NORTH KOREAN TACTICS

July 2020

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# North Korean Tactics

## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### PART ONE NORTH KOREAN FORCES

#### Chapter 1 NORTH KOREAN FUNDAMENTALS
- Operational Environments
- Major Combat Operations in Conflict
- Introduction to North Korea
- North Korean Motivations
- North Korean Capabilities and Intent
- North Korean Military Principles
- Framework for Military Operations
- North Korean Evolution and Adaptation
- Multi-domain Extended Battlefield
- Actions to Counter U.S. Forces
- Offensive, Defensive, and Counterstability Actions

#### Chapter 2 FUNCTIONAL TACTICS
- Tactical Terms, Symbols, and Control Measures
- Action and Enabling Functions
- Functional Method
- Action Forces and Elements
- Enabling Forces and Elements
- Functional Tactics in Operations
- Execution of Mission Tasks

#### Chapter 3 NORTH KOREAN FORCE STRUCTURE AND FORMATIONS
- Functional Organization of North Korean Forces
- Service Component Organizations
- Command and Support Relationships
- Command Post Command and Control
- Tactical-level Organization of Regular Forces
- Tactical-level Organization of Irregular Forces

### PART TWO NORTH KOREAN ACTIONS

#### Chapter 4 BATTLE DRILLS
Contents

Purpose of Battle Drills ................................................................. 4-1
Actions on Contact ........................................................................................................ 4-2
Fixing ..................................................................................................................................... 4-6
Break Contact .................................................................................................................. 4-9
Situational Breach .............................................................................................................. 4-13
Fire and Maneuver ............................................................................................................. 4-16
Complementary Combined Arms Actions ................................................................. 4-19

Chapter 5  RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY ................................................................. 5-1
Reconnaissance and Security Operations ................................................................. 5-1
Reconnaissance and Security Methods ........................................................................ 5-4
Reconnaissance and Security Plans, Preparation, and Execution .................................. 5-6
Reconnaissance Fundamentals ......................................................................................... 5-8
Reconnaissance Missions .................................................................................................. 5-9
Reconnaissance Formations ................................................................................................. 5-14
Security Fundamentals ....................................................................................................... 5-21
Security Missions ................................................................................................................ 5-22
Defensive Security Formations .......................................................................................... 5-36

Chapter 6  OFFENSIVE ACTIONS .................................................................................. 6-1
Purpose of the Offense ........................................................................................................ 6-1
Planning the Offense .......................................................................................................... 6-2
Preparing for the Offense ................................................................................................... 6-11
Executing the Offense ......................................................................................................... 6-11
Types of Offensive Action—Divisions and Regiments ....................................................... 6-14
Tactical Offensive Actions—Detachments, Battalions, and Subordinate Units .............. 6-22
Offensive Operations in Complex Operational Environments ........................................ 6-35

Chapter 7  DEFENSIVE ACTIONS .................................................................................. 7-1
Purpose of the Defense ........................................................................................................ 7-1
Planning the Defense .......................................................................................................... 7-2
Preparing the Defense ........................................................................................................ 7-3
Executing the Defense ........................................................................................................ 7-4
Types of Defensive Action—Divisions and Regiments ....................................................... 7-4
Tactical Defensive Actions—Detachments, Battalions, and Subordinate Units .................. 7-18
Defensive Operations in Complex Operational Environments ........................................ 7-22

Chapter 8  COUNTERSTABILITY ACTIONS .................................................................. 8-1
Purpose of Counterstability Actions .................................................................................. 8-1
Planning Counterstability Actions ...................................................................................... 8-1
Threats and Criminal Activity ............................................................................................. 8-4
Preparing Counterstability Actions ..................................................................................... 8-6
Executing Counterstability Actions ...................................................................................... 8-7
North Korean Actions Within the South Korean Population ............................................. 8-7
Counterstability in Support of North Korean Military Operations ...................................... 8-11

Chapter 9  ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE WARFARE...................................................... 9-1
Tactical-level Electronic Intelligence Warfare ................................................................. 9-1
Electronic Intelligence Warfare Tactical Tasks ................................................................. 9-1
Systems Warfare ................................................................................................................ 9-2
Windows of Opportunity ................................................................................................... 9-2
Competition and the Human Dimension ............................................................................ 9-3
Components of Electronic Intelligence Warfare .............................................................. 9-3

Appendix A  FIRES SUPPORT OPERATIONS ................................................................ A-1
Appendix B  AVIATION OPERATIONS ............................................................................. B-1
Appendix C  ANTITANK OPERATIONS ............................................................................ C-1
Appendix D AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS ................................................................. D-1
Appendix E ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONS ............................................ E-1
Appendix F ENGINEER OPERATIONS .................................................................. F-1
Appendix G CBRN AND OBSCURANT OPERATIONS ........................................... G-1
Appendix H LOGISTICS OPERATIONS .................................................................. H-1
Appendix I SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES OPERATIONS ................................. I-1
SOURCE NOTES ..................................................................................................... Source Notes-1
GLOSSARY ............................................................................................................. Glossary-1
REFERENCES ...................................................................................................... References-1
INDEX ..................................................................................................................... Index-1

Figures

Figure 1-1. One strategic environment with numerous operational environments .......... 1-3
Figure 1-2. Building blocks of KPA tactical doctrine ....................................................... 1-12
Figure 1-3. Actions to counter enemy shaping operations ............................................... 1-24
Figure 1-4. Actions to counter enemy deterrence .............................................................. 1-25
Figure 1-5. Actions to counter enemy seizing the initiative .............................................. 1-26
Figure 1-6. Actions to counter enemy dominance .............................................................. 1-27
Figure 1-7. Actions to counter enemy stabilizing actions ............................................... 1-28
Figure 1-8. Actions to counter enemy enabling civil authority ........................................ 1-28
Figure 2-1. Typical KPAGF control measures (conceptual) ............................................... 2-3
Figure 2-2. KPA unit/organization symbol presentation options ....................................... 2-5
Figure 2-3. Method for mission sequence analysis ......................................................... 2-6
Figure 3-1. KPA armed forces service components ........................................................ 3-1
Figure 3-2. KPAGF corps general locations .................................................................... 3-9
Figure 3-3. Different types of KPAGF divisions ............................................................ 3-10
Figure 3-4. KPAGF infantry division structure (example) .............................................. 3-11
Figure 3-5. Division integrated fires system possible task organization components ...... 3-12
Figure 3-6. Division integrated support system possible task organization components .... 3-13
Figure 3-7. KPA special operations forces headquarters (example) ............................... 3-13
Figure 3-8. KPAGF tank brigade (example) .................................................................. 3-14
Figure 3-9. KPAGF infantry regiment (example) ............................................................ 3-14
Figure 3-10. KPAGF infantry battalion organization (example) ..................................... 3-15
Figure 3-11. KPAGF infantry company organization (example) .................................... 3-16
Figure 3-12. KPAGF battalion-size detachment (example) ............................................ 3-17
Figure 3-13. KPAGF company-size detachment (example) ........................................... 3-18
Figure 3-14. KPAGF small unit symbols ....................................................................... 3-19
Figure 3-15. KPAGF small unit symbols with task-organized amplifiers ....................... 3-20
Figure 3-16. Guerrilla battalion organization (example) ................................................. 3-22
Figure 3-17. Relevant population relationships to irregular forces .............................................. 3-23
Figure 3-18. Armed and unarmed noncombatants (examples)...................................................... 3-24
Figure 4-1. Actions on contact (example) ...................................................................................... 4-4
Figure 4-2. Fixing (example) .......................................................................................................... 4-7
Figure 4-3. Break contact (example) ........................................................................................... 4-10
Figure 4-4. Situational breach (example) ..................................................................................... 4-13
Figure 4-5. Fire and maneuver (example) ................................................................................... 4-16
Figure 4-6. Disruption actions (example; part 1 of 2) .................................................................. 4-20
Figure 4-7. Disruption actions (example; part 2 of 2) .................................................................. 4-21
Figure 4-8. All-arms air defense actions (example) ..................................................................... 4-25
Figure 4-9. Air assault defense actions (example) ....................................................................... 4-30
Figure 4-10. Complexity in complex terrain (example) ............................................................... 4-33
Figure 4-11. Defense in a complex battle position (example) ..................................................... 4-36
Figure 4-12. Surface signature of a subterranean complex battle position (example) ............... 4-38
Figure 4-13. Subterranean complex battle position configuration (example) ........................... 4-39
Figure 4-14. Subterranean complex battle position (side-view functional example) ............... 4-40
Figure 5-1. Area reconnaissance and tactical tasks (example) ................................................... 5-11
Figure 5-2. Zone reconnaissance and tactical tasks (example) .................................................. 5-12
Figure 5-3. Route reconnaissance and tactical tasks (example) ................................................ 5-13
Figure 5-4. Task-organized long-range reconnaissance platoon (example) ............................... 5-16
Figure 5-5. Task-organized reconnaissance patrol (example) .................................................... 5-17
Figure 5-6. Task-organized independent reconnaissance patrol (example) ................................ 5-18
Figure 5-7. Reconnaissance company detachment, infantry division (example) ....................... 5-19
Figure 5-8. Reconnaissance battalion detachment, RGB (example) .......................................... 5-20
Figure 5-9. Task-organized reconnaissance brigade, RGB (example) ....................................... 5-21
Figure 5-10. Company defensive screen (example) .................................................................... 5-27
Figure 5-11. Flank guard and battalion detachment (example) ................................................... 5-30
Figure 5-12. Counterreconnaissance detachment (example) ..................................................... 5-38
Figure 5-13. Regiment task-organized for a cover mission (example) ....................................... 5-39
Figure 6-1. Encirclement maneuver (example) ............................................................................ 6-4
Figure 6-2. Penetration maneuver (example) ............................................................................. 6-5
Figure 6-3. Thrust maneuver (example) ..................................................................................... 6-6
Figure 6-4. Holding maneuver (example) .................................................................................. 6-7
Figure 6-5. Turning maneuver (example) ................................................................................... 6-8
Figure 6-6. Infiltration maneuver (example) ............................................................................... 6-9
Figure 6-7. Besetment maneuver (example) ............................................................................... 6-10
Figure 6-8. KPAGF primary small-unit (company and below) movement formations .......... 6-13
Figure 6-9. Integrated attack (KPAGF mechanized division-level encirclement example) ....... 6-16
Figure 6-10. Dispersed attack (example) ..................................................................................... 6-19
Figure 6-11. Assault (example) .................................................................................................. 6-24
Figure 6-12. Ambush (example) ................................................................................................. 6-26
Figure 6-13. Raid (example) ......................................................................................................... 6-28
Figure 6-14. Reconnaissance attack (example; part 1 of 5) ........................................................ 6-30
Figure 6-15. Reconnaissance attack (example; part 2 of 5) .......................................................... 6-31
Figure 6-16. Reconnaissance attack (example; part 3 of 5) ........................................................ 6-32
Figure 6-17. Reconnaissance attack (example; part 4 of 5) ........................................................ 6-33
Figure 6-18. Reconnaissance attack (example; part 5 of 5) ........................................................ 6-34
Figure 6-19. Known North Korean infiltration tunnel locations ..................................................... 6-37
Figure 7-1. KPAGF brigade mobile defense, initial layout (example; part 1 of 5) .......................... 7-6
Figure 7-2. KPAGF brigade mobile defense (example; part 2 of 5) ............................................... 7-7
Figure 7-3. KPAGF brigade mobile defense (example; part 3 of 5) ................................................ 7-8
Figure 7-4. KPAGF brigade mobile defense (example; part 4 of 5) .............................................. 7-9
Figure 7-5. KPAGF brigade mobile defense (example; part 5 of 5) ............................................. 7-10
Figure 7-6. Division area defense (example) ............................................................................... 7-12
Figure 7-7. KPAGF field army defensive zone (conceptual) ......................................................... 7-14
Figure 7-8. Antitank defensive position (example) ....................................................................... 7-16
Figure 7-9. Simple and complex battle position symbols (example) .......................................... 7-18
Figure 7-10. Platoon orientation in a battle position (example) .................................................. 7-20
Figure 7-11. Complex battle position in an urban defense (example) ...................................... 7-22
Figure 8-1. Counterstability actions to create conditions and effects ............................................. 8-2
Figure 8-2. Counterstability plan-act-exploit cycle ..................................................................... 8-3
Figure 8-3. Criminal gang organizational structure (example) ................................................. 8-4
Figure 8-4. Criminal large-scale network organizational structure (example) ............................ 8-5
Figure 8-5. Criminal transnational organization structure and functions (example) .................. 8-6
Figure 8-6. Attempted assassination of the South Korean President ........................................... 8-11
Figure F-1. KPA combat engineer company (example) ............................................................... F-1
Figure F-2. KPA general engineer battalion (example) ............................................................... F-2
Figure H-1. Regimental Rear Service Department (example) .................................................... H-1
Figure H-2. Division Rear Service Department (example) .......................................................... H-2
Figure H-3. Corps Rear Service Department (example) ............................................................. H-2

Tables

Introductory Table. Unit conversions................................................................................................. xi
Table 1-1. Variables of an operational environment ...................................................................... 1-2
Table 2-1. KPAGF standard attack frontage and depth .................................................................. 2-2
Table 3-1. KPA command and support relationships ..................................................................... 3-3
Table 3-2. Command post types by command level ..................................................................... 3-4
Table 3-3. KPAGF corps and locations .......................................................................................... 3-8
Table 5-1. Reconnaissance mission descriptions ........................................................................ 5-10
Table 5-2. Security mission functions by mission type ................................................................. 5-21
Table 5-3. Typical type of security unit in support of main body force ....................................... 5-23
Table 6-1. Known North Korean infiltration tunnels ..................................................................... 6-36
Table 7-1. Security elements in a security zone........................................................................... 7-13
Table 7-2. KPAGF counterattack types and criteria ................................................................. 7-17
Table 9-1. Electronic intelligence warfare objectives............................................................... 9-4
Table A-1. Typical KPAGF indirect fire weapons, corps level and below................................. A-2
Table A-2. KPA indirect fire weapons, corps level and below ..................................................... A-3
Table B-1. KPAAF air divisions.................................................................................................. B-1
Table C-1. KPAGF tank and antitank weapons systems............................................................. C-2
Table D-1. KPA air defense weapons systems by unit type....................................................... D-2
Table D-2. KPA surface-to-air missile and MANPADS weapons systems............................... D-3
Table D-3. KPA antiaircraft artillery weapons systems............................................................ D-4
Table E-1. KPA radar systems .................................................................................................. E-3
Table G-1. KPA CBRN- and obscurant-capable tanks and armored fighting vehicles .............. G-2
Table G-2. KPA CBRN- and obscurant-capable guns, howitzers, and mortars.......................... G-2
Table G-3. KPA CBRN- and obscurant-capable mortars, rocket launchers, and missiles.......... G-3
Table G-4. U.S. Army radiation exposure guide......................................................................... G-4
Table G-5. KPAGF smoke classifications.................................................................................. G-5
Table I-1. KPA special operations forces units.......................................................................... I-2
Preface

Army Training Publication (ATP) 7-100.2 describes North Korean tactics for use in Army training, professional education, and leader development. This document is part of the ATP 7-100 series that addresses a nation-state’s military doctrine with a focus on army ground forces and tactical operations in offense, defense, and related mission sets. Other foundational topics include task organization, capabilities, and limitations related to military mission and support functions. ATP 7-100.2 serves as a foundation for understanding how North Korean ground forces think and act in tactical operations. This publication presents multiple examples of functional tactics in dynamic operational environment conditions. The tactics in this ATP are descriptive, and provide an orientation to tactics gathered from North Korean doctrine, translated literature, and observations from recent historical events.

The principal audience for ATP 7-100.2 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this publication.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See Field Manual (FM) 6-27.)

To compare and contrast information in this ATP with other Army doctrine, the reader must first understand the fundamentals of land operations in FM 3-0 and the Army’s supporting ADPs and ATPs that describe military operations and the application of combat power. Joint and multinational application will require comparison to and contrast with relevant joint and multinational doctrine.

ATP 7-100.2 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. For definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. This publication is not the proponent for any Army terms.

ATP 7-100.2 contains acronyms that are theater-specific and are not found in either FM 1-02.1 or the DOD Dictionary. It also contains Korean People’s Army and other theater-specific concepts, translated into English where appropriate, that are underlined when introduced in the text. If the concept name is similar to a U.S. term but has a different meaning, an explanation of the North Korean concept is provided.

ATP 7-100.2 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ATP 7-100.2 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. The lead agency tasked with developing this ATP is the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command G-2, Analysis and Control Element, Operational Environment & Threat Analysis Directorate. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, United States Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCD (ATP 7-100.2), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by email to usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.
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Introduction

ATP 7-100.2 addresses the tactics, organization, and activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s ground forces. Part one of this document focuses on the strategic and operational levels, and includes North Korea’s military structure, organizational philosophy, and an introduction to functional tactics. Part two focuses on the tactical level, and describes Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF) offensive and defensive tactics in detail. Several appendixes provide additional information on specific military functions and their use in tactical actions.

