Joint Publication 3-07.3

Peace Operations

01 March 2018
PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides joint doctrine to plan, execute, and assess peace operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the US, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

KEVIN D. SCOTT
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Force Development
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-07.3
DATED 1 AUGUST 2012

- Added a chapter on planning for peace operations.

- Removed a chapter on peacebuilding, condensing relevant information, and referring readers to Joint Publication 3-07, *Stability*, for additional information.

- Added a figure depicting organization of a representative peacekeeping mission, and its relationship to the United Nations country team.

- Modified a figure depicting types of peace operations.

- Added a figure to illustrate different levels of joint force integration with other actors.

- Added a discussion on the protection of civilians, and the responsibility to protect.

- Added discussions of identity activities, commander’s communication synchronization, information, and assessments.

- Replaced appendix on mass atrocity response operations with an appendix on the protection of civilians.

- Enhances consistency among other doctrinal publications and Department of Defense (DOD) and other US Government policies.

- Modifies, adds, and removes terms and definitions from the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

- Discusses peace operations in the strategic environment.
- Outlines the legal basis for peace operations.
- Describes the fundamentals of peace operations.
- Discusses peace operations planning considerations and challenges.
- Describes peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.
- Presents the fundamentals of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.
- Discusses peacekeeping and peace enforcement planning considerations

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Overview

**Peace Operations and the Strategic Environment**

Peace operations are activities intended to build, keep, enforce, or make peace, or when necessary, prevent conflict. They include crisis response and limited contingency operations and frequently involve international military missions to contain conflict, restore peace, and shape the strategic security environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding, as well as to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. They include peacekeeping operations (PKO), peace building, peacemaking, conflict prevention, and peace enforcement operations (PEO). Peace operations may be conducted under the sponsorship of the United Nations (UN), another international organization, within a coalition of nations, or unilaterally.

As with all military operations, each peace operation is unique, reflecting the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure characteristics of the operational environment.

**Legal Basis**

The US may conduct peace operations either independently or as part of an international or multinational effort. In some cases, the UN may authorize a peace operation by a coalition or another international organization such as the
Executive Summary

North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the African Union.

Fundamentals

The 15 fundamentals of peace operations are:

- Consent.
- Impartiality.
- Transparency.
- Credibility.
- Freedom of Movement.
- Flexibility and Adaptability.
- Civil-Military Harmonization and Cooperation.
- Restraint and Minimum Force.
- Objective/End State.
- Perseverance.
- Unity of Effort.
- Legitimacy.
- Security.
- Mutual Respect and Cultural Awareness.
- Current and Sufficient Intelligence.

Five Types of Peace Operations

PKO. PKO are undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute and are normally designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

PEO. PEO consist of coercive measures, including the employment or threat of military force, to restore peace and security or for humanitarian and civilian protection purposes.
**Peace Building.** Peace building is the long-term, post-conflict process of creating conditions for a lasting peace.

**Peacemaking.** Peacemaking is a diplomatic process aimed at establishing a cease fire or an otherwise peaceful settlement of a conflict.

**Conflict Prevention.** Conflict prevention consists of diplomatic and other actions to prevent inter-state or intra-state tensions from becoming violent.

While the circumstances of each peace operation are unique, the following characteristics frequently apply to missions in complex environments:

- Political Primacy.
- Complexity, Ambiguity, and Uncertainty.
- Adversaries and Spoilers.
- Civilian Risks.
- Operational Environment.
- Duration.
- Comprehensive Approach.
- Host Nation (HN) Ownership and Capacity.
- Multinational Cooperation.
- Commander’s Communication Strategy
- Force Protection.
- Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.
- Civil Disturbances.
- Transitions.
- Risks.
Command and Control

The US may participate in peace operations under various command authority arrangements. These arrangements might include:

- Unilateral US joint operations.
- Multinational operations with the US as the lead nation.
- Multinational operations with the US as a contingent nation.

In any of these arrangements, US forces will report to the US chain of command. However, in multinational peace operations, the US force may also report to the sponsoring international organization such as the UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, African Union, Organization of American States, or European Union. By law, the President retains command authority over US forces. However, as Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to place US forces under the operational control of a foreign commander when doing so serves American security interests.

Key Documents

Political objectives guide the development of key documents that provide legal authority and define the parameters for a peace operation. Key documents can include:

- Mandate.
- Status-of-Forces Agreement or, for UN operations, Status-of-Mission Agreement.
- Terms of Reference.
- Memorandum of Understanding.
- Rules of Engagement (ROE).

Planning for Peace Operations

Planning Considerations

Each of the joint functions is relevant for peace operations:
Command and Control (C2). C2 is often challenging in peace operations because a mission will likely include a variety of military, civilian, and police participation from multiple nations.

Intelligence. Successful peace operations rely upon accurate, timely intelligence to provide early warning of risks and opportunities.

Fires. Fires are often critical during PEO, and their employment is essentially similar to other combat situations. They are less common during PKO, although UN peacekeeping forces normally include mortars in infantry battalions and, in rare cases, peacekeeping missions may be authorized to include artillery units.

Movement and Maneuver. In a peace operation, a military force may be employed to provide area security or to establish a separation (buffer) zone between belligerents.

Protection. Forces involved in peace operations must employ active and passive measures to protect themselves against adversaries, accidents, diseases, and other health and environmental threats.

Sustainment. A key function in any military activity, sustainment is particularly significant in peace operations. Units are likely to be dispersed to remote areas at the end of a long distribution chain.

Information. The information function encompasses the management and application of information and its deliberate integration with other joint functions to influence relevant actor perceptions, behavior, action or inaction, and support human and automated decision making, which is especially important during peace operations.

Interorganizational Cooperation. Most peace operations are multidimensional efforts with military, police, and civilian components. Missions typically interact with other international and HN
organizations including nongovernmental organizations, other international organizations, HN governmental agencies and security forces, the media, and businesses, among others. Many have no formal relationship with the peace operation, but are instrumental to achieving the mission’s objectives.

**Commander’s Communication Synchronization.** Joint forces conducting peace operations should integrate informational efforts that promulgate messages, inform audiences, and influence perceptions regarding the situation and particularly the objectives and actions of the military force. These efforts are increasingly critical in modern military operations, as every statement and action can be monitored instantly by an interconnected world. Communication efforts can dissuade perpetrators, influence other groups to behave positively, inform vulnerable populations, and increase support for the peace operation.

**Asymmetric Threats.** Peace operations increasingly face threats from spoilers, armed opposition groups, criminal groups, terrorist groups, and, in some cases, HN security forces. Such threats often target peacekeeping and peacebuilding forces, the humanitarian and development organizations that operate in an area, and the civilian population.

**Protection of Civilians and the Responsibility to Protect.** Peace operations are often conducted for the main purpose of protecting civilians from extreme threats such as genocide or other mass atrocities. In most cases, modern peace operations include civilian protection as one of the key tasks of the mandate.

**Transitions and Termination.** Two types of transitions are relevant for the military force. The first type relates to the phases or stages of an operation and the second refers to the transfer of authorities and responsibilities from one actor to another. As the situation changes, so too will the authorities, responsibilities, roles, and activities of different actors, including the peace operations force. Transitions may occur between an international coalition and the UN.
or a regional organization (or vice-versa). Ultimately, responsibility and authority must be successfully transitioned to capable HN authorities to enable a force drawdown and eventual termination of the international mission.

**Conflict Prevention.** Conflict prevention is the employment of complementary diplomatic, civil, and, when necessary, military means to monitor and identify the causes of conflict and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities.

**Peacemaking.** Peacemaking is a diplomatic process aimed at establishing a cease fire or an otherwise peaceful settlement of a conflict. Peacemaking is usually accomplished by a special political mission that involves few, if any, military personnel.

**Peace Building.** Peace building provides the reconstruction and societal rehabilitation necessary to resolve core conflict issues or prevent further outbreaks of violent conflict. It promotes reconciliation, strengthens and rebuilds civil infrastructure and institutions, builds confidence, and supports economic reconstruction. The major responsibility for peace building resides ultimately with the HN and the civil sector, but the peace operations force has a supporting and essential role.

**Humanitarian Assistance (HA).** HA refers to efforts that relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation in an impartial manner. While HA is provided ideally by civilian organizations without military involvement, military forces and other security units may be mandated or tasked to support humanitarian actions.

**Challenges**

Complex environments, mandates, and tasks make peace operations inherently challenging, especially as there will usually be gaps between the mission’s requirements and the available resources.
Corruption may be the biggest obstacle to developing a capable HN that can eventually assume the responsibilities of a peace operation.

Corruption is not just an HN problem, but can also be found in international organizations including multinational partners, contractors, and others. Corruption diverts resources from their intended purposes, which can greatly undermine a peace operation. It also empowers belligerents, threatens responsible actors, and fosters a culture of impunity rather than a culture of lawfulness.

A peace operation may be constrained in its authority and responsibility. Constraints may include limitations on where operations are conducted, the types of operations permitted, ROE, restrictions on activities such as intelligence collection or the ability to conduct investigations, and limited latitude to support some of the nonmilitary efforts commonly associated with peace building.

Unity of effort is another common challenge. Military forces can help provide security so other actors have space within which to operate; ultimately, a successful peace operation depends upon the effectiveness of police forces and other HN organizations assisted by international organizations with the necessary nonmilitary expertise. Other actors should have the lead role for many of the required efforts.

Peacekeeping Operations

PKO consist of military support to diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts to establish or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict. The US has participated in and supported many UN-sponsored PKO.

PKO take place following diplomatic negotiation and agreement among the parties to a dispute, the sponsoring organization, and potential force-contributing nations. Before PKO begin, a credible truce or cease fire must be in effect, and the parties to the dispute must consent to the operation. PKO are conducted in an open and highly conspicuous
manner (transparency). A main function of the PKO force is to establish a presence that inhibits hostile actions by the disputing parties and bolsters confidence in the peace process. PKO support continuing peace building efforts to achieve long-term political settlements and normalized peaceful relations. The US may participate in PKO as a lead nation, as a contingent force, unilaterally, or by providing staff officers or United Nations military experts on mission.

**Fundamentals of Peacekeeping Operations**

- **Consent.** PKO require an invitation or, at a minimum, consent of all the major parties to the conflict.

- **Restraint and Minimum Force.** Peacekeeping forces are restricted to using force only in self-defense and in defense of the mandate.

- **Impartiality, Credibility, and Legitimacy.** While a peacekeeping force is impartial to a dispute, it may be mandated to support the improvement of host government capacity.

**Peacekeeping Personnel and Peace Operations Forces**

US military personnel may perform a wide variety of peacekeeping functions. They may be detailed to serve on a UN staff or other multinational staff or as a UN military expert on mission. The US may also participate in peacekeeping by providing officers to UN Headquarters in New York.

**Peacekeeping Tasks**

Peacekeeping tasks usually involve observing and monitoring compliance with a peace agreement. Depending on the mandate, a peacekeeping mission may also be tasked to protect civilians, support the provision of HA, and support nation-building efforts.

**Peacekeeping Planning Considerations**

The mandate, term of reference, and status-of-forces agreement or status-of-mission agreement are important sources of information for mission analysis and planning. Additionally, commanders and staffs may gain valuable insights by reviewing the lessons learned from previous PKO or training exercises. PKO may be initiated on relatively short
notice, requiring extraordinary effort to develop a complete plan, identify, and build a headquarters staff.

**Employment**

PKO include separation of the parties to the dispute, patrolling, and observing and reporting on compliance with or violations of agreements. Peacekeeping forces must have freedom of movement and open access to observe, monitor, and verify the conditions of the governing agreements.

A peacekeeping force may be employed in one of two ways: each national contingent is allocated to a specific operational area (OA) or the national contingents rotate among the OAs. Normally, the former method is preferred.

**Peace Enforcement Operations**

**Description of Peace Enforcement Operations**

PEO are conducted in accordance with (IAW) a mandate designed to maintain or restore peace and order when consent by a major party to a conflict is absent. They may include the enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of personnel providing foreign HA, restoration of order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties. Peace enforcement may be conducted pursuant to a lawful mandate or IAW international law and do not require the consent of the HN or the parties to the conflict, although broad based consent is preferred. PEO use force or the threat of force to coerce or compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions. Force is threatened against or applied to belligerent parties to terminate fighting, restore order, and create an environment conducive to resolving the dispute. Although combat operations may be required, PEO are not necessarily classified as major combat operations and normally have more restrictive ROE. Forces generally have full combat capabilities, although there may be some restrictions on weaponeering and targeting.

**Fundamentals of Peace Enforcement Operations**

In conjunction with the fundamentals already discussed, the following caveats apply specifically to PEO:
Consent. Consent of the parties to the dispute is not a prerequisite for peace enforcement, although some parties may extend it.

Impartiality. This fundamental still requires the force to act on behalf of the peace process and mandate.

Restraint and Minimum Force. A misuse of force can have a negative impact upon the legitimacy of the PEO. Conversely, the appropriate use of force to prevent disruption of the peace process can strengthen consent.

Peace Enforcement Operations Tasks

Peace enforcement tasks may include some of those conducted in PKO, as well as enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of humanitarian actors, operations to restore order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties or parties to a dispute.

Command and Control for Peace Enforcement Operations

In most cases, peace enforcement mirrors conventional military operations and possesses many of the same C2 characteristics. Unity of effort is particularly important when planning command arrangements, international agreements, and coordination centers and cells.

Peace Enforcement Planning Considerations

Many planning considerations for PEO are similar to those for peacekeeping. The planning process for peace enforcement is the same as for any other military operation and begins with a comprehensive mission analysis. US forces are normally employed IAW a concept of operations that includes transition from peace enforcement to peacekeeping or peace building.

Employment

Typical phases for PEO may vary for some missions, but these phases provide a starting point for the employment planning process:

- Preparation and Deployment.
- Establishment of Presence in the OA.
- Expansion of the OA.
Executive Summary

- Enforcement of the Mandate.
- Transition and Redeployment.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides joint doctrine to plan, execute, and assess peace operations.
1. Introduction

a. Peace operations are activities intended to build, keep, enforce, or make peace, or when necessary, prevent conflict. They include crisis response and limited contingency operations and frequently involve international military missions to contain conflict, restore peace, and shape the strategic security environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding, as well as to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. They include peacekeeping operations (PKO), peace building, peacemaking, conflict prevention, and peace enforcement operations (PEO). Peace operations may be conducted under the sponsorship of the United Nations (UN), another international organization, within a coalition of nations, or unilaterally. The UN and other international organizations often refer to a peace operations organization as a mission.

b. The global demand for peace operations is growing. These efforts can be effective and legitimate mechanisms that demonstrate international support while sharing the requisite burden. Peace operations can also be an important theme for multinational exercises and other joint force security cooperation (SC) activities to build relationships with partner nations for which peacekeeping is a strategic priority.

c. The US provides support for peace operations through three lines of effort:

(1) Direct contributions with funding, personnel, units, or other support.

(2) Indirect contributions including building the capability and capacity of other contributors to peace operations.

(3) Support for systemic reform in the UN to improve the effectiveness of peace operations.

d. As with all military operations, each peace operation is unique, reflecting the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure characteristics of the operational environment (OE).
2. Legal Basis

   a. The US may conduct peace operations either independently or as part of an international or multinational effort. In some cases, the UN may authorize a peace operation by a coalition or another international organization such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the African Union (AU).

   b. The *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*, herein referred to as the UN Charter, provides several means for the international community to address threats to peace and security. Although the terms “peacekeeping” and “peace enforcement” are not in the UN Charter, they generally describe actions taken under Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) and Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) in the UN Charter. Chapter VI of the UN Charter addresses peaceful means of establishing or maintaining peace through negotiation, enquiry, arbitration, conciliation, judicial settlement, and mediation, while Chapter VII provides the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) with a wide range of enforcement actions—from diplomatic and economic measures to the extensive application of armed force by member nations.

   c. Under Chapter VIII (Regional Arrangements) of the UN Charter, the UN may authorize regional organizations such as NATO, the Organization of American States (OAS), the AU, the Economic Community of West African States, and the European Union (EU) to prevent, halt, or contain conflict in their respective regions.

   d. Additionally, some nations have negotiated multilateral agreements to conduct peace operations independent of any permanent international forum. However, such operations have usually taken place with the tacit approval of a regional organization or the UN.

   *For more information, see Appendix A, “United Nations Involvement in Peace Operations.”*

3. Fundamentals

   Certain fundamentals apply specifically to peace operations, although not all are necessary for success in every case. They are, nevertheless, general considerations which are relevant in most cases. Figure I-1 depicts the 15 fundamentals of peace operations, which are discussed below.

   a. **Consent.** Consent of the host nation (HN) and parties to the conflict determines the nature of the peace operation, whether the mission is peacekeeping or peace enforcement. One side may consent in whole or in part, multiple parties may consent, there may be no consent, or the consent may vary dramatically over time. There may be consent at the strategic level among the party representatives signing an agreement. However, renegade splinter groups at the tactical level, criminal groups, or violent extremist organizations (VEOs) may oppose a peace agreement, threaten stability, or be hostile to the mission.
When strong consent of, or commitment by, the parties to the peace agreement exists, a reduced military force capability is possible. Degrees or levels of consent can change over time. The objective of the mission is to increase the consent for the peace process by gaining broad and deep buy-in to the mission’s mandate, the peace agreement, or the plan for governance. As consent becomes more general, the mission’s force levels may be reduced. If the level of consent decreases, the force’s capability to enforce compliance should increase. The promotion of consent is fundamental to attaining the national end state in all peace operations.

Joint force commanders (JFCs) should seek ways to promote consent by giving the people, parties, and local institutions a stake in the peace process. Joint military commissions, liaison officers (LNOs), media broadcasts, and leaders throughout the force are key ways by which to promote consent or understand and share information. Collaborative assessment of the conflict with community leaders can help secure local-level consent for a peace operation. If any of the people, parties, or local institutions become unwilling to support a peace operation, the force may no longer be capable of dealing with the situation. New political decisions, mandates, rules of engagement (ROE), or force compositions may be necessary. Additional capabilities and resources may be required or the mission may need to be concluded.

b. **Impartiality.** Impartiality requires the force to act on behalf of the peace process and not show preference for any faction or group over another. This fundamental applies to the belligerents or parties to the dispute, not to possible spoilers (e.g., terrorists, criminals, or other hostile elements outside the peace process). The force maintains
impartiality by focusing on the current behavior of the involved parties—employing force because of what is being done, not because of who is doing it. Impartiality should not be confused with neutrality, as a peace operation will not necessarily affect all sides equally. Impartiality includes using force when necessary for self-defense or in defense of the mandate.

c. **Transparency.** The mission should make the parties and the populace aware of the mandate, intentions, and techniques used to enforce compliance. Transparency reinforces legitimacy and impartiality. A failure to communicate fosters suspicion and may erode the development of the trust and confidence upon which the long-term success of an operation depends. Proactive communications, planned through commander’s communication synchronization (CCS), can facilitate transparency. Civil-military harmonization, joint commissions, and an effective liaison system reinforce transparency. JFCs must balance the need for transparency against the need for operations security (OPSEC).

d. **Credibility.** Credibility is essential to ensure mission accomplishment. The force should convince belligerents and other actors that it has the capability and will to accomplish its mission. It must discharge its duties swiftly and firmly, leaving no doubt as to its capabilities and commitment. All personnel must consistently demonstrate the highest standards of discipline, control, and professional behavior on and off duty.

e. **Freedom of Movement.** Freedom of movement is necessary for maintaining the initiative. Additionally, freedom of movement for the civilian population and other actors (such as humanitarian and development organizations and HN authorities) may be a priority to allow the transition to peace to continue. In accordance with (IAW) most mandates, force movements should normally be unrestricted. If belligerents interfere with freedom of movement, the authorizing political organization may decide to change the mandate, increase force levels, or withdraw the force.

f. **Flexibility and Adaptability.** The complex OEs associated with peace operations require commanders at all levels to place a premium on initiative and flexibility across the range of military operations. UN mandates frequently include a wide range of tasks such as supporting security sector reform (SSR), protection of civilians, supporting elections, supporting the delivery of humanitarian assistance (HA), and supporting the extension of HN government authority. The array of tasks in a mandate frequently permits wide latitude for the force. Commanders and staffs should continually reassess the changing political, security, and social contexts and adjust missions, operations, and tasks as appropriate. The successful transition to peace involves managing change. Forces should be able to adapt and move from one activity to another on short notice.

g. **Civil-Military Harmonization and Cooperation.** Civil-military harmonization enhances the credibility of the force, promotes consent and legitimacy, supports unity of effort, and encourages the parties to the conflict to work toward a peaceful settlement, thereby facilitating the transition to civil control. It includes civil-military operations (CMO) that coordinate, integrate, and synchronize civil and military efforts and actions to build the peace. At the operational level, commanders should coordinate the use of joint
military and joint civil commissions, including representatives from all stakeholders. At the tactical level, the timely and effective harmonization, cooperation, and coordination between peace operations forces and civilian agencies is essential for mission success. Military and nonmilitary organizations can facilitate cooperation through collaborative analyses and the establishment of committees, action groups, and liaison with agencies and organizations involved in the operational area (OA). A civil-military operations center (CMOC) or a civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) center can assist with these efforts.

h. **Restraint and Minimum Force.** Military force should be applied prudently, judiciously, and with discipline. A single act could have significant military and political consequences. Restraint requires the careful and disciplined balancing of the need for security, the achievement of military objectives, and the attainment of the end state. The use of excessive force could result in civilian casualties, antagonizing the parties involved and thereby damaging the legitimacy of the organization that uses it while potentially enhancing the legitimacy of the opposing party. Commanders at all levels should take proactive steps to train and equip their personnel for the unique aspects of a peace operation, including the use of means to create nonlethal effects. ROE in peace operations are generally restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political and cultural concerns. The national laws and policies of individual multinational force (MNF) partners may be more restrictive concerning the use of force than the MNF ROE. In some cases, the use of force should be avoided even if technically permitted.

i. **Objective/End State.** Every peace operation should be directed toward clearly defined, achievable objectives and an attainable end state. The commander should translate strategic guidance into appropriate objectives and reflect a common understanding with national/political authorities. Military leaders should be alert for misunderstandings stemming from different practices and terminology used by civilian, police, and multinational military counterparts. Additionally, military efforts should support and avoid undermining political and other civilian objectives that may comprise the mission’s main purpose.

j. **Perseverance.** The joint force should be prepared for protracted employment in support of the mandate. Some peace operations may require years to achieve objectives. It is important to anticipate setbacks and assess possible responses to a crisis in terms of the long-term political objectives. Often, this will involve diplomatic, informational, and economic measures to complement or supplement military efforts.

k. **Unity of Effort.** Unity of effort ensures all means are directed to a common purpose. In peace operations, achieving unity of effort is often complicated by a variety of international, foreign, and domestic military and nonmilitary participants; the lack of definitive command arrangements; and dissimilar objectives. While the chain of command for US military forces remains inviolate, command arrangements among multinational partners may be less well-defined and may not include full command authority. Commanders may answer to or support a civilian authority, such as an ambassador, or may rely on civilian resources. Unity of effort among the various nations’ militaries involved in the peace operation can be greatly enhanced with multinational planning augmentation teams, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and coordination centers in the MNF
headquarters (HQ). Additionally, even if unity of effort exists operationally, this unity may not exist diplomatically. Therefore, even if staffs and units remain integrated and cohesive, when faced with a decision or requirement for action, each country will evaluate the situation with regards to national interests and take action or refuse to take action accordingly.

Refer to Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, Multinational Operations, for additional information.

