MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR OF COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR OF NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES


Reference: Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Establishment of the Secretary of Defense Close Combat Lethality Task Force,” February 8, 2018

Purpose. This DTM:

- Establishes the CCLTF, which will include the CCLTF Executive Committee (EXCOM) and the CCLTF Senior Steering Group (SSG).

- Is effective March 16, 2018; it will be converted to a new DoD directive. This DTM will expire effective March 16, 2020.

Applicability. This DTM applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD
Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the Department of Defense (referred to collectively in this DTM as the “DoD Components”).

**Definitions.** See Glossary.

**Policy.** Through the CCLTF, the DoD will develop, evaluate, recommend, and implement improvements to U.S. squad-level infantry combat formations in order to ensure close combat overmatch (see Glossary) against pacing threats and strengthen the combat, lethality, survivability, resiliency, and readiness of infantry squads. To achieve overmatch, the DoD will:

- Accelerate promising Service-level close combat initiatives.
- Develop joint solutions to capability gaps that affect the joint force.
- Federate disparate developmental and research efforts into a DoD community of practice to accelerate innovation and implementation.
- Take immediate actions when able to achieve desired change, and develop long-term solutions when necessary.
- Prioritize analysis in a manner that minimizes delays in fielding the most promising approaches and solutions.

**Responsibilities.** See Attachment 1.

**Summary of Changes.** The changes to this DTM are administrative and update the expiration date.

**Procedures.** See Attachment 2.

**Releasability.** **Cleared for public release.** This DTM is available on the Directives Division Website at http://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.

Attachments:
As stated

Change 1, 12/28/2018 2
ATTACHMENT 1

RESPONSIBILITIES

1. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS (USD(P&R)). The USD(P&R):
   
   a. Serves as the DoD proponent for the CCLTF.
   
   b. Serves as the Chairman of the CCLTF EXCOM.
   
   c. No later than March 15, 2018, designates an O-5/GS-14 or equivalent member to serve on the CCLTF.
   
   d. Serves as the principal advisor to the SSG on personnel and readiness matters, which include:

      (1) Development of training programs and policy, to include live, augmented, synthetic, virtual, and advanced distributed learning initiatives, in cooperation with the Military Services and others, as applicable.

      (2) Integration of manpower, personnel, training, human factors, and safety issues into the execution of approved CCLTF initiatives ensuring interoperability, consistency, and standardization in cooperation with the Military Services, Combat Support Agencies, and others, as applicable.

   e. Coordinates with the Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) for the provision of human capital services, payroll services, travel services, information technology, facilities, contract services, legal services, administrative services, financial and budget services, records management, experimentation, and any other validated activities in support of CCLTF objectives.

      (1) Ordinary expenses associated with Service member participation in the CCLTF will be paid by the DoD Component to which they are assigned.

      (2) Extraordinary expenses such as extended travel or training of Service members, that are primarily conducted in support of the CCLTF, will be paid by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD(P&R)).

   f. Provides adequate support staff in the form of an executive assistant, correspondence manager, analyst, and communications director for the CCLTF.

2. MILITARY DEPUTY, OUSD(P&R). The Military Deputy, OUSD(P&R):

   a. Serves as the Chairman of the CCLTF SSG.
b. Serves as the principal advisor to the Director, CCLTF, and provides oversight of CCLTF operations and activities.

3. **DIRECTOR, CCLTF.** Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P&R), the Director, CCLTF:

   a. Leads the CCLTF. Is selected and vested with duties and responsibilities by the Secretary of Defense or the USD(P&R).

   b. Serves as the principal close combat advisor to the USD(P&R).

   c. Serves as the DoD point of coordination for the efforts necessary to establish rapidly the necessary implementation strategies for initiatives validated through the CCLTF. This includes identifying additional near-, mid-, and long-term objectives to achieve close combat overmatch against the pacing threats identified in the National Defense Strategy.

   d. Provides quarterly updates to the Secretary of Defense through the USD(P&R).

