

**FMI 5-0.1**  
**March 2006**

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**THE OPERATIONS PROCESS**

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**HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

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**FMI 5-0.1, C1**

14 March 2008

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# THE OPERATIONS PROCESS

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# Preface

Doctrine provides a military organization with unity of effort and a common philosophy, language, and purpose. This FMI provides doctrine for the exercise of command and control throughout the conduct (planning, preparing, execution, and assessment) of full spectrum operations.

## PURPOSE

This FMI reinforces fundamental principles in FMs 3-0, 5-0, and 6-0. It clarifies, emphasizes, or expands upon those fundamentals based on changes in Army structure and lessons learned from ongoing operations. It provides commanders with doctrinal considerations for organizing their individual command and control (C2) systems and putting them into action to accomplish missions. It also replaces the battlefield operating systems described in FM 3-0 with the six warfighting functions.

This FMI establishes the Army's position on how the joint effects-based approach to joint operations affects Army forces and Army C2 doctrine. This FMI also is a guide for further refining battalion through corps headquarters design and developing branch and echelon manuals concerning C2 in operations.

## SCOPE

FMI 5-0.1 has an introduction and five chapters. It augments but does not replace the planning doctrine in FM 5-0 and the C2 doctrine in FM 6-0. It expands C2 doctrine regarding decision making, assessment, and exercising C2 during execution.

- The introduction expands upon the manual's purpose and summarizes the doctrinal changes it contains.
- Chapter 1 discusses the Army's operational concept and describes several keystone doctrine changes. It provides a doctrinal position on how the effects-based approach to joint operations affects the conduct of operations by Army forces.
- Chapter 2 provides doctrine for organizing C2 systems for operations. It provides a taxonomy for command post (CP) structure and general guides for the role and functions of CPs and cells within CPs.
- Chapter 3 expands the operations process. It discusses how several processes integrate during the planning, preparing, executing, and assessment activities of an operation. It reinforces the commander's role in exercising C2 and the staff's role in supporting the commander and subordinate commanders.
- Chapter 4 broadens the doctrine for exercising C2 during execution established in FM 6-0. It introduces the rapid decision making and synchronization process.
- Chapter 5 provides doctrine for assessment, including tactics, techniques, and procedures for assessing operations.
- Appendix A expands doctrine on full spectrum operations, to include planning considerations for stability and reconstruction operations and civil support operations.
- Appendix B provides doctrine for crafting mission and task statements that clearly describe the commander's intended effects.

## APPLICABILITY

FMI 5-0.1 applies to Army headquarters from battalion through corps. It applies to all Army leaders, especially trainers, educators, force designers, and doctrine developers.



Army headquarters serving as a headquarters for a joint force land component or joint task force should refer to appropriate joint doctrine, policies, and regulations.

This publication applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard of the United States, and U.S. Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

## **DESCRIPTION OF FIELD MANUALS—INTERIM**

An FMI is a Department of the Army publication that provides expedited delivery of urgently needed doctrine the proponent has approved for use without placing it through the standard development process. Unless an FMI is rescinded, information it disseminates is incorporated into a new or revised field manual.

## **ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION**

Terms that have joint or Army definitions are identified in both the glossary and the text. The glossary lists most terms used in FMI 5-0.1 that have joint or Army definitions. Terms for which FMI 5-0.1 establishes definitions are indicated with an asterisk in the glossary and printed in boldface in the text. For other definitions in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent field manual follows the definition.

Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, is the proponent for this publication. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. Send written comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-CD (FMI 5-0.1), 201 Reynolds Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to [web-cadd@leavenworth.army.mil](mailto:web-cadd@leavenworth.army.mil); or submit on an electronic DA Form 2028.

# Introduction

## THE ROLE OF DOCTRINE

Doctrine is the concise expression of how Army forces contribute to campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements. It provides a common frame of reference across the Army. Rather than establishing a set of hard-and-fast rules, the objective of doctrine is to foster initiative and creative thinking. Doctrine provides a menu of practical options based on experience from which Army leaders can create solutions to tactical problems.

Doctrine facilitates unity of effort by providing a common philosophy and language. This common understanding of how Army forces fight and the doctrinal terms used to describe this understanding facilitate rapid team-building, tailoring, and task-organizing among units and Soldiers. It helps standardize operations and aids readiness by establishing common ways of accomplishing military tasks. Well-established terms and graphics and commonly accepted practices allow for shorter orders. They also facilitate their rapid production, dissemination, and understanding.

The Army is a learning organization. Its doctrine is not static. It continuously revises doctrine based on the ever-changing security environment and lessons from operations. FM 1 and FM 3-0 are the Army's two capstone field manuals. They provide the fundamental principles for employing landpower. Among many things, these manuals provide overarching doctrinal direction for the conduct of full spectrum operations.

The revision of Army capstone and several keystone doctrinal manuals has begun with the publication of the June 2005 edition of FM 1. FM 1 establishes the Army's operational concept and refines the principle of full spectrum operations. Additionally, the Army is currently revising FMs 3-0 and its two keystone command and control (C2) manuals, FMs 5-0 and 6-0. This is a parallel effort with the revisions of JPs 3-0 and 5-0.

## EMERGING DOCTRINAL REQUIREMENTS

Since the publication of the 2001 edition of FM 3-0, there have been significant changes in the security environment (for example, the War on Terrorism) and organizational changes in the operational Army (transformation to the modular force). Lessons from ongoing operations and transformation initiatives have revealed several doctrinal, training, and leader development requirements. Doctrinal needs include—

- Expanding full spectrum operations doctrine to better describe how to plan, prepare, execute, and assess stability and reconstruction operations simultaneously with offensive and defensive operations.
- Better describing how to integrate several integrating processes (the military decision making process [MDMP], targeting, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, intelligence synchronization, and risk management) with each other and throughout the operations process.
- Better describing the roles and functions of command posts, cells within command posts, and the duties and responsibilities of key staff officers.
- Describing the applicability of the effects-based operations/effects-based approach concept to Army operations.

The deliberate process of incorporating these needs into doctrine is underway with the revisions of FMs 3-0, 5-0, and 6-0. This effort, however, will take up to two years to complete. It involves ensuring that Army doctrine nests with joint doctrine and is coordinated with organizational design, training, and leader development initiatives. It also requires acceptance by the Army—especially the operational force. It requires staffing, coordination, and resolution of differences. Ongoing operations and continuing work in Army transformation, however, requires immediate implementation of the doctrinal changes this FMI contains.

FMI 5-0.1 establishes interim doctrine to clarify, expand, or adjust current doctrine related to the exercise of C2 during operations. Feedback from this doctrine will inform the further development of FMs 3-0, 5-0, and 6-0 and guide branch and echelon manual development.

## SUMMARY OF CHANGES

The following paragraphs summarize the doctrinal changes made by this FMI.

### NEW, MODIFIED, AND RESCINDED TERMS

Introductory tables 1 and 2 (below) list changes to Army terms made by this FMI.

**Introductory table 1. New Army terms**

<b>This FMI adds the following terms to Army doctrine:</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Army positive control</li> <li>• Army procedural control</li> <li>• battle rhythm</li> <li>• board</li> <li>• command post cell</li> <li>• center</li> <li>• command and control warfighting function</li> <li>• early-entry command post</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• effect</li> <li>• fire support warfighting function</li> <li>• graphic control measure</li> <li>• intelligence warfighting function</li> <li>• measure of effectiveness</li> <li>• measure of performance</li> <li>• movement and maneuver warfighting function</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• protection warfighting function</li> <li>• situational awareness</li> <li>• staff element</li> <li>• staff section</li> <li>• sustainment warfighting function</li> <li>• warfighting function</li> <li>• working group</li> </ul>

**Introductory table 2. Modified and rescinded Army terms**

<b>This FMI modifies the following Army terms:</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• assessment</li> <li>• command</li> <li>• commander's intent</li> <li>• commander's visualization</li> <li>• command group</li> <li>• control</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• control measure</li> <li>• evaluate</li> <li>• line of operations</li> <li>• main command post</li> <li>• military decision making process</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• monitoring</li> <li>• operations process</li> <li>• planning</li> <li>• running estimate</li> <li>• tactical command post</li> </ul>
<b>This FMI rescinds the following Army terms:</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• air defense battlefield operating system</li> <li>• battlefield operating system</li> <li>• combat service support battlefield operating system</li> <li>• command and control battlefield operating system</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• criteria of success</li> <li>• fire support battlefield operating system</li> <li>• intelligence battlefield operating system</li> <li>• maneuver battlefield operating system</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• mobility, countermobility, survivability battlefield operating system</li> <li>• positive control*</li> <li>• procedural control*</li> <li>• staff estimate</li> </ul>
*The joint terms and definitions for positive control and procedural control remain in effect.		

## CHANGES BY CHAPTER

The following paragraphs summarize the doctrinal changes by chapter.

### Chapter 1 – Command and Control

Chapter 1 makes the following changes:

- Describes how the Army’s operational concept expressed in FM 1 affects current C2 doctrine.
- Replaces the **battlefield operating systems** with the **warfighting functions** (intelligence, movement and maneuver, fire support, protection, sustainment, and command and control).
- Retains the fundamental of **combat power** but changes the **elements of combat power** to the six warfighting functions tied together by leadership.
- Summarizes how joint forces use **an effects-based approach in the conduct of joint operations**. Provides guidance on how this joint methodology impacts on Army forces, to include defining the term **effect** for Army use.
- Reinforces Army doctrine on **mission command** and **mission orders**, to include emphasizing the use of the Army’s who, what (task), where, when, and why (purpose) construct when issuing instructions to subordinates to accomplish objectives and missions.
- Modifies the definition of **military decision making process** prescribed in FM 5-0 to account for the interaction among the commander, staff, and subordinate commanders during planning.
- Modifies the definition of the **operations process** prescribed in FM 6-0 to provide a more complete definition of the term.
- Modifies the definition of **assessment** prescribed in FM 3-0 to provide a clearer definition of the term.
- Combines the terms *staff estimate* (FM 5-0) and *running estimate* (FM 6-0) into a single term, **running estimate**. It also revises the definition of running estimate. The change emphasizes that there is only one type of continuous estimate.
- Rescinds the term **criteria of success** and adds the terms **measure of effectiveness** and **measure of performance** to enhance doctrine on assessment.
- Modifies the definition of **control measure** and adds the term **graphic control measure** to account for the various forms of Army positive and Army procedural controls.
- Modifies the definition of **commander’s visualization** prescribed in FM 6-0 to provide a more clear definition of the term.
- Adds the term **situational awareness** to account in doctrine for a term commonly used throughout the Army. Within the cognitive hierarchy, situational awareness is at the knowledge level. Commanders, leaders, and staff members apply judgment to situational awareness to achieve situational understanding.
- Modifies the definition of **command** for the Army. The definition now includes leadership.
- Modifies the definition of **commander’s intent** prescribed in FM 3-0 to account for civil considerations that may be a part of the commander’s envisioned end state.
- Adds the word “Army” in front of the terms **positive control** and **procedural control** to prevent confusion between the Army’s command and control terms and the joint terms that refer to means of controlling airspace. Changes the definition of Army procedural control to reflect that doctrine includes tactics, techniques, and procedures.

## Chapter 2 – Command Posts and Staff Operations

Chapter 2 makes the following changes:

- Provides a common doctrinal taxonomy for CP organization by establishing and defining the terms **staff section**, **center**, **command post cell**, and **staff element**. A center is a C2 node similar to a CP but with a narrower focus. The cells within a CP are **functional cells** (intelligence; movement and maneuver; fire support; protection; sustainment; and command, control, communications, and computer operations) and **integrating cells** (current operations, future operations, and plans). Provides doctrine for the overall function of each functional and integrating cell.
- Retitles the staff section **G-5/S-5**, civil-military operations, to G-5/S-5, plans, to better align Army and joint staff structures. The civil-military operations staff section is now the **G-9/S-9**. Establishes a **G-8**, financial management, staff section. The financial management section is lead by the financial management officer, formerly called the resource management officer/comptroller.
- Purposely does not retitle the **fire support coordinator** the “effects coordinator” or title the **fire support cell** the “fire and effects cell.” Using these terms has added to confusion in the duties and responsibilities of staff officers and cells, and implied that Army doctrine includes the effects-based operations concept.
- Shortens the definition of **command group** prescribed in FM 1-02.
- Establish common functions for tactical CPs and main CPs.
- Modifies the definition of **tactical command post** prescribed in FM 1-02 by deleting the CP’s location (well forward on the battlefield).
- Modifies the definition of **main command post** prescribed in FM 1-02 to provide a more accurate definition of the term.
- Defines an **early-entry command post**, providing a definition for the term used in the transformed division and corps headquarters.
- Establishes and defines the terms **working group** and **board**. Provides doctrine on typical working groups used by commanders to exercise C2.
- Provides planning considerations (effectiveness factors and survivability factors) for organizing CPs for operations.
- Establishes and defines the term **battle rhythm** to account in doctrine for a term commonly used throughout the Army.
- Modifies the format of **paragraph 5 of the operation order** prescribed in FM 5-0 to better account for CP employment.

## Chapter 3 – Exercising Command and Control

Chapter 3 makes the following changes:

- Expands the discussion of the exercise of C2 during all operations process activities. Describes how several **integrating processes** (the MDMP, targeting, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, intelligence synchronization, and risk management) and **continuing activities** (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations; security operations; protection; liaison and coordination; terrain management; information operations; and Army airspace command and control) are synchronized throughout operations.
- Establishes more precisely the **synchronization requirements for planning and current operations** by CP and CP cells.
- Provides doctrine on **time horizons** (short-, mid-, and long-range) as a construct for assigning responsibilities to CPs and CP cells.

### Chapter 4 – Execution

Chapter 4 makes the following changes:

- Expands upon the Army's **operational concept** established in FM 1. Provides considerations for commanders on how to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative during execution by continuously exploiting opportunities and countering threats to achieve the operation's end state.
- Expands the doctrine on decision making during execution described in FM 6-0. It introduces the **rapid decision making and synchronization process (RDSP)**—a tool available to leaders when time is short or it is inappropriate to conduct a full MDMP.
- Provides guidelines for **collaborative synchronization** during execution.

### Chapter 5 – Assessment

Chapter 5 makes the following changes:

- Expands doctrine on assessment described in FM 6-0.
- Modifies the definition of **monitoring** prescribed in FM 6-0. Expands the definition to include more than the common operational picture.
- Provides techniques for crafting **measures of performance** and **measures of effectiveness**.

### Appendix A – Considerations for Stability and Reconstruction Operations and Civil Support Operations

Appendix A makes the following changes:

- Expands the discussion of stability and reconstruction operations and civil support operations within the context of full spectrum operations. Provides an increased emphasis on the **simultaneous nature** of operations and the **complementary effects** of each on the types of operations (offense, defense, stability and reconstruction, and civil support).
- Expands the doctrinal discussion of **transitions** between operations and phases of operations. Links operational art and the execution of transitions.
- Modifies the definition of **lines of operations** prescribed in FM 3-0 to account for logical lines of operations within the definition.
- Provides an expanded discussion of the use of **logical lines of operations** during operational design to support planning considerations for stability and reconstruction and civil support operations.

### Appendix B – Mission Statements and Tasks to Subordinate Units

Appendix B reinforces doctrine on **developing mission statements** and **tasks to subordinate units**. It discusses using the who, what (task), when, where, and why (purpose) construct to clearly articulate desired effects or results.

**Chapter 1**  
**Command and Control**

This chapter is rescinded. Refer to FM 3-0.

