Commanders seek to apply overwhelming combat power to achieve victory at minimal cost. They integrate and coordinate a variety of functions with the elements of combat power to sustain it at the operational and tactical levels.
C2W, CA, and PA are interrelated operations1 that are conducted to support the Army objective of achieving information dominance in any operational environment-combat or peace. This chapter discusses each element of C2W and the functions of CA and PA and how they support achieving information dominance. CA and PA operations provide liaison and connectivity with essential actors and influences in the GIE and interact with specific elements of C2W. Grouping C2W, CA, and PA together as specific IO provides a framework to promote synergy and facilitate staff planning and execution. This idea is reinforced by including the CA and PA staff representatives in the IO cell or on the information operations battle staff (IOBS) in routine staff coordination (see Appendix D). This construct conceptually provides for greater integration and synchronization of CA and PA with the more traditional warfighting elements of C2W.
Major emphasis was placed on C2W, CA, and PA activities during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Commanders integrated OPSEC, military deception, PSYOP, and EW efforts during Desert Shield to pave the way for successful combat operations. During planning for Desert Storm, the senior leadership recognized that Iraq's C2 was a critical vulnerability whose destruction could enable victory with minimal friendly loss. This is evident from the Secretary of Defense's guidance outlining the military objectives for Desert Storm:
During Desert Storm's air operations, the enemy was selectively blinded by EW and physical destruction to mask friendly force movements and operations. Deception operations continued to enforce erroneous enemy perceptions of the CINC's intentions. EW and precision air strikes against C2 targets were used to disorganize and isolate Iraqi forces. When the ground attack commenced, Iraqi forces were close to disintegration, with numerous formations unable to coordinate their efforts. The need for synchronization was an early lesson learned and demonstrated immediate payoffs. Successfully denying Saddam Hussein the ability to command and control his forces substantially reduced casualties on all sides and significantly reduced the time required to achieve coalition objectives.
Fully aware that the enemy, as well as the public at home, was focused on PA coverage of the confrontation, the coalition used that coverage to confuse the enemy by encouraging speculation on the place, time, and size of the impending attack. At the same time, the coalition learned that immediacy of media attention could have unforeseen consequences for its own strategic, operational, and tactical planning. After the cessation of hostilities, CA elements enhanced the restoration of Kuwaiti governmental and social order and responded promptly and effectively to one of the central unanticipated consequences of the war as Iraqi forces created an enormous refugee crisis in the northern Kurdish provinces of Iraq and in southern Turkey.
To be effective, C2W needs to be fully integrated into the commander's concept of the operation and synchronized with other operations. The synchronization of these actions will require rapid and reliable intelligence support and communications. JFCs [joint force commanders] should ensure that the C2W objectives are part of the planning guidance and priorities.
Joint Pub 3-0
C2W directly supports the Army goal of achieving information dominance and winning any conflict or succeeding in any OOTW quickly, decisively, and with minimum casualties. C2W incorporates both the sword against anadversary's C2 system and the shield against the C2-attack actions of the adversary. This combination of both offensive and defensive aspects into an integrated capability provides expanded opportunities for synergy in warfare. C2W allows the Army and individual commanders to accomplish missions with fewer risks, in shorter time frames, and with fewer resources.
C2W applies to all phases of operations, including those before, during, and after actual hostilities. Even in OOTW, C2W offers the military commander lethal and nonlethal means to achieve the assigned mission while deterring war and/or promoting peace. The offensive aspect ofC2W can slow the adversary's operational tempo, disrupt his plans and ability to focus combat power, and influence his estimate of the situation. The defensive aspects of C2W minimize friendly C2 system vulnerabilities and mutual interference. C2W is defined as--
The integrated use of operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological operations (PSYOP), electronic warfare (EW), and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary C2 capabilities, while protecting friendly C2 capabilities against such actions. Command and control warfare applies across the operational continuum and all levels of conflict.
CJCSI 3210.03, 31 March 1996
The foundation for C2W is robust and redundant command, control, communications, and computer (C4) INFOSYS, coupled with seamless, national-to-tactical, relevant information and intelligence support. The building blocks, or elements, of C2W include-
Thesebuilding blocks contribute to protection of the force and mission accomplishment in various ways, depending on the situation. This situation dependence leads to the building blocks that are shown in a constantly changing pattern in Figure 3-1. The integrated employment of these five elements leads to synergy on the battlefield and results in the most effective execution ofC2-attack and/or C2-protect tasks. The commander drives this C2W process to achieve agility by focusing attacks on the adversary's ability to command and control his forces while simultaneously protecting friendly C2.