1. Legitimacy. A peace operation’s legitimacy is based largely on the authorizing authority (for example, the UNSC), the means used, and the objectives achieved. Different audiences, such as the US public, other nations, HN authorities and populations, and other interested parties, often perceive a mission’s legitimacy differently. A peace operation perceived as legitimate, both internationally and within the HN, will have a better chance of long-term success, while one perceived as lacking legitimacy may generate opposition. It is also critical that partners of the peace operation, such as the HN government, are seen as legitimate.

m. Security. The force may be responsible for securing other components of the operation; protecting civilians; or establishing a sufficiently secure environment in which humanitarian, development, and other actors can conduct their activities. Security may be a combined responsibility of the force, HN security forces, and other actors. These HN and other security actors may be particularly significant if the force has inadequate resources to secure the entire OA and because security must ultimately be the responsibility of the HN.

n. Mutual Respect and Cultural Awareness. Personnel will need to develop positive relationships with military, police, and civilian personnel from the HN and other nations. This can require time, patience, open-mindedness, and emphasis from leaders at all levels. Cultural awareness and basic language training for the OA may be important components of pre-mission preparation.

o. Current and Sufficient Intelligence. An effective peace operation relies on the identification, collection, analysis, and dissemination of information that supports the commander’s situational understanding and planned operations. Intelligence remains essential for force protection (FP), other mission requirements including protection of civilians, and early warning of risks and opportunities. As with other joint operations, accurate intelligence and effective operations feed each other, particularly since HN personnel will be more forthcoming with useful information if they see positive results from the peace operation. Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) will provide a detailed analysis of the OE with relevant information that will aid in the execution of peace operations.

For more information on JIPOE, see JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.
4. Types

As depicted in Figure I-2, the five types of peace operations are peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace building, peacemaking, and conflict prevention. Military forces are typically significant contributors to peacekeeping and peace enforcement, but normally are less prominent in the other types. A particular mission may transition over time from one type to another as the situation changes and as specified in a revised mandate. Additionally, a type of operation may include some tasks that are characteristic of other types of peace operations.

a. PKO. PKO are undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute and are normally designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Before PKO begin, a credible truce or cease fire should be in effect, and the parties to the dispute must consent to the operation. PKO normally commence following diplomatic negotiation and agreement
among the parties to a dispute, the sponsoring organization, and the potential troop contributing countries (TCCs) and police contributing countries (PCCs). A PKO may be primarily military in nature, such as the UN Interim Security Force in Abyei, Sudan. Most contemporary PKO are “multidimensional” with military, police, and civilian components and are led by a civilian head of mission (HOM). In the past, PKOs were usually conducted IAW Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) of the UN Charter. More recently, however, many mandates have cited Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) as the justification for the PKOs, particularly if some level of conflict remains in the OA. Formerly, the use of force in a PKO was generally limited to self-defense, but in many contemporary missions, force is also permitted when in “defense of the mandate.” The loss of consent from the major parties may result in withdrawal of the peacekeeping force or a change in its mission to peace enforcement.


b. PEO. PEO consist of coercive measures, including the employment or threat of military force, to restore peace and security or for humanitarian and civilian protection purposes. The UNSC may authorize PEO without the consent of the parties to a conflict. PEO may include the enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of personnel conducting HA, restoration of order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties or parties to a dispute. However, the impartiality with which the force attempts to treat all parties, and the nature of its objectives, distinguishes peace operations from major operations. The purpose of PEO is not to destroy or defeat an adversary, but to use force or threat of force to establish a safe and secure environment so peace building can proceed. The UN Charter does not specifically mention the term “peace enforcement.” However, the UN Charter’s language allows the UNSC to authorize military operations “as may be necessary to restore or maintain international peace and security.” PEO are often conducted by regional organizations or a coalition of states under a lead nation, with UN authorization.

For additional guidance concerning PEO, see Chapter IV, “Peace Enforcement Operations.”

c. Peace Building. Peace building is the long-term, post-conflict process of creating conditions for a lasting peace. It strengthens HN capacities to address the root causes of conflict; rebuilds institutions, infrastructure, and civic life; and maintains effective and harmonious political and societal order.

(1) Peace building includes military and nonmilitary activities that foster the elements of a stable state:

(a) Human security.

(b) Governance and rule of law.

(c) Economic and infrastructure development.
(d) Political settlement.

(e) Societal relationships.

(2) Peace building begins with PEO or PKO and may continue for years. Many mandates for contemporary peacekeeping missions include tasks that address peace building. Military support to peace building may include PKO, SC, training defense forces, and other stability activities that establish an environment conducive to continuing the post-conflict political process.

(3) Civilian organizations from the HN, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) conduct most peace building activities. For military forces, peace building responsibilities are similar to those during stability actions. For additional guidance, see JP 3-07, Stability.

d. Peacemaking

(1) Peacemaking is a diplomatic process aimed at establishing a cease fire or an otherwise peaceful settlement of a conflict. The process may include measures such as negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means.

(2) Peacemaking is predominantly conducted through diplomatic efforts, although these may be supported by a military force. However, such military operations should not be referred to as “peacemaking operations.” While the military may not lead in peacemaking, military leaders may become involved in negotiating the military aspects of a peace agreement. This often includes face-to-face meetings with the leaders of the warring factions.

(3) Military support to peacemaking includes provision of military expertise to the process, military-to-military contacts, security assistance, peacetime deployments, or other activities that influence the disputing parties to conclude a diplomatic settlement.

e. Conflict Prevention. Conflict prevention consists of diplomatic and other actions to prevent inter-state or intra-state tensions from becoming violent. Supporting military activities may be intended to build situational understanding, deter potential belligerents, or strengthen capacities that enhance stability. These activities will generally fall within the following categories: early warning, surveillance, training associated with SSR, preventative deployment, and enforcement of sanctions and embargoes.

5. Environment and Characteristics

While the circumstances of each peace operation are unique, the following characteristics frequently apply to missions in complex environments:

a. Political Primacy. Peace operations are normally intended to achieve objectives consistent with the HN’s political objectives. Military personnel at all levels should
understand the objectives of the operation, strive to support them, and avoid inappropriate actions that may undermine these objectives.

b. **Complexity, Ambiguity, and Uncertainty.** Peace operations often take place in environments that are highly fluid and dynamic. In addition to the various HN and international actors, a wide range of political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructural factors create complexity. Unresolved political issues, an unclear description or misunderstanding of a desired end state, and difficulty in gaining HN and international consensus may cause ambiguity. Authoritative information will be elusive, and the outcomes of mission actions and other events will always be uncertain.

c. **Adversaries and Spoilers.** Parties to a conflict may or may not include professional armies or other organized groups that are responsive to a chain of command. However, rogue, undisciplined elements or paramilitary units may be present and not inclined to abide by others’ decisions. They may be motivated by political objectives, extremist ideologies, or profit. Local leaders may encourage splinter groups to continue to conduct operations while allowing themselves a degree of deniability. Groups of irregulars, terrorist organizations, criminal groups, or other hostile elements of the population may be present. Some adversaries may originate or operate across transregional or international boundaries. While some may attempt to perpetuate a preexisting conflict, they may also target the peace operation, humanitarian workers, and others attempting to bring stability to the nation. Spoilers are leaders, and parties who believe the emerging peace threatens their power, world view, and interests, and use violence to undermine the peace process. In any peace operation, joint leaders must identify and understand the motivations, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of these spoilers and determine the best ways of coopting or neutralizing them. Collaborating assessments with multiple stakeholders, including local civil society organizations, community leaders, and NGOs, can improve this understanding.

d. **Civilian Risks.** Most contemporary peace operations include a mandated task to protect civilians or may be conducted expressly for protection of civilians. The joint force should be prepared to monitor, prevent, and if necessary, respond to threats against civilians, including mass atrocities. Mass atrocities or other physical threats to civilians can erupt at any time during any operation, even in an initially uncontested PKO or HA operation.

(1) Threats against civilians may arise during armed conflict and deteriorating conditions in a fragile state, or when perpetrators directly and deliberately target civilians. The outbreak of widespread violence directed against the civilian population often has wide-ranging effects on regional stability, for example, when it results in large-scale refugee flows across neighboring borders.

(2) A peace operations force may be required to conduct mass atrocity response operations (MARO) to prevent or halt the widespread and systematic use of violence by state or non-state armed groups against civilians or other defenseless groups. Many lethal and nonlethal measures used in peace operations, such as no-fly zones, protected enclaves,
or separation of forces, may be applicable to MARO. This is also true of most tactical tasks including convoy escort, direct fires, and detainee operations.

*See Appendix B, “Protection of Civilians,” for additional guidance.*

e. **OE.** A peace operation may take place in an austere area, but it is likely to occur in highly populated urban environments as well. Logistics will likely be a major challenge when conducting operations in remote areas over rugged terrain. Additionally, a war-torn or impoverished country may suffer from poor air and sea ports, road networks, essential services, and other infrastructure. The peace operations force, other international actors, HN organizations, and the general population will likely overwhelm the limited infrastructure that does exist.

f. **Duration.** Peace operations may be conducted on short notice or evolve over an extended period of time and may require long-term commitments to resolve the issues that led to the escalation of tension or conflict. An established time limit for a peace operation is a high-level policy decision by the authorities that develop the mandate. On the one hand, an operational time limit can cede the initiative to the parties to the conflict who might then bide their time until the departure of the force. On the other hand, establishing a fixed date for a peace operation serves notice that parties must work diligently to resolve their differences, lest they forgo the support of the force.

g. **Comprehensive Approach.** Numerous organizations are involved in peace operations. These may include other United States Government (USG) departments and agencies, different organizations within the UN or other international organizations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, NGOs, HN government and civil society groups, and private organizations.

(1) Commanders should coordinate and, where appropriate, integrate military activities with those of other agencies to optimize the effectiveness of the total effort. The chief of mission is responsible for all USG elements in country, except those under the authority of the geographic combatant commander (GCC). Close coordination with the US embassy country team is essential, and the joint force may establish early liaison with the various agencies operating in country. At the GCC level, a joint interagency coordination group supports regular and timely collaborative working relationships with other USG departments and agencies. At the JFC level, coordinating centers, such as CMOCs, can harmonize USG and other organizational efforts.

(2) Because of their familiarity with the culture, language, and population sensitivities, NGOs and civil society organizations can be valuable resources to commanders and their staffs. However, caution is necessary to prevent any perception by the populace or the parties to the dispute that these organizations are part of an information-gathering mechanism. Their purpose is to address humanitarian requirements, disaster and emergency responses, and long-term development. NGOs and international organizations often consider their neutrality, impartiality, and independence as their primary source of security. Civil society organizations may be local and informal, and not readily apparent to outsiders. However, it may be possible to identify local coordinating bodies with which
to establish contact. Commanders may also find the cultures of some of these organizations differ markedly from military culture, and these organizations may exhibit a strong desire to maintain a wide distance from military activities.

(3) A myriad of NGOs, international organizations including the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, civil society organizations, private sector companies, and other agencies are involved in relieving the adverse humanitarian conditions that accompany peace operations. While civilian organizations would ideally provide HA without military involvement, the joint force and other security actors may be tasked to establish or maintain conditions conducive to humanitarian action. The CMOC or a CIMIC center are specifically designed to facilitate this process.

(4) The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) coordinates with NGOs and its implementing partners, so the peace operations force should establish liaison with the USAID mission to obtain information on the various NGOs operating in the theater. Usually, where USAID has an enduring mission in a HN, it maintains a system for vetting local NGOs to determine their technical and fiduciary competence to mitigate potential risks. In most situations, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) will synchronize the activities of UN and other humanitarian and development organizations using a cluster system structured to address key humanitarian sectors.

For further information on coordination, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

For further information on CMOCs, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

For further information on clusters, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

h. HN Ownership and Capacity. For a peace operation to be successful outside of traditional PKO, it is important for the HN to have the will and capability to assume responsibility for security, governance, and development. This can be complicated when the nation lacks effective institutions and is struggling to remedy many of the problems that necessitated the peace operation in the first place. Peace operations forces may be tasked to support SSR to improve HN military and police capacity, and the mission may be mandated to help build HN capacity in other sectors. However, HN authorities may demonstrate limited commitment to following the agendas of outsiders.

i. Multinational Cooperation. Several factors are essential for success during multinational peace operations. Personnel should demonstrate mutual respect for ideas, cultures, religions, and customs and maintain a professional demeanor. In many cases, the military personnel of other nations may have useful experience in peace operations and can provide invaluable expertise.

(1) Missions should be appropriate to each multinational partner’s capabilities and national direction. Multinational partners should be integrated into the planning process, thus ensuring both the perception and the reality of unity of effort. Language requirements and linguistic support are important considerations.
(2) Multinational partners may seek assistance with logistics support or may be able to contribute additional logistics support to the peace operation. Agreements need to be established for exchangeable or transferable commodities before operations begin and should be further developed and refined throughout the operation. Legal support will be important in formulating and interpreting these agreements.

(3) Personal relationships and effective rapport at all levels in a peace operation can contribute significantly to its success.

For further information on multinational coordination, refer to JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. For NATO-led operations where the US is a TCC, see the appropriate Allied joint publication (AJP).

j. CCS. CCS is a process that helps implement strategic-level guidance by coordinating, synchronizing, and ensuring the integrity and consistency of strategic- to tactical-level narratives, themes, messages, images, and actions throughout a joint operation across all relevant communication activities. To build public support and cooperation, it is critical for peace operations to develop and promulgate messages to a variety of audiences effectively. A holistic and consistent approach for messaging helps achieve the operation’s objectives. The consequence of not synchronizing actions and messages may result in contradictions and loss of credibility for the mission.

For further information on CCS, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations; JP 3-61, Public Affairs; JP 3-13, Information Operations; and Joint Doctrine Note 2-13, Commander’s Communication Synchronization.

k. FP. These considerations are important for planning and execution of peace operations, particularly when the mission requires interposition of forces between former belligerent groups or if spoilers target the force. Personnel may also be vulnerable to accidents and illnesses because of poor infrastructure, local driving habits, and diseases that are common in the area. Some multinational contingents to a peace operation will concentrate more on minimizing their own casualties than other mission requirements such as tasks in the mandate. Local perceptions of the force’s credibility and impartiality may affect threat levels, appropriate FP postures, and the ROE.

For additional ROE guidance, refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01, (U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces.

1. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. Ultimately, settlement, not victory, is the key in peace operations. Settlement is achieved through a combination of actions using the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic powers of the participants. A settlement reached by conciliation among the disputing parties is generally preferable to a conflict terminated by force. It is imperative that peace operations establish or sustain the conditions in which political and diplomatic activities may proceed. It is also important to recognize when the end state is not attainable. This may stem from such factors as a
breakdown in political resolve by the parties to the dispute or a lack of support from the international community.

m. **Civil Disturbances.** In fragile states, civil disturbances may occur concurrent to the conduct of peace operations. While such disturbances may be likely as a population takes advantage of democratization, violent events can be a setback to stabilization. A well-handled situation can lead to an enhanced view of both the professionalism and credibility of the mission, instill confidence in democratic and law enforcement institutions involved, and result in fewer future disturbances. Civil disturbances can be effectively managed through the following actions:

1. **Isolate the trouble spot from outside influence or interaction.** Use a system of multilayered checkpoints to enable the peace operations force to limit and control access and cull identifiable troublemakers from the population without attracting unnecessary attention. Consider using helicopters, the employment of biometric and forensic capabilities, and other monitoring technologies to monitor the situation and the surrounding area.

2. **Control the situation through force presence.** An appropriate show of force at checkpoints and anticipated trouble spots, including aircraft overflights and biometric enrollment and screening, may dissuade entry into the area by potentially destabilizing elements. When possible, force presence should be increased before disturbances occur.

3. **Maintain situational awareness.** The peace operations force should use a variety of information sources to identify potential civil disturbances, monitor events as they occur, and understand the follow-on effects. Air, space, and cyberspace capabilities may provide real-time data to improve situational awareness.

4. **Integrate multidimensional, multi-echeloned actions.** Military activities should be coordinated with civilian and police efforts. They should support political attempts to negotiate settlements to any grievances prompting the civil disturbances and convince local media to avoid inflammatory broadcasts or to make broadcasts designed to quell and disperse the crowds. Crowd control should include the use of nonlethal weapons, munitions, and device capabilities. HN security forces, especially the police, should generally participate in operations to mitigate civil disturbances. However, in some situations, their presence may aggravate the overall situation.

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**Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY** is an example of a transitional peace operation. The operation began in September 1994 with deployment of the US-led multinational force. The US operation officially transitioned to the United Nations (UN) Mission in Haiti on March 31, 1995. However, a large contingent of US troops continued as part of the UN mission until 1996; the US forces commander also served as the UN force commander during that period.

**Various Sources**
n. **Transitions.** Transitions are critical periods during a peace operation and relate to an operation’s phases or the transfer of authority and responsibility from one participant to another. Successful transitions require satisfactory conditions in the current phase and adequate capability to ensure the demands of the next phase can be met. Transitions may occur between military and civilian authorities or from a US-led peace operation to a UN mission. Ultimately, a peace operation’s mission responsibilities should be transferred to legitimate and capable HN authorities. Commanders should plan for transition and mission termination as early as possible.

Chapter II, “Planning for Peace Operations,” further discusses transitions.

o. **Risks.** Peace operations pose a wide variety of risks and require mitigation strategies to assess what can go wrong and to reduce their likelihood and consequences. The following risks commonly apply to peace operations in general and to specific actions that a peace operations force may consider.

   (1) **Ineffectiveness.** Peace operations missions may be too benign, inadequately resourced, or too late to achieve the desired objectives. Some actions may be time-consuming and result in actions that are not sufficiently responsive. Lack of progress could generate resentment among HN individuals who were originally supportive of the mission. In addition to being ineffective, inadequate efforts can also weaken the credibility of the mission, possibly encouraging—rather than discouraging—further resistance by spoilers.

   (2) **Escalation of Violence.** The volatile situations confronting most peace operations contain seeds for conflict. Rival groups and spoilers may resort to violence because they perceive a window of opportunity to be closing or if they believe their survival or power is threatened. Military efforts may inspire HN opposition groups to increase antigovernment activities, which could prompt a harsh government response against civilians or intervention by other external parties. In other cases, the HN might engage in violence in violation of the mandate or agreement with contributing countries.

   (3) **Collateral Damage.** Military actions could result in unintended casualties which, in addition to the physical harm caused, may have adverse political and strategic consequences. Although a force may be assigned a relatively benign mission, a heightened FP status could result in harm to innocents whose status or intentions may be unclear. The risk of civilian casualties increases when military forces conduct offensive operations, even if they involve limited actions against clearly identified hostile targets. Consequently, the employment of nonlethal weapons can mitigate the chance of civilian casualties. Unambiguous training with lethal and nonlethal weapons and a thorough understanding of ROE can help mitigate this risk, but even the best ROE cannot address every conceivable situation or prevent confusion regarding their implementation.

   For more information on targeting, see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

   (4) **Mission Creep.** Because of the multidimensional facets required to secure peace (such as a safe and secure environment, good governance, rule of law, social well-being, and a sustainable economy), peace operations could entail an extended commitment
and an expanded mission to address root causes, inadequate capacity in a fragile state, and a variety of challenges or second-order effects that could develop. Most mission transitions and terminations will seek to avoid a premature departure that leaves conditions likely to cause future armed conflict. Some situations may be so intractable that they may not be resolved under the best of circumstances, and certainly not if the military force and its partners are only conducting a limited effort. In some cases, a peace operations force may become involved in broader peace building efforts once a situation is relatively stable and nation-building efforts become more prominent.

(5) **Losses.** Peace operations may result in casualties or equipment losses because of hostile actions, accidents, or other threats. In an extreme situation, a unit could be at risk if placed in a situation beyond its capability. Such situations could also jeopardize nonmilitary partners from the HN, NGOs, and international organizations.

(6) **HN Resistance.** Peace operations may generate opposition from within the HN, resulting in the population and government becoming more intransigent or motivating local actors to oppose foreign interference. Increased pressure from the mandate on any issue, such as human rights reforms, may generate additional resentment. Some factions within the HN will automatically be suspicious of the motives behind the peace operation, and the mission may become a convenient scapegoat for the nation’s problems.

(7) **Friction with Partners.** The military force may disagree with other HN and international actors regarding objectives, methods, burden-sharing, mandate interpretation, or other issues. Some actors may contend that the mission is doing too much, not doing enough, or doing things incorrectly. Others, including contributors to the peace operation, may be influenced by constituencies skeptical about the mission, particularly if there are setbacks.

(8) **Negative Second-Order Effects.** Even if largely successful, a peace operation may result in HN dependence upon external participants. It could also benefit one identity group at the expense of others. A peace operation may motivate an influx of foreign fighters, and setbacks could encourage violent acts by spoilers. Second-order effects are difficult to predict, but leaders should try to anticipate and mitigate them. Humanitarian workers, trusted HN personnel, and other sources can often provide insights regarding the potential side effects of contemplated actions.

(9) **Inaction.** Invariably, there will be risks associated with any contemplated action, but commanders should also be aware of the potential risks involved in not taking action. These include the possibility that spoilers may be emboldened and the situation could deteriorate even further, thereby requiring a more robust effort in the future.

(10) **Partner Behavior.** To prevent the US from appearing or inadvertently becoming complicit in crimes or abuses committed by other countries, the PEO requires working closely with, or providing material support to, partner nations. This could negatively affect US efforts in a PEO but also have an effect on US strategic objectives outside of the operation.
p. **Opportunities.** It is critical to identify potential opportunities to exploit during any operation. The staff seeks out opportunities for action by informing the commander throughout the planning and execution phases of a peacekeeping operation.

q. **Risk Mitigation.** Risk mitigation refers to efforts that prevent potential risks from occurring, reduce their impact should they occur, and provide appropriate response when necessary. Risk mitigation can be more effective when done in collaboration with other actors such as HN representatives, NGOs, or USG departments and agencies. This helps provide a comprehensive understanding of risks and mitigation efforts, including actions that can reduce civilian vulnerabilities and respond to incidents which result in civilian harm. However, some NGOs may be reluctant to collaborate with US forces. Joint risk mitigation with HN security forces can be particularly important, both to identify potential sources of harm to civilians and to enhance protection of civilians efforts. Mitigation measures often include:

1. Training.
2. Adjusted force levels, deployment, or composition.
3. Contingency planning.
4. Designated response forces or reserves.
5. Key leader engagement (KLE).
6. CCS.
7. Elevated or delegated decision authority.
8. Modified ROE.
9. Reduced or expanded information sharing with other actors.

6. **Command and Control**

a. The US may participate in peace operations under various command authority arrangements. These arrangements might include:

1. Unilateral US joint operations.
2. Multinational operations with the US as the lead nation.
3. Multinational operations with the US as a contingent nation.

b. In any of these arrangements, US forces will report to the US chain of command. However, in multinational peace operations, the US force may also report to the sponsoring international organization such as the UN, NATO, AU, OAS, or EU. By law, the President retains command authority over US forces. However, as Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to place US forces under the operational control (OPCON) of a
foreign commander when doing so serves American security interests. Within the limits of OPCON, a foreign commander cannot change the mission or deploy US forces outside the OA agreed to by the President. Nor may the foreign commander separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change the US forces’ internal organization. The greater the anticipated US military role, the less likely it will be that the US will agree to have a non-US commander exercise OPCON over US forces. Ordinarily, any large-scale participation of US forces in a PEO likely to involve combat will be conducted under US command authority.

c. In the same manner US forces or personnel operate under the ultimate authority of the President, other contributing countries abide by their own national authorities. Countries working with or under the US in a PEO may operate with caveats and seek direction from their leaders, regardless of any prior agreements or mandate for the peace operation.