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## Chapter 2

# Command Posts and Staff Operations

The staff's primary function is to help the commander and subordinate commanders exercise control. Commanders organize their individual command and control (C2) systems into command posts (CPs). By doing this, commanders disperse their staff and C2 capabilities. This enhances the commander's ability to exercise C2 and makes the C2 system more survivable. This chapter begins by identifying coordinating, special, and personal staff sections. Next it describes how commanders organize their C2 system into CPs. This chapter provides a common taxonomy for CP organization. It describes the key functions of each type of CP and CP cell for the transforming Army. Next, this chapter provides organizational principles and guidelines. The chapter concludes with several tactics, techniques, and procedures for CP operations, including battle rhythm and CP administration. This chapter applies at battalion through corps level. CPs, however, vary widely among types of units and echelons. Refer to echelon manuals for specifics of CP design. This chapter supplements material in FM 6-0, paragraphs 5-111–5-115.

## BACKGROUND

2-1. Headquarters have existed throughout military history as the organizational structure through which commanders exercise command and control (C2). In the nineteenth century, Napoleon recognized that a headquarters providing the planning and analytic capability for a campaign was too large to use in battle. He exercised C2 through a smaller grouping brought from the larger headquarters but with communications to it for coordinating and planning. By World War II, Army doctrine divided headquarters into forward and rear elements. Under the Army of Excellence design, maneuver battalions through corps are structured to command and control operations through a command group and three primary command posts (CPs):

- Tactical CP (TAC CP).
- Main CP.
- Rear CP.

2-2. While some headquarters are still under the Army of Excellence design, Army transformation initiatives have changed the headquarters CP construct. Brigade combat teams through modular corps headquarters are no longer resourced for a rear CP. Many of the rear CP functions have been moved to subordinate units or incorporated into the main CP. Additionally, the roles, functions, and relationships among CPs have changed. This chapter focuses on the modular force and describes these changes. Units that have not transformed should continue to refer to their appropriate current echelon field manual.

## STAFF ORGANIZATION

2-3. Commanders cannot exercise control alone except in the simplest and smallest of units. The staff's primary function is to help the commander and subordinate commanders exercise control. Control allows commanders to direct the execution of operations. Unlike command functions, which remain relatively similar among echelons of command, control functions increase in complexity at each higher echelon.

2-4. Staffs at every echelon are structured differently; however, all staffs are similar. A staff includes a chief of staff (COS) or executive officer (XO), and various staff sections.

2-5. A *staff section* is a grouping of staff members by area of expertise under a coordinating, special, or personal staff officer. (See figure 2-1, below.) The number of coordinating, special, and personal staff officers and their corresponding staff sections varies with different command levels. FM 6-0, appendixes C and D, details the duties and responsibilities of staff officers. Unless specifically stated in this FMI, FM 6-0 remains the doctrinal source for staff officers' duties and responsibilities. Staffs are organized based on three considerations:

- Mission.
- Areas of expertise.
- Regulations and laws.

## MISSION

2-6. The mission determines which tasks and activities to accomplish. These activities determine how commanders organize, tailor, or adapt their staffs to accomplish the mission. The mission also determines a staff's size and composition. For example, a division headquarters may serve as the base for a joint task force headquarters. Based on the factors of METT-TC, the division staff would be augmented with additional staff members and C2 capabilities to accomplish the mission.

## AREAS OF EXPERTISE

2-7. Regardless of mission, every commander divides staff duties and responsibilities along common areas of expertise. Grouping related activities this way gives commanders an effective span of control. It also facilitates unified effort by the staff. Areas of expertise may vary slightly, depending on the command echelon, mission, and environment. For example, there is normally no financial management officer at battalion level and certain logistic units combine the intelligence and operations areas.

2-8. Army modular organizations have added staff sections and changed some staff sections' areas of expertise. Staffs now include a separate sections for plans (the G-5/S-5) and financial management (the G-8/S-8). The civil-military operations section is redesignated the G-9/S-9. The G-5/S-5 performs duties related to planning listed in FM 6-0, paragraph D-59. The G-8/S-8 performs duties listed in FM 6-0, paragraphs D-91 and D-96. The G-9/S-9 performs duties listed in paragraphs D-71–D-73. Some staffs also include a personnel recovery section. See FM 3-50.1, paragraphs 2-22–2-30, for this section's responsibilities.

## REGULATIONS AND LAWS

2-9. Army regulations and laws establish special relationships between certain staff officers and the commander. For example, ARs 20-1, 27-1, 165-1, and 360-1 require the inspector general, staff judge advocate, chaplain, and public affairs officer to be members of the commander's personal staff.

2-10. Each military unit has an authorization document that states a unit's approved structure and resources. It is the basis and authority for personnel assignments and equipment requisitions. This document is the modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE).

2-11. Doctrine and a unit's MTOE provide commanders a starting point for organizing their staff into CPs. Each operation is different, depending on the factors of METT-TC. As commanders organize their force for an operation, they organize their individual C2 systems for effective C2.

## COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION

2-12. A *command post* is a unit headquarters where the commander and staff perform their activities (FM 6-0). CPs are the principal facilities commanders use to control operations. Each facility is a CP, regardless of whether the commander is present. When necessary, commanders personally control the battle from other locations. In all cases, the commander alone exercises command, whether in the CP or elsewhere.




Figure 2-1. Basic staff structure and coordinating authorities

2-13. Commanders organize CPs to meet changing situations and the requirements of different operations. CPs help commanders control operations by coordinating and synchronizing the warfighting functions (WFFs). Activities common to all CPs include—

- Maintaining running estimates and the common operational picture.
- Information management. (See FM 3-0, paragraphs 11-28–11-48; FM 6-0, appendix B.)
- Developing and disseminating orders. (See FM 5-0.)
- Controlling operations. (See chapter 4.)
- Assessing operations. (See chapter 5.)
- Coordinating with higher, lower, and adjacent units.
- CP administration.
  - Displacing.
  - Providing security.
  - Organizing for operations.
  - Maintaining continuity of operations.

**TYPES OF COMMAND POSTS**

2-14. The number and types of CPs of a given headquarters vary by echelon. (See table 1-1, below.) This section provides a definition of each CP type and describes its primary purpose. Not depicted in table 2-1 is an early-entry command post (EECP). Division and corps may form an ad hoc, temporary EECP based on the factors of METT-TC. (See paragraphs 2-23–2-24.)

**Table 2-1. Modular command post design by echelon**

<i>Combined Arms Battalion</i>	<i>Brigade Combat Team</i>	<i>Division</i>	<i>Corps</i>	<i>Army Service Component Command</i>
Command Group	Command Group	Mobile Command Group	Mobile Command Group	Mobile Command Group
TAC CP	TAC CP	TAC CP (2 per division)	TAC CP	Operational Command Post
Main CP	Main CP	Main CP	Main CP	Main CP
Combat Trains CP				
Field Trains CP or Support Area CP				

**Command Group**

2-15. **The *command group* consists of the commander and selected staff members who accompany commanders and enable them to exercise command and control away from a command post.** The command group is organized and equipped to suit the commander’s decision making and leadership requirements while ensuring he or she can accomplish critical C2 functions anywhere in the area of operations (AO). The command group consists of critical staff officers the commander needs to directly influence the operation. It normally includes the capability to provide local security and personal assistance for the commander.

2-16. Divisions and corps headquarters have a mobile command group (MCG). MCGs allow commanders to exercise battle command on the move. They include ground and air components. The ground component contains vehicles configured with Army Battle Command System multifunctional displays and communications equipment. The air component includes UH-60A/L helicopters equipped with Army Airborne

Command and Control System information systems. The commander selects MCG members based on METT-TC.

2-17. Whether ground or air based, the MCG is highly mobile. It allows commanders to move to the point of decision. Commanders normally position their MCG where they can observe the decisive operation while communicating with the entire force.

### Tactical Command Post

2-18. **The *tactical command post* is a command and control facility containing a tailored portion of a unit headquarters designed to control current operations.** (This definition replaces the definition in FM 1-02.) The TAC CP includes representatives of all the WFFs. Depending on the echelon, commanders employ one or two TAC CPs. (When published, FMI 3-91 will discuss the two-TAC-CP design and employment.) Commanders can use the TAC CP to control execution of discrete tasks, like river crossings. A TAC CP can also control a special task force.

2-19. The TAC CP is fully mobile. As a rule, it includes only the Soldiers and equipment essential to control current operations. The TAC CP relies on the main CP for planning, detailed analysis, and coordination. A deputy commander or the G-3/S-3 leads the TAC CP. They are assisted by a chief of operations or assistant S-3 (depending on the echelon) and a senior noncommissioned officer.

2-20. Normal TAC CP functions include the following:

- Control current operations, to include resynchronizing forces and WFFs.
- Provide information to the common operational picture.
- Monitor and assess the progress of operations.
- Monitor and assess the progress of higher and adjacent units.
- Perform targeting for current operations.
- Perform short-range planning.
- Provide input to future operations planning.
- Provide a facility for the commander to control operations, issue orders, and conduct rehearsals.

### Main Command Post

2-21. **The *main command post* is a command and control facility that contains the portion of the unit headquarters in which the majority of planning, analysis, and coordination occurs.** (This definition replaces the definition in FM 1-02.) The main CP includes representatives of all staff sections. It is larger in size and personnel and less mobile than the TAC CP. The main CP controls current operations when the TAC CP cannot or is not employed. The COS/XO leads and provides staff supervision of the main CP. He or she is assisted by the chief of operations/assistant S-3 and a senior noncommissioned officer.

2-22. Normal functions of the main CP include the following:

- Planning future operations.
- Performing detailed analysis.
- Developing intelligence.
- Performing mid- to long-range assessment of the overall conduct of an operation.
- Conducting detailed coordination.
- Assessing the progress of operations.
- Assessing the progress of higher and adjacent units.
- Controlling current operations for short periods, based on METT-TC.
- Providing a facility for the commander to control operations, issue orders, and conduct rehearsals.

### Early-Entry Command Post

2-23. **An *early-entry command post* is a command and control facility containing tailored portions of the unit's headquarters for a specific mission over a specific period. It normally includes members of**

**the tactical command post and additional planners, intelligence analysts, liaison officers, and others as required.** The EECP is a temporary arrangement of personnel and equipment to help the commander command and control a deployment and initial operations. It is not included in unit tables of organization and equipment and not intended to be a permanent part of a unit's CP structure.

2-24. Commanders configure an EECP to deploy rapidly. Normally, they form an EECP around a TAC CP. Liaison officers, planners, intelligence analysts, and others from the main CP are added, based on METT-TC. The EECP performs the main and TAC CPs' functions until the headquarters is operational. A deputy commander, G-3/S-3, chief of operations/assistant S-3, and senior noncommissioned officer lead and provide staff supervision of an EECP.

## CENTERS

2-25. A **center is a command and control facility established for a specific purpose.** Centers are similar to command posts in that they are facilities with staff members, equipment, and a leadership component. However, centers have a more narrow focus (for example, movement control) and are normally formed around a subordinate unit headquarters.

2-26. Centers are more common at operational echelons. (Examples include the joint interrogation and debriefing center of a joint task force, and the theater materiel management center of an Army service component command.) But centers are also formed by Army tactical commanders. For example, a civil affairs battalion under the operational control of a division normally establishes a civil-military operations center. The civil-military operations center may not locate with a division CP.

## STAFF SECTIONS, COMMAND POST CELLS, AND STAFF ELEMENTS

2-27. Staffs are organized into staff sections by areas of expertise. (See figure 2-1, page 2-3, above.) Commanders organize CPs into functional and integrating cells. These cells contain elements from staff sections.

### Staff Sections

2-28. Doctrine and tables of organization and equipment assign portions of each staff section (coordinating, special, and personal) to CPs and to cells and elements within CPs. For example, in a modular division, G-2 elements are assigned to the main and TAC CPs. Within each CP, G-2 elements are allocated among several cells.

2-29. Some staff sections do not normally provide elements to CP cells. The inspector general section is an example. Others—for example the G-7 and G-9 sections—operate primarily as staff sections, sending elements to CP cells as required.

### Command Post Cells

2-30. A **command post cell is a grouping of personnel and equipment by warfighting function or purpose to facilitate command and control during operations.** There are two types of CP cells, functional and integrating. (See figure 2-2, below.) Functional cells group personnel and equipment by WFF. Integrating cells group personnel and equipment to integrate functional cell activities. Integrating cells normally focus on different time horizons. For example, the plans cell focuses on the long-range time horizon, while the current operations cell focuses on the short-range time horizons. (Paragraphs 3-11–3-25 discuss time horizons.)

2-31. This is not to say that the functional cells do not integrate. The sustainment cell integrates numerous logistic areas and services. The fire support cell integrates Army indirect fires and joint fires. It also integrates the contributions of all WFFs to targeting through the targeting working group. (Working groups are discussed in paragraphs 2-38–2-42, below.) This integration, however, generally focuses on maximizing the effects of a single WFF. Integrating cells focus the efforts of functional cells on planning, preparing for, or executing the overall operation within a time horizon.

2-32. Functional cells and integrating cells are not single staff sections. In a sense, they are combined arms staff components. For example, in a corps main CP, G-2 section personnel often form elements of the intelligence, fires, current operations, and plans cells.

2-33. Not all cells depicted in figure 2-2 are in every CP. A battalion or brigade TAC CP, for example, is usually not divided into cells: the entire TAC CP is the current operations cell. It comprises representatives from various staff sections. A corps TAC CP, in contrast, normally has all cells listed in figure 2-2 except for plans.




Figure 2-2. Command post organization

**Staff Elements**

2-34. A *staff element* is a component of either a staff section or a command post cell. Tables of organization and equipment normally specify element composition. However, commanders may alter these based on METT-TC.

2-35. CP cells include elements from staff sections whose areas of expertise affect the cell’s work. Using the example from paragraph 2-28, the portion of the G-2 assigned to the division TAC CP current operations cell is called the “G-2 current operations element.” The current operations cell contains numerous elements. These may include fire support, Army airspace command and control, civil-military operations, and provost marshal elements.

**MEETINGS, WORKING GROUPS, AND BOARDS**

2-36. Periodically or as required, ad hoc groupings form to solve problems and coordinate actions. These groups include representatives from within or outside a CP. Their composition depends on the issue. These groups are called meetings, working groups, and boards. Each is a control measure for regulating a specific action, process, or function. (See JP 5-00.2 for joint force headquarters design options. It addresses the boards, bureaus, and centers used by joint force commanders.)

**Meetings**

2-37. Meetings (sometimes called huddles) are informal gatherings used to present and exchange information. CP cell chiefs and staff section representatives hold meetings as needed to synchronize their activities.

## Working Groups

2-38. A **working group** is a temporary grouping of predetermined staff representatives who meet to coordinate and provide recommendations for a particular purpose or function. Some working groups may be thought of as ad hoc CP cells. Others are forums used to synchronize contributions of multiple cells to a process. For example, the targeting working group brings together representatives of all staff sections concerned with targeting. It synchronizes the contributions of the entire staff to the work of the fire support cell. It also synchronizes fires with current and future operations. Working groups may be held at a central location, by teleconference, by video teleconference, or by a combination of these. They are formed as needed or when the commander directs.

2-39. Typical working groups and the lead cell or staff section at division and corps headquarters include—

- Operations synchronization (current operations cell).
- Plans (plans cell).
- Targeting (fire support cell).
- Information operations (G-7 staff section).
- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) (current operations cell).
- Intelligence synchronization (intelligence cell).
- Protection (protection cell).
- Logistics synchronization (sustainment cell).
- Movements (sustainment cell).
- Civil-military operations (G-9 staff section).
- Information management (C4OPS cell).