PART ONE—NORTH KOREAN FORCES

Chapter 1 describes the strategic environment, operational environments, and approaches to conflict. It reviews North Korea’s history and political structure, then delves into the country’s military forces. Topics covered include military principles; operational framework; concept of evolution and adaptation; planned actions to counter U.S. forces; and motivations, capabilities, and intent.

Chapter 2 explains Korean People’s Army (KPA) actions within the framework of functional tactics. It discusses the functional method and the terms, symbols, and control measures used to portray and govern North Korean military activities. A description of action and enabling functions is given, along with common function types performed by action and enabling units. The chapter concludes with a discussion of mission task execution.

Chapter 3 addresses North Korean force structure and command and control of formations. It reviews KPA service component organizations, command and support relationships, and command and control of military forces. A concise description of force structure at the tactical echelon addresses regular and irregular forces, with the former primarily at the tactical echelons of division, brigade, regiment, battalion, and company.

PART TWO—NORTH KOREAN ACTIONS

Chapter 4 describes the standardized execution of several fundamental tactical tasks based on conditions and situational cues during mission performance. North Korean tactical drills common to reconnaissance and security, offensive, defensive, and counterstability actions can include—but are not limited to—actions on contact, situational breach, fixing, fire and maneuver, and breaking contact.

Chapter 5 describes how the KPA uses reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition as essential elements to successfully meet its reconnaissance and security requirements, and addresses the intelligence process. The section on security provides information on how North Korea protects its military units from being surprised by the enemy. Examples of reconnaissance and security organizational structures and the types of missions conducted by both types of units are found throughout the chapter.

Chapter 6 describes the KPAGF’s primary types of offensive actions at the tactical level. The ground forces have six purposes for conducting offensive action and use seven different forms of maneuver in their attacks. These maneuver forms can be used in conducting any type of offensive attacks—integrated, dispersed, and limited-objective attacks at the regimental and divisional level, or assaults, ambushes, raids, and reconnaissance attacks at battalion level and below.

Chapter 7 describes the KPAGF’s primary types of defensive actions at the tactical level. The ground forces have two primary forms of defensive actions: mobile defense and area defense. North Korean forces only go on the defense when necessary, and desire to return to the offense as soon as possible.

Chapter 8 describes North Korea’s counterstability actions, designed to counteract an enemy’s attempts to create a stable environment for the civilian population to live in and flourish. These activities degrade and disrupt an enemy’s civil security, law enforcement, public services, infrastructure, and effective governance, and destroy enemy resolve to resist the eventual outcome of the unification of Korea under the Kim regime.
Chapter 9 describes North Korea’s system to achieve informational and situational understanding advantages over an enemy. The country utilizes 11 different components, all of which are used in conjunction with combat operations. North Korea conducts electronic intelligence warfare to obtain information on its enemies, to deceive them, and to achieve effects against them. While much of this warfare is conducted above the tactical level on the battlefield, it affects ground forces at all levels.

APPENDIXES

Appendix A describes how North Korean forces provide integrated fires in support of ground maneuver forces in tactical missions.

Appendix B describes how the KPA conducts aerial operations to include homeland defense, close air support of its ground forces, and support to special operations forces units.

Appendix C describes how the KPAGF employ antitank weapons in tactical missions in support of ground maneuver forces.

Appendix D describes how the KPAGF use all-arms air defense to protect its ground maneuver forces.

Appendix E describes North Korea’s ability to conduct electronic warfare at the tactical level in support of tactical missions.

Appendix F describes the KPAGF’s use of engineers in offensive and defensive tactical missions.

Appendix G describes KPAGF capabilities to use smoke and other obscurants, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons in tactical missions.

Appendix H describes how North Korea supplies and sustains its ground maneuver forces in tactical missions.

Appendix I describes the KPA’s normal methods of using special operations forces to support ground maneuver force operations.

UNITS OF MEASURE

Units of measure in ATP 7-100.2 are metric. The only exceptions to this are large weights, which are in U.S. tons (also known as short tons) and are denoted as “tons,” and volumes, which are shown in gallons. The introductory table provides conversion data from one measurement system to another for units used in this publication.
**Introductory Table. Unit conversions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>1 square kilometer</td>
<td>0.38610 square miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>1 square meter</td>
<td>10.7639 square feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>1 meter (m)</td>
<td>3.28084 feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>1 centimeter (cm)</td>
<td>0.39370 inches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>1 kilometer (km)</td>
<td>0.62137 miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed</td>
<td>1 kilometer per hour (kph)</td>
<td>0.62137 miles per hour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed</td>
<td>1 meter per second (mps)</td>
<td>3.28084 feet per second</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon bore size</td>
<td>1 millimeter (mm)</td>
<td>0.03937 inches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon bore size</td>
<td>1 millimeter (mm)</td>
<td>0.03937 caliber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight</td>
<td>1 kilogram (kg)</td>
<td>2.2046 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight</td>
<td>0.90718 metric tons</td>
<td>1 (U.S./short) ton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volume</td>
<td>3.78541 liters</td>
<td>1 gallon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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PART ONE

North Korean Forces

Part One addresses three primary areas: North Korean fundamentals; functional tactics; and Korean People’s Army (KPA) force structure. Chapter 1 discusses operational environments (OEs) and North Korean fundamentals. Chapter 2 describes functional analysis and tactics used in KPA offensive, defensive, and counterstability actions. Chapter 3 presents the Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF) structure and task-organization methods at tactical echelons for regular and irregular forces. Examples include task-organized units, organization military symbology, command and support relationships, integrated capabilities, and limitations of combat power.

Chapter 1

North Korean Fundamentals

This chapter describes the strategic environment, OEs, and approaches to conflict. It reviews North Korea’s history and political structure, then delves into the country’s military forces. Topics covered include military principles; operational framework; concept of evolution and adaptation; planned actions to counter U.S. forces; and motivations, capabilities, and intent.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

1-1. The Department of Defense defines an operational environment (OE) as a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (Joint Publication, (JP) 3-0). This definition applies to an OE for a specific operation and at any level of command. Analysis of an OE, either real-world or composite, focuses on eight interrelated operational variables, shown in table 1-1 on page 1-2.

1-2. Comprehending these eight operational variables and their interrelationships assists in understanding an OE and its impacts on a particular operation. Military operations will be significantly affected by conditions beyond just military force capabilities. The largest country with the strongest military forces and the most modernized systems will not always win in a conflict, because a threat can be a master at employing basic-technology solutions and exploiting environmental conditions to achieve success. This can include redefining the elements of victory to be simply continued existence as a force in being. A threat can be regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, criminal organizations, or some hybrid thereof. As a learning organization, it seeks to continually improve its situational awareness and understanding of both its OE and its opponent. The threat confronts a foe with adaptive and innovative actions and operates with a range of motivations, weapons, equipment, and task-organized capabilities optimized to its particular environment.
Note: The chapters of this ATP address topics from the North Korean point of view. So, friendly refers to North Korea and allied or affiliated forces. Likewise, enemy, adversary, and foe refer to its opposition, which may be a challenger from within the country itself, or a regional or extraregional opponent (normally the U.S. or a U.S.-led coalition). Parties are neutral regarding North Korea. A threat has the capability and intent to harm the U.S., and an opponent may be against either the U.S. or North Korea, with context determining the correct interpretation.

### Table 1-1. Variables of an operational environment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td>Describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance—formally constituted authorities as well as informal or covert political powers—within the operational environment, as well as associated regional and global political conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military</strong></td>
<td>Explores the military and/or paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, friendly, and neutral) in a selected operational environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic</strong></td>
<td>Encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and consuming resources across an operational environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social</strong></td>
<td>Describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic composition within an operational environment, including the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors of society members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information</strong></td>
<td>Describes the nature, scope, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infrastructure</strong></td>
<td>Portrays the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physical environment</strong></td>
<td>Explains the geography and man-made structures, as well as the climate and weather of an operational environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time</strong></td>
<td>Describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within an operational environment, as well as how the timing and duration are perceived by various actors within the operational environment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1-3. In preparing an Army training event, scenario, or associated road to war information, leaders consider an entire OE and its impact on the threat’s organization of forces, equipment, operations, tactics, and probable techniques in mission execution. In predeployment training against a specific real-world threat, an OE created for training and readiness evaluation represents the anticipated OE for the actual operation as closely as possible. For other training, professional education, and leader development venues for sustained Army learning and readiness, an OE represents a composite of the types of conditions that can exist in various actual OEs.

**THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT**

1-4. The **strategic environment** is the set of general conditions, circumstances, and influences throughout the world that can affect military operations. It is the global environment in which the U.S. Government employs all the elements of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. There is one strategic environment and numerous OEs—each of which can refer to a region, a country, a town, or any other defined area.

1-5. Conditions existing in various OEs, combined with how different actors operate within them, comprise the strategic environment in which both the Army and its opponents operate. An understanding of these complexities in OEs across the world is a necessary element of both U.S. and threat preparation and mission
readiness. A threat may have a strategic perspective or be focused on a regional outcome to its actions. Figure 1-1 shows examples of potential OEs.

![Figure 1-1. One strategic environment with numerous operational environments](image)

1-6. Several key judgments show how threat actors will respond to current and trending conditions in the strategic environment to attain the necessary influence and combat power to achieve their goals and objectives. Understanding these judgments enables Army decision-making for how and when to act against an opponent. Paragraphs 1-7 through 1-14 outline these key judgments about the strategic environment.

1-7. Future threats will likely prioritize evolution of the organization over adaptation. While adaptation is a short-term reaction to a battlefield stimulus that enables momentary survival, evolution is how the threat cultivates an environment for the long term by manipulating conditions in order to ensure the survival and growth of the organization over time. Evolution facilitates long-term growth and development, while adaptation focuses on short-term survival.

1-8. An expanding spectrum of contentious issues will likely fuel future conflict among state and non-state actors. Traditional points of conflict—such as personal interest, religion, honor, and fear—will persist, and the number and intensity of those friction points will bring state and non-state actors—including peer and near-peer competitors of the U.S.—closer to overt conflict. Increasing social media presence could provide a new venue for aggravating flash points between countries or groups. Threats will take advantage of these friction points to gain an organizational advantage.

1-9. Regional actors will likely challenge the relative position of the U.S. in the global order to gain an economic, cultural, or other type of advantage. Potential or known competitors include Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and non-state actors such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (commonly known as ISIS). Each competitor will have a different motivation for challenging the U.S.; part of successfully meeting this challenge will be to understand the other side’s motivations. The combined power of regional players could exceed that of the U.S. and effectively create a situation where U.S. national power is severely constrained.

1-10. Nation-states will likely continue to fight proxy wars. Criminal and militant groups, special operations forces (SOF), and other military or paramilitary units can present plausible deniability by a nation-state. Proxy forces can be used to conduct operations and achieve outcomes that would otherwise be unacceptable to world powers and international organizations.

1-11. Exponential growth in science and technology will likely provide threats with increased lethality and stand-off weapon system capabilities. Opponents will seek technologies to achieve overmatch in specific niche weapons systems directed at perceived or known areas of U.S. vulnerability. Commercial off-the-shelf technology is a norm for threat acquisitions, and will help them achieve overmatch capabilities.
1-12. Threats often operate in urban environments characterized by increased human interactions, but also interact globally due to increased connectivity through various communications devices. Four major trends that influence OEs are population growth, urbanization, population growth along major bodies of water, and human connectedness and interrelations. The convergence of these trends results in turbulence that threats can manipulate to their short-, mid-, and long-term advantage.

1-13. Physical environmental conditions will remain catalysts for conflict. Climate stress, natural disasters, extreme weather events, and their second- and third-order effects will have significant impact on affected regions. Those with the most poverty may have natural resources or locations of strategic importance to nation-states.

1-14. The global commons—the earth’s unowned natural resources such as oceans, the atmosphere, and space—will be increasingly contested. Organizations around the world are prioritizing research and development efforts that would enable control of these currently minimally governed spaces. The domains of air, maritime, space, and cyberspace will continue to be targeted by threat actors on a regional and potentially global scale.

**THREAT ACTIONS WITHIN AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT**

1-15. Peer and near-peer threats employ direct and indirect actions to create physical and psychological effects that can suddenly or progressively diminish the U.S. military element of power. Such threats have significant capabilities to act in all domains of land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace to attack the U.S. and its interests. Primary and enabling actions using military, political, and informational means are integral to manipulating all elements of combat power to influence a foe’s situational awareness, understanding, and mission decision-making in a particular OE. In addition to physical forms of attack, a relevant population supportive of threat objectives, deception, distorted reporting in social media and political channels, and other forms of injecting believable misinformation in an OE can be integrated to convince a foe to act in a manner that favors a threat objective.

1-16. These threats integrate capabilities in order to mitigate the use of U.S. military power. Five broad physical and psychological ways are as follows: systems warfare, preclusion, sanctuary, isolation, and information operations. Some of these methods are often more appropriate at the operational and strategic levels of confrontation; however, actions and impacts can also be conducted or supportive at the tactical echelon. Actions and outcomes at all three levels focus ultimately at defeating a foe’s resolve to achieve its stated objective. At the tactical level of operations in conflict, these threats use tactics linked to functions necessary for combat action. In this ATP, these are referred to as functional tactics. Functional tactics and non-prescriptive techniques are used to conduct effective mission tasks and drills, achieve desired immediate or near-term effects, and support higher-echelon aims of weakening or defeating a foe’s resolve to continue a conflict.

**MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS IN CONFLICT**

1-17. Major combat operations aim to defeat the enemy’s forces and eliminate its military capability. These conflicts are dominated by large-scale conventional operations but often include unconventional warfare. At the conclusion of major combat operations, the character of the campaign may evolve to irregular warfare or peace operations. Not all combat operations are protracted. Joint operations may capitalize on superior military capability to quickly overwhelm a weaker enemy. Successful major combat operations defeat or destroy the enemy’s armed forces or seize terrain. Commanders assess them in terms of numbers of military units destroyed or rendered combat ineffective, the level of enemy resolve, and the terrain objectives seized or secured.
1-18. Current complex local, regional, and global changes lead to both opportunities and risks for nations around the world. This risk component of change manifests in certain trends that drive instability and global competition. Some important trends that will affect ground-force operations in such an era include—

- Globalization.
- Technology.
- Demographic changes.
- Urbanization.
- Resource demand.
- Climate change and natural disasters.
- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and effects.
- Failed or failing states.

**Note.** This ATP can be used to inform and shape the composite features, capabilities, activities, and tactics of an opposing force for Army individual, collective, and leader education and development training in live, virtual, constructive, and gaming simulations. Army Regulation (AR) 350-2 defines an **opposing force** as a plausible, flexible, and free-thinking mixture of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements representing a composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces and capabilities (doctrine, tactics, organization, and equipment). The opposing force is used in lieu of a specific threat force for training and developing Army forces, and is tailored to replicate highly capable regular and irregular threats that, when combined, can replicate hybrid threats.

The purpose of an opposing force is to portray a threat and challenging conditions in learning environments for Army sustained readiness. The ATP 7-100 series provides information on specific real-world regular and irregular force threats for training and educating Army forces. This information can be used to tailor an opposing force in order to assess and evaluate individual and unit readiness to achieve mission-essential tasks and selected mission tasks.

**INTRODUCTION TO NORTH KOREA**

1-19. The Korean Peninsula is a location of strategic interest for the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific Command due to its proximity to China, South Korea’s historical relationship with the U.S. over the past 7 decades, and the booming South Korean economy that makes it an important U.S. trading partner. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, commonly known as North Korea or the DPRK, remains one of the United States’ most critical security challenges for many reasons. These include the country’s provocative and destabilizing behavior, such as unprovoked attacks on the Republic of Korea (South Korea; ROK); its pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles; and its willingness to proliferate weapons in contravention of international treaties. For over 50 years, North Korea has sporadically conducted operations directed against its foes, especially South Korea. These actions include numerous armed incursions into South Korea; capture of a U.S. ship in international waters and detention of its crew for months; attacks on South Korean naval and fishing vessels; hijacking of one South Korean passenger airplane and blowing up of another; electronic warfare (EW) against South Korean signals, including global positioning satellites; cyberspace attacks against multiple countries; and successful or attempted assassinations of South Korean officials, including the country’s president.

**HISTORY AND POLITICS**

1-20. North Korea is run by an oligarchy led by Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un. The Kim family has ruled the country since the end of World War II, and most military and civilian leadership consists of second- and third-generation leaders who are family or close friends of the country’s late founder, Kim Il Sung; his late son, Kim Jong II; or his grandson, Kim Jong Un. North Korean history has been full of conflict. Outsiders from China, Mongolia, and—most recently—Japan have repeatedly invaded the peninsula throughout its history. Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910 brought great hardship to the Korean people, and independence
was not returned until the conclusion of World War II in 1945. The U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to divide Korea along the 38th parallel to prevent the possibility of friendly fire between the two sides. The intent was not to divide the country, but for security and control prior to free elections, in which North Korea chose not to participate.