Figure 3-1. C2W Construct
Operations security is defined as--
A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities; identifying those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; determining indicators adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and selecting and executing measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.
Joint Pub 3-54
OPSEC is the key to denial. It gives the commander the capability to identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems. It can provide an awareness of the potentially friendly indicators that adversary intelligence systems might obtain. Such an awareness could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information regarding friendly force dispositions, intent, and/or courses of action that must be protected. The goal of OPSEC is to identify, select, and execute measures that eliminate, or reduce to an acceptable level, indications and other sources of information that may be exploited by an adversary.
OPSEC planning is severely challenged by the new family of global commercial capabilities, to include imaging, positioning, andcellular systems that offer potential adversaries access to an unprecedented level of information against friendly forces. The inevitable presence of the news media during military operations complicates OPSEC. The capability of the media to transmit real-time information to a worldwide audience could be a lucrative source of information to an adversary. OPSEC planners, working closely with PA personnel, must develop the EEFI used to preclude inadvertent public disclosure of critical or sensitive information.
Many different measures impact OPSEC. These includecounterintelligence, information security (INFOSEC), transmission security (TRANSEC), communications security (COMSEC), and signal security (SIGSEC). As more and more of the force is digitized, INFOSEC takes on an ever-growing importance.
Military deception is defined as--
Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.
Joint Pub 3-58
Military deception is the primary means to influence the adversary commander's decisions through distortion, concealment, and/or falsification of friendly intentions, status, dispositions, capabilities, courses of action, and strengths. The goal of deception is to cause the opposing military commander to act in a manner that serves the friendly commander's objectives.
Tactical deception had significant positive impacts on the success of Operation Overlord, and, thus the retaking of the European continent in World War II. Deception worked hand in hand with OPSEC to keep the organization and location of the real Overlord cantonments, training sites, dumps, movements, and embarkations carefully hidden. Unbelievable effort was put into creating mock airfields and ports, phony ships, boats, planes, tanks, vehicles, and troop movements, both real and staged. A new era of deception was introduced-the electronic one. German coastal defense radars were destroyed in a calculated pattern. Deception planners purposely left some intact in the Calais region.
The night the invasion was launched, the Allies began massively jamming German radars with chaff. But they purposely did not completely cover their targets. German radar operators could "see" between Allied jamming curtains. And, what they saw was a ghost fleet of small ships towing barges and blimps headed for Calais at eight knots-or the speed of an amphibious fleet. Powerful electronic emitters received the pulse of the German radar and sent it strongly back to the German receivers. For each repetition of this deception it looked to the German operators like a 10,000-ton ship was out there. The small ships also had the recorded sounds of the amphibious assault at Salerno to play over speakers from 10 miles out. German troops ashore could hear the Allies "getting into their landing craft" for the run into the beach. This information threw German intelligence into chaos for several precious hours and played a major role in delaying German counteractions to the actual invasion taking place at Normandy.
Psychological operations are defined as--
Operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and, ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.
Joint Pub 3-53
PSYOP are based on projection of truth and credible message. PSYOP are an essential tool in both C2-protect and C2-attack operations. The Army has shown considerable strength in applying both PSYOP and deception to military operations. PSYOP can proliferate discrete messages to adversary C4I collectors, enhance joint combat power demonstrations with surrender appeals, and magnify the image of US technological superiority. PSYOP elements must work closely with other C2W elements and PA strategists to maximize the advantage of IO. As an example, the Army has shown considerable strength in applying both PSYOP and deception to military operations.
PSYOP's main objective in C2-protect is to minimize the effects of an adversary's hostile propaganda and disinformation campaign against US forces. Discrediting adversary propaganda or misinformation against the operations of US/coalition forces is critical to maintaining favorable public opinion.
As an early commander of Combined Task Force Provide Comfort, it is my belief that much of the success achieved during Operation Provide Comfort can be attributed to the successful integration of PSYOP in support of the overall humanitarian assistance mission. Over five million PSYOP products were dispersed over northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey in support of the Operation's goals and objectives. PSYOP is a true force multiplier."