2-40. The number of and subjects working groups address depend on the situation and echelon. For example, a corps CP may form working groups to address enemy improvised explosive device tactics or refugee return and resettlement. Battalion and brigade headquarters normally have fewer working groups than higher echelons. Working groups there are often less formal. Groups may gather daily, weekly, or monthly, depending on the subject, situation, and echelon.

2-41. Working groups form a major part of a CP's battle rhythm. (Battle rhythm is discussed in paragraphs 2-89–2-92, below.) The COS/XO oversees the battle rhythm and working group scheduling. Each meeting or working group should be logically sequenced so that one group's outputs are available as another's inputs when needed. COSs/XOs balance the time required to plan, prepare for, and hold working groups with other staff duties and responsibilities. They also critically examine attendance requirements. Some staff sections and CP cells may not have enough personnel to attend all working groups. COSs and cell leaders constantly look for ways to combine working groups and eliminate unproductive ones. Figure 2-3 (below) shows a sample standing operating procedure (SOP) for a working group.

2-42. Unit SOPs should address the following for each working group:

- Purpose.
- Frequency.
- Composition (chair and attendees).
- Inputs and expected outputs.
- Agenda.

## Boards

2-43. A **board** is a temporary grouping of selected staff representatives delegated decision authority for a particular purpose or function. Boards are similar to working groups. When the process or activity being synchronized requires command approval, a board is the appropriate forum. Typical boards address targeting, planning, sustainment, and movement. Commanders determine the subjects boards address and those delegated to working groups. Unit SOPs establish the following for each board:



- Purpose.
- Frequency.
- Required inputs.
- Expected outputs.
- Attendees.
- Agenda.

<b>Purpose/Frequency</b>	<p><b>Purpose:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Establish policies, procedures, priorities, and overall direction for all civil-military operations (CMO) projects.</li> <li>● Provide update on ongoing CMO projects.</li> <li>● Identify needs within the area of operations.</li> <li>● Present suggested future projects.</li> </ul> <p><b>Frequency:</b> Weekly.</p>	
<b>Composition</b>	<p><b>Chair:</b> G-9</p> <p><b>Attendees:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Civil affairs battalion representative.</li> <li>● G-2 planner.</li> <li>● G-3 operations representative.</li> <li>● G-5 planner.</li> <li>● G-7 representative.</li> <li>● Staff judge advocate representative.</li> <li>● Psychological operations planner.</li> <li>● Host-nation liaison officers.</li> <li>● Engineer planner.</li> <li>● Psychological operations company representative.</li> <li>● Provost marshal/force protection representative.</li> <li>● Special operations forces liaison officer.</li> <li>● Surgeon.</li> <li>● Chaplain.</li> <li>● Project manager and contractor representatives.</li> <li>● Brigade combat team and Marine force liaison officers.</li> </ul>	
<b>Inputs/Outputs</b>	<p><b>Inputs:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Intelligence synchronization working group.</li> <li>● Project management status.</li> <li>● Information operations working group (last week's).</li> <li>● Targeting board.</li> <li>● Higher headquarters operation order.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Outputs:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Updated project status matrix.</li> <li>● Proposed project matrix.</li> <li>● Long-range CMO plan adjustment.</li> </ul>
<b>Agenda</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● G-2 update/assessment.</li> <li>● Operations update.</li> <li>● Public perception update.</li> <li>● Civil affairs project update.</li> <li>● Engineer project update.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Staff judge advocate concerns.</li> <li>● Discussion/issues.</li> <li>● Approval of information operations working group inputs.</li> </ul>

Figure 2-3. Sample SOP for a division civil-military operations working group

## COMMAND POST CELL DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2-44. Doctrine provides overarching duties and responsibilities of CP members and cells. Commanders further define them to meet their particular needs in their SOPs. The following discussion addresses each CP cell type's duties and responsibilities. It includes considerations for assigning leadership and supervisory responsibilities.

### FUNCTIONAL CELLS

2-45. Functional cells are organized by WFF except for the command, control, communications, and computer operations (C4OPS) cell. (See figure 2-2, page 2-7, above.) The C4OPS cell is different from the C2 WFF. The C2 WFF is broader, including the commander and the C2 system.

#### Intelligence

2-46. The intelligence cell coordinates activities and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations. This includes tasks associated with intelligence preparation of the battlefield and ISR. The unit's G-2/S-2 leads this cell.

#### Movement and Maneuver

2-47. The movement and maneuver cell coordinates activities and systems that move forces to achieve a position of advantage in relation to the enemy. This includes tasks associated with employing forces in combination with direct fire or fire potential (maneuver), force projection (movement), mobility, and counter-mobility. The movement and maneuver cell may also form the base of the current operations cell. The unit's G-3/S-3 or a deputy G-3/S-3 leads this cell.

#### Fire Support

2-48. The fire support cell coordinates activities and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires and joint fires. This includes tasks associated with targeting and the targeting process. The fire support cell integrates lethal and nonlethal fires, including offensive information operations, through the targeting process. The unit's fire support coordinator leads this cell.

#### Protection

2-49. The protection cell coordinates the activities and systems that preserve the force. This includes protecting personnel, physical assets, and information of the United States and multinational partners. It also performs the tasks listed in paragraph 1-28. Commanders normally select this cell's leader from among the air and missile defense coordinator, chemical officer, engineer coordinator, and provost marshal.

#### Sustainment

2-50. The sustainment cell coordinates activities and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. It includes the tasks listed in paragraph 1-29. The commander normally selects this cell's leader from among the G-1/S-1, G-4/S-4, and G-8.

#### Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Operations

2-51. The C4OPS cell coordinates activities and systems that provide support to continuous and assured communications. This includes tasks associated with C4 operations, network operations, and information systems support to information management. The unit's G-6/S-6 leads this cell.

## INTEGRATING CELLS

2-52. Integrating cells group personnel and equipment to integrate functional cell activities. CPs normally include current operations, future operations (FUOPS), and plans cells. The plans cell is normally located in the main CP. The current operations and FUOPS cells are normally located in the TAC CP.

### Current Operations

2-53. The current operations cell is responsible for assessing the current situation while regulating forces and WFFs in accordance with the commander's intent. Normally, all staff sections are represented in the current operations cell. The unit's G-3/S-3, supported by the chief of operations or an assistant S-3, leads this cell. Members of the movement and maneuver cell are normally also members of the current operations cell.

2-54. Staff representatives in the current operations cell actively assist subordinate units. They provide them information, synchronize their activities, and coordinate their support requests. The current operations cell solves problems and acts within the authority delegated by the commander. It also performs short-range planning using the military decision making process (MDMP) in a time-constrained environment or makes decisions and resynchronizes operations as described in chapter 4.

### Future Operations

2-55. The FUOPS cell is responsible for planning and assessing operations for the mid-range time horizon. This includes preparing branches. Corps and Army service component commands have a FUOPS cell. Battalion through division headquarters are not resourced for one; the plans and current operations cells share its responsibility. The FUOPS cell uses the MDMP or the MDMP in a time-constrained environment to develop plans and orders. The cell consists of a core group of planners led by the deputy G-3 (chief of future operations). All staff sections assist as required.

### Plans

2-56. The plans cell is responsible for planning operations for the mid- to long-range time horizons. It develops plans, orders, branches, and sequels. This cell is also responsible for long-range assessment of an operation's progress. It consists of a core group of planners and analysts led by the G-5/S-5. All staff sections assist as required.

## COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION CONSIDERATIONS

2-57. Planning considerations for CP organization can be categorized as—

- Those contributing to effectiveness.
- Those contributing to survivability.

In many cases these factors work against each other; therefore, neither can be optimized. Trade-offs are made to acceptably balance survivability and effectiveness.

## EFFECTIVENESS FACTORS

2-58. CP staff and equipment are arranged to facilitate coordination, smooth exchange of information, and rapid decision making. CPs must be able to effectively communicate with all subordinate units. They are organized to quickly deploy throughout the unit's AO. Five factors contribute to CP effectiveness: design, standardization, continuity, deployability, and capacity and range.

## Command Post Design and Fusion of Command and Staff Efforts

2-59. Many design considerations affect CP effectiveness. At minimum, CP cells and staff elements should be positioned to facilitate communication and coordination. Other design considerations include—

- Ease of information flow.
- User interface with communications systems.
- Positioning information displays for ease of use.
- Integrating complementary information on maps and displays.
- Adequate workspace for the staff and commander.
- Ease of displacement (setup, tear-down, and mobility).

2-60. Well-designed CPs integrate command and staff efforts. Meeting this requirement requires matching the CP's manning, equipment, information systems, and procedures against its internal layout and utilities. Organizing the CP into functional and integrating cells promotes efficiency and coordination.

## Standardization

2-61. Standardization increases efficiency and eases CP personnel training. Commanders develop detailed SOPs for all aspects of CP operations during all operations process activities. Standardizing CP layouts, battle drills, and reporting procedures increases efficiency. These SOPs must be followed and revised throughout training. Using the standardized procedures must be reinforced constantly. Doing this makes many C2 processes routine. Staffs then effectively execute them in demanding, stressful times.

## Continuity

2-62. CPs exercise C2 continuously for long periods. They must be manned, equipped, and organized to control operations without interruptions by enemies, environmental conditions, or actions.

2-63. The CP's personnel, information systems, and equipment must be able to support 24-hour operations. However, duplicating every staff member within a CP is unnecessary. Commanders carefully consider the primary role and functions assigned to each CP and resource it accordingly. Internal CP SOPs should address shifts, rest plans, and other CP activities important to operating continuously. Leaders should enforce these provisions.

2-64. SOPs should address providing C2 continuity when communications are lost with the commander, subordinates, and or a particular CP. Maintaining C2 continuity during displacement or catastrophic loss requires designating alternate CPs and procedures for passing control between them. Continuity of command requires commanders to designate seconds in command and inform them of all critical decisions. Primary staff officers should also designate alternates.

## Deployability

2-65. CPs must deploy efficiently and move within the AO as the situation requires. Determining the capabilities, size, and the sequence of CPs in the deployment flow requires careful consideration. Modular CP elements can be configured as an EECF based on the situation. Commanders can add or subtract elements to the EECF as the situation requires. CP size directly affects deployment and employment.

## Capacity and Range

2-66. CPs should be organized to manage the information needed to operate effectively. The capacity to conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and continuously assess) operations concerns both staffing and information systems. So does the ability to manage relevant information. CP personnel must have the necessary tactical and technical proficiency. CPs must be able to communicate with all higher and lower headquarters, including those outside the force's AO.

## **SURVIVABILITY FACTORS**

2-67. CP survivability is vital to mission success. Survivability is often obtained at the price of effectiveness. CPs need to remain small and highly mobile. They should be able to operate on the move or disperse into cells. These capabilities enhance CPs' survivability. Most CPs are easily acquired and targeted when concentrated. However, it is difficult to maintain a coordinated staff effort when CPs are dispersed.

2-68. The details of a commander's C2 system depend on the command's level and nature. However, the following survivability considerations are useful when developing C2 SOPs and organizing headquarters into CPs for operations.

### **Dispersion**

2-69. Dispersing CPs enhances survivability. Commanders place minimum resources forward and keep more elaborate facilities back. This makes it harder for enemies to find and attack them. It also decreases support and security requirements forward. Most of the staff resides in the main CP; the TAC CP contains only the staff and equipment essential to controlling current operations. Commanders disperse and harden CP components as well.

### **Size**

2-70. A CP's size affects its deployability, mobility, and survivability. Large CPs ease face-to-face coordination. However, they are vulnerable to multiple acquisition and attack means. Smaller CPs may be easier to hide but unable to control all force elements. The key is striking the right balance to provide a responsive yet agile organization. For example, commanders require information for decisions; they do not need every subject matter expert located with them. Commanders identify necessary elements and eliminate unnecessary ones.

### **Redundancy**

2-71. Reducing CP size reduces signature and enhances deployability and mobility. However, some personnel and equipment redundancy is required for continuous operations. Inevitably, in combat some C2 assets are lost or fail under stress. Redundancy allows CPs to continue operating when that happens.

### **Mobility**

2-72. CP mobility is important, especially at lower echelons. Lower-echelon CPs and those employed forward in the combat zone may need to move quickly and often. Small size and careful transportation planning allow CPs to displace rapidly.

## **COMMAND POST OPERATIONS**

2-73. The operations process is dynamic and all its activities occur continuously. However, commanders must establish a consistent pattern to this process throughout a command. They use the following control measures to do this: SOPs, plans and orders, and battle rhythm.

### **COMMAND AND CONTROL SOPs**

2-74. Command and control SOPs increase C2 effectiveness. These SOPs serve two purposes. First, internal SOPs standardize each CP's internal operations. Second, external SOPs developed for the entire force standardize interactions among CPs and between subordinate units and CPs. For SOPs to be effective, all must know their provisions and train to their standards.

## Internal SOP Requirements

2-75. Each CP should have SOPs that address the following:

- Organization and setup.
- Staffing and shifts.
- Continuous operations, including eating and sleeping plans.
- Physical security and defense.
- Priorities of work.
- Loading plans and equipment checklists.
- Orders production and dissemination procedures.
- Journals and log maintenance.
- Equipment and vehicle maintenance.

### *Shift-change Briefings*

2-76. During continuous operations, CPs normally operate in shifts. To ensure uninterrupted operations, staffs execute a briefing when shifts change. Depending on the situation, it may be formal or informal and include the entire staff or selected members. Normally it is done face-to-face among key CP leaders. The COS/XO oversees the briefing, with participants briefing their areas of expertise. The briefing's purpose is to inform the incoming shift of—

- Current unit status.
- Significant activities that occurred during the previous shift.
- Significant decisions and events anticipated during the next shift.

The commander may attend. This may change the focus of the briefing. If the commander issues guidance or makes a decision, issuing a fragmentary order may be necessary.

2-77. The shift-change briefing format and emphasis change based on the situation. For example, the format for a force supporting civil authorities in a disaster area differs from one for a force conducting offensive operations abroad. To facilitate a quick but effective shift-change briefing, unit SOPs should contain its format and sequence. (See figure 2-4, below.)

**Current mission and commander's intent (COS/XO).**

**Enemy situation (G-2/S-2).**

- Significant enemy actions during the last shift.
- Current enemy situation and changes in the most likely enemy courses of actions.
- Changes in priority intelligence requirements (PIRs).
- Limited visibility and weather update.
- Changes to collection priorities and updates to the intelligence synchronization plan.
- Disposition and status of selected intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) units and capabilities.

**Civil situation (G-9/S-9).**

- Significant actions by the population during the last shift.
- Current civil situation.
- Disposition and status of civil affairs units and capabilities.
- Significant activities involving the population anticipated during the next shift.

**Friendly situation (G-3/S-3).**

- Significant friendly actions during the last shift.
- Subordinate units' disposition and status.
- Higher and adjacent units' disposition and status.
- Major changes to the task organization and tasks to subordinate units that occurred during the last shift.
- Answers to commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) and changes in CCIRs.
- Changes to the ISR plan.
- Disposition and status of selected ISR units and capabilities.
- Answers to friendly forces information requirements (FFIRs) and changes in FFIRs.
- Significant activities and decisions scheduled for next shift (review of the decision support matrix).
- Anticipated planning requirements.