1-21. In June 1950, North Korea invaded its southern neighbor in an attempt to unify the peninsula under Kim Il Sung. With the intervention of the United Nations (UN) after the Soviet Union boycotted a UN Security Council meeting, an international coalition led by the U.S. pushed the North Korean military back across the pre-1950 boundary between the two countries in September 1950. U.S. General Douglas MacArthur then drove the UN forces all the way to the Yalu River where China, feeling threatened by anti-communist forces, interceded on behalf of North Korea with organized Chinese forces. The Chinese-led counterattacks pushed the U.S. military and its allies back and recaptured Seoul, the capital of South Korea. The UN forces then counterattacked, pushing the Chinese/North Korean forces to approximately the 38th parallel, the original dividing line between the two Koreas. Over the following 2 years a stalemate ensued, with only minor changes of territory between the warring sides. In late July 1953, the military commanders of North Korea’s KPA, the Chinese People’s Volunteers, and the United Nations Command signed an armistice that ended the fighting and created a 2,000-m wide demilitarized zone (DMZ) on either side of the then-current unit disposition, also known as the military demarcation line. Over 60 years after the armistice, no formal peace treaty has been signed, and the military demarcation line and the 4,000-m wide DMZ still exist from the peninsula’s east coast to its west coast. Furthermore, North Korea has never renounced its ultimate goal, which is to unify all of Korea under its control. With a population of approximately 25 million people, 1.2 million—almost 5 percent of the population—serve on active military duty in the country, and another 7.7 million serve in the reserve forces. Besides military operations, the North Korean Government often uses its uniformed personnel for public service projects or harvesting crops.

1-22. The presence of U.S./UN military forces in South Korea and the size and capabilities of the South Korean military likely deter North Korea from crossing the border to reunite the two countries by force. The South Korean military is composed of approximately 600,000 active and 3.1 million reserve personnel, with a mandatory service requirement for almost all South Korean males. Since the armistice was signed, North Korea has broken it many times with incursions into the DMZ and South Korea by land, sea, air, and even underground by tunnel. Today, the country faces off against the Combined Forces Command, Korea—composed of South Korea and the U.S.—with a conventional regular force backed by nuclear weapons. The United Nations Command is also still present throughout South Korea, primarily in the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom, where periodic talks take place between the two sides.

1-23. The KPA uses tactics based on former Soviet or current Russian doctrine, Chinese developments, lessons learned, and observation of recent military actions. North Korea also emphasizes SOF units that primarily use unconventional warfare tactics. The country has initiated provocative actions against South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. in defiance of the armistice’s terms. Publicly, the North Korean Government claims that its country lives in fear of an invasion from the south or an attempt by extraregional forces to instigate a regime change and the removal of Kim Jong Un. In June 2018, North Korean and U.S. leaders met in Singapore and agreed to an eventual denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. No timeline was set to achieve this goal. A second, unsuccessful summit took place in February 2019.

1-24. While North Korea maintains large amounts of military equipment, much of it is outdated making it quantitatively superior to most armies but qualitatively inferior. Due to the high cost of modern military equipment and the lack of funds for and access to the same from years of economic sanctions and poor economic policies, the country retains obsolete hardware, as evidenced by the presence of the T-34/85—a World War II-era tank—in some of its lower-priority armor units. The age and variety of equipment from the former Soviet Union, Russia, and China, and its own internally produced equipment generate major logistical issues for the KPA to effectively keep the assortment of weapons systems fully functional. The various types of ammunition required by weapon systems that date from the 1940s also puts additional strain on the military’s logistics.
**Note.** An explanation on naming and acronym conventions follows. The proper name for North Korea’s military is the Korean People’s Army, or KPA. This organizational structure is comparable to the U.S. Department of Defense; it does not refer exclusively to ground forces, as does the U.S. Army. The KPA consists of multiple components that include—but are not limited to—a ground force, a navy, and an air force. For the sake of clarity, this document adopts the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency convention of referring to the entire military as the KPA, the ground force as the Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF), the navy as the Korean People’s Army Navy (KPAN), and the air force as the Korean People’s Army Air Force (KPAAF).

**SONGBUN (NORTH KOREAN CASTE SYSTEM)**

1-25. *Sonbun* is a three-tier class system divided into 51 categories that was created by the Kim regime to isolate and control perceived internal political threats. It is very difficult to move up even from one category to the next-higher category, but it is very easy to move downward. Even an elite person living in Pyongyang can commit an infraction and be exiled to the country with a much lower songbun. Every person above the age of 17 in North Korea has a file maintained by the government that contains the individual’s songbun. The key factors considered include—

- Ancestral socioeconomic background at the time of liberation (1945).
- Ancestral activities during the Korean War (1950–1953).
- Relatives living outside of North Korea (South Korea, China, or Japan).

1-26. The three classes of songbun are core, wavering, and hostile:

- **Core.** This is about 28% of the population, including professional revolutionaries, friends of the Kim family, descendants of “war heroes” who died working or fighting for North Korea, peasants, or those from peasant families.
- **Wavering.** This is the largest group, with about 45% of the people. These are people who previously lived in South Korea, China, or Japan; those with relatives that fled to South Korea; small-scale merchants and their families; and intellectuals.
- **Hostile.** This group comprises 27% of the population and includes the descendants of landlords, capitalists, religious people, political prisoners, those that assisted South Korean forces during the Korean War, those deemed anti-Party, or those associated with external countries. The lowest of the low are those that are permanently banished to labor camps and worked to death. Even if a couple in the camp is allowed to marry and has children, the children will live their entire lives in the gulag unless they escape.

1-27. One’s songbun affects whatever a person does in North Korea:

- **Occupation.** The government chooses a person’s job, which cannot change unless also approved by the government. If an individual has a low songbun, the government will likely assign the person manual labor. People with high songbun might receive a cushy Party cadre position. Job promotion is not based on merit, meaning that those that are most capable may not be working to their full potential.
- **Education.** In North Korea, there is no merit system for education. If one’s parents have good songbun, a student can continue to go to school and even university. Those that attend universities because of their songbun make connections that will eventually help them when they are working as adults.
- **Family.** Parents impress upon their children to obey the laws because a misstep can damage the entire family. When a North Korean citizen is “convicted” of a crime and sent to a prison or “re-education camp,” three generations of the family are swept up, as the North Koreans believe that there must be “bad blood” running through the family. North Koreans usually marry someone of the same songbun, as the marriage automatically moves the higher songbun spouse to the partner’s category.
- **Internal Exile.** The North Korean Government systematically moves political undesirables to isolated locations, especially the mountainous areas in the northeastern part of the country. There
they are forced to perform hard labor in mines with few safety devices. Pyongyang and the 
surrounding area is now almost entirely composed of the core class that supports the Kim regime.

• **Food.** People with higher songbun get more food from the government stores than those with 
lesser songbun. This was especially true during the famine in the early 1990s, when up to 30% of 
the population died in the hardest-hit areas. About 60% of all North Korean refugees who now 
live in South Korea come from North Hamyong Province in the northeastern part of North Korea, 
an area hit particularly hard by the famine and where food insufficiency remains to this day.

• **Medical Care.** Until the 1990s, medical care was free to everyone. With the sanctions, there is 
not enough medicine or equipment to take care of the people. Special treatment centers are still 
available in Pyongyang, but only for those who are the core supporters of the system. Doctors in 
rural areas use whatever they can obtain through the system, find on the black market, or obtain 
from the fields, such as herbs. Families are expected to provide food and often the drugs needed 
for any operation outside of the best-equipped hospitals for the elites.

• **Housing.** There is no private ownership of houses or property in North Korea. Those with higher 
songbun, however, receive better housing than those with lesser songbun. In rural areas, much of 
the housing is “accordion” style, where a series of six or more houses are built right next to each 
other so fewer walls are needed (townhouses). Since the 1990s, people have been known to bribe 
officials to get better housing or a second unit for their family. Since the 1990s, there have also 
been reported cases of people “selling” their houses to others that could afford to buy them in 
order to use the money for food.

**NORTH KOREAN MOTIVATIONS**

1-28. North Korea embraces three primary goals, with additional second-tier objectives that support its 
principal aims. The first goal is for Kim Jong Un and his family to maintain their position of authority in the 
regime through the ideological control of the country’s population. The Kim family and its supporters will 
likely pursue any strategy necessary to remain firmly in power. The second goal is for North Korea to remain 
an independent state free of outside interference, especially from the Western powers. The country’s 
possession of a nuclear arsenal and its pursuit of missile technology are attempts to ensure that external 
powers do not interfere with its internal affairs for fear of a nuclear reprisal. The third goal, often espoused 
as the primary goal—from Kim Il Sung through Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un—is the unification of all of 
Korea under the North Korean Government. While this ambition is probably not obtainable as long as 
U.S./UN forces remain on the peninsula, a unified Korea under the Kim family’s control remains the 
government’s ultimate objective.

1-29. North Korea’s large military is used as a tool to threaten its neighbors. The country uses limited military 
provocations to obtain diplomatic concessions at the negotiating table with South Korea, Japan, the U.S., and 
other countries. It also uses threats of possible war to obtain humanitarian aid. The North Korean Government 
knows that the Western powers and South Korea do not want another active war on the peninsula, so its 
threats often lead to success at the negotiating table. Its nuclear arsenal and fear by other countries that it may 
initiate a conventional or nuclear attack often serve as the impetus for North Korea’s foes to acquiesce to the 
Kim regime’s demands.

1-30. While North Korea’s leaders may seem outlandish at times to the outside world, the Kim family is 
treated reverently and is seen as almost godlike in this officially non-religious country. Kim Il Sung 
developed a personality cult around himself during his long period in power. His son, Kim Jong Il, continued 
to cultivate the myth of the Kim family during his time as the country’s supreme leader. The North Korean 
people treat the current ruler, Kim Jong Un, with almost the same awe as the previous two rulers. One reason 
for this is that many North Koreans are too afraid of the consequences for doing otherwise. Another reason 
that the current leader is treated so reverently is that life for the average North Korean has improved under 
Kim Jong Un, as compared to the famine of 1994—1998 during his father’s regime—which many North 
Koreans still remember. These years of famine—in which an estimated two million North Koreans died—is 
known as the “Arduous March.” Despite these bleak years where people starved to death, Kim Jong Il is still 
held in high regard by the current citizens that can remember that period, because he kept the country free 
from external—especially Western—interference. The Kim family’s cult status is a major component of the 
glue that holds the country together.
NORTH KOREAN CAPABILITIES AND INTENT

1-31. North Korea is adaptive, flexible, and agile—as much as a primarily non-motorized, mechanized, or tank army can be—and changes its composition and focus to optimize organizational capabilities and use them against known or perceived enemy vulnerabilities. North Korea will take prudent risks; however, the KPA may also make significant practical sacrifices in individuals and materiel in order to achieve a major psychological impact on an enemy. An example of such deliberate sacrifice would be a number of KPA near-simultaneous small-unit or direct action cell assaults on targets that result in the deaths of most or all attackers, but receive sensational media coverage to a global audience that indicates an absolute commitment to an objective.

1-32. North Korea maintains a range of capabilities and will apply them at selected times and locations in order to achieve desired effects. The KPA uses functional offensive and defensive tactics or acts of crime and terrorism to counter an enemy. These actions can also be employed to manipulate a population and dissuade support to an enemy’s military forces or other enemy institutions. When necessary, North Korea will use acts of physical and psychological violence to gain influence and develop willing or coerced cooperation from a local population. Concurrently, the country will use indirect means to progressively degrade an enemy’s combat power and infrastructure resources, and otherwise psychologically influence the political, social, economic, military, and information variables of an OE.

1-33. North Korea will attempt to exploit its familiarity with the physical environment and its ability to blend in to a local or regional populace and infrastructure in order to exploit U.S. limited language and cultural skills/experiences to accomplish its missions. The time variable normally favors the goals and objectives of North Korea, as the country is more flexible time-wise than typical enemy expectations or mandates. KPA activities occur over extended periods of time, but may change in pace, tempo, speed, and duration. Timing of KPA actions may appear random, while the actual mode of operations and activities are deliberate decisions as part of a long-term campaign or strategy.

1-34. Significant capabilities of North Korea include its ability to manipulate or ignore the restrictions and sanctions that apply to regulated military forces, law enforcement agencies, and internal security forces belonging to a sovereign state, alliance, coalition, or similar formal partnership of forces. International protocols and conventions, national statutes and law, and moral codes that guide or regulate behavioral norms and social interactions can limit an enemy’s use of weapon systems and other capabilities that overmatch those of North Korea. The country complies with these codes of conduct when advantageous for its electronic intelligence warfare (Eiw) campaign and overt or clandestine actions. When its regular forces incorporate clandestine use of combat power, the KPA can claim to plausibly deny responsibility for actions considered illegal or immoral by its foe. North Korea can easily ignore typical standards of conduct, however, when such standards no longer provide operational value to achieving a goal or objective.

1-35. Although violent actions by an individual, organization, or combination of forces often receive immediate notoriety, North Korea complements physical violence with methodical, long-term psychological warfare. The overarching agenda of the KPA can include but is not limited to the following issues:

- Spotlight popular grievances for resolution, including abuse, accidents, or war crimes by foreign soldiers fighting for North Korea’s enemy.
- Establish influence, popular recognition, and support of susceptible South Koreans.
- Expand active or passive support of those that support North Korean goals or objectives.
- Deter opposition to its goals and objectives from the South Korean populace.
- Marginalize the governance or extraregional influence of the U.S.
- Develop general acceptance and legitimacy of KPA programs and actions.
- Achieve KPA objectives without alienating critical segments of the South Korean populace and other regional actors.
- Attract an international or global audience and external organizational sources of influence that support KPA aims.

1-36. North Korea seeks to gain the approval and support by some regional actors, such as China, in order to obtain active or passive assistance. The methods must eventually communicate a compelling narrative of legitimacy that is accepted by the population. North Korea can also attempt, however, to confer authority on
itself without regard to the population. A credential of legitimacy may require a gradual process of convincing the relevant population that conceding to North Korea is an acceptable means to achieve desired social, economic, or political effects. The country may declare its actions are justifiable under existing conditions and attempt to degrade the legitimacy of a foe. Of note, North Korea already possesses legitimacy from its populace and recognition by most foreign governments.

1-37. Sometimes external recognition and support are not as important to North Korea as establishing a geographic or cyberspace enclave from which to plan, prepare, and conduct its activities and influence. For example, North Korea has established cyberspace teams in foreign countries. The country conducts direct and indirect actions that are adaptive and persistent from both types of sanctuaries. North Korea is a complex array of regular and irregular organizations, units, or individuals with sometimes disparate single-agenda aims. Many of the North Korean senior leaders create small fiefdoms, with the only common denominator being support—overt or tacit—from Kim Jong Un. A particular geographic, political, cyberspace, or ideological issue may lead to alliances or affiliations that are dynamic and changeable in purpose and actions.

1-38. In particular conditions and circumstances, North Korean irregular actions can include support from regular military forces or SOF from other states. The specter of weapons of mass destruction and an announced willingness to use any of these weapons are additional considerations in senior KPA leader risk assessment and decision-making in operations.

1-39. South Korean internal security forces and law enforcement organizations that might be infiltrated by the KPA can also be used to support KPA actions. The collaboration with organizations, units, or individuals may be based on coercion, contractual agreement, or temporary or long-term common goals and objectives. North Korea may prefer to use indirect approaches such as subterfuge, deception, and nonlethal action to achieve its objectives. However, it may commit to violent action, when necessary, in order to compel its enemy to submit to its intentions. Some irregular organizations, such as criminal gangs in both North and South Korea, exist for their own commercial profit and power and are not interested in the quality of life or civil security of a population that they influence or coerce. In the event of a war on the Korean Peninsula, the KPA may attempt to co-opt or affiliate with varied types of organizations in South Korea for mutual temporary benefit. Such alliances, however, may not be successful.

1-40. North Korea possesses a variety of military capabilities. Past actions may indicate possible future actions. While many of these provocations raised tension, the incidents did not lead to a resumption of the Korean War. These potential actions include the following, with examples in parenthesis:

- Conventional ground attack across the DMZ (June 1950).
- SOF direct mission (Blue House attack, January 1968).
- Seizing ships in international waters (United States Ship [USS] PUEBLO, January 1968).
- Hijacking airliners (December 1969).
- Blowing up airliners (November 1987).
- Ordering assassinations by hit squads (Burma, October 1983, and Malaysia, February 2017).
- Conducting SOF spy missions (September 1996).
- Launching unprovoked conventional artillery attacks (Yeonpyeong Island, November 2010).
- Torpedoing unsuspecting ships (Republic of Korea Ship [ROKS] CHEONAN, March 2010).
- Ambushing South Korean patrols by planting landmines on the southern side of the DMZ (August 2015).
- Assassinating Kim Jong Nam—Kim Jong Un’s half-brother—using VX nerve agent in a Malaysian airport (February 2017).
- Launching missiles (multiple dates).