7. Key Documents

Political objectives guide the development of key documents that provide legal authority and define the parameters for a peace operation.

a. **Mandate.** The UNSC establishes the scope for UN-sponsored peace operations through a United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR), which is often referred to as the mandate for the operation. Peace operations sponsored by organizations other than the UN may be based on treaties, accords, resolutions, or agreements of international organizations, often with authorization by a UNSCR under Chapter VIII (Regional Arrangements) of the UN Charter.

b. **Status-of-Forces Agreement (SOFA) or, for UN Operations, Status-of-Mission Agreement (SOMA).** These agreements, negotiated between the HN and the sponsoring organization on behalf of the participating countries, establish the detailed legal status of peace operations forces and involve close coordination among the Department of State (DOS), combatant commanders (CCDRs), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Authority to negotiate a SOFA is held at the national level. Some specified portions of that authority have been delegated to the Joint Staff and CCDRs. Neither the commander nor the staff has such authority without specific approval or delegation from higher authority. Considerations for entering into any negotiations or agreement with another nation should include the consult of the staff judge advocate. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5530.3, *International Agreements*, assigns responsibility for controlling the negotiation and conclusion of agreements with foreign governments and international organizations by DOD personnel, components, commands, or other organizational elements. US forces remain subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, as administered by the appropriate US commander.

c. **Terms of Reference (TORs).** TORs are developed to govern implementation of the peace operation based on the mandate and the situation and may be subject to approval by the parties to the dispute. The TORs describe the mission, command relationships, organization, logistics, accounting procedures, coordination and liaison, and
responsibilities of the military units and personnel assigned or detailed to the peace operation. When the US is a participant in a peace operation, TORs are coordinated with the CJCS, DOD, and DOS before final approval by the Secretary of Defense.

d. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). In the context of a peace operation, an MOU is an agreement between the sponsoring organization and contributing countries concerned primarily with logistics and administrative matters such as financial management of the peace operation.

e. ROE. In peace operations, well-conceived, clearly stated, and thoroughly disseminated ROE can make the difference between mission success and failure. ROE, together with rules for the use of force, define when and how force may be used. All commanders assess threat capabilities and make recommendations for specific ROE through the chain of command.

(1) US commanders should be aware that peace operations forces from other nations may interpret ROE differently than US forces or may be required to operate under different ROE. During NATO operations, the applicable NATO ROE will authorize the participating nations to publish supplemental ROE guidance based upon national requirements. Commanders and their staffs must understand the limitations of other MNFs and develop solutions during planning to prevent confusion during a crisis.

(2) For PKO, the ROE may be highly restrictive and limit the use of force to self-defense of the force and protection of the mission. In PKO authorized under Chapter VII (Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of the UN Charter, however, the ROE may permit the use of force under a wider variety of circumstances, such as to protect civilians from imminent violence.

(3) In PEO, the ROE are less restrictive concerning the use of force than in peacekeeping situations, but tailored to the situation. Restraint will still be a primary consideration since the transition to peace may be easier when the applications of force remain proportional and appropriate.

For additional information, refer to CJCSI 3121.01, (U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces.
CHAPTER II
PLANNING FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

“To be successful, UN [United Nations] peacekeeping missions today and in the future must be capable of defending themselves, protecting civilians, and carrying out their mandate in the context of a very dynamic security environment. In short, to meet what I believe will be a growing demand for more complex peace operations, we’re going to need to adapt. Meeting the growing demand for a wide range of peacekeeping operations requires a robust set of capabilities and capacities.... [T]hey include: strong civilian and military leadership teams; staff capacity to design missions with clear objectives, end states, and measures of effectiveness; effective command and control; well-trained forces at the brigade, at the battalion, and at the company level; and appropriate enabling capabilities to include intelligence, air and ground mobility, logistics, counter IED [improvised explosive device] capability, engineering, and medical capability.”

General Joseph F. Dunford
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Introduction

While planning for peace operations is similar in many respects to planning for other military operations, this chapter highlights the essential aspects of planning for multidimensional peace operations.

2. Planning Considerations

   a. **Application of Joint Functions.** Each of the joint functions is relevant for peace operations. In many cases, their application will differ slightly from other joint operations.

      (1) **Command and Control (C2).** C2 is often challenging in peace operations because a mission will likely include a variety of military, civilian, and police participation from multiple nations. Higher-level staffs will normally be multinational, with English as the official language. At lower levels, another language may be used.

         (a) Typically, UN missions will be organized as depicted in Figure II-1, and missions conducted by other international organizations will often follow the same structure. The HOM is usually a civilian holding the title of special representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). In rare cases where the mission includes all UN agencies in the country, the HOM may be designated as the executive representative of the Secretary-General (ERSG). A multidimensional mission has military, police, and civilian components. In an integrated mission, the resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator of the adjacent UN country team also holds a deputy SRSG position in the mission. Civilian-led state or province coordinating offices normally report directly to the mission HQ.
(b) Multinational sector HQs are usually brigade-level organizations. Their subordinate organizations are usually national, although some may be composite units from two or more countries.

(c) Interoperability is frequently a challenge because of different languages, equipment, and doctrine. Radio and computer communications are usually nonsecure, although some nations will have their own secure systems and use them internally.

(d) Effective C2 is challenging in peace operations, as vague or multiple lines of authority may exist. National governments may impose caveats on the military forces they contribute. For example, caveats may restrict when, where, or how they can be
employed. Commanders and planners should be aware of such caveats. A functional relationship will also have to be developed with other partners such as HN security forces. In many situations, military commanders may be directly subordinate to civilian authorities. This may require an adjustment for commanders whose previous experiences have been as subordinates to other military officers.

For information on UN C2, see the United Nations Force Headquarters Handbook.

(2) Intelligence. Successful peace operations rely upon accurate, timely intelligence to provide early warning of risks and opportunities. Intelligence enables situational understanding of the OE, including civilian vulnerabilities and threats. Intelligence activities and effective peace operations are mutually reinforcing, as civilians will provide information more freely when they can do so safely and if it further enhances their well-being. In turn, focused, timely intelligence should drive operations that improve conditions within the OE.

(a) Many UN personnel avoid the use of the term “intelligence,” as it implies operations against hostile or potentially hostile forces. Additionally, HN consent can be jeopardized if a peace operation is known to involve intelligence operations. As impartial actors, UN organizations often prefer using the term “information.” Most UN missions have a joint mission analysis center to analyze information and provide assessments of the OE and specific issues of concern.

(b) Intelligence activities, including information sharing, can be challenging in multinational peace operations. It is imperative commanders decide and communicate early their broad intent regarding information sharing. DOD policy effectively mandates a bias to share rather than withhold information whenever possible, making write-to-release and born-unclassified approaches effective norms for activities such as peace operations. JFCs should consult their foreign disclosure officials. Nonetheless, it is important to sufficiently protect sources and methods of information acquisition. Joint forces must also consider their own OPSEC and counterintelligence efforts against adversaries who are attempting to collect information on them, possibly by using covert agents or civilians whom the force is attempting to protect. Political and resource constraints may limit a unit’s ability to obtain and exploit accurate, timely intelligence.

For more information on intelligence, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence; JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations; and JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

(3) Fires. Fires are often critical during PEO, and their employment is essentially similar to other combat situations. They are less common during PKO, although UN peacekeeping forces normally include mortars in infantry battalions and, in rare cases, peacekeeping missions may be authorized to include artillery units.

(a) When authorized and available in PKO, fires are normally limited to defensive situations, although they could be employed under other circumstances such as to protect civilians from imminent threats. Concerns about collateral damage and
disproportionate response will frequently constrain the use of fires even if they are permitted under the ROE.

(b) Some UN peacekeeping missions are authorized the use of attack helicopters which have been employed to provide fire support in crisis situations. Peacekeeping forces do not normally include naval gunfire assets, combat aircraft, missiles, rockets, or armed unmanned aerial systems. Such capabilities may exist in military forces that operate in parallel with UN peacekeeping missions.

For more information on fires, see JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.

(4) Movement and Maneuver. In a peace operation, a military force may be employed to provide area security or to establish a separation (buffer) zone between belligerents. During peace enforcement, as well as some robust peacekeeping situations, military forces may be used to defeat or neutralize armed groups such as spoilers who refuse to abide by a peace agreement or who are targeting civilians or mission assets.

(a) Some of the primary peacekeeping tasks for military forces include patrols, observation posts and checkpoints, cordon and search, convoy escort, and quick response to sudden crises. Units also conduct outreach and military engagement activities and encourage situational awareness as part of their normal operations.

(b) Military forces may conduct other supporting tasks such as disarmament and demobilization, protection of critical infrastructure, crowd management, detention, and evacuation of civilians. Units may conduct their primary and supporting tasks in conjunction with international or HN police, other military forces, or UN civilian specialists.

(c) UN training scenarios and contingency plans often use a four-stage framework for the use of military force.

1. Prevention (threat of spoiler violence is present but low).
2. Preemption (probability of spoiler violence is serious or high).
3. Response (spoiler violence is ongoing or impending).
4. Consolidation (spoiler threat has subsided; counteraction operations terminated).

For more information on force employment in UN peacekeeping missions, see the United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual (Volumes I and II).

(5) Protection. Forces involved in peace operations must employ active and passive measures to protect themselves against adversaries, accidents, diseases, and other health and environmental threats. Additionally, the mission’s success will also likely depend on protection of civilians and protecting other mission assets, humanitarian workers, other actors, or critical infrastructure. Effective FP helps preserve the capability
to achieve mission objectives. However, concern about FP may result in a cautious posture that ultimately reduces operational effectiveness or jeopardizes civilian well-being.

(6) Sustainment. A key function in any military activity, sustainment is particularly significant in peace operations. Units are likely to be dispersed to remote areas at the end of a long distribution chain. Poor transportation, weak power infrastructure, extreme climates, and inadequate essential needs (such as potable water) will add to the challenge and increase security concerns. Additionally, the political or diplomatic environment may constrain force levels, including sustainment capacity. Therefore, other sustainment sources may be necessary (e.g., operational contract support [OCS], acquisition and cross-servicing agreements [ACSAs], and other nation logistics.)

(a) Many multinational partners do not have the same robust logistics capabilities as the US. Without adequate logistics support, units will be insufficiently resourced and will consequently spend an inordinate amount of effort attending to their own internal needs while placing less emphasis on primary mission tasks. Robust military operations will require extensive logistics support, which could result in a drain on limited infrastructure already being used by other actors such as NGOs. Indirectly, these effects can negatively impact civilian welfare, such as driving up wages and prices or reducing the availability of already-scarce resources.

(b) In some emergency situations, the military force’s logistics resources may be used to support other participants or to provide essential goods and services to needy civilians, many of whom may seek security and support from military forces. Other unique logistics requirements, such as security lighting and long-range acoustic hailing devices for large numbers of displaced personnel, should be anticipated.

(c) Military engineering units, medical units, water purification units, military bands, and other units can support societal reconstruction during peace operations.

For more information on sustainment, see JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, and the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Logistics Unit Manual.

(7) Information. The information function encompasses the management and application of information and its deliberate integration with other joint functions to influence relevant actor perceptions, behavior, action or inaction, and support human and automated decision making, which is especially important during peace operations. The information function helps commanders and staffs understand and leverage the pervasive nature of information, its military uses, and its application during all military operations. This function provides JFCs the ability to integrate the generation and preservation of friendly information while leveraging the inherent informational aspects of all military activities to achieve the commander’s objectives and attain the end state.

For more information on US role in medical and health service support during peace operations, see JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

b. Interorganizational Cooperation. Most peace operations are multidimensional efforts with military, police, and civilian components. Missions typically interact with
other international and HN organizations including NGOs, other international organizations, HN governmental agencies and security forces, the media, and businesses, among others. Many have no formal relationship with the peace operation, but are instrumental to achieving the mission’s objectives.

(1) Different levels of interaction include coexistence, communication, information sharing, formal coordination, and collaboration. As shown in Figure II-2, higher levels of interaction may be possible when military forces share objectives and a common higher authority with other actors and a mutual level of trust exists. In some cases, it is only possible or necessary to understand each other’s objectives, requirements, capabilities, limitations, procedures, and terminology. However, closer coordination is particularly critical for successful peace operations; an important example is close integration with local police forces to ensure stability. The different levels of interaction are usually voluntary and may be depicted as follows:

(a) Coexistence. Multiple groups are present in an area but do not interact or communicate with each other. This may be the case with certain groups who do not want any affiliation with the military.

(b) Communication. Parties have periodic contact, such as at meetings that may occur, but do not share substantive information on a regular basis, if at all. Parties may be able to contact each other if necessary (e.g., if they have cell phone numbers for each other). When parties do not share any common interests, direct communication may
not even be possible. In cases where no direct communication exists, messages may be relayed through intermediaries such as civilian personnel associated with the mission or HN officials.

(c) **Information Sharing.** Parties share substantive information periodically, but such exchanges are likely to be circumspect and may not occur on a regular basis. Exchanged information is likely to be limited to matters of extremely high mutual concern. For example, an NGO may be willing to provide some information regarding a mass atrocity that has occurred, but unwilling to share details about its planned operations.

(d) **Formal Coordination.** Parties regularly exchange information on a wide range of topics, to include some planned operations, generally answering most requests for information when they are reasonably able to do so. The parties may find it beneficial to meet on a routine basis and may invite outside representatives to attend their own internal meetings.

(e) **Cooperation or Collaboration.** The highest level of interaction entails cooperation or collaboration which could include jointly conducted planning and operations, collocation of organizations, exchange of liaisons, and other measures to achieve more effective integration. In a loosely collaborative relationship, military forces may occasionally provide direct security for the other actors (e.g., convoy escort). In some collaborations, the interaction will be closer and more routine (e.g., sharing of contract vendors).

(2) **Role of Humanitarian and Development Organizations.** Humanitarian organizations provide essential needs such as protection, food, water, shelter, and medical support to vulnerable populations. Development organizations focus on longer-term programs, such as institutional capacity building of HN ministry counterparts and local NGOs and civil society organizations. Both types of organizations are critical in peace operations and may be part of the UN country team or national government organizations (such as USAID). NGOs conduct much of the humanitarian and development work, either as independent actors or as implementing partners of the UN, USAID, or other bilateral or multilateral donor agencies and institutions. Most humanitarian and development organizations attempt to maintain neutrality and independence from military forces and prefer situations in which sufficient security exists such that they can conduct their activities without consultations with security actors.

(3) **Cluster System.** In parallel with peace operations, and in other scenarios such as natural disasters, the UN country team often employs a cluster system to coordinate humanitarian and development activities of UN agencies, NGOs, and local organizations. Clusters are based on functional sectors such as health, nutrition, protection, and emergency shelter. Although it is a voluntary system, each cluster has a lead coordinating agency and provides the following:

(a) Support for service delivery.
(b) Decision-making information.
(c) Planning and strategy development.
(d) Advocacy.
(e) Monitoring and reporting.
(f) Contingency planning and preparedness.
(g) Capacity building.

For further information on clusters, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

For further information on coordination with other participants, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

c. CCS. Joint forces conducting peace operations should integrate informational efforts that promulgate messages, inform audiences, and influence perceptions regarding the situation and particularly the objectives and actions of the military force. These efforts are increasingly critical in modern military operations, as every statement and action can be monitored instantly by an interconnected world. Communication efforts can dissuade perpetrators, influence other groups to behave positively, inform vulnerable populations, and increase support for the peace operation. Communication is also essential to managing expectations and mitigating the effects of incidents that result in civilian harm.

(1) Messages may be strictly informative or instructional. For example, they could describe recent operations or explain to vulnerable civilians how they might improve their security. Other messages could be intended to influence the opinions and actions of an audience. For example, they may attempt to convince bystanders to assist the military force and not support perpetrators. Still other messages may be intended to “name and shame” spoilers, call attention to their actions, and potentially dissuade them from undesired behavior in the future. Messages may be intended to have long-term significance, or they could address immediate issues such as recent events (positive or negative) or disinformation promulgated by adversaries. Examples of enduring messages could include:

(a) The joint force is committed to protection of civilians.

(b) The joint force is not intended to occupy the HN and will remain only as long as its presence is required for security and stability.

(c) The mission is supported by the international community, as well as responsible HN actors.

(d) Spoilers who deliberately attack civilians or internationally sanctioned peacekeepers are committing war crimes and will be held accountable.
(e) It is important to establish a safe and secure environment that does not foster sexual violence, threats to children, or other threats to civilians. The HN and international security forces should not tolerate such acts.

(2) **Liaison.** The joint force should establish liaison with parallel international and HN security organizations. Whether full or part-time, LNOs can help synchronize communication with other actors. Liaison may be conducted at multiple echelons during a peace operation. In rare circumstances, such as during a natural disaster, it may be appropriate to liaise with humanitarian organizations. The CMOC may be an effective venue for conducting liaison with local authorities and civilian agencies.

(3) **Public Affairs (PA).** Effective PA efforts require an understanding of the audiences, messages, and available methods. These three variables will likely result in different approaches, as a single effort will seldom be effective. Audiences may include the general civilian population in the HN and its subsets (such as women); HN leaders; victim groups; NGOs; perpetrators (leaders or followers); and other potential adversaries, bystanders, positive or negative actors, the media, international audiences, and domestic leaders and populations in coalition states or TCCs. Messages are also promulgated to subordinates in the form of PA guidance to ensure consistency and facilitate wider dissemination.

(4) **Information.** The CCS process should ensure relevant information is incorporated into every operation to shape the OE. An effective CCS process will magnify the impact of other actions; similarly, other actions can enhance information. A command’s CCS process both informs outside audiences and enables subordinates to advance important messages effectively during their own activities. Information sharing will be critical to deter and preempt threats when indicators suggest that violence against civilians is imminent. The joint force should integrate informational efforts of other partners as much as possible, while nesting within those of the HN political authorities. Higher military and political echelons may have a robust staff capability often lacking at lower levels.

(5) **Cyberspace and Social Media.** Although peace operations often occur in undeveloped countries or those ravaged by conflict, websites and social media can still reach relevant audiences in many situations and, if possible, should be created in different languages. Audio and video recording and editing equipment can provide extremely valuable capabilities to such venues.

(6) **KLE.** KLEs offer important ways to coordinate with other actors and to support CCS. Specific KLEs can have a variety of purposes such as to foster relationships, clarify intentions, establish desired conditions to support future efforts, convey messages (including promises, threats, condolences, or apologies), or address problems confronting the peace operation.

d. **Asymmetric Threats.** Peace operations increasingly face threats from spoilers, armed opposition groups, criminal groups, terrorist groups, and, in some cases, HN security
forces. Such threats often target peacekeeping and peace building forces, the humanitarian and development organizations that operate in an area, and the civilian population.

(1) VEOs often pose the greatest threat to a peace operation. They may form after a peace operation has been initiated and could originate from within the country or from a different country. It is common for a homegrown organization to develop linkages with a wider global or regional terrorist network.

(a) These organizations may pursue political objectives such as securing power in a nation or forming an independent state. Some may pursue extremist religious goals. Additionally, such organizations may be intent on targeting members of other tribes, ethnicities, religions, or other identity groups.

(b) VEOs may attack members of a peace operation, international aid workers, HN security personnel and other officials, innocent civilians, and any others viewed as collaborating with the peace operation or rival groups. They may also attack critical infrastructure or soft targets such as schools and marketplaces. These groups may employ improvised explosive devices (IEDs), mortars and rockets, sniper rifles, and other military grade or improvised weapons, as well as unmanned aircraft systems (UASs). They may ambush convoys, including those of humanitarian workers, and may attempt to kidnap personnel for ransom or for use during negotiations or as human shields. Small and isolated members of a peace operations force may be vulnerable to these practices. These tactics and methods may be employed by any group, including hostile members of the HN’s security forces or employees of contractors that are opposed to the peace operations force.

(2) In addition to VEOs, other transnational threats may include criminal groups that seek to exploit the HN’s fragility. Frequently, they are involved in illicit economic activities such as human trafficking and smuggling of drugs, weapons, and natural resources, including valuable minerals and endangered species. In some cases, they may consist of rebel groups that have established sanctuaries in a neighboring country.

(3) UN peace operations forces do not normally have a robust capability to counter IEDs or other asymmetric threats. Often, they do not have the intelligence assets needed to identify threat networks and usually lack technologies that can locate and negate IEDs or other improvised threats. A peace operation may involve a small UN Mine Action Service office to provide some expertise regarding education, victim assistance, and mine clearing. Additionally, a force operating in an especially high-risk area may include explosive ordnance units. When operating in parallel with a UN mission, US joint forces will likely have superior counter-IED and counter threat network capabilities that can help redress the UN mission’s gaps in this area.

e. Protection of Civilians and the Responsibility to Protect. Peace operations are often conducted for the main purpose of protecting civilians from extreme threats such as genocide or other mass atrocities. In most cases, modern peace operations include civilian protection as one of the key tasks of the mandate.
(1) Civilians comprise the majority of the victims in most modern conflicts, and they remain at risk during peace operations in post-conflict settings. Military forces safeguard civilians by avoiding civilian harm during their operations and by conducting actions, including the employment of capabilities that create lethal and/or nonlethal effects, with the specific intent to improve civilian security.

(2) Protection of civilians refers to efforts that reduce civilian risks from physical violence; secure their rights to access essential services and resources; and contribute to a secure, stable, and just environment for civilians over the long-term.

(a) The UN approach to civilian protection consists of three tiers of action:

1. Tier 1—Protection through dialogue and engagement.
2. Tier 2—Provision of physical protection.
3. Tier 3—Establishing a protective environment.

(b) Protection of civilians entails three fundamentals for joint forces during any military operation:

1. Understand civilian risks.
2. Protect civilians during operations.
3. Shape a protective environment.

(c) Local and international unarmed civilian protection efforts may exist to promote protection of civilians through nonviolent means such as interpositioning, protective accompaniment, and monitoring. The organizations performing these activities may predate the peace operation and may be effective partners of the peace operations force.


(3) The Responsibility to Protect. The responsibility to protect reflects the expectation that states must protect civilians from mass atrocity crimes such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. It includes prevention, response, and rebuilding measures undertaken by individual governments and the international community. The UN recognizes three supporting pillars of the responsibility to protect:
(a) Pillar 1—A state’s responsibility to protect its population from mass atrocities.

(b) Pillar 2—The international community’s responsibility to assist states in the prevention of mass atrocities.

(c) Pillar 3—The international community’s responsibility to take action when a state is failing in its responsibility to protect. This may entail a wide range of measures including MARO.

f. Transitions and Termination. Two types of transitions are relevant for the military force. The first type relates to the phases or stages of an operation and the second refers to the transfer of authorities and responsibilities from one actor to another. As the situation changes, so too will the authorities, responsibilities, roles, and activities of different actors, including the peace operations force. Transitions may occur between an international coalition and the UN or a regional organization (or vice-versa). Ultimately, responsibility and authority must be successfully transitioned to capable HN authorities to enable a force drawdown and eventual termination of the international mission.

(1) Effective transitions require, first, a manageable situation conducive to the transition and, second, actors capable of accepting their new responsibilities and authorities. As much as possible, transitions should be planned in advance and coordinated with the different stakeholders. It will be necessary to obtain as much concurrence as possible while managing expectations. Transitions should occur based upon actual conditions rather than planned timelines. Conditions will likely differ in the various regions of a country, and it may be advisable to conduct local or regional transitions incrementally based upon the particular circumstances. It is also possible that transitions in one particular sector (such as governance) may occur before others.