**Running estimate summaries by warfighting function and staff section.**

Briefers include—

• Fire support coordinator.	• Chemical officer.
• Air liaison officer.	• Provost marshal.
• Aviation coordinator.	• G-1/S-1.
• Air and missile defense coordinator.	• Surgeon.
• G-7/S-7.	• G-4/S-4.
• Engineer coordinator.	• G-6/S-6.

Briefings include—

- Any significant activities that occurred during the last shift.
- Disposition and status of units within their area of expertise.
- Any changes that have staffwide implications (for example, "higher headquarters changed the controlled supply rate for 120mm HE, so that means...").
- Upcoming activities and anticipated changes during the next shift.

**CP operations and administration (headquarters commandant or senior operations noncommissioned officer).**

• CP logistic issues.	• CP displacement plan and proposed new locations.
• CP security.	• Priority of work.

**COS/XO guidance to the next shift, including staff priorities and changes to the battle rhythm.**

**Figure 2-4. Example shift-change briefing**

2-78. The shift-change briefing provides a mechanism to formally exchange information periodically among CP members. However, CP members share information throughout the shift. They coordinate activities and inform each other continuously. Information that answers a CCIR and exceptional information is given to the commander immediately. (See FM 6-0, paragraphs B-60–B-62, for a discussion of exceptional information.) Information that answers a PIR or FFIR is routed to the appropriate coordinating staff officer. Information that can potentially affect the entire force is disseminated to the commander, higher

headquarters, and subordinate units as the situation dictates. Situational understanding for CP members includes knowing who needs what relevant information and why they need it. CP members exercise subordinates' initiative when they ensure relevant information gets to people who need it.

### ***Command Post Battle Drills***

2-79. Each CP requires procedures to react to a variety of situations. Specific actions taken by a CP should be defined in its SOPs and rehearsed during training and operations. Typical CP battle drills include—

- React to an air attack.
- React to a ground attack.
- React to a chemical attack.
- React to indirect fire.
- React to jamming or suspected communications compromise.
- Execute time-sensitive targets.
- Execute a close air support or joint fires mission.
- React to a mass casualty incident.
- React to a civil riot or incident.
- React to significant collateral damage.
- React to a misinformation incident.

### **External SOP Requirements**

2-80. Procedures for how CPs interact with each other and how subordinate units interact with CPs are also required. Key areas include—

- Standardized reports and returns.
- Operation update and assessment briefing.
- Procedures for transferring control of operations between CPs.

### ***Reports and Returns***

2-81. A unit's reporting system facilitates timely and effective information exchange among CPs and higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters. An established SOP for reports and returns is key to effective information management. These SOPs include—

- Who is required to submit each report.
- The frequency and time reports are due.
- The recipient of each report.

Changes to the unit SOP involving reports are normally reflected in the command information management plan. This is normally a stand alone plan and not part of an operation order.

### ***Operation Update and Assessment Briefing***

2-82. An operation update and assessment briefing may occur daily or anytime the commander calls for one. It is similar in content to the shift-change briefing but has a different audience. The staff presents it to the commander and subordinate commanders. Its purpose is to provide all key personnel a common situational awareness. Often commanders require this briefing shortly before an operation begins to summarize changes made during preparation, including changes resulting from ISR efforts.

2-83. During the briefing, staff sections present their running estimates. Subordinate commanders brief their current situation and planned activities. This briefing is rarely conducted face-to-face. Various communications means are used; among them, FM-voice, joint network node conference call, and video teleconference. All CPs and subordinate commanders participate. The briefing follows a sequence and format specified by SOP. That keeps transmissions short, ensures completeness, and eases note-taking. This briefing normally has a format similar to a shift-change briefing. However, it omits CP administrative information and includes presentations by subordinate commanders in an established sequence.



### *Transferring Control of Operations between Command Posts*

2-84. The employment and use of CPs are important decisions reflected in the operation order. Often, a particular CP may control part of the operation or control the operation for a specific time. Effectively transferring control between CPs requires a well-understood SOP.

2-85. While all CPs have some ability to perform C2 on the move, they lose many capabilities they have when stationary. Therefore, CPs normally control operations from a static location. During moves, control responsibilities are transferred to another CP. Transfer of control requires notifying subordinates and many network operations changes to route information to the new controlling CP. SOPs establish these requirements to minimize interruptions when transferring control.

### **Establishing Command Post Locations and Responsibilities**

2-86. When planning operations, staffs develop a C2 plan that addresses each CP's initial and subsequent position. The plan also includes the command group's composition and how the commander plans to employ it. The C2 plan establishes which CP controls specific parts of the operation. This is especially important for modular divisions, which have two TAC CPs.

2-87. The C2 plan is published in paragraph 5 of the operation order. Areas of that have not changed from the unit's SOP are not addressed.

2-88. This FMI modifies paragraph 5 of the operation order to better account for the above requirements. Figure 2-5, page 2-18 (below), shows the revised format for paragraph 5.

### **Battle Rhythm**

2-89. A key control measure commanders use to establish a CP operations pattern is a unit's battle rhythm. ***Battle rhythm is the sequencing of standardized command and control activities within a headquarters and throughout the force to facilitate effective command and control.*** The COS usually controls the battle rhythm.

2-90. Battle rhythm establishes the time, frequency, and type of meetings, working groups, boards, and other events, and who attends them. Reports, briefings, meetings, and working groups all require input and preparation. Additionally, the outputs of certain working groups are inputs for other working groups. The battle rhythm accounts for such requirements. Staff officers and subordinate units require a schedule to prepare for each C2 event.

2-91. The battle rhythm changes as operations progress. For example, early in the operation a commander may require a plans update briefing each morning. As the situation changes, the commander may only require this update every three days. Many factors help determine a unit's battle rhythm. Some of these factors are the staff's proficiency, higher headquarters' battle rhythm, and current mission.

5. Command and Control.

a. Command.

(1) Location of the commander. (State where the commander plans to be, including the mobile command group's location. If the operation is phased, state the location of the commander by phase.)

(2) Succession of command. (State the succession of command, if not covered in unit's SOP.)

(3) Special instructions for deputy commanders. (Specify responsibilities of deputy commanders and associated CPs, by phase if necessary.)

b. Control.

(1) Scheme of CP employment. (State each CP's location and how each CP will be used. State which CP is the primary controlling CP for the operation. If the operation is phased, state this scheme by phase.)

(2) Special instructions for CPs. (State special tasks or additional instructions for each CP not detailed elsewhere. These might include movement of key staff officers between CPs and movement of functional cells. List these by phase if necessary.)

(3) Liaison requirements. (Provide instruction for liaison to higher, lower, and adjacent commands.)

c. C4 Operations (See Annex H.)

(1) Network operations. (Include network control procedures for network administration and management.)

(2) Signal Operating Instructions. (Current SOI in effect.)

(3) Information management procedures. (Special requirements under the command information management plan.)

(4) Recognition and identification instructions. (Special instructions not included in the SOP, friendly recognition signals, vehicle markings, and so forth.)

**Figure 2-5. Format for operation order paragraph 5**

2-92. Battle rhythm must remain flexible. Some missions require more time and effort to plan and prepare, than others. Additionally, battle rhythm must not keep commanders from exploiting opportunities. In a protracted stability operation, a division's battle rhythm may look something like figure 2-6 (below). In fast-paced offensive or defensive operation, the division battle rhythm would be quite different.

0700– Shift-change briefing (chief of staff/CP members).

0800–Operation update and assessment briefing (commander, staff, subordinate commanders).

0900–G-5 plans update (chief of staff and plans cell).

1000–Logistic synchronization conference call.

1100–Movement synchronization meeting.

1300–Operation synchronization meeting (G-3, chief of operations, and section and cell chiefs).

1700–Corps operation update and assessment briefing.

1900–Shift-change briefing (chief of staff/CP members).

2000–Working groups.

- Interagency working group (Monday).
- Targeting working group (Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday).
- Information operations working group (Wednesday).
- Civil-military operations working group (Friday).
- Assessment working group (Sunday).

**Figure 2-6. Battle rhythm example for a stability operation**

**Chapter 3**  
**Exercising Command and Control**

This chapter is rescinded. Refer to FM 3-0.

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## Chapter 4

# Execution

FM 6-0 provides principles and a framework for exercising command and control during execution. This chapter expands on that doctrine. It discusses how commanders seize, retain, and exploit the initiative during execution by continuously exploiting opportunities and countering threats to better achieve the operation's end state. It discusses the nature of decision making in execution and introduces the rapid decision making and synchronization process. The rapid decision making and synchronization process is a tool commanders, other leaders, and staffs use to make decisions and rapidly resynchronize forces and warfighting functions during execution.

### INTRODUCTION

4-1. *Execution* is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions (FM 6-0). This definition applies to any combination of offensive, defensive, stability and reconstruction, and civil support operations throughout an operation. Doctrine for execution also supports the Army's operational concept of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative with speed, shock, surprise, depth, simultaneity, and endurance. (See FM 1, chapter 3.)

### SEIZE, RETAIN, AND EXPLOIT THE INITIATIVE

4-2. Operation plans and orders incorporate the Army's operational concept by establishing how initiative will be seized and retained. They do this by providing instructions on synchronizing the warfighting functions (WFFs) and assigning tasks to subordinate units. An order alone, however, does not seize and retain the initiative, let alone exploit it. Fully seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative depends on commanders doing the following:

- Taking action.
- Creating and exploiting opportunities.
- Continuously assessing the situation and taking calculated risks.
- Applying sound tactics.
- Employing joint capabilities.

Opportunities are events or conditions that offer better ways to achieve success. However, every opportunity for greater success carries some elements of risk, if only that of temporarily desynchronizing the operation. Thus, execution requires adjusting and resynchronizing operations to meet changing conditions. Doing this enables commanders to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. (FM 6-0, paragraph 2-94, addresses calculated risks.)

4-3. Execution also requires commanders to build and maintain momentum. Commanders and staffs do this by continuously assessing and synchronizing operations. Commanders build and maintain momentum by constantly pressuring the enemy. They control tempo to present enemies with new problems before they can solve current ones. Forecasting and anticipation helps keep up pressure. Perceived requirements for synchronizing can slow momentum; however, the enemy force's condition dictates the level of synchronization required.

4-4. To fully achieve the end state, commanders must exploit success. This requires making refinements during execution to take advantage of success when it occurs. Exploitation also depends on assessing and

understanding the impact of sustainment. Ultimately, however, only initiative that contributes to achieving the end state counts.

## **SYNCHRONIZATION AND COMBINED ARMS**

4-5. Executing synchronized combined arms operations requires extensive planning, preparation, and training. *Synchronization* is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive time and place (JP 1-02). In full spectrum operations, it also includes achieving a balance among offensive, defensive, and stability and reconstruction or civil support operations to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander's intent. It requires mastery of the tactical art. (See FM 3-90, paragraphs 1-12–1-19.) Control by higher headquarters reduces risk and ensures various units remain closely linked by schedule, position, and action. However, excessively centralized control, while contributing to a highly synchronized operation, stifles subordinates' initiative. It may result in missed opportunities. Commanders balance control and flexibility. Careful task-organizing reduces the span of control and permits greater tactical flexibility. (See FM 6-0, paragraphs 5-100–5-105.)

4-6. Effective synchronization is collaborative as well as directive. Modern technological tools help achieve this collaborative synchronization; however, synchronization starts with Soldiers exercising subordinates' initiative. Situational understanding for staff members entails knowing how factors in their area of expertise affect other areas. It underlies the collaborative synchronization needed to effectively exploit opportunities commanders discern. Staff work at brigade, division, and corps entails sustaining synchronization over time as movement, casualties, and enemy actions affect original arrangements. It also entails achieving unity of effort with larger joint, interagency, and multinational operations. This requires understanding other agencies' capabilities and agendas as well as establishing measures for coordination and deconfliction.

## **TRANSITION TO EXECUTION**

4-7. The Army has a time-proven process for planning: the military decision making process (MDMP). The MDMP produces a plan or order that provides the initial guide for actions during execution and control measures for regulating them. These measures include schemes of maneuver and fires; an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan; tasks to subordinate units; and various schemes of support. The most important control measures provide guidelines for exercising subordinates' initiative. These are the commander's intent, mission, and concept of operations.

4-8. Operations never unfold the way the planners envision them. Enemy actions, friendly mistakes, unforeseen environmental conditions, and many other factors conspire to disrupt the synchronized application of combat power envisioned in the order. The MDMP is not designed to address the many decisions necessary during execution. To fight as intended in the operational concept, Army forces require execution doctrine that facilitates flexibility. The rest of this chapter addresses this requirement.

## **CONCEPT OF EXECUTION**

4-9. The Army's operational concept envisions executing operations at a tempo enemies cannot match by acting or reacting faster than they can adapt. To achieve this type of flexibility, commanders use mission command to focus subordinate commanders' initiative. Subordinates exercising initiative within the commander's intent can significantly increase tempo; however they also may desynchronize the unit's WFFs. This may reduce commanders' ability to mass the effects of combat power. Even relatively minor, planned actions by command post (CP) cells affect other cells' areas of expertise, affecting the operation's overall synchronization.

4-10. Under mission command, commanders accept some risk in synchronization as the price of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative. The commander's intent and mission orders focus every level of the organization on executing the concept of operations. Collaborative synchronization—enabled and expected by mission command—uses subordinates' initiative to achieve resynchronization continuously. Subordinates' successes may offer opportunities within the concept or develop advantages that make a new concept practical. In either case, the commander's intent keeps the force acceptably focused and synchro-

nized. Subordinates need not wait for top-down synchronization. Mission command is especially appropriate for operations in which stability and reconstruction operations predominate. It allows subordinates to exploit information about enemies, adversaries, events, and trends without direction from higher echelons.

4-11. During execution, the current operations cell strives to keep the WFFs synchronized and balanced between subordinates' initiative and synchronized activities as the situation changes. The current operations cell follows and provides its own level of collaborative synchronization. It considers the following outcomes when making synchronization decisions or allowing others' collaborative synchronization to proceed:

- Combined arms integration.
- Responsiveness—both proactive and reactive.
- Timeliness.

This lets commanders mass the effects of combat power at decisive times and places.

## VARIANCES

4-12. A *variance* is a difference between the actual situation during an operation and what the plan forecasted the situation would be at that time or event (FM 6-0). Staffs ensure information systems display relevant information that allows them to identify variances. When a variance emerges, the commander and staff evaluate it. If necessary, the staff updates its running estimates and recommends a course of action (COA) to the commander, who directs the necessary action. There are two forms of variances: opportunities and threats.

### Opportunities

4-13. The first form of variance is an opportunity to accomplish the mission more effectively. Opportunities result from forecasted or unexpected successes. When they recognize an opportunity, commanders alter the order to exploit it if the change achieves the end state without incurring unacceptable risk. Exploiting a forecasted opportunity usually involves executing a branch or sequel. When exploiting an opportunity, the concept of operations may change, but the commander's intent usually remains the same.

### Threats

4-14. The second form of variance is a threat to mission accomplishment or survival of the force. When a threat is recognized, the commander adjusts the order to eliminate the enemy advantage, restore the friendly advantage, and regain the initiative. Not all threats to the force or mission involve hostile or neutral persons. Disease, toxic hazards, and natural disasters are examples of other threats that may arise.

4-15. Victory in battle requires commanders to recognize and evaluate opportunities and threats—current and projected—in time to direct effective actions that exploit or counter them. Commanders use their visualization based on the common operational picture as their primary evaluation method. Staffs use their running estimates, derived from their understanding of the common operational picture, to evaluate the situation and provide recommendations.

