# Logistics Operations

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Preface

Field manual (FM) 4-95 provides detailed information on Army logistics operations. It discusses how the logistics element of the sustainment warfighting function facilitates operational success by providing Army forces operational reach, freedom of action, and endurance. FM 4-95 serves as the doctrinal bridge between the overarching principles prescribed in Army doctrine publication (ADP) 4-0 and Army doctrine reference publication (ADRP) 4-0 and the lower level sustainment Army techniques publications (ATP), and Army tactics, techniques, and procedures publications (ATTP).

The principal audience for FM 4-95 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this publication.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)

FM 4-95 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which FM 4-95 is the proponent publication (the authority) are italicized in the text and marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Terms and definitions for which FM 4-95 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

FM 4-95 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of FM 4-95 is the United States Army Combined Arms Support Command. The preparing agency is the G3 Doctrine Division, USACASCOM. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, United States Army Combined Arms Support Command and Fort Lee, ATTN: ATCL-TDD (FM 4-95), 2221 A Avenue, Fort Lee, Virginia 23801 or submit an electronic DA Form 2028 by e-mail to: usarmy.lee.tradoc.mbx.leee-cascom-doctrine@mail.mil.
Introduction

FM 4-95, Logistics Operations, is the Army’s doctrine for Army logistics operations at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. This publication emphasizes logistics tactics and procedures in order to provide all commanders, staffs, and Soldiers an understanding of Army logistics operations.

The contents of FM 4-95 are consistent with ADP and ADRP 4-0, Sustainment, and serve as the doctrinal foundation for all Army logistics operations. FM 4-95 is consistent to the extent possible with joint logistics operations. FM 4-95 details logistics operations, mission command for logistics, and logistics support to theater operations.

FM 4-95 contains four chapters:

**Chapter 1** discusses the Army principles of logistics that form the body of thought on how the Army operates to provide logistics support to unified land operations in the present to near term, with current force structure and materiel. It also discusses the elements of logistics that make up the distinct function of logistics.

**Chapter 2** discusses the strategic and joint interfaces, Army Title 10 logistics requirements, and identifies unified action partners that provide logistics support to unified land operations. It will also discuss joint interdependence, logistics support to force projection and interagency coordination.

**Chapter 3** discusses the context (operational environment) within which logistics operations in support of unified land operations occurs. It discusses the theater structure, mission command for logistics and command and support relationships.

**Chapter 4** discusses how logistics is integrated into the operations process to support decisive action. This chapter discusses establishing metrics for logistics operations in order to gauge the success of logistics support provided; planning, preparing, and executing logistics; and provides an example of logistics operations from force projection to theater closing.
Chapter 1

Logistics Overview

Logistics is planning and executing the movement and support of forces. It includes those aspects of military operations that deal with: design and development; acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, and disposition of materiel; acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and acquisition or furnishing of services (ADP 4-0).

The sustainment warfighting function consists of three elements: logistics, personnel services and health service support. Logistics enables the success of operations by providing joint and Army forces operational reach, freedom of action, and prolonged endurance. FM 4-95 focuses on the logistics element of the sustainment warfighting function. For more information on the personnel services and health service support principles and elements of the sustainment warfighting function see ADRP 4-0, Sustainment; and the FM 1 and FM 4 series publications.

Logistics involves both military art and science. Knowing when and how to accept risk, prioritizing a myriad of requirements, and balancing limited resources all require military art while understanding logistics capabilities incorporates military science. Logistics operations integrate strategic, operational, and tactical support of deployed forces while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of additional forces and materiel. Chapter 1 discusses the Army principles of logistics which form the body of thought on how the Army operates in the present to near term, with current force structure and materiel. This chapter also discusses the elements of logistics that make up the distinct function of logistics.

LOGISTICS SUPPORT TO UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS

1-1. Army logistics is a critical enabler of unified land operations. Logistics provide the support required to keep Army and its joint and coalition partners engaged in operations across the operational environment. The effect of not providing sufficient logistical support could cause forces to slow down or culminate operations causing a loss of momentum and possible defeat of Army forces. It is essential that logistics planners and operational planners be inseparable in planning, preparation, execution and assessment of operations.

OPERATIONAL REACH

1-2. Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities (JP 3-0). Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, or purpose, including deep-close-security operations, to achieve definitive results (ADRP 3-0). Army leaders strike enemy forces throughout their depth, preventing the effective employment of reserves, command and control nodes, logistics, and other capabilities not in direct contact with friendly forces. Operations in depth can disrupt the enemy’s decision cycle. These operations contribute to protecting the force by destroying enemy capabilities before the enemy can use them. Commanders balance their forces’ tempo and momentum to produce simultaneous results throughout their operational areas. To achieve simultaneity, commanders establish a higher tempo to target enemy capabilities located at the limit of a force’s operational reach.

1-3. Sustainment (logistics) determines the depth and duration of Army operations. It is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative (ADRP 3-0). The Army’s robust logistics capability assists in
providing crucial theater and port opening functions enabling joint forces to conduct strategic and
operational reach. Once the theater is set, Army logistics capabilities continue to provide the bulk of Army
support to other services, common-user logistics (CUL), and other common sustainment resources to
prevent forces from reaching a culmination point.

**FREEDOM OF ACTION**

1-4. *Mission command* is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders
to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the
conduct of unified land operations (ADP 6-0). Mission command encourages the greatest possible freedom
of action from subordinates. While the commander remains the central figure in mission command, it
enables subordinates to develop the situation. Through disciplined initiative in dynamic conditions within
the commander’s intent, subordinates adapt and act decisively (ADRP 3-0). The ability of logistics forces
to tailor and task-organize ensures commanders freedom of action to change as mission requirements
dictate.

1-5. The logistics mission command structure maximizes the centralized planning and synchronization of
operations. It enables subordinate logistics commanders maximum flexibility to execute their mission based
on the situation within their assigned operational areas. Mission command of logistics equips subordinate
commanders with the confidence and discipline to take bold initiatives to achieve decisive action. A
successful logistics commander provides freedom of action to the operational commander by increasing the
number and quality of available support options.

**PROLONGED ENDURANCE**

1-6. Endurance refers to the ability to employ combat power anywhere for protracted periods. It stems
from the ability to create, protect, and sustain a force, regardless of the distance from its base and the
austerity of the environment. Endurance involves anticipating requirements and making the most effective,
efficient use of available resources. Endurance gives Army forces their campaign quality. It makes
permanent the transitory effects of other capabilities.

1-7. The endurance of Army forces is primarily a function of their sustainment. Logistics provides the
support necessary to maintain operations until mission accomplishment. Endurance is facilitated by
providing all of the logistics functions to support operations. The application of logistics principles guides
commanders in ensuring operational reach, freedom of action, and prolonged endurance.

**PRINCIPLES OF LOGISTICS**

1-8. Army logistics are guided by eight principles as shown in figure 1-1. The logistics principles are the
foundation that provides the Army the operational reach, freedom of action, and prolonged endurance
necessary to support decisive action. While these principles are independent, they are also mutually
supporting. For example, in order for integration and continuity of support to occur, commanders and staffs
must anticipate operational requirements, be responsive in requisitioning and distributing resources and
improvising tactics and techniques responsiveness to operations to unexpected situations.
INTEGRATION

1-9. Integration is combining all of the sustainment elements within operations assuring unity of command and effort (ADRP 4-0). It requires deliberate coordination and synchronization of logistics with the personnel services and health service support elements of the sustainment warfighting function as well as with operations across the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. Army forces integrate logistics with joint and multinational operations to maximize the complementary and reinforcing effects of each Service component and national resources. One of the primary functions of the logistics staff is to ensure the integration of logistics with operations plans (ADRP 5-0).

ANTICIPATION

1-10. Anticipation is the ability to foresee operational requirements and initiate actions that satisfy a response without waiting for an operations order or fragmentary order (ADRP 4-0). It is shaped by professional judgment resulting from experience, knowledge, education, intelligence, and intuition. Logistics commanders and staffs must understand and visualize future operations and identify appropriate required support. They must then start the process of acquiring the resources and capabilities that best support the operation. Anticipation is facilitated by automation systems that provide the common operational picture upon which judgments and decisions are based.

RESPONSIVENESS

1-11. Responsiveness is the ability to react to changing requirements and respond to meet the needs to maintain support (ADP 4-0). It is providing the right support in the right place at the right time. It includes the ability to anticipate operational requirements. Responsiveness involves identifying, accumulating, and maintaining sufficient resources, capabilities, and information necessary to meet rapidly changing requirements. Responsive logistics allows commanders to maintain operational focus and pressure, set the tempo of friendly operations to prevent exhaustion, replace ineffective units, and extend operational reach.
**SIMPlicity**

1-12. *Simplicity* relates to processes and procedures to minimize the complexity of sustainment (ADP 4-0). Unnecessary complexity of processes and procedures leads to confusion. Clarity of tasks, standardized and interoperable procedures, and clearly defined command relationships contribute to simplicity. Simplicity enables economy and efficiency in the use of resources, while ensuring effective support of forces.

**ECONOMY**

1-13. *Economy* is providing sustainment resources in an efficient manner to enable a commander to employ all assets to achieve the greatest effect possible (ADP 4-0). Economy is achieved through efficient management, discipline, prioritization, and allocation of resources. Economy is further achieved by eliminating redundancies and capitalizing on joint interdependencies. Logistics assure the greatest possible tactical endurance and constitutes an advantage to commanders. Economy may be achieved by contracting for support or using host nation (HN) resources that reduce or eliminate the use of limited military resources. Just as centralized control of logistics and decentralized operations helps ensure the economy of logistics operations, so does centralized control of critical logistics assets, i.e. container handling equipment and heavy equipment transporters, especially when demands/requirements for a specific capability exceeds existing resources.

**SURVIVABILITY**

1-14. *Survivability* is all aspects of protecting personnel, weapons, and supplies while simultaneously deceiving the enemy (JP 3-34). Survivability consists of a quality or capability of military forces to avoid or withstand hostile actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission. This quality or capability of military forces is closely related to protection (the preservation of a military force’s effectiveness) and to the protection/force protection warfighting function (the tasks or systems that preserve the force). Hostile actions and environmental conditions can disrupt the flow of logistics and significantly degrade forces’ ability to conduct and sustain operations. In mitigating risks to logistics operations commanders must often rely on the use of alternative logistics capabilities and alternative support plans.

**CONTINUITY**

1-15. *Continuity* is the uninterrupted provision of sustainment across all levels of war (ADP 4-0). Continuity is achieved through a system of integrated and focused networks linking the three sustainment elements of logistics, personnel services and health service support to operations. Continuity is achieved through joint interdependence; linked logistics organizations; a strategic to tactical level distribution system; and integrated information systems. Continuity assures confidence in logistics allowing commanders freedom of action, operational reach, and endurance.

**IMPROVISATION**

1-16. *Improvisation* is the ability to adapt sustainment operations to unexpected situations or circumstances affecting a mission (ADP 4-0). It includes creating, inventing, arranging, or fabricating resources to meet requirements. It may also involve changing or creating methods that adapt to a changing operational environment. Logistics leaders must apply operational art to visualize complex operations and understand additional possibilities. These skills enable commanders to improvise operational and tactical actions when enemy actions or unexpected events disrupt sustainment operations.

**ELEMENTS OF LOGISTICS**

1-17. The elements of logistics include: maintenance, transportation, supply, field services, distribution, operational contract support, and general engineering. These elements are pivotal to enabling forces with operational reach, freedom of action and prolonged endurance.
MAINTENANCE

1-18. Maintenance is all actions taken to retain materiel in a serviceable condition. The Army’s two levels of maintenance are field maintenance and sustainment maintenance (see ATTP 4-33). Maintenance is necessary for endurance and is performed at all levels of war.

Field Maintenance

1-19. Field maintenance is repair and return to user and is generally characterized by on-(or near) system maintenance, often utilizing line replaceable units, component replacements, battle damage assessment, repair, and recovery (see ATTP 4-33). Field maintenance capabilities are generally found in brigade support battalions and sustainment brigades. The focus of field maintenance is returning a system to an operational condition. Field level maintenance is not limited to remove and replace, but also provides adjustment, alignment, and fault/failure diagnosis. Field maintenance also includes battlefield damage and repair tasks performed by either the crew or support personnel to return or maintain systems in an operational state. One key criterion of field maintenance is that it always returns the repaired item to the user.

Sustainment Maintenance

1-20. Sustainment maintenance is generally characterized as “off system” repair to a national standard using structure and capabilities emanating from the United Stated Army Materiel Command (USAMC) (see ATTP 4-33). The intent is to perform commodity-oriented repairs on all supported items to one standard that provides a consistent and measurable level of reliability. Off-system maintenance consists of overhaul and remanufacturing activities designed to return components, modules, assemblies, and major end items to the supply system or to units, resulting in extended or improved operational life expectancies. By exception, sustainment level repair may be returned to the user.

TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS

1-21. Army transportation units play a key role in facilitating operational reach and prolonged endurance. Transportation units move assets from ports to points of need and retrograde materiel as required. Transportation operations encompass the wide range of capabilities needed to allow joint and Army commanders to conduct operations. Transportation functions include movement control, intermodal operations, port/terminal operations, mode operations, and containerization.

Movement Control

1-22. Movement control is the dual process of committing allocated transportation assets and regulating movements according to command priorities to synchronize distribution flow over lines of communications (LOCs) to sustain land forces (ADRP 4-0). Movement control balances requirements against capabilities and requires continuous synchronization to integrate military, HN, and commercial movements by all modes of transportation to ensure seamless transitions from strategic through the tactical level of an operation. It is a means of providing commanders with situational awareness to control movements in their operational area. Movement control responsibilities are imbedded in an infrastructure that relies on coordination for the planning and execution to ensure transportation assets are utilized efficiently while ensuring LOCs are deconflicted to support freedom of access for military operations.

Intermodal Operations

1-23. Intermodal operations is the process of using multiple modes (air, sea, highway, rail) and conveyances (i.e. truck, barge, containers, pallets) to move troops, supplies and equipment through expeditionary entry points and the network of specialized transportation nodes to sustain land forces (ADRP 4-0). It uses movement control to balance requirements against capabilities to synchronize terminal and mode operations ensuring an uninterrupted flow through the transportation system. It consists of facilities, transportation assets and material handling equipment required to support the deployment and distribution enterprise.
Port/Terminal Operations

1-24. Port/terminal operations consist of the receiving, processing, and staging of passengers; the receipt, transit storage and marshalling of cargo; the loading and unloading of transport conveyances; and the manifesting and forwarding of cargo and passengers to a destination (JP 4-01.5). A port or terminal may also be emplaced in an austere or unimproved location to enable operational reach, freedom of action, and prolonged endurance. They are essential in supporting deployment, redeployment and logistics operations. For more information see FM 4-01, Army Transportation Operations.

Mode Operations

1-25. Mode operations are the execution of movements using various conveyances (truck, lighterage, railcar, aircraft) to transport cargo (ADRP 4-0). It includes the administrative, maintenance, and security tasks associated with the operation of the conveyances.

Containerization

1-26. Containerization is a system of cargo transport based on a range of intermodal International Organization for Standardization containers. These containers can be loaded and unloaded, stacked, transported efficiently over long distances, and transferred from one mode of transport to another without the intermediate handling of the container’s contents.

1-27. Containerization also increases interoperability between Service components and commercial industry. Additional information on containerization and container management can be found in ATP 4-12, Army Container Operations.

Container Management

1-28. Container management is the process of establishing and maintaining visibility and accountability of all cargo containers moving within the Defense Transportation System (ADRP 4-0). In theater, container management is conducted by commanders at the operational and tactical levels.

1-29. The Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) is the global container manager and provides Department of Defense (DOD) with inventory, accountability, tracking, and visibility services and support, establishes container procedures, functions as the DOD single manager for container leasing, and controls the movement of all containers in the Defense Transportation System. The Army Intermodal and Distribution Platform Management Office is a component within SDDC. Army Intermodal and Distribution Platform Management Office is the Army’s single manager for the managing and controlling Army-owned/leased International Organization for Standardization containers, flatracks and other distribution platforms. The Army Intermodal and Distribution Platform Management Office also develops and implements practices/procedures that ensure the Army operates effectively and efficiently within the DOD and commercial intermodal systems. See ATP 4-12 for additional information on container management.

1-30. A Service or joint task force (JTF) commander can appoint/designate a logistics organization within theater to serve as the country container authority. The country container authority will work hand-in-hand with the SDDC global container manager representative in theater to ensure the accountability and return of all containers entering theater.

Supply

1-31. Supply is essential for enhancing Soldiers’ quality of life and providing prolonged endurance in support of decisive action. Supply provides the materiel and life support that gives Army forces the combat power and prolonged endurance to accomplish the mission. Figure 1-2 displays the supply classes and subclasses.
FIELD SERVICES

1-32. Field services maintain the force by providing life support, morale and welfare. Field services include shower and laundry; field feeding; water production and distribution; clothing and light textile repair; aerial delivery; and mortuary affairs.

Shower and Laundry

1-33. Shower and laundry capabilities provide Soldiers a minimum of two weekly showers and up to 17 pounds of laundered clothing each week (comprising three uniform sets, undergarments, socks, two towels and two washcloths). The shower and laundry function does not include laundry decontamination support.

Field Feeding

1-34. Food preparation is a basic unit function and one of the most important factors in Soldiers’ health, morale, and welfare. The standard is to provide Soldiers at all echelons three quality meals per day (Army Regulation [AR] 30-22). Proper refuse and waste disposal is important to avoid unit signature trails and maintain field sanitation standards.

Water Production and Distribution

1-35. Water production and distribution are essential for hydration, sanitation, food preparation, medical treatment, hygiene, construction, and decontamination. Water production is both a field service and a supply function. Quartermaster supply units normally perform purification in conjunction with storage and distribution of potable water.
Clothing and Light Textile Repair

1-36. Clothing and light textile repair is essential for hygiene, discipline, and morale purposes. Clean, serviceable clothing is provided as far forward as the brigade area.

Aerial Delivery

1-37. Aerial delivery includes parachute packing, air item maintenance, and rigging of supplies and equipment. This function supports airborne insertions, airdrop and airland resupply. It is a vital link in the distribution system and provides the capability of supplying the force even when land lines of communication have been disrupted or terrain is unfavorable for ground travel, thus adding flexibility to the distribution system. See FM 4-20.41 for details.

Mortuary Affairs

1-38. Mortuary Affairs is a broadly based military program to provide for the necessary care and disposition of deceased personnel. For more information on Mortuary Affairs see JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs.

Distribution

1-39. Distribution is the operational process of synchronizing all elements of the logistic system to deliver the “right things” to the “right place” at the “right time” to support the geographic combatant commander (JP 4-0). Additionally, it is also the process of assigning military personnel to activities, units, or billets. Distribution is the primary means that enables the other elements of logistics to provide operational reach, freedom of action and prolonged endurance.

1-40. The distribution system consists of a complex of facilities, installations, methods, and procedures designed to receive, store, maintain, distribute, manage, and control the flow of military materiel between point of receipt into the military system and point of issue to using activities and units.

1-41. The joint segment of the distribution system is referred to as global distribution while the Army segment of the distribution system is referred to as theater distribution. Theater distribution is the flow of equipment, personnel, and materiel within theater to meet the combatant commanders’ (CCDR) mission. The theater segment extends from the ports of debarkation or source of supply (in theater) to the points of need. It is enabled by a distribution management system that synchronizes and coordinates a complex of networks (physical, communications, information, and resources) and the sustainment warfighting function to achieve responsive support to operational requirements. Mission command of the distribution processes is key to its success.

1-42. Mission command of distribution is better known as distribution management. Distribution management is optimizing the distribution networks to achieve the effective and efficient flow of personnel, equipment, and materiel to meet the combatant commander's requirements. Distribution management includes the mission command of transportation and movement control, warehousing, inventory control, order administration, site and location analysis, packaging, data processing, accountability for equipment (materiel management), people, and communications. Distribution and distribution management are discussed in greater details in later chapters. Also see ATTP 4-0.1, Army Theater Distribution for details.

Operational Contract Support

1-43. Operational contract support is the integration of commercial sector support into military operations. Operational contract support consists of two complementary functions: contract support integration and contractor management. Operational contract support has three types of contract support: theater support, external support, and systems support. See AR 715-9, JP 4-10 and ATTP 4-10 for a full discussion on operational contract support. A more detailed discussion of operational contract support is contained in subsequent chapters.
GENERAL ENGINEERING

1-44. General engineering provides support that enables logistics. Engineers combine and apply capabilities from three engineer disciplines (combat, general, and geospatial engineering) to establish and maintain the infrastructure necessary for sustaining military operations. This involves general engineering tasks that consist of building, repairing, and maintaining roads, bridges, airfields, port facilities, and other structures as well as reinforcing force protection measures. Other tasks also include the planning, acquisition, management, remediation and disposition of real estate, supplying mobile electric power, utilities and waste management, environmental support, diving and firefighting (see FM 3-34.400).

SUMMARY

1-45. Logistics operations are necessary for successful mission accomplishment. This chapter introduced the sustainment warfighting function and discussed the principles and elements of logistics that are vital to the success of decisive action. Logistics provides the Army the personnel/forces, materiel, and equipment that gives the Army combat power. Logistics also extends operational reach, enables freedom of action, and facilitates the prolonged endurance of joint and Army forces.
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Chapter 2

Strategic Level Logistics

The logistics support of unified land operations is linked between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It consists of deliberate coordination and collaboration with other Services, allies, HN, and other governmental and nongovernmental organizations. While United States (U.S.) Title 10 requires each Service provide its own logistics support, it also gives the CCDR the authority to organize and direct Services’ logistics support as required to accomplish the mission. Figure 2-1 demonstrates the logistical connectivity between the strategic to tactical levels. Logistics support originates at the strategic base, consisting of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the industrial base, and extends to the tactical level of war.

Figure 2-1. Example of logistics in relation to the levels of war

This chapter covers the strategic and joint interfaces, Army Title 10 logistics requirements, and identifies unified action partners that provide logistics support to unified land operations. It will also discuss joint interdependence, logistics support to force projection and interagency coordination.
STRATEGIC AND JOINT INTERFACES

2-1. Strategic and joint interfaces include DOD agencies, Services, and commands that link the national base to the theater. Effective interfaces between the national strategic, operational and the tactical levels are essential to providing responsive support throughout the theater. Strategic and joint interfaces enable U.S. forces to maintain combat power as well as enable operational reach, freedom of action, and prolonged endurance. It is important for logisticians at all levels to have an understanding of who the interfaces are and the services/capabilities each provide. It is also important to understand how to incorporate and integrate support from strategic and joint interfaces into the overall concept of logistics support.

ARMY TITLE 10 LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS

2-2. Title 10, United States Code (USC) and DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the DOD and Its Major Components, describe the organization, roles, and responsibilities for the elements of the DOD to include the statutory requirements for each Military Department. In accordance with Title 10, each Service retains responsibility for the logistics support of forces it allocates to a joint force. The Secretary of the Army exercises this responsibility through the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army and the theater Army assigned to each combatant command. The theater Army is responsible for the preparation and administrative support of Army forces assigned or attached to the combatant command. Army Service component command (ASCC) or designee (theater sustainment command [TSC] and/or expeditionary sustainment command [ESC]) execution of assigned executive agent (EA) or lead Service responsibilities is commonly referred to as Army support to other services.