1-41. North Korea is constantly adapting and evolving its capabilities. These include improvements in organization, equipment, tactics, and techniques. North Korea’s actions are a continuum in pursuit of accomplishing desired outcomes. Any pause or apparent pause in operations can be part of a coherent combat campaign. A long-term perspective guides near-term and mid-term actions to plan and marshal capabilities for future actions. While one form of action may appear stalled, another form of action is likely underway against a foe’s vulnerability. This agility and flexibility are critical to how effectively North Korea adapts its
near-term patterns of operations to keep the initiative while maintaining a long-term expectation of achieving its goals and objectives.

**Shape the Operational Environment**

1-42. A shaping operation establishes conditions for the decisive operation through effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain. It is likely that North Korea will use EIW techniques including propaganda to shape the environment, whether it is in an offensive, defensive, or counterstability operation. The intent of shaping operations is to create the conditions for success of the decisive operation.

**Time and Tempo**

1-43. During the initial phases of a war, North Korea may attempt to employ a high operational tempo to take advantage of its conventional army strength against coalition forces stationed on the Korean Peninsula. Time is not on North Korea’s side when it comes to war on the Korean Peninsula. To successfully win the war, the KPA must quickly defeat the coalition forces already in South Korea before any country can deploy additional forces from other places around the world. North Korea cannot fight a long war due to a lack of petroleum products, ammunition, and spare parts. At most, North Korea has fuel for only 2 months before it must get resupplied from external sources or used captured stores. If North Korea cannot end the conflict quickly, it will likely take steps to slow the tempo and prolong the conflict.

1-44. North Korea realizes the significance of coalitions and has observed successes and failures of U.S.-led coalitions. If timely victory does not occur, U.S. public support may begin to wane and ultimately influence political decisions. Therefore, the country will seek protraction of conflict to keep U.S. forces engaged in order to weaken resolve and drain military and economic resources. The KPA may avoid decisive combat with superior forces and focus on alternative methods. These activities may not be linked to maneuver or ground objectives, but may instead be intended to inflict mass casualties or destroy critical or essential systems, thus reducing U.S. resolve or ability to continue the fight.

**Weapons of Mass Destruction**

1-45. North Korea possesses nuclear and chemical weapons, and it is highly likely that the country has also done research on biological weapons. North Korea sought nuclear weapons because its leaders thought the threat of a nuclear attack would prevent other countries from contemplating a regime change. Estimates for North Korean nuclear weapons range from 20–60 bombs, with the capability to produce 6 new devices each year. The Kim family saw that Muammar Gadhafi gave up his nuclear weapons in 2003 but, without them, external powers intervened in Libya when the domestic revolts began in 2011. The Kim family does not want something similar to happen in North Korea.

1-46. North Korea has a longstanding chemical weapons program with the capability to produce nerve, blister, blood, and choking agents, and likely possesses a large chemical weapons stockpile. It is estimated that the country possesses 2,500–5,000 tons of chemical weapons of approximately 20 different types, making it the third-largest possessor of chemical agents in the world. This includes the highly toxic sarin and VX chemical agents. It is highly likely that the KPA would use chemical artillery shells. North Korea is not a signature to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which is an arms-control treaty that outlaws the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and their precursors.

1-47. North Korea possibly has weaponized anthrax or smallpox that could be mounted on missiles for use against South Korean, U.S., or Japanese targets in the region. One of the most recent defectors, who was a KPAGF soldier, had been vaccinated against anthrax.

**North Korean Military Principles**

1-48. North Korea arrived at its current military principles through a disciplined process that incorporated thorough research of its previous military ideology, its steadfast attitude to complete its national objective, and its military-first policy, or Songun. These three foundational elements produced the KPA military strategy that led to its principles of war and its associated tactical doctrine. This systematic process is shown in figure 1-2 on page 1-12.
NORTH KOREAN MILITARY IDEOLOGY

1-49. The Military Training Bureau serves as the KPA’s military think tank and has studied conflict from World War II to the present. With that knowledge, the KPA has developed a military ideology based on its experiences from 1950–53 fighting the U.S.; Soviet/Russian military theory; and Chinese light-infantry tactics, modified by more-recent U.S. experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other locations around the world. Due to the United States’ ability to overwhelm almost any opponent with technology and firepower, the KPA emphasizes asymmetric warfare in conjunction with large numbers of SOF units. Even with this emphasis, the KPA plans the use of large amounts of artillery, including multiple rocket launches in lieu of air support, heavy reliance on antitank guns, and antiair support by a variety of first- and second-generation wire-guided antitank missiles. The KPA plans to overcome the technological mismatch by getting in close to a more advanced force, where weapons standoff ranges are no longer a factor. The KPA will attempt to concentrate and coordinate the firing of large numbers of older weapons systems in order to make up for a shortage of the latest technologically advanced equipment. The lessons learned from the country’s experience and observation of wars over the past 80 years is the basic foundation of the KPA’s military ideology.

NORTH KOREAN NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

1-50. The second building block is the primary national objectives discussed in the motivations section above: the reunification of Korea under North Korean control, prevention of external interference in the country’s internal affairs, and the Kim family remaining in power. For North Korea, the U.S./UN presence in South Korea is a potential threat to the first, an obvious reminder of the failure of the second, and completely prevents the third.

NORTH KOREAN MILITARY POLICY

1-51. Juche, translated as “self-reliance,” began as North Korea’s economic self-reliance policy. Kim Il Sung announced his juche policy in 1972 and this national ethos places an emphasis on self-reliance, independence, resourcefulness, a display of one’s strength, and self-defense, with the responsibility to internally solve problems without outside assistance. Songun, begun by Kim Jong II in the mid-1990s, was a continuation of his father’s juche policy with an added emphasis on military capability at the expense of civilians and the
economy. Despite the bravado of juche, North Korea relies on imports to make up for shortages in raw materials, finished products, and technology that are not available in the country. During the Cold War, North Korea relied heavily on the support of the Soviet Union and China, especially its economy and military.

1-52. Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, North Korea has found itself isolated and with few options for support due to UN sanctions and the international political climate. The country’s only ally and major benefactor is China, with bilateral trade involving over half of North Korean exports and almost 75 percent of its imports. North Korea maintains a bilateral mutual aid and cooperation treaty with China, which calls for each country to come to the aid of the other if it is attacked. North Korea also serves as a buffer state between China and the economically capitalistic and democratic South Korea. The historical ties between North Korea and China continue to bind the two countries together, and the latter’s fear of a unified and economically powerful Korean Peninsula under a democratic-style government most likely motivates Chinese actions to preclude such an event.

NORTH KOREAN MILITARY STRATEGY

1-53. From the three primary national objectives and the country’s careful examination of the U.S. performance in battle since 1953, the KPA created a three-part strategy if war were to occur on the Korean Peninsula: surprise attack; a quick, decisive war; and mixed tactics.

Surprise Attack

1-54. The KPA will attempt to conduct all attacks with some form of surprise at the strategic, operational, or tactical level, with reconnaissance playing a key role.

Quick, Decisive War

1-55. North Korea lacks the resources to fight a protracted war, so any war the KPA fights must be quick and decisive to present the world with a fait accompli. The country also realizes that the U.S. democratic system takes time to react, as politicians attempt to build a coalition to deal with international problems. If the war is over before the U.S. can react, the U.S. may decide to let the status quo remain. This is similar to the Crimean situation where the international community condemned Russia for annexing part of the Ukraine, but did nothing to change the outcome.

Mixed Tactics

1-56. Offensively, the KPA plans a two-front war through both regular and irregular means. The country will use SOF units and clandestine operatives prepositioned in South Korea to create a “second front” in the enemy’s rear areas while the enemy must deal with the conventional battle on the primary front. The SOF units will attack enemy key command and control (C2) facilities and important logistical centers, and attempt to create fratricide between enemy rear-echelon units.

1-57. Since 1992, some North Korean leaders have boasted that their military forces could reach Pusan, a city on the southern coast of South Korea, in just 3 days. While totally unrealistic, some North Korean leaders actually believe that, in the right military and political conditions, their goal of reaching Pusan could occur in less than a month. However, some South Korean reports indicate that several KPA generals now believe that the capture of the entire peninsula is an impossibility and that, after the capture of Seoul, North Korea would need to sue for a negotiated peace based upon its position of greater strength. It is not known where Kim Jong Un stands on this policy revision, but some of the KPA’s military plans reflect this change in attitude. If war were to resume on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea would face a formidable foe both on the front line and in its rear areas. Support for both regular and unconventional warfare would include EIW elements, such as offensive cyberspace operations and EW. See chapter 9 for more details on EIW.

Note. JP 3-13 describes information operations as the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. North Korea refers to its unique version of information operations as electronic intelligence warfare (EIW).
**NORTH KOREAN PRINCIPLES OF WAR**

1-58. Based on its military strategy, the KPA created several principles of war that guide its operational and tactical doctrine, ranging from a two-front war to rear area protection.

**Two-front War**

1-59. KPA doctrine calls for a two-front war, but not in the traditional sense of the term such as in World War I or World War II with one force fighting in two different directions. The first front would consist of a massive conventional assault across the DMZ, using substantial firepower and chemical attacks on selected forward-position targets to isolate Seoul before moving farther south. Additionally, ballistic missile strikes—including missiles with chemical warheads—could hit South Korean and U.S. air bases, ports, and C2, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets throughout South Korea and in Japan. There is also a possibility that North Korea may attempt to use offensive biological weapons in its attacks or launch intercontinental ballistic missiles aimed at U.S. targets in Hawaii, Alaska, or even the California coastal cities.

1-60. The second front would be an attack by KPA SOF units throughout the South Korean rear area with assistance from prepositioned North Korean clandestine operatives. The SOF could reach South Korea by various means, including helicopter, hovercraft, light plane, parachute, small boat, submarine, or infiltration tunnel. These personnel could potentially, but not likely, attack U.S. bases in Japan. In addition, North Korea would focus on asymmetric warfare attacks on perceived areas of U.S. weakness as seen in recent U.S. overseas operations.

**Surprise**

1-61. The KPA will attempt to attack its enemy in an unexpected place, time, or means. The characteristics of a surprise attack could include the use of inclement weather, nighttime operations, or rugged terrain; a detailed deception plan; skilled infiltration units to include SOF units; parachute or air assault operations; massing of fires; quick concentration of forces at the decisive point and time; or the unexpected employment of large-scale mechanized or armor forces.

1-62. Reconnaissance is very important to the KPA. The military will strive to conduct reconnaissance continuously at all levels, including in the enemy’s rear areas, in order to achieve surprise when attacking and to prevent surprise when on defense. Each forward-deployed KPAGF infantry corps fields a reconnaissance battalion, each infantry division contains an organic reconnaissance company, and each infantry regiment possesses its own reconnaissance platoon. There are also three independent reconnaissance brigades that could be deployed anywhere on the battlefield for additional intelligence-gathering operations.

**Mass and Dispersion**

1-63. The KPA will concentrate its combat power at the decisive point and time and will weight its main effort with additional assets. The country believes that it will only need a 2:1 ratio in favor of its ground forces at the decisive point to achieve offensive success. The offensive main effort will operate on a narrower front than the attacks to its flanks, with the supporting attacks dispersing over a wider front to deceive the enemy on where the main attack will occur. The KPA will use the terrain to maximize its success and deception operations when dispersing to avoid excessive concentration that could make units a lucrative target.

1-64. The KPA will also use indirect fire as part of its massing operations. Like the old Soviet Union/Russian doctrine that dates back to World War II, KPA doctrine expounds the use of large quantities of artillery fire on a single target. The KPA will use massed fires—including chemical weapons—from artillery, missiles, or multiple rocket launchers to both psychologically frighten the enemy as well as destroy its position. The KPAGF field over 10,000 artillery pieces of all types and the KPAAF is focused on support of the ground forces. With this large amount of indirect fire support available on the battlefield, the KPA can ensure that almost all targets receive the emphasis they deserve. When not otherwise employed, KPAAF aircraft will fly in support of ground troops.
Maneuverability

1-65. The KPA wants to fight and win a quick, decisive war. To achieve this objective, the KPAGF emphasize maneuverability as a basic element of combat power during training. In combat, units will seek to use the terrain to their maneuver advantage. The KPAGF will employ ground vehicles to quickly reposition artillery, armor, and infantry on the battlefield using existing high-speed networks or aircraft. SOF or other forces will conduct raids to seize key transportation nodes. However, the KPAGF will also conduct night moves and use minor roads and the rugged terrain to surprise the enemy.

Initiative

1-66. The KPA stresses to its leaders using deception and information denial or—as the Koreans call it—cunning and personified tactics in all planning for its troops. The emphasis to KPA leaders is to use initiative and aggressiveness with no hesitation in all situations. While the KPA conducts comprehensive planning and keeps these plans close hold, the leadership expects subordinates to make quick estimates and conduct bold operations that will result in a quick, but decisive, war. However, if a KPA commander deviates from the original plan and it results in failure, the commander will suffer the consequences—which could result in relief from duties or even execution for disobeying orders.

Operational Security (Secure Secrets)

1-67. The KPA places emphasis on operational security (called secure secrets) and teaches its members to keep their secrets and plans secure at all times. North Korea not only keeps a close hold on all plans, but also distributes false information to confuse the enemy as it attempts to protect and secure its secret information. Activities to safeguard the KPA’s secrets may include reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, deception, counterintelligence, and cover and concealment measures—such as conducting operations in inclement weather or darkness—at all levels of command (tactical, operational, and strategic).

Annihilation

1-68. KPA offensive doctrine calls for the annihilation (“destroy” in U.S. terminology) of the enemy at any cost by continuing the pursuit, staying close to the enemy to reduce the likelihood of the latter’s superior artillery and close air support coming to the rescue, and continual contact to prevent the enemy from withdrawing or regrouping for a future attack. The taking of terrain is secondary to the enemy’s destruction. In the KPA’s seven designated offensive movements—penetration, thrust, holding, turning, infiltration, besetment, and encirclement—the focus is on the destruction of the enemy or the movement of ground forces in order to set up another maneuver that will aid in the enemy’s annihilation. (See chapter 6 for more details.)

Combined Operations

1-69. KPA doctrine emphasizes that all actions, conventional or otherwise, must be coordinated at all levels and between the different types of units. Much of this coordination will be done through liaison or courier, which reduces the likelihood that an enemy can learn KPA intent by an increase in radio chatter or the interception of electronic signals. The KPA has many specialized units, including river crossing brigades and regiments, sniper brigades in all three services, and large numbers of SOF units. Any major attack will coordinate the use of all the different arms to attack the decisive point at the proper time.

Mobility

1-70. KPA doctrine also stresses the use of armored vehicles in all its operations. Ground forces will use the speed of vehicles to exploit all openings and, when on defense, the KPAGF will employ their mobile forces to counterattack any enemy penetration. Military vehicles will use both major and minor roads to move quickly, and light infantry units possess the ability to travel on foot through the rugged mountainous terrain to sneak up on enemy positions from an unexpected direction. The KPAGF will attempt to use their tanks and other vehicles in areas where the enemy does not operate mechanized or armored units, because the KPAGF fear a direct tank-on-tank battle due to their inferior weapon systems.
Rear Area Protection

1-71. The KPA understands the vulnerability of rear areas, as its leaders see the enemy’s rear area as an operational center of gravity for U.S. forces. Much of North Korea’s SOF effort will be directed at its enemy’s rear area. Conversely, the KPAGF will also defend their own rear area against ground attacks to ensure continued rear area operations without disruption from enemy SOF. The country will deploy its vast number of paramilitary units to defend against rear area attacks in order to free its regular units for more conventional offensive operations.

NORTH KOREAN TACTICAL DOCTRINE

1-72. The KPA’s offensive and defensive tactical doctrine flows from its principles of war. The KPA professes both a defensive and offensive strategy in case of war. The defensive strategy is to prevent an invasion across the DMZ or an amphibious landing on either of North Korea’s coasts. If such an attack would occur, the country would mobilize not only its 7.7 million reserve personnel, but likely declare a total war in which every North Korean citizen would be obligated to defend the country. While much of the reserves may not be useful in combat, the personnel may serve other purposes. To deter any foe from attacking, the country has threatened the use of nuclear weapons against South Korea, Japan, or any reachable U.S. military facility in Asia. The country will likely use chemical or biological weapons. The military decision-making process to invade North Korea by a U.S.-led coalition could be delayed as allies debate the ramifications of North Korean use of such weapons.