   e. Recommends CCLTF current year initiatives for potential reprogramming in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Department of Defense (USD(C)/CFO).

   f. Recommends future-year CCLTF issue papers for consideration in the program review.

   g. Assists the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)), the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)), and other responsible acquisition officials in developing transition plans for proven CCLTF initiatives into DoD programs of record for sustainment and further integration and sustainment.

   h. Establishes, maintains, and preserves all CCLTF historical records including those relating to organization, functions, policies, procedures, and decisions.

   i. Tracks the current status of program execution, operational fielding, and performance of CCLTF initiatives.

   j. Develops resource requirements and appropriate planning and programming documents for establishment of current and future CCLTF funding needs, including out year funding requirements.

   k. Coordinates with the Military Services and other agencies on congressional notifications, as appropriate, for CCLTF initiatives.

   l. Coordinates budget formulation, presentations, and execution funding control and evaluation.
m. Coordinates all correspondence with CCLTF stakeholders, as appropriate.

n. Coordinates and approves CCLTF requests for contract support.

4. **USD(A&S).** The USD(A&S):
   
a. No later than March 15, 2018, designates an O-5/GS-14 or equivalent level representative to serve on the CCLTF.

b. Serves as a member of the EXCOM.

c. Designates a general or flag officer or Senior Executive Service (SES) member (or equivalent) to serve on the SSG.

d. Serves as the principal advisor to the SSG on acquisition and sustainment.

5. **USD(R&E).** The USD(R&E):
   
a. No later than March 15, 2018, designates an O-5/GS-14 or equivalent level representative to serve on the CCLTF.

b. Serves as member of the EXCOM.

c. Designates a general or flag officer or SES member (or equivalent) to serve on the SSG.

d. Serves as the principal advisor to the SSG on technology and innovation.

6. **DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION (CAPE).** The Director, CAPE:
   
a. No later than March 15, 2018, designates an O-5/GS-14 or equivalent level representative to serve on the CCLTF.

b. Serves as member of the EXCOM.

c. Designates a general or flag officer or SES member (or equivalent) to serve on the SSG.

d. Serves as the principal advisor to the SSG on CAPE matters.
7. **USD(C)/CFO.** The USD(C)/CFO:

   a. No later than March 15, 2018, designates an O-5/GS-14 or equivalent level representative to serve on the CCLTF.

   b. Serves as a member of the EXCOM

   c. Designates a general or flag officer or SES member (or equivalent) to serve on the SSG.

   d. Serves as the principal advisor to the SSG on financial matters.

8. **DIRECTOR, WHS.** Under the authority, direction, and control of the Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense, the Director, WHS:

   a. No later than March 15, 2018, provides human capital services, payroll services, travel services, information technology, and facilities for twelve Task Force members, contract services, legal services, administrative services, financial and budget services, and records management.

   b. No later than March 15, 2018, provides office space and associated support to accommodate a staff of 24 personnel within the Pentagon reservation or closely-located leased space.

9. **SECRETARY OF THE ARMY.** The Secretary of the Army:

   a. No later than March 15, 2018, designates individuals with acknowledged infantry close combat experience to serve on the CCLTF as follows:

      (1) Two O-6 level representatives, one to serve as the Deputy Director, CCLTF.

      (2) An O-5.

      (3) An E-9.

   b. Designates a general or flag officer or SES member (or equivalent) and appropriate senior enlisted advisor to the SSG and EXCOM.

10. **COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS.** The Commandant of the Marine Corps:

    a. No later than March 15, 2018, designates individuals with acknowledged infantry close combat experience to serve on the CCLTF as follows:
(1) An O-6.

(2) An O-5.

(3) An E-9.

b. Designates a general or flag officer or SES member (or equivalent) and appropriate senior enlisted advisor to the SSG and EXCOM.

11. CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU (NGB). The Chief, NGB:

   a. No later than March 15, 2018, designates an O-5 with acknowledged infantry close combat experience to serve on the CCLTF.

   b. Designates a general or flag officer or SES member (or equivalent) to the SSG and EXCOM.