2-3. There are twelve Army Title 10 responsibilities; of the twelve, nine (bold lettering) are logistics related responsibilities:

- Recruiting.
- Organizing.
- Supplying.
- Equipping (including research and development).
- Training.
- Servicing.
- Mobilizing.
- Demobilizing.
- Administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel).
- Maintaining.
- Construction, outfitting, and repair of military equipment.
- Construction, maintenance, repairs of building and structures, utilities, acquisition of real property and interests in real property necessary to carry out the responsibilities.

2-4. The purposeful combination of complementary Service capabilities to create joint interdependent forces is often the most effective and efficient means by which to sustain a joint force. Therefore, additional authorities to Title 10 have been developed to provide for interservice and interagency mutual support.

ARMY EXECUTIVE AGENT RESPONSIBILITIES

2-5. Executive agent (EA) is a term used to indicate a delegation of authority by the Secretary of Defense to a subordinate to act on behalf of the Secretary of Defense (JP 1). EA refers to Secretary of Defense (SecDEF) directives and instructions to the head of a DOD component (such as Chief of a Service, CCDR, or director of a Combat Support Agency) to provide specific categories of support to other agencies or Service component. The SecDEF designates the Army as the EA for numerous DOD common support requirements. Examples of the Army’s logistics related EA responsibilities and support to other services as provided in Department of Defense Directives (DODD) and JPs are shown in table 2-1. These DOD-level EA requirements relate to lead Service responsibilities. EA reduces redundancy of common support requirements across the DOD. However, in many cases, lead Service requirements will be closely related to
the DOD EA requirements. Under a CCDR’s authority he may assign a Service lead Service responsibilities for support not EA related.

Table 2-1. Examples of Army logistics related responsibilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tasking Document</th>
<th>Support Responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DODD 4705.1</td>
<td>Management of Land-Based Water Resources in Support of Joint Contingency Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DODD 1300.22</td>
<td>Defense Mortuary Affairs Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DODD 5101.11</td>
<td>DOD Executive Agent for Military Postal Service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Army Support to Other Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tasking Document</th>
<th>Support Responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JP 3-34</td>
<td>Airfield Repair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP 4-01.2</td>
<td>Sealift Support to Joint Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP 4-01.5</td>
<td>Joint Terminal Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP 4-01.6</td>
<td>Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP 4-03</td>
<td>Petroleum, Storage, Distribution, and Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP 4-06</td>
<td>Theater Collection Point and Evacuation Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP 4-09</td>
<td>Provide Logistics Support to Enemy Prisoners of War</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2-6. The SecDEF or the Deputy Secretary of Defense may designate as an EA for specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities to provide defined levels of support for operational missions, administrative, or other designated activities that involve two or more DOD components. By definition, the designation as an EA makes that organization responsible for a joint capability (see figure 2-2 on page 2-4).
2-4 FM 4-95 1 April 2014

Chapter 2

COMBATANT COMMANDER LOGISTICS RESPONSIBILITIES

2-7. Title 10, USC, Sec 164 (Command Authority of Combatant Commanders), specifies the CCDR’s responsibility for authoritative direction for logistics, (doctrine referred to as directive authority for logistics [DAFL]). Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the authority, direction, and control of the commander of a combatant command with respect to the commands and forces assigned to that command include the command functions of -(A) giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics; (B) prescribing the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command; (C) organizing commands and forces within that command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command; (D) employing forces within that command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command; (E) assigning command functions to subordinate commanders; (F) coordinating and approving those aspects of administration and support (including control of resources and equipment, internal organization, and training) and discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command; and (G) exercising the authority with respect to selecting subordinate commanders, selecting combatant command staff, suspending subordinates, and convening courts-martial, as provided in subsections (e), (f), and (g) of this section and section 822(a) of this title, respectively.

2-8. For logistics, the CCDR has directive authority for organizing, training, and logistics of Service components under his command. Through DAFL, the CCDR may organize Service logistics capabilities to establish joint logistics task forces, joint logistics boards and centers, joint logistics special staffs, and joint logistics headquarters, as needed.
Directive Authority for Logistics

2-9. The CCDR uses DAFL to assign responsibility for execution of EA, lead Service responsibilities and to make other special arrangements such as assigning common user support or common user logistics to a Service or agency. Directive authority for logistics is the CCDR authority to issue directives to assigned forces. It includes peacetime measures to ensure the effective execution of approved operations plans, effectiveness and economy of operation, prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities, and overlapping of functions among the Service component commands (JP 1).

2-10. DAFL, like other combatant command authorities, cannot be delegated or transferred. However, the CCDR may assign the responsibility for the planning, execution and/or management of as many common support capabilities to a subordinate joint force commander (JFC) or Service component commander as required to accomplish the subordinate JFC’s or Service component commander’s mission. For some commodities, support or services common to two or more Services, the SecDEF or the Deputy Secretary of Defense may designate one provider as the EA.

2-11. The CCDR must formally delineate assigned responsibilities by function and scope to the subordinate JFC or Service component commander. When exercising this option, the CCDR must specify the control and tasking authorities being bestowed upon the subordinate joint command for logistics, as well as the command relationships it will have with the Service components.

Lead Service

2-12. The CCDR may choose to assign specific common user logistics (CUL) functions, to include planning and execution to a Lead Service. A lead Service or agency for common-user logistics is a Service component or DOD agency that is responsible for execution of common-user item or service support in a specific combatant command or multinational operation as defined in the combatant or subordinate JFC’s operation plan, operation order, and/or directives (JP 4-09).

2-13. Lead Service assignments can be for single or multiple common user functions and may also be based on phases and/or locations within the area of responsibility (AOR). The CCDR may augment the lead Service’s logistics organization with capabilities from another component’s logistics organizations as appropriate. The lead Service must issue procedures and sustainment funding for all items issued to other Services as well as a method for collecting items from other Services.

Common User Logistics (CUL)

2-14. CUL is materiel or service support shared with or provided by two or more Services, DOD agencies, or multinational partners to another Service, DOD agency, non-DOD agency, and/or multinational partner in an operation. It is usually restricted to a particular type of supply and/or service and may be further restricted to specific unit(s) or types of units, specific times, missions, and/or geographic areas.

2-15. While normal Service channels may be an effective means of supporting a joint operation, the Services will often be precluded from deploying the capabilities necessary to provide 100 percent dedicated Service support. More often than not, the operational situation will require CUL support in order to provide effective and efficient support of one or more major services or supplies. In fact, CUL support occurs in almost all joint operations, especially in the form of standing inter-Service support relationships. An example is Army supply and service support to U.S. Air Force weather detachments attached to Army regiments, divisions, and corps aviation organizations.

2-16. When properly executed, CUL can produce significant efficiencies by eliminating duplication among Service components, DOD agencies, multinational partners, and/or contractors in theater. By utilizing common-item and common-service support, the CCDR may be able to produce significant savings in equipment, personnel, and supplies deployed to a particular joint operations area (JOA). These savings may further reduce the requirement for strategic lift, the logistics footprint within a JOA, and possibly the overall cost of an operation.
Interservice and Intra-governmental Support Agreement

2-17. Inter-Service support agreements are formal long-term or operational specific support agreements between Services, DOD, and/or non-DOD agencies governed by DOD Instruction 4000.19, inter-service and intra-governmental support. These agreements are normally developed at the Service secretariat and governmental agency director level to document funding and reimbursement procedures as well as standards of support between the supplying and receiving Service or agencies. Inter-Service, intra-governmental agreements, while binding Service level agreements, do not connote DOD-level EA responsibilities. When designated, Army logisticians provide action by one military Service or element thereof to provide logistics and/or administrative support to another military Service or element thereof. These actions can be recurring or nonrecurring on an installation, area, or worldwide basis.

Acquisition Cross Service Agreement (ACSA)

2-18. Under ACSA authority (Title 10 USC, sections 2341 and 2342), the SecDEF can enter into an ACSA for logistics support, supplies, and services on a reimbursable, replacement-in-kind, or exchange-for-equal-value basis. These agreements can be with eligible nations and international organizations of which the U.S. is a member. An ACSA is a broad overall agreement, which is generally supplemented with an implementing agreement. Implementing agreements contain points of contact and specific details of the transaction and payment procedures for orders for logistics support. Neither party is obligated until the order is accepted.

2-19. Under these agreements, common support may include food, billeting, transportation (including airlift), petroleum, oils, lubricants, clothing, communications services, medical services, ammunition, base operations, storage services, use of facilities, training services, spare parts and components, repair and maintenance services, calibration services, and port services. Items that may not be acquired or transferred under the ACSA authority include weapon systems, major end items of equipment, guided missiles, nuclear ammunition, and chemical ammunition (excluding riot control agents).

Joint Command for Logistics

2-20. The CCDR, through exercising DAFL, may assign joint logistics responsibilities to a Service component to establish a joint command for logistics (see JP 4-0). Generally, the CCDR will designate the Service with the preponderance of forces or the most capable logistics structure to fill the joint command for logistics requirement. The designated joint command for logistics may require augmentation from other Services to meet joint force requirements.

2-21. For example, if the theater Army is assigned responsibility to establish a joint command for logistics, the TSC or ESC with augmentation from other Service components is designed to fulfill that mission. A more detailed discussion of the TSC and/or ESC is contained in subsequent chapters. Also see ATP 4-94, Theater Sustainment Command.

Logistics Related Unified Action Partners

2-22. Unified action partners are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with which Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations. Unified action partners include joint forces and components, multinational forces, and U.S. government agencies and departments (ADRP 3-0).

Industrial Base

2-23. The defense industrial base is the DOD, government, and private sector worldwide industrial complex with capabilities to perform research and development, design, produce, and maintain military weapon systems, subsystems, components, or parts to meet military requirements (JP 3-27). Figure 2-3 displays the relationships between DOD, Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) and the geographic combatant command (GCC).
2-24. During a crisis, the Army will call on the existing (wartime) authority to utilize the national industrial base for preplanned production and buy, lease, or contract for goods and services from any available commercial source. The industrial base consists of privately owned and government-owned industrial capability and capacity for the manufacture, maintenance, modification, overhaul, and/or repair of items required by the U.S. and selected allies. It includes the production base and maintenance base. Active plants and production lines have some capability to surge during crisis response. Repair parts manufacturers may be able to surge production for items that sustain deployed weapon systems.

2-25. The Army production base is comprised of Army-controlled industrial activities and contractor facilities. The Army will coordinate expanded production requirements with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) on common use items. Included in these industrial activities are active and inactive ammunition plants, arsenals and proving grounds, missile plants, and other miscellaneous plants. These facilities are to be activated or expanded to provide maximum wartime production levels of materiel. It is DOD policy to maintain a state of industrial preparedness by working with private industry to produce, maintain, and repair materiel that meets mobilization requirements. Where it is determined that required mobilization items cannot be provided by the private sector, then government-owned facilities and equipment are acquired and maintained to produce them.

2-26. The DOD-level management philosophy applies to the Army’s Industrial Preparedness Program. The Army depends on private industry as the foundation for production of military materiel. Therefore, when Army production facilities or depot-level maintenance do not exist, first consideration will be given to developing private industrial facilities that produce critically needed items.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AGENCIES

2-27. The DOD relies on the Services, DLA, and non-DOD government agencies such as the General Services Administration to manage national level logistics. National-level logistics can be described as wholesale level support to the defense industrial base; development and procurement of new materiel systems; management and improvement of the logistics infrastructure and rebuild modification and retirement of old materiel systems when required. These agencies provide an essential interface with the industrial base through the acquisitioning of military resources, such as storage, movement, and distribution of materiel; maintenance and disposition of materiel; acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation,
and disposition of facilities; and acquisition or furnishing of services. Some of these agencies are discussed in the following paragraphs.

**Defense Logistics Agency**

2-28. DLA is the focal point for the industrial base and is the EA for consumable supply items minus Class V. DLA procures, stores, and distributes items to support the military Services and other customers. It also buys and distributes hardware and electronic items used in the maintenance and repair of military equipment. DLA provides support for military departments, the GCC, military allies and coalition partners during peace and war. When directed, DLA also supports interagency and non-DOD organizations by providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Excluded supply items are munitions, missiles, and military Service unique items.

2-29. DLA provides reutilization and marketing services at the strategic through operational levels. Initially, salvage and excess materiel destined for the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office is collected in theater areas. As the theater matures, DLA-directed activities may use host nation (HN) or contractor support to assist in retrograding this materiel for inspection, classification, and disposal.

2-30. DLA has EA responsibilities for subsistence, bulk fuel, construction and barrier materiel, and medical materiel. DLA is a major source of Class III bulk which allows customers to benefit from “one-stop shopping” for all of their needs. DLA’s bulk fuels services provide worldwide support of authorized activities in the areas of contracting, distribution, transportation, and inventory control. DLA provides a continuous worldwide presence and has liaison officers attached to every combatant command staff to assist with planning, exercises and current operations. DLA’s contingency support teams and deployable distribution centers are also utilized to enhance theater distribution to meet the warfighter’s needs.

**Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)**

2-31. DCMA is responsible for assuring that procured materiel and services are satisfactory and delivered when and where needed. DCMA may be directed to provide administrative contract services for contracts awarded by all DOD components and other designated federal and state agencies, and foreign governments. DCMA is a separate combat support agency under DOD and deploys its own command structure when supporting contingency operations. The services performed by DCMA may include:

- Contract management.
- Support to small business and labor surplus areas.
- Transportation and packaging assistance.
- Acquisition planning support services.
- Property management.

**Defense Finance and Accounting Service**

2-32. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service is responsible for finance and accounting policies, procedures, standards, systems, and operations that support CCDRs and the Services. It is an agency supporting the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, the principal advisor to the SecDEF for budgetary and fiscal matters. As such, it is the responsibility of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service to coordinate and collaborate with all civilian defense agencies, the military Services and combatant commands.

**Joint Interdependence**

2-33. Logistics is inherently joint. One area of joint interdependence is joint logistics. Joint interdependence is the purposeful reliance by one Service’s forces on another Service’s capabilities to maximize the complementary and reinforcing effects of both. Army forces operate as part of an interdependent joint force. All services require a wide range of logistics capabilities, personnel services, and health services to support their forces. The mutual reliance on joint logistics capabilities makes for a more effective utilization of sustainment resources. Combinations of joint capabilities defeat enemy forces by shattering their ability to operate as a coherent and effective force.
UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (USTRANSCOM)

2-34. USTRANSCOM is a functional combatant command responsible for providing and managing strategic common-user airlift, sealift, and terminal services worldwide. USTRANSCOM’s deployment distribution operation center is USTRANSCOM’s single focal point for all combatant command and major shipper customers, including the Office of the SecDef, Joint Staff, Army and Air Force Exchange Service, DLA, and the Services. The deployment distribution operation center monitors the status of planned and ongoing movements in the Defense Transportation System through the global transportation network. The deployment distribution operation center interfaces with the GCC’s joint deployment distribution operations center (JDDOC).

2-35. Designated as the distribution process owner, USTRANSCOM is responsible for integrating and synchronizing strategic and theater deployment execution and distribution operations within each GCC’s AOR. It may also provide personnel augmentation to the GCC’s JDDOC.

2-36. USTRANSCOM’s Service components include: the U.S. Air Force’s Air Mobility Command for airlift, the U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command for sealift, and the U.S. Army’s SDDC for strategic surface transportation support.

Air Mobility Command

2-37. Air Mobility Command is the U.S. Air Force airlift component of the USTRANSCOM and serves as the single port manager for air mobility. Air Mobility Command aircraft provide the capability to deploy the Army’s forces worldwide and help sustain them across a range of military operations. As follow-on forces to USTRANSCOM’s joint task force–port opening (JTF-PO) aerial port of debarkation (APOD), Air Mobility Command performs single port management functions necessary to support the strategic flow of the deploying forces’ equipment and supplies from the aerial port of embarkation (APOE) to the theater.

2-38. APOEs and APODs are usually designated joint aerial complexes and managed by Air Mobility Command. Where designated, Air Mobility Command is also the operator of common-use APOEs and/or APODs. The operation of a joint aerial complex can be divided into two parts: air terminal operations and air terminal support operations. Air terminal operations are run by Air Mobility Command. The TSC typically has responsibility for air terminal support operations (less health service support) that facilitate reception, staging, onward movement, integration (RSOI) of deploying forces and materiel to designated tactical assembly areas to include redeployment operations.

2-39. Air terminal operations include supervising cargo documentation, cargo loading and unloading, providing clearance, movement operations, and security. As single port manager, Air Mobility Command and the TSC work together to provide a seamless strategic/theater interface in order to provide for the efficient RSOI of forces and supplies to and from the theater.

2-40. Air terminal support operations include port clearance, operation of holding and marshalling areas, postal operations, personnel processing, movement control, onward movement, security, and life support. The TSC may perform some of these functions at locations other than the joint aerial complex.

2-41. A HN may limit the APOE and/or APOD to military use or the military may share the facility with commercial activities. In the latter case, commercial carriers, governmental and non-governmental agencies, and the military often compete for the use of limited resources.

Military Sealift Command

2-42. Military Sealift Command is the Navy’s sea transportation component of USTRANSCOM. The mission of the Military Sealift Command is to provide ocean transportation of equipment, fuel, supplies, and ammunition to sustain U.S. forces worldwide during peacetime and in war for as long as operational requirements dictate.

2-43. Military Sealift Command provides sealift with a fleet of government-owned and chartered U.S. flagged ships. Military Sealift Command executes voluntary intermodal sealift agreement contracts for chartered vessels. Sealift ships principally move unit equipment from the U.S. to theaters of operation all over the world. In addition to sealift ships, Military Sealift Command operates a fleet of prepositioned ships
strategically placed around the world and loaded with equipment and supplies to sustain Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and DLA operations. These ships remain in an operational status at sea or pier side; ready to deploy on short notice, which significantly reduces the response time for the delivery of urgently needed equipment and supplies to a theater, theater of operation, or JOA.

Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command

2-44. SDDC is the Army surface transportation component of USTRANSCOM and is DOD’s single port manager at the seaport of embarkation (SPOE) and the seaport of debarkation (SPOD). USTRANSCOM exercises combatant command of SDDC forces. SDDC is also a major subordinate command of the USAMC who has administrative control (ADCON) for Title 10 functions.

2-45. SDDC performs single port management functions necessary to support the strategic flow of the deploying forces’ equipment and supplies to and from the theater. In carrying out this responsibility, SDDC works closely with the JDDOC, TSC, and Military Sealift Command to coordinate the arrival, discharge, or loading of vessels in accordance with GCC priorities. As single port manager, SDDC and the TSC work together to provide a seamless strategic/theater interface in order to provide for the efficient RSOI of unit equipment and supplies to and from the theater. SDDC is also responsible for providing management of all port operations within the port to include coordinating workload requirements, water-side port security, and port support activities.

2-46. Continuous coordination and collaboration between SDDC units and the TSC facilitates integrated and synchronized operations throughout the distribution system. This interface with joint partners will enable local direction and control of critical resources essential to achieving unity of effort.

Joint Task Force – Port Opening Aerial Port of Debarkation and Seaport Of Debarkation

2-47. The JTF-PO is a joint capability provided by USTRANSCOM that is designed to rapidly establish and initially operate an APOD and SPOD, establish a distribution node, and facilitate port throughput within a theater of operations. The JTF-PO is a standing task force that is a jointly trained, ready set of forces constituted as a joint task force at the time of need. Army elements of a JTF-PO (APOD) will normally include a transportation detachment (rapid port opening), movement control teams, cargo transfer units, and transportation truck units. The JTF-PO capability (APOD/SPOD) is designed to deploy and operate for 45-60 days. As follow-on theater logistics capabilities arrive, the JTF-PO (APOD/SPOD) will begin the process of transferring mission responsibilities to arriving forces or contracted capabilities to ensure the seamless continuation of airfield and distribution operations. The Army contribution to the JTF-PO is the Rapid Port Opening Element which deploys within hours to establish air ports of debarkation in contingency response operations. It also provides in-transit visibility (ITV) and cargo clearance.

2-48. The JTF-PO (APOD) facilitates joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration and theater distribution by providing an effective interface with the theater JDDOC for initial APOD operations. Its capabilities include:

- Performing APOD assessment.
- Conducting APOD opening and initial operations.
- Providing movement control to include coordination for onward movement of arriving cargo and passengers.
- Establishing joint ITV and radio frequency identification network.
- Establishing ITV from APOD to first forward destination.

2-49. The JTF-PO (SPOD) design and capabilities are similar to those of the JTF-PO (APOD). Likewise, the Army’s contribution to the JTF-PO (SPOD) is the Rapid Port Opening Element which deploys within hours to establish sea ports of debarkation in contingency response operations.

2-50. The JTF-PO (SPOD) enables and facilitates Joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration by bridging distribution and onward movement gaps between strategic and operational levels; and enabling the coordinated handoff of SPOD operations to follow-on forces. Its capabilities include:

- Performing SPOD assessment.
- Rapidly establishing SPOD and forward distribution node operations.
- Managing port support activities for discharge operations.
- Establishing joint in-transit visibility and radio frequency identification network.
- Providing movement control to include coordination for onward movement of arriving cargo and passengers.
- Establishing in-transit visibility from SPOD to first forward destination.
- Establishing staging areas.

**ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY, ASA (ALT)**

2-51. The ASA (ALT) is a civilian political appointee and is responsible for providing executive branch and DOD civilian oversight of Army logistics. It serves, when delegated, as the Army acquisition executive, as the senior procurement executive, the science advisor to the secretary, and as the senior research and development official for the DA. The ASA (ALT) also has the principal responsibility for all DA matters related to logistics. Included among these logistics responsibilities are:

- Advising the Secretary of the Army on all matters relating to acquisition and logistics management.
- Overseeing the logistics management function including readiness, supply, services, maintenance, transportation, and related automated logistics systems management.
- Reviewing the Secretary of the Army portions of the Army International Affairs Plan to ensure that they are logistically sound and supportable and compatible with the Army’s research, development, acquisition, and industrial base programs.
- Overseeing the Army industrial base and industrial preparedness programs.

**HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF (G-4)**

2-52. HQDA, G-4 enables a ready Army by providing and overseeing integrated logistics policies, programs, and plans in support of Army Force Generation. The Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G–4 and USAMC are the Army’s national level logistics staff and operator. The Army G-4 is responsible for developing the strategy, policy and programming to support Army-wide logistics operation programs for strategic mobility, supply, maintenance, war reserves and prepositioning, aviation, munitions, transportation, distribution, readiness, and integrated logistics support. It also manages the readiness of new systems throughout the acquisition life cycle as well as current readiness of legacy systems.

2-53. The Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4:

- The responsible official for sustainment to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (ASA) for acquisition, logistics and technology (ALT).
- The principal military advisor in the functional area of logistics.
- Serves as appropriations director for the Trust Revolving Fund Account (commissary surcharge).
- The proponent for the Sustaining Program Execution Group and for logistics equipment in the Equipping Program Execution Group.
- Exercises direct supervision over the Logistics Innovation Agency which is responsible for logistics innovation, technology exploration, and changes to logistics processes to facilitate joint interdependency.

**U.S. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND**

2-54. The USAMC is the Army’s materiel integrator providing national level sustainment, acquisition integration support, contracting services, and selected logistics support to Army forces. It also provides related common support to other Services, multinational, and interagency partners. The capabilities of USAMC are diverse and are accomplished through its various major subordinate commands and other subordinate organizations.

2-55. USAMC plans contingency contracting operations at the strategic and operational levels and provides mission command of the contingency contracting mission. It also handles contracting services for
deployed units and installation-level services, supplies and common-use information technology hardware
and software. Additionally, USAMC operates a network of Army field support brigades and battalions,
logistics support elements, and brigade logistics support teams which identify and resolve equipment and
maintenance problems, as well as materiel readiness issues for combatant commands. USAMC’s major
commands include: Army Sustainment Command (ASC) and Army Contracting Command (ACC).