General John M. Shalikashvili
Electronic warfare is defined as--
Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) or to attack the enemy. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronic warfare support (ES).
EA is the use of jamming, electronic deception, or directed energy to degrade, exploit, or destroy the adversary's use of the EMS. EA can attack the adversary anywhere-from his tactical formations, back to his national infrastructure.
EP is the protection of the friendly use of the EMS. EP covers the gamut of personnel, equipment, and facilities. EP is part of survivability. As an example, self and area protection systems can interfere with the adversary's target acquisition and engagement systems to prevent destruction of friendly systems and forces.
Electronic Warfare Support
ES is conflict-related information that involves actions tasked by or under the direct control of an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy to detect immediate threats. ES is the embodiment of combat information and capitalizes on the timeliness of sensor-to-shooter systems.
Physical destruction is defined as--
The application of combat power to destroy or neutralize enemy forces and installations. It includes direct and indirect fires from ground, sea, and air forces. Also included are direct actions by special operations forces.
The destruction of a hostile C2 target means that adversary C2 capabilities are degraded for a period of time or, if necessary, permanently shut down. Physical destruction is used only after a full, comparative assessment-strategic-through-tactical perspectives-of the trade-offs between preserving the target versus its destruction.
On April 14, 1943, US intelligence experts intercepted and decoded a message revealing that Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of Japan's Navy, would be flying to Bougainville in four days. When analysis determined that Bougainville lay just within the extended range of US P-38 fighters at Henderson Field on Guadalcanal, Allied planners recognized the opportunity to strike at the heart of Japanese command and control and strategic planning in the Pacific.
In less than 48 hours, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz's forces planned and coordinated an operation to shoot down Yamamoto's plane and obtained approval from Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and President Roosevelt.
Yamamoto was known to be invariably punctual, and American planners were confident that his plane would appear over Bougainville on schedule-9:39 am, April 18. At that moment, 16 carefully positioned P-38s from Henderson Field spotted the two Japanese Betty bombers of Yamamoto's party and attacked.
Both aircraft were quickly sent plummeting to the ground, completing a classic information operation that took less than four days from start to finish and rendered irreparable damage to Japanese command and control. The Japanese would feel the impact of this single mission throughout the remainder of the war.
The two disciplines that comprise C2W are C2-attack and C2-protect.
C2-attack is defined as--
The synchronized execution of actions taken to accomplish established objectives that prevent effective C2 of adversarial forces by denying information to, by influencing, by degrading, or by destroying the adversary C2 system.
The three principles of C2-attack are to-
Figures 3-2 and 3-3 illustrate some of the potential relationships between the elements of C2W.
In general terms, C2-attack has four effects that focus on the adversary's C2 infrastructure and information flow to produce a lower quality and slower decision-making process.
Heraclitus of Ephesus in sixth century BC noted that "if you do not expect the unexpected, you will not find it." During the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Germans recognized, but the Russians did not, exploitable deficiencies in the existing Soviet C2 system. Employing the tools of C2W in an interrelated fashion, the Germans were able to effectively disrupt, exploit, and destroy the Soviet C2 system. Using weapons specifically built for C2W, the Germans attacked elements of the Soviet system by air, artillery, and sabotage. The results of these attacks were startling. Due to cross-border German sabotage efforts, many of the Soviet units "did not receive the war alert order when it was issued [from Moscow] on the night of 20-21 June 1941." By 24 June, large gaps had already been torn in the Soviet communications network, thus forcing commanders to rely on easily exploitable, unprotected, radio networks. This, in turn, led to the successful targeting of exposed command posts and associated units throughout the theater. These attacks, because of their effectiveness, led Soviet commanders to prohibit the use of radios because they might give positions away. Using C2W, the Germans had effectively shut down the Soviet C2 system, creating an operational environment that quickly led to a general collapse of the entire eastern front.
Figure 3-2. Mutual Support Within the Elements of C2W
Figure 3-3. Potential Conflicts Within C2-Attack
C2-protect is defined as--
The maintenance of effective C2 of ones own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to, to influence, to degrade, or to destroy the friendly C2 system.
C2-protect can be offensive or defensive. Offensive C2-protect uses the five elements of C2W to reduce the adversary's ability to conduct C2-attack. Defensive C2-protect reduces friendly C2 vulnerabilities to adversary C2-attack by employing adequate physical, electronic, and intelligence protection.