## TYPES OF DECISIONS

4-16. Current doctrine designates decisions made during execution as either execution decisions or adjustment decisions. Execution decisions involve COAs anticipated in the order. Adjustment decisions modify the order. (See figure 4-1, page 4-4, below.) The decision type establishes the decision authority. It may also determine how the current operations cell participates.

### Execution Decisions

4-17. Execution decisions implement a planned action under circumstances anticipated in the order. Staff members or the chief of staff/executive officer make most execution decisions. In their most basic form, execution decisions apply resources or implement activities as outlined in the order or within minor toler-

ances. For example, transitioning between phases and executing a branch or sequel are execution decisions. Commanders normally make decisions concerning branches and sequels.




Figure 4-1. Decisions in execution

4-18. Decisions made to support the plan within the execution activities are also execution decisions. Other execution decisions are made to maintain tactical coherence and synchronization, often through collaborative synchronization. Execution activities are routine occurrences designed to limit variances and prevent them from becoming a threat to success. These functions include those identified in chapter 3:

- Focus assets on the decisive operation.
- Adjust commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) based on the situation.
- Adjust control measures.
- Manage movement and positioning of supporting units.
- Adjust unit missions and tasks as necessary.
- Modify the concept of operations as required.
- Position or relocate committed, supporting, and reserve units.

### Adjustment Decisions

4-19. Adjustment decisions modify the plan to respond to opportunities and threats. They often require completely resynchronizing the WFFs. Commanders make these decisions unless they explicitly delegate them. Adjustment decisions generally take one of three forms:

- Unanticipated resource or priority reallocation.
- Changing the concept of operations.
- Changing the mission.



4-20. After adjustment decisions have been made, commanders and staffs make execution decisions to re-synchronize operations. They employ collaborative synchronization as much as possible. Perfect synchronization in these situations cannot be attained; commanders do not expect it. Major combat operations and operations in which stability and reconstruction operations predominate require collaborative synchronization by subordinates—commanders and staffs—to maintain the synchronization necessary to accomplish the mission.

## **RAPID DECISION MAKING AND SYNCHRONIZATION PROCESS**

4-21. This section introduces the rapid decision making and synchronization process (RDSP). The RDSP is a decision making and synchronization technique for commanders and staffs to use during execution. While identified here with a specific name and methodology, the basic process is not new; it has always been used by successful commanders.

4-22. The RDSP applies to both execution and adjustment decisions. Leaders can use it to complement the focused COA and recognition decision techniques. (See FM 6-0, paragraphs 6-116–6-121.) The RDSP is based on research in intuitive decision making. It helps leaders focus on executing rather than planning. The RDSP facilitates continuously integrating and synchronizing the WFFs to address ever-changing situations. It meets the following criteria for making effective decisions during execution:

- It is comprehensive, integrating all WFFs. It is not stovepiped by WFF.
- It ensures all actions support the decisive operation by relating them to the commander's intent and concept of operations.
- It allows rapid changes to the order.
- It is continuous, allowing commanders to react immediately to opportunities and threats.
- It accommodates but is not tied to cyclical processes, such as targeting.

4-23. The RDSP focuses on synchronizing actions and understanding relationships within staffs as well as among commanders. It applies to all leaders. Although this discussion describes staff duties within the RDSP, leaders can use it with or without a staff. It also applies in multinational and interagency environments.

4-24. One significant difference between the RDSP and the MDMP is that the RDSP is based on an existing order. Control measures in the order identify the commander's priorities. The most important of these control measures are the commander's intent, concept of operations, and CCIRs. Leaders use these priorities as criteria for making decisions.

4-25. A second difference between the RDSP and the MDMP is that the RDSP seeks an acceptable solution, while the MDMP seeks the optimal (most desirable) one. Using the RDSP lets leaders avoid the time-consuming requirements of developing decision criteria and comparing COAs. METT-TC factors continually change during execution. This often makes COAs and decision criteria obsolete before leaders can make a decision. Under the RDSP, leaders combine their experience and intuition with situational awareness to quickly reach situational understanding. Based on this, they develop and refine workable COAs. While these decisions may not have included explicit consideration of multiple COAs, they can be considered optimal. They may even improve the original concept of operations. In any event, the RDSP supports timely decisions. Timeliness is essential to obtaining the speed of action needed to seize fleeting opportunities.

4-26. Implementing the RDSP requires three skills. First, leaders must be able to recognize when a variance requires an adjustment. Second, they must be able to visualize several possible COAs and quickly select an acceptable one. Third, they must know what actions are feasible in the time available. Developing these leader skills requires training and experience.

4-27. The RDSP includes five steps. (See figure 4-2, page 4-6, below.) The first two may be performed in any order, including concurrently. The last three are performed interactively until an acceptable COA is identified.




Figure 4-2. Rapid decision making and synchronization process

### COMPARE THE CURRENT SITUATION TO THE ORDER

4-28. Leaders monitor the situation to identify variances. Staff members look for indicators of variances that affect their areas of expertise. (See table 4-1, below, for examples of indicators organized by WFF.) The commander, chief of staff, and CP cell chiefs look for indicators of variances that affect the overall operation. While these indicators may come from any source, they will often come from ISR efforts or reports from units executing the operation.

4-29. Staff members are particularly alert for answers to CCIRs; commanders need them to make execution decisions. They also watch for exceptional information. *Exceptional information* is information that would have answered one of the commander's critical information requirements if the requirement for it had been foreseen and stated as one of the commander's critical information requirements (FM 6-0). Exceptional information usually reveals a need for an adjustment decision.

### DETERMINE THAT A DECISION, AND WHAT TYPE, IS REQUIRED

4-30. When a variance is identified, leaders quickly compare the current situation to the expected situation. This assessment accomplishes the following:

- Describes the variance.
- Determines if the variance provides a significant opportunity or threat.
- Determines if an adjustment decision is needed by identifying if the variance—
  - Directly threatens the decisive operation's success.
  - Indicates an opportunity that can be exploited to accomplish the mission faster or with fewer resources.
  - Threatens a shaping operation such that it may threaten the decisive operation directly or in the near future.
  - Can be addressed within the commander's intent and concept of operations. (If so, determine what execution decision is needed.)

4-31. For minor variances, leaders determine whether changes to control measures are needed. If so, they determine how those changes affect other WFFs. They direct changes within their authority (execution decisions) after coordinating with staff elements the changes affect.

4-32. If a decision exceeding their authority is required, staff members notify the decision authority according to the appropriate procedure. That leader determines how much of the staff should be involved. If it does not require more than one or two CP cells, the action is directed to the appropriate cell chief. Otherwise, the leader assembles the appropriate cell chiefs and proceeds to the next step. When an adjustment decision is necessary, the leader contacts the commander for guidance.

**Table 4-1. Examples of decision indicators by warfighting function**

<b>Intelligence</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identification of enemy main effort.</li> <li>• Identification of enemy reserves or counterattack.</li> <li>• Indications of unexpected enemy action or preparation.</li> <li>• Identification of an IR.</li> <li>• Insertion of manned surveillance teams.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UAS launch.</li> <li>• Identification of HPT/HVT.</li> <li>• Answer to a PIR.</li> <li>• Enemy electronic attack use.</li> <li>• Enemy rotary-wing or UAS use.</li> <li>• Identification of threats from within civilian population.</li> </ul>
<b>Movement and Maneuver</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Success or failure of a subordinate unit task.</li> <li>• Success or failure in breaching operations.</li> <li>• Capture of significant numbers of EPWs, enemy CPs, supply points, or artillery units.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Modification of an ACM.</li> <li>• Answer to an FFIR.</li> <li>• Numbers of refugees sufficient to affect friendly operations.</li> <li>• Damages to civilian infrastructure affecting friendly mobility.</li> </ul>
<b>Fires</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Receipt of an air tasking order.</li> <li>• Battle damage assessment results.</li> <li>• Unplanned repositioning of firing units.</li> <li>• Success or lack thereof in offensive information operations.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identification of an IR.</li> <li>• Execution of planned fires.</li> <li>• Modification of a FSCM.</li> <li>• Effective enemy counterfire.</li> <li>• Identification of HPT/HVT.</li> </ul>
<b>Sustainment</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Significant loss of capability in any class of supply.</li> <li>• Identification of significant incidences of disease and nonbattle injury casualties.</li> <li>• Mass casualties.</li> <li>• Receipt of significant resupply.</li> <li>• Contact on a supply route.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Civilian mass casualty event beyond capability of HN resources.</li> <li>• Identification of significant shortage in any class of supply.</li> <li>• Aeromedical evacuation launch.</li> <li>• Answer to an FFIR.</li> <li>• Changes in availability of HN support.</li> </ul>
<b>Protection</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NBC 1 report or other indicators of enemy CBRNE use.</li> <li>• Report or other indicators of enemy improvised explosive device use.</li> <li>• Indicators of coordinated enemy actions against friendly forces.</li> <li>• Identification of threat to base or sustainment facilities.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identification of threats to communications or computer systems.</li> <li>• Reports of enemy targeting critical HN infrastructure.</li> <li>• Increased criminal activity in a given sector.</li> </ul>
<b>Command and Control</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Answer to a CCIR.</li> <li>• Identification of an IR.</li> <li>• Loss of contact with a CP or commander.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Jamming.</li> <li>• Receipt of a fragmentary order or warning order from higher headquarters.</li> </ul>
ACM CBRNE CCIR CP EPW FFIR FSCM	airspace control measure chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-explosives commander's critical information requirement command post enemy prisoner of war friendly forces information requirement fire support coordinating measure	HN HPT HVT IR NBC PIR UAS host nation high-priority target high-value target information requirement nuclear, biological, and chemical priority intelligence requirement unmanned aircraft system

4-33. Staff members constantly compare the current situation to their expectations to identify variances. Likewise, as the time for an anticipated execution decision approaches, staff members assess the situation in their area of expertise. Doing this allows them to confirm that the decision will produce the planned effects. It “jump-starts” the RSDP, essentially bypassing recognition and allowing the staff to discover small changes in conditions that might otherwise go unnoticed.

## DEVELOP A RESPONSE

4-34. If the variance requires an adjustment, the leader and affected CP cell chiefs begin developing COAs. They use the following control measures from the order to screen possible COAs:

- Mission.
- Commander's intent.
- Concept of operations, especially the decisive operation.
- CCIRs.

4-35. The COAs must not violate the commander's intent. They may alter the concept of operations and CCIRs if the change remains within the intent. However, the commander must approve CCIR changes.

4-36. Functional cell chiefs and other staff section leaders identify areas that may be affected within their area of expertise by proposed changes to the order. Considerations include but are not limited to those shown in table 4-2 (below).

4-37. Commanders have two options for an adjustment decision: make the decision personally or delegate it. In general, commanders should focus on decisions only they must or can make and delegate the rest.

4-38. If time is available, commanders normally direct the plans or future operations cells to develop a new COA, using the MDMP. They may also direct the current operations cell to issue a fragmentary order setting conditions for executing the new COA. When time is not sufficient to perform the MDMP, commanders make an immediate adjustment decision—using intuitive decision making—in the form of a focused COA. (See FM 6-0, paragraph 6-118.) Developing the focused COA often proceeds from mental wargaming commanders perform until they reach an acceptable COA.

## REFINE AND VALIDATE THE COA

4-39. Once the commander has described the COA, the current operations cell analyzes it. It validates the COA for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. If it finds something rendering the COA unacceptable, the G-3/S-3 informs the commander. If the COA is acceptable, it is refined to resynchronize the WFFs enough to generate the needed combat power.

4-40. The validation and refinement is done very quickly. In many cases, the G-3/S-3 conducts a mental simulation. The G-3/S-3 considers potential enemy reactions, the unit's counteractions, and secondary effects that might affect the force's synchronization. When time allows, the G-3/S-3 assembles CP cell chiefs and performs this refinement and validation in an open forum. Staff members consider the following:

- Does this action affect my area of expertise?
  - Does it require changing my information requirements?
  - Are any of my information requirements CCIRs?
  - What actions within my area of expertise does this change require?
  - Will it require changing objectives or targets nominated by the staff section?
- What other CP cells and elements does this action affect?
- What are potential enemy reactions?
- What are the possible friendly counteractions?
  - Does this counteraction affect my area of expertise?
  - Will it require changing my information requirements?
  - Are any of my information requirements CCIRs?
  - What actions within my area of expertise does this counteraction require?
  - Will it require changing objectives or targets nominated by the staff section?
  - What other CP cells and elements does this counteraction affect?

**Table 4-2. Synchronization considerations**

<p><b><i>Movement and Maneuver</i></b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assigning new objectives.</li> <li>• Revising or refining the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance plan.</li> <li>• Assigning new tasks to subordinate units.</li> <li>• Adjusting terrain management.</li> <li>• Modifying airspace control measures.</li> <li>• Unit boundary changes.</li> <li>• Emplacing obstacles.</li> <li>• Clearing obstacles.</li> </ul>
<p><b><i>Intelligence</i></b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Modifying priority intelligence requirements and other intelligence requirements.</li> <li>• Modifying the intelligence synchronization plan.</li> <li>• Updating the event template.</li> <li>• Updating named areas of interest and targeted areas of interest.</li> <li>• Confirming or denying threat courses of action.</li> </ul>
<p><b><i>Fires</i></b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Modifying the high-payoff target list and attack guidance matrix.</li> <li>• Delivering fires against targets or target sets.</li> <li>• Modifying radar zones.</li> <li>• Modifying fire support coordinating measures.</li> </ul>
<p><b><i>Sustainment</i></b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Modifying priorities.</li> <li>• Modifying distribution.</li> <li>• Repositioning logistic assets.</li> <li>• Prioritizing medical evacuation assets.</li> <li>• Repositioning and prioritizing general engineering assets.</li> </ul>
<p><b><i>C4 Operations</i></b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Moving communications nodes.</li> </ul>
<p><b><i>Protection</i></b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enhancing survivability through engineer support.</li> <li>• Employing smoke.</li> <li>• Establishing decontamination sites.</li> <li>• Conducting chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance.</li> <li>• Changing air defense weapons control status.</li> <li>• Moving air defense weapons systems.</li> <li>• Modifying of aerial coverage.</li> <li>• Moving command posts.</li> </ul>
<p><b><i>G-7/S-7</i></b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Synchronizing and adjusting information operations (IO) to support the new decision.</li> <li>• Modifying IO priorities.</li> <li>• Modifying and submitting IO target recommendations to the targeting process.</li> <li>• Synchronizing psychological operations, electronic warfare, operations security, military deception, and, where permitted, computer network operations and other supporting IO capabilities with the operation.</li> </ul>
<p><b><i>G-9/S-9</i></b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Revising advice to commanders on military effects of operations on civilians to reflect new operations decisions.</li> <li>• Recommending modifications of civil-military operations (CMO), including employment of civil affairs and other units to perform CMO tasks.</li> <li>• Adjusting measures for minimizing civilian interference with operations.</li> <li>• Revising recommended protected targets to fire support coordinator.</li> <li>• Coordinating with provost marshal to adjust civilian traffic control measures.</li> <li>• Identifying and adjusting use of host nation and other resources available from civil authorities.</li> </ul>

4-41. The validation and refinement show if the COA will acceptably resolve the situation. If it does not, the G-3/S-3 modifies it through additional analysis or develops a new COA. The G-3/S-3 informs the commander of any changes made to develop an acceptable solution.