Army Sustainment Command

2-56. The ASC provides logistics from the strategic through tactical level by synchronizing acquisition,
logistics, and technology support. The ASC is designed to support the operational Army in the continental
United States (CONUS) and deployed. It is responsible for integrating logistics support with strategic
partners and links the national sustainment base with the expeditionary Army. Major mission areas include
systems support contracting services, logistics synchronization in support of Army Force Generation, Army
prepositioned stocks (APS), theater support, materiel management, and the Logistics Civil Augmentation
Program (LOGCAP). Mission execution is through a global network of organizations to include a
distribution management center (DMC), Army field support brigades (AFSBs), Army field support
battalions, and brigade logistics support teams.

2-57. The ASC works closely with key DOD strategic partners, specifically USTRANSCOM and DLA to
ensure the Army national sustainment base is properly integrated into joint logistics and that the national
supply system effectively supports deployed Army forces.

2-58. The AFSB is responsible for the integration of acquisition, logistics and technology capabilities in
support of operational and tactical level commanders. The AFSB provides integrated and synchronized
acquisition, logistics and technology support to deployed Army forces. It is regionally aligned to an ASCC
and focused to serve as ASC’s bridge between the generating force and the operating force. When
deployed, the AFSB will be under the operational control (OPCON) of the supported theater Army. This
OPCON relationship is normally delegated to the supporting TSC or expeditionary sustainment command
(ESC) as appropriate. AFSBs are augmented with additional staff or capabilities to meet expanded and/or
unique operational requirements, particularly where retrograde property assistance teams may be used to
facilitate the turn-in of equipment for redistribution or retrograde.

2-59. The AFSB is the primary point of contact for acquisition, logistics and technology support within the
theater. Key functions include:

- Maintaining accountability of specified Army contractors authorized to accompany the force and
  other theater designated contractor personnel.
- Providing direct reach to the national sustainment base to include expert advice and call forward
  assistance regarding readiness and sustainment.
- Responsible for coordination of Army science and technology functions as well as all materiel
  fielding organizations providing new equipment training.
- Plan and integrate LOGCAP support.
- Coordinating APS to include off-loading and property accountability.
- Providing mission command and management of the logistics assistance program through
  attached Army field support battalion, logistics support elements, and other USAMC logistics
  organizations called forward.
- Providing mission command of sustainment maintenance organizations deployed to the theater.
  These organizations include forward repair activities, theater aviation sustainment maintenance
  group, component repair companies, combat vehicle evaluation teams, and equipment support
  activities.
- Identifying, storing, and coordinating the distribution/redistribution of designated theater
  provided equipment, and excess non-theater provided equipment Class VII in accordance with
  theater policies and procedures.
- In coordination with the contracting support brigade (CSB) commander, integrating the ASCC
  developed Annex W (operational contract support) plan into the overall AFSB support plan.

2-60. For more information regarding the AFSB, its subordinate units, and operations see ATP 4-91, Army
Field Support Brigade.
Army Contracting Command

2-61. ACC is a major subordinate command within the USAMC. The ACC provides theater support contracting services to deployed Army forces, and systems contracting support to Army program executive officers and program managers, including the LOGCAP executive director. It also provides contracting services to garrison operations through its two subordinate commands: the Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) and the Mission and Installation Contracting Command. In addition, the ACC provides reach-back contracting support from its CONUS-based contracting centers.

Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC)

2-62. The ECC trains, equips, deploys, and commands all active component Army contracting commands, units and teams, and reserves contracting elements when activated. It provides trained and ready forces for theater support contracting for Army deployed forces and provides garrison contracting for all outside the continental United States (OCONUS) Army installations and associated forward stationed units. It accomplishes and supports theater contracting support missions through its subordinate CSBs.

Contracting Support Brigade

2-63. CSBs serve as the Army’s primary theater support contracting headquarters and executes theater support contracting actions in support of Army forces. The CSB commander also serves as the primary contracting support advisor to the ASCC. CSB’s are aligned with a specific regionally focused ASCC. When deployed, the aligned CSB normally has a direct support relationship with the Army forces (ARFOR) commander in the area of operations (AO) and executes its contracting mission under the direction and contracting authority of the ECC. The ARFOR commander may further delegate this direct support relationship as required.

2-64. CSBs provide mission command over a number of contingency contracting battalions, senior contingency contracting teams, and contingency contracting teams as determined during the mission planning process.

Contingency Contracting Battalions (CCBN)

2-65. Like the CSB, the primary mission of the CCBN is planning and mission command. The CCBN does not normally write, award or administer contracts. Their subordinate contingency contracting teams are responsible for writing, awarding, and administering contracts. CCBNs are normally placed under the direct command of the deploying CSB or, in small scale operations, may deploy separately from the CSB headquarters (HQ). In major sustained operations, the CCBN may be combined with senior contingency contracting teams, contingency contracting teams and/or contracting elements from other Services to form a regional contracting center.

Senior Contingency Contracting Teams

2-66. Senior contingency contracting teams normally deploy under the mission command of a CSB and provide theater support contracting services on a general support basis within a designated support area or in direct support to a designated maneuver or sustainment unit. In long-term operations, senior contingency contracting teams may be utilized to form regional contracting offices to provide general support to multiple organizations as directed.

Contingency Contracting Teams

2-67. Contingency contracting teams normally deploy under the mission command of a CCBN and provide theater support contracting, on a direct support or general support basis. In long-term operations, contingency contracting teams may be combined with a senior contingency contracting team or other contingency contracting teams to form regional contracting centers and regional contracting offices as required.

2-68. For more information regarding the CSB and its subordinate units, see FM 4-92, Contracting Support Brigade.
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

2-69. Interagency coordination is inherent in unified action. Within the context of DOD involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of DOD, and engaged U.S. government agencies and departments for the purpose of achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Army forces conduct and participate in interagency coordination using strategic communication and defense support to public diplomacy.

2-70. Interagency coordination for logistics is an essential characteristic of unified action. Military logistics operations must be coordinated with the activities of other agencies of the U.S. government, inter-governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and activities of various HN agencies.

2-71. The SecDEF may determine that it is in the national interest to task U.S. military forces with missions that bring them into close contact with (if not in support of) inter-governmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations. In such circumstances, it is mutually beneficial to closely coordinate the logistics activities of all participants. Unity of effort between inter-governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and military forces should be the goal. However, it must be clear that, while working with or supporting non-governmental organizations, they are not an arm of the military. Being construed as such may jeopardize their relationship with the local population. Taskings to provide logistics support to inter-governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations are normally for a short-term purpose due to extraordinary events. In most situations, logistics, communications, mobility, and security are the capabilities most needed.

2-72. For some operations, logistics forces may be employed in quantities disproportionate to their normal military roles and in nonstandard tasks. Furthermore, they may precede other military forces or may be the only forces deployed. They also may have continuing responsibility after the departure of combat forces in support of multinational forces, inter-governmental organizations, or nongovernmental organizations. In such cases, they must adhere to any applicable status-of-forces agreements and ACSAs to which the U.S. is a party.

2-73. In a national emergency or complex contingency operation, DOD and the U.S. military often serve in a supporting role to other agencies and organizations. Commanders and their staffs should develop an understanding of how military operations and capabilities can be coordinated with those of other agencies and organizations to focus and optimize the military’s contributions to accomplish the desired end state. U.S. agencies, the United Nations, inter-governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations provide for their own logistics support. However, U.S. military logistics capabilities are frequently requested and provided to these organizations. The JTF may be asked to assume all or part of the burden of logistics for these organizations after arrival. This support may include intertheater and intratheater airlift, ground transportation of personnel, equipment, and supplies, airfield control groups, and port and railhead operational capabilities.

MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS OPERATIONS

2-74. Logistics support during multinational operations differs from unilateral joint operations in that the participating nations represent different national and military objectives, cultures, and approaches to logistics support. This impacts how the U.S. organizes, prepares, and executes logistics support during multinational operations.

2-75. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, lists two basic types of multinational operations—alliance and coalition—and describes the general command structures associated with each. Each type of operation has distinctive characteristics that affect the logistics mission command relationships, funding and reimbursement mechanisms for multinational logistics support, and the scope of multinational logistics arrangements.

2-76. Army forces support multinational operations in alliances and coalitions throughout the world. A major logistics objective when participating in multinational operations is to maximize operational effectiveness while improving cost effectiveness and economy of effort for all nations involved.

2-77. Multinational logistics is any coordinated logistic activity involving two or more nations supporting a multinational force conducting military operations under the auspices of an alliance or coalition,
including those conducted under United Nations mandate (JP 4-08). Multinational logistics includes activities involving both logistics units provided by participating nations designated for use by the multinational force commander as well as a variety of Multinational logistics support arrangements that may be developed and used by participating forces.

2-78. In multinational operations, logistics is primarily a national responsibility. However, within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) logistics have evolved to where it is also viewed as a collective responsibility (NATO Military Committee Decision 319/1). During multinational operations, the multinational commander must have sufficient authority and control mechanisms over assets, resources, and forces to effectively achieve his mission.

2-79. Support provided and received in multinational operations must be in accordance with existing legal authorities. For example, Chapter 138 of Title 10 authorizes exchanging support between U.S. services and those of other countries. It authorizes DOD acquisition from other countries by payment or replacement-in-kind, without establishing an ACSA. Logistics authorized under Chapter 138 does not include major end items, missiles, or bombs. It does include food, billeting, petroleum, oils, transportation, communications services, medical services, ammunition, storage, spare parts, maintenance services, and training.

COALITIONS

2-80. A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action (JP 5-0). Coalitions normally form as a rapid response to unforeseen crises, for limited purposes and for a limited length of time. Many coalitions are formed under the auspices of the United Nations. The United Nations does not have a military organization, and therefore, no preplanned formal military structures.

2-81. An example of a coalition is the American, Britain, Canada, Australia-New Zealand program; a coalition of English speaking nations. While this coalition has not participated in an operation under the American, Britain, Canada, Australia-New Zealand program, they have served together either under NATO or other conflict arrangements. The American, Britain, Canada, Australia-New Zealand program develops handbooks to facilitate the establishment of successful coalition forces. Included in these handbooks is the Coalition Logistics Handbook.

ALLIANCES

2-82. An alliance is the relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members (JP 3-0). Alliance participants establish formal, standard agreements for broad objectives. Alliance nations strive to field compatible military systems, follow common procedures, and develop contingency plans to meet potential threats. As forces of these nations plan and train together, they develop mutual trust and respect.

2-83. An alliance may use an integrated staff, instead of merely augmenting the staff of one nation’s organization with other national representatives. Each primary staff officer could be a different nationality, and usually the deputy commander represents major participants other than the lead nation. An integrated staff demonstrates the burden sharing and commitment of the partner nations. In most recent operations, the U.S. has operated within the NATO alliance, which has a military organization to support its political goals. The U.S. has also agreed to various NATO standardization agreements. Standardization agreements and NATO Military Committee Decisions enhance interoperability. For example, NATO Standardized Agreement 2406/ Allied Land Publication 4.2, Land Force Logistics, describes overarching logistics doctrine for NATO land force operations to include command and control arrangements for logistics forces.

2-84. NATO doctrine allows for the formation of a combined joint force land component command. The combined joint force land component command HQ can be set at a sub-regional command level or formation level. The combined joint force land component commander establishes requirements and sets priorities for support of forces in accordance with the overall direction given by the JFC.
MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS OPTIONS

2-85. A significant challenge in multinational logistics involves establishing effective mission command systems that are acceptable to all troop contributing nations. To facilitate multinational logistics support, several command options are available for use. These are discussed below.

Parallel Command

2-86. During the early stages of a contingency, nations rely on their own military command systems to control the activities of their forces. Hence, the initial coalition arrangement most likely involves a parallel command structure. Under a parallel command structure, the coalition does not designate a single, multinational commander. Member nations retain control of their own national forces, and the coalition partners write a plan effecting coordination among the participants. Parallel command is the simplest to establish but from a logistics perspective is the least effective.

Lead Nation Command

2-87. As the coalition matures, members often opt to centralize their efforts through establishing a command structure built around the structure of one of the nations. If nations are very similar in culture, doctrine, training, and equipment, or if extensive cooperative experience exists, an integrated command structure may be effective. This direct approach requires each armed force to receive, understand, plan, and implement missions in the same manner as the other nations. Some nations call this a framework nation command structure, but the term lead nation command is better known and more commonly used. The lead nation command structure concept recognizes one nation in the lead role and its mission command system predominates.

2-88. Other nations participating in the operation provide liaison personnel to the lead nation headquarters. The lead nation commander, working in close coordination with the commanders of the other national contingents, determines appropriate command and control and logistics procedures. Staff augmentation may be required if a partner has unique organizations or capabilities not found in forces of the lead nation. This augmentation provides the commander with a ready source of expertise on the respective partners’ capabilities during planning and execution.

Role Specialization

2-89. Although not a command structure, role specialization is a method used in multinational logistics support operations to maximize unity of effort and efficiencies for the multinational force. In role specialization, one nation or organization assumes the sole responsibility for procuring and providing a particular class or subclass of supply or service for all or part of the multinational force. Role specialization is normally used for a finite mission and time because of the great burden it places on the nation or organization. If properly planned and negotiated, this approach promotes greater efficiency in cases where one multinational force member is already well established in the area and has contractual arrangements in place, has a unique relationship with the populace, or has a much greater capability than other nations.

MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS PLANNING

2-90. Multinational operations of even modest complexity require some centralized coordination of logistics and the use of mutual support arrangements to facilitate smooth, timely, responsive, and effective deployment and force sustainment. This may include negotiation of host nation support HNS and agreements relating to border crossings, customs and duty fees, medical support, civil engineering, contracting, movement control, and provision of CUL supplies, such as bulk petroleum.

2-91. Maximum unit effectiveness requires commanders to assemble the optimal array of support assets, relationships, and procedures. To do this, commanders must concurrently engineer support of the multinational force with mission clarification and force composition. Commanders must emphasize their analyses of coalition/alliance member capabilities and willingness to support organic elements and other force components equally with combat planning.
2-92. Staffs should evaluate the level of standardization and interoperability among participating nations and, where situations permit, agree on which nations will provide support functions for the multinational force, and the procedures and methods for how to provide the support. (See JP 3-16 and FM 3-16 for multinational operations doctrine. See JP 4-08 for logistics support to multinational forces doctrine. See Allied Joint Publication-4, and Allied Logistics Publication-4.2 for NATO logistics support operations doctrine. Also see American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand Publication 323 for more information).

LOGISTICS SUPPORT TO POWER PROJECTION

2-93. Power projection is the ability to project the military instrument of national power from the U.S. or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations (JP 5-0). Power projection is a crucial element of strategic reach. It entails a host of support and supporting relationships that enables Army forces to train, prepare, and mobilize to meet national military objectives. Power projection begins with Army installations also referred to as power projection platforms. Logistics operations are a significant part of power projection.

POWER PROJECTION PLATFORM

2-94. Power projection platforms are Army installations that strategically deploy one or more high priority active component brigades or larger and/or mobilize and deploy high priority Army reserve component units. Installation responsibilities include training, provisioning, and deploying a tactical unit, as well as acting as a CONUS support base. They facilitate the movement of forces to and from ports using rail and highways. Rail provides the critical capability required to move Army equipment, especially tanks and outsized equipment, while minimizing congestion along the nation's highways. The ability of installations to accomplish the mission as power projection platforms lay heavily in the proper resourcing. Installation resourcing is one of the primary means required in the balancing of strategic ends, ways, and means to conduct power projection operations.

INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT COMMAND

2-95. Although not considered a generating force, U.S. Army Installation Management Command (IMCOM), plays a critical role in power projection. IMCOM through subordinate installations, supports unit commanders in the conduct of activities ranging from predeployment to redeployment and reintegration activities. The IMCOM’s mission is to provide the Army the installation capabilities and services to support expeditionary operations and provide a quality of life for Soldiers and families commensurate with their service.

2-96. Through its installation transportation offices, IMCOM plans and coordinates the movement of units from home station to ports of embarkation. IMCOM also provides capabilities to operate and manage bases on behalf of JFCs. Security for those bases, however, remains the responsibility of operating force commanders. Army installations become a key power projection platform for the mobilization, deployment, redeployment, and demobilization of the Reserve Component.

THE U.S. ARMY RESERVE

2-97. The Army National Guard and the Army Reserve makeup the Army reserve components. The Army National Guard represents Component 2 and the Army Reserve represents Component 3. These two reserve components make up over half of the Army’s total force.

2-98. The Army Reserve is largely composed of sustainment and maneuver support forces. Almost 80 percent of the Army’s sustainment force structure is in the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve sustainment capabilities are essential for the operating force and provide the preponderance of medical, logistics, civil affairs and psychological capabilities.

2-99. Originally considered a strategic reserve force the Army reserve components were not expected to deploy early into an operation. However, as the operational environment has changed, the deployment timeline for the Army reserve components has shortened significantly.
2-100. When authorized by Congressional resolution and directed by the president, the DOD may mobilize part or all the Army reserve components. There are 5 types of mobilization:

- Selective mobilization. For “domestic emergencies”, the President may order expansion of the active armed forces by activation of Individual Ready Reserve units and/or individual Reservists to deal with a situation where the armed forces may be required to protect life, federal property, or to prevent disruption of federal activities. A selective mobilization would not be associated with a requirement for contingency plans involving external threats to the national security.

- Presidential reserve call-up. The President may augment the active forces by an involuntary call-up of units and individuals of the Selected Reserve or any member of the Individual Ready Reserve designated as essential up to 200,000 persons from all Services for up to 365 days to meet an operational requirement. No more than 30,000 of the 200,000 may be members of the Individual Ready Reserve. The President must notify Congress whenever this authority to call up the Individual Ready Reserve is exercised.

- Partial mobilization. In time of national emergency declared by the President or when otherwise authorized by law, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned may, without the consent of the persons concerned, order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in the Ready Reserve under the jurisdiction of that Service Secretary to active duty for not more than 24 consecutive months. Not more than 1,000,000 members of the Ready Reserve may be on active duty, without their consent, under partial mobilization at any one time.

- Full mobilization. In time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law, an authority designated by the Service Secretary concerned may, without the consent of the persons affected, order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, of a Reserve Component under the jurisdiction of that Service Secretary to active duty for the duration of the war or emergency and for six months thereafter.

- Total mobilization. Total mobilization involves expansion of the active armed forces beyond the approved force structure by organizing and/or activating additional units to respond to requirements of the emergency. All national resources, to include production facilities, needed to sustain additional forces will also be mobilized. Congressional authorization is required for these actions.

**GENERATING FORCE**

2-101. The *generating force* is those Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the operational Army’s capabilities for employment by joint commanders (ADP 1). Generating Army capabilities for specific operations requires two types of processes. One is the ongoing process of manning, training, equipping, and educating the Army for unified land operations. This lies within the primary mission sets of the generating force. The second process is the activities that prepare Soldiers and units for a specific campaign or operation. This is the responsibility of the operational Army. The generating force assists the operating force in preparation for the conduct of unified land operations (for more information on the operating and generating forces see ADRP 4-0).

2-102. The generating force retains the responsibility to facilitate JFCs’ employment of its capabilities, whether deployed OCONUS or not. Once generated, landpower capabilities are projected for employment by JFCs. Many capabilities may be employed without being deployed due to the reach enabled by ongoing improvements to information technology. The generating force is responsible to move Army forces to and from ports of embarkation, assist in the management and operation of ports of embarkation and debarkation, and provide capabilities to GCCs for conducting RS0I. The generating force also plays an important role in redeploying forces from the JOA.

2-103. Army logistics generating force organizations play a critical role in preparing Army units for deployment. This section, though not all inclusive, will discuss a few roles and missions of logistics generating force organizations.
UNITED STATES ARMY MATIERIEL COMMAND

2-104. The USAMC equips and sustains the Army, providing strategic impact at operational speed. The USAMC is the Army’s materiel integrator. It provides national level sustainment, acquisition integration support, contracting services, and selected logistics support to Army forces. It also provides related common support to other Services, multinational, and interagency partners. The capabilities of USAMC are diverse and are accomplished through its various major subordinate commands and other subordinate organizations.

2-105. The USAMC is the lead for the Army’s national-level maintenance and supply programs which are managed and executed by its subordinate life cycle management command (LCMC). These USAMC LCMCs coordinate with the USAMC staff as well as related Assistant Secretary of the Army, ASA (ALT), program executive officers and product/project manager’s offices. Together, USAMC LCMC and Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology elements work to ensure support for fielded weapon systems and equipment for their entire life cycle. The LCMC’s support to deploying and deployed forces is coordinated through the ASC and is executed under the control of the supporting AFSB. LCMCs are discussed in more detail below.

USAMC LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT COMMANDS

2-106. The USAMC provides logistics, technology, acquisition support, and selected logistics support to Army forces as well as USAMC related common support to other Services, multinational and interagency partners. This is accomplished principally through national-level maintenance and supply programs managed and executed by the LCMCs. These USAMC LCMCs include USAMC staff as well as related ASA(ALT) program executive officer and program management (PM) offices. Together, these LCMC USAMC and ASA(ALT) elements work to ensure support for fielded weapon systems and equipment for their entire life cycle. Program executive officer and PM staffs often work in the same office or on the ground in the field along with USAMC LCMC item managers and other technical support personnel. The LCMCs are:

- U.S. Army Tank and Automotive Command: This command develops, acquires, fields, and sustains Soldier and ground systems for the operational Army through the integration of effective and timely acquisition, logistics, and cutting-edge technology.
- Joint Munitions and Lethality: The Joint Munitions and Lethality LCMC executes integrated life-cycle management through providing effective, and affordable munitions and lethality for the joint force. It is comprised of the Joint Munitions Command, the program executive officer for ammunition and the U.S. Army Armament, Research, Development, and Engineering Center.
- Communications-Electronics: The Communications–Electronics LCMC develops, acquires, fields and sustains Army communications systems. It provides significant technical support capabilities to deploying and deployed Army forces.
- Aviation and Missile: This command develops, acquires, fields, and sustains aviation, missile and unmanned vehicle systems, ensuring system readiness with seamless transition to operations. The LCMC transitions science and technology into aviation, missile and unmanned vehicle systems.

USAMC Logistics Support

2-107. USAMC support of operations primarily falls into five categories: distribution management at the strategic level; maintenance support; operational contract support; management of operating force equipment; and augmenting munitions and explosives safety management.

Distribution Management

2-108. USAMC maintains and manages the Army’s portions of the strategic distribution system for Army logistics that supports the theater distribution system. USAMC provides the asset management, logistics requirements determination, distribution management, and resource management that ensures the generating force correctly anticipates operating forces’ logistics requirements.
**Maintenance Support**

2-109. Through a combination of forward presence, call forward, and technical reach support, USAMCs LCMCs ensure the safety, reliability, and sustainability of operational Army equipment and munitions. USAMC draws on the capabilities of its depots, national maintenance contracts, below depot maintenance activities, and deployable component repair companies. Based on the needs identified by the TSC, USAMC generates the required sustainment maintenance capability. Component repair units are deployed primarily to provide sustainment support to secondary item repair and return to supply. USAMC provides limited, specialized maintenance capability to augment component repair units or theater maintenance units as needed. USAMC also integrates manufacturers into their support plans.

**Forward Repair Activities**

2-110. Army-operated depots are part of USAMC’s industrial base and are managed by their respective commodity-oriented LCMCs. USAMC depots have the organic capability to perform complete end item overhaul, component overhaul, remanufacturing, and fabrication of components and repair parts. Depot field support capabilities are provided in theater through the deployment of forward repair activities.