(2) During peace operations, military forces may approach transitions similarly to reliefs in place or mission handovers. Transitions can be sequential, with an incremental transfer of units, locations, or functions. Alternatively, the entire transition can occur simultaneously. In all cases, transitions should maintain security, as instability and civilian risks can increase during and after transitions. Depending upon the circumstances, transitions could include the following general steps:

(a) Preparation. Outgoing and incoming participants jointly develop a transition plan. Outgoing participants provide information and necessary orientations. Incoming participants conduct necessary training and other organizational preparations. PA activities and CCS efforts will help set the conditions for the transition and should emphasize stability and civilian protection in relevant messages.

(b) Tutorship. Incoming participants are incorporated into operations while the outgoing participants retain authority and responsibility. The incoming participants gradually perform a more prominent role. The main objective of this step is to accustom the incoming participants with the situation, operations, responsibilities, and authorities.
(c) **Formal Transition.** The incoming participants assume responsibility and authority. In some situations, this will be seamless, with conditions essentially unchanged from those immediately before the formal transition. In other cases, the outgoing participants will leave no residual influence or presence.

(d) **Mentoring.** In some situations, the outgoing participants will remain (often with reduced presence) to provide advice and assistance.

(e) **Reachback Support.** After transition has occurred, it may be desirable for the incoming participants to be able to contact the outgoing participants for a variety of purposes, such as to provide any necessary historical information.

(3) Over time, military commanders will assume a diminished role in supporting and enabling civilian organizations. Similarly, international efforts will recede as HN actors develop the capacity to assume responsibility and authority. Transitions can result in instability and heightened risks to civilians. If poorly managed, transitions may generate grievances and, potentially, renewed conflict due to lack of progress in areas such as governance and development.

(4) Effective transitions are difficult to manage. One challenge may be establishing and progressively achieving meaningful yet reasonable objectives, based on requirements and the means available to address them. Another challenge may be building and maintaining consensus. Different stakeholders must support the transitions, which will frequently require compromises. There are apt to be pressures to transition too quickly and inertia that results in transitions not occurring quickly enough. Yet another challenge may be effectively merging ongoing top-down and bottom-up efforts. Finally, military commanders and planners should ensure mutual understanding of transition expectations prior to initiation of projects not essential to the core mission.

g. **Conflict Prevention.** Conflict prevention is the employment of complementary diplomatic, civil, and, when necessary, military means to monitor and identify the causes of conflict and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities. Designated conflict prevention efforts can include fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings, inspections, and monitoring. It is also an implied task for many peacekeeping missions and other post-conflict operations.

(1) Many stability activities support conflict prevention, as they help address the root causes of conflict. The establishment of a safe and secure environment, with the presence of capable and legitimate security forces, can prevent conflict. Other security activities that support the delivery of essential services, ensure good governance and the rule of law, and foster social well-being and economic growth can reduce grievances that might lead to conflict.

(2) Military forces support conflict prevention during shaping activities, as well as deterrence and combat operations. SC activities can improve the credibility of HN security forces. Stability activities (as discussed above) can help reduce drivers of conflict. Monitoring activities can provide early warning of potential conflict which, in turn, can
permit diplomatic remedies. Military presence, including preventive deployments and shows of force, can deter would-be belligerents. These deployments could occur locally within an ongoing peace operation or internationally with the deployment of a new force, such as the 1995 United Nations Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia.

h. **Peacemaking.** As discussed in Chapter I, “Overview,” peacemaking is a diplomatic process aimed at establishing a cease fire or an otherwise peaceful settlement of a conflict. Peacemaking is usually accomplished by a special political mission that involves few, if any, military personnel.

(1) Even if a peace agreement has been concluded at higher levels between major belligerents, it is possible the leaders of these groups do not have effective control over subordinate elements, splinter groups, or potential spoilers of the peace process. In such cases, peacemaking efforts may be incorporated within other peace operations, especially peacekeeping missions authorized under Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) of the UN Charter.

(2) During other peace operations missions, peacemaking activities will usually be conducted by the mission’s civilian leadership using the UN’s good offices and mediation roles to strengthen a peace settlement. Military leaders could supplement these efforts with their own KLE with HN security forces, non-state armed groups, and other local groups. Military forces may be used to provide security for peacemaking processes and monitor related activities.

i. **Peace Building.** Peace building provides the reconstruction and societal rehabilitation necessary to resolve core conflict issues or prevent further outbreaks of violent conflict. It promotes reconciliation, strengthens and rebuilds civil infrastructure and institutions, builds confidence, and supports economic reconstruction. The major responsibility for peace building resides ultimately with the HN and the civil sector, but the peace operations force has a supporting and essential role. Because the peace operations force and civil efforts are inextricably linked, harmony and synchronization are imperative. Peace building usually begins during PKO or PEO and continues after they are concluded.

(1) The planning considerations in peace building are generally the same as those in stabilization efforts. Essential to ensuring the population’s well-being and to preclude grievances that could cause a return to conflict, peace building includes military and nonmilitary objectives, activities, and actors working to establish the following elements of a stable state.

(a) **Human Security.** In peace operations, military forces, as well as international and HN police forces, are directly involved with establishing and maintaining a safe and secure environment. A safe and secure environment follows the cessation of large-scale violence, the establishment of public order, and the achievement of a legitimate state monopoly over the means of violence, physical security, and territorial security.
(b) **Governance and Rule of Law.** Transparent, accountable, and effective governance is critical to maintaining an effective peace settlement. Good governance entails the provision of essential services, stewardship of state resources, political moderation and accountability, and civic participation and empowerment. Effective rule of law ensures civilians are protected from human rights violations and crimes (including violent acts), authorities behave properly, and criminals are deterred and held accountable. It includes just legal frameworks, public order, accountability to the law, access to justice, and a culture of lawfulness. Transitional justice mechanisms are likely to be important to establish accountability for past crimes while providing a basis for reconciliation and a positive future.

(c) **Economic and Infrastructure Development.** Deprivation results in civilian suffering including malnutrition, exposure, and illness. Along with basic needs such as food, water, shelter, and medical care, the population must be provided the requirements for human dignity such as human rights, opportunities for education and employment, and hope for the future. Without adequate economic growth and infrastructure, problems such as unemployment, inflation, and shortages can result in grievances that foster violence and spur criminal activity, including corruption among government officials. A sustainable economy results from macroeconomic stabilization, control over the illicit economy and economic-based threats to peace, and employment generation.

(d) **Political Settlement.** A desirable political settlement ensures political power is organized and exercised without resorting to violence. However informal, it is the foundation of a political process and must be accepted by elites and the wider society, while bringing in groups that may have previously been excluded. A peaceful, just, and accepted political settlement is the most important indicator of stabilization in a post-conflict nation.

(e) **Societal Relationships.** A stable state requires harmonious relationships between diverse identity groups. Societal well-being includes a variety of issues from the equitable provision of necessities to fostering attitudes in which different groups are tolerant of each other. Peace operations may require the return and resettlement of dislocated civilians (DCs) and social reconstruction.

(2) **Military Support to Peace Building.** Military forces can assist and provide structure for cease fire mechanisms that support a peace agreement which may be vague and lacking specificity. For long-term peace building, the military will most likely focus on establishing and maintaining a safe and secure environment to protect civilians and provide the secure space necessary for other actors to operate effectively. In many cases, the military can support these actors with personnel, equipment, communications, information, or supplies. In situations of last resort, military forces may need to perform nonmilitary functions until other actors are adequately established and prepared to assume responsibility. Some military activities may have an impact beyond peacekeeping or peace enforcement. For example, repair of infrastructure such as bridges and roads can improve military operations and logistics, but can also mitigate the isolation of civilians in remote areas and assist government and humanitarian access, the return of displaced persons, and
the restoration of services and trade. Military forces in peace operations may also be involved in important peace building activities such as SSR; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); and providing security for elections.

For additional information, see JP 3-07, Stability.

j. **HA** refers to efforts that relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation in an impartial manner. While HA is provided ideally by civilian organizations without military involvement, military forces and other security units may be mandated or tasked to support humanitarian actions. HA includes the distribution of food, water, shelter, medical care, and other items (such as blankets or cooking materials) to provide for essential needs, as well as the associated coordination, logistics, and communications.

For more information on US military medical planning considerations, see JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

(1) The diverse organizations that may deliver HA include UN agencies, international organizations, local NGOs, contractors, and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, each with a different governing and accountability structure. Many organizations delivering goods and services are multi-mandated, providing both short-term HA and long-term recovery and development assistance which often contributes to the sustainability of a state. Some humanitarian organizations may be very concerned with remaining neutral and independent to gain or retain access to communities in need. In addition to providing goods and services (for example, clean water, sanitation, food, and shelter), some humanitarian organizations also provide programs such as rights education, local conflict mediation and trust building, monitoring, reporting, and advocacy.

(2) **Relevance to Peace Operations.** Peace operations environments are often accompanied by acute needs for essential goods and services. Civilians may flee a threat, thus losing their access to livelihoods, services, and support networks. Belligerents may destroy sources of food, water, and shelter or otherwise purposely restrict access to essential services. Effects of conflict may be exacerbated by natural disasters such as droughts or flooding. Lack of access to clean water, medical services, and other essential needs can harm more civilians than physical violence. Moreover, lack of access to basic goods and services may undermine an individual or communities’ ability to rebound from conflict. Additionally, competition over scarce essential goods and services can be a root cause of or contribute to further conflict and violence against civilians. Therefore, it is vital to foster an environment conducive to HA to support effective peace operations. This requirement could accompany other military operations and may at times be the military’s most important task to prevent widespread human suffering.

(3) **Military Support to HA.** Generally, a military force’s primary role is to help provide secure space so humanitarian actors may operate based on objective and apolitical human needs. In some situations, the military may have more direct involvement. For example, units may be asked to provide escorts for humanitarian actors. In such cases, humanitarian use of military assets should seek to comply with international guidance designed to safeguard humanitarian participants and the people they seek to assist. Where
humanitarian organizations are not present or able to provide assistance, military forces may be temporarily involved in the actual delivery of essential goods and services until other participants are able to assume the role. While they may become directly involved in HA as a last resort, military units normally contribute to an environment conducive to humanitarian action when they:

(a) Establish and maintain general security to provide space in which humanitarian organizations can operate.
(b) Provide situational awareness regarding such issues as the location, number, and condition of civilians in need.
(c) Provide information on potential threats.
(d) Provide communications support.
(e) Support planning efforts.
(f) Provide security at storage sites and during transfer operations, transportation, and distribution.
(g) Improve or build infrastructure capacity for transportation and delivery of HA.
(h) Provide transportation support (including helicopter transport and airfield operations).
(i) Provide equipment (such as materiel handling equipment) and operators.
(j) Support and conduct public information dissemination.
(k) Provide required technical expertise with selected military personnel or units (e.g., medical, construction, water purification, mortuary affairs, or interpreters).
(l) When humanitarian organizations are not present or able to provide assistance, initiate HA efforts and transition to other organizations when they are established.

(4) **HA Funding.** Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid funding may be available, but its uses are narrowly defined by public law and DOD policy. Difficulties often arise from commitment of resources prior to ensuring understanding of those legal and policy restrictions.

For more information, see JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

k. **Assessments.** Operation assessment to support a peacekeeping operation requires a continuous process that supports decision making by determining progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, achieving an objective, or attaining an end state.
(1) **Purpose of Assessments.** The purpose of the assessment activity is to develop, adapt, and refine plans and for making campaigns and operations more effective. Mission analysis is required to first understand the situation and identify problems, capabilities, and gaps that need to be addressed to support mission accomplishment. The assessment also evaluates the performance and effectiveness of the military force (and other relevant actors) to determine if any changes are required to the peace operation. Changes could include revision of the mission, modifications in the military force’s employment, additional training or resources, or rebalancing of operational activities as the peace operation progresses.

(2) **Sources of Information.** Information can be obtained from the intelligence community and military reporting channels, but other sources can be even more valuable, including civilian agencies, NGOs, the media, and the local population. Many human rights organizations monitor conflict situations, and their reports are often readily available. These can be particularly useful for analyzing trends and gaining familiarity with a situation at the outset of a peace operation. Military leaders must carefully handle information they receive from NGO representatives in the field, as it could jeopardize the NGOs’ status as neutral actors. Normally, the military should not attribute information to the NGOs and, in some cases, it may be advisable to delay any use of the information obtained from these sources.

(3) Many organizations may be reluctant to cooperate with the military due to the risk to their neutrality. It may be more effective for the military to interact with them through civilian intermediaries, and units should generally treat them as protected sources and refrain from attributing information to them. Local leaders and members of the population can be excellent sources of information, particularly when they believe that their well-being and that of their families will be preserved. Effective peace operations will make the population more forthcoming with information, which in turn will improve the effectiveness of future operations. However, units should be aware that individuals may have ulterior motives for providing information (such as to undermine a rival), so they should be cautious about trusting a source completely. Any information received should be cross-checked with other sources when possible.

*For more information on intelligence, see* JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence; JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations; JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment; and JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks.

(4) Assessment includes monitoring, evaluating, and recommending or directing action.

(a) **Monitoring** includes a continuous tracking of the situational variables discussed in this section and is supported by such measures as unit reports, coordination with other actors, KLE, LNO reports, intelligence activities, polls and surveys, and a wide variety of other information sources. Monitoring focuses particularly on pre-determined commander’s critical information requirements, intelligence requirements (IRs), and indicators.
(b) Evaluating involves the development of metrics to help evaluate progress. Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) answer the question “are the desired effects being created?” Measures of performance (MOPs) answer the questions “are directed actions being accomplished?” or “are we doing things right?” Indicators are information items that help determine the status of MOPs and MOEs and should be measurable (quantitatively or qualitatively), collectable, and relevant. Nonmilitary indicators may partially depend on information from other actors, such as humanitarian organizations. Figure II-3 depicts examples of metrics to assist with assessments.

(c) Recommending or directing action involves application of MOEs, MOPs, and other indicators to inform decision making. MOEs can be useful criteria for decisions to progress to another phase of an operation, conduct transitions, or make significant changes to plans and operations. MOPs can be used as criteria to change procedures or shift the allocation of resources. In some cases, the commander will be able to direct the action required. In other cases, because of a lack of authority, responsibility, or capability, the commander will provide recommendations to superiors or other actors such as HN officials.

(5) Figures II-4 and II-5 provide an example of how assessments can support decisions to conduct a transition, relative to the five peace building elements discussed previously.

![Example Assessment Metrics](image-url)

**Example Assessment Metrics**

**Outcome:**
- Effect, objective, or end state
  - Safe and secure environment

**Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs)**
- Criterion related change in behavior, capability, or operational environment:
  - Decrease in attacks against civilians
  - Public perception of security improved

**Measures of Performance (MOPs)**
- Criterion related to task accomplishment; often answerable by “yes” or “no”
  - Local armed group of perpetrators neutralized
  - Police station in city X operational

**Indicators**
- Informational item related to MOEs or MOPs:
  - Number of weekly attacks against civilians in city X
  - Number of monthly patrols vicinity city X by host nation security forces
  - Number of trained detectives in city X police force
  - Number of matches against the Biometrics Enabled Watch List

**Figure II-3. Example Assessment Metrics**
(a) Figure II-4 addresses an assessment of “cessation of large-scale violence,” which is one of the conditions for human security. While the current situation is deemed satisfactory, there are some concerns with transition preparations from the “initial response” stage. Overall, the status is good.

**Example Assessment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stability Element: Human Security</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Condition: Cessation of Large-Scale Violence</td>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage: Initial Response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date: 23 April 20xx</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Current Situation**
- G) Peacekeeping force deployed: yes
- G) Ceasefire implemented: yes
- Y) Monitoring and control measures in place: nearly complete
- G) CCS planned and implemented: yes
- Y) Violent incidents (past week): 2
- Y) Conflict casualties (past week): 3 killed, 4 wounded

**Transition Preparations**
- G) DDR program planned: yes
- Y) SSR program planned: nearly complete
- G) Mine clearance planned: yes
- Y) Host nation military prepared: partial
- G) New civilian authorities identified: yes
- O) New civilian authorities prepared: partial

**Remarks**
Incoming civilian authorities need facilities and communications. Host nation regional military headquarters lacks effective C2. Peacekeeping force does not have access to northern district.

**Legend**
- C2 command and control
- CCS commander's communication synchronization
- DDR disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
- SSR security sector reform

**Figure II-4. Example Assessment**
(b) Figure II-5 depicts a consolidated assessment of multiple conditions. While human security generally exists, more progress is required in other elements before a low-risk transition from the initial response stage can occur.

![Transition Assessment Table](image-url)

**Legend**
- Green (G): satisfactory
- Yellow (Y): minor concerns, but transition possible
- Orange (O): moderate concerns, transition risky
- Red (R): major concerns, transition should be delayed
- Black (B): extreme problems, current conditions untenable

**Figure II-5. Transition Assessment**
An assessment framework should be a tool that supports effective operations; it should not be a burden that impairs them. In some cases, an elaborate framework is unnecessary because the commander’s understanding is sufficiently comprehensive or because the situation is so urgent that such a framework is infeasible. Developing and maintaining assessment frameworks can require extensive resources—especially personnel—that may be diverted from more critical activities. Assessment frameworks can also cause units to focus on generating “good” numbers by whatever means possible. For example, if a unit is evaluated on the number of daily patrols it conducts, the result may be a large number of brief excursions rather than a few extended multiday patrols that might have better operational effect. Information on the ground is often incomplete or questionable, particularly when it is impossible for a unit to monitor every event in a large OA. As information is reported to progressively higher echelons it may be misinterpreted as being completely accurate and complete. Nevertheless, lack of an effective and systemic assessment framework can result in poor situational understanding, ill-advised operations, and poor information sharing with other organizations.

1. Other Considerations

   (1) **Inclusive Security.** Peace operations may be conducted to protect and secure the human rights of marginalized and vulnerable groups, which often include women, children, the elderly and infirm, and certain identity groups.

      (a) **Women, peace, and security** is an internationally recognized term that includes protective and participatory dimensions and addresses the disproportionate and unique impact of conflict on women. Sexual violence, and other gender-based violence, frequently occurs during conflict and in fragile societies. It is usually, but not always, directed against women and girls. The protective dimension mitigates harm, exploitation, discrimination, abuse, conflict-related sexual violence, and human trafficking, while holding perpetrators accountable. This protective dimension also addresses access to HA, relief, and recovery and protection of human rights. Human trafficking and sexual exploitation and abuse are particularly damaging when conducted by personnel in peace operations. Gender issues also include women’s participation in a nation’s political, economic, and security sectors and institutions, as women are vital to establishing peace and maintaining future stability. This participatory dimension helps to safeguard women’s interests and results in greater stability. Institutions are more effective and societies are more stable when women are integrated rather than marginalized. Executive Order 13595, *Instituting a National Action Plan On Women, Peace, and Security*, which promulgated the *United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security*, directed implementation of the plan throughout the federal government. DOD subsequently created an implementation guide to support the *United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security* and prescribed incorporation of the plan’s objectives into relevant documents. When appropriate, peace operations should integrate the following five objectives from the *United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security*:

   1. **National Integration and Institutionalization.** Peace operations should contribute to gender-responsive policies in conflict-affected environments and support the integration of women into HN positions of responsibility.
2. **Participation in Peace Processes and Decision Making.** Peace operations support prospects for an inclusive, just, and sustainable peace by promoting and strengthening women’s rights, effective leadership, and substantive participation in peace processes, conflict prevention, peace building, transitional processes, and decision-making institutions in conflict-affected environments.

3. **Protection from Violence.** Peace operations should protect women and children from harm; exploitation; discrimination; and abuse, including sexual and gender-based violence and trafficking in persons and hold perpetrators accountable in conflict-affected environments.

4. **Conflict Prevention.** Peace operations support the promotion of women’s roles in conflict prevention; improve conflict early-warning and response systems through the integration of gender perspectives; and assist efforts to invest in women’s and girls’ health, education, and economic opportunity to create conditions for stable societies and lasting peace.

5. **Access to Relief and Recovery.** Peace operations support the distinct needs of women and children in conflict-affected disasters and crises. This includes ensuring safe, equitable access to HA.

(b) **Child Protection.** Peace operations should set conditions that prevent children from becoming victims of violence, exploitation, neglect, and abuse and allow them to grow into healthy and productive adults. Comprising up to fifty percent of the population, children are particularly vulnerable to armed conflict because their needs for care are greater, they are dependent upon others to provide that care, and they have greater vulnerabilities than adults. They particularly suffer from the impact of dislocation and disruption to their normal lives. Children are exposed to a variety of threats including malnutrition; disease; psychological harm; separation from or loss of their families; physical attack; unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO); sexual abuse; child pornography; abduction; forcible conscription as slaves, laborers, or child-soldiers; or auxiliaries, such as lookouts, smugglers, suicide bombers, or messengers. Girls are especially marginalized in some societies and may even be sold into bondage by their families.

1. While the protection of children is a distinct area of focus, it should also be integrated into all other peace operations activities. The military force primarily has a supporting role, as other actors are better able to provide for the unique needs of children. Units may modify their methods and objectives if they know that an adversary’s forces include child-soldiers.

2. Generally, it is best for children to remain with their immediate or extended families. This is not always possible, however, and children may end up in foster homes, orphanages, or gangs or wander alone or in small groups. While many orphanages are reputable and do their best to care for the resident children, others have squalid conditions in which children do not receive adequate care and are subjected to exploitation and abuse. Schools should be an early priority to care for and develop children while establishing a normal environment for communities.
3. Child welfare should be deliberately incorporated into peace building efforts. In addition to improving the current environment, it is an important investment that will pay dividends as children become adults (often within the timeframe of a peace operation). It is particularly important to develop institutional capabilities to deal with children, such as training juvenile specialists within police forces. While military forces will have limited ability to affect these outcomes directly, they can support and enable the creation of effective institutions such as schools, orphanages, juvenile justice systems, recreational opportunities, and medical care. This is done primarily by ensuring a secure environment within which HN actors, NGOs, and international organizations such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) can operate. Military forces can also identify and report needs, monitor progress, and emphasize the importance of child protection with HN counterparts. Civil-military task forces may be established to care for and reintegrate abandoned or abducted children and child-soldiers.

4. Leaders should emphasize the importance of child protection, and personnel should be trained regarding expected standards of behavior and the situations they are likely to encounter. The capture of child-soldiers should be addressed in the plan prior to such operations. For example, child-soldiers that are captured should be separated from other combatants and given the necessary physical and psychological support to be reintegrated into society. Unit plans and operations may account for the likelihood that child-soldiers will be encountered, but the practical impact on tactical operations may be limited due to the difficulty in determining whether an armed and deadly adversary is a child or not.

5. Military units may conduct missions that are specifically related to child protection, such as to secure schools or clear UXO. Other activities, such as routine patrols, can also support the protection of children by being alert for indicators that child protection is deficient. These indicators may include the prevalent behavior of children, the presence of abandoned children or abducted children who have escaped their captors, and information obtained from interviews. Units should be alert for child abuse in institutions such as orphanages and hospitals; this can be mitigated by interacting with patients and orphans while caretakers are not present. In addition to creating the space for child specialists to work, units can respond to identified problems by coordinating for necessary civilian support, if reasonably available. For example, many UN missions will include child protection advisors on their staffs. Ultimately, child abuse should be addressed as a criminal matter by an HN legal apparatus that is capable of handling such incidents.

(c) A peace operation should safeguard other groups that may be vulnerable. Ethnic, religious, and other identity groups may become victims of violent acts including mass atrocities. DCs may encounter violence when they seek to return and reclaim their homes. Military forces should anticipate such problems and ensure adequate security is provided to these groups. This may require physical protection as well as coordination with other actors and effective CCS.

