-28 is based on the following primary references:

### 1. General

- a. EO 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*.
- b. EO 12656, *Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities*.
- c. HSPD-5, *Management of Domestic Incidents*.
- d. HSPD-7, *Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection*.
- e. HSPD-8, *National Preparedness*.
- f. National Security Act of 1947.
- g. *Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (Patriot) Act of 2001*.
- h. Homeland Security Act of 2002.
- i. National Strategy for Homeland Security.
- j. Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support.
- k. *National Response Plan*, and Notice of Change to the National Response Plan.
- l. *National Incident Management System*.
- m. *National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations*.
- n. The North American Aerospace Defense Command Agreement and Terms of Reference and the Canadian/US Basic Security Document 100/35.
- o. Presidential Decision Directive-14, *Counternarcotics*.
- p. Title 10, USC, *Armed Forces*.
- q. Title 14, USC, *United States Coast Guard*.
- r. Title 18, USC, Section 1385, *The Posse Comitatus Act*.

- s. Title 31, USC, Section 1535, *The Economy Act*.
- t. Title 32, USC, *National Guard*.
- u. Title 42, USC, Section 5121 et seq, *The Stafford Act, as amended*.
- v. Unified Command Plan.
- w. National Security Strategy.

## 2. Department of Defense

- a. DODD 1100.20, *Support and Services for Eligible Organizations and Activities Outside the Department of Defense*.
- b. DODD 2000.15, *Support to Special Events*.
- c. DODD 3000.3, *Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons*.
- d. DODD 3020.36, *Assignment of National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) Responsibilities to DOD Components*.
- e. DODD 3020.40, *Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP)*.
- f. DODD 3025.1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)*.
- g. DODD 3025.12, *Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS)*.
- h. DODD 3025.13, *Employment of Department of Defense Resources in Support of the United States Secret Service*.
- i. DODD 3025.14, *Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad (Short Title: Noncombatant Evacuation Operations)*.
- j. DODD 3025.15, *Military Assistance to Civil Authorities*.
- k. DODD 3025.16, *Military Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) Program*.
- l. DODD 3150.5, *DOD Response to Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents*.
- m. DODD 3150.8, *DOD Response to Radiological Accidents*.
- n. DODD 5200.27, *Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations Not Affiliated with the Department of Defense*.

- o. DODD S-5210.36, *Provision of DOD Sensitive Support to DOD Components and Other Departments and Agencies of the United States Government*.
- p. DODD 5525.5, *DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials*.
- q. DODD 5410.18, *Public Affairs Community Relations Policy*.
- r. DODD 5500.7-R, *Standards of Conduct*.
- s. DODI 2000.18, *DOD Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines*.
- t. DODI 3001.02, *Personnel Accountability in Conjunction with Natural or Manmade Disasters*.
- u. DODI 5525.10, *Using Military Working Dog Teams (MWDTs) to Support Law Enforcement Agencies in Counterdrug Missions*.
- v. DOD Manual 3025.1-M, *DOD Manual for Civil Emergencies*.
- w. Strategic Planning Guidance.
- x. Contingency Planning Guidance.
- y. Quadrennial Defense Review.
- z. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*.
- aa. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3502, *Civil Disturbance Operations*.

### **3. Joint Publications**

- a. JP 1-0, *Personnel Support to Joint Operations*.
- b. JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
- c. JP 1-05, *Religious Support in Joint Operations*.
- d. JP 1-06, *Financial Management Support in Joint Operations*.
- e. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*.
- f. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.
- g. JP 3-07.2, *Antiterrorism*.

- h. JP 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*.
- i. JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, (Vols I and II)*.
- j. JP 3-27, *Homeland Defense*.
- k. JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*.
- l. JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*.
- m. JP 3-35, *Deployment and Redeployment Operations*.
- n. JP 3-41, *Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosives Consequence Management*.
- o. JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*.
- p. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics Support*.
- q. JP 4-02, *Health Service Support*.
- r. JP 4-05.1, *Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Call-up*.
- s. JP 4-06, *Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations*.
- t. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.
- u. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System*.