## IMPLEMENT

4-42. When the COA is acceptable, the G-3/S-3 implements it if delegated that authority (most execution decisions) or recommends approval to the commander (for all other decisions). The staff then implements the decision. The most important staff actions are resynchronizing the WFFs and disseminating changes to control measures.

## Collaborative Synchronization

4-43. After the analysis is complete, CP cell chiefs update decision support templates and synchronization matrices. When time is available, the G-3/S-3 continues this analysis through to the end of the operation to complete combat power integration. Staff members begin synchronization needed to implement the decision. This synchronization involves collaboration with other CP cells and subordinate staffs. Staff members determine how actions in their areas of expertise affect others. They coordinate those actions to eliminate undesired effects that might cause friction. This collaborative synchronization requires staff members to exercise subordinates' initiative. Situational understanding for staff members includes being able to visualize how actions in their area of expertise affect other areas and what is required to synchronize them.

4-44. Collaborative synchronization also occurs among commanders. Commanders establish relations with higher, adjacent, and subordinate commanders. These relationships and networked information systems lead to collaboration. They enhance the effectiveness of eavesdropping and cross-talk over command channels during execution.

4-45. The commander's intent, planning guidance, and CCIRs guide subordinates—staff and subordinate commanders—in synchronizing operations. They are also essential to achieving collaborative synchronization. Collaborative synchronization occurs without direction from higher headquarters or commanders. It requires subordinates to inform other affected staff sections or commanders of their decisions and actions. It also requires monitoring their counterparts' decisions for implications that affect their areas of expertise. Doing this allows subordinates to resynchronize their activities with their counterparts'. This exercise of subordinates' initiative results in collaborative synchronization of the force.

4-46. Leaders aim to achieve the minimum synchronization needed to generate enough combat power to implement the decision while preserving flexibility. Spending too much time synchronizing results in too slow a response, less flexibility in execution, and lost opportunities. Deciding how much synchronization is enough requires an accurate situational understanding by commanders and subordinates. It requires applying experience gained through training to situational awareness and the courage to act amid uncertainty.

## Control Measures

4-47. Once the commander decides on a COA, the current operations cell issues a fragmentary order directing implementing actions. It may be written or verbal. Common revisions to control measures needed to effect adjustments include the following:

- Updated enemy situation, including the situational template.
- Revised CCIRs.
- Updated ISR execution (retask assets).
- Updated scheme of maneuver and tasks to maneuver units, including an execution matrix and decision support matrix/template.
- Updated scheme of fires, including the fire support execution matrix, high-payoff target list, and attack guidance matrix.
- Updated civil-military operations tasks.

4-48. If the decision does not affect the overall operation, this directive may be released by a CP cell chief as an update (after coordination). Updates address such areas as—

- Delivery on of fires targets or target sets.
- Modification of radar zones.
- Updates to information requirements.
- Modifications of air defense weapons control status.

4-49. If time permits, leaders verify that subordinates understand critical tasks. Methods for doing this include the confirmation brief and backbrief. (See FM 6-0, paragraphs F-7 and F-8.) This is done both between commanders and within staff elements to ensure mutual understanding.

## Cautions

4-50. Leaders consider the following when using the RDSP.

4-51. Validating and refining actions is normally not a formal process but an intuitive one. (When available, automated decision support tools can help refine the decision). It should be done quickly and not drawn out. The focus is on speed to maintain the tempo and minimum necessary synchronization. The RDSP is not designed to mass maximum combat power but to make the minimum coordination needed to generate enough combat power to prevail.

4-52. Most decisions during execution are made at a relatively low level by CP cell chiefs. They refine execution of the order; they do not change it significantly. However, even small changes can affect other staff sections. Given time, any changes should be coordinated in open forum. When time does not allow this, the staff element making the change advises all affected elements immediately.

4-53. Maximizing combat power requires avoiding unneeded actions. During execution, it is essential to keep decision support tools current. Delete targets from target lists and CCIRs and priority intelligence requirements from the ISR plan when they no longer affect the operation. This frees assets for other priorities. All staff members continually monitor targets they nominated and information requirements they submitted. When these no longer are needed, requestors act to delete them.

4-54. Follow the principle of economy of force in all cases. When reallocating resources or priorities, assign only minimum essential assets to shaping operations. Use all other assets weight the decisive operation. This principle applies when allocating resources for the overall operation or within a WFF. It pertains to ISR assets, combat power, and sustainment.

4-55. Execution is multilayered. The answer to a CCIR or priority intelligence requirement may result in a new target or objective. If so, the current operations cell evaluates the target or objective to determine its relative importance. A priority needs to be assigned to it and resources allocated based on that priority. Base the priority on the contributions of the target or objective to the concept of operations, especially the decisive operation. If it is a higher priority than existing targets or objectives, reallocate assets to attack it. This may require reallocating ISR assets to develop the information needed for the attack.

4-56. Conversely, attack of a newly identified target may require diverting assets from other targets. If an attack is unsuccessful, it may require reallocation of combat power for reattack. It may also require tasking ISR assets to determine the extent of failure and develop the information for a successful reattack. If an attack is successful, it may render collection against or attack of other targets unnecessary. For example, enemy counterfire radars may be rendered useless if the firing units they support are destroyed. This might change the requirement to attack such radars or collect against them.

4-57. For the RDSP to work, it must be done continuously, not tied to cyclical events or the battle rhythm. Cyclical events (such as targeting working groups) can be used to review an entire process or evaluate the entire ISR or targeting plan; however, the RDSP cannot be tied to them or it loses its effectiveness. The key is to be able to act and react in real time as events occur, not at predetermined points. Only in this way can Army forces operate within the enemies' decision cycles at a tempo they cannot match.

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## Chapter 5

# Assessment

Assessment is integral to the operations process. It enables commanders and staffs to effectively plan, prepare, and execute operations. This chapter expands on assessment doctrine in FM 6-0. It describes the use and role of assessment during each operations process activity. It discusses assessment tools and techniques, including how to develop and use measures of effectiveness and performance to evaluate progress.

### CONCEPT OF ASSESSMENT

5-1. **Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and progress of an operation.** (This definition replaces the one prescribed in FM 3-0.) It involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes to actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of force employment. Commanders and staffs base assessment on their situational understanding. They achieve and maintain situational understanding to identify opportunities for more effective mission accomplishment, threats to the force, and gaps in information.

5-2. Many aspects of military operations are quantifiable. Examples include movement rates, fuel consumption, and weapons effects. While not easy, assessing physical aspects of operations can be straightforward. However, the dynamic interactions among friendly forces, adaptable enemies, and populations make assessing many aspects of operations difficult. This is especially true of operations in which stability and reconstruction operations predominate. For example, assessing the results of planned actions to change human behavior is very challenging. In these instances, assessment relies on understanding trends and indicators over time to make judgments concerning the success of given actions.

5-3. Assessment is conducted at all echelons and levels of war. It is essential to the successful conduct of operations. It is continuous throughout planning, preparation, and execution. Assessment precedes, accompanies, and follows all operations. It helps commanders determine whether executed missions and tasks are creating the desired results (effects) envisioned by the commander and expressed in the order. Put simply, assessment helps commanders determine what is and is not working. It provides insight into how to do things better.

5-4. Commanders drive assessment at all echelons. Some commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) support assessment. Commanders establish CCIRs that help them determine whether specific decisions are succeeding or if they must adjust the operation. Sources of information for assessment include liaison personnel, reconnaissance units, intelligence analysts, and other staff specialists. The G-2/S-2 and G-9/S-9 are especially important in assessing civil-military operations and stability and reconstruction operations.

5-5. As a rule, the higher the echelon, the more formal the assessment process. For example, a joint task force headquarters may have a dedicated assessment command post cell, formalized assessment plan, and structured assessment progress, including assessment working groups and boards. Assessment at battalion level is usually less formal, often relying on the judgment of commanders and staff officers. (FM 6-0, paragraphs 2-13-2-18 and 2-76-2-106, discusses judgment and intuition.)

5-6. Understanding the contributions and effects of other elements of the joint force is essential to assessment. This is true today at lower levels than previously because of greater mobility, longer weapons and sensor ranges, and larger areas of operations. Many nonmilitary agencies—governmental and nongovernmental—prepare their own assessments, especially in stability and reconstruction operations. Some of these assessments can contribute to the commander's assessment of the operation's success. The U.S.

Agency for International Development and the country team can help commanders understand issues concerning the various agency assessments.

5-7. Situational understanding during planning forms the basis for the initial commander's visualization. Commanders understand the general situation before planning begins; receiving a mission focuses their attention on a specific purpose. During preparation and execution, an accurate situational understanding allows commanders to assess the operation's progress, continuously update their visualization, and make rational decisions. Keeping CCIRs current focuses efforts to gather information commanders need to make expected decisions. Throughout an operation, intelligence provides products that contribute to the situational awareness and situational understanding needed for assessment and decision making.

5-8. Assessing consists of two tasks:

- Monitoring the current situation and operation's progress.
- Evaluating operations against measures of effectiveness and measures of performance.

Based on their assessment, commanders adjust the order to accomplish the mission more effectively. Subordinate commanders assess their unit's progress by comparing it with their mission and higher commander's intent (one and two levels up). They adjust their actions as required.

## MONITORING

5-9. **Monitoring is continuous observation of the current situation to identify opportunities for the force, threats to the force, gaps in information, and progress according to the plan or order.** (This definition replaces the one prescribed in FM 3-0.) Monitoring is the foundation of situational awareness, which leads to situational understanding. During planning, commanders and staffs focus their monitoring on the facts and assumptions that underlie the plan. They monitor these to ensure they remain valid and to identify new ones that will affect the plan. During preparation and execution, commanders and staffs continue to validate facts and assumptions but focus their monitoring on the current situation, identifying variances and gaps in relevant information.

5-10. At lower levels, reports required by standing operating procedures are often adequate for monitoring. Sometimes simple reports or communications through liaison teams are enough. However, the complexities of operations at higher echelons require a monitoring plan. The monitoring plan assigns responsibility for monitoring specific actions.

## EVALUATION

5-11. **Evaluate is to compare relevant information on the situation or operation against criteria to judge success or progress.** (This definition replaces the one prescribed in FM 6-0.) Evaluation allows commanders to identify variances, confirm or invalidate assumptions, and forecast trends. It uses the common operational picture (COP) to measure, analyze, and report the performance of forces against criteria commanders establish. Staff sections and command post cells incorporate assessments based on evaluations into their running estimates. They use these to make adjustments within their delegated authority or present recommendations to the commander. Commanders consider these recommendations, make a decision, and direct actions.

5-12. Commanders and staffs continuously evaluate the current and projected situations to identify decisions needed to accomplish the mission or better achieve the commander's intent. One aid to evaluation is the following list of questions. These questions may also serve as a basis for designating or revising the CCIRs or identifying relevant information for running estimates. However, they must be converted to address the specific situation before they suffice for CCIRs. Many answers to these questions can serve as a way to assess an operation's success:

- Can the force achieve the commander's intent?
- Where is the enemy? Doing what? How?
- Where are friendly forces? Doing what? How?
- What is the enemy force's posture now? What will it be at the time being considered (for example, an anticipated decision time)?

- Where will the friendly force be at the time being considered?
- What are the enemy force's problems? How can the force exploit them?
- What are friendly force's problems? How can they be corrected?
- What are the enemy force's opportunities? How can the force deny them?
- What are friendly force opportunities? How can they be exploited?
- Are any changes needed to the concept of operations? Task organization? Mission?
- What is the disposition of the local populace? What impact do they have on the operation? What impact does the operation have on them?

By evaluating the answers to questions such as these, commanders and staffs can determine variances and their significance.

## ASSESSMENT IN PLANNING

5-13. During planning, staffs achieve situational understanding based on the mission analysis and the COP. From this, they develop and evaluate courses of action (COAs), and identify opportunities, threats, and information gaps. Assessing includes establishing initial measures of effectiveness and performance to evaluate COAs. (See paragraphs 5-23–5-36.) Commanders and staff develop these criteria during the COA analysis and use them for COA comparison. They then use these criteria for evaluating during preparation and execution. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is a key tool for assessing the enemy situation, environment, and civil considerations. It begins during planning and continues during all operations process activities. Running estimates also begin during planning and are key tools for all staff sections.

5-14. Operation orders include provisions for assessment. At minimum, paragraph 5 should include where the commander, deputy commanders, and key staff officers will be positioned during the operation. (See figure 2-5, page 2-17, above.) One useful assessment technique is the “directed telescope.” (See FM 6-0, paragraphs 3-102–3-105.)

5-15. The plan for assessment is particularly important during early deployment stages and initial operations. An expeditionary force—with its fast arrival, early employment, and varying task organization—requires particularly accurate means of assessing its own and the enemy's situations. That means assessment measures and collection means have to be understood early and in place when deployment starts.

5-16. A formal assessment plan may be included in the coordinating instructions of the basic order. If it is complex, a full annex may be needed. Operations complex enough to require a formal, written assessment plan usually occur at higher echelons. However, in longer-term operations, lower echelons may require a formal assessment plan. Synchronization matrices and decision support templates provide starting points for developing assessment plans. They show key events and outcomes to assess. The end state in the commander's intent and the conditions defining success in it also contain aspects of the operation to assess.

## ASSESSMENT IN PREPARATION

5-17. Assessing during preparation focuses on determining changes in the friendly force's readiness to execute the operation. It also considers changes to the situation that the plan or order was based on. Commanders continue to receive information about the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations. Staff sections integrate new information into their running estimates and assess its effects against the order. This allows them to understand the factors of METT-TC in relation to each other (and not in isolation) and their impact on achieving the end state. They compare the actual information against expectations to determine variances and their significance. Assessing during preparation includes confirming or invalidating assumptions made during planning and any threats or opportunities that might require the commander to adjust the order. Continuously updating running estimates facilitates an accurate situational understanding and predictive analysis. These estimates contribute to revising and refining the plan and issuing new orders to modify subordinates' tasks if necessary.

## ASSESSMENT IN EXECUTION

5-18. During execution, assessment involves a deliberate comparison of forecasted outcomes to the current situation using criteria to judge progress toward the end state. Assessing during execution focuses on identifying variances and their nature and magnitude. Significant variances prompt adjustments. During execution, running estimates continue to assess the current situation against possible future operations and the end state.

5-19. Commanders use their situational understanding to assess the operation. The most important question when assessing during execution is whether the order is still valid and the force will achieve the end state. Assessment in execution emphasizes identifying opportunities and threats. Once identified, commanders exploit the opportunities and solve or mitigate the problems that the threats create. Commanders make execution decisions if the plan is still valid. They make adjustment decisions if the situation requires altering the plan. Altering the plan requires enough resynchronization to effectively apply combat power while affording maximum flexibility to subordinates. As commanders develop an assessment, they describe their conclusions to their staffs and subordinates. After commanders make a decision, staffs transmit the necessary orders. When necessary, it adjusts the order—to include adjusting the measures of effectiveness and performance if required. The focus then returns to executing and assessing.

## ASSESSMENT CONSIDERATIONS

5-20. Assessing may be formal or less formal based on the situation. Quarterly training briefings and unit status reports, for example, are formal assessments. In fast-paced operations, however, a formal assessment process may not be possible. Commanders may rely on the COP, personal observations, and periodic operational and assessment briefings from the staff and subordinate commanders as their assessment mechanisms.

5-21. Commanders balance time and staff resources allocated for assessing against other requirements just as they do for other operations process activities. To help balance the time and staff resources devoted to assessment, commanders and staffs address the following questions:

- What will be assessed and to what detail?
- How will a particular task, activity, or effect be assessed? What criteria will be used?
- Who in the staff has primarily responsibility for assessing a particular area?
- What information requirements are needed to support a particular assessment?