(2) **HN Capacity.** Ultimately, the HN must have the capacity to assume the responsibilities of a peace operation, to include sustaining a safe and secure environment
in which civilians are protected from different threats while fostering good governance, the rule of law, a sustainable economy, and social well-being. These efforts will depend upon capable HN actors from the military, police, and civilian sectors. One of the most significant efforts is the improvement of HN policing, and military forces may be able to contribute to this and other nonmilitary capacity building activities.

(a) HN capacity has short-term, mid-term, and long-term dimensions; realistic objectives should be determined accordingly. Plans for immediate HA needs (such as providing food or creating security units that are comprised of members of an ethnic group) could differ from lasting developmental goals (such as self-sustaining infrastructure or security forces that are ethnically integrated and represent the society’s cross-sections).

(b) Military forces will be mostly concerned with the capacities of military and other security actors, but should not ignore capacities related to non-security sectors. In some cases, military forces can support other international actors who in turn are attempting to improve HN institutions. In other cases, military forces may directly assist in improving HN capacity and capability. One of the objectives of coordination with other participants should be an increase in collective capacity to protect civilians.

(c) HN actors will have diverse requirements, and military forces may be limited in their authorities and resources regarding the support they can provide. Generally, military forces can help build partner capability and capacity in any of the following ways:

1. Provide advisors and mentors. In addition to providing technical assistance on security affairs, advisors should emphasize such issues as respect for human rights, the proper treatment of civilians, civil-military relations, and enforcement of the rule of law.

2. Assist with development of administrative and logistics systems (such as pay, training, maintenance for security forces).

3. Monitor and, if necessary, restrain other actors regarding protection of civilians and human rights.

4. Assist with assessing, planning, and monitoring efforts to achieve any of the peace operation’s objectives.

5. Provide or upgrade facilities and bases from which other actors may operate.

6. Provide security for other actors.

7. Provide transportation, communications, medical, or other logistics support to other actors (either on a routine or emergency basis).

8. Provide personnel augmentation to other actors.
9. Support and reinforce efforts of other participants through CCS and military engagement.

10. Enable scientific collaboration from the forensics and biometrics communities.

(3) Technology. Many contingents in multinational peace operations are not technologically advanced, lacking equipment such as night vision devices and adequate communications. When they are available, the usefulness of such items is hampered by lack of adequate training and maintenance systems. UN peace operations have recently begun improving technological capabilities, and related US contributions can be particularly valuable.

(a) Monitoring and Surveillance. High-resolution day and night sensors, radars, and optics can provide early warning of crises and improved situational awareness on the ground and from the air and space. Some missions may have a limited number of unmanned aerial systems, though their use may be constrained by the HN.

(b) Protection. Some missions will face asymmetric threats and may need to employ various technologies to counter IEDs, UASs, and indirect fire weapons. Technologies may also be employed to support the protection of civilians.

(c) Sustainment. Asset tracking technologies can monitor the status of inventories and distribution. Emerging energy technologies and water purification and recycling systems can greatly reduce supply requirements and enable the flexible repositioning of UN forces in remote areas. Biometrics as a receipt verification protocol can dramatically limit black marketeering or other fraudulent receipt of relief supplies.

(d) Identity Activities. During peace operations, commanders employ identity activities to help establish a safe and secure environment, reinstitute proper governance, and manage resources. Biometrics capabilities support vetting and screening activities, encourage participation in representative government, enhance physical security and access, and strengthen efforts to protect the civilian population. It can support rule of law, victim identification, and response to atrocities.

For more information, refer to Joint Doctrine Note 2-16, Identity Activities.

(e) Nonlethal Weapons. The ROE should address use of nonlethal weapons, and US forces should be trained in the proper use of all nonlethal weapons to be employed in the operation. Nonlethal weapons and other means that can create nonlethal effects can support the commander’s objectives during peace operations.

For more information, refer to ATP 3-22.40 (Field Manual [FM] 3-22.40)/Marine Corps Tactical Publication (MCTP) 10-10A (Marine Corps Warfighting Publication [MCWP] 3-15.8)/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-07.3.2/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.45/Coast Guard Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (CGTTP) 3-93.2, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for
Planning for Peace Operations

Nonlethal Weapons; JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks; and Army Training Circular 3-19.5, Nonlethal Weapons Training.

3. Challenges

   a. Complex environments, mandates, and tasks make peace operations inherently challenging, especially as there will usually be gaps between the mission’s requirements and the available resources. Gaps create mission risks, which can be mitigated by prioritizing objectives, efforts, locations, units to support, vulnerable populations to protect, and actors to influence; economizing in noncritical areas; flexibility and adaptability; and measures to improve or increase capabilities and capacities.

   b. Corruption may be the biggest obstacle to developing a capable HN that can eventually assume the responsibilities of a peace operation. Often, a fine line exists between corrupt activities (such as bribes, misappropriation, and nepotism) and legitimate practices (such as gifts, reallocation of resources, and patronage) that may have different levels of cultural acceptability, with varying interpretations among local, international, and even partner nation actors. Corruption is not just an HN problem, but can also be found in international organizations including multinational partners, contractors, and others. Corruption diverts resources from their intended purposes, which can greatly undermine a peace operation. It also empowers belligerents, threatens responsible actors, and fosters a culture of impunity rather than a culture of lawfulness.

   c. A peace operation may be constrained in its authority and responsibility. Constraints may include limitations on where operations are conducted, the types of operations permitted, ROE, restrictions on activities such as intelligence collection or the ability to conduct investigations, and limited latitude to support some of the nonmilitary efforts commonly associated with peace building. These constraints may originate from the mission’s political leadership, the mandate, the political leadership and laws of the nations that provide forces, SOFAs, and the laws and authorities of the HN.

   d. Unity of effort is another common challenge. Military forces can help provide security so other actors have space within which to operate; ultimately, a successful peace operation depends upon the effectiveness of police forces and other HN organizations assisted by international organizations with the necessary nonmilitary expertise. Other actors should have the lead role for many of the required efforts. This assortment of actors will have different interests and objectives, and their willingness to cooperate with the military force will vary. Additionally, they will be responsive to different lines of authority. Although a comprehensive approach resulting in unity of effort is widely understood to be vital, achieving it will be a difficult challenge in the best of circumstances.
CHAPTER III
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

“Peacekeeping is not a soldier’s job, but only a soldier can do it.”
Dag Hammarskjold
Secretary-General of the United Nations 1953-1961

1. General

PKO consist of military support to diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts to establish or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict. The US has participated in and supported many UN-sponsored PKO.

2. Description of Peacekeeping Operations

a. PKO take place following diplomatic negotiation and agreement among the parties to a dispute, the sponsoring organization, and potential force-contributing nations. Before PKO begin, a credible truce or cease fire must be in effect, and the parties to the dispute must consent to the operation. PKO are conducted in an open and highly conspicuous manner (transparency). A main function of the PKO force is to establish a presence that inhibits hostile actions by the disputing parties and bolsters confidence in the peace process. PKO support continuing peace building efforts to achieve long-term political settlements and normalized peaceful relations. The US may participate in PKO as a lead nation, as a contingent force, unilaterally, or by providing staff officers or United Nations military experts on mission (UNMEMs). These personnel may be categorized as UN military observers, UN military LNOs, or UN military advisors.

b. Once the UNSC mandates a PKO, the UN generally requires at least six months to generate and deploy forces to the OA. As such, a single nation or multinational bridging force is often necessary to maintain stability until the UN reaches full operational capability. Bridging forces can be generated from a group of nations operating from a common interest (with one country often designated as lead nation); a regional security organization, such as NATO, AU, or EU; or a single national contingent. Political will and national interest play large roles in a nation’s level of participation in a PKO or bridging force. Often, the same nations participating in a bridging force will continue to serve in the UN PKO. C2 poses the biggest challenge when shifting from the conflict period to the bridging force and finally to the UN.

3. Fundamentals of Peacekeeping Operations

a. Consent. PKO require an invitation or, at a minimum, consent of all the major parties to the conflict. The peacekeeping force remains effective only with this consent, which includes recognition of the host government’s authority.

b. Restraint and Minimum Force. Peacekeeping forces are restricted to using force only in self-defense and in defense of the mandate. A major challenge during peacekeeping
is effectively dealing with situations of extreme tension and violence without becoming a party to the conflict. When the OE does not permit restraint, a mission change or a mandate change should be requested.

c. **Impartiality, Credibility, and Legitimacy.** While a peacekeeping force is impartial to a dispute, it may be mandated to support the improvement of host government capacity. This can be problematic if the peacekeeping force is perceived as favoring one of the parties concerned, as the trust of the other party will be compromised or lost. Once lost, the peacekeeping force will find it difficult to implement the mandate. Demonstrated impartiality is essential to establish and maintain the legitimacy of the PKO.

4. **Peacekeeping Personnel and Peace Operations Forces**

US military personnel may perform a wide variety of peacekeeping functions. They may be detailed to serve on a UN staff or other multinational staff or as a UNMEM. The US may also participate in peacekeeping by providing officers to United Nations Headquarters (UNHQ) in New York.

a. UNMEMs are traditionally deployed unarmed to observe, record, and report, and are prohibited from bringing Service or privately owned weapons and ammunition into the mission area. Decisions authorizing exceptions to this practice are made at UNHQ in New York, following a request from the HOM through the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG), based on a security risk assessment. Military observers serve as members of an observer group and carry out such tasks as vehicle patrols in sensitive areas, local negotiations between rival forces, and special investigations. Their presence is intended to be sufficient to deter violations. By providing accurate, up-to-date, and impartial reports, UNMEMs help reduce the number of claims and counterclaims by the disputing parties. UNMEMs rely strongly on their impartial status and a permissive peacekeeping environment. In scenarios where a military force is also present, the UNMEMs work in conjunction with the military force but usually in a separate observer or advisory organizations reporting to the force HQ. The Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) is the DOD executive agent for DOD personnel support to UN missions, IAW DODD 2065.01E, *DOD Personnel Support to the United Nations*. As such, SECARMY is responsible for the administration of personnel support to the United States Military Observer Group (USMOG). DODD 2065.01E charges the SECARMY with the following in relation to DOD personnel supporting the UN:

1. Oversees all DOD personnel assigned to the UN through the Commander, USMOG, so mission requirements, administrative requirements or control, and logistics demands of the personnel are met.

2. The USMOG Commander, acting on behalf of SECARMY, assumes responsibility for implementation. When directed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, SECARMY coordinates with the Secretaries of other Military Departments and heads of DOD agencies to provide personnel to support peace operations. US UNMEMs perform observer duties under the control of the observer group chief of staff (COS) or commander designated by the sponsoring organization. When detailed as UNMEMs, US
personnel do not normally report to the GCC. Pursuant to Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 2000.12, *DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program*, GCCs exercise tactical control for FP for DOD personnel assigned to the UN in their respective geographic areas of responsibility.

b. The force size and mix will vary depending on the mission, mandate, and threat in the OA. Peacekeeping forces may include units or personnel with specialized abilities such as language skills, engineering, decontamination, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), identity activities (forensic-enabled intelligence, biometrics-enabled intelligence, document and media exploitation), military information support operations (MISO), and civil affairs (CA) operations. Peacekeeping forces should be mobile, capable of self-defense, and self-sufficient until logistic resupply channels can be established. The JFC should ensure there are sufficient female personnel across those forces. Additionally, the JFC should advocate for sufficient female personnel from the PCC.

1. Ground forces may supervise or assist in the separation of opposing sides to establish a buffer zone (BZ) or demilitarized zone (DMZ). The peacekeeping force controls and surveys the line of demarcation, which facilitates the disengagement and withdrawal of disputing party forces, discourages infiltration confrontations, and assists in resolving local disputes. Ground operations will involve observation and monitoring of military and paramilitary units within a specified area. Military police (MP)/security force units, in particular, have experience in exercising authority in tense circumstances while controlling escalation. Their image as a police force, rather than a combat force, may help defuse tensions. Ground force support capabilities include those in Figure III-1.

### Ground Force Support Capabilities

- Observing, monitoring, and reporting
- Maintaining public order and protecting civilians and public officials
- Support to elections
- Delivery and protection of humanitarian assistance efforts
- Manning of checkpoints and patrolling
- Force protection
- Medical support
- Limited construction of critical infrastructure
- Supervising truces and cease fires
- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
- Crowd control
- Negotiation and mediation
- Interposition between parties to the conflict
- Demobilization and disarmament
- Personnel recovery
- Inspection of facilities
- Training
- Operational contract support

*Figure III-1. Ground Force Support Capabilities*
(2) Air forces conduct air and space operations, which provide the speed, range, and flexibility to rapidly cover large areas. Air forces can meet a wide range of peacekeeping operational requirements. These include the air forces’ support capabilities listed in Figure III-2.

(3) Maritime forces provide support capabilities listed in Figure III-3. They support the HN in monitoring its territorial waters, securing the coastline, and support to build the HN’s maritime capabilities. They also conduct or augment ground and air forces support capabilities (e.g., delivery of humanitarian aid, combat air patrol, intelligence collection, medical evacuation, personnel recovery [PR]). Additionally, maritime forces can provide harbor movement control and port security to safeguard vessels, harbors, waterfront facilities, and cargo. Maritime forces may also conduct operations on inland waterways. The United States Coast Guard (USCG) may provide additional support capabilities to improve port security capacity and maritime governance through its International Port Security Program. Activities to improve port security are conducted by many entities including other USG departments and agencies and international organizations. Additionally, the International Port Security Program helps present a principal face to international trading partners who are often confused by the myriad of security inspections (e.g., customs, agriculture, or immigration) by various entities.

For more information on medical evacuation, see DODI 6000.11, Patient Movement, and DODI 4515.13, Air Transportation Eligibility, for guidance on movement of non-DOD traffic on DOD transportation assets. For more information on the USCG’s International Port Security Program, see Commandant Instruction 16618.7, International Port Security Program.

(4) Special operations forces (SOF) can play a significant role in peacekeeping because of their unique capabilities, training, and experience. SOF often have detailed
regional knowledge of cultures and languages, as well as experience working with indigenous forces. In working by, with, and through local partners, SOF can make significant additions to the intelligence picture for the commander. SOF can form small, versatile, self-contained units that can rapidly deploy and provide a full spectrum of air, ground, and maritime support with links to space-based assets. SOF capabilities are particularly important in peacekeeping to enable an understanding of the complexity of operating in cross-cultural environments. SOF, when properly directed, can support sensitive missions such as reconnaissance and capture operations targeting war crimes suspects. Due to limited numbers of SOF personnel and high demand for their use, commanders should ensure tasks are appropriate for SOF employment.

For further guidance on special operations capabilities, refer to JP 3-05, Special Operations.

(5) MISO can assist in facilitating cooperation between the disputing parties, their supporters, and the peacekeeping force. MISO can help create favorable attitudes and behavior on the part of disputing parties and uncommitted segments of the population. For example, MISO may provide the capability to develop, produce, and disseminate a wide variety of products to inform all parties about the role of the peacekeeping force, the requirements of the mandate, locations of critical services, and information that can assist in bridging cross-cultural gaps between peacekeeping forces and indigenous populations.

For additional information on MISO, refer to JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations, and CJCSI 3110.05, Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.
(6) In peacekeeping, CMO are conducted to foster a cooperative relationship between military forces, participating civilian organizations, and the governments and populations within the OA. When conducting CMO, the commander may employ a number of military capabilities with many different indigenous populations and institutions, international organizations, NGOs, and HN organizations. Among these capabilities are military information support (MIS) teams and CA forces. CA assist commanders in conducting CMO and are technically qualified and experienced in six functional specialty areas: rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information. CA teams can provide the following support: area assessments (including input of all applicable data into the commander’s common operational picture); cultural awareness training; liaison and coordination among US, multinational, and indigenous forces; advice and assistance in handling DCs; coordination of host-nation support (HNS); and the establishment of CMOCs. CMO require careful consideration and planning to prevent the risk of appearing partial to one or more disputing parties.

For additional information on CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

5. Peacekeeping Tasks

Peacekeeping tasks usually involve observing and monitoring compliance with a peace agreement. Depending on the mandate, a peacekeeping mission may also be tasked to protect civilians, support the provision of HA, and support nation-building efforts.

a. Observation and Monitoring. Observation and monitoring tasks are performed primarily by unarmed UNMEMs, but may also be performed by other peacekeeping forces. In either case, they help ensure the agreements are followed by the parties to the dispute. UN observer groups may also use civilian personnel or police as observers. The success of these missions depends on the willingness of the disputing parties to comply with the terms of the accord or agreement. This willingness may exist because UNMEMs have established a visible presence and are able to detect violations of agreements. Typical observation activities include:

(1) Observing, monitoring, verifying, and reporting any alleged violation of the governing agreements. Agreements may include treaties, truces, cease fires, arms control agreements, or any other binding agreements between the disputing parties.

(2) Investigating alleged ceasefire violations, boundary incidents, and complaints. This may include incidents, unauthorized troop movements, and construction or reinforcing of defensive positions. An investigation provides evidence regarding violations of the agreements and may involve negotiation or mediation, to include direct dialogue between the disputing parties.

(3) Negotiating and mediating. UNMEMs may undertake negotiations on behalf of the disputing parties to mediate low-level disputes. Reconciliation of differences at the lowest possible level often contributes to the overall success of the peacekeeping mission.
(4) **Conducting regular liaison visits within the OA.** Disputes thrive on rumors, uncertainty, and prejudice. Liaison visits establish a presence to build confidence in the agreement, maintain personal contact, and allow for a timely and routine exchange of information with disputing parties, the HN, local civilian officials, NGOs, international organizations, the peacekeeping mission, and other actors.

(5) **Maintaining up-to-date information on the disposition of disputing forces within the OA.** This requires periodically visiting forward positions to observe and report on the disposition of forces of the disputing parties.

(6) **Verifying the storage or destruction of certain categories of military equipment specified in the relevant agreements.**

b. **Supervision and Assistance.** Peacekeeping forces undertaking these tasks require, in most cases, large service-support organizations, equipment, and finances. In addition to the tasks performed by UNMEMs in observation missions, peacekeeping forces may perform the tasks described below:

(1) **Supervising ceasefires.** Once a ceasefire is arranged, peacekeeping forces may observe and report on the disputing parties’ compliance with a ceasefire. If the mandate so specifies, the force may have to deploy on the territory of more than one nation to perform its mission. The tempo and outcome of diplomatic activities taken to establish a credible ceasefire are often unpredictable, and negotiations to constitute and insert a peacekeeping force may occur simultaneously.

(2) **Supervising disengagements and withdrawals.** If required, establishment of a BZ between disputed parties is a high priority to help ensure an uneventful disengagement and withdrawal. Peacekeeping forces may mediate disagreements in the positioning of the disputing parties’ forces, verify troop and equipment dispositions, and, if authorized, provide assistance to the civilian population in the BZ.

(3) **Supervising detainee exchanges.** At any stage in the resolution of a dispute, peacekeeping forces may supervise and assist in detainee exchanges between the parties.

(4) **Supervising demobilization and demilitarization.** The parties to the dispute may agree to demobilization or demilitarization of their forces. Peacekeeping forces may supervise and assist in these activities and provide progress reports to the sponsoring organization.

(5) **Assisting civil authorities.** Peacekeeping forces may assist civil authorities in such functions as supervision of elections, establishment or restoration of the rule of law, transfer of authority, partitioning of territory, evacuation, convoy escort, or the temporary administration of civil functions. CA units, in coordination with the CMOC, can provide advice and assistance in the execution of these functions.

(6) **Assisting in the maintenance of public order.** Peacekeeping forces may assist in the reestablishment or maintenance of public order. The responsibility for public order rests primarily with civilian police. However, military assistance may be required if
there has been a breakdown in the civil police structure or if the situation exceeds the police’s capacity to control it.

(7) Supporting foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations. Although FHA is not a peace operation, it may be necessary for peacekeeping forces to provide security for, as well as to supervise the offloading and transfer of HA supplies until FHA operations are fully established. It may also be necessary for peacekeeping forces to provide transportation, security, or communication support for international organizations, NGOs, and other agencies. CA teams provide the commander a resource to plan, coordinate, and improve new or existing assistance programs in support of FHA.

*For further guidance on FHA, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.*

### 6. Command and Control for Peacekeeping Operations

C2 relationships are established prior to the PKO in the appropriate operation plan (OPLAN), order, directive, or other authoritative correspondence. With continual mission analysis and revised plans crucial in any military operation, the C2 relationships may be adjusted to the situation.

a. **US Policy.** The President retains command authority over US forces assigned as a contingent to a multinational peacekeeping force. The US contingent commander remains within the US chain of command. On a case-by-case basis, the President may consider placing appropriate US forces under the OPCON of a multinational force commander (MNFC).

b. **UN Policy.** UN PKO are established by the UNSC and fall under its authority. The UNSG reports to the UNSC on the organization, conduct, and direction of the operation. The UNSG implements UNSCRs or mandates and monitors all UN peacekeeping missions. The UNSG will appoint a UN peacekeeping force commander and a UN HOM. The force commander is a military officer from a nation not involved in the dispute, whose qualifications are acceptable to the UNSC. Additionally, the force commander must also be acceptable to the HN and all the parties to the dispute.

1. The HOM is normally a professional diplomat and is frequently designated as the SRSR. The UN peace operations force commander is responsible to the HOM for ensuring military activities support the mission.

2. The US contingent commander may be under the OPCON of the UN commander. However, US forces will remain within the US chain of command.

c. **MNF HQ.** Although the UN has standard organizations for force HQ, each will likely have some unique features. A force HQ staff is normally organized as follows:

1. The MNFC’s personal staff normally consists of a military assistant; a legal adviser; medical adviser; a military public information officer; a provost marshal; a chief security advisor; and specialists on gender, child protection, and conflict-related sexual violence. Each MNFC will also normally have a deputy commander.
(2) The MNF military staff normally consists of a COS; a deputy COS; and functional staff elements such as personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, communications, training, engineer, and civil-military coordination. The military staff may also include air operations, maritime operations, LNOs, and other functions. Linguists, interpreters, and translators should be included to facilitate communications. Smaller missions will normally have a deputy COS for operations, and larger missions will likely have deputy COSs for operations, operations support, and personnel, evaluation, and training.

(3) The civilian staff, provided by the UN Secretariat in New York, at a minimum, consists of a chief administrative officer. The chief administrative officer is responsible for the direction of all administrative matters having financial management implications, as well as for the overall direction of the force’s administration.

For more information on UN military staff organization and procedures, refer to the UNDPKO/UNDFS Force Headquarters Handbook.

d. Command. The MNFC may be given OPCON over US and other military units assigned to the peacekeeping force. The MNFC will ensure the national contingent commanders perform assigned tasks consistent with the mandate and the peacekeeping force’s mission.

(1) A national contingent consists of a nation’s entire contribution. National contingent commanders are responsible for disciplinary action within their own contingents, IAW their national military law. The authority for national contingent commanders to carry out their national laws in the HN’s territory should be included in the SOFA and/or SOMA for the peacekeeping mission. The MNFC may discuss a major disciplinary breach with a contingent commander or, if applicable and warranted, may refer the matter to the SRSG.

(2) Each contingent commander is responsible for accomplishing assigned tasks, communicating changes in the situation, and responding to the needs and the directives of the MNFC. Figure C-1 in Appendix C, “Command Relationships,” shows a notional chain of command for a peacekeeping mission.

e. Commander’s Directive. The MNFC’s directive should clearly outline who is empowered to give orders to contingents and under what circumstances. US contingent commanders may issue directives based on their own mission analysis and the MNFC’s directive. An MNFC’s directive should include:

(1) The degree of C2 the MNFC has over national contingents by covering such topics as:

(a) Appointment and authority of the peacekeeping force commander.

(b) Applicability of national laws and regulations to personnel in the various contingents.
(c) Support responsibilities and procedures.