2-111. Specialized maintenance operations, usually identified as forward repair activities, may be of short or long duration to support unique operating force requirements. These activities are carried out by Soldiers, Army civilians, and contractors. Examples of USAMC forward repair activities include—

- Projects to armor tactical wheeled vehicles.
- The installation of anti-rocket-propelled grenade skirts on tactical vehicles and other modifications.
- The repair and refurbishment of vehicles.
- Specialized communications and electronics component repair.

2-112. To support unique weapons systems and equipment, USAMC LCMCs may establish forward repair activities or special repair activities. The systems involved are usually low density and technically complex.

**Retrograde Process**

2-113. USAMC manages the Army retrograde process. Retrograde is part of the Army’s distribution and supply chain management. Major end items of equipment, or major components such as engines, transmissions, weapons systems, and excess repair parts, are returned from the JOA to the sustaining base to restore unserviceable assets to serviceable condition or to return serviceable excess parts to the supply system. USAMC, in coordination with operating forces and DOD agencies, maintains ITV of retrograde assets from the point of origin to final destination through joint ITV systems. For more on the retrograde process see ATP 4-91.

**Operational Contract Support**

2-114. Operational contract support provides operating forces contracted resources for a variety of supplies services, and minor construction. USAMC and ASA (ALT) also help provide contractor sustainment and maintenance support to mobilization, deployment, employment, and redeployment. Planners identify contractor support requirements early in the planning process. If it is determined a commercial source is required, the designated requiring activity is responsible to develop and acquisition ready requirements package. All requiring activities must monitor their supporting contracts utilizing unit provided contracting officer representative and coordinate with the supporting contracting organization to adjust the contract as necessary based on changes to operational requirements. The three main types of contractor support are systems support contracts, external support contracts, and theater support contracts. For additional information on operational contract support, see ATTP 4-10.

**Systems Support Contracts**

2-115. USAMC’s LCMCs provide the entire life-cycle management of Army systems, munitions, and platforms. The ASC, through its subordinate AFSBs, assists the LCMCs and separate program executive
officers and PM offices in providing system contract support to new or partially fielded Army systems and platforms. In some cases, utilizing deployable system contract support personnel (often referred to as field service representatives), the program executive offices and PMs provide technical support to selected weapon and other major military systems and platforms. They sometimes provide complete maintenance support. These system contractor personnel can and often do use technical reach and call forward capabilities for additional assistance. System support contracts are pre-arranged by the ASA (ALT) program and PM offices. In major operations, the ASA(ALT) may deploy a forward operations team to assist the ASCC or designated ARFOR staff in the integration and synchronization of program executive office and/or PM systems support and fielding activities.

2-116. Systems support contractors, made up of U.S. citizen contractors authorized to accompany the force, provide support to the force in training and real-world operations. Systems support contractors provide either temporary support during the initial fielding of a system, called interim contracted support, or long-term support for selected materiel systems, referred to as contractor logistics support. ASCC and TSC support operations officer (SPO) do not normally have a role in determining systems support requirements.

External Support Contracts

2-117. External support contracts are contracts awarded by contracting organizations whose contracting authority does not derive directly from the theater support contracting head(s) of contracting activity or from systems support contracting authorities. External support service contracts provide a variety of logistics and other non-combat related services and supply support. The largest and most commonly known external support contract is the Army’s LOGCAP. LOGCAP may provide supply services (e.g. storage, warehousing, distribution, etc.) for the nine classes of supplies, but the Services source the actual commodities. ASCC G-4, and TSC SPO are critical in determining sustainment related external support requirements (e.g. LOGCAP). The requiring activity will be required to develop the requirements and provide contracting officer representative to monitor contractor performance for contracted logistics services provided in the affected area of operation. For additional information, see ATTP 4-10 and AR 700-137.

Theater Support Contracts

2-118. Theater support contracts are primarily an operating force support capability where in-theater contingency contracting personnel contract common logistics support via commercial vendors primarily located in or near the operational area. In some situations, theater support contracting for deployed forces can be reinforced through reach from home station directorates of contracting. Theater support contracts are provided by the supporting CSB. The requiring activity will be required to develop the requirements and provide contracting officer representatives to monitor contractor performance for logistics services and receiving officials for contracted logistics commodities provided in the affected area of operation. For additional information, see ATTP 4-10.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

2-119. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers provides engineering, construction, and environmental management services for the Army, other Services, other assigned U.S. government agencies, and foreign governments. Some of the frontline services, provided by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, include base camp construction and master planning, antiterrorism/force protection, protective design, utility assessment and repair, contingency airfields, tactical military hydrology, rapid mapping, reconnaissance of infrastructure (assessments and surveys), bridge assessment, repair, and other support. These services are provided by a variety of entities, including forward engineering support teams, contingency real estate support teams, and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers overseas districts and field offices. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also provides a wealth of technical expertise and analytical capabilities through reach from its supporting agencies, including: U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center, the Transatlantic Programs Center, and the U.S. Army Engineering and Support Center. For more information on the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, see FM 3-34.
OPERATING FORCE

2-120. The operating force consists of those forces whose primary missions are to participate in combat and the integral supporting elements thereof. Operational Army units are typically assigned to CCDRs. The Army normally executes its responsibilities to organize, train, and equip operational Army units through ASCCs. A more detailed discussion of the operating force is contained in chapter 3.

MANAGEMENT OF OPERATING FORCES’ EQUIPMENT

2-121. To resource training and readiness, the Army effectively and efficiently makes use of all sources of equipment. One option for equipping forces projecting into robust active theaters is the reallocation of left-behind equipment in theater.

2-122. In the event that HQDA directs that deploying units fall in on equipment already in theater, USAMC will maintain deployed units’ equipment. USAMC provides accountability and support of theater-provided equipment, in coordination with the appropriate ASCC and the HQDA assistant chief of staff, financial management (G-8) and the assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3)/ assistant chief of staff, plans (G-5)/ assistant chief of staff, inform and influence activities (G-7).

2-123. Units often operate with a different set of equipment than they are authorized under their modified table of organization and equipment. To ensure they are fully ready for the operational environment, units conduct the final phases of their training using the equipment they will employ in theater. USAMC maintains equipment at training centers to conduct theater-specific premobilization training.

2-124. For more information regarding theater provided equipment see ATP 4-91.

Army Pre-positioned Stocks

2-125. The Army maintains APS to increase the responsiveness of U.S. Army forces and selected allies. APS consist of pre-positioned unit sets of equipment, operational project stocks, Army War Reserve Stocks, and war reserve stocks for allies.

2-126. HQDA, G-3 determines the overall APS strategy and requirements. HQDA G-4 is the Army’s APS PM and develops/coordinates all policy and programmatic related actions. Under the guidance and oversight of the G-4, USAMC executes the APS program and provides accountability, storage, maintenance, and transfer (issue and receipt) of all equipment and stocks (except medical supplies and subsistence items). The Army Surgeon General manages medical supplies, and the DLA manages subsistence items.

2-127. ASC assists in transferring equipment to unit(s) designated to receive APS. Unit personnel actively participate in the equipment preparation and transfer process. Upon mission completion, or as directed, this equipment then is transferred back to ASC. ASC manages and coordinates support to deploying and deployed forces. The supporting AFSB executes this support.

Augmenting Munitions and Explosives Safety Management

2-128. Operational Army organizations, headquarters and units, routinely rely on civilian specialists to execute the day-to-day tasks associated with the management of munitions in transportation and storage during peacetime. Most of these civilian specialists are not organic to these operational Army organizations. Instead, they are assigned to IMCOM installations or USAMC. Consequently, non-unit civilian augmentees are required at headquarters, transportation hubs, and storage sites when munitions are provided to operating forces.

2-129. When U.S. or multinational ammunition is stored or transported during logistics operations in the area of operations, personnel familiar with the proper methods of handling packaged munitions and the effects of explosions involving mass quantities of packaged munitions participate during planning and execution. Proper planning of munitions operations in the logistics system and constant monitoring of operations and storage preclude the occurrence of and the severity of unintended explosions.
2-130. USAMC provides munitions management and explosives safety specialists. They augment headquarters and unit personnel in the planning and execution of the munitions mission in the JOA.

SUMMARY

2-131. Chapter 2 identified unified action partners that provide logistics support to unified land operations. It also discussed Army Title 10 logistics requirements, joint interdependence, logistics support to force projection and interagency coordination. The next chapter extends the discussion beyond national strategic level logistics and introduces who logistics support is provided to in theater and how support is provided through mission command at the operational-tactical level.
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Chapter 3
Operational - Tactical Level Logistics

Logisticians operate in an increasingly global environment that encompasses air, land, maritime, space and cyberspace domains. It is within this setting that the logisticians’ conducts mission command of Army theater level logistics in support of joint or multinational forces throughout an AOR. This chapter discusses the context (operational environment) within which logistics operations in support of unified land operations occurs. It discusses the theater structure, mission command, and the command and support relationships.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

3-1. An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). Any operational environment consists of many interrelated variables and sub-variables. How the many variables and conditions behave and interact with each is difficult to discern and always results in differing circumstances. Therefore, no two operational environments are the same (ADRP 3-0).

3-2. Understanding a given operational environment is essential to the successful execution of deployment and logistics operations conducted in support of GCC objectives. Analysis of a specific operational environment is framed in the context of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PME II-PT) relationships. This PMESII-PT analysis provides relevant information essential to understanding any given operational environment, including that of a particular GCC. It also helps logisticians understand the nature of logistical support needed in support of the GCC’s mission.

3-3. A range of factors will affect ground force operations. These factors include the evolving war on terrorism, globalization of economies, and natural disasters, failed or failing states, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As a result of a changing operational environment, logisticians must be prepared to support operations in a variety of vastly different operational environments. The specific operational environments may be characterized by:

- A complex, non-contiguous battlefield, where boundaries may not be clearly defined.
- A threat scenario in which potential adversaries are not readily identifiable.
- Simultaneous, geographically dispersed operations that may result in long lines of communication.
- Increased coordination between organizations and functions to achieve desired effects.
- Joint or single Service organizations operating in a collaborative or interdependent joint environment.
- Joint, single Service and multinational force interaction with intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and contractors. For more information on multinational, intergovernmental organization and non-governmental organization support see JP 4-08, Logistics Support in Multinational Operations and ADRP 4-0, Sustainment.

AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

3-4. An AOR is a geographical area for which a GCC is assigned military responsibility (JP 1). The command assesses the level of international military cooperation available with the degree of dedicated U.S. military resources necessary. These factors influence prospective Army logistics operations in each
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AOR. Inherently these factors also impact JOA and/or AO at the operational and tactical levels of war as well.

DESIGNATION OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

3-5. To conduct operations within its geographic AOR, the GCC may designate a specific area within the AOR as a theater of war, theater of operations, or a JOA (see figure 3-1). Commanders may use these terms independently or in conjunction with one another, depending on the needs of the operation. If used in conjunction, the theater of war would encompass the larger area with smaller theaters of operation and JOAs within it. JP 3-0 describes the criteria for each designation in more detail. This manual uses the more generic term AO to refer to any area where the commander may deploy an ESC and/or sustainment brigade to conduct operations. The GCC (or subordinate CCDR) maintains responsibility for the operations of U.S. forces in an AOR or designates a JTF to command forces in a designated area. The ASCC provides Army forces to the JFC and/or JTF to support those operations. JP 3-0 discusses theater organization.

![Figure 3-1. Area of operations](image)

THEATER STRUCTURE

3-6. The CCDR is the senior leader in the GCC (figure 3-2). The CCDR exercises DAFL through the GCC logistics directorate of a joint staff (J-4). The J-4 uses the Joint Logistics Operations Center and the JDDOC for planning, preparing, and executing logistics operations. The JDDOC is an organization under the GCC J-4 and works to achieve the synchronization and integration of strategic requirements. The J-4 can retain control of the JDDOC or position the JDDOC within the ARFOR TSC. The theater Army, as ARFOR for all theater committed forces, has a G-4 that controls logistics requirements. The theater Army controls the TSC who is the senior Army logistics commander. The TSC can employ an ESC as the mission command element in theater. The TSC and/or ESC controls logistics operations through the G-4 (internal requirements) and the SPO (external requirements). The SPO controls the distribution management center where support requirements are coordinated. The sustainment brigade coordinates logistics support with the
SPO. The brigade combat team (BCT) coordinates support with the sustainment brigade. Figure 3-2 provides an example of a notional theater structure.

![Figure 3-2. Example of a notional theater structure](image)

**GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND**

3-7. USC Title 10 establishes the GCC roles, functions, and responsibilities. As such, GCC exercises combatant command (COCOM) authority over all forces to accomplish the missions assigned to the command and is the senior DOD HQ in an AOR. COCOM authority cannot be delegated or transferred. OPCON is inherent in COCOM and may be delegated within the combatant command by the GCC. GCC uses authoritative directives to organize forces, as required, to accomplish assigned missions including logistics. Accordingly, a GCC may designate a Service component commander as a JFC to improve span of control and provide for unity of effort. The GCC may establish one or more joint force commands.

3-8. CCOFRs use DAFL to assign common-user logistics responsibilities to the Service component. This is conducted in accordance with SecDEF designated EA responsibilities for DOD agencies, Services, and commands operating within the theater. The GCC logistics directorate (J-4) is responsible for developing logistics plans, formulating policies that ensure effective logistics support for all forces in the command, and coordinating execution of the commander’s policies and guidance. The coordination and supervision of deployment and distribution, supply, maintenance, logistics services, operational contract support, and engineering are integral to providing effective logistics support across the range of military operations. Because many of the issues confronting this directorate are of a single-Service nature, close coordination and collaboration with the Service component commands or their designated representatives are necessary for achieving unity of effort.

3-9. From a logistics perspective, one of the options available to the GCC is the establishment of a joint logistics headquarters or a command for joint logistics. Staffed with personnel from each Service, the joint
logistics headquarters or command for joint logistics would serve as a planning and execution headquarters for the GCC AOR. It should be noted that such a headquarters would not have DAFL as that is the GCC’s assigned authority and cannot be transferred or delegated. When this option is used the GCC should clearly delineate the command relationships between the combatant command staff, particularly the J-4, Services, and the joint force land component commander and his logistics staff. GCC command relationship options for planning and executing joint logistics operations are OPCON, tactical control (TACON), or a supporting to supported relationship.

3-10. If the GCC directs the ASCC to provide lead Service logistics, common user logistics or establish a command for joint logistics the TSC or ESC will most likely be selected by the GCC as the option to plan and execute joint logistics for the theater. Once the command relationships between the forces are clarified then decisions must be made to assure the proper responsibilities are assigned to the TSC or ESC to execute the joint functions. A more detailed discussion of the TSC and ESC follows later in this chapter.

3-11. To obtain unity of effort for the deployment and distribution of strategic forces the GCC may establish a JDDOC. Resourced by the GCC and augmented by USTRANSCOM, DLA, the Services, and other national partners, the JDDOC enables a seamless transition between the strategic deployment and distribution processes and operational-level functions; enabling optimum use of available resources to achieve improved efficiency and effectiveness. More details on the JDDOC and other boards, centers and cells are discussed later in this chapter.

THEATER SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (TSOC)

3-12. Each GCC has an assigned TSOC. U.S. Special Operations Command has COCOM authority over the TSOCs but the GCC maintains OPCON. The TSOC commander is responsible for the day-to-day activities of assigned and attached special operations forces (SOF) and is the senior special operations advisor to the GCC. The special operations logistics command structure is tailored to support a SOF Task Force depending upon the level of complexity, duration, and resources required by the circumstances.

3-13. Army special operations forces (ARSOF) are not logistically self-sufficient and rely upon the GCC theater infrastructure for virtually all of their support above their organic capabilities. ARSOF units have no organic mortuary affairs, field service, heavy airdrop, or explosive ordnance disposal units. Conventional force augmentation may be necessary when ARSOF are set up in undeveloped theaters without established Army theater opening, theater distribution, or area support; when operating from bases which are not established fixed facilities; or when a high percentage of ARSOF units are committed simultaneously. The TSOC J4 in coordination with the 528th Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations)(Airborne) ARSOF liaison element will coordinate logistics support with the theater ASCC.

3-14. For rapid response operations, ARSOF units will maintain the capability to support SOF elements for an initial period of 15 days. Services and/or EAs should be prepared to support ARSOF as soon as possible but no later than 15 days after ARSOF are employed.

ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND

3-15. Each COCOM has a Service component commander from each Service-level organization (Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, Navy, and Coast Guard). The ASCC assigned to each GCC supports all areas required under Title 10 USC.

3-16. The ASCC, also referred to as the theater Army, is the senior Army command in an AOR. The ASCC commander serves as the principal advisor to the GCC for supporting and employing Army forces in the AOR. The ASCC accomplishes this by participating in mid- and long-range planning to support the GCC theater strategy and plan. In addition to fulfilling its Service-specific responsibilities, the ASCC may, by exception when corps or division headquarters is not available, be tasked to play a joint role during military operations. For example, with significant augmentation, the GCC may designate the ASCC as the joint force land component commander. With significant augmentation, the ASCC is also capable of providing a JTF capable headquarters to serve as the joint headquarters for smaller-scale contingencies. However, the ASCC was not designed to function as a JTF or a joint force land component command. The TSC or ESC will serve as the senior Army logistics headquarters assigned to a theater Army. For more detail on the ASCC and theater Army see FM 3-93.
CORPS

3-17. The corps provides a HQ that specializes in operations as a land component command HQ and a joint task force for contingencies. When required, a corps may become a transitional tactical HQ under the land component command, with OPCON of multiple divisions (including multinational or Marine Corps formations) or other large tactical formations. Its primary purpose is land combat operations. The corps HQ has the capability to provide the nucleus of a joint HQ.

DIVISION

3-18. Divisions are the Army’s primary tactical warfighting HQ. Their principal task is directing subordinate brigade operations. Divisions are not fixed formations. Therefore, they may have all types of brigade combat teams (BCT) or one particular type of BCT. A division can control up to five BCTs with additional appropriate supporting brigades during major combat operations. The types of support brigades are combat aviation, fires, maneuver enhancement, battlefield surveillance, and sustainment. The sustainment brigade normally remains attached to the TSC or ESC for mission command to support one or more divisions and other units operating in the sustainment brigade’s assigned area. The sustainment brigade provides general support to the division AO using the area support method. Area support is a method of logistics, medical support, and personnel services in which support relationships are determined by the location of the units requiring support. Sustainment units provide support to units located in or passing through their assigned areas (ATP 4-90). As an exception and when conditions warrant, a division may have TACON of a sustainment brigade while conducting large-scale operations, such as during exploitation and pursuit.

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

3-19. As combined arms organizations, BCTs form the basic building block of the Army’s tactical formations. They are the principal means of executing engagements. Three standardized BCT designs exist: armor, infantry, and Stryker. Battalion-sized maneuver, fires, reconnaissance, and brigade support battalions (BSB) are organic to BCTs, and they may also contain other functional maneuver support elements. For more information on the brigade support battalion see ATP 4-90.

THEATER LOGISTICS STRUCTURE/MISSION COMMAND

3-20. The theater logistics structures facilitate mission command of organizations performing logistics operations.

THEATER SUSTAINMENT COMMAND

3-21. The TSC is assigned to the ASCC and provides general support (GS) to the AOR. The TSC serves as the senior Army sustainment HQ (less medical) for the theater Army. The TSC provides mission command of units assigned, attached, or OPCON.

3-22. The TSC is capable of planning, preparing, executing, and assessing logistics and human resource support for Army forces in theater. As the distribution coordinator in theater, the TSC leverages strategic partnerships and joint capabilities to establish an integrated theater-level distribution system that is responsive to theater Army requirements. It employs sustainment brigades to execute theater opening, theater sustainment, and theater distribution operations.

3-23. The TSCs assigned units provide supply, maintenance, transportation, petroleum, and port and terminal operations. Other specialized capabilities, such as mortuary affairs, aerial delivery, human resources, and financial management, are available from the force pool.

EXPEDITIONARY SUSTAINMENT COMMAND

3-24. ESCs are normally under the mission command of the TSC. The ESC provides mission command of logistics units in designated areas of a theater. The ESC plans, and executes distribution, theater opening, reception, staging, and onward movement operations. When directed by the GCC or designated
multinational or joint logistics task force, it may serve as a basis for command for joint logistics with appropriate joint augmentation. The ESC normally deploys when the TSC determines that a forward command presence is required. This capability provides the TSC commander with the regional focus necessary to provide effective operational-level support to ARFOR or JTF. The ESC provides essentially the same range of support staff capabilities but not to the scale and scope of the TSC.

3-25. The ESC is regionally focused on a specific JOA or AO but may be deployed worldwide. By design, the ESC is structured to mirror the organizational structure of the TSC but its capabilities (planning horizons, ability to conduct materiel management) are limited when compared to the TSC. The mission command relationship of the ESC is attached to a TSC or OPCON to ARFOR. The support relationship is general support to ARFOR AO or JOA.

**THEATER ENGINEER COMMAND**

3-26. The theater engineer command is designed to exercise mission command over engineer capabilities for all assigned or attached engineer brigades and other engineer units and missions for the joint force land component or theater Army commander. It is the only organization designed to do so without augmentation and can provide the JFC with an operational engineer headquarters or augment an engineer staff for a JTF. The theater engineer command is focused on operational-level engineer support across all three of the engineer disciplines and typically serves as the senior engineer headquarters for a theater Army, land component headquarters, or potentially a JTF (see FM 3-34).

**ARMY FIELD SUPPORT BRIGADE**

3-27. An AFSB provides materiel readiness focused support to include coordination of acquisition logistics and technology actions (less theater support contracting and medical) to Army operational forces. The AFSB is assigned to the ASC and when deployed, is placed OPCON to the theater Army. This OPCON relationship is normally delegated to the supporting TSC or ESC as appropriate. AFSBs serve as ASC’s link between the generating force and the operational force.

3-28. AFSBs are also responsible for integrating LOGCAP support into contract support integration plans, in coordination with the theater Army G-4 and the supporting CSB. For more information see ATP 4-91.

**Expeditionary Contracting Command**

3-29. The ECC is responsible for theater support contracting in support of deployed Army forces worldwide and garrison contracting support for OCONUS Army installations and associated forward stationed units. The ECC exercises mission command over the CSB and Army active component contracting force structure and is the Army’s force provider of contingency contracting assets. (See FM 4-92).

**Contract Support Brigade**

3-30. The CSB is assigned to the ECC. CSBs are regionally aligned and provide theater support contracting services and operational contract support planning assistance in support of the theater Army, ARFOR headquarters, and their major subordinate commands. The CSB serves under the command and procurement authority of the ECC, providing direct support to the theater Army, ARFOR, or TSC as directed. The CSB exercises mission command of contingency contracting battalions and contingency contracting teams (see FM 4-92).

**Contingency Contracting Battalion**

3-31. When deployed, the CCBN concentrates on exercising mission command and contracting operations coordination and execution. The CCBN normally serves under the supporting CSB command and procurement authority and is generally co-located and aligned with a division or, corps HQs to facilitate contract support planning and staff assistance. In small-scale operations, a CCBN may deploy separately from the CSB headquarters; when this happens, the CSB normally places the CCBN in direct support of the ARFOR. This direct support relationship may be further delegated per mission, enemy, terrain and weather,
troops and support available-time available and civil considerations (METT-TC). For more information on CCBN see FM 4-92.