#### **4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directives**

- a. CJCS CONPLAN 0500-98, *Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosives Situation*.
- b. Domestic Operational Law (DOPLAW) Handbook for Judge Advocates.
- c. CJCSI 3110.07B, *Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical defense; Riot Control Agents and Herbicides*.
- d. CJCSI 3110.16, *Military Capabilities, Assets, and Units for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosive Consequence Management Operations (FOUO)*.

e. CJCSI 3121.01B, *Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces* (SECRET).

f. CJCSI 3125.01, *Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive Situation*.

g. CJCSI 3217.01A, *Military Assistance to the US Postal Service*.

h. CJCSI 3710.01A, *DOD Counterdrug Support*.

i. CJCSI 4120.02, *Assignment of Movement Priority*.

j. CJCSI 5120.02, *Joint Doctrine Development System*.

## **5. Air Force**

a. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-10, *Homeland Operations*.

b. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-802, *Military Assistance to Civil Authorities*.

c. AFI 10-2501, *Emergency Management Program Planning and Operations*.

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## APPENDIX H ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

### 1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Doctrine Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

### 2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is USNORTHCOM. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

### 3. Change Recommendations

- a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CDR USNORTHCOM//DC//  
INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD//  
CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//JT10//

Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine>.

- b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

- c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE NUMBER	COPY NUMBER	DATE OF CHANGE	DATE ENTERED	POSTED BY	REMARKS



#### 4. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, *Information Security Program*.

#### 5. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are available on JDEIS at <https://jdeis.js.mil> (NIPRNET), and <https://jdeis.js.smil.mil> (SIPRNET) and on the JEL at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine> (NIPRNET).

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications.

## GLOSSARY

### PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AC	Active Component
ADA	aerial damage assessment
AFI	Air Force instruction
AFME	Armed Forces Medical Examiner
AFNORTH	Air Force North
ANG	Air National Guard
ANGUS	Air National Guard of the United States
AOR	area of responsibility
APHIS	Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
ARC	American Red Cross
ARNG	Army National Guard
ARNGUS	Army National Guard of the United States
ARNORTH	US Army North
ASD(HA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)
ASD(HD&ASA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs)
ASD(RA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
BSI	base support installation
C2	command and control
CAP	Civil Air Patrol
CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives
CCDR	combatant commander
CD	counterdrug
CDRUSJFCOM	Commander, United States Joint Forces Command
CDRUSNORTHCOM	Commander, United States Northern Command
CDRUSPACOM	Commander, United States Pacific Command
CDRUSSOCOM	Commander, United States Special Operations Command
CDRUSSOUTHCOM	Commander, United States Southern Command
CDRUSSTRATCOM	Commander, United States Strategic Command
CDRUSTRANSCOM	Commander, United States Transportation Command
CERFP	CBRNE enhanced response force package
CFO	chief financial officer
CI	counterintelligence
CI/KR	critical infrastructure/key resources
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CJTF	commander, joint task force
CM	consequence management

## Glossary

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CNE	Counter Narcotics Enforcement
CONPLAN	concept plan
CONUS	continental United States
CPG	Contingency Planning Guidance
CrM	crisis management
CS	civil support
CSS	combat service support
DCE	defense coordinating element
DCO	defense coordinating officer (DOD)
DEST	domestic emergency support team
DFAS	Defense Finance and Accounting Service
DHHS	Department of Health and Human Services
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DMIGS	Domestic Mobile Integrated Geospatial-Intelligence System
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOS	Department of State
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
EMAC	emergency management assistance compact
EMS	emergency medical services
EO	executive order
EOC	emergency operations center
EP	emergency preparedness
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EPLO	emergency preparedness liaison officer
ESF	emergency support function
EXORD	execute order
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBO	faith-based organization
FCC	Federal coordinating center
FCO	federal coordinating officer
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FI	foreign intelligence
FM	financial management
FOB	forward operating base
FP	force protection
FRC	federal resource coordinator
GCC	geographic combatant commander
GEOINT	geospatial intelligence

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GIG	Global Information Grid
GSA	General Services Administration
HD	homeland defense
HS	homeland security
HSC	Homeland Security Council
HSPD	homeland security Presidential directive
HSS	health service support
IACG	interagency coordination group
IAW	in accordance with
ICP	incident command post
ICS	incident command system
IPC	interagency planning cell
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
J-1	manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff
JDDOC	joint deployment distribution operations center
JDOMS	Joint Director of Military Support
JFC	joint force commander
JFHQ	joint force headquarters
JFHQ – NCR	Joint Force Headquarters - National Capital Region
JFHQ – State	joint force headquarters state
JFO	joint field office
JIACG	joint interagency coordination group
JIC	joint information center
JIS	joint information system
JOA	joint operations area
JOPEs	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JP	joint publication
JPERSTAT	joint personnel status and casualty report
JRSOI	joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
JTF	joint task force
JTF-AK	Joint Task Force - Alaska
JTF-CS	Joint Task Force - Civil Support
JTF-HD	Joint Task Force - Homeland Defense
JTF-N	Joint Task Force - North
JTF-State	joint task force state
LEA	law enforcement agency
LNO	liaison officer
MCIO	military criminal investigative organization
MOTR	maritime operational threat response

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## Glossary

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MOU	memorandum of understanding
MTF	medical treatment facility
NCR	National Capital Region (US)
NCRCG	National Cyber Response Coordination Group
NDMS	National Disaster Medical System
NETOPS	network operations
NG	National Guard
NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NGB-OC	National Guard Bureau — Office of the Chaplain
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NGRF	National Guard reaction force
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NIPRNET	Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network
NLW	nonlethal weapon
NOC	National Operations Center
NRCC	national response coordination center
NRP	National Response Plan
NSHS	National Strategy for Homeland Security
NSS	National Security Strategy
NSSE	national special security event
OGA	other government agency
OPCON	operational control
OPORD	operation order
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA	public affairs
PCA	Posse Comitatus Act
PDA	preliminary damage assessment
PFO	principal federal official
PIO	public information officer
POD	port of debarkation
RC	Reserve Component
RFA	request for assistance
RMP	religious ministry professional
ROE	rules of engagement
RRCC	regional response coordination center
RS	religious support
RSP	religious support policy
RST	religious support team
RUF	rules for the use of force

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SCO	state coordinating officer
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SEPLO	state emergency preparedness liaison officer
SEWG	Special Events Working Group
SFLEO	senior federal law enforcement official
SIPRNET	Secret Internet Protocol Route Network
SJFHQ-N	Standing Joint Force Headquarters North
SME	subject matter expert
SPG	Strategic Planning Guidance
SROE	standing rules of engagement
SRUF	standing rules for the use of force
TAG	the adjutant general
TF	task force
UAS	unmanned aircraft system
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
UCP	Unified Command Plan
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
USAFR	United States Air Force Reserve
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USC	United States Code
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USG	United States Government
USMCR	United States Marine Corps Reserve
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
USNR	United States Navy Reserve
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WMD-CST	weapons of mass destruction – civil support team

## PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Unless otherwise annotated, this publication is the proponent for all terms and definitions found in the glossary. Upon approval, JP 1-02 will reflect this publication as the source document for these terms and definitions.

**base support installation.** A Department of Defense Service or agency installation within the United States and its possessions and territories tasked to serve as a base for military forces engaged in either homeland defense or civil support operations. Also called BSI. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**catastrophic event.** Any natural or man-made incident, including terrorism, which results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives incident.** An emergency resulting from the deliberate or unintentional release of nuclear, biological, radiological, or toxic or poisonous chemical materials, or the detonation of a high-yield explosive. Also called CBRNE incident. (This term and its definition modify the existing term “chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives incidents” and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**civil authorities.** Those elected and appointed officers and employees who constitute the government of the United States, the governments of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, United States possessions and territories, and political subdivisions thereof. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**civil disturbance.** Group acts of violence and disorder prejudicial to public law and order. (JP 3-28)

**civil emergency.** Any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, federal assistance is needed to supplement state and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**civil support.** Department of Defense support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. Also called CS. (JP 3-26)

**consequence management.** Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents. Also called CM. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)



**cooperating agency.** An agency that provides technical and resource support (including planning, training, and exercising), at the request of the coordinating agency, to conduct operations using their own authorities, subject-matter experts, capabilities or resources (i.e., personnel, equipment, or other resource support). The Department of Defense is considered a cooperating agency for the majority of the National Response Plan support annexes. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**coordinating agency.** An agency that supports the incident management mission by providing the leadership, expertise, and authorities to implement critical and specific aspects of the response. Responsible for orchestrating a coordinated response, provides staff for operations functions, notifies and tasks cooperating agencies, manages tasks with cooperating agencies, works with private-sector organizations, communicates ongoing activities to organizational elements, plans for short- and long-term incident management and maintains trained personnel to execute their appropriate support responsibilities. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**crisis management.** Measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or an act of terrorism. It is predominantly a law enforcement response, normally executed under federal law. Also called CrM. (JP 3-28)

**defense coordinating element.** A staff and military liaison officers who assist the defense coordinating officer in facilitating coordination and support to activated emergency support functions. Also called DCE. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**defense coordinating officer.** Department of Defense single point of contact for domestic emergencies. Assigned to a joint field office to process requirements for military support, forward mission assignments through proper channels to the appropriate military organizations, and assign military liaisons, as appropriate, to activated emergency support functions. Also called DCO. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**defense support of civil authorities.** Civil support provided under the auspices of the National Response Plan. Also called DSCA. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**domestic emergencies.** Emergencies affecting the public welfare and occurring within the 50 states, District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, US possessions and territories, or any political subdivision thereof, as a result of enemy attack, insurrection, civil disturbance, earthquake, fire, flood, or other public disasters or equivalent emergencies that endanger life and property or disrupt the usual process of government. Domestic emergencies include civil defense emergencies, civil disturbances, major disasters, and natural disasters. (JP3-27)

**emergency operations center.** The physical location at which the coordination of information and resources to support domestic incident management activities normally takes place. An emergency operations center may be a temporary facility or may be located in a more central or permanently established facility, perhaps at a higher level of organization within a jurisdiction. Emergency

operations centers may be organized by major functional disciplines (e.g., fire, law enforcement, and medical services), by jurisdiction (e.g., Federal, state, regional, county, city, tribal), or by some combination thereof. Also called EOC. (JP 3-41)

**emergency preparedness liaison officer.** A senior reserve officer who represents their Service at the appropriate joint field office conducting planning and coordination responsibilities in support of civil authorities. Also called EPLO. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**emergency support functions.** A grouping of government and certain private-sector capabilities into an organizational structure to provide the support, resources, program implementation, and services that are most likely to be needed to save lives, protect property and the environment, restore essential services and critical infrastructure, and help victims and communities return to normal, when feasible, following domestic incidents. Also called ESFs. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**execute order.** 1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement a decision by the President to initiate military operations. 2. An order to initiate military operations as directed. Also called EXORD. (JP 1-02)

**force protection.** Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called FP. (JP 1-02)

**homeland.** The physical region that includes the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, United States possessions and territories, and surrounding territorial waters and airspace. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**homeland defense.** The protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President. Also called HD. (JP 3-27.)

**homeland security.** A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that occur. Also called HS. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**hostile act.** An attack or other use of force against the US, US forces, or other designated persons or property. It also includes force used directly to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of US forces, including the recovery of US personnel or vital US Government property. (This term and

its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**immediate response.** Any form of immediate action taken to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions when time does not permit approval from a higher authority. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**incident.** 1. In information operations, an assessed event of attempted entry, unauthorized entry, or an information attack on an automated information system. It includes unauthorized probing and browsing; disruption or denial of service; altered or destroyed input, processing, storage, or output of information; or changes to information system hardware, firmware, or software characteristics with or without the users' knowledge, instruction, or intent. 2. An occurrence, caused by either human action or natural phenomena, that requires action to prevent or minimize loss of life or damage to property and/or natural resources. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**incident command post.** The field location at which the primary tactical-level on-scene incident command functions are performed. It may be collocated with the incident base or other incident facilities and is normally identified by a green rotating or flashing light. Also called ICP. (This term and its definition modify the existing term "incident control point" and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**incident command system.** A standardized on-scene emergency management construct designed to aid in the management of resources during incidents. Consists of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications established for this purpose. Also called ICS. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**incident management.** A national comprehensive approach to preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. Incident management includes measures and activities performed at the local, state, and national levels and includes both crisis and consequence management activities. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**joint field office.** A temporary multiagency coordination center established at the incident site to provide a central location for coordination of federal, state, local, tribal, nongovernmental, and private-sector organizations with primary responsibility for incident oversight, direction, and/or assistance to effectively coordinate protection, prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery actions. Also called JFO. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**joint information system.** Integrates incident information and public affairs into a cohesive organization designed to provide consistent, coordinated, timely information during a crisis or incident. Also called JIS. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**joint interagency coordination group.** An Interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of US Government civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported joint force commander, the joint interagency coordination group provides the joint force commander with the capability to coordinate with other US Government civilian agencies and departments. Also called JIACG. (JP 3-03)