(2) Appointment of subordinate commanders, especially those detached from the main body.

(3) Individuals authorized to issue directives and instructions to the unit, as well as under what circumstances.

(4) Subunit OAs and tasks.

(5) Methods of operation and deployment.

(6) Reserve forces.

(7) States of readiness.

(8) Succession to command.

(9) Location of forces and unit HQ.

(10) Peace operations force composition.

(11) Identification; for example, the wearing of peace operations force distinctive identification (headgear, badges, and armbands) and marking of vehicles and positions.

(12) Duration of duty and policies on liberty and rest and recuperation (R&R).

(13) Relationship with the host government; its local administration, armed forces, and police; and other organizations and agencies in the OA.

(14) Powers of search and seizure and rights of entry.

(15) Media relations, including guidance on when and through whom operational information may be provided.

(16) FP measures, to include information and communications security.

(17) Off-duty regulations and restrictions.

(18) Biometric sharing agreements.

7. Peacekeeping Planning Considerations

a. The mandate, TOR, and SOFA or SOMA are important sources of information for mission analysis and planning. Additionally, commanders and staffs may gain valuable insights by reviewing the lessons learned from previous PKO or training exercises. PKO may be initiated on relatively short notice, requiring extraordinary effort to develop a complete plan, identify, and build a HQ staff.
b. SOPs for PKOs are especially useful given their extended duration, multinational contingent participation, and specific cultural and environmental considerations.

c. When practical, the JFC should consider having the staff develop an area information handbook to orient joint force members to the mission; OA; history of the conflict and its parties, religious, cultural, and economic factors; and other important information about the environment in which they will be operating. Other sources include country team personnel, PA, intelligence personnel, foreign area officers, CMO, MISO, and SOF.

d. Successful planning and employment requires detailed coordination at all levels. Therefore, LNOs should be identified to assist the commander and staff as they coordinate plans and actions among the peacekeeping contingents, the UN or other international organizations, NGOs, other agencies, and local authorities. The latter may include military leaders, local officials, customs, transportation authorities, and police. A CMOC provides a venue for coordination between the military and these organizations.

e. **Logistics.** There are some differences in how logistic support is provided in PKO. Consequently, logisticians’ involvement in the planning process from the very beginning will help to ensure mission success. The ad hoc and multinational nature of PKO demands careful and detailed logistic planning. This is particularly true in UN-sponsored PKO.

(1) In UN PKO, the deployed elements of UNDFS comprise a mission support directorate that makes arrangements for goods and services common to all the contingents, such as for water, some food items, fuel, and billeting. It may be provided directly or reimbursed. However, the UN requires time to contract for this support. Consequently, and to the extent possible, when peacekeeping forces initially deploy, they should be self-sufficient for a minimum of 60 days. National contingents are responsible for all logistic support that is unique to their requirements. Normally, US forces will be supported through a combination of scheduled US resupply, contracted support, HNS, and UN logistic support. Other logistic considerations for multinational operations include the possibility of role specialization and a lead nation provider for certain classes of supply or services.

(2) In non-UN-sponsored operations, a single nation may be responsible for planning and coordinating logistic support for the peacekeeping force. For example, in the MNF and observers in the Sinai Peninsula, the US is responsible for logistic support to all national contingents, to include supply, transportation, maintenance, communications, small arms maintenance, movement control, financial management, postal, health services, EOD, and mortuary affairs. However, many of these requirements may be satisfied through commercial contracts and require reimbursements from the participating or requesting nations or agencies.

*For more information on US role in health service support during humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, see JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.*

(3) OCS is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of CCDR-directed operations through the
related contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor management functions. Planning for contracted support has also become increasingly critical due to the recognition that, in some operations, supplies and services delivered through contracts may, when planned and executed properly, have positive impacts on the civil-military aspects of the operation or campaign. OCS will generally be necessary in PKO and may include theater support contracting through a Service or joint contingency contracting support organization or from a Service management external support contract such as the Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, the Navy Global Contingency Construction Multiple Award Contract and Global Contingency Service Multiple Award Contract, or the Air Force’s contract augmentation program. Effective advance parties include contracting personnel to assure the necessary level of support for the US contingent force. Planners should also be aware that, in some regions, reliability and timeliness of contractor performance may not be the same as in developed areas. When the US participates in UN PKO, direct coordination between US military planning staffs and UN planners should be authorized to ensure effective and responsive support to US forces. While various countries have their own contracting authorities and funding, efficiencies may be realized through the co-location of contracting offices. Additionally, the use of contractors includes contractor management for the oversight of contractor personnel and associated equipment.

For further guidance on OCS, refer to JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

(4) For UN PKO, many of the costs incurred by the US are reimbursable by the UN. The UN issues detailed guidance explaining the logistic support provided by the UN and the procedures for participating nations to follow to receive reimbursement for other support. US units that participate in UN PKO must provide a detailed accounting for all costs incurred in the operations to justify UN reimbursement. UN and US or MNF standards for various types of logistic support may be different, and special costs and complications may ensue. Early determination of these differences is important and specific agreements should spell out exactly who is to provide specified support to whom, for what period, and in what quantities. CA and CMO staff should be involved in coordinating and tracking any logistics or logistics activities involving HN or civilian personnel.

(5) PKO are often conducted in austere theaters where there may be limited or inadequate air and seaport facilities. If the HN has insufficient capability or capacity to support offloading at their ports, US support personnel should deploy before the scheduled arrival of the US contingent force. In some cases, existing facilities may require expansion or new facilities constructed to handle incoming forces. It may also require joint logistics over-the-shore operations. Repositioning of additional materials handling equipment may also be necessary.

(6) Logistic planners will also determine if existing bilateral HNS agreements containing logistic support provisions applicable to the sustainment of US contingent forces are adequate. If not in existence, logisticians should be actively involved in their formulation—a process that may take 12-24 months. Activation of HNS agreements are
not necessarily automatic during PKO. Approval by the concerned governments may be necessary.

*For detailed information on multinational logistic planning, refer to JP 4-08, Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations.*

f. **Intelligence and Information Gathering.** The overt collection of information that is readily available or observable can provide significant intelligence. Use of the term “intelligence” in the context of UN peacekeeping can be politically sensitive. However, the UN recognizes the value of focused, fused information analysis to enhance the MNFC’s situational awareness. Intelligence support can also assess the needs of the population; infrastructure; and the effects of politics, history, and culture. Commanders and their staffs should seek to share information and intelligence, within appropriate guidelines and OPSEC considerations, with other contingents of the multinational peacekeeping force, and selected international organizations and NGOs, while protecting sources and methods.

*For further guidance on intelligence support, refer to JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.*

g. **Communication Systems.** Attention to cybersecurity during the planning phase will facilitate cross domain (network) information transfer and decrease the potential for DOD system compromises. Units must protect systems even in unclassified peacekeeping environments. Additionally, interoperability and bandwidth requirements and capabilities should be addressed.

*For additional information, see JP 6-0, Joint Communication Systems.*

h. **FP.** FP is a high priority for a deployed peacekeeping force. Strict impartiality, as previously mentioned, may reduce the threat to the force. ROE are also essential to provide for appropriate action to protect the force. The US contingent commander sets and enforces standards of physical security for US forces in coordination with the peace operations force commander and the supported CCDR. Some FP considerations include the following:

(1) Coordination with HN civil police, supporting MP units, CA teams, and MIS units.

(2) Terrorism poses serious threats for the peacekeeping mission. Effective antiterrorism (AT) training and measures should be planned and executed to reduce this threat. Adequate precautions will protect personnel, positions, HQ, transportation assets, infrastructure, facilities, and billets.

*For further guidance on AT, refer to JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.*

(3) The peacekeeping force may become a target for criminal activity or dissatisfied or desperate people.

(4) Vulnerability to attacks with mines, IEDs, UASs, rocket propelled grenades, or indirect fires.
(5) Peacekeeping forces may have limited ability to check the backgrounds of local employees. US law prohibits providing funds to the enemy per Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 2302.

(6) Peacekeeping forces may have limited communications-security capabilities.

(7) The FP plan should be modified at irregular intervals to avoid predictable behavior patterns that can be exploited by adversaries.

(8) Units should plan and train for PR scenarios.

For further guidance on PR, refer to JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

(9) Units should be trained with capabilities that produce lethal and nonlethal effects to enable escalation of force and FP.

(10) Commanders and staffs should consider protection measures necessary to mitigate adverse effects to personnel, equipment, and critical assets from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards and toxic industrial materials. The risk to the force could stem from CBRN attacks or supporting the final disposition of contaminated or infected human remains.

For further guidance on CBRN, refer to JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.

i. Peacekeeping Reserve Forces. Although a multinational peacekeeping force may designate a reserve force, the US contingent commander may also designate a US reserve. Reserves should be sufficiently armed, trained, equipped, funded, advantageously located, and mobile. When employed, the reserve will normally deploy in a high-profile, nontactical manner with the UN or MNF force markings or flags clearly displayed.

j. Contingency Planning. Contingency planning in peacekeeping missions is challenging because UN organizations typically do not have robust planning staffs. Additionally, UN organizations are reluctant to formally consider politically sensitive, hypothetical scenarios, particularly if doing so would undermine HN consent or perceptions of the UN’s impartiality. Peacekeeping forces may develop plans and SOPs for different states of readiness and potential situations such as evacuation, response to disasters, handling of displaced persons, or other situations.

(1) The peacekeeping force HQ will normally have three states of readiness: normal vigilance, increased vigilance, and full alert. Each increase in the state of readiness will be complemented by restrictions on R&R, training, and certain operations. Changes in the states of readiness are normally implemented only by the peacekeeping force commander. In an emergency, a US contingent commander may order a higher state of readiness, but must immediately inform the peacekeeping force HQ.

(2) A peacekeeping force may need to be evacuated if armed conflict breaks out or the disputing parties withdraw consent. This may occur in part of the mission area and
evacuation of the entire force may be ordered by the appropriate authority, in extreme situations. If ordered to evacuate, the peacekeeping force commander is responsible for the safe and timely evacuation of the peacekeeping force, visitors, observer groups in the area, and personnel affiliated with the sponsoring organization. The peacekeeping force may also be directed to evacuate other personnel such as humanitarian workers, third country nationals, or HN persons at risk. The US contingent commander plans for the possibility the US contingent may need to be evacuated unilaterally. In this instance, the US contingent commander coordinates with the peacekeeping force HQ to determine if the contingent’s positions and tasks are to be transferred to another organization or abandoned. The US contingent commander coordinates evacuation plans with the supported GCC who has responsibility to evacuate the US contingent. Evacuation plans include specific instructions for destroying critical items, equipment, and other assets that cannot be removed. Every attempt should be made to evacuate medical supplies and equipment. Those items which cannot be evacuated will be abandoned; however, such abandonment is a command decision. Medical supplies and equipment are protected under the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and may not be intentionally destroyed.

(3) Contingency plans may be developed to address response procedures for potential natural or man-made disasters. CA and MISO can provide the interaction with civilian authorities and relevant indigenous populations and institutions. Personnel accountability procedures should also be addressed for all personnel, including military, DOD civilians, and civilian contractors under their control.

(4) DCs can pose significant challenges, and contingency plans for any emergency should address the likelihood of increased numbers of DCs. The TORs and SOPs should include considerations for DC support. Commanders must determine the capability of care required to support these operations, especially preventive medicine, and should consider the fiscal authority to render HA. A determination must be made regarding the eligibility of personnel for care by the peacekeeping force. MP, CA teams, and MIS teams are trained to assist in these activities.

For more information on DCs, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

(5) Handling of requests for asylum should be outlined in the peacekeeping force SOPs or other documents available to commanders. Granting requests for asylum can compromise the impartiality of the peacekeeping force.

(6) **Mass Atrocities.** A peacekeeping force may be required to prevent or respond to mass atrocity situations, possibly to take action against perpetrators if authorized by the mandate. In most recent UN missions, peacekeepers are mandated to protect civilians within their capabilities and areas of employment.

See Appendix B, “Protection of Civilians,” for additional information on MARO.

k. **Special Considerations.** A number of special considerations apply to PKO.

(1) Peacekeeping personnel will be required to conduct many independent actions with a high degree of professionalism, self-discipline, flexibility, patience, and tact.
(2) Peacekeeping personnel will encounter differences in cultural norms, work ethics, and standards of professionalism among other national contingents; these differences require understanding and respect. National participants in peacekeeping missions are expected to conform to UN standards of conduct. However, US forces must always comply with US standards based on US law and regulations, even where more relaxed UN standards exist.

(3) The peacekeeping force will have an impact on the local economy. Although the presence of the peacekeeping force may stimulate growth in the local economy, commanders must also be aware of the potential negative impacts on the economy, including after the peacekeeping force departs. Policies may be developed to reduce these impacts, such as regulating the amount of dollars US personnel are allowed to convert to local currency and paying local civilians hired to support the US contingent force the prevailing wages for the area. The policy on leave, pass, liberty, and R&R should also consider these economic impacts.

(4) Peacekeeping forces may wish to avoid the development of elaborate base camps and support facilities that could lead to a perception of a planned permanent presence by the local population.

(5) Coordination with other USG departments and agencies, international organizations, NGOs, civil society organizations, and UN agencies will be an important part of the PKO.

(6) Medical assistance to the local population or other contingents may become part of the mission, requiring advanced planning for legality and procedures, as well as avoidance of marked improvements to quality of life that would not be sustained following conclusion of the peace operation.

For more information on US role in medical support planning with progression of PKO, see JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

(7) Nonlethal weapons give commanders a wide array of options in developing and implementing measured responses to a given situation. Use of nonlethal weapons requires special training to ensure they are properly used and effectively integrated with lethal weapons and other capabilities. Nonlethal weapon usage during any escalation of force situation may reduce HN civilian casualties, which is of strategic importance due to the nature of the PKO and the need for forces to gain the trust of the local citizens.

For more information on the employment of nonlethal weapons, refer to ATP 3-22.40 (FM 3-22.40)/MCTP 10-10A (MCWP 3-15.8)/NTTP 3-07.3.2/AFTTP 3-2.45/CGTTP 3-93.2, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nonlethal Weapons.

8. Employment

a. PKO include separation of the parties to the dispute, patrolling, and observing and reporting on compliance with or violations of agreements. Peacekeeping forces must have
freedom of movement and open access to observe, monitor, and verify the conditions of the governing agreements.

b. A peacekeeping force may be employed in one of two ways: each national contingent is allocated to a specific OA, or the national contingents rotate among the OAs. Normally, the former method is preferred. Peacekeeping depends on accurate human intelligence (HUMINT) and other information derived from the civilian population, which require time and involve the entire peacekeeping force.

(1) Assignment to a Specific OA

(a) The key advantage to this approach is that each national contingent develops in-depth knowledge of the terrain and community in its specific OA. This results in continuity in collecting and processing information. Additionally, useful relationships are developed with the local authorities of the host government, police, and leadership of the parties to the dispute. Peacekeeping forces become attuned to the normal activities in the area and consequently can quickly detect changes to normal routines. Forces become well-acquainted with the local forces and are able to recognize and prohibit military personnel of the opposing forces from passing through checkpoints.

(b) The disadvantage is that national contingents may become overly familiar with the people in the area due to habitual contact and as a result may liberally interpret agreements and enforcement policies in their OA. This may lead to a perception of partiality and compromise mission accomplishment. If actual or perceived inequities exist, the parties to the dispute may request an exchange of contingent forces. An additional risk is that, over time, the force may become complacent in its tactical mission execution.

(2) Rotation Among OAs

(a) The key advantage is that each contingent obtains a working knowledge of more than one area. The potential for forces to become overly familiar with parties to the dispute is also reduced.

(b) There are several disadvantages. A national contingent may not have sufficient time to acquire an in-depth knowledge of the area or community. Important background information gathered by a national contingent may not be effectively passed to succeeding national contingents due to language differences and different ways of operating. Rotation may also disrupt logistic operations and HUMINT collection efforts. With each rotation of national contingents, even slight differences in how the peacekeepers operate may cause concern among the local populace.

c. Separation of Parties to the Dispute. Many PKO will require the contingent forces to supervise the orderly disengagement and withdrawal of the parties to the dispute. Direct intervention by peacekeeping forces may be required to defuse sensitive or potentially explosive situations. It will also give the disputing parties the confidence that their withdrawal will not be exploited by other parties.
For additional information, see ATP 3-07.31/MCTP 3-03B (MCWP 3-33.8)/AFTTP 3-2.40, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations.
CHAPTER IV

PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

“Diplomacy is utterly useless where there is no force behind it.”

Theodore Roosevelt
June 2, 1897

1. Description of Peace Enforcement Operations

a. PEO are conducted IAW a mandate designed to maintain or restore peace and order when consent by a major party to a conflict is absent. They may include the enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of personnel providing FHA, restoration of order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties. Peace enforcement may be conducted pursuant to a lawful mandate or IAW international law and do not require the consent of the HN or the parties to the conflict, although broad based consent is preferred. PEO use force or the threat of force to coerce or compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions. Force is threatened against or applied to belligerent parties to terminate fighting, restore order, and create an environment conducive to resolving the dispute. Although combat operations may be required, PEO are not necessarily classified as major combat operations and normally have more restrictive ROE. Forces generally have full combat capabilities, although there may be some restrictions on weaponeering and targeting.

For more information on targeting, see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

b. Peace enforcement is normally governed by UN Charter Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression), and conducted by a regional organization or lead nation designated by the UN. In rare situations, PEO may be conducted under the basis of collective self-defense by a regional organization, a lead nation-led coalition, or unilaterally by the US because they do not require the consent of the HN or the parties to the conflict, and to that end, they may appear to disregard state sovereignty.

c. In PEO, the use of force is not limited to self-defense and includes the use of force to implement UNSC mandates. Protection of civilians is a likely component of such mandates authorizing the use of force, and may be the mission’s primary objective. Mission-specific ROE define the manner in which force should be applied.

d. Where PEO occur within the context of an international or non-international armed conflict, the law of war will govern the conduct of all parties, including uses of force and treatment of any detainees.

Further guidance on the law of war can be found in DODD 2311.01, DOD Law of War Program, and the Department of Defense Law of War Manual.

e. Contingent forces may have to fight their way into the conflict area and use force to physically separate the combatants.
f. The OA will normally include civilians who pose special considerations such as threat identification, collateral damage, civilian casualty mitigation, and other issues associated with DCs.

g. Commanders must consider several factors in multinational PEO. Some multinational partners may not have a vital national interest at stake in the conflict or may face certain dilemmas regarding their involvement. Consequently, the partners’ resolve may be reduced by factors such as casualties, protracted involvement, or financial costs. Some MNFs may not possess sufficient military capacity or capabilities to conduct effective peace enforcement. The challenge to the commander is to constitute a force capable of coordinated and sustained operations, as required.

2. Fundamentals of Peace Enforcement Operations

In conjunction with the fundamentals already discussed in Chapter I, “Overview,” the following caveats apply specifically to PEO:

a. Consent. Consent of the parties to the dispute is not a prerequisite for peace enforcement, although some parties may extend it. While such consent should translate to the tactical level, it may not be observed by independent local groups or those that do not abide by their higher leaders’ decisions.

b. Impartiality. This fundamental still requires the force to act on behalf of the peace process and mandate. Because peace enforcement entails coercion against some parties, PEO may not be perceived as impartial. CCS should develop themes and messages to counter these perceptions.

c. Restraint and Minimum Force. A misuse of force can have a negative impact upon the legitimacy of the PEO. Conversely, the appropriate use of force to prevent disruption of the peace process can strengthen consent. The commander uses situational understanding to include cultural, sociological, religious, and ethnic aspects to determine how best to apply military force. The amount and type of force used should be no more than is necessary and proportionate to resolve and defuse a crisis. It must be limited to the degree, intensity, and duration required to remove the threat and prevent further escalation. Forces should be trained, equipped, and proficient in the use of both lethal and nonlethal weapons to minimize civilian casualties.

3. Peace Enforcement Operations Tasks

Peace enforcement tasks may include some of those conducted in PKO, as well as enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of humanitarian actors, operations to restore order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties or parties to a dispute.

a. Enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones includes a broad range of possible tasks. Commanders must understand that actions to enforce sanctions, even when endorsed by the UNSC, have traditionally been considered acts of war and should posture their forces accordingly.
b. PEO contingent forces may be tasked to provide protection for FHA operations. This could include protection for international organizations, NGOs, other government departments and agencies, and other military personnel who are providing FHA. Such protection may include establishing secure base areas, protecting routes or corridors for the transport of HA supplies, and providing security for distribution sites. If belligerent parties oppose the delivery of HA supplies by international organizations, NGOs, or other agencies, forces may deliver the supplies by providing airlift or other forms of logistic support. The CMOC, when established, may serve as the focal point for requests for support from US forces.

c. Operations to restore order are conducted to halt violence and support, reinstate, or establish civil authorities. They are designed to restore stability to the point where indigenous police forces can effectively enforce the law and reinstate civil authority.

d. A peace enforcement mission may be tasked to separate belligerent parties or to neutralize belligerents that threaten civilians or refuse to comply with a peace process. These tasks can pose high risks to the contingent force and may involve reducing the combat capability of one or more of the belligerent parties. The contingent force will normally retain the right of first use of force and will require offensive combat capabilities, combat support, and combat service support. The objective is to force the belligerent parties to disengage and withdraw. Subsequently the peace operations force may be tasked to establish a BZ or DMZ.

e. Peace operations forces may be required to conduct detainee operations. Forces must plan to employ appropriate assets to support this requirement. These tasks will become critical as a mission transitions from peace enforcement to peacekeeping.

4. Command and Control for Peace Enforcement Operations

In most cases, peace enforcement mirrors conventional military operations and possesses many of the same C2 characteristics. Unity of effort is particularly important when planning command arrangements, international agreements, and coordination centers and cells.

a. For both unilateral and multinational operations, US forces will normally be structured as a joint task force. The composition of this force will depend on the mission, concept of operations (CONOPS), and the threat.

b. For multinational PEO, forces may operate under a lead nation, a parallel, or a combination command structure.

(1) In the lead-nation command structure, one nation’s commander directs or leads the multinational partners in the accomplishment of the peace enforcement mission. This approach also includes situations in which the UN, another international organization, or an alliance is conducting an operation and all participating countries are within the international mission. A UN mission is usually under the leadership of a civilian SRSG. Lead-alliance command structures, such as NATO, are governed by standardization agreements with national elements under the direction of a multinational HQ element. The
lead nation or organization normally provides the commander, the basic staff, the preponderance of the forces, and the communications to control operations. This helps achieve unity of command and unity of effort and facilitates mutual understanding of the mandate by all partners. If the US is the lead nation, the US supported GCC or a subordinate commander will normally be designated as the commander.

(2) A parallel command structure exists when some participating nations retain autonomous control of their forces. This may be appropriate in situations wherein an international organization (such as the UN) establishes a peacekeeping mission and a separate nation or coalition conducts PEO against VEOs, noncompliant armed groups, or other spoilers. Commanders must develop a means for coordination among the participants to achieve unity of effort. This can be accomplished through coordinating councils between parallel organizations.

(3) **Combination.** Lead nation and parallel command structures can exist simultaneously in peace operations. This combination occurs when two or more nations serve as controlling elements for a mix of multinational organizations or coalitions. Coordinating mechanisms need to be established to synchronize operations.

*For further guidance on multinational C2, refer to JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.*

5. **Peace Enforcement Planning Considerations**

Many planning considerations for PEO are similar to those for peacekeeping. The planning process for peace enforcement is the same as for any other military operation and begins with a comprehensive mission analysis. US forces are normally employed IAW a CONOPS that includes transition from peace enforcement to peacekeeping or peace building.