SUSTAINMENT BRIGADE

3-32. The sustainment brigade’s focus is the synchronization of logistics with the tactical commander’s battle rhythm to maintain combat power. It plans, prepares, executes, and assesses sustainment operations within an area of operations. It provides control of sustainment operations and distribution management. When deployed, it is a subordinate to the TSC, or by extension the ESC. The sustainment brigade is a flexible, multifunctional sustainment organization, tailored and task organized according to METT-TC.

3-33. A sustainment brigade supporting theater forces is a tailorable organization comprised of both functional and multifunctional combat sustainment support battalions (CSSB). The command relationship of a sustainment brigade is attached to a TSC or ESC and the support relationship is general support using the area support method. The sustainment brigade is capable of deploying an early entry element sized in accordance with METT-TC for command of logistics during initial entry operations to establish an initial command and control presence in a theater, and provide for continuous command and control when the brigade incrementally repositions its forces in support mission requirements. See ATP 4-93 for more information on the role and functions of the sustainment brigade.

COMBAT SUSTAINMENT SUPPORT BATTALION

3-34. CSSBs are the building blocks of the sustainment brigades. Their designs are standardized and can consist of up to seven companies. CSSBs are task organized to support theater opening, distribution, area sustainment, or life support functions. Selected CSSB may be organized to provide specific types of support to division aligned brigades lacking selected internal logistics capabilities. The CSSB coordinates, synchronizes, and executes logistics on an area basis including transportation, maintenance, ammunition, supply, mortuary affairs, airdrop, field services, water, and petroleum. It provides mission command over subordinate logistics organizations that support all phases of operations. It oversees distribution and sustainment as well as coordinates external support.

3-35. The CSSB provides area support, and the operational command relationship of the CSSB is attached to a sustainment brigade with the support relationship being general support unless otherwise designated by OPORD, including when supporting division aligned brigades lacking certain internal sustainment capabilities. The CSSB may also be aligned with a corps and/or division HQs in order to provide area support for specific logistics functions. See ATP 4-90, ATP 4-93, and ATP 4-94 for more information.

3-36. The CSSB may operate remotely from the sustainment brigade and therefore must maintain communications with the sustainment brigade. The CSSB establishes voice communications along with mission command and sustainment information system connectivity to support mission command and convoy operations as well as to monitor, update, and evaluate internal operations and supported unit logistics postures.

SUSTAINMENT BRIGADE (SPECIAL OPERATIONS) (AIRBORNE)

3-37. The sustainment brigade (special operations)(airborne) does not have organic logistics units within its force structure. Its mission is to provide mission command of a SOF logistics task force in support of a SOF JTF during initial operations and to plan, coordinate, and synchronize sustainment support at the operational level. During initial entry operations or theater expansion, the sustainment brigade (special operations)(airborne) may be directed to deploy a tailored brigade headquarters augmented by conventional force CSSB capabilities to command and control operational-level logistics in support of ARSOF operations until relieved by ASCC logistics capabilities.

3-38. The sustainment brigade has ARSOF liaison elements which are permanently employed in each COCOM and have personnel stationed with both the TSOC and ASCC. Their mission is to assist the TSOCs with operation plan reviews, ensure ARSOF logistics support is written into concept of support documents, and assist in coordinating logistics support for ARSOF units deploying into theaters to conduct operations or exercises.
3-39. In mature theaters or when the sustainment brigade headquarters is not required to provide logistics mission command, the sustainment brigade has the ability to deploy ARSOF support operations teams to collocate with the TSC and/or ESC and ARSOF logistics mission command elements to synchronize ASCC provided logistics support to deployed ARSOF units.

3-40. The sustainment brigade also has a Special operations medical detachment. The detachment headquarters mission commands the Special operations resuscitative teams and medical logistics section. The Special operations resuscitative teams provide forward resuscitative surgical integration, critical care, staging and en-route critical care for deployed ARSOF.

**ARSOF GROUP SUPPORT BATTALION**

3-41. The ARSOF group support battalion is a joint and multinational capable organization that can accept, integrate, and employ augmentation of assets from other Services and nations. The group support battalion commander may assume the role of deputy commander for support responsible for developing the concept of support for all component SOF elements within the JTF operating across entire countries or in multiple countries based on the operational construct. The group support battalion provides direct support to the forward support company (FSC) which includes supply, transportation, maintenance, ammunition, water, petroleum, airdrop and medical. Due to the unique employment characteristics of ARSOF units, the group support battalion habitually does not deploy in entirety as there is only one group support battalion in each special forces group which must simultaneously support the operations of each battalion. No single support battalion can cover the geographical dispersion without conventional force logistics support. For more information on ARSOF logistics capabilities see ATP 3-05.40.

**BRIGADE SUPPORT BATTALION**

3-42. The BSB is an organic component of a BCT and some support brigades. When resourced, the BSB provides supply, maintenance, motor transport, and Roles 1 and 2 medical support (see FM 4-02) to the BCT or supported brigade. It is tailored to support the brigade to which it is assigned. For example, the BSB of an armor brigade combat team has more fuel distribution capabilities and maintenance than does an infantry brigade BSB. The BSB plans, prepares, executes, and assesses logistics operations in support of brigade operations (see ATP 4-90).

3-43. BSBs operate with a single command post. Procedures for providing mission command during deployment or tactical moves are detailed in ATPs and ATTPs. The operational command relationship of the BSB is organic to a brigade combat team with the support relationship being direct support. The BSB can provide general support using the area support method within the limits of its capabilities. Requirements in excess of its capabilities should be coordinated with the sustainment brigade. See ATP 4-90 for more information.

**AVIATION SUPPORT BATTALION**

3-44. The aviation support battalion is organic to the combat aviation brigade and the theater aviation brigade. It provides aviation and ground field maintenance, brigade-wide satellite signal support, supply, and Role 1 medical support to the aviation brigade. The aviation support battalion has been optimized to support the combat aviation brigade’s forward support companies, aviation maintenance companies, and the brigade HQ and HQ company (see FM 3-04.111).

**MISSION COMMAND SYSTEM LOGISTICS**

3-45. The mission command system is the arrangement of personnel; networks; information systems; processes and procedures; and facilities and equipment that enable commanders to conduct operations (ADP 6-0). Through the mission command system logistics commanders allocate resources and direct the execution of logistics support to operations. The logistics commander’s mission command system manages information to produce and disseminate a common operational picture to the commander, staff, and subordinate units. The goal is to provide commanders with knowledge based on relevant logistics information to which they can apply judgment to reach situational understanding and discern operational advantages. An effective mission command system allows the commander to: operate freely throughout the
JOA and exercise mission command from anywhere on the battlefield; delegate authority to subordinate commanders and staff to allow decentralized execution of operations; synchronize actions throughout the JOA; and focus on critical actions instead of details.

CONTROL

3-46. The science of control supports the art of command. Control is the regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander’s intent (ADP 6-0). Aided by staffs, logistics commanders exercise control over assigned forces in their area of operations. Logistics staffs coordinate, synchronize, and integrate actions, inform the commander, and exercise control for the commander. Control permits commanders to adjust logistics support operations to account for changing circumstances and direct the changes necessary to address the new situation. The commander’s mission command system, especially the staff, assists the commander with the science of control.

3-47. Control relies on continuous flow of information between the commander, staff, subordinates, and unified action partners about the unfolding situation. Control of logistics is essential for orchestrating all of the many facets of logistics support to operations. The science of control depends on information, communications, structure and degree of control.

LOGISTICS STAFF, G-4/S4

3-48. The primary Army staff for logistics is the G-4/S4. The G4/S4 develops, coordinates, and monitors plans, policies, procedures, and programs for supply, transportation, maintenance, field services, and facilities for the command’s subordinate units. It determines logistics requirements for subordinate units, monitors the logistics posture of subordinate units, and establishes support priorities in accordance with the commander’s priorities and intent. This staff section provides staff supervision of subordinate unit field feeding and subsistence operations; monitors and analyzes subordinate unit equipment readiness status. It is also responsible for planning and management of fixed facilities and coordination of construction, utilities, and real estate for the command.

Logistics Staff, Support Operations

3-49. The SPO staff is a unique primary staff position that only resides in logistics organizations. Unlike the G-4/S-4, the support operations staff focuses on the logistics mission of providing support to customer units. The SPO is responsible for managing logistics support to supported organizations in accordance with the logistics plan. It focuses on detailed planning support for deployment and establishing and maintaining the Army portion of the theater distribution system. This staff section manages supply, maintenance, hazardous waste management, field services, transportation, and movement control activities associated with support to the force. It integrates transportation and movement of units, supplies, and materiel into, within, and out of theater. It provides this support through a DMC comprised of subordinate branches (distribution integration, supply, material readiness, munitions, mobility, and log automation); sections (civil-military operations, HN support); and cells (medical supply, ARSOF). The actual composition of the DMC is METT-TC dependent.

Engineer Staff

3-50. The engineer staff in the TSC and/or ESC assists the TSC and/or ESC and subordinate commanders in controlling forces and coordinating warfighting functions based on the current order and commander’s intent. The staff determines requirements and coordinates engineer support for TSC or ESC units. The staff relies on the theater engineer command or an engineer brigade to provide general engineering expertise that exceeds the capabilities of the engineer staff in the TSC and/or ESC.

Operational Contract Support Staff

3-51. The TSC SPOs operational contract support branch plays a central role in the planning, execution, monitoring, and assessment of logistics related operational contract support actions. Key responsibilities include, but are not limited to:
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- Membership on the acquisition review board, or joint acquisition review board. The acquisition review board reviews contracted support requirements against the Annex W (operational contract support plan) and priorities established by the CCDR, subordinate joint commands, and/or theater Army/ARFOR.

- Contributing to the development of the Army component level Annex W in coordination with the theater Army/ARFOR G-4, the CSB, and AFSB (OCONUS).

- Integrating the logistics aspects of Annex W into the overall support plan for the theater or JOA.

- Requirements development, validation, and prioritization in coordination with the theater Army/ARFOR G-4, CSB, and subordinate sustainment commands.

- Nominating commodities and logistics related contracted services for consolidation and/or theater-controlled procurement.

- Logistics related contract oversight planning and execution, to include contracting officer representative and receiving official tracking, in coordination with the all supporting contracting organizations.

- Contractor management planning and coordination with focus on government furnished support in coordination with the theater Army G-3/4, ARFOR G-3/4, supporting contracting organizations.

**LOGISTICS BOARDS AND CENTERS**

3-52. The CCDR may also establish boards, centers, offices, and cells to meet increased requirements and to coordinate and control the logistics effort. Synchronizing and integrating the many joint logistics functional capabilities, multinational and interagency capabilities, and operational contract support may require that the logistics planners establish a location or center where the requirements, resources, and processes can come together in a way that provides knowledge to affect quality decision-making. This fusion of information is essential to effective logistics support and critical to enabling logistics planners to see the logistics support requirements with clarity. These staff organizations are comprised of functional experts representing the joint logistics functions and provide functional assessments, analysis, and expertise to the planning and execution elements of the J-4. Service components may be tasked to provide functional logisticians to chair boards and provide representation to the boards or centers.

**Joint Logistics Operations Center**

3-53. The joint logistics operations center (JLOC) may be established at the combatant command or joint subordinate commands at the discretion of the CCDR and operated by the logistics staff. The JLOC receives reports from supporting commands, Service components, and external sources, distills information for decision/briefings, and responds to questions. The JLOC is tailored to the mission or operation to coordinate and synchronize the planning and the logistics operations for such functions as engineering, operational contract support, materiel readiness, mortuary affairs, HNS, and other services. The JLOC coordinates and synchronizes the planning and execution of ongoing combatant command operations, interagency support requirements, and validates priority movement for selected senior officials. The JLOC must coordinate closely with the combatant command JDDOC concerning transportation and distribution of supplies.

**Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations Center**

3-54. JDDOC is a joint capability solution designed to synchronize and optimize intertheater and theater deployment, distribution, and logistics operations within a GCC’s AOR. The JDDOC is an integrated operations and fusion center (movement control organization), acting in consonance with the GCC’s overall requirements and priorities, and on behalf of the GCC, may direct common user and intratheater distribution operations. The JDDOC is a standing operations center, normally under the direction of the CCDR’s J-4, but may be placed under other command or staff organizations. The JDDOC may move to a forward-deployed location, or be collocated with a subordinate logistics command, unit, or task force. Regardless of location, the JDDOC retains its direct organizational relationship to the combatant command and does not become a subordinate activity of the host organization to which it may be attached. The JDDOC relies on liaison and collaboration to achieve reach back to access national support capabilities.
Joint Transportation Board

3-55. The Joint Transportation Board may be convened by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during wartime or contingencies to ensure President and SecDEF transportation requirements are apportioned and scheduled. When convened, the Joint Transportation Board adjudicates competing requirements and, when required, evaluates courses of action to make recommendations to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Joint Movement Center

3-56. The Joint Movement Center may be established at a subordinate unified or JTF level to coordinate the employment of all means of transportation (including that provided by allies or HNs) to support the concept of operations. This coordination is accomplished through establishment of theater and JTF transportation policies within the assigned operational area, consistent with relative urgency of need, port and terminal capabilities, transportation asset availability, and priorities set by a JFC. The JTF Joint Movement Center works closely with the JDDOC.

Joint Petroleum Office and Subarea Petroleum Office

3-57. The Joint Petroleum Office established by the GCC works in conjunction with its Service components, Subarea Petroleum Offices and DLA to plan, coordinate, and oversee all phases of bulk petroleum support for forces employed or planned for possible employment in the AOR. Joint Petroleum Offices typically have a mix of Service representatives. When tactical operations warrant extensive management of wholesale bulk petroleum in a JOA, the GCC’s Joint Petroleum Office may establish a Subarea Petroleum Office. The primary function of the Subarea Petroleum Office is to discharge the staff petroleum logistics responsibilities of the JTF. The Subarea Petroleum Office is responsible for petroleum, oil, and lubricants planning and execution within the JOA. This level of planning focuses on support for each Service component. Its products are the inland petroleum distribution plan and base support plans.

Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board

3-58. The CCDR or subordinate JFC may establish a Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board to assist in managing civil-military construction and engineering projects and resources. The Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board is a temporary board, chaired by the CCDR or the CCDR’s designated representative such as the combatant command J-4, combatant command engineer, subordinate joint force engineer, or civil affairs officer. The joint force engineer will provide the secretariat and manage the administrative details of the board.

Joint Facilities Utilization Board

3-59. Joint Facilities Utilization Board evaluates and reconciles component requests for real estate, use of existing facilities, inter-Service support, and construction to ensure compliance with Joint Facilities Utilization Board priorities. The JFC may establish a Joint Facilities Utilization Board to assist in managing Service component use of real estate and existing facilities. The Joint Facilities Utilization Board is a temporary board chaired by the combatant command or subordinate joint force engineer, with members from the joint force staff, components, and any other required special activities (e.g., legal, force protection, comptroller, contracting, and civil affairs). The Joint Facilities Utilization Board serves as the primary coordination body within the JTF for approving construction projects to support installation and mission requirements.

Distribution Management Center

3-60. The DMC is a standing section located under the SPO staff of the TSC, ESC and sustainment brigade. The DMC monitors unit movements associated with reception, staging, onward movement, integration and redeployment. It monitors the distribution of all classes of supply and services, and units/personnel supporting the deployed Army forces in theater as well as the movement of retrograde materiel within the theater. It involves ensuring systems and processes are in place to monitor the flow of materiel, equipment, and personnel. The DMC provides location of mode assets and movement of critical
supplies along main supply routes. It provides staff recommendations to direct, redirect, retrograde, and cross level resources to meet mission requirements. The DMC receives strategic distribution information from the JDDOC and logistics/unit movement priorities from the JFC. Upon receipt of this information, the DMC develops the theater distribution plan based on ARFOR and/or JFC guidance.

**COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS**

3-61. Inherent in command and support relationships is a clear understanding of the roles of each commander. The establishing commander, typically the GCC, will define the supporting to supported relationships, the degree of authority the supported commander has, and the overall priorities.

3-62. In general, the supported commander identifies his support requirements in terms of priority, location, timing, and duration. The supporting commander determines the forces, methods, and procedures to be employed in providing the support. If the supporting commander, subject to his existing capabilities and other assigned tasks, cannot fulfill the supported commander’s requirements, then the establishing commander is responsible for determining a solution – i.e. a change in overall priorities or allocation of resources.

**ARMY COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS**

3-63. Table 3-1 lists the Army command relationships and inherent responsibilities. Command relationships define superior and subordinate relationships between unit commanders. By specifying a chain of command, command relationships unify effort and enable commanders to use subordinate forces with maximum flexibility. Army command relationships identify the degree of control of the gaining Army commander. The type of command relationship often relates to the expected longevity of the relationship between the headquarters involved and quickly identifies the degree of support that the gaining and losing Army commanders provide. Army command relationships include organic, assigned, attached, OPCON, TACON, and ADCON.

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**Table 3-1. Army command relationships**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If relationship is:</th>
<th>Have command relationship with:</th>
<th>May be task-organized by:</th>
<th>Unless modified, ADCON responsibility goes through:</th>
<th>Are assigned position or AO by:</th>
<th>Provide liaison to:</th>
<th>Establish/maintain communications with:</th>
<th>Have priorities established by:</th>
<th>Can impose on gaining unit further command or support relationship of:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organic</td>
<td>All organic forces organized with the HQ</td>
<td>Organic HQ</td>
<td>Army HQ specified in organizing document</td>
<td>Organic HQ</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Organic HQ</td>
<td>Attached; OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attached</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>Gaining Army HQ</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>As required by gaining unit</td>
<td>Unit to which attached</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>Attached; OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>Combatant command</td>
<td>Gaining HQ</td>
<td>Gaining Army HQ</td>
<td>OPCON chain of command</td>
<td>As required by OPCON</td>
<td>As required by OPCON</td>
<td>ASCC or Service-assigned HQ</td>
<td>As required by OPCON HQ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3-1. Army command relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If relation-ship is:</th>
<th>Have command relationship with:</th>
<th>May be task-organized by:</th>
<th>Unless modified, ADCON responsibility goes through:</th>
<th>Are assigned position or AO by:</th>
<th>Provide liaison to:</th>
<th>Establish/maintain communications with:</th>
<th>Have priorities established by:</th>
<th>Can impose on gaining unit further command or support relationship of:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>Parent unit and gaining unit; gaining unit may pass OPCON to lower HQ</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>As required by gaining unit</td>
<td>As required by gaining unit and parent unit</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>As required by gaining unit</td>
<td>As required by gaining unit and parent unit</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>TACON; GS GSR; R; DS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In NATO, the gaining unit may not task-organize a multinational force. (See TACON.)

ADCON administrative control
AO area of operations
ASCC Army Service component command
DS direct support
GS general support
GSR general support–reinforcing

Organic

3-64. Organic forces are those assigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization. Organic parts of a unit are those listed in its table of organization for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and are assigned to the administrative organizations of the operating forces for the Navy (JP 1-02). Joint command relationships do not include the term organic because a JFC is not responsible for the organizational structure of units.

3-65. The Army establishes organic command relationships through organizational documents such as tables of organization and equipment and tables of distribution and allowances. If temporarily task-organized with another headquarters, organic units return to the control of their organic headquarters after completing the mission. To illustrate, within a brigade combat team, the entire brigade is organic. In contrast, within most modular support brigades, there is a “base” of organic battalions and companies and a variable mix of assigned and attached battalions and companies.

Assigned

3-66. Assigned places units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel (JP 3-0). Unless specifically stated, this relationship includes ADCON.
Attached

3-67. Attached places units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary (JP 3-0). Once the mission or function is completed, the attached unit returns to its parent unit.

OPCON

3-68. OPCON is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON is a command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. OPCON should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate JFCs and Service and/or functional component commanders. OPCON normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in OPCON considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training (JP 3-0).

TACON

3-69. TACON is a command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. TACON is inherent in operational control. TACON may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. TACON provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of sustainment assets within the assigned mission or task (JP 3-0). TACON allows commanders below combatant command level to apply force and direct the tactical use of logistics assets, but it does not provide authority to change organizational structure or direct administrative and logistical support.

ADCON

3-70. When commanders establish command relationships, they determine if the command relationship includes ADCON. ADCON is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support (JP 1). ADCON of an Army unit must remain in Army channels and cannot be transferred to a unit of another Service.

3-71. Attachment orders normally state whether the parent unit retains ADCON of the unit. If it does not, the attachment order specifically states that the gaining unit has ADCON. For OPCON and TACON, parent units retain ADCON.

ARMY SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

3-72. Table 3-2 lists Army support relationships. Army support relationships are direct support, general support, reinforcing, and general support-reinforcing. Army support relationships are not command authorities and are more specific than joint support relationships. Commanders establish support relationships when subordination of one unit to another is inappropriate. Commanders assign a support relationship when—

- The support is more effective if a commander with the requisite technical and tactical expertise controls the supporting unit rather than the supported commander.
- The echelon of the supporting unit is the same as or higher than that of the supported unit. For example, the supporting unit may be a brigade, and the supported unit may be a battalion. It would be inappropriate for the brigade to be subordinated to the battalion; hence, the echelon uses an Army support relationship.
The supporting unit supports several units simultaneously. The requirement to set support priorities to allocate resources to supported units exists. Assigning support relationships is one aspect of mission command.

3-73. Army support relationships allow supporting commanders to employ their units’ capabilities to achieve results required by supported commanders. Support relationships are graduated from an exclusive supported and supporting relationship between two units—as in direct support—to a broad level of support extended to all units under the control of the higher headquarters—as in general support. Support relationships do not alter administrative control. Commanders specify and change support relationships through task organization.

Table 3-2. Army support relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If relationship is:</th>
<th>Have command relationship with:</th>
<th>May be task-organized by:</th>
<th>Receives sustainment from:</th>
<th>Are assigned position or an area of operations by:</th>
<th>Provide liaison to:</th>
<th>Establish/maintain communications with:</th>
<th>Have priorities established by:</th>
<th>Can impose on gaining unit further command or support relationship by:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct support1</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Supported unit</td>
<td>Supported unit</td>
<td>Parent unit; supported unit</td>
<td>Supported unit</td>
<td>See note 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcing</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Reinforced unit</td>
<td>Reinforced unit</td>
<td>Parent unit; reinforced unit</td>
<td>Parent unit; then parent unit</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General support-reinforcing</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Reinforced unit and as required by parent unit</td>
<td>Reinforced unit and as required by parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit; then reinforced unit</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General support</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>As required by parent unit</td>
<td>As required by parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** 1 Commanders of units in direct support may further assign support relationships between their subordinate units and elements of the supported unit after coordination with the supported commander.

3-74. Direct support is a support relationship requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance. (Joint doctrine considers direct support as a mission rather than a support relationship). A unit assigned a direct support relationship retains its command relationship with its parent unit, but is positioned by and has priorities of support established by the supported unit.

3-75. General support is that support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. Units assigned a general support relationship are positioned and have priorities established by their parent unit.

3-76. Reinforcing is a support relationship requiring a force to support another supporting unit. Only like units (for example, artillery to artillery) can be given a reinforcing mission. A unit assigned a reinforcing support relationship retains its command relationship with its parent unit, but is positioned by the reinforced unit. A unit that is reinforcing has priorities of support established by the reinforced unit, then the parent unit.
3-77. General support-reinforcing is a support relationship assigned to a unit to support the force as a whole and to reinforce another similar-type unit. A unit assigned a general support-reinforcing support relationship is positioned and has priorities established by its parent unit and secondly by the reinforced unit.