1-73. The KPA prefers the offense to the defense and will remain on the former unless forced to temporarily go on the latter. It knows the only way to reunify the peninsula under North Korean control is to compel South Korea to join the country by military force. The last time that North Korea fought a major war was between 1950 and 1953 against South Korean and UN forces led by the U.S. during the Korean War. The KPA has studied the wars that the U.S. and other major powers have participated in since that time and reached a number of conclusions regarding the conduct of war: the most powerful military power does not win every time; technological advantages can be mitigated; and Western militaries almost always try to achieve their military goals quickly. One of the most recent examples of the KPA adapting because of observations on modern battlefields is the conversion of seven infantry or mechanized infantry divisions into light infantry divisions, presumably tailored to replicate tactics the KPA deemed successful, based on observations of insurgents fighting conventional coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. These divisions will likely fight in complex environments, such as cities, where vehicles are not essential for movement due to reduced battlefield distances. (See chapter 7 for more information on operations in complex environments.) From these observations and research, the KPA has decided on a number of techniques for its success in battle that include the following:

Sustainment (Adequate Logistics)

1-74. KPA doctrine calls for each commander to ensure that there are sufficient supplies to complete the unit’s mission. Due to lack of supplies, most commanders will likely plan to the use of captured supplies, military or civilian, to successfully complete their assigned mission. KPAGF weapons systems, mortars, and artillery are often of a slightly larger caliber than those of the enemy, allowing the military to use captured ammunition stores while denying the same option to its opponent.

Camouflage, Concealment, Cover, and Deception

1-75. Protection and security measures to keep secrets secure for the KPA involve the use of camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) by all units. Since North Korea will likely not obtain even local air superiority, KPA doctrine calls for denying the enemy any intelligence it may receive from aerial platforms through the use of both active and passive C3D techniques. The KPAAF uses both underground runways and harden sites to hide aircraft from aerial attack. The KPAN not only hides its ships in underground berthing facilities that are connected to the sea by fortified tunnels, it will also attempt to hide its vessels among civilian fishing boats found in small villages. All three KPA service components will use decoys to protect KPA assets for long enough to complete the mission and to give the enemy an inaccurate assessment of KPA attrition, possibly causing the enemy to incorrectly conclude that KPA assets have been destroyed. The KPA gleaned this from U.S. aerial strikes on Serbia, where the U.S. Air Force fired at decoy sites nearly as often
as at actual positions. North Korean military forces believe that each operation should include a deception plan that may include a demonstration, feint, raid, or an attempt to create fratricide among enemy units.

**Echelon Forces**

1-76. The KPA takes from Soviet/Russian doctrine in its use of echelons during both offensive and defensive operations. In a division offensive operation, the KPAGF will likely place two-thirds (67 percent) of their forces in the first echelon and two-ninths (22 percent) in the second echelon, with only one-ninth (11 percent) in operational reserve or as a third echelon. At the corps level (KPA Army Group), KPAGF doctrine describes a first echelon of four infantry divisions; a second echelon of two infantry divisions and a tank regiment; a third echelon of two mechanized infantry regiments; and a reserve of divisions not likely to be involved in the offensive operation. See Chapter 6 for examples of echelons in offensive operations.

1-77. The ground forces will also use echelons when forced to go on the defense, as the KPA believes echeloning its forces provides for defensive depth with rapid counterattack possibilities. Approximately one-ninth (11 percent) of a division’s defensive force will be positioned as a forward security force, five-ninths (56 percent) will be in the first echelon, two-ninths (22 percent) in the second echelon, and the final one-ninth (11 percent) held in reserve for unforeseen events. The corps will be similarly arrayed in echelons. See chapter 7 for examples of echelons in defensive operations.

**KPAAF and KPAN Employment**

1-78. KPA doctrine states that joint operations should be used for most missions. Any major attack by the country will likely use KPAAF and KPAN assets to deploy KPAGF units into the enemy’s rear areas. The KPAAF will infiltrate SOF units into South Korea with small airplanes, such as the recently repainted Antonov An-2 fleet or helicopters. The KPAAF can also use its airplanes, helicopters, or paragliders to drop airborne units in an air assault operation or to conduct SOF missions. The KPAN will use its small boats, stealth vessels, surface effect ships (a cross between catamaran and hovercraft), and submarines to clandestinely transport SOF forces behind enemy lines on both coasts of South Korea.

**Terrain Appreciation**

1-79. Lastly, KPA tactical doctrine calls for its forces to use the physical environment to best advantage, with a focus on the mountains, poor weather, or night operations to minimize the advantages of a technologically superior foe. Just like during the Korean War, the KPAGF will likely use the mountain ranges and ridges as an avenue of advance in bad weather or at night while their enemy focuses on the more easily accessible valley floor with its highways.

**FRAMEWORK FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS**

1-80. In pursuit of its national security strategy, North Korea conducts four types of operations that can be described as follows:

1-81. **Strategic Operations.** A strategic-level course of action (COA) that uses all instruments of power in peace and war to achieve the goals of the country’s national security strategy by attacking its enemy’s strategic centers of gravity.

1-82. **Regional Operations.** A strategic-level COA—including conventional, force-on-force military operations—against the country’s regional foes and internal threats.

1-83. **Transitional Operations.** A strategic-level COA that bridges the gap between regional and adaptive operations, and contains elements of both. The country continues to pursue its regional goals while initiating actions to counter intervention from outside of its area of operations (AO).

1-84. **Adaptive Operations.** A strategic-level COA to preserve the country’s power and apply it in adaptive ways against enemies that may overmatch North Korea’s military capabilities.
Note. These terms are not actual North Korean tactics or actions as outlined by the country’s doctrine, but how the U.S. military categorizes possible or potential North Korean actions within the framework of U.S. adversarial doctrine concepts.

1-85. Regional, transitional, and adaptive operations are typical of operational design for OEs in which North Korean tactical-level commanders operate. A tactical-level commander receives a mission statement and intent in plans and orders from higher headquarters. The commander’s analysis and decisions focus on how to plan, prepare, and execute tactical actions in the current operational context. Conventional patterns of operation may be initial ways to conduct the mission, while situational understanding and risk-taking may cause a commander to shift from regional to transitional or adaptive operations. A North Korean commander sustains a keen understanding of a foe within an OE and decides when and how to employ offensive, defensive, and counterstability missions and tasks. Operations, missions, and tasks are ordered and conducted in a flexible and agile manner, and can shift from offense to defense, defense to offense, or transition back and forth depending on emergent OE conditions.

STRATEGIC OPERATIONS

1-86. Since 1953, North Korea has used its special diplomatic relationships with the Soviet Union and China to delay the implementation of a final peace treaty to end the Korean War. The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 meant that North Korea would no longer receive the financial subsidies necessary to reduce the cost of fuel and other products to its people. China, to a lesser extent, has also reduced its unequivocal support to the country.

1-87. Without the protection of the Soviet Union and China, North Korea began a three-prong approach to deter its foes by creating a nuclear bomb, improving its missile capabilities, and placing even more emphasis on EIW through attacks on other countries’ computer network systems. By creating a viable nuclear bomb small enough to fit on an intermediate- or long-range ballistic missile, North Korea believed that the potential for a nuclear war would prevent a potential attack on the country or a regime change aimed at the overthrow of the Kim family. It is likely that the country’s nuclear program began in the late 1960s, with its nuclear weapons program starting in the late 1970s and being operational by the mid-1980s. North Korea continued to improve its EIW capabilities over the past two decades for strategic reasons, and the attack on Sony provided the world with ample evidence of the country’s computer warfare capabilities.

1-88. North Korea’s national military strategy is designed to support its national objectives by defending the Kim family’s rule and enabling the regime to conduct coercive diplomacy through the potential threat of nuclear weapons and computer warfare. This strategy relies heavily on strategic deterrence through the nuclear weapons program and supporting delivery systems, and a large, heavily armed, forward-deployed military that presents a constant threat to South Korea, especially the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area. These two aspects of its military strategy are meant to be mutually supporting; the threat posed by one is employed as a deterrent against an attack on the other.

REGIONAL OPERATIONS

1-89. North Korea can conduct this type of operation against regional opponents with some probability of success, using primarily offensive actions. The country may possess an overmatch in some elements of combat power against regional opponents, and focuses this power on discrete or discontinuous offensive actions. These offensive operations are characterized by using all available means to saturate an OE with actions designed to disaggregate the opponent’s capability, capacity, and resolve to resist. Actions are conducted throughout an entire OE; may involve the political, military, economic, social, information, or infrastructure variables; and are not limited to attacks on military and security forces or conventional weapons.

1-90. North Korea prefers to achieve its objectives through regional operations, but maintains the flexibility to adapt its actions quickly in order to sustain or regain the initiative. The country assumes the possibility of regional or extraregional intervention and has contingencies for transitional and adaptive operations. During regional operations, North Korea acts to achieve its desired objectives and initially operates at a threshold
that does not cause intervention by other regional actors or extraregional forces. Strategic operations, including EIW and diplomatic or political actions, are used to dissuade outside intervention. In addition, the country plans and positions capabilities to conduct antiaccess and area denial operations against the U.S., the UN, or other external powers.

**TRANSITIONAL OPERATIONS**

1-91. Transitional operations serve as a pivot point between regional and adaptive operations. They feature a mixture of offensive and defensive actions that set conditions for the country to control the tempo and pace of enemy introduction into an AO. Transitional operations can also expand the available time for offensive operations to succeed. When shifting to this type of operation, the country may still have the ability to exert its combat power against an overmatched regional enemy in a specific location, and may have already defeated its original foe.

1-92. As North Korea begins transitional operations, an immediate aim is to preserve its combat power while setting conditions on the peninsula that allow it to transition back to more offensive-oriented operations. North Korea identifies and acts against extraregional actor vulnerabilities in conventional or clandestine ways to slow deployment of combat power or otherwise disaggregate operations. The country may elect to conduct conventional operations against an extraregional force that could not fully deploy or has been successfully separated into isolated elements, either in a deployment flow or in an AO.

1-93. North Korea may conduct transitional operations when a coalition threatens the country’s ability to continue conventional regional operations on the Korean Peninsula. For example, successful North Korean actions in regional operations may prompt the U.S. to send additional troops to the peninsula. In such a case, North Korea will initiate actions to defeat the additional intervention.

1-94. Two probable outcomes to transitional operations are as follows:

- The U.S. withdraws from the region based on political decisions subsequent to its military defeat or for other unilateral or international reasons. In this instance, North Korean operations may begin to transition back to regional operations if appropriate to country objectives.
- The U.S. continues to deploy combat power into the region. In this situation, North Korean transitional operations may begin to shift toward adaptive operations and the expectation of future conflict on the peninsula.

**ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS**

1-95. Any coalition that faces North Korea on the Korean Peninsula will likely field a technological advantage—but a considerably smaller quantity of equipment—to meet the KPA on the conventional battlefield. North Korea will adapt its operations to mitigate its limitations and lesser capabilities, especially in technology. North Korean operational planners identify conditions, circumstances, terrain, and times that provide opportunities to optimize the country’s own capabilities and degrade those of the enemy. The country task-organizes and tailors its forces for specific missions against enemy vulnerabilities. Many North Korean operations have an overarching intent to disrupt, defeat, or destroy the enemy’s C2 framework and logistics.

1-96. The types of actions and methods that characterize adaptive operations can also promote success in regional or transitional operations. North Korea has conducted adaptive operations since the 1953 armistice, including assassination attempts on the South Korean president, the deployment of SOF personnel to start an insurgency in South Korea similar to that of Vietnam, and infiltration of SOF for direct actions in South Korea. Should war break out on the Korean Peninsula, it is likely that North Korea would attempt to conduct adaptive operations if its country was invaded by outside forces.

1-97. The North Korean policy is that if any country decides to invade it and the KPA is defeated, every North Korean citizen should do his or her duty to resist the invader. KPAGF soldiers learn that if their unit is no longer functional, the remaining soldiers should turn to guerrilla warfare and continue to fight the enemy through stay-behind ambushes, harassment, or destruction of enemy supplies. KPAGF soldiers will most likely fall back to the thousands of subterranean facilities located throughout the country, complete with pre-positioned supplies, as part of the country’s defensive plans. Civilians are also taught that they should do
everything they can to resist the enemy and continue the fight to the best of their ability with any available resources.

NORTH KOREAN EVOLUTION AND ADAPTATION

1-98. North Korean evolution is a continuous process of development that enables the country to expand from a simple capability to a higher, more complex, and sustainable entity. It operates on a premise of creating permanent presence and influence in an OE. Actions promote continual resilience to conditions that would potentially degrade or destroy its organizational existence. The intent of evolution is continual improvement towards achieving objectives and permanence in North Korean power and expanding influence in the region and effects in a strategic OE.

1-99. Adaptation involves changing to accommodate particular near-term conditions in order to facilitate some capability based on lessons learned in an OE. Adaptation is different, however, from evolution. Adaptation is a process of change that is often designed to optimize or counter a specific purpose or condition, and provides results that are often temporary in nature based on variables of a particular OE. While North Korea can employ adaptive means and methods during various phases of its existence, adaptation results in temporary changes based on an immediate situation. North Korea will adapt and change based on its success or lack of success against the coalition forces it engages on the battlefield.

1-100. Analysis by North Korea on evolution centers on understanding how North Korea is to survive and thrive. Manipulating regional conditions can create leverage and time advantages to keep an adversary or enemy off-balance in its intended actions, and cause focus on reactive methods to North Korean initiatives rather than proactive methods to diminish North Korea’s influence. Given observations of U.S. military performance in Afghanistan, Iran, and Syria, North Korea has modified aspects of its military force structure.

1-101. North Korea can decide to apply an action for purposes of adaptation in a near-term response against an adversary or enemy. Multiple actions can distract an adversary or enemy from concentrating on issues that would hamper North Korea from thriving and evolving in capabilities. Sustaining a constant series and group of organizational activities may force an adversary or enemy into a reactive cycle that centers most of its capabilities on immediate responses often at the tactical level of operations.

1-102. Multiple drivers of evolution exist with four critical aspects:

- Safe haven.
- Recruitment and retention or forced support of its population.
- C2.
- Logistics.

Of these four conditional drivers for evolution to occur, safe haven takes primacy. A sanctuary, whether physical, virtual, or both physical and virtual, compounds the value of relative shelter and safety. Safe haven from external influences provides favorable time and location for plans, preparation, support, and conduct of actions. With over 3,000 underground facilities located throughout North Korea and most within 113 km of the DMZ, North Korea considers its mountainous terrain and vast subterranean network a safe haven from enemy observation and destruction.

1-103. North Korea will attempt to launch an EIW campaign with integrated direct and indirect tactical actions that amplify public awareness of adversary or enemy inability to adequately counter threat actions. This manipulation of public opinion and general dissatisfaction of tactical interactions within a relevant population can include—

- Continually increasing military and civilian casualties.
- Ineffective governance and law and order.
- Ineffective protection and health and welfare life support.
- Unrepaired damage to infrastructure.
- General conflict weariness over extended periods of time.

1-104. Evolution is a concept with a strategic orientation, fostered and reinforced with actions at the operational and tactical levels of combat. North Korea aims to protect, nurture, and harness the conditions of an OE to avoid organizational demise, while enabling the ability to evolve as a supple nation-state with
resilient long-term organizational purpose and capabilities. Evolution and adaptation recognize the North Korean commitment to a long-term program that promotes operational and strategic initiatives and objectives.

MULTI-DOMAIN EXTENDED BATTLEFIELD

1-105. Like most countries that fight a war, North Korea will likely act in several deliberate ways to establish conditions for success. These ways are conceptually enduring methods that bring about desired ends. While a wide array of methods is available, the one method currently perceived to be unavailable to the country is to defeat the U.S. in a conventional battle. Instead, any aggregated violence will be designed not to defeat the U.S. on a battlefield, but to cause enough damage—real or perceived—in the physical and informational spheres that the U.S. cannot sustain its resolve.

1-106. Such a strategy requires two major lines of effort: attacks that cause damage, and actions that extend the time required for U.S. mission accomplishment. Likely North Korean actions will progress along these two lines of effort using all means available in the environment. The country will likely employ five broad conflict approaches toward limiting the effectiveness of U.S. military power: systems warfare, preclusion, sanctuary, isolation, and EIW.

SYSTEMS WARFARE

1-107. Systems warfare identifies and deconstructs vulnerable and vital enemy systems and networks. A system is a set of connected or related elements that, when combined, perform a unique function. The essential ingredients of a system include the individual components, the synergy among the components and other systems, and a functional boundary separating the system from other systems. A system of systems is a set of different systems so connected or interrelated as to produce results unachievable by the discrete individual systems. In systems warfare, the intent is to identify critical system components and attack them in a way that will degrade or destroy the effective use or practical importance of the overall system.