The C2-protect process can best be understood by reverse engineering our C2-attack process. Commanders ask how the adversary can employ destruction, EW, military deception, OPSEC, and PSYOP to disrupt our C2 systems and decision-making process. Having wargamed the adversary's C2-attack courses of action, the commander can develop a comprehensive protect operation, synchronized with the main effort and C2-attack. The commander is guided by the five principles of C2-protect.
The history of the Information Age is being made now. In 1988 we saw the first well-publicized case of a computer virus. This insidious, self-replicating virus known as the Internet Worm penetrated the computer system at the University of California at Berkeley, corrupting thousands of computers on the internet. A computer emergency response team (CERT) had been created at Carnegie Mellon University. In 1993 they had their first large event as they put out a warning to network administrators that a band of intruders had stolen tens of thousands of internet passwords.
When CERT began in the late 1980s, they processed less than 50 events per year. Now they are in the thousands per year. The military is a target of this attack. Recent stories have told of a 16-year-old who compromised the security of more than 30 military systems and more than 100 other systems before he was caught after a 26-day international electronic manhunt. This experience hints at the impact a professional, well-financed effort could have against computer nets. The lesson this evolving history is showing us vividly today is that the information highway is creating a great vulnerability to US forces. We are all familiar with the security of transmitting information over a radio or telephone. But there is an even greater weak spot now in computers, data bases, software (such as decision-making aids and tools), servers, routers, and switches. This vulnerability exists today and is growing in geometric proportions.
The effects of C2-protect mirror those of C2-attack. We can deny information the adversary needs to take effective action. We can influence the adversary not to take action, to take the wrong action, or to take action at the wrong time. We can degrade and destroy his capabilities to perform C2-attack against friendly forces. PSYOP and PA supports C2-protect. PSYOP can drive a wedge between the adversary leadership and its populace to undermine the adversary leadership's confidence and effectiveness. The Commander's Internal Information Program (formerly the Command Information Program), publicized by the PAO, can be extremely beneficial in countering adversary propaganda in the US and among the deployed forces. PA specialists, working with PSYOP and intelligence personnel, can also develop information products that commanders can use to help protect soldiers against the effects of adversary disinformation or misinformation.
CA activities encompass the relationship between military forces, civil authorities, and people in a friendly or foreign country or area. CA activities support national policy and implement US national objectives by coordinating with, influencing, developing, or controlling indigenous infrastructures in operational areas. CA secures local acceptance of and support for US forces. CA is important to gain information dominance because of its ability to interface with key organizations and individuals in the GIE; for example, CA's traditional relationship with NGOs and PVOs such as the International Committee of the Red Cross.
Commanders fully integrate civil-military operations (CMO) into all operations and use CMO to influence, coordinate, control, or develop civilian activities and civil organizations. CA activities play a command support role in all operational environments and across the operational continuum. However, CA operations are most common when supporting the lower end of the operational spectrum.
Many CA activities require specific civilian skills. CA activities most relevant to the GIE and supporting IO are categorized into four major sections:
Public administration provides liaison to the civilian government.
Economics and commerce monitors government economic and commercial agencies, normally only in a civil administration mission.
PUBLIC FACILITIES SECTION
Public communications allocates civilian communications resources for civilian and military use and directs civil communications agencies as required, normally only in a civil administration mission.
SPECIAL FUNCTIONS SECTION
Civil information advises, assists, supervises, controls, or operates civil information agencies and provides TV, radio, or newspaper services.
The nature of CA activities and the need for CA personnel to develop and maintain a close relationship with the civilian populace puts them in a favorable position to collect information. CA information collection activities encompass the complete spectrum of cultural, social, political, and economic issues within the present or potential area of operations. In their daily operations, CA personnel deal with people, equipment, and documents that are prime sources of information. Information collected is often important to other units' staff sections or agencies and supports the CCIR.
CA units are included in the information collection plan of the supported unit. CA units report information that meets the criteria of the supported unit's collection plan. Prime sources of information available to CA units include, but are not limited to-
The information collected can supplement the intelligence effort. US forces need timely and accurate information and intelligence to plan missions, secure the element of surprise, identify and develop targets, and protect US interests across the operational continuum. CA activities are closely tied to the intelligence functions and operations associated with the overall tactical mission.