Relationships Of Echelons Above Brigade Sustainment Units

3-78. Forces allocated to the TSC (ESC, sustainment brigades, CSSB, functional battalions, and companies), are normally attached. The TSC is responsible for task organizing forces, establishing command relationships and priorities of support, and allocating resources, as necessary, to support mission requirements. In almost all instances, companies and battalions will be further attached to subordinate logistics mission command headquarters during employment. The command relationship between the ASCC and TSC is assigned.

3-79. The typical relationship between TSC organizations and supported forces is support. However, under certain METT-TC conditions, TACON or OPCON may be appropriate. For example, in a smaller-scale contingency or during support operations where a division is the senior Army headquarters and a sustainment brigade is the senior sustainment command in the AO and/or JOA. Regardless of the formal command and control relationships, the TSC executes its mission command function and maintains situational awareness through command reporting enabled by automated logistics mission command systems, and other mechanisms as established by the GCC and ASCC.

Relationships For Brigades And Below

3-80. The armored, infantry and Stryker BCTs and selected support brigades have organic BSBs. The armored BCT/infantry BCT and Stryker BCT forward support company (FSC) is organic to the BSB. The BSB provides support to the maneuver battalions through the FSC; it resources the FSC to set the logistics conditions necessary to ensure maneuver success. Depending on the current operation and situation an FSC may be attached to or placed under OPCON of its supported battalion for a limited duration. The fires brigade FSCs are separate companies (numbered not lettered). They are normally assigned to the BSB and attached or OPCON to the artillery battalion for the duration of an operation, or as determined by the brigade commander. Combat aviation brigades have an organic aviation support battalion and FSCs. However, the FSCs and aviation maintenance companies are organic to aviation brigade battalions, not the aviation support battalion. Within the maneuver enhancement brigade, engineer battalions have FSCs, but military police and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear battalions do not. The engineer battalions are the parent of the FSCs. Support to the battlefield surveillance brigade comes from a brigade support company assigned directly to the battlefield surveillance brigade. The sustainment brigades have neither BSBs nor FSCs.

Priorities Of Support And Unity Of Effort

3-81. From the President, SecDEF, and GCCs, on down to divisions; commanders communicate their requirements and priorities for support through commander’s intent, orders, the planning process, and briefings/conferences (see ADRP 3-0 for in-depth discussion). While doing so, they also ensure that coordination occurs not only with subordinate units, but also with their higher HQ and laterally to units which may be called upon to perform in a supporting role. Commanders at all levels continually ensure cohesiveness and unity of effort. Under the concept of centralized logistics mission command, the TSC and/or ESC supports the GCC or JTF commander by ensuring that all actions throughout the theater of operations or JOA, for which the TSC and/or ESC is responsible, continually support unified action and reinforce the commander’s intent. Commanders at all levels must ensure the supported commander has confidence in the concept of support and that supporting plans enable the objectives of the supported commanders. They do this by continuous coordination, to include attending battlefield update briefings and commanders’ conferences of both the supported commander and their own higher HQ (or sending appropriate command representation). Additionally, assigning liaison officers to the supported commander’s planning staff provides unity of effort and ensures that the supporting commander is knowledgeable of future operations and of the supported commander’s intent throughout the planning cycle.
3-82. Supporting and supported commanders must develop a collaborative environment. Although the value of face-to-face interaction is undisputed, capabilities that improve long-distance collaboration among dispersed forces can enhance both planning and execution of operations. A collaborative environment is one in which participants share data, information, knowledge, perceptions, and ideas. Collaboration provides planners with a view of the whole plan while working on various portions of a plan, which facilitates identifying and resolving conflicts early. The following are some leadership practices of supported and supporting commanders that have proven to be highly effective in the field.

3-83. Because the AO of the sustainment brigades are not typically along divisional boundaries, but rather are METT-TC, one sustainment brigade may provide area support to more than one division (or major combat force) and also more than one sustainment brigade may provide area support to forces belonging to a single division. If more than one division is supported by one sustainment brigade, the TSC, in concert with the ASCC plan, will clarify which division has the priority of effort and will ensure that the sustainment brigade is updated as priorities change. In the instance of more than one sustainment brigade providing support to forces belonging to a single division, the division commander should have to coordinate and request support from only one sustainment brigade with courtesy copy to the TSC and/or ESC. The two sustainment brigades then coordinate their actions for support. This is to ensure optimum and continuing support and instill confidence in the division commander. It should be transparent to the division commander that more than one sustainment brigade is providing support. Normally, the sustainment brigade assigned to provide direct support to the division will also be performing the Manager Review File and Routing Identifier Code-Geographic management for the entire division, while the other sustainment brigade provides support to its designated units.

3-84. During RSOI, the sustainment brigade performing theater opening will provide life support and mission command to any unit undergoing the RSOI process, including units without their HQ. Likewise the sustainment brigade operating a major hub in the theater distribution role will provide distribution direct to the ultimate consignee where possible.

SUMMARY

3-85. This chapter discussed the operational environment, PMESII-PT variables, and theater structure from the COCOM down to the tactical level units. This chapter also discussed how the theater logistics structure facilitates logistics operations through decentralized mission command. Chapter 3 concluded with the command and support relationships of logistics organizations within the AOR. The next chapter completes the discussion of logistics in support of unified land operations through the integration of logistics into the operations process.
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Chapter 4

Integrating Logistics into Operations

Effective integration of logistics sets the conditions to ensure mission success and extend strategic and operational reach. Integration begins with the operations process—planning, preparation, execution, and continuous assessment. It is conducted simultaneously and in synchronization with the operations plan development. Logistics must be integrated across each level of war and with joint and multinational operations. Chapters 1-3 provided the overview of logistics and discussed logistics operations from the strategic level down to the tactical level of war. Chapter 4 brings it all together and covers how logistics is integrated into the operations process to support decisive action. This chapter discusses establishing metrics for logistics operations in order to gauge the success of logistics support provided; planning, preparing, and executing logistics; and provides an example of logistics operations from force projection to theater closing.

INTEGRATING LOGISTICS INTO THE OPERATIONS PROCESS

4-1. The Army’s framework for exercising mission command is the operations process—the major mission command activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation (ADP 5-0). See figure 4-1 on page 4-2 for an illustration of the operations process. Logistics commanders, supported by their staffs, use the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their operational environment; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations. Integrating logistics with the operations process across each level of war is vital for ensuring the synchronization of logistics with the warfighting functions and unity of effort during operations. Integrating logistics with joint and multinational operations allow forces to conduct operations using mutual support capabilities while reducing redundancy and competition for limited resources. Commanders and staffs at every level must make all efforts to integrate logistics with the operations process.
Figure 4-1. The operations process

ASSESSMENT FOR LOGISTICS OPERATIONS

4-2. Assessment is the determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Assessment precedes and guides the other activities of the operations process and is an ongoing process throughout the operations process. Assessment involves deliberately comparing forecasted logistics outcomes with actual outcomes to determine the overall effectiveness of logistics support. More specifically, assessment helps the logistics commanders determine progress toward attaining the desired end state of providing operational reach, freedom of action, and prolonged endurance.

4-3. Logistics commanders should establish quantifiable metrics (measures of effectiveness, measures of performance) and track progress in order to track the effectiveness of logistics support. Examples of metrics include operational readiness rates, customer wait times, percentage of requisitions filled, and quantity of water produced. Examples of tools available for the commander to use to determine progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks logistics include: logistics boards, cells, and centers, the information network, and the Army integrated Standard Army Management Information System.

4-4. Throughout the operations process, logistics commanders integrate their own assessments with those of the staff, subordinate commanders, and other unified action partners. Running estimates provide information in the form of reports, conclusions, and recommendations for directing action for improvement from the perspective of each staff section. Other tools for assessing progress of the operation include the common operational picture, personal observations, after action reviews, and the assessment plan. For more information on the assessment process and assessment planning see ADRP 5-0 and ATTP 5-0.1.

PLANNING LOGISTICS OPERATIONS

4-5. Planning for logistics support begins with analysis and assessment of the conditions in the operational environment with emphasis on supporting friendly forces. It involves understanding and framing the problem and envisioning the set of conditions that represent the desired end state. Logistics planning indirectly focuses on the enemy but more specifically on sustaining friendly forces to the degree
the Army as a whole accomplishes the desired end state. There are several tools available for conducting course of action analysis with a couple of tools highlighted below.

**SUSTAINMENT PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT**

4-6. Sustainment preparation of the operational environment is the analysis to determine infrastructure, environmental, or resources in the operational environment that will optimize or adversely impact friendly forces means for supporting and sustaining the commander’s operations plan. The sustainment preparations of the operational environment assist planning staffs in refining the logistics estimate and concept of support. It identifies friendly resources (HNS, contract, or otherwise accessible assets) or environmental factors (endemic diseases, climate) that impact logistics support.

4-7. Some of the factors considered (not all inclusive) are as follows:

- **Geography.** Information on climate, terrain, and other natural resources in the AO to determine when and what types of logistics are needed. For example, hydrology information determines the need for such things as early deployment of well-digging assets and water production and distribution units.
- **Supplies and Services.** Information on the availability of supplies and services readily available in the AO. Supplies (such as subsistence items, bulk petroleum, and barrier materials) are the most common. Common services consist of bath and laundry, sanitation services, and water purification.
- **Facilities.** Information on the availability of warehousing, cold-storage facilities, production and manufacturing plants, reservoirs, administrative facilities, hospitals, sanitation capabilities, and hotels.
- **Transportation.** Information on road and rail networks, inland waterways, airfields, truck availability, bridges, ports, cargo handlers, petroleum pipelines, materials handling equipment, traffic flow, choke points, and control problems.
- **Maintenance.** Availability of HN maintenance capabilities.
- **General Skills.** Information on the general skills such as translators, truck drivers, mechanics, and skilled and unskilled laborers.

**OPERATIONS LOGISTICS (OPLOG) PLANNER**

4-8. The OPLOG Planner is a web-based interactive tool that assists commanders and staff from strategic through operational levels in developing a logistics estimate. It is designed to support operations typically associated with multi-phase operations plans and orders. The OPLOG Planner enables staffs to develop estimated mission requirements for supply Class I, Class II, Class III(P), Class IV, Class VI, Class VII, Class X including water, ice, and mail. The tool uses the latest Army approved planning rates and force structures. It is updated at least annually to stay current with force structure and rate changes.

4-9. OPLOG Planner allows planners to build multiple task organizations from a preloaded list of units and equipment or from custom built units that are generated or imported. Each task organization is assigned a consumption parameter set that establishes the rates, climate, joint operations phase (i.e. deter, seize initiative, dominate), and Army unified land operations. The planners have the option of using predefined default planning rates or customizing rates based on what a unit is experiencing.

4-10. OPLOG Planner generates the logistics supply requirements which can be viewed by the Entire Operation, each Phase of the Operation, each Task Organization, each Unit, or each Unit’s Equipment. Logistics requirement reports can be printed or exported to automated spread sheets for further analysis or saved for recall to be used in course of action analysis.

**PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISIVE ACTION**

4-11. Army forces demonstrate the Army’s core competencies through decisive action—the continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks. In unified land operations, commanders seek to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative while synchronizing their actions to achieve the best effects possible. Operations conducted outside the U.S. and
its territories simultaneously combine three elements—offense, defense, and stability. Within the U.S. and its territories, decisive action combines the elements of defense support of civil authorities and, as required, offense and defense to support homeland defense (see figure 4-2).

![Tasks conducted outside the United States](image)

**Figure 4-2. Decisive action**

4-12. Decisive action begins with the commander’s intent and concept of operations. As a single, unifying idea, decisive action provides direction for the entire operation. Based on a specific idea of how to accomplish the mission, logistics commanders and staffs refine the concept of support during planning. They adjust it throughout the operation as subordinates develop the situation or conditions change. Often, subordinates acting on the higher commander’s intent develop the situation in ways that exploit unforeseen opportunities.

**Operational Energy**

4-13. Planning for the effective use of operational energy is an essential consideration. Operational energy is the sum of energy and associated systems, information and processes required to train, move, and sustain forces and systems for military operations. Commanders at all levels must reinforce behaviors, and plan for and employ technical solutions that reduce the amount of energy consumed and make more effective use of energy. Energy considerations should be included during mission planning and resourcing and then monitored during mission execution. Commanders should seek out and plan for the use of energy saving technologies and use other techniques that will reduce both the unit and AO operational energy footprint. One such technique is using common/efficient power sources shared by multiple units where possible. Energy conservation practices reduce logistics requirements, increase operational reach and freedom of action, and prolong endurance.

**Logistics Support to Offensive Tasks**

4-14. An offensive task is a task conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers (ADRP 3-0). Logistics operations in support of offensive operations are typically intense, requiring commanders and staffs to plan for increased requirements and demands on sustainment. Logistics planners work closely with other warfighting function staffs to determine the scope of the operations and develop estimates for quantity and types of support required. They anticipate where the greatest need might occur and develop a priority of support. Logistics planners may consider positioning logistics units in close proximity to operations to reduce response times for critical support. They also consider alternative methods for delivering logistics in emergency situations.

4-15. To maintain momentum and freedom of action, coordination between staff planners must be continuous. During offensive operations, certain requirements present special challenges. The most important materiel is typically fuel (Class III Bulk) and ammunition (Class V), Class VII, and movement
control. Based on planning assessments, logistics commanders direct the movement of these and other support to meet anticipated requirements.

4-16. Another challenge in planning for and sustaining an offensive operation is the lengthened lines of communication (LOCs). Widely dispersed forces, longer LOCs, and congested road networks increase stress on transportation systems. As a result, a combination of ground and aerial delivery may be planned to accommodate the distribution. Distribution managers and movement control units synchronize movement plans and priorities according to the commander’s priority of support. Distribution must be closely coordinated and tracked to ensure delivery of essential support. The routing function of movement control becomes an essential process for coordinating and directing movements on main supply routes or alternate supply routes, and regulating movement on LOCs to prevent conflict and congestion.

4-17. Using contractors during logistics support to offensive operations entails great risk and raises significant practical and legal considerations. However when necessary, the force commander may be willing to accept this risk and use contractors in forward areas. Commanders should seek counsel from their judge advocates when considering the use of contractors during offensive operations.

LOGISTICS SUPPORT TO DEFENSIVE TASKS

4-18. A defensive task is a task conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks (ADRP 3-0).

4-19. The commander positions assets so they can support the forces in the defense and survive. Requirements for sustainment of forces in the defense depend on the type of defense. For example, increased quantities of ammunition and decreased quantities of fuel characterize most defensive operations. However, in a mobile defense, fuel usage may be a critical factor. Conversely, in a fixed defensive position, fuel requirements are lower.

4-20. Typically, defensive operations require more centralized control. Movements of supplies, replenishment, and troops within the AO have to be closely and continuously coordinated, controlled, and monitored. In retrograde operations (a type of defense) special care is necessary to assure that combat units receive necessary support across the depth of the AO and that the logistics units and stocks are not lost as the unit moves away from enemy activity.

4-21. Distribution managers’ direct resupply forecasted items to designated units. Increases in items such as barrier and construction materials should be pushed to designated collection points for unit retrieval whenever possible. Planners should consider the impact of increased ammunition expenditures on available transportation assets.

LOGISTICS SUPPORT TO STABILITY TASKS

4-22. Stability operations is an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the U.S. in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (See JP 3-0.)

4-23. Although Army forces focus on achieving the military end state, they ultimately need to create conditions where the other instruments of national power are preeminent. Sustainment of stability operations often involves supporting U.S. and non-governmental organizations in a wide range of missions and tasks. The tasks most impacted by logistics are briefly discussed below.

Establish Civil Security

4-24. Civil security involves providing for the safety of the HN and its population, including protection from internal and external threats. Logistics staffs must consider plans to support internment/resettlement operations. Logistics support may be provided to these operations until HNS, non-governmental organization, and other government organizations are available.

4-25. Logistics planners must address the support of internment/resettlement operations. Logistics support to internment/resettlement involves all of the elements of logistics. For example planners should consider
general engineering support horizontal and vertical construction of detention centers, as well as repair and maintenance of the infrastructure.

**Restore Essential Services**

4-26. Efforts to restore essential services involve developing HN capacity to operate, maintain, and improve those services. At the tactical or local level, logistics in support of civil authorities will restore essential civil services as defined in terms of immediate humanitarian needs (such as providing food, water, and shelter) necessary to sustain the population until local civil services are restored. Other logistics tasks associated with restoration of services include support to dislocated civilians and demining operations.

**Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development**

4-27. The role of logistics in supporting infrastructure development is significant, especially at the local level. Here the emphasis is on generating employment opportunities, infusing monetary resources into the local economy, stimulating market activity, fostering recovery through economic development, and supporting the restoration of physical infrastructure. Drawing on local goods, services, and labor through contracting, presents the force an opportunity to infuse cash into the local economy, which in turn stimulates market activity.

**LOGISTICS SUPPORT TO DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES TASKS**

4-28. Defense support of civil authorities is support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD component assets, and National Guard forces (when the SecDEF, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, USC, status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Civil authorities typically request assistance only when the size and scope of events exceed the capabilities or capacities of domestic civilian agencies. Defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) tasks are conducted within the U.S., and DOD forces are always subordinate to civilian control (See ADRP 3-28 for more information). Army forces support civil authorities in a DSCA situation by performing four primary tasks:

- Provide support for domestic disaster.
- Provide support for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives incidents.
- Provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies.
- Provide other designated support.

4-29. Restoring the transportation infrastructure in the area is central to economic recovery. General engineering is required in order to initiate immediate improvement of the transportation network. These networks enable freedom of maneuver, logistics support, and the movement of personnel and material to support ongoing operations.

**PREPARING FOR LOGISTICS OPERATIONS**

4-30. Preparation for logistics support to operations consists of activities performed by units to improve their ability to execute an operation. Preparation consists of those activities performed by units and Soldiers to improve their ability to execute an operation (ADP 5-0). For logistics to be effective, several actions and activities are performed across the levels of war to properly prepare forces for operations.

**REHEARSALS AND TRAINING**

4-31. Rehearsals are a vital component of preparing for logistics operations. A rehearsal is a session in which the commander and staff or unit practices expected actions to improve performance during execution (ADRP 5-0). The integration of logistics and operational rehearsals are essential preparation activities. Rehearsals allow leaders to practice synchronizing operations at times and places critical to mission accomplishment. Large rehearsals, such as rehearsal of concept drill, require considerable resources, but provide the most planning, preparation, synchronization, and training benefit. Effective rehearsals imprint a
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mental picture of the sequence and synchronization of the operation’s key actions. Rehearsals improve mutual understanding and coordination of subordinate and supporting leaders and units. Depending on circumstances, units may conduct a full dress rehearsal. The extent of rehearsals depends on METT-TC. See ATTP 5-0.1 for a discussion of the different types of rehearsals.

LIAISON

4-32. Establishing liaison is necessary for preparation of logistics operations. Liaison is that contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action (JP 3-08). The liaison officer (LNO) is the personal and official representative of the sending organization’s commander and should be authorized direct face-to-face liaison with the supported commander. LNOs must have the commander’s full confidence and the necessary rank and experience for the mission. Using an LNO conserves manpower while guaranteeing the consistent, accurate flow of information, coordination, advice, and assistance.

4-33. LNOs are essential for logistics for several reasons. LNOs provide quick information on mission changes thus enabling responsive adjustments in support of the operation. The LNO enables logistics command staffs and supported command staffs in their planning and coordination, thereby assuring unity of effort. The LNO is an important advisor to the supported commander aiding in the employment of logistics assets. LNOs may also bridge the understanding between unified action partners and logistics planners to ensure effective use and acquisition of resources.

NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS

4-34. Negotiating HNS and theater support contracting agreements may include pre-positioning of supplies and equipment, civilian support contracts, OCONUS training programs, and humanitarian and civil assistance programs. These agreements are designed to enhance the development and cooperative solidarity of the HN and provide infrastructure compensation should deployment of forces to the target country be required. The pre-arrangement of these agreements reduces planning times in relation to contingency plans and operations.

4-35. Negotiation of agreements enables access to HNS resources identified in the requirements determination phase of planning. This negotiation process may facilitate force tailoring by identifying available resources (such as infrastructure, transportation, warehousing, and other requirements) which if not available would require deploying additional logistics assets to support.

OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT

4-36. Operational contract support plays an ever increasing role in the sustainment of operations and is an integral part of the overall process of obtaining support. Contract support is used to augment other support capabilities by providing an additional source for required supplies and services. Because of the importance and unique challenges of operational contract support, commanders and staffs need to fully understand their role in managing contract support in the AO.

4-37. The requiring activity (normally brigade through ASCC level units), in close coordination with the supporting contracting unit/office or Team LOGCAP-Forward, must be able to describe what is needed to fulfill the minimum acceptable standard for the government. A detailed description of the requirement is instrumental in allowing the contracting officer to create a solicitation against which bidders can submit a proposal and successfully deliver in accordance with the terms of the contract. As part of this process, the requiring activity is responsible to do basic research to ensure the required support is not available through the non-commercial means (organic military support, multinational, and/or HNS sources) and to determine if there are any commercial standards for the item of support along with potential local sources of support.

4-38. The requiring activity, with support and guidance from the supporting contracting office and Team LOGCAP-Forward staff, is also required to develop an independent government estimate and, for service contracts, a performance work statement (sometimes referred to as a statement of work). The requiring activity then must obtain staff and command approval of the requirements packet. While the supporting contracting unit will provide requirements development process advice and guidance, it is ultimately the
requiring activity's responsibility to ensure that this packet is “acquisition ready” developed, staffed, approved, prioritized, and funded in accordance with local command policies.

4-39. Once the contract support request is approved, the requiring activity must also be prepared to provide government oversight assistance to the contracting organization, that includes at a minimum, qualified contracting officer representative support for all service contract and receiving official support (for community contracts). Finally, all requiring activities must ensure contract support is properly integrated into their operations in the areas of government furnished support, contractor accountability, force protection measures (to include biometric vetting of HN contractor personnel), and so forth (see AR 715-9, JP 4-10, FM 4-92, and ATTP 4-10).

4-40. An important capability for the commander is to incorporate contract support with operational reach. The major challenge is ensuring that theater support and external support contracts are integrated with the overall sustainment plan. It is imperative that the TSC and/or ESC SPO and the ASCC G-4 coordinate with the supporting CSB. The CSB assists the theater Army G-4 to develop the contracting support integration plans. The CSB commands contracting deployed units to support those plans. Close coordination with the TSC and CSB is necessary to ensure proper execution of the contract support integration plan. (See chapter 2 for more information on theater support contracts, external support contracts, and system support contracts).

ARMY PRE-POSITIONED STOCKS

4-41. The APS program is a key Army strategic program. APS is essential in facilitating strategic and operational reach. USAMC executes the APS program and provides accountability, storage, maintenance, and transfer (issue and receipt) of all equipment and stocks (except subsistence items which are managed by DLA for the Army). The reserve stocks are intended to provide support essential to sustain operations until resupply LOCs can be established. Prepositioning of stocks in potential theaters provides the capability to rapidly resupply forces until air and sea LOCs are established. Army prepositioned stocks are located at or near the point of planned use or at other designated locations. This reduces the initial amount of strategic lift required for power projection, to sustain the war fight until the LOC with CONUS is established, and industrial base surge capacity is achieved.

4-42. The four categories of APS are: prepositioned unit sets, operational projects stocks, Army war reserve sustainment stocks, and War Reserve Stocks for Allies (FM 3-35.1).