1-108. North Korea views an OE, the battlefield, its own instruments of power, and an opponent’s instruments of power as a collection of complex, dynamic, and integrated systems composed of subsystems and components. The country will likely seek to disaggregate enemy combat power by destroying or neutralizing vulnerable single points of failure in a warfighting function. Due to the inferiority of much of its equipment compared to its foes, the KPAGF regular forces will attempt to avoid infantry and armor units and instead attack enemy combat support and rear service units. The KPA believes that, without logistical support, U.S. frontline units will collapse due to lack of supplies. This belief that U.S. Soldiers will quit fighting when surrounded by the enemy or without a large logistical advantage dates back to the Korean War and a Chinese/KPA assessment of U.S. combat units during that period. The large number of KPA SOF will also concentrate its attacks in rear areas against combat support, rear service, or other high-value targets. These can include missile and radar sites; C2 cells; chemical or nuclear facilities; airfields; petroleum, oils, and lubricants facilities; dams or power plants; bridges; isolated communications relay sites; and logistical bases. The KPA believes its best chance for success on the battlefield is to break the U.S. logistical system and thus render the infantry and armor units combat ineffective due to lack of ammunition, fuel, and other supplies that U.S. Soldiers rely heavily upon in battle.

PRECLUSION

1-109. Preclusion combines antiaccess and area denial methods to degrade U.S. ability to mass and sustain joint combat power. Antiaccess is defined as action, activity, or capability, usually long-range, designed to prevent an advancing enemy force from entering an operational area (JP 3-0). Area denial is action, activity, or capability, usually short-range, designed to limit an enemy force’s freedom of action within an operational area (JP 3-0). Preclusion refers to the combination of antiaccess and area denial methods, and seeks to influence an extraregional foe’s ability to introduce forces into the AO and sustain combat power. It is an efficient way to prevent accumulation of enemy combat power in a region, and promote defeat or deny success to a militarily superior enemy. North Korea will attempt to use preclusion to selectively deny, delay, and disrupt entry of additional forces into the region (antiaccess), and compel extraregional forces to keep their staging and operating bases beyond continuous operational reach (area denial).
1-110. **Strategic preclusion** seeks to completely deter extraregional involvement or severely limit its scope and intensity. North Korea will attempt to achieve strategic preclusion in order to reduce the influence of the U.S., hostile regional powers, or other Western countries that may interfere with its actions on the peninsula. The country will employ all its instruments of power to preclude direct involvement by any extraregional power. Since U.S. military forces are already located on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea’s actions would most likely focus on the prevention of additional forces deploying to South Korea. The country uses its close relationship with China in diplomatic and economic circles to prevent additional isolation of North Korea. Until 2017, China showed a reluctance to force the country to the negotiating table or to condone the most severe economic sanctions wanted by the UN. North Korea originally used the large KPA, with reserves numbering over seven million, as a strategic deterrent. When the collapse of external support from Russia and China reduced the KPA’s strength due to weapons becoming obsolete over time, the country chose to focus on nuclear weapons and missile system as an attempt to regain strategic preclusion. Kim Jong Un reinforced this COA in March 2013 by instituting the policy of *byungjin*, which gave priorities to the nuclear and munitions sectors within North Korea while still providing resources to the electrical, coal, metal, and railway transport sectors of the country’s economy.

1-111. **Operational exclusion** is to selectively deny an extraregional force access to or use of forward operating bases or sites within the region. North Korea could attempt operational exclusion by launching nuclear or chemical missiles at existing military bases in Japan, Guam, Alaska, or Hawaii.

1-112. **Access limitation** is an attempt to affect an extraregional foe’s ability to introduce forces into the theater. Access-control operations do not necessarily have to deny the enemy access entirely. A more realistic goal would be to limit or interrupt access into the theater in such a way that the KPA could deal with the forces after their arrival. The KPA might conduct access limitation through minefields laid in sea lanes, submarine attacks on troop or supply ships, airplanes or air defense weapons shooting down aircraft, or SOF operations.

**SANCTUARY**

1-113. Sanctuary provides protection to key assets using both physical and non-physical means. North Korea will use any means necessary to protect key elements of its combat power from destruction by enemy forces, with particular attention paid to its air and missile capabilities. This protection for the KPA may come from use of any or all of the following:

- Engineer effort and fortifications.
- Complex terrain.
- Proximity to noncombatants.
- Risk of unacceptable collateral damage.
- Countermeasure systems.
- Dispersion.
- EIW.

1-114. Sanctuary generally cannot protect the entire KPA for an extended time period. Knowing this, the organization will seek to protect selected elements of its forces for long enough to gain the freedom of action necessary to pursue its strategic goals. The country will employ a wide variety of counterprecision techniques that include C3D; Global Positioning System jamming; EW; terminal defenses; close-contact tactical fights; aircraft; and extended-range munitions. It will also create sanctuary by exploiting civilian populations and cultural sites to hide weapons systems, support defensive postures and capabilities, and shape dispositions for offensive actions.

1-115. North Korea employs hardened and buried facilities and uses decoys of key facilities or capabilities, such as short-range ballistic missiles and surface-to-air missiles. North Korea will likely employ an integrated fires system that includes cannon, howitzer, multiple rocket, and short-range and medium-range missile systems capable of tactical to extreme-range fires and counterfires. North Korea employs a large number of older air defense weapons in its integrated air defense systems that may include a limited number of countertactical ballistic missiles. The KPA’s reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition capabilities are essential to the country’s use of its integrated systems.
1-116. The estimated number of underground facilities in North Korea range from 3,000 to 14,000, most within 113 km of the DMZ. The KPA will launch its offensive against South Korea from the relative safety of its subterranean facilities and use tunnels under the DMZ to place SOF in the enemy rear areas. If forced to retreat back over the DMZ, the KPA will fall into these previously prepared combat battle positions; it will require significant personnel, ammunition, and time to eliminate the military personnel located in these underground facilities. See Chapter 6 for additional information on KPA subterranean operations.

**ISOLATION**

1-117. Isolation techniques are used to attempt to contain a foe’s combat power so that it cannot impact KPA mission accomplishment. North Korea will seek ways and means to isolate U.S. military power and influence indirectly rather than with direct confrontation. The country will seek to degrade and isolate U.S. capabilities in ways that include—

- Disrupting effective communications with higher command and coordinating headquarters.
- Disrupting sustainment and general logistics to and within regional operations.
- Altering situational understanding of an OE through deception.
- Persuading South Koreans to repudiate outside support.
- Convincing enemies they are decisively engaged.
- Limiting or preventing mobility due to complex terrain, man-made or reinforced natural obstacles, or effects of weapons of mass destruction.
- Defeating political resolve to continue government commitment to actions in the theater, region, or operational area.

1-118. It is likely that North Korea believes that defeat of U.S. forces is not just a battle between the armed forces of enemies. For North Korea, victory is to not be defeated and to force the U.S. military to conclude its actions before its assigned goals are achieved. The intent of isolation is to limit U.S. freedom to act effectively against physical attacks, prevent mutual support of U.S. forces, diminish psychological attacks on KPA resolve, and minimize attack effects on KPA C2, systems, networks, and general support infrastructure.

**ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE WARFARE**

1-119. EIW uses all aspects of the information environment to create effects favorable to North Korea’s objectives. Kim Jong Il stated that there were three pillars to creating a powerful state: ideology, arms, and information technology. Kim Jong Un has continued this emphasis on EIW. North Korea will attempt to identify critical or essential decisions by enemy forces that would most affect its own goals and objectives. With an understanding of these actions and the situational awareness and understanding that impact on these decisions, the country will attempt to execute a comprehensive EIW campaign to induce preferred decisions and actions by the enemy. An EIW campaign is waged through multiple means that can include—

- EW.
- Deception.
- Physical destruction.
- Protection and security measures.
- Perception management.
- Information attack.
- Computer warfare.
- Reconnaissance.
- Cryptanalysis.
- Intelligence Collection.
- Disinformation operations.

1-120. These EIW means are combined systematically and continuously to target decision-making processes. Multiple forms of information attack present a believable compilation of information and corroborating evidence, as a deception, that guides decisions that seem to be reasoned and correct to an enemy, but actually support KPA goals. KPA perception management manipulates information and other
forms of sensory presentation so that apparently true data obtained are mutually supporting misinformation that is undetected by the target of the EIW.

**ACTIONS TO COUNTER U.S. FORCES**

1-121. North Korea can operate across all domains and oppose U.S. interests in all phases of a joint operation. Using varied forms of hybrid and multi-domain capabilities, the North Koreans will carefully plan and execute actions prior to overt hostilities with U.S. forces as a series or group of integrated operations. Some actions will purposely be overt while others will be intentionally covert, to be activated at a critical point in time as determined by the commander. The balance of the five domains will shift with the tempo and nature of ongoing operations. While all five domains will be employed, there are important trends that might predominate actions and be most critical to North Korean success at particular points in time and events during a conflict.

**ACTIONS TO INFLUENCE SHAPING OPERATIONS**

1-122. North Korea prefers to win without fighting and on terms favorable to its interests. If its actions are successful but counter to critical U.S. interests, the U.S. may consider introducing additional armed force to the region. North Korean goals prior to this increase are centered on preventing this decision and, if that fails, constraining the introduction of additional military forces in such a way as to prevent the success of a U.S. joint and combined operation. During enemy shaping operations, North Korea will primarily use EIW, with less emphasis on systems warfare and preclusion and even less emphasis on sanctuary and isolation, as shown in figure 1-3. The balance of the country’s methodologies will be focused on four key areas.

![Figure 1-3. Actions to counter enemy shaping operations](image)

**Provide an Alternate Understanding of an Operation Environment**

1-123. North Korean EIW activities will manipulate the acquisition, transmission and presentation of information in a way that suits its preferred decision outcomes. Manipulating cognitive understanding of conditions shapes a foe’s decisions to actually support North Korean objectives.

**Enable Targeted Instability**

1-124. North Korea will attempt to foster instability in the South Korean population in such a way that regional security does not match U.S. operational requirements.

**Disaggregate Partnerships**

1-125. The country will act upon partnerships to reduce the ability of the U.S. to operate in its preferred combined, joint, and interagency manner.
Prevent the Facilitation of Access

1-126. North Korea will focus pre-conflict preclusion activities on nonlethal means. It will attempt to undermine relationships, raise political stakes, manipulate public opinion, and attack resolve in order to constrain or deny basing rights, overflight corridors, logistic support, and concerted allied actions.

ACTIONS TO DETER AUGMENTATION OF ENEMY FORCES

1-127. North Korea desires to accomplish its aims to deter introduction of additional enemy forces into the region, with focus on four key areas. During the enemy deter phase, North Korea will focus its operations on the reflexive control and preclusion domains, place a lesser emphasis on the systems warfare and sanctuary domains, and perform limited operations in the isolation domain, as shown in figure 1-4. Its goals are centered on manipulating deterrence efforts with effects that halt or significantly slow introduction of additional combat power.

![Figure 1-4. Actions to counter enemy deterrence](image)

Alter Perception of Risk

1-128. North Korea may use EIW activities to manipulate an opponent’s view of the risks involved in key actions. These efforts will focus on the heightened risk of escalation inherent in any action conducted by the U.S. and the potential loss of life for all sides.

Expose U.S. and Allied Forces

1-129. North Korea could expose enemy forces to attack, such as ships from South Korea, submarines, and even possible attacks on aircraft flying into the AO. These actions are designed to degrade the deterrence value of adding additional enemy forces to the Korean Peninsula in an attempt to destroy credibility among current and potential U.S. partner nations.

Mask Intent

1-130. North Korea could manipulate the information environment to incorrectly portray its intent. Successful deception would cause the U.S. to build deterrence capacity aimed at a false or less than critical North Korean capability.

Slow and Disrupt Deployment

1-131. North Korea could focus on continuing preclusion activities to limit the accumulation of applicable U.S. combat power to a level and presence that does not threaten the accomplishment of its goals.
Chapter 1

**ACTIONS TO MAINTAIN THE INITIATIVE**

1-132. North Korea understands the role of initiative in victory. Time is a weapon the country believes favors its own goals and interests initially, and then fades the longer the conflict will last. During the enemy’s seize initiative phase, North Korea will attempt to use the preclusion and systems warfare domains to stifle its enemy’s ability to seize the initiative. To a lesser extent, North Korea will use the EIW and isolation domains, with even less reliance on the sanctuary domain, as shown in figure 1-5. The balance of its methodologies at this point in operations will be focused on two key areas: tempo and preclusion.

![Figure 1-5. Actions to counter enemy seizing the initiative](image)

**Control Tempo**

1-133. During the initial phases of an extraregional force’s entry into the region or the addition of forces from a country already involved, North Korea may employ a high operational tempo to take advantage of the weaknesses inherent in enemy power projection. Lightly equipped forces are usually the first to enter the region. This may take the form of attack against enemy early-entry forces and be linked to diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts to terminate the conflict quickly, before the main enemy force can be brought to bear. If the North Koreans cannot end the conflict quickly, they will likely take steps to slow the tempo and prolong the conflict. The country realizes the significance of coalitions and has observed successes and failures of U.S.-led coalitions. If timely victory does not occur, U.S. public support begins to wane and ultimately influences political decisions. Therefore, the North Koreans will seek protraction of conflict to keep U.S. forces engaged in order to weaken resolve and drain military and economic resources. The preferred tactics during this period avoid decisive combat with superior forces. These activities may not be linked to maneuver or ground objectives, but may instead be intended to inflict mass casualties or destroy critical or essential systems, which reduces U.S. resolve or ability to continue the fight.

**Conduct In-theater Preclusion**

1-134. North Korea will threaten and attack forward bases and supplies via operational fires and affiliated irregular forces. This raises the risk to U.S. forces, hinders operational phasing, and diminishes host-nation support for protection of U.S. lines of communications. The North Koreans may now, or in the near future, have access to multiple weapons platforms to assist in conducting preclusion. Medium- and long-range, precision-strike munitions can provide the ability to target deploying forces, strategic mobility assets, forward operating bases and sites, staging areas, and lines of communications. Proliferation of long-range air defense systems can present significant challenges as North Korea attempts to exclude or limit U.S. access to areas where U.S. forces are directed to deploy. Other North Korean platforms may include unmanned aircraft that employ capabilities such as Global Positioning System jammers, sensors, EW capabilities, or other weaponized capabilities. In addition, readily available commercial imagery and omnipresent media sources provide early warning of U.S. actions and will become increasingly difficult to elude.
**ACTIONS TO GAIN AND SUSTAIN DOMINANCE**

1-135. North Korean actions will seek to render U.S. combat power ineffective by systematic and continual attacks on sustainment activities and C2 networks. North Korea will attempt to isolate and contain enemy maneuver and fires formations, and force U.S. forces to commit combat power to battles and engagements that diminish capabilities and prevent U.S. success. North Korea will likely focus on the domains of systems warfare, isolation, and sanctuary during the enemy’s dominate phase. EIW is relegated to a subordinate role, while preclusion has an even lesser role, as shown in figure 1-6.

![Figure 1-6. Actions to counter enemy dominance](image)

**Employ Targeted Overmatch**

1-136. The destruction of high-visibility or unique systems employed by U.S. forces offers exponential value in terms of North Korean goals. These actions are not always linked to military objectives; they also maximize effects in the information and psychological arenas. High-visibility systems that could be identified for destruction might include stealth aircraft, attack helicopters, counterbattery artillery radars, aerial surveillance platforms, or rocket launcher systems. Losses among these premier systems could undermine U.S. morale, degrade operational capability, and inhibit employment of these weapons systems. If North Korea is able to obtain them, precision munitions can degrade or eliminate high-technology weaponry. Camouflage, deception, decoy, or mock-up systems can degrade the effects of sensor systems. The North Koreans can employ low-cost Global Positioning System jammers to disrupt precision munitions targeting, sensor-to-shooter links, and navigation. Lethal weapon systems such as missiles, air defense systems, sensor and EW weapons, unmanned aircraft systems, and artillery will all be used to degrade U.S. capabilities. An alternate way to operate on the margins of U.S. technology is to maneuver during periods of reduced exposure, based on detailed study of U.S. capabilities and patterns.

**Protect Key Capabilities**

1-137. North Korean forces could selectively forego massed formations, patterned echelons, and linear operations that would present easy targets. Military forces may hide and disperse in areas of sanctuary that limit the ability to apply the full range of U.S. technological capabilities. The country will retain the ability to rapidly mass forces and fires from dispersed locations for decisive combat at the time and place of its own determination. North Korea will use the physical environment and natural conditions to neutralize or offset the technological advantages of modern reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence operations. The country will employ its large array of reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence, and target acquisition systems. Deceptive misinformation to large numbers of sensors can overwhelm a foe’s ability to receive, process, and analyze raw intelligence data and provide timely and accurate intelligence analysis.
Disaggregate Enemy Formations

1-138. North Korea will target key vulnerabilities, fix maneuver forces, disconnect networks, and manipulate decision-making to limit or prevent U.S. forces from benefitting from the synergy of mobile, integrated, and protected firepower. North Korea will attempt to influence enemy maneuver forces to choose incorrect deployment times and attack avenues. North Korean regular and irregular forces’ countermobility efforts will limit flexibility and disrupt enemy maneuver responses and counterattacks.