12. CJCS. The CJCS:

   a. No later than March 15, 2018, ensures the Joint Force Development Directorate (J7) designates an O-5/GS-14 or equivalent member to serve on the CCLTF.

   b. No later than March 15, 2018, ensures the Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J8) designates an O-5/GS-14 or equivalent member to serve on CCLTF.

   c. Designates appropriate general or flag officer and senior enlisted advisor representation to the EXCOM.

   d. Designates a general or flag officer or SES member (or equivalent) and senior enlisted advisor to serve on the SSG.

13. COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (USSOCOM). The Commander, USSOCOM:

   a. No later than March 15, 2018, designates an O-5 with acknowledged infantry close combat experience to serve on the CCLTF.

   b. Designates a general or flag officer or SES member (or equivalent) to the SSG and EXCOM.
1. PURPOSE. DoD will establish a general framework for the implementation of close combat initiatives, experimentation, and analytics that produces close combat overmatch against pacing threats. The CCLTF is tasked to improve the combat, lethality, survivability, resiliency and readiness of U.S. infantry squads.

2. BACKGROUND.
   a. During 2017, CAPE conducted a Close Combat Strategic Portfolio Review to identify the most promising investment opportunities to improve close combat effectiveness and survivability.
   b. The review is now closed, pending recommendations.
   c. The Secretary of Defense established, via the referenced memorandum, the CCLTF within the OUSD(P&R) to further the implementation of select initiatives identified during the 2017 CAPE review and to identify, evaluate and, as appropriate, implement additional initiatives.

3. PROBLEM STATEMENT. The fundamental problem to overcome is an erosion in close combat capability relative to the pacing threats identified in the National Defense Strategy. The CCLTF will analyze and provide focused recommendation on Military Department and Military Service efforts to achieve overmatch to ensure infantry squads are never in a fair fight. Overcoming this problem will require changes to infantry squad manpower management, training, equipping, and other domains, to enhance lethality and survivability, thereby achieving overmatch.

4. MISSION STATEMENT. The CCLTF will develop, evaluate, recommend, and monitor the implementation of improvements to U.S. squad level infantry combat formations in order to ensure overmatch against pacing threats and strengthen the combat lethality, resiliency, and readiness of infantry squads.

5. OBJECTIVE. The CCLTF will capitalize on CAPE’s Close Combat Strategic Portfolio Review by evaluating CAPE’s recommendations and establishing implementation strategies for initiatives validated through the CCLTF. This includes identifying additional near-, mid-, and long-term objectives to achieve close combat overmatch against the pacing threats identified in the National Defense Strategy. Principles to guide the achievement of overmatch are:
   a. Accelerate promising Service-level close combat initiatives.
b. Develop joint solutions to cross-cutting capability gaps where warranted.

c. Federate disparate developmental/research efforts into a Departmental community of practice to accelerate innovation and implementation.

d. As practicable, take immediate actions to achieve desired change, and develop long-term solutions when necessary.

e. Evaluate solutions across DOTMLPF-P domains.

f. Prioritize analysis in a manner that minimizes delays in fielding the most promising approaches and solutions.

6. CONCEPT OF OPERATION. This is a DoD-wide and multi-year effort involving the whole of government. The CCLTF Concept of Operation will have five overlapping phases and five lines of effort (LOEs). Decisive to the effort is the attainment of the required close combat capabilities described in the Glossary in such a manner that when combined they create a decisive effect on U.S. adversaries. This campaign will have five phases:

   a. Phase I – Establish the CCLTF. The CCLTF secures working spaces and equipment, support personnel, establishes the EXCOM and SSG, arrays data, and initiates planning by March 15, 2018.

   b. Phase II – Shaping. During this phase, the CCLTF will conduct fact finding visits and develop the required community of practice across the Joint Force, science and technology, and research and development communities, as needed, and will develop an understanding of threat capabilities, which will help the CCLTF evaluate overmatch. The Military Departments, Military Services, and Combatant Commanders will provide information to fully articulate the demands of the current and future operating environment for close combat units. The CCLTF will help key DoD leaders explain the CCLTF efforts to audiences within and outside the DoD. This phase runs concurrent to all other phases.