Prepositioned Unit Sets

4-43. Prepositioned unit sets consist of prepositioned organizational equipment (end items, supplies, and secondary items) stored in unit configurations to reduce force deployment response time. Materiel is prepositioned ashore and afloat to meet the Army's global prepositioning strategic requirements of more than one contingency in more than one theater of operations.

Operational Projects Stocks

4-44. Operational projects stocks are materiel above normal table of organization and equipment, table of distribution and allowances, and common table of allowance authorizations, tailored to key strategic capabilities essential to the Army’s ability to execute force projection. They authorize supplies and equipment above normal modified table of organization and equipment authorizations to support one or more Army operation, plan, or contingency. They are primarily positioned in CONUS, with tailored portions or packages prepositioned overseas and afloat. The operational projects stocks include aerial delivery, mortuary affairs, and force provider base camp modules.

Army War Reserve Sustainment Stocks

4-45. Army War reserve sustainment stocks are acquired in peacetime to meet increased wartime requirements. They consist of major and secondary materiel aligned and designated to satisfy wartime sustainment requirements. The major items replace battle losses and the secondary items provide minimum essential supply support to contingency operations. Stocks are prepositioned in or near a theater of
operations to reduce dependence on strategic lift in the initial stages of a contingency. They are intended to last until resupply at wartime rates or emergency rates are established.

**War Reserve Stocks for Allies**

4-46. War Reserve Stocks for Allies is an Office of the SecDEF directed program that ensures U.S. preparedness to assist designated allies in case of war. The U.S. owns and finances War Reserve Stocks for Allies assets and prepositions them in the appropriate theater.

4-47. Land-based APS in Korea, Europe, or Southwest Asia allow the early deployment of a BCT to those locations. These prepositioned sets of equipment are essential to the timely support of the U.S. National military strategy in the areas of U.S. national interest and treaty obligations. Fixed land-based sites store Army prepositioned sets of BCT equipment, operational projects stocks, and sustainment stocks. Land-based sets can support a theater lodgment to allow the off-loading of Army pre-positioned afloat equipment and can be shipped to support any other theater worldwide (see FM 3-35.1).

4-48. The Automated Battlebook System contains details on each APS program. G-3 planners and unit movement officers use Automated Battlebook System to identify equipment in the categories to accompany troops and not authorized for prepositioning. This automated system also provides a consolidated list of all APS stockpile inventories. Automated Battlebook System supports deployment planning by providing the deploying unit with a contingency-updated database for all APS equipment and selected supplies in prepositioned locations. AFSBs coordinate APS support to include command over units responsible for maintaining, issuing, and accounting for APS unit equipment and supplies.

4-49. Army prepositioned afloat is the expanded reserve of equipment for an infantry BCT, theater-opening sustainment units, port-opening capabilities, and sustainment stocks aboard forward-deployed prepositioned afloat ships. Army prepositioned afloat operations are predicated on the concept of airlifting an Army infantry BCT with sustainment elements into a theater to link up with its equipment and supplies prepositioned aboard Army prepositioned afloat ships (see FM 3-35.1).

**EXECUTING LOGISTICS OPERATIONS**

4-50. Execution means putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission (ADP 5-0). It focuses on concerted actions to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Execution of logistics operations includes the range of operations from force projection to theater closing and drawdown.

**STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL REACH AND ENDURANCE**

4-51. Strategic and operational reach and endurance enable force projection. Strategic reach is the distance a nation can project decisive military power against complex, adaptive threats operating anywhere. Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities (JP 3-0). The ability to conduct strategic and operational reach combines joint military force projection capabilities.

4-52. Army forces increase the joint force’s strategic reach by securing and operating bases in the AOR. However, Army forces depend on joint-enabled force projection capabilities to deploy and sustain them across intercontinental distances. In many instances, land operations combine direct deployment with movements from intermediate staging bases located outside the operational area.

4-53. Extending operational reach is a paramount concern for commanders. To achieve the desired end state, forces must possess the necessary operational reach to establish and maintain conditions that define success. Commanders and staffs increase operational reach through deliberate, focused operational design, and the appropriate sustainment to facilitate endurance.

4-54. Endurance stems from the ability to maintain, protect, and sustain forces, regardless of how far away they are deployed, how austere the environment, or how long land power is required. Endurance is enabled by an Army distribution system that provides forces with a continuous flow of sustainment. A discussion of the Army distribution system is presented later in this chapter.
LOGISTICS SUPPORT TO FORCE PROJECTION

4-55. Force projection is the ability to project the military instrument of national power from the U.S. or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations (JP 3-0). It includes the processes of mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces. These processes are a continuous, overlapping, and repeating sequence of events throughout an operation.

4-56. Force projection operations are inherently joint and require detailed planning and synchronization. Logistics support to force projection operations is a complex process involving the GCC, strategic and joint partners such as USTRANSCOM, and transportation component commands like Air Mobility Command, Military Sealift Command, SDCC, USAMC, DLA, Service Component Commands, and Army generating forces.

4-57. The Army relies on air and sea transportation to reach most theaters of operations. SDCC is the ASCC to and primary interface with USTRANSCOM. SDCC is responsible for coordinating strategic surface movement, and common user port management, to include commercial and mode neutral movement, in the deployment of Army forces to theater and their redeployment from theater.

4-58. USAMC plays a critical role in force projection. USAMC manages Army equipment throughout all phases of deployment and redeployment. It maintains APS, ashore and afloat. USAMC and ASA(ALT) manage equipment requirements for units undergoing modernization, theater-provided equipment, predeployment, and operational theater support and subsequent redeployment equipping. In accordance with the direction of HQDA and affected Army commands and direct reporting units, USAMC manages the redistribution of equipment affected by restationing, and impacts or changes requiring disposition of Army equipment and supplies. Through the ASC, USAMC assists Forces Command (FORSCOM) with the rapid projection of Army forces to the JOA and their redeployment, integrates Army logistics with joint and strategic partners in the national sustainment base, and coordinates distribution plans with USTRANSCOM and other strategic partners.

Mobilization

4-59. Mobilization is the process of bringing the armed forces to a state of readiness in response to a contingency. Logistics builds and maintains force readiness. Army generating sustainment forces in the execution of its Title 10 mission prepare Army forces for unified land operations. Upon alert for deployment generating force sustainment organizations, ensure Army forces are manned, equipped, and meet all Soldier readiness criteria. IMCOM operates Army installations that serve as deployment platforms. Army active and reserve component units mobilize from Army installations that ensure Soldiers, equipment, materiel, and medical readiness are verified prior to deployment.

Deployment

4-60. Logistics is crucial to the deployment of forces. Deployment is the movement of forces to an operational area in response to an order. It requires joint and Service sustainment capabilities to strategically move and maintain deploying forces. Joint transportation assets including air and sealift capabilities provide the movement capabilities for the Army. Army forces are moved to APOEs and SPOEs generally by commercial means to begin the deployment process. Logistics commands monitor and track unit deployment status and provide information to Army HQ.

THEATER OPENING

4-61. Theater opening is the ability to rapidly establish and initially operate ports of debarkation, to establish the distribution system and logistics bases, and to facilitate port throughput for the reception, staging, and onward movement of forces within a theater of operations. Preparing for efficient and effective theater opening operations requires unity of effort among the various commands and a seamless strategic-to-tactical interface. It is a complex joint process involving the GCC and strategic and joint partners such as USTRANSCOM, its components, and DLA. Working together, theater opening functions set the conditions for effective support and lay the groundwork for subsequent expansion of the theater distribution system. It comprises many of the sustainment functions including, human resources (including Military
Mail Terminal Team), financial management, health service support, engineering, movement (air/land/water transport, inland terminal operations), materiel management, maintenance, and contracting.

4-62. When given the mission to conduct theater opening, a sustainment brigade is designated a sustainment brigade (theater opening) and a mix of functional battalions and multi-functional CSSBs are assigned based on mission requirements. The sustainment brigade HQ staff may be augmented with a transportation theater opening element to assist in managing the theater opening mission. The augmentation element provides the sustainment brigade with additional manpower and expertise to mission command theater opening functions, to conduct transportation planning, and provide additional staff management capability for oversight of RSOI operations, port operations, node and mode management, intermodal operations, and movement control. The sustainment brigade will participate in assessing and acquiring available HN infrastructure capabilities and contracted support (see ATP 4-93).

4-63. Port opening and port operations are critical components for preparing theater opening. The GCC and associated regional ASCC is responsible for conducting surveys of infrastructures within their AORs as part of the deliberate planning effort and the pre-deployment planning prior to non-notice operations and force commitment. In permissive environments supported by HNs, commanders and staffs coordinate with the HN to ensure sea ports and aerial ports possess sufficient capabilities to support arriving vessels and aircraft. USTRANSCOM is the port manager for deploying U.S. forces. Army has organic port opening and terminal operations forces assigned regionally as well as Service retained.

Joint Task Force Port Opening (JTF-PO)

4-64. The JTF-PO is a joint capability designed to rapidly deploy and initially operate aerial and sea ports of debarkation, establish a distribution node, and facilitate port throughput within a theater of operations. The JTF-PO is designed to deploy and operate for up to 60 days. The JTF-PO is a standing task force that is a jointly trained, ready set of forces constituted as a JTF at the time of need OPCON to USTRANSCOM. See chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of JTF-PO.

Transportation Brigade Expeditionary

4-65. The transportation brigade expeditionary provides mission command of assigned and attached port, terminal, and watercraft units conducting expeditionary port-opening, movement control, and austere intermodal operations at unimproved seaports in support of unified land operations. The transportation brigade expeditionary provides oversight of the Army watercraft and water terminal assets. The transportation brigade expeditionary has the ability to perform port management and can provide mission command to both operating and generating force deployed units.

Seaports

4-66. SDDC is the single port manager for all common user SPODs. The single port manager may have OPCON of a port support activity provided by any unit. The port support activity assists in moving unit equipment from the piers to the staging/marshaling/loading areas, assisting the aviation support element with movement of helicopters in preparation for flight from the port, providing limited maintenance support for equipment being offloaded from vessels, medical support, logistics support, and security for port operations.

4-67. Ideally, the SPOD will include berths capable of discharging large medium speed roll-on/roll-off ships. The SPOD can be a fixed facility capable of discharging a variety of vessels, an austere port requiring ships to be equipped with the capability to conduct their own offloading, or beaches requiring the conducting of logistics over-the-shore operations. Whatever the type of SPOD, it should be capable of accommodating an armored BCT.

4-68. When vessels arrive at the SPOD, the port manager is responsible for discharging the unit equipment, staging the equipment, maintaining control and ITV, and releasing it to the unit. The port commander remains responsible for unit equipment and supplies until they reach the staging area where arriving units assume responsibility for their supplies and equipment. This includes minimum standards that are critical for the physical security/processing of DOD sensitive conventional arms, ammunition, and explosives, including non-nuclear missiles and rockets.
4-69. The movement control team (MCT) manages the processing of the units’ equipment for onward movement. Their actions are based on advanced manifests received via the Global Air Transportation Execution System, available transportation, theater priorities, tactical situation, and throughput capacity.

4-70. The Theater Gateway Personnel Accounting Team and supporting human resources company and platoons will normally operate at the SPOD. The MCT that has responsibility for the SPOD, coordinates personnel accounting with the supporting CSSB or sustainment brigade for executing life support functions (billeting, feeding, transportation, and so forth) for personnel who are transiting into or out of the theater.

Aerial Ports

4-71. The APOD is an airfield that has been designated for the sustained air movement of personnel and materiel. It is designated an APOD by the supported CCDR in coordination with USTRANSCOM. Reception at the APOD is coordinated by the senior logistics commander and executed by the Contingency Response Group/Element (Air Force), a MCT, an arrival and departure control group, or both, depending on the magnitude of the operations. The MCT and/or arrival and departure control group must be in the lead elements of the transported force. Augmentation with cargo transfer companies, cargo documentation teams, theater support contractor, and HNS is desired to rapidly clear the port. The port MCT has the mission of coordinating transport services for the APOD and ensuring quick clearance of cargo movements into and out of the APOD. Both Air Force and Army have responsibilities at an APOD.

4-72. Air Mobility Command is the single port manager for all common user APODs. Ideally, the APOD will provide runways of varying capacity, cargo handling equipment, adequate staging areas, multiple links to the road and rail network, and a qualified work force. The single port manager has OPCON of an arrival and departure control group provided by the sustainment brigade that has the theater opening mission. The arrival and departure control group assists in moving unit equipment from the aircraft to the staging/marshaling/loading areas. It also assists the aviation support element with movement of helicopters in preparation for flight from the APOD.

4-73. The arrival and departure control group coordinates with the MCT for clearance of personnel and equipment from the APOD. The Air Force and the inland cargo transfer company do the offloading of aircraft and move them to the staging area for onward movement. The inland cargo transfer company discharges, loads, and transships cargo at air, rail, or truck terminals.

Employment

4-74. Employment is the conduct of operations to support a JFC. It prescribes how to apply force and/or forces to attain specified national strategic objectives. Employment encompasses a wide array of operations—including but not limited to—entry operations, decisive operations, and post-conflict operations. Employment includes RSOL, through sustainment preparation activities discussed earlier, Army forces which are able to enter established ports, assemble units for operations, and move personnel and equipment to operational areas.

Basing

4-75. A base is a locality from which operations are projected or supported (JP 4-0). The base includes installations and facilities that provide sustainment. Bases may be joint or single Service areas. Commanders often designate a specific area as a base and assign responsibility for protection and terrain management with the base to a single commander. Units located within the base are TACON to the base commander, primarily for the purpose of facilitating local base defense. Within large bases, controlling commanders may designate base clusters for mutual protection and mission command.

4-76. The generating force provides capabilities to establish, operate, and manage bases in support of contingency operations. To support base development, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers maintains base development teams that operating forces access through reach. IMCOM also provides capabilities to operate and manage bases in support of JFCs. These capabilities have a contingency operations focus, emphasizing flexibility and responsiveness. Generating force organizations develop installations according to standard templates, modified as appropriate to local circumstances. This provides common levels of support for all of the Services.
In addition to standard base operations, the generating force provides CCDRs capabilities for conducting theater-specific training. One example is ranges for the conduct of live fire exercises. Another is rehearsals and facilities for training in the use of electronic warfare. Other capabilities include training programs to refine the preparation of units and Soldiers for the operational environment.

**Warehouse And Billeting And Other Support**

4-78. Warehousing, billeting, and other infrastructure capabilities must be identified at each port of debarkation prior to the arrival of forces in theater. Any limitations influence the efficiency of the entire sustainment system. Host nation infrastructure such as electrical power grids, sanitation, bulk petroleum, oil, and lubricant availability, petroleum, oil, and lubricant 'tank farms', and potable water sources and facilities are important to the successful employment and deployment of forces.

4-79. Force provider is the Army’s system for providing life support for transient forces deploying to operations. Force provider missions include theater RSOI and base camps for military operations. Force provider offers environmentally controlled billeting, feeding, and field hygiene (laundry, shower, and latrine) capabilities. Add on capabilities include: cold weather kit; prime power connection kit; and morale, welfare, and recreation kit. For more information see FM 4-20.07.

**Intermediate Staging Bases (ISB)**

4-80. An ISB is a secure base established near, but not in, the AOR through which forces and equipment deploy (figure 4-3 on page 4-14). While not a requirement in all situations, the ISB may provide a secure, high-throughput facility when circumstances warrant. The commander may use an ISB as a temporary staging area en route to a joint operation, as a long-term secure forward support base, and/or secure staging areas for redeploying units, and noncombatant evacuation operations.

4-81. An ISB is task organized to perform staging, support, and distribution functions as specified or implied by the CCDR and the theater Army operations order. The ISB task organization is dependent on the operational situation and the factors of METT–TC. It may provide life support to staging forces in transit to operations or serve as a support base supporting the theater distribution plan.

4-82. As a support base, an ISB may serve as a transportation node that allows the switch from strategic to intratheater modes of transportation. Whenever possible an ISB takes advantage of existing capabilities, serving as a transfer point from commercial carriers to a range of tactical intratheater transport means that may serve smaller, more austere ports. Army forces may use an ISB in conjunction with other joint force elements to pre-position selected sustainment capabilities. ISB personnel may perform limited sustainment functions, such as materiel management and selected sustainment maintenance functions.

![Figure 4-3. Basing](image-url)
Forward Operating Bases

4-83. Forward operating bases extend and maintain the operational reach by providing secure locations from which to conduct and sustain operations. They not only enable extending operations in time and space; they also contribute to the overall endurance of the force. Forward operating bases allow forward deployed forces to reduce operational risk, maintain momentum, and avoid culmination.

4-84. Forward operating bases are generally located adjacent to a distribution hub. This facilitates movement into and out of the operational area while providing a secure location through which to distribute personnel, equipment, and supplies. For more information on basing see FM 3-34.400.

Sustainment

4-85. Sustainment includes the provision of logistics, personnel services, and health service support required to maintain and prolong operations until mission accomplishment. The increasingly interconnected global environment allows the generating force to apply its sustainment capabilities directly within the JOA. These capabilities include contingency and sustainment contracting; the maintenance and repair of equipment; acquisition, logistics, and technology functions; and health service support. Generating force support to sustaining operations focuses on logistics and health service support. For more information on personnel services and health service support see FM 1-0 and FM 4-02.

4-86. USAMC, in coordination with the supported ASCC’s TSC, facilitates the provision of in-theater support from DLA depots, other Services, private industry, and other government agencies. Distribution is a significant part of sustainment operations.

Distribution

4-87. Distribution is the key component for executing logistics. It is based on a distribution system defined as that complex of facilities, installations, methods, and procedures designed to receive, store, maintain, distribute, and control the flow of military materiel between point of receipt into the military system and point of issue to using activities and units. The Army’s segment of distribution begins at the point of need, and terminates at the point of employment and is referred to as tactical movement and distribution.

4-88. Theater distribution is enabled by a distribution management system. Distribution management is the function of synchronizing and coordinating a complex of networks (physical, communications, information, and resources) and the sustainment warfighting function (logistics, personnel services, and health service support) to achieve responsive support to operational requirements (ADRP 1-02). Distribution management includes the management of transportation and movement control, warehousing, inventory control, materiel handling, order administration, site and location analysis, packaging, data processing, accountability for people and equipment, and communications. It involves activities related to the movement of materiel and personnel from source to end user, as well as retrograde operations.

4-89. The DMC orchestrates the distribution of all classes of supply and manages all aspects of theater distribution by maintaining visibility of requirements, managing the capacity of the system, and controlling the execution of distribution operations. The DMC considers the impact of unit movement requirements on the distribution system. It provides current information on location of mode assets and movement of critical supplies along main supply routes. They provide staff recommendations to direct, redirect, retrograde, and cross-level resources to meet the distribution mission and user mission requirements.

Distribution Management

4-90. Theater distribution management is conducted by the DMCs located within the SPO section of the TSC and ESC. The DMC develops the theater distribution plan and monitors distribution performance in coordination with strategic distribution process owners and the support operations staffs in sustainment brigades and BSBs, this coordination ensures timely movement and retrograde of logistics within the CCDR’s area of responsibility. The DMC coordinates distribution with the Human Resources Sustainment Center and ASCC assistant chief of staff, personnel (G-1)/G-4/G-8 to ensure personnel and resources are linked. It exercises staff supervision of movement control units in a theater. Figure 4-4 displays the role of the DMC.
4-91. Materiel management is the warehousing, managing, stock/requirements determination, requirements validation and prioritization for procurement, distribution, redistribution of excess, and retrograding of materiel. The DMC executes materiel management functions centrally at the TSC and/or ESC thus reducing redundant materiel management layers and employing a theater-wide view of resources. It performs materiel management for all classes of supplies (less medical) and maintenance management for those activities for which the TSC has control and responsibility. DMC personnel perform the day-to-day planning for sustainment operations; providing the theater interface between strategic and operational-level support to forces. These planning functions are performed within the parameters of policies, plans, priorities, and allocations developed in coordination with the ASCC G-4.

4-92. In accordance with ASCC support priorities, the DMC provides direction for receiving, storing, and issuing theater stocks. When the required stocks are not available or stock replenishment is required, the requirement passes to the appropriate CONUS national inventory control point. For requirements being considered for local procurement, the DMC validates the requirement prior to forwarding it to the local procuring activity.

4-93. Materiel requisitions flow from the requesting unit directly to SSA warehouse activities. These requisitions are sent to the corps/theater automated data processing service center. The TSC has visibility of all requisitions received at the corps/theater automated data processing service center. This requisition process allows the TSC to reach across theater-wide resources and capabilities to satisfy ARFOR requirements. Enabled by asset visibility, this approach not only reduces but also minimizes the level of stocks required to be stored throughout the theater.

4-94. Materiel management is conducted through the different branches that make up the DMC. These branches are the distribution integration branch, materiel readiness branch, supply branch, munitions branch, mobility branch, and logistics automation branch.
4-95. The materiel readiness branch is responsible for management of CL IX repair parts. The degree of management is proportional to the contribution repair parts make to the operational readiness of the end items they are supporting. Items such as major assemblies, that directly affect the ability of end items to operate in combat, receive high priority and control. Dollar value is another factor that affects management of supplies. Combat essential and high-dollar value items are intensely managed at all levels. Low-cost, noncombat essential items may be managed within the established parameters of the automated logistics systems at the various echelons of supply, thereby allowing the manager to concentrate on fewer items.

4-96. Class IX support at the operational level focuses on maintaining a theater level of supply that provides an on-hand level for all repair parts, and a level of stockage for repair items that will not be sent to the theater via air lines of communication. Easing these supply requirements are the serviceable repair parts that are generated through maintenance. These theater generated repair parts can offset the requirement to support from the strategic level of supply.

4-97. The supply branch is responsible for management of all other classes of supply (less CL I, CL V, and CL VIII). Classes II, III (Packaged), and IV represent a broad range of general supplies. Class II consists of common consumable items such as clothing, individual equipment, tentage, tool sets and kits, maps, administrative/housekeeping supplies, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear protective equipment. Class III (Packaged) consists of packaged petroleum oils and lubricants products that can be handled in basically the same manner as dry cargo. Class IV consists of fortification, barrier, and construction materials.

4-98. The munitions branch is responsible for stockage of Class V in theater. The ASCC establishes priorities for theater Class V, giving priority to the highest usage and most critical ammunition. The TSC coordinates the shipment and delivery of stocks from CONUS according to the GCC’s support plan. Shipment is by either surface ships or aircraft. To immediately support rapid deployment forces, initial shipment is likely to be by air (ammunition accompanying troops and ammunition requirements prior to the forecasted arrival of APS ships). This is followed by APS ships and then surge shipping. The CCDR and JFC sustainment planners must consider total force ammunition requirements in a contingency environment when planning for the movement of stocks and supported forces. The intent is to maximize throughput of ammunition whenever possible. Requirements are then filled using by the sustainment brigade.

4-99. The DMC executes centralized materiel management capability which enables responsive support to theater requirements and reduces customer wait time. It also reduces redundant materiel management layers by centralizing materiel management functions, and employing a theater-wide view of resources.

4-100. The DMC performs materiel management for all classes of supplies (less medical – CL VIII and classified communications security equipment) and maintenance management for those activities for which the TSC and/or ESC has control and responsibility. DMC materiel management functions include managing, cataloging, requirements determination, requirements validation and prioritization for procurement, distribution, redistribution of excess, and retrograde of materiel. These functions are performed within the parameters of policies, plans, priorities, and allocations developed in coordination with the JFC.

4-101. The distribution management of medical materiel is accomplished by a forward support team from the Medical Logistics Management Center, which collocates with the DMC under the mission command of the medical command (deployment support) to facilitate the flow of Class VIII materiel throughout the theater. For more information see FM 4-02.

4-102. In accordance with JFC support priorities, the DMC provides direction for receiving, storing, and issuing theater stocks. For requirements being considered for local procurement, the DMC validates the requirement prior to forwarding it to the local procuring activity.

4-103. Requisitions flow from the requesting unit directly to systems controlled by DMC materiel managers in accordance with standard operating procedures. This streamlined requisition process permits the TSC to reach across theater-wide resources and capabilities to satisfy Army requirements. Enabled by asset visibility, this approach not only reduces but also minimizes the level of stocks required. Figure 4-5 depicts materiel management functions and managers.
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Figure 4-5. Materiel management functions and managers

Storage Management

4-104. Storage management at the theater level includes receipting, storing, issuing, consolidating, and preparing for shipment materiel intended for theater-wide use as well as return to wholesale. It is generally executed in multi-supply class warehouses which stock shipping classes II, III, IV and IX principally, but may also include the Class VIII storage operation under certain circumstances. Storage sites receive and store replenishment from wholesale sources and as serviceable returns from customers. Typically unserviceable items will be stored in separate facilities. Theater-level operations can be executed by Army organizations or, when offered and available, by DLA either from a fixed operation or by DLA’s deployable depot package.

4-105. Army organizations will be the primary provider of storage management in the initial phases of an operation. When offered and available, DLA distribution operations once deployed and/or established may be the main source of theater-level distribution support for classes II, III, IV, and IX and in some circumstances, VIII. However, these operations are likely to be reliant on the CCDR to provide services such as billeting, communications, and force protection.

4-106. If DLA performs theater level storage management for classes of supply that experience returns, such as Class IX, the Army will likely retain responsibility for aspects of retrograde and managing returns, including documentation and identification of returns, and any required repackaging. The Army will also have primary responsibility for managing unserviceable retrograde, including storage. The Army will project this capability forward by deploying augmentee manpower from CSSBs or other units, or developing item classification units for this purpose.

In-Transit Visibility

4-107. In-transit visibility is the ability to track the identity, status, and location of DOD units, and non-unit cargo (excluding bulk petroleum, oils, and lubricants) and passengers; patients and personal property
from origin to consignee, or destination across the range of military operations (JP 3-35). This includes force tracking and visibility of convoys, containers/pallets, transportation assets, other cargo, and distribution resources within the activities of a distribution node.

4-108. Visibility begins at the point where personnel and materiel enter the distribution system. Data concerning personnel and materiel are entered into the appropriate automated system. This data is updated by subsequent ITV systems until it reaches its final destination (See ATP 4-93 for more information on automation systems). The information is accessible to all users regardless of the military service or echelon of command.

4-109. ITV provides the distribution manager the ability to assess how well the distribution process is responding to supported force needs. Distribution managers gain and maintain visibility (items, personnel, units, transition hubs, and transport modes) at the earliest practical point in the management process. This allows managers to operate with timely information. ITV of personnel and materiel is continuous throughout the distribution process.

Retrograde Of Materiel

4-110. Another aspect of distribution is retrograde of materiel. Retrograde of materiel is the return of materiel from the owning/using unit back through the distribution system to the source of supply, directed ship-to location, and/or point of disposal (ATTP 4-0.1). Retrograde includes turn-in/classification, preparation, packing, transporting, and shipping. To ensure these functions are properly executed, commanders must enforce supply accountability and discipline and utilize the proper packing materials. Retrograde of materiel can take place as part of theater distribution operations and as part of redeployment operations. Retrograde of materiel must be continuous and not be allowed to build up at supply points/nodes.

4-111. Early retrograde planning is essential and necessary to preclude the loss of materiel assets, minimize environmental impact, and maximize use of transportation capabilities. Planners must consider environmental issues when retrograding hazardous materiel.

4-112. Contractor or HNS may be used in the retrograde of materiel. This support is planned and negotiated early in the operation. HNS must be identified early enough to ensure they are properly screened and present no security risk. Leaders at all levels are responsible for the adherence of all policies and safety measures by contractors and HNS.

4-113. Retrograde materiel flows through the distribution system from the tactical to strategic levels. Retrograde materiel is consolidated at the lowest supply support activity and reported up through the support operations for distribution instructions. When released by the maneuver commander, USAMC assumes responsibility for providing disposition instructions, accounting, and shipment of retrograde materiel from the theater. For more on the retrograde process see ATP 4-91.

4-114. An approved military customs inspection program must be in place prior to redeployment to preclear not only redeployment materiel but also the shipment of battle damaged equipment out of theater. The theater Army is responsible for establishing the customs inspection program to perform U.S. customs preclearance and U.S. Department of Agriculture inspection and wash down on all materiel retrograded to the U.S. in accordance with defense transportation regulation (DTR) 4500.9-R.

In-Theater Reconstitution

4-115. In-theater reconstitution is extraordinary actions that commanders take to restore degraded units to combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available resources. In-theater reconstitution should be considered when the operational tempo, mission, or time, does not allow for replacements by an available unit. Reconstitution requires both generating and operating force involvement. Generally it should be conducted in a relatively low stress environment.

4-116. The combat readiness of the unit, mission requirements, risk, and the availability of a replacement unit are the keys for considering reconstitution operations. Commanders must closely evaluate the combat worthiness of a unit to determine whether a reconstitution operation should be ordered. Commanders must also decide what type of reconstitution effort would be best for the organization based on METT-TC.
factors. The three major elements of in theater reconstitution are reorganization, regeneration, and rehabilitation.

Reorganization

4-117. Reorganization is action to shift resources within a degraded unit to increase its combat effectiveness. Commanders of all types of units at each echelon may conduct reorganization. Reorganization may be conducted when the operational tempo is such that the risk for removing a unit from the operation may jeopardize the mission. Depending on METT-TC factors there are two types of reorganization operations, immediate and deliberate.

Immediate Reorganization

4-118. Immediate reorganization is the quick and usually temporary restoring of degraded units to minimum levels of effectiveness. Normally, the commander implements immediate reorganization in the combat position or as close to that site as possible to meet near term needs. Immediate reorganization consists of cross-leveling personnel and equipment, matching weapon systems to crews, or forming composite units (joining two or more attritted units to form a single mission-capable unit).

Deliberate Reorganization

4-119. Deliberate reorganization is conducted when somewhat more time and resources are available. It usually occurs farther away from hostile activity than immediate reorganization. Procedures are similar to those for immediate reorganization. However, some replacement resources may be available. Also, equipment repair is more intensive and more extensive cross-leveling is possible.

Regeneration

4-120. Regeneration is the rebuilding of a unit. It requires large-scale replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies. These replacements may then require further reorganization. Regeneration involves reestablishing or replacing the chain of command and conducting mission essential training to get the regenerated unit to standard. Because of the intensive nature of regeneration, it occurs at a designated regeneration site after the unit disengages from operations. The regeneration site is normally situated in a relatively secure location.

4-121. Regeneration requires help from higher echelons and may include elements from the generating force, contract support, and HNS. Since regeneration typically requires large quantities of personnel and equipment, commanders carefully balance these needs against others in the command as well as the mission.

Rehabilitation

4-122. Rehabilitation is the processing, usually in a relatively quiet area, of units or individuals recently withdrawn from combat or arduous duty, during which units recondition equipment and are rested, furnished special facilities, filled up with replacements, issued replacement supplies and equipment, given training, and generally made ready for employment in future operations (JP 1-02).

4-123. Rehabilitation will most likely require similar high levels of support to execute. The main difference is that rehabilitation may occur when time is not a critical factor. If the conditions are such that forces will rotate in and out of operations on a regular basis, commanders may choose to establish a semi-permanent rehabilitation site.

In-Theater Reconstitution Operations

4-124. Regardless of the type of reconstitution operation, sustainment of the operation will be intense. Reconstitution of a unit will require involvement by most, if not all, of the sustainment functions to execute. Logistics support will require a full range of capabilities including field services, maintenance, supply, transportation, contract support, and general engineering, and may include human resources and other sustainment support.
4-125. The sustainment brigade will be crucial to providing the logistical support to reconstitution. It may require support from the AFSB, CSB, and USAMC capabilities to provide the full range of required sustainment.

TERMINATING JOINT OPERATIONS

4-126. Terminating joint operations is an aspect of the CCDR’s functional or theater strategy that links to achievement of national strategic objectives (JP 5-0). Based on the President’s strategic objectives that compose a desired national strategic end state, the supported CCDR can develop and propose termination criteria. The termination criteria describe the standards that must be met before conclusion of a joint operation. These criteria help define the desired military end state, which normally represents a period in time or set of conditions beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power as the primary means to achieve remaining national objectives. Termination criteria should account for a wide variety of operational tasks that the joint force may need to accomplish, to include disengagement, force protection (including force health protection support to conduct retrograde cargo inspections and pest management operations), transition to post-conflict operations, reconstitution, and redeployment. While there may be numerous terminating tasks the Army must achieve, the discussion below is deliberately broad and not all inclusive. The discussion focuses on redeployment, drawdown of non-unit materiel, and transitioning of materiel, facilities and capabilities to HN or civil authorities.

4-127. Planning for the transition from sustained combat operations to the termination of joint operations, and then a complete handover to civil authority, must commence during plan development and be ongoing during all phases of a campaign or major operation. Planning for redeployment should be considered early and continued throughout the operation and is best accomplished in the same time-phased process in which deployment was accomplished.

4-128. Theater closing is the process of redeploying Army forces and equipment from a theater, the drawdown and removal or disposition of Army non-unit equipment and materiel, and the transition of materiel and facilities back to HN or civil authorities. Theater closing begins with the termination of joint operations.

REDEPLOYMENT

4-129. Redeployment is the transfer or rotation of forces and materiel to support another joint force commander’s operational requirements, or to return personnel, equipment, and materiel to the home and/or demobilization stations for reintegration and/or out-processing (JP 3-35). Redeployment can be cyclic or a subset of terminating joint operations.

4-130. Redeployment preparation is actions taken out of contact to ready a unit for its redeployment to home station. During this phase, the primary generating force role is to manage the disposition of unit equipment that will either remain in theater as theater-provided equipment or be subject to retrograde to the sustaining bases for repair or upgrade.

4-131. The deployed ARFOR headquarters is responsible for facilitating units’ movement to ports of embarkation. SDDC manages sea ports of embarkation and prepares military traffic for movement by sea. It also provides capabilities, either with organic Military Sealift Command assets or through contract carriers, to move unit equipment from ports of embarkation to ports of debarkation.

4-132. USAMC, through its Installation Transportation Offices working with the SDDC element at each port, coordinates unit movements from the port to home station. IMCOM, in coordination with FORSCOM, USAMC, National Guard Bureau, U.S. Army Reserve, and other generating force organizations, also facilitates the conduct of reintegration and demobilization as units return from the JOA. Reintegration includes activities to recover equipment and personnel, demobilization processing, and all other activities necessary to facilitate the reintegration of Soldiers and Army Civilians into their families and communities.

4-133. Reuniting unit personnel and their equipment at their home station triggers the start of the lifecycle management process (reset/train, ready, and available to deploy).
**Drawdown**

4-134. Planning for drawdown of non-unit equipment and materiel should occur early in the operational and strategic planning process. Drawdown planning entails more than returning equipment to CONUS. At the strategic level, the requirement for specific types of equipment may necessitate the redistribution of equipment to another AOR.

4-135. Even though equipment drawdown is an important mission in the redeployment operation, it may not be the Army’s or the GCC main priority; thus, prioritization of equipment redistribution/disposition must be established early on to maximize distribution capacity and velocity. A challenge is visibility of strategic-level materiel requirements synthesized into the already established priority timeline. Overcoming this challenge is through strategic-level collaboration between partners including Service HQs, GCCs, USAMC, DLA, and USTRANSCOM to effectively and efficiently strategically reset both Joint and Army forces. Through this partnership, the nation’s resources are preserved for other security needs.

4-136. As planners begin the process of reducing forces in a theater of operations, they must develop a balance between operational capability and sustainment capability. There is a natural tendency to eliminate the sustainment and enabler forces first because they do not provide an inherent capability to engage with the population or enemy. However, as the sustainment and enabling force are withdrawn, there is a direct impact on the operational forces in the form of reduced operational reach and requirements for assumption of additional missions.

4-137. To provide unity of effort and ensure operational freedom of action through rapid return, repair, redistribution, and combat power regeneration for the Army, a USAMC Responsible Reset Task Force provides a comprehensive solution for drawdown. Reset is a coordinated effort to methodically plan and execute the timely, repair, redistribution, and/or disposal of non-unit equipment, non-consumable and materiel identified as excess to theater requirements, to home station, sources of repair, or storage or disposal facilities. Through the phased redeployment of forces, the Responsible Reset Task Force mission will reset the Army in the shortest time possible.

4-138. The TSC and/or ESC work closely with the DLA in the close out of materiel in the theater. The DLA support team serves as the single point of contact to the TSC and/or ESC. The DLA support teams are tasked to provide support to the theater closure plan and are focused on providing support to echelons at the theater level and below based on the priorities of effort. During theater closure, the DLA provides support in the form of adjusting the flow of CL I, II, III (B) (P), IV, VIII and IX to ensure support to the warfighter. DLA could, if requested, provide a theater consolidation and shipping point for departing forces. Additionally, DLA assists Army forward operating base closure by providing expeditionary disposal remediation teams to provide expert advice and oversight to U.S. forces on the preparation for and the closure of Army units.

**Closing Operational Contracts**

4-139. The supporting contracting organization will be required to terminate and close out existing contracts and orders. Ratifications and claims must be processed to completion. Contracting for life support services and retrograde support may continue until the last element departs, but standards of support should be reduced as much as possible prior to final contract closeout. In some operations, the supporting contracting organization may be required to assist in the transition of contracted support (the contracts themselves are not transferable) to the Department of State, a multi-national partner or to the HN. This transition of contract support may include limited continuation of existing contracts in support of high priority Department of State operations. Because of the nature of contract support transition/closeout during termination operations, contingency contracting officers will often be some of the last soldiers to leave the area of operations.

**Port Closing**

4-140. USTRANSCOM, through SDDC, is responsible for providing and managing strategic common-user sealift and terminal services in support GCC’s drawdown or termination requirements. As the single port manager, it is SDDC’s responsibility to integrate and synchronize strategic and theater re-deployment execution and distribution operations within each CCDR's area of responsibility. It ensures
drawdown/termination requirements are met through the use of both military and commercial transportation assets based on the supported commander’s business rules and the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise best business practices.

SUMMARY

4-141. Logistics commanders must integrate and synchronize logistics support with the operations plan and be involved in every step of the operations process. Successful logistics support requires planning, preparing, and executing logistics operations in a manner that provides operational reach, freedom of action, and prolonged endurance. Establishing measurable metrics and conducting continuous assessment of logistics operations enables successful unified land operations.
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<th>ACRONYM</th>
<th>ABBREVIATION</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Army Contracting Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACSA</td>
<td>acquisition and cross service agreement</td>
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<td>ADCON</td>
<td>administrative control</td>
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<td>ADP</td>
<td>Army doctrine publication</td>
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<td>Army doctrine publication</td>
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<td>AFSB</td>
<td>Army field support brigade</td>
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<td>AO</td>
<td>area of operations</td>
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<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<td>APOD</td>
<td>aerial port of debarkation</td>
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<td>APOE</td>
<td>aerial port of embarkation</td>
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<td>APS</td>
<td>Army pre-positioned stock</td>
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<td>AR</td>
<td>Army regulation</td>
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<td>ARFOR</td>
<td>Army forces</td>
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<td>ARSOF</td>
<td>Army special operations forces</td>
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<td>ASA (ALT)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology</td>
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<td>ASC</td>
<td>Army Sustainment Command</td>
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<td>ASCC</td>
<td>Army Service component command</td>
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<td>ATP</td>
<td>Army techniques publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATTP</td>
<td>Army tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCT</td>
<td>brigade combat team</td>
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<td>BSB</td>
<td>brigade support battalion</td>
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<td>CCBN</td>
<td>contracting contingency battalion</td>
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<td>CCDR</td>
<td>combatant commander</td>
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<td>COCOM</td>
<td>combatant command (Command Authority)</td>
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<td>CONUS</td>
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<td>CSB</td>
<td>contracting support brigade</td>
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<td>CSSB</td>
<td>combat sustainment support battalion</td>
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<td>CUL</td>
<td>common-user logistics</td>
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<td>DA</td>
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<td>DAFL</td>
<td>directive authority for logistics</td>
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<td>Defense Contract Management Agency</td>
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<td>Defense Logistics Agency</td>
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<td>DMC</td>
<td>distribution management center</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense Directive</td>
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<td>DODI</td>
<td>Department of Defense Instruction</td>
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<td>DTR</td>
<td>defense transportation regulation</td>
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<td>EA</td>
<td>executive agent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECC</td>
<td>Expeditionary Contracting Command</td>
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<td>United States Army Forces Command</td>
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<td>FSC</td>
<td>forward support company (Army)</td>
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<td>G-1</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, personnel</td>
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<td>G-3</td>
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<td>G-8</td>
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<td>headquarters</td>
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<td>Headquarters Department of the Army</td>
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<td>IMCOM</td>
<td>Installation Management Command</td>
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<td>ISB</td>
<td>intermediate staging base</td>
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<td>ITV</td>
<td>in-transit visibility</td>
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<td>J-4</td>
<td>logistics directorate of a joint staff, logistics staff section</td>
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<td>JDDOC</td>
<td>joint deployment and distribution operations center</td>
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<td>joint force commander</td>
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<td>JLOC</td>
<td>joint logistics operations center</td>
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<td>JOA</td>
<td>joint operations area</td>
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<td>joint publication</td>
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<td>joint task force</td>
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<td>joint task force-port opening</td>
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<td>LCMC</td>
<td>life cycle management command</td>
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<td>liaison officer</td>
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<td>lines of communication</td>
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<td>LOGCAP</td>
<td>Logistics Civil Augmentation Program</td>
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<td>MCT</td>
<td>movement control team</td>
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<tr>
<td>METT-TC</td>
<td>mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available and civil considerations (mission variables) (Army)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCONUS</td>
<td>outside the continental United States</td>
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<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
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<td>OPLOG</td>
<td>Operations Logistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>program manager</td>
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</table>
PMESII-PT political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment, time (operational variables)(Army)
RSOI reception, staging, onward movement, integration
SDDC Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
SecDEF Secretary of Defense
SOF special operations forces
SPO support operations officer
SPOD sea port of debarkation
TACON tactical control
TSC theater sustainment command
TSOC theater special operations command
U.S. United States
USAMC United States Army Materiel Command
USC United States Code
USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

SECTION II – TERMS

alliance
(DOD) The relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. (JP 3-0)

anticipation
The ability to foresee operational requirements and initiate actions that satisfy a response without waiting for an operations order or fragmentary order. (ADRP 4-0)

area support
Method of logistics, medical support, and personnel services in which support relationships are determined by the location of the units requiring support. Sustainment units provide support to units located in or passing through their assigned areas. (ATP 4-90)

base
(DOD) 1.A locality from which operations are projected or supported. (JP 4-0)

coalition
(DOD) An arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 5-0)

container management
The process of establishing and maintaining visibility and accountability of all cargo containers moving within the Defense Transportation System. (ADP 4-0)

continuity
Continuity is the uninterrupted provision of sustainment. (ADP 4-0)

defense industrial base
(DOD) The Department of Defense, government, and private sector worldwide industrial complex with capabilities to perform research and development, design, produce, and maintain military weapon systems, subsystems, components, or parts to meet military requirements. (JP 3-27)

defensive task
A task conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks. (ADRP 3-0)
distribution
(DOD) 5. The operational process of synchronizing all elements of the logistic system to deliver the “right things” to the “right place” at the “right time” to support the geographic combatant commander. (JP 4-0)

distribution management
The function of synchronizing and coordinating a complex of networks (physical, communications, information, and resources) and the sustainment warfighting function (logistics, personnel services, and health service support) to achieve responsive support to operational requirements. (ADRP 1-02)

distribution system
(DOD) That complex of facilities, installations, methods, and procedures designed to receive, store, maintain, distribute, and control the flow of military materiel between the point of receipt into the military system and the point of issue to using activities and units. (JP 4-09)

economy
Providing sustainment resources in an efficient manner to enable a commander to employ all assets to achieve the greatest effect possible. (ADP 4-0)

execution
Putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission. (ADP 5-0)

executive agent
(DOD) A term used to indicate a delegation of authority by the Secretary of Defense to a subordinate to act on behalf of the Secretary of Defense. Also called EA. (JP 1)

force projection
The ability to project the military instrument of national power from the United States or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations. (JP 3-0)

generating force
Those Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the operational Army’s capabilities for employment by joint commanders. (ADP 1)

improvisation
The ability to adapt sustainment operations to unexpected situations or circumstances affecting a mission. (ADP 4-0)

integration
Combining all of the sustainment elements within operations assuring unity of command and effort. (ADRP 4-0)

intermodal operations
The process of using multiple modes (air, sea, highway, rail) and conveyances (i.e. truck, barge, containers, pallets) to move troops, supplies and equipment through expeditionary entry points and the network of specialized transportation nodes to sustain land forces. (ADRP 4-0)

in-transit visibility
(DOD) The ability to track the identity, status, and location of Department of Defense units, and non-unit cargo (excluding bulk petroleum, oils, and lubricants) and passengers; patients and personal property from origin to consignee, or destination across the range of military operations. (JP 4-01.2)

lead Service or agency for common-user logistics
(DOD) A Service component or Department of Defense agency that is responsible for execution of common-user item or service support in a specific combatant command or multinational operation as defined in the combatant or subordinate joint force commander’s operation plan, operation order, and/or directives. (JP 4-09)

logistics
Planning and executing the movement and support of forces. It includes those aspects of military operations that deal with: design and development; acquisition, storage, movement, distribution,
maintenance, and disposition of materiel; acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and acquisition or furnishing of services. (ADP 4-0)

**mission command**
The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. (ADP 6-0)

**mission command system**
The arrangement of personnel; networks; information systems; processes and procedures; and facilities and equipment that enable commanders to conduct operations. (ADP 6-0)

**mode operations**
The execution of movements using various conveyances (truck, lighterage, railcar, aircraft) to transport cargo. (ADRP 4-0)

**movement control**
The dual process of committing allocated transportation assets and regulating movements according to command priorities to synchronize distribution flow over lines of communications to sustain land forces. (ADRP 4-0)

**multinational logistics**
(DOD) Any coordinated logistic activity involving two or more nations supporting a multinational force conducting military operations under the auspices of an alliance or coalition, including those conducted under United Nations mandate. (JP 4-08)

**offensive task**
Task conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. (ADRP 3-0)

**operational environment**
A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

**operational reach**
The distance and duration across which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities. (JP 3-0)

**redeployment**
The transfer or rotation of forces and materiel to support another joint force commander’s operational requirements, or to return personnel, equipment, and materiel to the home and/or demobilization stations for reintegration and/or out-processing. (JP 3-35)

**rehearsal**
A session in which the commander and staff or unit practices expected actions to improve performance during execution. (ADRP 5-0)

**responsiveness**
The ability to react to changing requirements and respond to meet the needs to maintain support. (ADP 4-0)

**simplicity**
Relates to processes and procedures to minimize the complexity of sustainment. (ADP 4-0)

**stability operations**
(DOD) Overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (See JP 3-0)
survivability

(DOD) All aspects of protecting personnel, weapons, and supplies while simultaneously deceiving the enemy. (JP 3-34)
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