CA personnel are not, and must not have the appearance of being, intelligence agents. The mission of the unit drives the intelligence cycle. As operational planning begins, so does intelligence planning. Requirements for operational planning are normally for finished intelligence studies, estimates, or briefings. CA planners prepare their estimates from basic intelligence documents that are not primarily written for CA use, such as an area study. Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, and processing of information.
Overall, CA elements collect information that the G2/J2 turns into intelligence. CA forces, if used correctly, can complement the intelligence collection process, especially HUMINT. In some cases, CA elements can also enhance the capabilities of technical intelligence (TECHINT) or intelligence concerning foreign technological development that may have eventual application for military use.
All CA activities require close coordination with military forces, US and foreign government agencies, and nonmilitary agencies with a vested interest in military operations. CA planners must consider all available support to ensure successful completion of the CA mission. In most cases, CA planners directly or indirectly support the agencies assigned by law to carry out national policy. CA planning is a command responsibility. It must be coordinated, at a minimum, with all other staff planners. To ensure success, coordination and cooperation with the following are vital to the conduct of all operations: other US staffs and units, host nation military, coalition military, US Government, foreign governments, international agencies, PVOs, and NGOs.
Effective CA activities require close contact between the US military, the Department of State (DOS), and other US Government agencies. Because DOS formulates and implements foreign policy, it has a vested interest in CA activities. In the area of CA, DOS has primary or joint responsibility with DOD for policy. Some examples are matters involving PSYOP, PA, CA, civil information, or other measures to influence the attitude of the populace and plans for turning CA activities over to civilian control at the end of hostilities.
PVOs AND NGOs
The list of PVOs and NGOs that may be found in an AO could be very large. Approximately 350 agencies capable of conducting some form of humanitarian relief operation are registered with the USAID. Commanders must consider the presence and capabilities of PVOs and NGOs and, when appropriate, coordinate and cooperate with their efforts. Because many of these organizations may have been established in the AO in advance of the Army's presence, they may be a good source of information and knowledge.
CA, PSYOP, AND PA ELEMENTS
CA, PSYOP, and PA elements are able to use the same communications media with essentially the same messages but to different audiences. CA and PSYOP personnel address local populations and enemy forces, respectively, while PA personnel address US forces and national and international news media. Popular American public support contributes to the success of CA. CA and PSYOP personnel provide news and information to the local populace on the effects of combat operations.
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER
Commanders can establish a CMOC to perform liaison and coordination between the military PVOs and NGOs, as well as other agencies and local authorities. Figure 3-4 illustrates additional GIE players that may interact with the CMOC. Relationships with nonmilitary agencies are based on mutual respect, communication, and standardization of support. NGOs and PVOs have valid missions and concerns, which at times may complicate the mission of US forces. As an example, liaison with an organization that is caring for the sick and injured of the local populace may reveal that human rights abuses are occurring. This information could provoke a response by DOS officials to warn local authorities to stop such abuse from happening, as well as increasing the level of protection for the local population by US forces.
CA operations must be integrated into the battle plan, to include providing for timely and accurate reporting of the operation and combating distorted or disinformation disseminated by the adversary. The CA representative to the IOBS-
In concert with the G2/J2 and chief of staff, the CA staff officer (G5/J5) controls, coordinates, and integrates the CA effort at each echelon. One essential function is to prepare and issue a CA annex as part of the unit's OPORDs or OPLANs. See Appendix A, Annex A.
Figure 3-4. Additional GIE Players
In the early spring of 1991, in the aftermath of its humiliating defeat at the hands of US-led coalition forces, the Iraqi Army launched a violent attack against the Kurdish minority in northern Iraq. More than half a million refugees fled across the border into southeastern Turkey. Huddling on exposed mountainsides, they promptly began to become ill and die from starvation, exposure to the bitter cold, and various diseases. The world press reported that over a thousand Kurds, especially children and the elderly, were dying each day.
On April 5, President Bush directed US military forces to "stop the dying." Lieutenant General John M. Shalikashvili, then deputy commander of US Army Europe, was placed in command of the coalition task force Provide Comfort. Elements of several CA units, active and reserve, were redeployed from the Persian Gulf or deployed from Fort Bragg to Turkey under the 353d Civil Affairs Command (USAR), Bronx, New York.