ACTIONS TO COUNTER CONSOLIDATION OF ENEMY GAINS

1-139. North Korea will act to prevent consolidation of enemy gains and to alter conditions into a situation in which the country resumes control of an OE. Its goals are centered on manipulating consolidation efforts to a point where the country returns to or gains a level of influence over the region commensurate with its objectives and interests. If North Korea is losing the war and the enemy goes into a stabilization phase, the remaining North Korea assets will focus on the domains of EIW and systems warfare, with a lesser role for the sanctuary and isolation domains. Any efforts in the preclusion domain are minor, as shown in figure 1-7. If North Korea loses the war and the enemy’s enable civil authority phase begins, any remaining pro-Kim regime elements would primarily operate in the EIW domain, deemphasizing the domains of systems warfare and sanctuary. The preclusion and isolation domains will have even less emphasis, as shown in figure 1-8. The balance of its methodologies at this point in the operation will be focused on four key areas.

![Figure 1-7. Actions to counter enemy stabilizing actions](image1)

![Figure 1-8. Actions to counter enemy enabling civil authority](image2)

Counter Stability

1-140. North Korean use of reflexive-control activities will manipulate the foe’s view of the value of continued actions in the region. These efforts will focus both on altering the value of continued operations
by the U.S. and changing the perceived value by other actors in their continuing support as ally or partner to
the U.S. This effort will include actions to undermine the authority and effectiveness of governance elements
acting in concert with U.S. forces.

Redirect Support

1-141. North Korea will attempt to influence the South Korean populace and possibly other regional actors
to shift their support to its interests and to act against the stated aims of the U.S. The country will exploit any
lack of cultural understanding observed in U.S. forces. It will conduct EIW campaigns dedicated to portray
the U.S. culture as an institution bent on political and economic global domination in the name of “Western”
democracy. Information campaigns will present U.S. military forces as brutal and unconstrained by the
accepted rules of warfare, and exploit instances of U.S. missteps due to cultural differences. The fabrication
and exaggeration of U.S. cultural shortcomings are designed to alienate the South Korean populace from
supporting the U.S. and aid in recruiting people and other countries to support North Korea and its goals and
objectives.

Change the Nature of the Conflict

1-142. North Korea will seek to shift the nature of the conflict, or at least its perceived nature, to
characteristics that do not match the themes proffered by U.S. information operations. North Korean forces
will also act to prevent enemy consolidation areas from becoming secure enough to permit substantive
stability operations.

Employ Cultural Standoff

1-143. North Korea will optimize cultural standoff and social aspects of an OE to provide protection and
freedom to maneuver for friendly forces. Cultural standoff techniques employed by North Korean actors
include integrating religious, medical, and other sensitive facilities into sanctuaries; employing human terrain
and cognitive manipulation for deception objectives; and exploiting the South Korean population using EIW.

OFFENSIVE, DEFENSIVE, AND COUNTERSTABILITY ACTIONS

1-144. Offensive and defensive actions occur within three general types of KPA operations. Those types of
actions at the tactical echelons are—

- Offensive actions.
- Defensive actions.
- Counterstability actions.

1-145. The types of actions in KPA operations are both tactical methods and guides to the design of COAs
and mission orders. KPA counterstability actions, although offensive and defensive in nature, are often
recurring actions to create or amplify conditions that support an OE conducive to achieving North Korean
objectives. These types of actions often seek to create or sustain conditions to destabilize a society, its
governance of law and order, and other social support to a relevant population of the society.

OFFENSIVE ACTIONS

1-146. The KPAGF conduct three basic types of tactical offensive actions at the echelons of regiment and
higher—

- Integrated attack.
- Dispersed attack.
- Limited-objective attack.

1-147. The tactical missions of integrated and dispersed attacks are based on the objective and how the
KPAGF assess their combat power in relation to their enemy. An integrated attack applies overmatch
capabilities in selected windows of opportunity for synchronized and massed combat power to destroy an
enemy’s resolve to continue a conflict. When the KPAGF do not have overmatch capability, typical offensive
actions include dispersed attacks conducted over extended periods of time and expansive areas. Attacks can
include domains of land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace. Interdependent and coordinated actions by dispersed forces attack throughout their assigned areas of responsibility. Specific actions aim to destroy key components of an enemy’s combat system, degrade enemy resolve, and gradually defeat enemy ability to continue a conflict through continuous EIW actions.

1-148. The KPAGF will conduct limited-objective attacks when, while combating a stronger enemy force, they recognize an opportunity to seize the initiative from enemy operations. Two types of tactical limited-objective attacks are spoiling attack and counterattack. The purpose of a spoiling attack is to pre-empt or seriously disrupt an enemy while it is in the process of planning, forming, assembling, or preparing to attack. A counterattack prevents the enemy from achieving its offensive mission outcome, and allows the KPAGF to regain tactical initiative in their operations. Typical forces with the flexibility to react to situational opportunities with a limited-objective attack are reserve or designated counterattack forces.

1-149. KPAGF attacks can have designated purposes with expected outcomes. An attack to destroy eliminates a target entity as a useful fighting force or an objective, and often focuses on a single component of an enemy’s combat system. An attack to seize is to gain control of key terrain or man-made facilities/infrastructure. An attack to expel forces an enemy to vacate an area. Attacks to expel often have a significant EIW component that facilitates degradation of enemy resolve and fosters enemy defeat. A strike is an offensive action that rapidly destroys a key enemy organization through a synergistic combination of massed precision fires and maneuver. A strike mission is conducted typically at a C2 operational level above division, based on the combat power required for effective mission success. The tactical outcomes for strikes are not limited to destruction, seizure, or expulsion.

1-150. At the tactical echelon of battalion and below, the KPAGF conduct four basic types of offensive action—
- Ambush.
- Assault.
- Raid.
- Reconnaissance attack.

1-151. The tactical actions of ambush, assault, and raid can be conducted with a combat power allocation as minimal as one individual, whereas the combat power normally required to conduct a reconnaissance attack is at least that of a task-organized company. See chapter 6 for discussion and examples of offensive actions at divisional, regimental, and subordinate-unit levels.

DEFENSIVE ACTIONS

1-152. The KPAGF consider defensive operations as a temporary interval between attacks in order to gain time or conserve troop strength. The KPAGF will only go on the defense when forced to do so and only as a temporary measure until they can return to the offense again. The KPAGF go on the defense to repulse a superior attacking force, to inflict grave casualties upon an attacking force, to defend key terrain, and to transition to a decisive attack. Defense is conceptually a planned defense or a situational defense. Planned actions typically involve sufficient time, knowledge, and situational understanding of an OE to prepare and rehearse forces for specific tasks. Nonetheless, circumstances change often and suddenly at times that preclude actions as originally planned. In instances such as being surprised or finding KPAGF combat power at a significant disadvantage, conditions can require a temporary situational defensive posture until the KPAGF can regain the initiative.

1-153. At the tactical echelons of regiment and above, defensive tactics are identified with one of two descriptions:
- Mobile defense.
- Area defense.

1-154. A KPAGF tactical mobile defense applies fires and maneuver to destroy key elements of the enemy’s combat system to deny enemy forces their objective while preserving its own combat power. A mobile defense uses the depth and breadth of an AO and available time to create favorable conditions for KPAGF actions to disrupt, defeat, or destroy an enemy. The objective is typically focused on defeat or destruction of key C2 nodes and logistics support. For the KPAGF, this form of defense trades space for time. The main
combat power is concentrated in the second echelon, while the first echelon fights a series of delaying actions to disrupt the enemy until the decisive fight against the second echelon.

1-155. A tactical area defense denies key areas of terrain or access to designated areas in order to set the conditions that cause an enemy’s offensive operations to culminate before achieving its objectives. Deception activities are a key component of EIW, especially during counterattacks. An area defense retains selected terrain, when directed, to support other defensive or offensive actions to protect critical capabilities, preserve combat power, or create favorable conditions for KPAGF actions to disrupt, defeat, or destroy an enemy.

1-156. At the battalion, detachment, and subordinate echelons, the KPAGF perform maneuver and area defensive actions using combinations of—
- Simple battle position (SBP) defenses.
- Complex battle position (CBP) defenses.

1-157. A SBP is a coordinated defensive position(s) oriented on an enemy avenue of approach. A CBP is a coordinated defensive location with multiple SBPs. The purpose of a CBP can include—
- Protect and conceal a safe haven or sanctuary of key KPA capabilities.
- Delay enemy forces in an AO for a specified period of time.
- Defend and prevent seizure of a location or area by an enemy.
- Contain or block enemy forces.

1-158. Defensive tasks often set conditions for the KPAGF to resume offensive actions. Whether the defensive mission task is terrain oriented or enemy-force oriented, conditional fires and maneuver of forces are typically part of how the KPAGF intend to use combat power in support of mission purpose and intent. See chapter 7 for discussion and examples of defensive actions at divisional, regimental, and subordinate-unit levels.

**COUNTERSTABILITY ACTIONS**

1-159. Counterstability actions are a normal aspect of North Korean operations, and often occur concurrent with other ongoing defensive or offensive actions. These types of actions leverage the variables of an OE, combat, and a relevant population to create conditions that enhance the KPA’s physical, informational, and cognitive goals and objectives in support of the mission. Offensive and defensive tasks in counterstability actions can be simultaneous and continuous at various levels of intensity. North Korea sustains or modifies the frequency and level of physical and cognitive violence and coercion in order to destabilize an OE. Actions are at times sudden and massive in effects, but are more often a series of gradually escalating incidents that cause long-term debilitating effects to an enemy and relevant population. Whether sudden and massive or gradual and insidious, counterstability actions degrade the capabilities of a foe and seek to manipulate OE conditions to the advantage of the KPA.

1-160. North Korea will plan and coordinate counterstability actions to incite dissatisfaction by the South Korean population. The country’s actions can overtly or covertly challenge legitimacy of the South Korean Government by disrupting governmental services such as military and internal security forces, law enforcement and judicial agencies, financial institutions, internal development programs, diplomatic initiatives, or degrading civil services and a safe and secure environment. North Korea will attempt to interrupt indigenous or external support to South Korea to extend instability in the area. In some instances, it may attempt to provide civil services and support to an area while concurrently disrupting those types of services and support from the South Korean Government in order to acquire support from the local population, political affiliates, and the North Korean diaspora.

1-161. An effective strategic communications program, integral to EIW objectives, can directly and indirectly criticize and damage the aims of South Korea, opposition groups, and partner actions through local, regional, and global media outreach. North Korea has proven it is not constrained or limited by the rule of law or international conventions and protocols. Crime and terrorism are two areas of counterstability actions that confront a safe and secure OE, the rule of law, social and economic well-being, and just and stable governance. These actions are instrumental to disruption and subversion of enemy military forces and society. See chapter 8 for discussion and offensive and defensive examples of counterstability tactical action.
The recent Russian takeover of Crimea only reinforced likely KPA previous planning to insert some KPA SOF into South Korea or to activate clandestine operatives already living in South Korea before any actual hostilities begin. Their task would be to help gain any North Korean advantage that would slow down the mobilization of South Korean reserves. The SOF could do this in a number of ways:

- **Social media**: spreading the word that war is not imminent and that military reserve mobilization is unnecessary as well as expensive.
- **Antiwar protests**: leading/infiltrating rallies intended to convince the South Korean Government not to act against its North Korean brothers.
- **False-flag provocations**: blaming any SOF actions in South Korea on others, especially those South Koreans who favor war preparedness.
- **Political attacks**: causing chaos and possibly advocating regime change during the crisis, thus diverting political attention away from North Korean actions.
- **Terrorist attacks**: if other means prove ineffective or as an approaching conventional attack date draws near, launching terrorist attacks to spread panic among the South Korean civilian population.
- **Attack key nodes**: just prior to the North Korean attack, attacking important C2 and communications centers to prevent the flow of true information throughout South Korea.
Chapter 2

Functional Tactics

This chapter explains Korean People’s Army (KPA) actions within the framework of functional tactics. It discusses the functional method and the terms, symbols, and control measures used to portray and govern KPA activities. A description of action and enabling functions is given, along with common function types performed by action and enabling units. The chapter concludes with a discussion of mission task execution.

TACTICAL TERMS, SYMBOLS, AND CONTROL MEASURES

2-1. The Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF) typically use a minimum number of control measures to orient or regulate functional actions in a military operation. A control measure is a means of regulating forces or warfighting functions (ADP 6-0). The KPAGF visualize an operational environment (OE) to facilitate rapid transition, when necessary, between offensive and defensive actions and between linear and nonlinear dispositions. The KPA adapts to the nature of conflict conditions and provides clear expectations of a mission—as well as limitations or constraints to mission expectations—in written, verbal, or graphical instructions.

Note. A force is normally regimental or larger in size. An element is normally battalion or smaller in size. A unit is a generic term for either a force or an element. An organization is the group of units that are tasked to complete a specific mission.

2-2. A commander identifies the conditions of an OE from the perspective of that level of command and a mission assignment. Within a unit’s area of operations (AO), defined by the next-higher commander, a commander designates specific AOs for subordinates, along with zones and other control measures to facilitate mission intent, responsibilities, freedom of action, and mission success. Typical tactical control measures include the AO and multiple zones:

- Offensive zones.
- Defensive zones.
  - Security zone.
  - Defense zones.
- Zone of reconnaissance responsibility (ZORR).
- Attack zone.
- Kill zone.
- Kill box.

AREA OF OPERATIONS

2-3. The KPA defines an area of operations (AO) as the geographical area and associated airspace within which a commander has the authority to plan and conduct combat operations. An AO is bounded by a limit of responsibility beyond which the organization may not operate or conduct fires without coordination through the next-higher headquarters. AO boundaries may be linear or nonlinear and may or may not be contiguous. Linear AOs can contain subordinate nonlinear AOs, and nonlinear AOs can contain linear AOs. Contiguous or noncontiguous boundaries are dependent on the mission and situational conditions of an OE and typically include more than military considerations, such as political declarations on sovereign territory,
formal objections by multiple actors on disputed resources, or rogue actors operating in global commons and jeopardizing regional stability.

2-4. A combat order normally defines an AO and zones within the AO by specifying boundary lines in terms of distinct local terrain features through which a line passes. An order specifies whether each of those terrain features is included or excluded from the unit’s AO or zones within the AO. A higher headquarters commander may retain control of airspace over an AO assigned to a subordinate headquarters. This decision would be stated in standard airspace management measures.

**ZONES**

2-5. On the offense or the defense, the KPAGF main body will be divided into a defense zone with either three echelons or two echelons and a reserve. In the offense, the first echelon will consist of approximately two-thirds of the maneuver units. The second echelon will consist of approximately two-ninths of the organization’s remaining combat power. The final one-ninth of the organization’s maneuver units will serve as a reserve or a third echelon unit. The location of the echelons depends on the size of the unit—battalion, regiment, division, or field army. In the offense, the KPA uses fewer control measures than when on the defense.

2-6. An AO depicts zones for a specified mission with the intent to preserve as much flexibility as possible for subordinate units to conduct their operations within the higher headquarters commander’s intent. The security zone, defense zones, and several other control measures are described in the following paragraphs. Other control measures in chapter 5 expand a discussion of control measures and tasks in reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, and security missions.

**Offensive Zones**

2-7. The KPAGF use minimal control measures when conducting offensive actions, including zones. The KPA commander gives each subordinate commander left and right boundaries, and the order delineates the avenues of advance. Table 2-1 provides the standard attack frontage and depth for various KPAGF units. See chapter 5 for detailed information about reconnaissance and advance guard units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Frontage, km</th>
<th>Depth, km</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>40–60</td>
<td>80–100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps</td>
<td>20–40</td>
<td>40–50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>10–16</td>
<td>10–15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiment</td>
<td>3–6</td>
<td>5–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion</td>
<td>1.5–2</td>
<td>2–3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Defensive Zones**

2-8. KPAGF AOs typically consist of four primary zones when on the defensive: the security zone and the first, second, and third defense zones. There is also a buffer zone located between each of the three defense zones in a field army area defense. Zones may be linear or nonlinear in nature. The size of these zones depends on the size of the KPA units involved, engagement ranges of weapon systems, the terrain, and the nature of the enemy’s operation. The KPAGF do not designate a support zone, so there is no support line as found in U.S. Army doctrine. The battle line (the KPA does not use this term) separates the first defense zone from the security zone. The KPAGF will place their logistical units in the rear of the first defense zone and throughout the second and third defense zones. Figure 2-1 illustrates several types of KPA control measures.
Security Zone

2-9. The security zone is the AO of a disruption force. This zone is a geographical area and airspace in which the security force fixes or disrupts an enemy, and sets conditions for successful combat actions throughout an AO. The KPAGF divide the security zone into the combat security area and the general security area. The combat security area is 1–2 km in front of the first defense zone and is subdivided into two areas. The first area extends 200–400 m from the forward battalions and is occupied by security outposts, security patrols, and ambush teams. The second area extends up to 2 km in front of each forward regiment and is occupied by a company (+) unit arrayed in 3–4 combat observation posts. These posts provide early warning, prevent surprise attacks, and call for and adjust artillery fire. The general security area extends 10–15 km in front of the first echelon defense zone of a division or corps. For corps operations the general security area is manned by a regiment (+) and for division operations this area is occupied by a battalion (+). The mission of general security outposts is to provide early attack warning and to conduct disruption, delay, and interdiction missions. Units in this security zone begin the attack on specified components of the enemy’s combat system to begin the disaggregation and defeat of that system. Successful actions in the security zone will create a window of opportunity that is exploitable for forces in the defense zones. Specific actions in the security zone can include:

- Defeat enemy reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance forces.
- Maintain reconnaissance or surveillance of critical enemy systems.
- Deny enemy ability to acquire and engage KPA systems with long-range fires.
- Disrupt enemy air defenses.
- Disrupt enemy engineer capabilities.
- Disaggregate enemy movements and maneuver.
- Interrupt effective enemy logistics support to action force.
- Deceive the enemy on disposition and actions of KPA units, main effort, or main defenses.