   c. Phase III – Decisive Action. In coordination with the Military Departments, Military Services, and Combatant Commanders, the CCLTF will recommend implementation of policy changes, investment and divestment strategies, and training methods and venues to achieve the CCLTF purpose. This phase runs concurrent to all other phases.

   d. Phase IV – Exploitation. Through an iterative process designed to identify and disseminate best practices, the CCLTF will continually evaluate on going Military Service and Combatant Command efforts. Additionally, the CCLTF will continue to leverage the community of interest and academia to identify technology and methods best suited increase infantry squad lethality and survivability.
e. Phase V – Transition. The CCLTF will pursue policies and mechanisms that ensure outcomes are enduring in nature. The bias is toward systemic changes that yield repeatable results across transitions and fiscal planning horizons.

7. LOEs. The following are the initial LOEs. The lines of effort will be executed concurrently. The CCLTF will recommend to the SSG the addition, deletion, or consolidation of LOEs, as warranted.

a. Manpower Policy. Infantry squads have a distinct and unique role in the Joint Force. As such, infantry personnel and units require tailored manpower management policies and practices to achieve overmatch. This LOE will address the following initial problem statements:

   (1) Infantry squads have a significant personnel turnover. This has negative impacts on unit training, cohesion, and small unit leadership.

   (2) Recruiting and retention practices do not deliberately identify candidates with the physical and personality traits that best align with success in close combat.

   (3) Infantry squads are not sufficiently staffed and stabilized.

b. Training and Human Performance. Extreme, interpersonal violence is synonymous with close combat. Developing physical, emotional, spiritual, and ethical resiliency in infantry squads is an imperative. Cognitive development and repetition in realistic, challenging training environments will build the type of infantry squads necessary for the modern battlefield. Twenty-five virtual battles before actual battle will attune infantry personnel to the shock of first contact within a hyper realistic training environment. Infantry squads will not simply survive on the modern battlefield, they will thrive through world-class physical and mental training and preparation. The CCLTF will catalyze the fielding of live, virtual, and immersive training venues to achieve combat ready formations. This LOE will address the following initial problem statements:

   (1) Infantry squads can be vulnerable during first contact with enemy forces. Current training practices must sufficiently prepare infantry squads for their first engagement through repetitive yet variable realistic training in an immersive, high-stress training environment.

   (2) The physical demands of close combat require exceptional fitness and health. DoD must fully explore opportunities to optimize the physical preparedness of infantry personnel.

   (3) Squad level infantry personnel must have the mental acuity to meet the cognitive demands of modern combat. Additionally, they must be prepared emotionally, ethically, and spiritually to quickly make sound decisions under extreme stress.
4) Infantry training is a progressive skill building process. Training and cohesion are negatively affected by insufficient squad stabilization, which disrupts unit training progression.

c. **Warfighter Equipment and Weapons Systems.** The CCLTF will identify or develop options for investment that include more lethal and discriminating individual weapons systems, while recognizing the imperative to lighten load for infantry squads. Secure, reliable, and efficient communication systems, as well as integrated non-line of sight sensors are critical to achieving the objectives of the CCLTF. Equipment and weapons systems recommendations will be based on mission requirements of infantry squads, which are different from other elements of the Joint Force. This LOE will address the following initial problem statements:

1. Infantry squads do not possess sufficient situational awareness tools to sense beyond line of sight.

2. Infantry squads require enhancements in organic lethality to prevail over the pacing threats.

3. Infantry squads do not have the required secure, reliable communication equipment to leverage non-organic supporting arms and do not have sufficient ability to communicate with higher, adjacent, and supporting units.