In Turkey, the CA soldiers joined with 10th Special Forces Group to aid overwhelmed relief workers already on the scene. The latter included personnel from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the US Department of State Office of Foreign Disaster Relief, the Turkish Red Crescent, and more than 40 different civilian humanitarian relief organizations, all of which were attempting to care for the Kurds in 40 or more scattered locations. Shalikashvili's greatest problem became coordinating all the organizations' efforts with the US Air Force-the primary means for transporting emergency supplies into the region.
At US European Command Headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, an Army Reserve CA captain with the 353d saw a possible solution. The captain, a software engineer in civilian life, joined with three other CA reservists in an intensive three-week effort, first in Stuttgart and later at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, to design and implement a unique relief supply data base. Their program, later named the Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System (DALIS), combined key data from agencies on the type of aid arriving, storage locations, and intended destinations. DALIS allowed planners to coordinate efforts and deliver the right supplies to the right locations at the right time. These innovative soldiers used the power of the microprocessor to unscramble what threatened to be a logistical, diplomatic, and humanitarian nightmare. By combining data from multiple sources, they provided vital information that reduced redundancy and avoided maldistribution of resources at a critical moment, saving thousands of lives. Using IO, CA soldiers became masters of the situation and made a decisive contribution to the success of Provide Comfort.
Public affairs must be integrated with other battlefield functions to achieve the desired effect of an accurate, balanced, credible presentation of information that leads to confidence in force and the operation
PA fulfills the commander's obligation to keep the American people and the soldiers informed. PA operations help establish the conditions that lead to confidence in America's Army and its readiness to conduct operations. Army operations are of interest to the public and subject to being covered by the media. PA is therefore a function that supports both combat and noncombat operations and contributes to success in war and other military operations.
The inherent challenge is for commanders to understand the dynamics of media coverage. The media can potentially have a quick and pervasive impact on their plans and operations. Its coverage of the development of plans and the conduct of operations may impact and influence strategic decisions in a more profound and immediate way than in the past. PA operations enable commanders to effectively operate with the media. Commanders must also have a better appreciation for the immediacy of media coverage such as personal interviews, live versus taped reports, film versus written dispatches, methods of transmission, and so on.
The commander's information needs are not answered by a single source, but by a combination of many systems and functions, including the news media. The advances in information technology provide potential adversaries with the capability to exploit (deny, distort, degrade, or destroy) information. The PAO must have the capability to monitor the national and international media and identify and assess information relevant to the operation.
The missions of PA, PSYOP, and CA involve communicating information to critical audiences to influence their understanding and perception of the operation. Information communication must be fully coordinated to eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort and ensure unity of purpose. Planning for these operations must be synchronized, and the messages they communicate must be truthful and mutually supportive to ensure that credibility is not undermined and mission success is achieved.
The PAO's support to the commander is multidimensional. The PAO advises the commander on media relations and the PA implications of current and future operations and events. He serves as the official command spokesperson and implements the Commander's Internal Information Program. PA focuses on achieving an accurate, balanced, and credible presentation of timely information that communicates the commanders perspective to enhance confidence in the force and the operation. It provides the critical battlefield function of media facilitation by serving as the interface between the media and the force.
With the broad scope and initiative given to soldiers and units today at every level, one of the primary tools the commander uses is the internal information program. Well-informed soldiers are likely to have higher morale and perform better. Soldiers need and want information from both external and internal sources and are interested in the public perception of an operation. Therefore, PA operations use various communication methods and channels to make this information available to soldiers, other Army audiences, and external audiences. The broad range of missions the Army executes today are done in an environment of global visibility. Media coverage can be pivotal to the success of the operation and achieving national strategic goals.
Every aspect of every operation may be an issue of interest to the media and consequently to the public. Existing and emerging technology puts military operations onto the global stage, often in real time. Soldier actions can induce public reactions, which in turn causes NCA reactions that impact operations without ever engaging US forces. For example, real-time or near real-time reports of the actions of a soldier manning a roadblock, the results of a minor skirmish, or the effects of a major combat action become the subject of discussion. Media personalities, politicians, pundits, critics, academics, and the general public rapidly form positions and opinions, often in pursuit of agendas well beyond the scope and purpose of the operation being reported. They become active participants in the international public debate of events and issues.