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**Example.** In stability and reconstruction operations, a brigade combat team may have an area of operations with several large towns damaged by combat operations. The commander tasks subordinate commanders to restore essential services to those towns and provides them the needed resources. This task may take months and require the higher commander to continuously assess its progress.

In this example, a common construct describing “essential services” must be developed and understood throughout the command. This construct would focus the efforts of subordinate commanders and the assessment efforts. A report providing the information necessary to assess progress in restoring essential services should be developed. In addition, a principal staff officer should be designated to collect this information and provide a comprehensive assessment to the commander.

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5-22. Commanders must be careful, however, not to overassess. Staffs can easily become bogged down developing formal assessment procedures for numerous tasks and effects. They might smother subordinate commanders and staffs with requirements for numerous reports, questions, and information requirements. Often, standard reports, returns, and updates by commanders are sufficient. The chief of staff/executive officer helps the commander achieve the right balance.

## MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE

5-23. To support assessment, commanders and staff develop measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs). Not all criteria can be reduced to MOEs or MOPs. Commanders should not use MOEs or MOPs when they are inappropriate. In those exceptional cases, commanders should develop criteria that fit the situation.

5-24. **A measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.** MOEs focus on the results or consequences of friendly actions taken. They answer the question, Is the force doing the right things, or are additional or alternative actions required? Often an effect cannot be measured directly. If direct measurement is not possible, then indicators of achieving the effect are measured. Staffs then apply analysis and judgment to develop conclusions about achieving the effect. Measuring indirectly requires great care in selecting and measuring indicators.

5-25. **A measure of performance is a criterion to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment.** MOPs answer the question, Was the task or action performed as the commander intended? MOPs confirm or deny that the task has been correctly performed.

5-26. MOEs and MOPs give commanders and staffs a basis to evaluate the contributions military efforts make toward achieving the end state. They are indicators used collectively to identify trends that can affect future actions, influence decisions, identify transitions, and determine termination points. MOEs and MOPs help commanders determine when all or part of the mission has been accomplished, permitting reallocation of resources. The criteria used depend on the situation. They often require readjustment as the situation changes and objectives evolve.

5-27. At lower levels, it may be impractical to use of a large number of MOEs and MOPs. The level of detail depends on the operation's nature and headquarters' staffing level. In stability and reconstruction operations, limited use of MOEs and MOPs may be possible down to battalion level. In general, units without a staff cannot perform assessments to such a level of detail. Consequently, higher echelon staffs ensure that their numerous MOEs and MOPs do not overly burden lower echelons—especially battalion and below.

5-28. When crafting MOEs and MOPs ensure they have the following characteristics:

- Measurable.
- Discrete.
- Relevant.
- Responsive.

### MEASURABLE

5-29. MOEs and MOPs require quantitative or qualitative standards that can be used to measure them. Quantitative measures are generally preferable, as they are usually more objective than qualitative measures. When qualitative measures are required, clear measurement criteria must be established and disseminated to prevent misinterpretation and useless information.

### DISCRETE

5-30. Although forces can measure any given task or desired impact with multiple MOEs and MOPs, care is required to ensure that each criterion measures a distinct aspect of the operation. This eliminates redundant efforts. Excessive numbers of MOEs and MOPs become unmanageable. At that point, the cost of collection efforts outweighs the value of assessing.

## RELEVANT

5-31. MOEs and MOPs must be relevant to measured task's outcome. Developing relevant MOPs is usually fairly simple. Relevant MOEs are more difficult. The key is visualizing the desired result or outcome and identifying the most accurate and simplest indicator of it.

## RESPONSIVE

5-32. MOEs and MOPs must detect situation changes quickly enough for commanders to respond immediately and effectively.

5-33. A *measure* is a data point that depicts the degree to which an entity possesses an attribute. This degree is expressed by a unit of measure. Although measures are informative, commanders and staffs are most interested in patterns and trends. Once two or more measures are taken, they can be plotted to determine patterns and trends. These reveal whether an attribute is more or less prevalent at different times. Commanders and staffs also develop a standard or baseline against which they compare measures and trends. Once established, this baseline remains a fixed reference point. From this information and analysis of why a trend is up or down, staffs can identify trouble spots and plan operations to reverse negative trends. They can also capitalize on positive trends by determining what is causing the positive increase and apply those tactics, techniques, and procedures more broadly.

5-34. The following examples illustrate the difference between MOEs and MOPs.

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**Example 1.** Assume a unit supporting disaster relief is tasked to establish a refugee camp (task) in order to provide shelter to displaced civilians (purpose).

An example of an MOP for this refugee camp would be the number of tents erected. This measures the level of task accomplishment.

An example of an MOE for this refugee camp would be the number of people within supporting distance of the refugee camp without shelter. This measures the desired result of establishing the refugee camp. The baseline for this MOE would be the number of people without shelter before the disaster. This provides a natural-state standard against which the unit can measure their results. Tracked over time, these measures produce trends that the unit can focus their efforts around until they reach the baseline.

Notice that MOPs generally measure performance of the task while MOEs generally measure accomplishment of the purpose.

**Example 2.** Assume a fires brigade is given the task, Neutralize enemy force 1 vicinity Objective Alpha (task) to enable 1st Brigade Combat Team's unimpeded movement along Route X (purpose).

MOPs for this task would include the number and type of rounds fired, when they were fired, and where they hit.

An MOE for this task would be, Is enemy force 1 able to impede 1st Brigade Combat Team's movement along Route X?

Again, the MOPs generally relate to accomplishing the task and MOEs generally relate to accomplishing the purpose.

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5-35. Commanders and staffs should exercise caution and judgment when using numerical and statistical indicators. These indicators may vary widely in interpretation. They may be valid only for a specific time, place, or group of people. They may not have a direct correlation to effectiveness. MOEs and quantitative MOPs may not capture qualitative changes.

5-36. MOEs and MOPs may be placed in the coordinating instructions subparagraph of operation order paragraph 3. If the discussion is too long, they may be placed in an annex. Usually, this annex includes the assessment plan. In stability and reconstruction operations, assessing focuses on the state of civil security and civil control (including governance) and the state of essential services for the civilian population.

**Appendix A**  
**Considerations for Stability and Reconstruction  
Operations and Civil Support Operations**

This appendix is rescinded. Refer to FM 3-0.

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## Appendix B

# Mission Statements and Tasks to Subordinate Units

An important aspect of command and control is communicating instructions to subordinates. Clearly communicated instructions help subordinates understand what to do and why. Army doctrine for planning, command and control, and tactics describes how to develop mission statements and tasks to subordinate units. The introduction of effects and effects-based planning in joint doctrine does not change Army doctrine. This appendix elaborates on existing techniques for developing mission statements and tasks to subordinate units. It is framed around the military decision making process; however, these techniques apply to targeting and general problem solving as well.

## RECEIPT OF MISSION AND MISSION ANALYSIS

B-1. Upon receipt of a mission, commanders and staffs take the steps necessary to begin planning. These include gathering tools, updating running estimates, and performing an initial assessment. This assessment includes determining the available planning time.

B-2. In mission analysis, commanders and staffs analyze the relationships among the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). They seek to understand—

- The operational environment, including enemies, adversaries, terrain, and civil considerations.
- The desired end state of their higher and next higher headquarters.
- Their mission and how it is nested within those of their higher and next higher headquarters.
- The forces, capabilities, and resources available.

B-3. In determining their unit's mission, commanders and staffs identify their specified and implied tasks. Staffs analyze the higher headquarters order and the higher commander's guidance to determine these. A *task* is a clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by individuals and organizations. Tasks are specific activities that contribute to the accomplishment of encompassing missions or other requirements (FM 7-0). A *specified task* is a task specifically assigned to a unit by its higher headquarters (FM 5-0). While specified tasks can be assigned anywhere in an operation order or plan, most are stated in paragraph 3, execution.

B-4. An *implied task* is a task that must be performed to accomplish a specified task or mission but is not stated in the higher headquarters order (FM 5-0). Implied tasks are derived from a detailed analysis of the higher headquarters order and the factors of METT-TC. Instructions in joint orders may be written as effects to achieve; for example, "Population X in area of operations B participates in the national election." In this case, commanders and staffs would consider the many implied tasks needed to achieve this effect. These could range from informing the population on the election process to providing polling station security.

B-5. Once staff members have identified specified and implied tasks, they ensure they understand each task's requirements and purpose. Then they determine the essential tasks. An *essential task* is a specified or implied task that must be executed to accomplish the mission. Essential tasks are always included in the unit's mission statement (FM 5-0). The staff presents the essential tasks to the commander for approval during the mission analysis briefing.

## DEVELOPING A RESTATED MISSION

B-6. An essential step in mission analysis is developing a restated mission based on analysis of the unit's specified, implied, and essential tasks. The chief of staff/executive officer or operations officer prepares a recommended mission statement based on the mission analysis. The unit's mission statement is presented to the commander for approval, normally during the mission analysis brief. A *mission statement* is a short sentence or paragraph describing the unit's essential task (or tasks) and purpose that clearly indicate the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. It contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why, and the reasons thereof, but seldom specifies how (FM 5-0). The five elements of a mission statement answer the following questions:

- Who will execute the operation (unit/organization)?
- What is the unit's essential task or tasks (stated as an intended effect [such as, fix, neutralize, influence] or an action by a friendly force [such as, link up, consolidate, or disengage])?
- When will the operation begin (by time or event), or what is the duration of the operation?
- Where will the operation occur (area of operations [AO], objective, or grid coordinates)?
- Why will the force conduct the operation (for what purpose or reason)?

B-7. The unit mission statement along with the commander's intent and concept of operations, provide the primary focus for subordinate actions throughout the operation. The following are two examples of a mission statement.

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*Example 1.* Not later than 220400Z August 2005 (**when**), 1st (U.S.) Armored Division (**who**) fixes elements of the 22d Division Tactical Group (**what/task**) in AO New York (**where**) to enable 3d (U.S.) Infantry Division's unimpeded attack west to seize Objective Carol (**why/purpose**).

*Example 2.* 1-505th Parachute Infantry Regiment (**who**) seizes (**what/task**) Jackson International Airport (**where**) not later than D-day, H+3 (**when**) to allow follow-on forces to air-land into AO Slammer (**why/purpose**).

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B-8. The mission statement may have more than one essential task. The following example shows a mission statement for a phased operation with a different essential task for each phase.

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*Example.* 1/509th Parachute Infantry Regiment (**who**) seizes (**what/task**) Jackson International Airport (**where**) not later than D-day, H+3 (**when**) to allow follow-on forces to air-land into AO Slammer (**why/purpose**). On order (**when**), secure (**what/task**) Objective Gold (**where**) to prevent the 2d Pandor Guards Brigade from crossing the Blue River and disrupting operations in Airhead Slammer (**why/purpose**).

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B-9. Additionally, commanders may include the type or form of the operation in the mission statement. While mission statements seldom contain *how*, including the type or form of the operation provides an overarching doctrinal description of how the commander wants the task accomplished. In the example below, the commander includes "infiltrates" for emphasis and to synchronize the force. This directive limits subordinates to a specific form of maneuver (infiltration) that the entire force will use to seize Objective Bravo.

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*Example.* At 021100Z August 2004 (**when**) 1st Brigade, 25th (U.S.) Infantry Division (Light) (**who**) infiltrates (**form of maneuver**) to seize (**what/task**) Objective Bravo (**where**) to prevent enemy forces from interfering with the rapid crossing of 3d (U.S.) Infantry Division over the Blue River (**why**).

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B-10. The *who*, *where*, and *when* of a mission statement are straightforward. The *what* and *why* are more challenging to write and can confuse subordinates if not stated clearly. The *what* is a task and is expressed in terms of action verbs (for example, contain, destroy, or isolate). These tasks are measurable and can be grouped as “actions by friendly forces” or “effects on enemy forces.” The *why* puts the task into context by describing the reason for performing it.

B-11. The *what* in a mission statement is a task to be accomplished. It is expressed in terms of an intended effect or an action by a friendly force. Commanders should use tactical mission tasks or other doctrinally approved tasks contained in combined arms field manuals or mission training plans in mission statements. These tasks have specific military definitions that are different from dictionary definitions. They are measurable and often describe results or effects in relationship to the enemy, terrain, and friendly forces. Using them simplifies orders. A *tactical mission task* is the specific activity performed by a unit while executing a form of tactical operation or form of maneuver. It may be expressed in terms of either actions by a friendly force or effects on an enemy force (FM 3-90). Table B-1 (below) lists the tactical mission tasks. FM 3-90, appendix B, describes each one. Commanders and planners should carefully choose the task that best describes the commander’s intent and guidance.

**Table B-1. Tactical mission tasks**

<b><i>Effects on Enemy Forces</i></b>	<b><i>Actions by Friendly Forces</i></b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Block</li> <li>• Canalize</li> <li>• Contain</li> <li>• Defeat</li> <li>• Destroy</li> <li>• Disrupt</li> <li>• Fix</li> <li>• Interdict</li> <li>• Isolate</li> <li>• Neutralize</li> <li>• Penetrate</li> <li>• Turn</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assault</li> <li>• Attack-by-fire</li> <li>• Breach</li> <li>• Bypass</li> <li>• Clear</li> <li>• Conduct personnel recovery</li> <li>• Consolidate and reorganize</li> <li>• Control</li> <li>• Counterreconnaissance</li> <li>• Disengage</li> <li>• Exfiltrate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Follow and assume</li> <li>• Follow and support</li> <li>• Linkup</li> <li>• Occupy</li> <li>• Reconstitute</li> <li>• Reduce</li> <li>• Retain</li> <li>• Secure</li> <li>• Seize</li> <li>• Support-by-fire</li> <li>• Suppress</li> </ul>
*Conduct personnel recovery replaces combat search and rescue. See FM 3-50.1		

B-12. Table B-2 (below) lists selected additional tasks available to commanders and the field manuals that discuss them. These tasks are stated in terms of the effects they produce.

**Table B-2. Other tactical tasks**

<b><i>Offensive Information Operations</i></b> <b><i>(See FM 3-13)</i></b>		<b><i>Defensive Information Operations</i></b> <b><i>(See FM 3-13)</i></b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Destroy</li> <li>• Disrupt</li> <li>• Degrade</li> <li>• Deny</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deceive</li> <li>• Exploit</li> <li>• Influence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Protect</li> <li>• Detect</li> <li>• Restore</li> <li>• Respond</li> </ul>	
<b><i>Obstacles (See FM 3-34)</i></b>		<b><i>Fires (See FM 6-20)</i></b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Block</li> <li>• Contain</li> <li>• Disrupt</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fix</li> <li>• Turn</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Destroy</li> <li>• Neutralize</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Suppress</li> <li>• Harass</li> </ul>

B-13. The *why* of a mission statement provides the mission’s purpose—the reason the unit is to perform the task. It is extremely important to mission command and mission orders. The purpose is usually stated as a descriptive phrase and is often more important than the task. Normally, the staff completes a task statement

by adding the phrase “in order to” and stating the task’s purpose. Table B-3 (below) shows sample purpose verbs for “in order to” phrases.

**Table B-3. Sample purpose verbs**

• Allow	• Divert	• Prevent
• Cause	• Enable	• Protect
• Create	• Envelop	• Support
• Deceive	• Influence	• Surprise
• Deny	• Open	

B-14. Including the purpose in the mission statement clarifies the tasks it contains and supports the exercise of subordinates’ initiative. The following example shows a mission statement that includes a purpose.