4. Individual loads on infantry personnel far exceed established standards, which negatively impacts the infantry squad’s mobility, survivability, and lethality.

d. **Guidance from Public Affairs.** The scope and purpose of the CCLTF must be clear and unambiguous to those inside and outside DoD. It is imperative to communicate the U.S. obligation to support those Service members that bear the brunt of close combat. A deliberate communication strategy, including senior leader engagement, especially senior enlisted engagement, is imperative. This LOE will address the following initial problem statements:

1. Extant cultures may not sufficiently emphasize the prestige (and hardship) associated with being a close combat soldier or Marine.

2. Across DoD, the same consideration is not provided to infantry squads as to other weapon systems. Previously, the infantry squad has not been viewed as a platform and addressed in a holistic manner, akin to how DoD manages other platforms, such as aircraft.

e. **Science and Technology Research and Development.** The CCLTF will leverage and recommend investments to address identified capability gaps where materiel solutions do not exist. Additionally, the CCLTF will recommend science and technology and research and development efforts aimed at improving human performance, within existing ethical guidelines. This LOE will address the following initial problem statements:

1. DoD and the Military Services invest a significant amount of resources into development of technologies that support close combat formations, but there are challenges in
understanding the full depth and breadth of DoD’s science and technology efforts. As a result, there are likely overlaps and seams in the development of close combat innovations.

(2) There is no collaborative mechanism for DoD to focus the totality of efforts of the scientific community toward close combat capability development to address gaps.

8. **CCLTF SSG.**

   a. The SSG is a decision body for the Secretary of Defense, established to provide oversight of the CCLTF and recommend initiatives for current-year reprogramming or consideration in program review. It will be comprised solely of active duty Service members and full time, or permanent part-time, federal civilian employees.

   b. The SSG is chaired by the Military Deputy, OUSD(P&R).

   c. Membership of the SSG consists of general or flag officer or SES member (or equivalent) representation from:

      (1) OUSD(P&R).
      (2) Office of the CJCS.
      (3) U.S. Army.
      (4) U.S. Marine Corps.
      (5) USSOCOM.
      (6) Office of the USD(A&S).
      (7) Office of the USD(R&E).
      (8) Office of the USD(C)/CFO.
      (9) CAPE.
      (10) NGB
ATTACHMENT 3

CCLTF GLOSSARY

PART I. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CAPE Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
CCLTF Close Combat Lethality Task Force
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
DOTMLPF-P Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy
DTM Directive-type Memorandum
EXCOM Executive Committee
J7 Joint Force Development Directorate
J8 Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate
LOE line of effort
NGB National Guard Bureau
OUSD(P&R) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
SES Senior Executive Service
SSG Senior Steering Group
USD(A&S) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
USD(C)/CFO Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Department of Defense
USD(R&E) Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
USD(P&R) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command
WHS Washington Headquarters Services

PART II. DEFINITIONS

Currently, some terminology is not rigorously defined in Service or Joint doctrine and some definitions may be inadequate. Below are initial key terms that may be subject to refinement, as appropriate.
close combat. Ground combat executed by dismounted infantry squad-sized formations carried out within line of sight of the enemy and characterized by extreme violence. Close combat focus areas include:

Manpower policies.
Training.
Lethality.
Mobility and Soldier’s Load.
Human performance (physical and cognitive).
Sensing.
Survivability.
Sustainment.
Resiliency.
Communications.

close combat overmatch. The ability of a squad sized unit to impose its will on a similar sized opponent under all conditions and operational environments. Achieving overmatch includes both materiel and non-materiel solutions, including the close combat focus areas described in the definition of “close combat.”

required close combat capabilities. The CCLTF will catalyze overmatch within the Military Services’ infantry squads. Specific desired outcomes include infantry squads that are properly led by mature, experienced, and qualified small unit leaders in cohesive squads. Infantry squads will be expertly trained for offensive and defensive operations and will prevail in first contact with the adversary. Their equipment will enhance their lethality and survivability, and they will have the situational awareness and decision making ability to discriminately apply lethal force. U.S. close combat forces will be manned, trained, and equipped commensurate with the contribution to national defense.