Adversaries can also attack the public opinion center of gravity and affect operations without ever engaging US forces. All Army operations can be influenced through planned or inadvertent messages communicated via the GIE. PA and the associated GIE addresses simultaneous effects that are integral to all levels of war (Figure 3-5). In the Information Age, the old separation of public information and internal information activities are compressed.
Providing accurate, timely news, information, and entertainment reduces distractions, rumors, fear, and confusion that could cause stress and undermine efficient operations. Such activities contribute to team building, morale, and unit cohesion. They enhance soldier confidence and understanding. They contribute to ethical behavior, respect for the law of war, private property, the rights of civilians and noncombatants, and human dignity.
Figure 3-5. Multiple Levels of Public Affairs
PA is a battlefield function and has a direct impact on the conduct of operations. It must be fully integrated into the planning process at all levels and across the full continuum of operations. A member of the PA staff serves on the IOBS (see Appendix D). The PA representative assesses media presence, capabilities, information needs and interests, and content analysis of both traditional media and electronic forums such as those on the internet and electronic bulletin board.
Finally, PA operations must be integrated into the battle plan, to include providing for the timely and accurate reporting of the operation, combating distorted or disinformation disseminated by the adversary. The PA representative to the IOBS-
PA is integrated into the OPLAN/OPORD through the PA Annex.
Appendix A, Annex A
provides the information to implement PA media facilitation, news, information
provisions, and force training operations. This annex is coordinated with
all staff agencies, especially those that significantly impact the information
environment, that is, PSYOP, CA, signal, military intelligence, to ensure
that PA activities are synchronized with other activities.
At 1800 hours local (Riyadh) on 27 February 1991, the Gulf War CINCCENT and ARCENT commanders agreed that in all likelihood no more than 24 hours of battle remained. At 2100 hours during a briefing for the press corps telecast live around the world, the CINCCENT reflected that opinion and indicated that coalition forces would be pleased to stop fighting when so ordered. The time of the briefing in CONUS (1300 hours EST) ensured a wide audience, including the President of the United States, for at least a portion. Reacting to the briefing, the President and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) conferred, and the CJCS called Riyadh from the Oval Office, indicating the President's wish to stop the offensive as soon as practicable. The CINC called his component commanders, stating that the NCA was considering a cease-fire at 0500 (local) on 28 February.
Meanwhile, VII Corps had prepared a double envelopment movement, passing 1st Cavalry Division around to the north of 1st Armored Division, to crush what remained of the Iraqi Republican Guard. The corps intended to execute the double envelopment beginning at 0500 on the 28th. In accordance with an ARCENT warning order concerning the cease-fire, however, VII Corps units assumed a local security posture, focusing on force protection. An ARCENT frag order, published at 0200 and titled "Potential Temporary Cease-Fire," reiterated the 0500 implementation time.
At 0300, CENTCOM notified ARCENT that the President had set 1200 am eastern standard time on 28 February (0800 hours local) as the beginning of the cease-fire time and urged the Army component to inflict the greatest possible damage on the enemy before that hour. Accordingly, ARCENT published a new FRAG order at 0330, calling for the resumption of offensive operations. At 0406, the VII Corps commander ordered his division commanders to execute the double envelopment with a new departure time of 0600, being mindful of the 0800 cease-fire. Difficulties inherent in reordering battle and executing the mission for maximum gain over the next four hours led to confused communications, misunderstood commander's intent, and postwar questions over operational and tactical execution.
In the space of 11 hours, a press conference that included unguarded
opinions about the past and future course of a war profoundly affected
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of that war. Commanders
on the front lines were neither informed nor consulted on the intent of
the public briefing, either before or after it had taken place. The ubiquitousness
and immediacy of press reportage effectively erased boundaries between
national and theater command authorities and dramatically compressed the
time between strategic decision and operational consequences.
Figure 3-6. Mutually Supported Roles of C2W, Civil Affairs, and Public Affairs
1 Joint Pub 3-13.1 states that beyond the five fundamental elements of C2W "other capabilities in practice may be employed as part of C2W to attack and protect." The Army recognizes that C2W is the joint reference point for IO when working with the joint staff and other services in the realm of IW. However, the Army interprets this new paradigm more broadly and recognizes the more comprehensive integration of other information activities as fundamental to all IO; hence the term operations, which includes specifically C2W, CA, and PA.