*For information on campaign planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning.*

a. **Mission Analysis.** Peace enforcement requires awareness of political factors, constraints, and restraints. Determined by the national objectives and end state specified in strategic guidance and UN mandates, termination criteria focus on the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. IRs are normally greater in peace enforcement than in peacekeeping since the potential for hostilities is higher and the level of detail of information required to support decision making, including FP issues, is greater. Accurate intelligence and comprehensive mission analysis will be the basis for determining the structure and composition of the force.

b. **Intelligence**

(1) In addition to standard threat indicators and order of battle, commanders and staffs should analyze the root causes of the conflict and how best to address them, as well as those factors that will help commanders to influence the population.
(2) The commander requires warning intelligence that can provide indications of a deteriorating situation or resumption of hostilities. As part of the JIPOE, probable courses of action of belligerents should be developed and analyzed.

(3) The inclusion of identity activities can help to remove anonymity from those displaying hostile intentions within the OA.

c. **Fire Support.** Fire support is regulated by the ROE, and a prime consideration is the need to minimize collateral damage. In most cases, the objective is to compel or coerce the belligerents to disengage, withdraw, and comply with the mandate. Fire support is often intended to suppress and neutralize targets, rather than destroy them.

*For additional information, refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, and JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.*

d. **Logistics.** Logistic planning and support in PEO include the considerations addressed in Chapter III, “Peacekeeping Operations.” Peace enforcement, especially when accompanied by active combat, may complicate the work of other agencies, such as international organizations and NGOs. Consequently, the demand for food, water, billeting, waste disposal, movement control, environmental and safety concerns, and medical support may increase substantially above the force’s own requirements if large numbers of DCs must be supported until humanitarian operations are fully established. Contracted support, coordinated through the OCS process, along with multinational support and HNS, should be considered when planning operations support. In some operations, contracted support may be considered a primary choice of support, especially in operations that require a minimal uniformed footprint due to the establishment of force caps seen in some recent operations. CA and the CMOC can enhance this effort and should be included in the logistic planning effort. Some general considerations for the commander include:

(1) Logistics may have to support both the peace operations force and an FHA effort. Coordination with international organizations and NGOs will facilitate this support.

(2) The JFC should ensure planning for mission termination or transition to PKO or peace building activities is considered and accomplished early in an operation. Staffs should assess what logistics infrastructure, materiel, capabilities, and equipment will remain in place for use by follow-on forces or organizations. Additionally, staffs should assess the close-out of contracts or transfer of contract capability to civil authorities. The subordinate commander’s OCS integration cell is normally responsible to ensure the contract support drawdown progresses according to plan. Contract support drawdown milestones are reported, tracked, and analyzed to ensure the overall plan is progressing on approved timelines. Planning for redeployment should be considered throughout the operation and is best accomplished through the same time-phased process by which deployment was accomplished.
(3) UN and multinational peace operations will vary with respect to logistical authorities and arrangements. Areas that must be clarified include funding, ACSAs, and mutual support agreements.

(4) A joint logistics center can provide necessary logistical control and coordination functions.

For additional information, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. For more information on the US role in the provision of health service support during changing operational demands, see JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

e. FP. Peace enforcement missions face a greater threat than those conducting other types of peace operations. In addition to the FP considerations in any peace operation, commanders in peace enforcement missions will likely need to address AT measures because of the potential threat from VEOs. Consideration should also be given to PR planning and training in anticipation of an isolating event occurrence. Additionally, international organizations, NGOs, other government departments and agencies, the media, and others may request some form of protection from military forces.

For additional information on FP, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

For further information on PR, refer to JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

f. Mobility and Survivability. To ensure a mobile and survivable force, both engineer and CBRN defense forces provide essential support during peace operations.

(1) Engineer Forces. Engineers may play a major role in supporting successful peace operations. While mobility and countermobility tasks may be appropriate, many engineer tasks may be more civic than combat-oriented.

(2) CBRN Defense Forces. Commanders should consider the requirement for CBRN defense forces in support of peace operations if there is evidence that belligerent forces may employ such capabilities. In addition, when properly authorized under the ROE, commanders can employ riot control agents as an alternative to deadly force in certain situations. A mix of different units (decontamination units/CBRN reconnaissance elements) are often necessary to achieve the proper balance. CBRN staff officers may advise on commercial CBRN threats, as well as on the collection, packaging, storage, disposal, and clean-up of hazardous materials or wastes.

6. Employment

Typical phases for PEO are shown in Figure IV-1. While the sequencing may vary for some missions, these phases provide a starting point for the employment planning process. Figure IV-1 also illustrates how the phases correspond to phases of a notional joint operation model similar to that discussed in JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

a. Preparation and Deployment. Mission analysis, available forces, and factors such as available HNS will influence deployment decisions. In most cases, PEO will
Peace Enforcement Operations require crisis planning. However, the joint planning community may be able to select from forces and capabilities using an existing OPLAN and time-phased force deployment list, time-phasing their entry.

For more information on the joint deployment and redeployment process, see JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

b. Establishment of Presence in the OA. In this stage, military forces occupy and secure a presence in the OA and establish security for follow-on elements.

(1) Some activities conducted during this phase are to:

(a) Make contact with USG departments and agencies, international organizations, local military and paramilitary organizations, and civil authorities.

(b) Establish surveillance over the planned points of entry.

(c) Conduct activities to reduce the risk to the force, including information activities to prepare the HN and its population for the arrival of forces and subsequent actions.

(d) Provide updated situation reports prior to the entry of follow-on forces.

(2) The situation will dictate the nature of the initial entry forces. An unopposed entry arranged through diplomatic actions and coordination with HN or local authorities is preferred. Preservation of the HN infrastructure is a key consideration in this stage. If a forcible entry is required, it should be conducted IAW JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations, and JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.

c. Expansion of the OA. In this stage, forces within the OA continue to expand their coverage to gain information on belligerent dispositions. Staffs continue to update their information on the area and revise their assessments for operational requirements. Forces continue to arrive and, when possible, theater support contracting can be used to offset the amount of logistic support required. Air and maritime operations continue and may involve the establishment and enforcement of exclusion zones.
d. Enforcement of the Mandate

(1) Separation of Belligerent Parties. Depending on the threat and the level of cooperation by the belligerents, the PEO force conducts operations to compel the belligerents to disengage and withdraw. This may involve shows of force, demonstrations, or combat operations with synchronized air, ground, maritime, and SOF actions. The objective is to establish a BZ between the belligerents. As the belligerent forces disengage and withdraw, lines of demarcation will be established to identify the forward limits of the belligerent forces. The resulting space between these lines of demarcation constitutes the BZ. If the belligerent parties show no inclination to consent to the formation of a BZ, the PEO force may be required to establish one forcibly. In doing so, the commander considers the belligerent forces’ dispositions and territorial advantages or disadvantages, as well as historical or cultural considerations. Even after the situation has stabilized, belligerent parties may still demonstrate animosity toward each other and perhaps the PEO force. Therefore, the peace enforcement mission must remain prepared to engage in combat.

(2) Support of Political Mediation. The JFC must thoroughly understand the political aims behind the peace enforcement mission and the impact of all actions on the resolution of the conflict. Military support may involve monitoring the compliance of belligerent parties with agreements; provisions of a mandate; or other constraints, restraints, or provisions regarding their activities.

(3) Establishment of a DMZ. Negotiations may eventually transform the BZ into a DMZ, as stipulated in a formal agreement. DMZs are created to neutralize certain areas from military occupation and activity. Generally, a DMZ is in an area claimed by two or more sides in the conflict and where control by one could constitute a direct threat to the others. Lines of demarcation define the boundaries of a DMZ. These boundaries must be easily recognizable and, ideally, should not run counter to locally accepted political or cultural divisions. The airspace over a DMZ is denied to the aircraft of the belligerents.

(4) Maintaining Separation of Belligerent Parties. The PEO force may conduct security operations such as screening, combat and reconnaissance patrolling, and cordon and search, and may establish checkpoints and roadblocks to control movement into and within the BZ or DMZ to maintain the separation of belligerent parties.

(5) DDR of belligerent parties can occur concurrently with PKO and PEO. Repatriation and resettlement are integral parts of the DDR process.

*For additional information on DDR, see JP 3-07, Stability.*

e. Transition and Redeployment. Effective peace enforcement planning includes the conditions for the eventual exit of the force. This will usually be expressed as part of the end state of the operation and will be as much of a political consideration as a military one. Once the belligerent parties agree to stop fighting IAW a ceasefire or a truce, the stage is set for transition from peace enforcement to peacekeeping and peace building. The commander must develop a redeployment CONOPS to identify how forces and materiel will redeploy and how contracts supporting the force will be closed out or transitioned to
civil authorities. This redeployment CONOPS is especially relevant and useful if force rotations are envisioned to sustain a long-term operation. The commander may not yet understand all planning factors to fully develop this CONOPS, but, by using the best available information for redeployment requirements, timelines and priorities, the efficiency and effectiveness of redeployment operations may be greatly improved.

*For more information on the joint deployment and redeployment process, see JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.*
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APPENDIX A
UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT IN PEACE OPERATIONS

1. General

a. The primary responsibility of the UN is the maintenance of international peace and security. The UN Charter provides the TOR for the various elements in fulfilling this responsibility. Article 36 in Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) of the UN Charter is the usual basis for the UN to conduct traditional PKO. Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of the UN Charter provides the authority for PEO and is also often cited as the basis for robust PKO in unstable environments.


b. Historical

(1) UN peacekeeping has evolved as a series of ad hoc practical mechanisms to help contain armed conflicts and settle them by peaceful means. The mechanism devised by the UN to ensure international peace and security is outlined in Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the UN Charter. During the Cold War, the UN conducted traditional UN peacekeeping missions. These missions were primarily political operations, supported by the military and dependent upon the consent and cooperation of the belligerents. They were usually restricted to the interposition of unarmed observers or lightly armed UN peacekeepers between warring states and contingent upon the following conditions:

(a) A cease fire agreement was in place.

(b) The parties to the conflict fully consented to their deployment.

(2) The objectives of traditional “UN peacekeeping” were generally limited to simply reporting conditions following the political agreement.

(3) Modern UN peacekeeping activities, often referred to as multidimensional missions, may be authorized under Chapters VI or VII of the UN Charter. The military component is only one part of a comprehensive political, diplomatic, humanitarian, and economic effort. Military objectives may include supporting other government departments and agencies, international organizations, and NGOs in the provision of humanitarian aid, the organization and protection of elections, the supervision of government functions, the disarmament and demobilization of a large number of parties, the repatriation and rehabilitation of refugees, the protection of safe areas, restoration of national government and institutions, and other tasks. The environment of today’s integrated mission can be considerably more complex than that of traditional UN peacekeeping, and is often characterized by unstable intrastate conflicts.

2. United Nations Headquarters Organization

The UNHQ has two departments involved in planning and executing PKO:
a. UNDPKO is the operational arm for all UN peacekeeping and is responsible for the conduct, management, direction, planning, and preparation of those operations. The Under-Secretary-General for PKO provides policy guidance and strategic direction and for the day-to-day operational matters affecting peacekeeping. UNDPKO also provides support for several missions under the Department of Political Affairs.

(1) Under the Under-Secretary-General for PKO is the military advisor to the UNSG and the Office of Military Affairs. Two key offices within the Office of Military Affairs are the Military Planning Service (MPS) and the Force Generation Service (FGS).

(2) UNDPKO also contains the Office of Operations; the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (including the Police Division); and the Policy, Evaluation, and Training Division.

(3) UN MPS takes the UNSG’s recommendations and the UNSC strategic-level guidance, provided through a UNSCR, and interprets this into military tasking. MPS transposes the UNSCR into a military CONOPS, which in turn generates the force requirements and ROE. FGS facilitates member nation pledges for military units to participate in UN PKO. FGS ensures that TCCs and PCCs have the requisite equipment as dictated by the force requirement. However, FGS does not have the responsibility to ensure the contingents receive proper training. TCCs and PCCs ensure their pledged units can carry out the tasks outlined in the CONOPS and Statements of Unit Requirements.

b. The UNDFS provides logistics, administration, and information and communications technology support for peacekeeping and field-based special political missions. Through the Global Field Support Strategy, the UNDFS strives for efficiency and effectiveness, reduced mission footprints, reduced mission start-up time, and improved quality of goods and services to the field. UNDFS supports its mission from regional service support centers at the UN logistics base in Brindisi, Italy, and the regional support base in Entebbe, Uganda.

3. Subordinate United Nations Organizations

Other UN organizations concerned with peace operations include the following:

a. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The UNHCR has a major role in coordinating aid to refugees, returnees, and displaced persons. Coordination with the UNHCR is critical for any HA effort.

b. UNOCHA. UNOCHA’s mission is to mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors.

c. UN Disaster Management Team. The appointed UN resident coordinator has a crucial role in providing leadership to the UN team at the country level and coordinates with international and local organizations as required. The UN disaster management team is the primary agency responsible for coordinating assistance to persons compelled to leave their homes because of natural and other disasters.
d. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The UNDP conducts long-term programs to eradicate poverty, develop national institutions, and build resilience. Much of the UNDP’s work addresses potential root causes of conflicts.

e. World Food Programme (WFP). The WFP is an operational, relief-oriented organization. It provides targeted food aid and supports rehabilitation, reconstruction, and risk-reducing development programs. Targeted food aid is special subsistence aligned to a special segment of the population. It should be noted that the WFP coordinates the logistics cluster and may be a useful in-theater contact organization for forces conducting peace operations.

f. UNICEF. UNICEF is a relief-oriented organization that attends to the well-being of children and women, especially child health and nutrition.

g. World Health Organization. The World Health Organization is primarily involved in long-range programs. It provides advice and assistance in all aspects of preventive and curative health care.

h. Food and Agriculture Organization. The Food and Agriculture Organization is an organization also involved in long-range programs. It provides technical advice in reducing vulnerability and helps in the rehabilitation of agriculture, livestock, and fisheries.

4. Overview of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Doctrine

   a. In 2008, UNDPKO produced a capstone doctrine entitled United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines. This UN publication discusses the core functions, success factors, and key lessons of UN PKO.

   b. The publication provides three core functions for a multidimensional PKO within the broader context of an international effort:

      (1) Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the state’s ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights.

      (2) Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance.

      (3) Provide a framework for ensuring that all UN and other international actors pursue their activities at the country level in a coherent and coordinated manner.

   c. In line with other principles or fundamentals from a variety of nations and alliances, UNDPKO recognized three basic principles of PKO:

      (1) Consent of the parties.

      (2) Impartiality.

      (3) Non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate.
d. Experience since 1990 shows the success of multidimensional UN peacekeeping is consistently dependent on a number of other factors, including legitimacy, credibility, and promotion of national and local ownership.

e. The UN capstone doctrine also emphasizes several key lessons from PKO:

   (1) There must be a peace to keep. UN PKO can only succeed if the parties on the ground are genuinely committed to resolving the conflict through a political process.

   (2) Positive regional engagement is essential. Many of the crises before the UNSC are regional in character, and the attitude of neighboring states can be as important in determining the viability of a peace process as the commitment of the local parties.

   (3) The UNSC must provide its full backing to a peacekeeping mission.

   (4) A UN peacekeeping mission must be given a clear and achievable mandate with resources to match.

f. The UN capstone doctrine describes three broad phases of UN PKO:

   (1) Mission start up.

   (2) Mandate implementation.

   (3) Transition (hand-over, withdrawal, and liquidation).

g. UNDPKO has also developed doctrinal manuals for a variety of peacekeeping units such as infantry, engineers, reconnaissance, signals, and others. These documents explain tasks, procedures, and standards that units may be expected to accomplish during PKO.

5. Integrated Assessment and Planning

   a. In 2013, the UN introduced the integrated assessment and planning (IAP) framework to support the planning of multidimensional UN PKO. The IAP is the authoritative basis for planning all new integrated missions, as well as the revision of existing plans. The IAP assists the UN system to arrive at common strategic objectives for a mission by bringing together all relevant UN participants and external actors. The IAP ensures appropriate agencies and organizations play a part in the development of the planning, the important concerns and issues are considered, and the necessary authorities and accountabilities are in place to produce an integrated plan. If a UN country team is in place, it will be an active participant in the IAP.

   b. The IAP has two parts, strategic assessment and strategic planning.

      (1) Strategic assessment is conducted to formulate or reformulate UN strategic engagement in countries where conflict is present, imminent, or could reoccur. It is conducted by an integrated task force (ITF) and consists of a conflict analysis; the identification of priority objectives; and the development of strategic options, which could
include a maintenance of the status quo or a new or revised UN strategy. The strategic assessment provides recommendations to the UNSG, policy committee, or the UNSC.

(2) After adoption of a UNSCR, the mandate is promulgated and the ITF conducts strategic planning to develop a directive to the UN’s senior field leadership, normally the SRSG or ERS and the resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator. The directive provides strategic direction and priorities, initial responsibilities, an outline of structural and coordination arrangements, and basic planning parameters. Based on the mandate and the directive, field leadership continues strategic planning by developing an integrated strategic framework document. This framework articulates priorities, programmatic functions, timelines, and responsibilities for the integrated UN approach.

c. Establishing the Force Commander and HQ. Upon the approval of the mandate and the budget plan, the UNSG will ensure negotiations commence with the disputing parties and the HN for preparation of the SOFA. The UNSG, with the approval of the UNSC, appoints the HOM and other senior mission leaders. The HOM determines the further delegation of authority in the field on behalf of the UNSG. The UNSG appoints the chief of the military component in UN peacekeeping (the force commander or chief UNMEM), who holds appropriate authority over all military units and personnel in the mission area in the light of operational requirements. A SRSG, supported by political and mediation staff, conducts diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict.

d. Participating Member-State Preparations. Participating member-states negotiate their contributions to the peace operation with the UN through a MOU. Many nations have training centers to prepare their units and have permanent organizations to coordinate their contributions to UN peace operations. Joint forces may be involved in assisting the countries as part of a GCC’s SC activities. The US Global Peace Operations Initiative program, managed by DOS and DOD, and the DOS’s Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program build peace operations capacity in many countries.

e. Reception and Service Support. The UN Office of Mission Support will usually deploy an advance party to establish reception and service support arrangements for the operation. The UN will plan, organize, and direct the deployment of the force to the theater.

f. OPCON. The operational chain of command for peace operations will be from the unit commander through any intermediate commanders to the HOM, usually the SRSG. In certain cases, the US forces may be placed under OPCON of a foreign commander, but command is exercised only by the US chain of command.

6. Key United Nations Documents

a. UN Mandate. The UN mandate is central to all peace operations and comes directly from UNSCRs. It will normally be specific as to the tasks to be undertaken and provide the general outlines of the mission’s size and composition.
b. **UNSG’s Directive to HOM, Resident Coordinator, and Humanitarian Coordinator.** The UNSG will issue a strategic planning directive stating the broad strategic objectives, as well as the proposed form and scope of a peace operation.

c. **Integrated Strategic Framework.** The senior field leadership develops this document, which provides the basis for detailed operational planning and includes the following:

   1. Main findings from previous integrated assessments of the conflict and challenges to peace consolidation, the UN role, and comparative advantages.

   2. Peace consolidation priorities for the UN, including for national capacity development and institution building.

   3. Programmatic, functional, and OAs requiring an integrated approach, with agreed form and depth of integration.

   4. Results, timelines, responsibilities, and other relevant implementation arrangements, including coordination mechanisms.

   5. Monitoring and reporting framework including indicators or benchmarks of progress.

d. **Force Commander’s Guidance.** The Under-Secretary-General for PKO will issue the force commander’s guidance. This is also referred to as an SOP (or standing order). Upon receipt of the force commander’s guidance from UN DPKO, the force commander will prepare more detailed regulations and operating procedures.

e. **UN ROE.** The ROE for a mission are developed at the UNHQ and support UNDPKO/UNDFS guidelines on the *Use of Force by Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. The equivalent police document is the directive on the use of force and applies to all armed police personnel and units in the mission.

   *For additional information and an up-to-date listing of ongoing PKO, see the UN peacekeeping home page at [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/).*
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

1. General

a. The protection of civilians applies during military operations. Regardless of an operation’s primary objective, the protection of civilians is an important legal, military, diplomatic, political, and moral consideration. It may encompass efforts that reduce civilian risks from physical violence; secure their rights to access essential services and resources; and contribute to a secure, stable, and just environment for civilians over the long-term. In addition to physical protection from imminent violence and provision of necessities, protection of civilians includes setting broader enabling conditions that enhance human security and mitigate grievances that can result in renewed conflict and other potential future threats to civilians.

b. The achievement of US strategic objectives depends on the joint forces’ ability to minimize harm to civilians in the course of operations and, potentially, their ability to mitigate harm caused by other parties. The law of war requires that belligerents take feasible precautions to protect civilians from the effects of war and military occupation. Joint forces must ensure civilians are not the object of attacks and must ensure civilians are spared and protected during conflict.

c. In many operations, the population’s support may be the center of gravity or otherwise indispensable for mission accomplishment. Some joint operations, such as the 2011 Operations ODYSSEY DAWN and UNIFIED PROTECTOR in Libya, were specifically conducted to protect civilians. Strategic objectives of most joint operations typically include security, stability, a sustainable peace, and other favorable conditions that contribute to civilian well-being. Potential civilian victims and observers around the world expect joint forces to take every precaution to ensure military operations spare the civilian population from harm, including measures to mitigate harm caused by other state or non-state parties to conflict.

d. Under the law of war, civilians who have protected status include persons who are not members of their country’s armed forces or other arms-carrying forces. Modern conflicts often take a far greater toll on civilians than they do on combatants. They can become casualties through incidental harm from military operations, are often directly targeted by combatants, and suffer from deprivations resulting from conflict. Civilians are also at risk in unstable environments in which joint forces conduct other military operations, even if these operations do not primarily involve combat. Examples include peace operations, FHA, and post-conflict operations characterized by stability activities. Most peacekeeping missions conducted or authorized by the UN include mandates to protect civilians.

e. Joint forces will likely be part of a comprehensive effort that includes other actors whose activities are often the most significant for creating an enduring environment in which civilians are protected. These actors include HN, international, and nongovernmental civilian, police, and military organizations that address security,
governance, rule of law, humanitarian requirements, and developmental needs. Though they may agree about the general desirability of protecting civilians, these various actors may employ entirely different methods to achieve very dissimilar objectives.

f. Depending on the situation, protection of civilians may be the primary purpose of a mission or a supporting task. Effective protection of civilians depends on adaptive units, a command climate that emphasizes its importance, and leaders who make timely and appropriate decisions based on critical situations on the ground. Joint forces must have an operational concept and ROE that prioritize protection of civilians, and they must account for it in the joint planning process. Regardless of the operation, joint forces will likely protect civilians in two general ways:

(1) Avoid Civilian Harm. Joint forces act IAW the law of war and other relevant bodies of law to minimize civilian harm. Additionally, joint forces avoid undermining efforts by other actors that improve human security, and they assess to what extent their presence, movements, activities, messages, and associations may put civilians in harm’s way.

(2) Perform Deliberate Actions to Protect Civilians. Joint forces conduct offensive, defensive, and stability activities expressly intended to mitigate harm to civilians, including operations that create an environment conducive to protection of civilians.

2. Protection of Civilians Fundamentals

a. Figure B-1 depicts three fundamentals for protection of civilians. Joint forces should understand factors related to civilian risks, conduct operations to protect civilians, and help shape the surrounding environment to support and sustain protection of civilians.

b. Understand Civilian Risks. Leaders must maintain situational awareness of civilian threats and vulnerabilities, as well as the relevant actors, dynamics, and other variables that comprise the OE. The staff’s analysis of the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure systems will contribute to understanding those threats to civilians and identify ways to protect them.