**law enforcement agency.** Any of a number of agencies (outside the Department of Defense) chartered and empowered to enforce US laws in the following jurisdictions: The United States, a state (or political subdivision) of the United States, a territory (or political subdivision) of the United States, a federally recognized Native American tribe or Alaskan Native Village, or within the borders of a host nation. Also called LEA. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**mission assignment.** The vehicle used by the Department of Homeland Security/Emergency Preparedness and Response/Federal Emergency Management Agency to support federal operations in a Stafford Act major disaster or emergency declaration that orders immediate, short-term emergency response assistance when an applicable state or local government is overwhelmed by the event and lacks the capability to perform, or contract for, the necessary work. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**national capital region.** A geographic area encompassing the District of Columbia and eleven local jurisdictions in the State of Maryland and the Commonwealth of Virginia. Also called NCR. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**national emergency.** A condition declared by the President or the Congress by virtue of powers previously vested in them that authorize certain emergency actions to be undertaken in the national interest. Action to be taken may include partial, full, or total mobilization of national resources. (JP 3-28)

**national interagency fire center.** A facility located in Boise, Idaho, that is jointly operated by several federal agencies and is dedicated to coordination, logistic support, and improved weather services in support of fire management operations throughout the United States. Also called NIFC. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**national operations center.** The primary national hub for domestic incident management operational coordination and situational awareness. A standing 24 hours a day, 7 days a week interagency organization fusing law enforcement, national intelligence, emergency response, and private-sector reporting. Also called NOC. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**national response coordination center.** A multiagency center that provides overall federal response and recovery coordination for incidents of national significance and emergency management program implementation. This center is a functional component of the national operations center. Also called NRCC. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**national special security event.** A designated event that, by virtue of its political, economic, social, or religious significance, may be the target of terrorism or other criminal activity. Also called NSSE. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**nonlethal weapon.** A weapon that is explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. Also called NLW. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**primary agency.** The federal department or agency assigned primary responsibility for managing and coordinating a specific emergency support function in the National Response Plan. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**principal federal official.** The federal official designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security to act as his/her representative locally to oversee, coordinate, and execute the Secretary's incident management responsibilities under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 for incidents of national significance. Also called PFO. (JP 3-41)

**regional response coordination center.** A standing facility that is activated to coordinate regional response efforts, until a joint field office is established and/or the principal federal official, federal or coordinating officer can assume their National Response Plan coordination responsibilities. Also called RRCC. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**religious support.** The entire spectrum of professional duties that a chaplain provides and performs in the dual role of religious leader and staff officer assisted by enlisted support personnel. (JP 1-05)

**request for assistance.** A request based on mission requirements and expressed in terms of desired outcome, formally asking the Department of Defense to provide assistance to a local, state, tribal, or other federal agency. Also called RFA. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**rules for the use of force.** Directives issued to guide United States forces on the use of force during various operations. These directives may take the form of execute orders, deployment orders, memoranda of agreement, or plans. Also called RUF. (JP 3-28)

**special events for homeland security.** Those special events designated as having an impact on homeland security. Also called SEHS. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**standing rules for the use of force.** Preapproved directives issued to guide United States forces on the use of force during various operations. These directives may take the form of execute orders, deployment orders, memoranda of agreement, or plans. Also called SRUF. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**support agency.** A federal department or agency designated to assist a specific primary agency with available resources, capabilities, or expertise in support of emergency support response operations, as coordinated by the representative of the primary agency. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)


**supporting commander.** 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. This includes the designated combatant commands and Department of Defense agencies as appropriate. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander's force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander. (JP 1-02)

**weapons of mass destruction.** Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high-yield explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. Also called WMD. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**weapons of mass destruction – civil support team.** Joint National Guard (Army National Guard and Air National Guard) team established to deploy rapidly to assist a local incident commander in determining the nature and extent of a weapons of mass destruction attack or incident; provide expert technical advice on weapons of mass destruction response operations; and help identify and support the arrival of follow-on state and federal military response assets. Also called WMD-CST. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)



# JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-28** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