---

**Example.** Not later than 031100Z July 2003 (**when**) 1st Brigade Combat Team (**who**) secures (**what/ task**) Objective Bravo (**where**) to prevent enemy forces from crossing the Blue River (**why/purpose**).

---

B-15. In the above example, if the enemy chooses to cross the Blue River at a fording site two kilometers west of Objective Bravo, subordinates would know to notify higher headquarters and quickly reposition to prevent the enemy from establishing a fording site. If they did not know their mission’s purpose, they would have to ask their higher headquarters for instructions. The delay involved would cede the initiative to the enemy. Here is an example of a mission statement without a purpose.

---

**Example.** At H-hour, D-day, 3-75 Ranger Regiment seizes Jackson International Airport (vicinity grid GL900231).

---

B-16. The purpose for seizing the airport in this example is unclear. Subordinates cannot determine if this mission’s purpose is to prevent enemy use of the airfield or to gain control of the airfield for friendly use. The mission’s purpose affects the approach subordinates may take to accomplish this mission. It should be included in mission statements.

## PLANNING GUIDANCE AND COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

B-17. Following mission analysis, commanders approve the unit’s mission statement, and issue their initial commander’s intent and planning guidance. These are based on their commander’s visualization. They describe how the commander envisions the operation’s end state and conditions necessary to achieve it. The initial commander’s intent focuses the rest of the planning process.

B-18. Thinking in terms of desired and undesired effects helps commanders develop and issue planning guidance. It also helps staff members develop courses of action (COAs). The Army defines an *effect* as a **result, outcome, or consequence of an action**. All actions create effects—some desired, others undesired. Desired effects are results that support accomplishment of an objective or the mission. Undesired effects could adversely impact accomplishment of an objective or the mission.

B-19. For example, a commander may state, “Key to stability in the unit’s AO is that a certain community in city B no longer supports the insurgency.” A COA to create this effect may include two activities: psychological operations messages to discourage insurgent support, and infrastructure development projects as rewards for shifting support. In addition, this COA may call for a limited military presence in the city to avoid the perception of occupation. Staff analysis should identify possible undesired effects associated with each COA. For example, the limited military presence might produce increased insurgent activity and support due to a perception of friendly force weakness. Thinking this way helps commanders and staffs thoroughly examine ways to best achieve desired effects while mitigating undesired effects.

## DEVELOPING TASK STATEMENTS

B-20. The staff translates the commander's planning guidance and approved COA into tasks to subordinate units. For example, a commander states in the planning guidance and part of a COA that the "enemy reserve does not interfere with the seizure of Objective Dog by 1st Brigade Combat Team." The staff then plans a series of actions or tasks to subordinate units to achieve the effects stated in the commander's guidance. In this example, actions may include any of the following or a combination of them:

- Nominating the enemy reserve for destruction by air attack.
- Assigning the aviation and fires brigades to neutralize the enemy reserve with fires.
- Deceiving the enemy reserve with a feint.
- Blocking the enemy reserve with a force or obstacle.

B-21. When developing tasks to subordinate units, staffs use the same task/purpose (what/why) construct as they did to develop the unit's restated mission. Staffs develop tasks to subordinate units the same way they developed the unit's restated mission. Each task statement follows the mission statement format and contains the same five elements. (See paragraph B-6.)

B-22. As with mission statements, task statements normally do not specify *how*. However, there may be occasions when commanders want to specify an activity (for example, raid, ambush, infiltrate) that provides an overarching doctrinal description of how the to accomplish a task.

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# Glossary

The glossary lists terms with Army and joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions are different, (*Army*) follows the term. Terms for which this FMI is the proponent manual (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (\*). The proponent manual for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition. Terms for which the Army and Marine Corps have agreed on a common definition are followed by (*Army-Marine Corps*).

## SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AO</b>	area of operations
<b>AR</b>	Army regulation
<b>BCT</b>	brigade combat team
<b>C2</b>	command and control
<b>C4OPS</b>	command, control, communications, and computer operations
<b>CCIR</b>	commander's critical information requirement
<b>COA</b>	course of action
<b>COP</b>	common operational picture
<b>COS</b>	chief of staff
<b>CP</b>	command post
<b>EBO</b>	effects-based operations
<b>EECP</b>	early-entry command post
<b>FFIR</b>	friendly forces information requirement
<b>FM</b>	field manual; frequency modulation
<b>FMI</b>	field manual-interim
<b>FRAGO</b>	fragmentary order
<b>FUOPS</b>	future operations
<b>G-1</b>	assistant chief of staff, personnel
<b>G-2</b>	assistant chief of staff, intelligence
<b>G-3</b>	assistant chief of staff, operations
<b>G-4</b>	assistant chief of staff, logistics
<b>G-5</b>	assistant chief of staff, plans
<b>+G-6</b>	assistant chief of staff, network operations
<b>G-7</b>	assistant chief of staff, information operations
<b>G-8</b>	assistant chief of staff, financial management
<b>G-9</b>	assistant chief of staff, civil affairs
<b>IPB</b>	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
<b>ISR</b>	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

<b>JFC</b>	joint force commander
<b>JP</b>	joint publication
<b>MCG</b>	mobile command group
<b>MDMP</b>	military decision making process
<b>METT-TC</b>	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations
<b>MOE</b>	measure of effectiveness
<b>MOP</b>	measure of performance
<b>+MTOE</b>	modification (or modified) table of organization and equipment
<b>PIR</b>	priority intelligence requirement
<b>RFC</b>	revised final coordination
<b>RDSP</b>	rapid decision making and synchronization process
<b>S-1</b>	personnel staff officer
<b>S-2</b>	intelligence staff officer
<b>S-3</b>	operations staff officer
<b>S-4</b>	logistics staff officer
<b>S-5</b>	plans staff officer
<b>+S-6</b>	network operations staff officer
<b>+S-7</b>	information operations staff officer
<b>+S-8</b>	financial management staff officer
<b>+S-9</b>	civil affairs staff officer
<b>SOP</b>	standing operating procedure
<b>TAC CP</b>	tactical command post
<b>U.S.</b>	United States
<b>USJFCOM</b>	United States Joint Forces Command
<b>WFF</b>	warfighting function
<b>XO</b>	executive officer

## SECTION II – TERMS

<b>adjustment decision</b>	During preparation and execution, the selection of a course of action that modifies the order to respond to unanticipated opportunities or threats. (FM 6-0)
<b>+Army positive control</b>	A technique of regulating forces that involves commanders and leaders actively assessing, deciding, and directing them. (FM 3-0)
<b>+Army procedural control</b>	A technique of regulating forces that relies on a combination of orders, regulations, policies, and doctrine (including tactics, techniques, and procedures). (FM 3-0)
<b>+assessment</b>	(Army) The continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation, particularly the enemy, and progress of an operation. (FM 3-0)
<b>*battle rhythm</b>	(Army) The sequencing of command and control activities within a headquarters and throughout the force to facilitate effective command and control.



<b>*board</b>	(joint) A temporary grouping of selected staff representatives delegated decision authority for a particular purpose or function.
<b>calculated risk</b>	An exposure to chance of injury or loss when the commander can visualize the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment or damage to the force, and judges the outcome as worth the cost. (FM 6-0)
<b>*center cell</b>	(joint) A command and control facility established for a specific purpose. <i>See</i> command post cell.
<b>civil considerations</b>	The influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations. (FM 6-0)
<b>combat assessment</b>	(joint) The determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. Combat assessment is composed of three major components: (a) battle damage assessment; (b) munitions effectiveness assessment; and (c) reattack recommendation. (JP 3-60)
<b>+combined arms</b>	The synchronized or simultaneous application of the elements of combat power to achieve an effect greater than if each element were used separately or sequentially. (FM 3-0)
<b>+command</b>	(joint) The authority that a commander in the military service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces to accomplish assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. (JP 1)
<b>command and control</b>	(Army) The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Commanders exercise command and control through a command and control system. (FM 6-0)
<b>command and control system</b>	(Army) The arrangement of personnel, information management, procedures, and equipment and facilities essential for the commander to conduct operations. (FM 6-0)
<b>+command and control warfighting function</b>	The related tasks and systems that support commanders in exercising authority and direction. (FM 3-0)
<b>+commander's critical information requirement</b>	(joint) An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision-making. The two key elements are friendly force information requirements and priority intelligence requirements. (JP 3-0)
<b>+commander's intent</b>	(Army) A clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions the force must establish with respect to the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations that represent the desired end state. (FM 3-0)
<b>+commander's visualization</b>	The mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning the broad sequence of events by which the force will achieve that end state. (FM 3-0)
<b>*command group</b>	The commander and selected staff members who accompany commanders and enable them to exercise command and control away from a command post.
<b>+command post</b>	(Army) A unit's or subunit's headquarters where the commander and staff perform their activities. (FM 6-0)
<b>*command post cell</b>	A grouping of personnel and equipment by warfighting function or purpose to facilitate command and control during operations.

<b>+control</b>	(Army) In the context of command and control, the regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander's intent. (FM 3-0)
<b>control measure</b>	A means of regulating forces or warfighting functions. (FM 3-0)
<b>decision making</b>	Selecting a course of action as the one most favorable to accomplish the mission. (FM 6-0)
<b>*early-entry command post</b>	A command and control facility containing tailored portions of the unit's headquarters for a specific mission over a specific period. It normally includes members of the tactical command post and additional planners, intelligence analysts, liaison officers, and others as required.
<b>+effect element</b>	(joint) The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. (JP 3-0) <i>See</i> staff element.
<b>+essential element of friendly information</b>	(Army) A critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation, and therefore must be protected from enemy detection. (FM 3-0)
<b>essential task</b>	A specified or implied task that must be executed to accomplish the mission. Essential tasks are always included in the unit's mission statement. (FM 5-0)
<b>*evaluate</b>	To compare relevant information on the situation or operation against criteria to judge success or progress.
<b>exceptional information</b>	Information that would have answered one of the commander's critical information requirements if the requirement for it had been foreseen and stated as one of the commander's critical information requirements. (FM 6-0)
<b>+execution</b>	Putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions. (FM 3-0)
<b>execution decision</b>	The selection, during preparation and execution, of a course of action anticipated by the order. (FM 6-0)
<b>+fires warfighting function</b>	The related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated Army indirect fires, joint fires, and command and control warfare, including nonlethal fires, through the targeting process. (FM 3-0)
<b>friendly forces information requirement</b>	(joint) Information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities. (JP 3-0)
<b>+graphic control measure</b>	A symbol used on maps and displays to regulate forces and warfighting functions. (FM 3-0)
<b>+information management</b>	The science of using procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect knowledge products, data, and information. (FM 3-0)
<b>information systems</b>	(Army) Equipment and facilities that collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information. This includes computers—hardware and software—and communications, as well as policies and procedures for their use. (FM 3-0)
<b>intelligence synchronization plan</b>	The plan the intelligence officer uses, with staff input, to synchronize the entire collection effort, to include all assets the commander controls, assets of lateral units and higher echelon units and organizations, and intelligence reach to answer the commander's critical information requirements. (FM 2-0)

<b>+intelligence warfighting function</b>	The related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding of the operational environment, enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. (FM 3-0)
<b>intuitive decision making</b>	The act of reaching a conclusion that emphasizes pattern recognition based on knowledge, judgment, experience, education, intelligence, boldness, perception, and character. This approach focuses on assessment of the situation vice comparison of multiple options. (FM 6-0)
<b>+line of operations</b>	(Army) A line that defines the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy and links the force with its base of operations and objectives. (FM 3-0)
<b>*main command post</b>	A command and control facility that contains the portion of the unit headquarters in which the majority of planning, analysis, and coordination occurs.
<b>+measure of effectiveness</b>	(joint) A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. (JP 3-0)
<b>+measure of performance</b>	(joint) A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 3-0)
<b>*military decision making process</b>	A process that integrates the activities of the commander, staff, and subordinate commanders in developing an operation plan or order. It establishes procedures for analyzing a mission; developing, analyzing, and comparing courses of action; selecting the best course of action; and producing an operation plan or order.
<b>mission</b>	(joint) The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. (JP 1-02)
<b>+mission command</b>	The conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission orders. Successful mission command demands that subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative, acting aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission within the commander's intent.. (FM 3-0)
<b>+mission orders</b>	A technique for developing orders that emphasizes to subordinates the results to be obtained, not how they are to achieve them. It provides maximum freedom of action in determining how to best accomplish assigned missions. (FM 3-0)
<b>+mission statement</b>	(joint) A short sentence or paragraph describing the organization's essential task (or tasks) and purpose – a clear statement of the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The mission statement contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why, but seldom specifies how. (JP 5-0)
<b>*monitoring</b>	(Army) Continuous observation of the current situation to identify opportunities for the force, threats to the force, gaps in information, and progress according to the plan or order.
<b>+movement and maneuver warfighting function</b>	The related tasks and systems that move forces to achieve a position of advantage in relation to the enemy. Direct fire is inherent in maneuver, as is close combat. (FM 3-0)
<b>+operations process</b>	The major command and control activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation. The commander drives the operations process. (FM 3-0)
<b>planning</b>	The process by which commanders (and the staff if available) translate the commander's visualization into a specific course of action for preparation and execution, focusing on the expected results. (FM 3-0)
<b>+preparation</b>	Activities by units to improve their ability to execute an operation.

	Preparation includes, but not limited to, plan refinement; rehearsals; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; coordination; inspections; and movement. (FM 3-0)
<b>+priority intelligence requirement</b>	(joint) An intelligence requirement, stated as a priority for intelligence support, that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or the operational environment. (JP 2-0)
<b>+protection warfighting function</b>	The related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power. (FM 3-0)
<b>relevant information</b>	All information of importance to commanders and staffs in the exercise of command and control. (FM 3-0)
<b>+running estimate</b>	A staff section's continuous assessment of current and future operations to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander's intent and if future operations are supportable. (FM 3-0)
<b>+situational awareness</b>	Immediate knowledge of the conditions of the operation, constrained geographically and in time. (FM 3-0)
<b>+situational understanding</b>	The product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the mission variables to facilitate decision making. (FM 3-0)
<b>*staff element</b>	A component of a staff section or command post cell.
<b>staff estimate</b>	<i>See</i> running estimate.
<b>*staff section</b>	A grouping of staff members by area of expertise under a coordinating, special, or personal staff officer.
<b>subordinates' initiative</b>	The assumption of responsibility for deciding and initiating independent actions when the concept of operations or order no longer applies or when an unanticipated opportunity leading to the accomplishment of the commander's intent presents itself. (FM 6-0)
<b>+sustainment warfighting function</b>	The related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. (FM 3-0)
<b>+synchronization</b>	(joint) The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive time and place. (JP 2-0)
<b>*tactical command post</b>	A command and control facility containing a tailored portion of a unit headquarters designed to control current operations.
<b>task</b>	(Army) A clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by individuals and organizations. Tasks are specific activities that contribute to the accomplishment of encompassing missions or other requirements. (FM 7-0)
<b>+tempo</b>	(Army-Marine Corps) The relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy. (FM 3-0)
<b>variance</b>	A difference between the actual situation during an operation and what the plan forecasted the situation would be at that time or event. (FM 6-0)
<b>+warfighting function</b>	A group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. (FM 3-0)
<b>*working group</b>	A temporary grouping of predetermined staff representatives who meet to coordinate and provide recommendations for a particular purpose or function.

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None.

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