(1) Civilians are potentially at risk from armed conflict (including insurgencies and civil wars), genocide, ethnic cleansing, other mass atrocities, government repression, post-conflict instability, intercommunal conflict, widespread predatory violence, or mob violence. Civilians may also suffer from other forms of targeted violence including terrorism and sexual violence, and human trafficking, as well as displacement and impeded access to HA and essential services. To mitigate these risks, joint forces must understand the relevant civilian vulnerabilities and the threats to civilians’ well-being.
(2) Civilian vulnerabilities depend upon many factors, including individual and group identity, environmental considerations, and unavailability of services such as healthcare and emergency food distribution. Ethnic or sectarian violence may target certain groups within a population, rendering those more vulnerable than others.

(3) Civilians may be intentionally targeted by an adversary, and those near military targets may be vulnerable to collateral damage. DCs who flee their homes may be particularly vulnerable to violence, coercion (such as forced recruitment into armed groups), sexual violence or exploitation, disease, starvation, and crime. Some groups may be more vulnerable in certain contexts, including women, children, elderly or infirm individuals, or males of fighting age.

(4) Vulnerable civilians may attempt to mitigate their risks in different ways, such as fleeing a dangerous situation; collaborating with perpetrators; mobilizing for self-defense; seeking support from other actors that may provide security or other assistance; or engaging in prostitution, crime, or the sale of essential items.

(5) Threats consist of individuals or groups with the capability, intent, and opportunity to harm civilians. Specific threats vary in terms of their dimensions, type, and perpetrators’ objectives. In some cases, perpetrators may be ideologically motivated to destroy or displace a victim group they see as an enemy. In others, perpetrators may pillage...
and forcibly obtain fighters and slaves from vulnerable civilians. Perpetrators may also attack civilians as a means to achieve other objectives. For example, civilians may be targeted during terrorist attacks, civil wars, insurgencies, and counterinsurgencies to degrade the will of an adversary.

(6) Joint forces will have to influence (and, in many cases, should be influenced by) a wide range of other actors that may be categorized as friendly security forces, adversaries, vulnerable civilians, bystanders, negative actors that enable violence against civilians, and positive actors that mitigate civilian risks. These categories may overlap and could change over time. For example, a particular ethnic group could be both a perpetrator and victim of violence against civilians. In many situations, joint forces will operate in support of other actors, such as the HN government, whose efforts are more important for protecting civilians. In some instances, the operation may be politically aligned with a state or non-state party that does not adhere to the law of war and is responsible for abuse and mistreatment of the civilian population.

(7) Additionally, it is important to comprehend dynamics such as evolving strategic guidance and mandates, the type of conflict, the strategic logic and motivations of perpetrators, the impact of joint operations, changing vulnerabilities and threats that relate to protection of civilians, resiliencies, emerging opportunities to enhance civilian security, and changes in the OE or among the actors.

(8) The OE will feature a complex and evolving relationship between these variables, requiring accurate intelligence, efficient information management based on the commander’s critical information requirements, and effective assessments of the situation and trends. Other actors concerned with protecting civilians, such as humanitarian organizations, may be reluctant to exchange information when this could compromise their neutrality, confidentiality, or operational security. However, it may be possible to develop formal and informal information-sharing mechanisms that improve joint and partner efforts to protect civilians.

c. **Protect Civilians during Operations.** Joint forces must mitigate their potential to cause civilian casualties or other harm. Additionally, they may be required to protect civilians, neutralize threats to civilians, and mitigate other forms of civilian harm. While planning, preparing for, and conducting operations, units must routinely and proactively integrate the protection of civilians. Failure to do so can convey the message that violence against civilians is acceptable.

(1) **Approaches.** Some operations, such as patrols, checkpoints, support for HA, or evacuation of noncombatants and civilians, may be specifically intended to protect vulnerable civilians. This may include lethal and nonlethal actions to deter, compel, neutralize, or otherwise influence perpetrators. Operations will often be conducted for another purpose, but may have a secondary effect of protecting civilians. Routine application of joint functions (C2, information, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment) should account for civilian protection, with plans and procedures adjusted as appropriate.
Protection of Civilians

(a) The joint force will likely employ a mix of offense, defense, and stability actions to protect civilians. It can use one or more of the following general approaches:

1. **Area Security**—secure a large area with sufficient force deployed in unit sectors.

2. **Shape-Clear-Hold-Build**—systematically secure limited areas and expand to other areas when able.

3. **Separation**—establish a DMZ or similar BZ between perpetrators and vulnerable populations.

4. **Safe Areas**—secure concentrations of vulnerable populations such as camps for DCs.

5. **Partner Enabling**—provide advisors, equipment, or specialized support such as deployment or air support to partner nations, HN forces, or victim groups.

6. **Containment**—influence perpetrator behavior with strikes, blockades, or no-fly zones when perpetrators display aggression towards civilians.

7. **Defeat Perpetrators**—attack and defeat perpetrator leadership and/or capabilities.

(b) More than one approach may be employed simultaneously or sequentially, and it may be appropriate to emphasize different approaches as the operation progresses or in different parts of the OA. For example, the containment approach may be appropriate as an initial effort when an immediate response is critical.

(c) Joint forces or partnered security forces can be deployed to prevent or preempt violence against civilians when indicators suggest a possible threat. They can be used to monitor a situation; support negotiation or other efforts by nonmilitary actors; establish a presence to deter or intimidate potential perpetrators; prepare for contingencies; or conduct limited operations to protect vulnerable civilians or neutralize perpetrators, including peace operations, preemptive actions, or preventive deployments.

(2) **Civilian Casualty Mitigation.** Historically, civilian casualties have been tragic but frequent consequences of conflict. Harm to civilians has a damaging impact on mission accomplishment, and joint forces frequently conduct operations in complex and populous environments. Joint operations are increasingly transparent and evaluated by external actors, and joint forces are expected to uphold the highest standards in an environment where the enemy will make false accusations and seek to exploit mistakes. While civilian casualty mitigation has a foundation in law and in principles of humanity, adherence to the law of war is the minimum standard. Civilian casualty mitigation directly affects the success of the overall mission, and even tactical actions can have strategic and other significant second-order effects. Efforts to minimize and address civilian casualty incidents support strategic imperatives and are also of key importance to the profession of arms.
(a) The avoidance of civilian casualties is more than a legal obligation; it is also good practice that supports the mission. It is important to appreciate that civilian casualties can be mitigated through training, preparation, and other efforts that begin long before a particular incident and should continue even after an incident has occurred.

(b) Civilian casualties refer to civilians who are either killed or wounded as a result of armed conflict. They could include members of the local population, civilians from NGOs, representatives from international organizations, and other civilian agencies. Civilian casualties comprise a subset of collateral damage which consists of incidental damage to civilian personnel and property incurred while conducting lawful military operations during conflict. Unacceptable collateral damage may occur when insufficient distinction is made, the proportionality analysis is not used, or feasible precautions are not exercised by one or more of the belligerents. Civilian casualties may also arise from enemy actions against civilians and their property either through deliberate targeting or the excessive use of force.

(c) The law of war, which includes the principles of military necessity, distinction, proportionality, honor, and humanity, contains the following considerations:

1. It is unlawful to direct attacks against civilians or civilian/protected objects. Civilians and civilian/protected objects enjoy this protection unless they directly participate in hostilities.

2. In the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to spare civilians. Military units and their security partners must take feasible precautions to minimize collateral harm to civilians and civilian/protected objects.

3. It is unlawful to conduct an attack that may be expected to cause collateral damage that is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

(d) In many cases, failure to prevent civilian casualties will undermine national policy objectives as well as the mission of joint forces, while assisting the enemy. Additionally, civilian casualties can incite increased opposition to joint forces. Focused attention on civilian casualty mitigation can be an important investment to maintain legitimacy and ensure eventual success.

(e) Joint forces may establish civilian casualty tracking and response cells to address the high occurrence of civilian casualties in armed conflict and serve as an example to HN security forces of the need to protect civilians and ensure accountability for casualties. Such civilian casualty mitigation structures must be coupled with strong command support, comprehensive investigations, transparency, accountability, making amends, and adjustment of tactics, when possible, following incidents resulting in civilian casualties. Without these elements, mitigation efforts will not be successful and will be viewed as insincere.

(f) Commanders should account for the different imperatives that include defeating the enemy, preserving the force, and fulfilling obligations and expectations to
keep civilians from harm. While they are often complementary, they can also require tradeoffs; for example, a high FP posture may increase the chances of accidental civilian harm. Short- and long-term mission objectives will dictate how to balance these imperatives.

(3) **Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and Child Protection**

   (a) JFCs should focus on the elimination of conflict-related sexual violence and the protection of children from threats—including their recruitment as child soldiers. These often overlooked problems are critical to address since it is impossible to have a secure environment and adequate protection of civilians when atrocities of these types are rampant.

   (b) Conflict can have a significant impact on women and girls as they suffer a loss of livelihood, displacement, separation from their family, food insecurity, and the loss of traditional networks. Equally, sexual and gender-based violence, with its associated psychological trauma, can often be used as a tactic of war. Rape not only inflicts terror and humiliation on individuals, it can also be used as a deliberate strategy to target and destabilize communities. Rape can also have long-lasting economic, social, and health impacts on the state and surrounding region. Men and boys can also be victims of sexual violence.

   (c) Associated foreign personnel will be vetted for human rights abuses prior to the US conducting theater contracting in the HN.

(4) **MARO.** Joint forces may be required to participate in MARO. A mass atrocity refers to widespread and often systematic acts of violence against civilians by state or non-state armed groups, including killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, or deliberately inflicting conditions that result in serious bodily or mental harm.

   (a) MARO may be directed for the specific purpose of mitigating such activities, or it may occur within the context of other complex situations such as civil wars or insurgencies. MARO efforts include offensive, defensive, and stability tasks to protect vulnerable populations or neutralize perpetrators.

   (b) Commanders should be prepared within their capabilities to monitor, prevent and, if necessary, respond to mass atrocity situations in all operations. Addressing the sources of instability may contribute to preventing mass atrocities.


   d. **Shape a Protective Environment.** In addition to understanding and operating within an OE, leaders must determine how to shape it in ways that enhance protection of civilians. These shaping efforts are conducted through stability activities, military engagement, effective risk mitigation, CCS, and programs including SSR, DDR, and transitional justice.
(1) Effective and lasting civilian protection ultimately depends on effective application of the joint stability functions (security, FHA, economic stabilization and infrastructure, rule of law, and governance and participation). Other actors (including domestic and international political, police, humanitarian, and developmental organizations) will have primary responsibility, authority, and capability for many of the necessary actions. Often, joint forces will at most be limited to a supporting and enabling role.

(2) Stability functions are often related to peace building and development, and they usually must be pursued as parallel, mutually supporting efforts. Inadequate stabilization can result in civilian harm or inflame grievances that result in further conflict and place civilians at increased risk. In many cases, there will be tensions and tradeoffs between short-term goals and long-term outcomes, as well as a potential tension between protection of civilians and other objectives. Joint forces are primarily involved with establishing a safe and secure environment so other actors such as government or nongovernmental agencies can conduct their stabilization and reconstruction efforts.

For more information on stability functions, see JP 3-07, Stability.

(3) Protection of civilians usually requires contributions from a wide variety of military and nonmilitary actors (both local and international) that are not subordinate to a common authority and do not necessarily share the same objectives. A comprehensive approach to protecting civilians is generally the most effective. Military and nonmilitary actors should integrate military and nonmilitary means to achieve shared objectives, with the common understanding that, in the long term, many of the nonmilitary considerations are the most important. Ultimately, HN institutions must be capable of assuming the primary responsibility to protect civilians. It is particularly important to understand civilian protection from the local population’s perspective. To the extent possible, plans and operations should be integrated with those of other actors. Local community efforts are also critical for protection of civilians.

3. Challenges to the Protection of Civilians

a. While conducting operations to protect civilians, military forces will confront tradeoffs and challenges that require difficult choices. Most problems will be situational in nature and defy a blanket solution. For example, peace and stability are important objectives, but so too is an environment in which basic human rights are protected and violators are held accountable. Adversaries may commit violent acts against civilians if they believe they will not be held accountable for previous crimes. Additionally, if they fear being brought to justice, they may continue or escalate attacks on civilians. Other tradeoffs include the role of HN and external actors, the pursuit of short-term and long-term goals, and balancing protection of civilians with other mission objectives.

b. The joint force and any partners will likely confront protection of civilians requirements that exceed their capacity. In addition, joint forces will likely be challenged by HN corruption, constraints with respect to civilian authorities and responsibilities, and difficulties in achieving unity of effort among the diverse participants.
APPENDIX C
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

1. The following figures (C-1, C-2, and C-3) are extracted from the UN Standard Training Module and depict the possible UN chain of command and UN peacekeeping organizational structures a US commander may encounter. Nations will rarely relinquish national command of their forces, if ever. As such, forces participating in a multinational peace operation will typically have at least two distinct chains of command: a national

Notional Chain of Command for a Peace Operation

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Notional Chain of Command for a Peace Operation

Secretary General (if UN-sponsored) or Director (if non-UN-sponsored)

Peace Operations Force Commander 1

Military Staff 3

Personal Staff 4

Civilian Staff 5

Observers

Non-US National Contingent Commander

Non-US Sector Commanders

Non-US Unit Commanders

Non-US National Contingent Commander

Non-US Sector Commanders

Non-US Unit Commanders

US National Contingent Commander

US Sector Commander(s)

US Unit Commanders

Executive Agent and/or Geographic Combatant Commander 2

Notes:
1. May or may not be US command
2. Will always be US command
3. Normally consists of a Chief of Staff, a Deputy Chief of Staff, and an operations staff
4. Normally consists of a military assistant, a political advisor, a legal advisor, a public affairs officer, an interpreter(s), and liaison officers from the armed forces of the parties in the conflict
5. Provided by the UN Secretariat for UN-sponsored operations

Legend

UN United Nations  operational control  coordination/liaison (as required)

Figure C-1. Notional Chain of Command for a Peace Operation
Although in certain circumstances US forces may be placed under the OPCON of non-US commanders, the US chain of command will remain inviolate, running from the President to the supported JFC.

2. Traditional UN peacekeeping forces normally have as their main element a military component. Civilian staff and police may be present, and all are supported by a civilian administration component. These missions tend to maintain their structure and organization with only minor changes for the duration of the mandate. The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan and the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus are examples of traditional UN peacekeeping organizations.

3. Multidimensional, integrated UN peacekeeping missions involve the entire UN system. These missions are multidimensional in that they have military, police, and civilian components. They are integrated in that they are to some degree linked to the humanitarian and developmental organizations in the UN country team. Normally, this linkage occurs through the dual-hatting of a deputy SRSG to the mission, who is also the resident coordinator and humanitarian coordinator of the UN country team. The human rights, civil administration, and public information offices, among many others, support peace efforts and have larger organizations and resources than in traditional peacekeeping missions. The OEs tend to be more fluid and difficult to predict, requiring continuous reassessments of the mandate. Reorganization and redeployment are common in these operations. Recent examples of these missions include the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, and the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission.
in the Central African Republic. Figure C-3 is an example of a generic UN multidimensional integrated mission organization.
APPENDIX D
POINTS OF CONTACT

Joint Staff/J-7/Doctrine Division
Website: http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine/
E-mail Support: js.pentagon.j7.jedd-support@mail.mil
Phone number: 703-692-7273 (DSN 222)

Joint Staff Doctrine Sponsor/J-5
At the time of this publication:
Stability and Humanitarian Engagement Division Global Policy and Partnerships
Comm: 703-695-3838 (DSN 225)

Office of the Secretary of Defense
At the time of this publication:
Stability and Humanitarian Affairs
Comm: 571-256-4937

US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)
At the time of this publication:
Mailing Address: 22 Ashburn Dr. Carlisle, PA 17013
Website: http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu
Comm: 717-245-3722/3409 (DSN 242)

US Military Observer Group (USMOG)
At the time of this publication:
Mailing Address: HQ DA G-3/5/7
2530 Crystal Drive, Suite 7166 Arlington, VA 22202
Website: https://g357.army.pentagon.mil/OD/USMOG-W/SitePages/Home.aspx
Comm: 703-545-7050 (DSN 865)

US Mission to the United Nations
At the time of this publication:
Military Staff Committee
Mailing Address: 799 United Nations Plaza New York, NY 10017
Website: https://usun.state.gov/
https://usun.state.gov/contact
Comm: 212-415-4480/4000
APPENDIX E
REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-07.3 is based upon the following primary references.

1. General
   c. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended (Title 22, USC, Chapter 32).
   d. Title 10, USC.
   g. Presidential Policy Memorandum on United States Support to United Nations Peace Operations.

2. Department of Defense Publications
   b. DODD 2065.1E, Assignment of Personnel to United Nations Missions.
   c. DODD 3000.03E, DOD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW), and NLW Policy.
   d. DODD 5530.3, International Agreements.
   e. DODI 455.13, Air Transportation Eligibility.
   f. DODI 6000.11, Patient Movement.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Publications
Appendix E


d. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

e. JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support.

f. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

g. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

h. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

i. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

j. JP 3-05, Special Operations.

k. JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.

l. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

m. JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.

n. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.


q. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

r. JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations.

s. JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

t. JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

u. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

v. JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.


x. JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

y. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

z. JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

aa. JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.
bb. JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*.


### 4. Multi-Service Publications


- b. ATP 3-07.31/MCTP 3-03B (MCWP 3-33.8)/AFTTP 3-2.40, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*.


### 5. Multinational Documents


6. Multinational Publications
   d. AJP-3.4.1, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support.
   e. Allied Tactical Publication-3.4.1.1, Peace Support Operations Techniques and Procedures.

7. Service Publications
   a. FM 3-07, Stability.
   b. Commandant of the Coast Guard Instruction 16618.7A, International Port Security Program.
   c. ATP 3-07.6, Protection of Civilians.

8. Other Publication
1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

a. The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5).

b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine development community, made a valuable contribution to the revision of this joint publication: lead agent, Mr. Allen (Dwight) Raymond, US Army (PKSOI); Joint Staff doctrine sponsor, Mr. William (Marshall) Mantiply, Joint Staff J-5; technical review authority, Mr. Maxwell Kelly, NDU; LtCol Matthew Robbins, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Analysis Division; and Mr. Larry Seman, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Division.

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations, 01 August 2012.

4. Change Recommendations

a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication, please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness
of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations, events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at https://www.jllis.mil (NIPRNET) or http://www.jllis.smil.mil (SIPRNET).

6. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume I, DOD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and Declassification, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, DOD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information.

7. Distribution of Electronic Publications


   b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

   c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies.
## Glossary

### Part I—Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACSA</td>
<td>acquisition and cross-servicing agreement</td>
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<td>AFTTP</td>
<td>Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<td>AJP</td>
<td>Allied joint publication</td>
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<td>AT</td>
<td>antiterrorism</td>
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<td>ATP</td>
<td>Army techniques publication</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BZ</td>
<td>buffer zone</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>civil affairs</td>
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<td>CBRN</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear</td>
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<td>CCDR</td>
<td>combatant commander</td>
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<td>CCS</td>
<td>commander’s communication synchronization</td>
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<td>CGTTP</td>
<td>Coast Guard tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>civil-military cooperation</td>
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<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CJCSI</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction</td>
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<td>CMO</td>
<td>civil-military operations</td>
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<td>civil-military operations center</td>
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<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>concept of operations</td>
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<td>COS</td>
<td>chief of staff</td>
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<td>DC</td>
<td>dislocated civilian</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration</td>
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<td>DMZ</td>
<td>demilitarized zone</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DODD</td>
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<td>DODI</td>
<td>Department of Defense instruction</td>
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<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
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<td>ERSG</td>
<td>executive representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FGS</td>
<td>Force Generation Service (UN)</td>
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<td>FHA</td>
<td>foreign humanitarian assistance</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual (Army)</td>
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<td>HNS</td>
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<td>head of mission</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>headquarters</td>
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<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>human intelligence</td>
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<td>IAP</td>
<td>integrated assessment and planning</td>
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<td>IAW</td>
<td>in accordance with</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>intelligence requirement</td>
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<td>integrated task force</td>
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<td>joint force commander</td>
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<td>JIPOE</td>
<td>joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<td>KLE</td>
<td>key leader engagement</td>
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<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
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<td>mass atrocity response operations</td>
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<td>MCTP</td>
<td>Marine Corps tactical publication</td>
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<td>MCWP</td>
<td>Marine Corps warfighting publication</td>
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<td>military information support</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>multinational force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNFC</td>
<td>multinational force commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>measure of effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOP</td>
<td>measure of performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>memorandum of understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>military police (Army and Marine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>Military Planning Service (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTTP</td>
<td>Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OA</td>
<td>operational area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>operational contract support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OE</td>
<td>operational environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>operations security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>public affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>police contributing country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEO</td>
<td>peace enforcement operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>peacekeeping operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>personnel recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;R</td>
<td>rest and recuperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>security cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECARMY</td>
<td>Secretary of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>status-of-forces agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOMA</td>
<td>status-of-mission agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>standard operating procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>special representative of the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>security sector reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>troop contributing country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>term of reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAS</td>
<td>unmanned aircraft system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDFS</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Field Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHQ</td>
<td>United Nations Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMEM</td>
<td>United Nations military expert on mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSG</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United State Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMOG</td>
<td>United States Military Observer Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>unexploded explosive ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEO</td>
<td>violent extremist organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme (UN)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

buffer zone. 1. A defined area controlled by a peace operations force from which disputing or belligerent forces have been excluded. Also called area of separation in some United Nations operations. Also called BZ. (JP 3-07.3) 2. A designated area used for safety in military operations. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-01)

conflict prevention. A peace operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and, when necessary, military means to monitor and identify the causes of conflict and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

demilitarized zone. None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)

disengagement. None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)

line of demarcation. A line defining the boundary of a buffer zone used to establish the forward limits of disputing or belligerent forces after each phase of disengagement or withdrawal has been completed. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.3)

mass atrocity response operations. Military activities conducted to prevent or halt mass atrocities. Also called MARO. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.3)

minimum force. Those minimum actions, including the use of armed force, sufficient to bring a situation under control or to defend against a hostile act or hostile intent, where the firing of weapons is to be considered as a means of last resort. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

operations to restore order. None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)

peace building. Stability actions that strengthen and rebuild a society’s institutions, infrastructure, and civic life to avoid a relapse into conflict. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

peace enforcement. Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.3)

peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken, with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

peacemaking. The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that led to it. Also called PM. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
**peace operations.** Multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. Also called **PO.** (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

**public diplomacy.** None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)

**relief in place.** An operation in which, by direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit and the responsibilities of the replaced elements for the mission and the assigned zone of operations are transferred to the incoming unit. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.3)
Intentionally Blank
STEP #1 - Initiation
- Joint doctrine development community (JDDC) submission to fill extant operational void
- Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-end analysis
- Joint Doctrine Planning Conference validation
- Program directive (PD) development and staffing/joint working group
- PD includes scope, references, outline, milestones, and draft authorship
- JS J-7 approves and releases PD to lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant command, JS directorate)

STEP #2 - Development
- LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first draft (FD)
- PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
- FD comment matrix adjudication
- JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system
- Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment matrix
- FC joint working group

STEP #3 - Approval
- JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7
- JS J-7 prepares publication for signature
- JSDS prepares JS staffing package
- JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for signature

STEP #4 - Maintenance
- JP published and continuously assessed by users
- Formal assessment begins 24-27 months following publication
- Revision begins 3.5 years after publication
- Each JP revision is completed no later than 5 years after signature

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process: