During analysis and comparison
of friendly COAs (staff wargaming), the staff identifies a set
of intelligence requirements for each potential friendly COA.
Each requirement supports a friendly decision expected to occur
during execution of a COA. This is the basis of the command's
list of intelligence requirements.
To this list are added those
received from higher units, in the form of intelligence acquisition
tasks, and lower units, in the form of requests for intelligence.
After arranging the list of requirements in priority order, the
collection manager recommends the most important to the commander
PIR are intelligence requirements
which are critical to accomplishing the mission. They are usually
related to the command's COA, becoming apparent during mission
analysis and wargaming. They may, however, come from the intelligence
requirements of higher or lower units.
The commander approves the
prioritized list of intelligence requirements and designates some
of them as PIR. Only the commander can approve PIR.
Each PIR should corm from
the original list of intelligence requirements developed during
wargarning. Hence, each should be focused, specfic, and directly
related to a friendly decision expected to occur during execution
of the COA.
Examples of Poor PIR
An often seen, but very poor,
Examples of Good PIR
Just as there are no standard
situation templates or friendly COAs that will serve in all situations,
there is no standard set of PIR. Good PIR, however, have some
things in common:
Common Excuses For Doing
It The Easy Way
"If I make my intelligence
requirements, and subsequently my PIR, that specific, I will generate
too many PIR. The increased number of PIR and IR will overload
my collection system."
Yes, there are more PIR and
IR, but each of them is clear and specific, and therefore more
likely to be answered. Their more specific focus makes it easier
to develop SIRs and SORs to support them. And, in the end, the
number of SORs will remain more or less constant; the "bad"
PIR that asks four questions will need about as many SORs as four
"There is no way our
staff can situation template and wargame all of the IR we are
going to need."
Once the ASPS develops the
basic threat COA models, and accompanying situation templates,
they can be quickly refined or used as the starting point for
For example, the division
engineer may have a requirement such as "What kind of obstacle
system will the 2d Brigade encounter at OBJ LUCKAU" in order
to plan the amount and type of breaching equipment 2d Brigade
The basic COA models show
the enemy's templated defensive positions, giving the engineer
a starting point for where he might expect to find the obstacle
systems at OBJ LUCKAU. After identifying the four types of systems
the enemy is likely to use on OBJ LUCKAU, he evaluates the differences
between these four systems and decides that only enemy use of
obstacle system type C will change his normal mix of engineer
Accordingly, he rewrites his
IR as: "Will the enemy use obstacle system type C on OBJ
LUCKAU?" With this new focus, ASPS develops SIRs that focus
on the signature items indicating enemy use of obstacle system
type C at OBJ LUCKAU.
"This system of wargaming
intelligence requirements will not work because there are PIR
and IR that need to be answered, but which cannot be linked to
a friendly action. For example, enemy use of nuclear, biological,
and chemical (NBC) weapons."
If enemy use of NBC weapons
really is important to your commander, then the staff should template
and wargame out how, where, and when the enemy will use NBC weapons.
They should also wargame what your command's response or reaction
will be if the enemy should use NBC weapons. For example: Will
you shift main supply routes? Deploy decontamination units to
previously identified sites? Deliver retaliatory fires? All of
these require wargaming and are indeed linked to friendly actions