2-10. The security zone is bounded by the battle line and the limit of responsibility of the overall AO. In linear offensive combat, the higher headquarters may move the battle line and limit of responsibility forward as the force continues to move and maneuver in successful offensive actions. A higher headquarters commander can adjust the security zone boundary as forces adopt a temporary defensive posture while consolidating gains after a successful offensive action or in preparation for subsequent offensive actions.
Similarly, a higher headquarters commander can adjust the security zone boundary based on emergent conditions in defensive actions.

2-11. Security zones between or among KPAGF units may be contiguous or noncontiguous. They can also be layered, with a security zone of a subordinate command being integral to the security zone of the next-higher command. Battalions and subordinate units may be directed to conduct disruption actions within the security zone of a higher headquarters.

**Defense Zones**

2-12. The defense zone is the portion of an AO where the KPAGF expect to conduct decisive actions. A KPAGF field army operates three defense zones separated by buffer zones with prepared positions in all zones. The KPAGF simply call these the first, second, and third defense zones. The defense zone is separated from the security zone by the battle line. Lateral boundaries are part of the limit of responsibility. Forces in the three defense zones exploit opportunities created by actions in the security zone. Using all elements of combat power, the KPAGF engage the enemy in close combat to achieve tactical success in this zone.

2-13. In a defense zone, the KPAGF unit is typically tasked to accomplish one or more of the following—

- Deceive enemy attention from a main offensive effort or supporting defensive effort.
- Prevent movement or maneuver of an enemy force that might otherwise impact KPA actions in an AO.
- Inflict significant casualties on enemy forces.
- Defeat enemy command and control (C2) or logistics.
- Destroy enemy forces.
- Defend key terrain.

2-14. A division does not always form a divisional defense zone, as the defense zone may be the aggregate of the defense zones of subordinate headquarters. In nonlinear situations, there may be multiple, noncontiguous regimental or divisional defense zones. The regimental defense zone provides each of the subordinate unit commanders the terrain to frame decisive tactical actions. Battalion and subordinate headquarters may have AOs that consist primarily of a defense zone with support units contained within it.

**Support Zone**

2-15. Unlike many threat armies, the KPAGF do not designate a support zone. Combat support/rear service units will be located in the AO of their parent headquarters, with much of this support located in the second and third defense zones. Security forces will operate in the rear of the first defense zone and the other two defense zones in a combat role to defeat enemy forces that might otherwise impact effective logistics and administrative support to KPAGF units in an AO. Camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception measures, as in other zones, improve defense against enemy reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) and precision attack. Logistics support and services integrate actions to ensure effective KPAGF combat power in conduct of missions and supporting tasks.

2-16. A division’s logistical units can be dispersed within the various defense zones of its subordinate units, or the division may place its logistical units in a defense zone that is separate from subordinate AOs. If the defense zone moves during the course of a battle, KPA logistical units will reposition based on command direction to ensure timely and continuous support to the command.

**Zone of Reconnaissance Responsibility**

2-17. A ZORR is the combination of a unit AO and the area outside of the AO that can be observed by the unit’s technical sensors. The ZORR extends into other AOs when boundaries are contiguous in an operation.

**Attack Zone**

2-18. An attack zone is given to a subordinate unit with an offensive mission, to delineate clearly where forces will be conducting offensive maneuver. Attack zones are often used to control offensive action by a subordinate unit inside a larger defensive battle or operation.
**Kill Zone**

2-19. A kill zone is a designated area where the KPAGF plan to destroy a key enemy target. A kill zone may be within the security zone or any of the defense zones of an AO. A kill zone is typically a two-dimensional control measure of depth and width on the ground, defined by a boundary of grid coordinates, terrain features, or another common reference system.

**Kill Box**

2-20. A kill box can be defined as a three-dimensional target area in depth, width, and height to facilitate the integration of coordinated joint weapons fire. This KPA joint coordination and control measure facilitates effective and timely use of air and indirect fires in support of the ground maneuver commander’s mission. The kill box may include no-fire areas, restricted operations areas, and airspace coordination areas. A kill box used as a joint forces coordination and control measure enables Korean People’s Army Air Force air assets to engage surface targets without further coordination or terminal attack control.

**UNIT SYMBOLS**

2-21. Unit symbols for all KPA units use the diamond-shaped frame. All KPA task-organized units use the “task force” amplifier placed over the “echelon” (unit size) modifier above the diamond-shape frame. Figure 2-2 shows ways in which KPA units can be portrayed. When multiple forces and elements are interspersed in an AO, special frames and colors can be described and used for visual clarity.

![Figure 2-2. KPA unit/organization symbol presentation options](image)

**ACTION AND ENABLING FUNCTIONS**

2-22. A number of functions occur each time a KPAGF unit executes a mission. While functions required to accomplish any given mission vary depending on the specific OE and mission set, functions can be divided into two broad categories:

- Action functions.
- Enabling functions.

2-23. The action function is the primary set of KPAGF activities that actually accomplishes a given mission outcome. One specific part of a KPAGF unit or organization that is conducting a particular action is normally responsible for performing this primary function or task to accomplish the objective of an assigned action. The unit with the primary function will be called an action force or action element, depending on its size and level of command.

2-24. The higher echelon commander will typically identify the action unit with a more specific designation that states the organization’s specific function. For example, if the objective of the action is to conduct an assault to destroy an enemy unit or seize terrain, the action unit designated to complete that action is called the assault unit. In regimental or larger unit offensive operations, an organization that has the primary offensive mission to attack and defeat or destroy an enemy, or seize and secure terrain, is the action force. Other attacking forces supporting this defeat or destruction are enabling the action function. In defensive action examples, a battalion or subordinate unit that performs the main defensive mission in a defense zone...
is the action element. Other units of the defensive mission throughout an AO enable the main defense function.

2-25. An enabling function is a set of activities that supports the mission task to be accomplished by the action unit. In relation to units conducting the action function, all other parts of the organization conducting a mission to support the action unit provide enabling functional support based on their assigned mission task(s). Enabling support can change as tactical opportunities arise during a mission. Each of these units is an enabling force or enabling element; however, each unit with an enabling function is normally identified by the specific function it performs.

2-26. Enabling units create the conditions that allow the action unit the freedom and flexibility to successfully operate. In order to create a window of opportunity for the action unit to succeed, the enabling unit(s) may be required to operate at significant risk and may sustain substantial casualties. In some instances, an enabling unit may not even make contact with the enemy in order to accomplish its function; for example, a force conducting a demonstration.

FUNCTIONAL METHOD

2-27. The functional method follows a three-step sequence for mission performance: identify the action function and enabling functions needed to achieve a mission task; allocate resources to execute the required functions; and synchronize the functions for conduct of the mission. Stating a task and purpose for each of the functions assists in identifying the capabilities required to enact or support both within the mission. An initial analysis, after receipt of a mission, includes a sequential and standardized process to—

- Understand and acknowledge an assigned mission purpose and intent with emphasis on completing the mission by the designated time.
- Restate a mission for analysis and development of an initial concept of mission conduct.
- Develop mission courses of action backward from the end state of the objective.
- Analyze mission courses of action from the current situation to completion of the mission purpose and intent.
- Determine a concept of operation for mission success.
- Plan the mission and consider branches and sequels.
- Prepare for the mission.
- Execute the mission.
- Conduct post-mission analysis to improve or sustain tactical performance.

2-28. The three-step method provides the framework for confirmation of actions or final adjustments prior to conduct of the mission task. KPA leaders executing the functions of a mission task remain alert for tactical conditions that indicate a change may be required to original orders or directives in order to achieve the mission purpose. At the conclusion of a mission, initial post-action analysis and subsequent deliberate analysis identify methods, processes, and actions to improve or sustain for effective mission execution. Figure 2-3 provides a simple diagram of the KPA mission sequence analysis.

![Figure 2-3. Method for mission sequence analysis](image_url)

2-29. The KPA uses two perspectives of analysis for mission planning, preparation, execution, and subsequent actions. Forward analysis makes an initial assessment of factors, assumptions, and successful mission end-state conditions that the KPA uses to visualize and evaluate critical actions and requirements.
Considerations include understanding tactical conditions from mission assignment to mission completion, and possible or probable actions and options that follow a mission assignment. A complementary perspective is a reverse sequence of analysis that starts at a point of achieving the mission objective and works backward through critical actions to the starting point of mission planning.

2-30. Once mission functions are determined, action and enabling forces or elements are identified and task-organized in order to accomplish the assigned mission, with consideration given to mission contingencies. Probable or possible subsequent mission tasks can be visualized and analyzed for conditions, purpose, mission intent, and relative KPA combat power required for potential future operations. Mission analysis identifies or indicates critical aspects that include but are not limited to—

- Relative KPA combat power at successful conclusion of the mission task.
- Combat effectiveness of enemy forces before, during, and at conclusion of the KPA mission.
- Prudent risk level a KPA commander is willing to accept in how combat power is positioned, tailored, and maneuvered in conduct of a mission.
- Coordination of electronic intelligence warfare (EIW) support.
- Combat power provided to a reserve.
- Assets allocated to or coordinated for RISTA for continuous redundant capabilities to achieve and maintain situational awareness.
- Assets allocated to the action unit(s) and enabling unit(s) throughout mission execution.
- Logistics support to the mission.
- Time requirements or allowances to conduct and complete a mission.
- Considerations for mission branches and sequels.

2-31. The analysis is a continuous process to validate information and intelligence, and engage KPA leaders in critical thinking and effective decision making for mission planning and execution. Mission planning considers all variables of an OE in the mission. KPAGF doctrine supposedly empowers military leaders with the C2 responsibility to maintain combat readiness and efficiency of their subordinate forces, plan and prepare for operations, and provide decisive leadership and direction during mission execution.

2-32. KPA writings appear to direct units to focus on the purpose of their tactical mission and act toward achieving its mission purpose and intent, even when the details of an original plan have changed or become irrelevant through enemy action or unforeseen events. KPA writing seems to emphasize flexible and agile actions and reactions in tactical situations as the result of training, practical experiences, and unit conditioning of leaders and subordinates. In actuality, KPA commanders may not deviate from their assigned missions for fear of the repercussions should failure occur. Despite the possible stifling of initiative by KPA leaders, especially at the lower levels of command, some basic functions become almost instinctive, as in a combat drill, and require minimal deliberate decision making and orders to conduct effective actions. Units are trained to tactical situations through learning standard functional responses; these can consist of immediate drills or groups of tactical tasks that use techniques appropriate to a particular OE and mission task.

ACTION FORCES AND ELEMENTS

2-33. An action unit (force for regimental and above; element for battalion and below) is the part of the organization(s) conducting a particular offensive or defensive action that is responsible for performing the primary task that accomplishes the overall mission objective. In most tactical situations, the higher unit commander will give the action unit a specific designation that identifies the function(s) or task(s) it is directed to perform in order to achieve the objective of the higher command’s mission. Functional action titles can include but are not limited to assault, main defense, and mission.

ASSAULT FORCE OR ELEMENT

2-34. An assault task can be the primary action to destroy an enemy unit through firepower or an integrated employment of fires and maneuver, or seize or secure specified geographical terrain, facilities, or other infrastructure. In this situation, an assault unit can be an action unit.
2-35. An assault unit can be designated with a more descriptive title. For example, if the objective of the action at company level is to conduct a raid, the element designated to complete the raid’s purpose is typically called the raiding element. As another example, the action force at regimental or higher echelon headquarters that completes the primary offensive mission of an attack by exploiting a window of opportunity, created by an enabling force, is called an exploitation force. For the KPAGF in a conventional attack, the exploitation force is normally a second tactical echelon mobile combat arms unit that passes through a first tactical echelon unit that has opened a gap in the enemy’s front line. The second tactical echelon unit will then “exploit” the situation by attacking the combat support and rear service units in the enemy’s division and corps rear areas.

**Main Defense Force or Element**

2-36. A KPAGF main defense unit has the primary defensive task of destroying the enemy in a defense zone. This main defense force completes the destruction of the enemy after the progressive disruption, reduction, or defeat of enemy combat power by an enabling force in a security zone as the enemy attempts to attack through that zone. For the KPAGF, the main defense unit operates in the first of its three sequential defense zones.

**Mission Force or Element**

2-37. In non-strike offensive actions where the mission can be accomplished without the creation of a specific conditional opportunity, the unit that accomplishes the mission can be called a mission unit. A KPA commander, however, may give a mission unit a designation that identifies its specific function. KPA examples could include a surveillance reconnaissance element or a film reconnaissance element.

**Enabling Forces and Elements**

2-38. In relation to the action force or action element, all other parts of a KPA unit/organization conducting an offensive or defensive action provide enabling functions in support of the primary action. At regimental or higher headquarters echelon, the unit headquarters and subordinate units performing these enabling functions are referred to as an enabling force. At battalion and subordinate units, these functional units/organizations are referred to as enabling elements.

2-39. In most tactical situations, the higher KPAGF unit commander will give the enabling unit a specific designation that identifies the function or task it is directed to perform in order to support achieving the objective of the mission. For example, a force at regimental and higher headquarters echelon that enables accomplishment of a mission task by fixing enemy forces so that the enemy cannot interfere with the primary action force is titled a fixing force. An element at battalion or lower echelon headquarters that clears or breaches obstacles to permit an action element to accomplish its primary mission task is titled a clearing or breaching element. Types of functional titles for enabling forces or elements can include but are not limited to—

- Security.
- Fixing.
- Deception.
- Disruption.
- Assault.
- Support.
- Reserve.

**Security Force or Element**

2-40. The security function is a principle enabler for all KPAGF tactical actions. Security is a continuous requirement and is performed by units with capabilities that act to protect KPA units from observation, destruction, or becoming fixed. Security functions can be to provide early warning and reaction time to the KPA, isolate enemy elements from an ongoing KPA mission, or actively delay, defeat, or destroy enemy forces to enable a KPAGF action unit to be successful.
2-41. A security unit provides security for a larger organization to which it is assigned, protects it from observation, and provides early warning of enemy actions. The security unit conducts activities to prevent or mitigate the effects of hostile actions against the overall tactical-level command or its key components. The KPA commander may choose to charge this security unit with providing protection for the entire AO, including the rest of the functional units; logistics and administrative units; and other key installations, facilities, and resources. The security force may include various types of units—such as infantry, special operations forces, counterreconnaissance, and signals reconnaissance assets—to focus on enemy special operations and long-range reconnaissance forces operating throughout the AO. It can also include internal security forces units allocated to tactical-level command, with the mission of protecting the overall command from attack by irregular or paramilitary forces. The security force may also be charged with mitigating the effects of weapons of mass destruction.

**FIXING FORCE OR ELEMENT**

2-42. The fixing function is a principle enabler for most tactical actions. Performing a fixing function requires capabilities that provide the means to prevent enemy units from interfering with KPA mission accomplishment. A fixing unit can fix the enemy by preventing a part of its force from moving from a specific location for a specific period of time so it cannot interfere with the primary KPAGF action. For example, in a mission to ambush a convoy moving through an urban area, a fixing function could be to delay arrival of an enemy quick reaction force. If the mission is to destroy an enemy force in a battle position, a fixing function could be to prevent a reserve from reinforcing the enemy force in the battle position.

2-43. Success in fixing an enemy is accomplished when a designated part of an enemy unit cannot participate in timely actions that otherwise could lead to disruption or failure of a KPA mission. This function can be accomplished in various ways including but not limited to—

- Suppressing a unit with fires.
- Deceiving with coordinated elements of EIW.
- Delaying enemy forces or elements from entering an area with voluntary or coerced civilian demonstrations.
- Ambushing enemy units.
- Denying enemy movement with countermobility effects.
- Disrupting enemy logistics sustainment.

2-44. The KPA identifies which enemy forces need to be fixed and the method(s) by which they will be fixed. It will then assign this responsibility to a force that has the capability to fix the required enemy forces with the correct method. A fixing force may consist of a number of units separated from each other in time and space, particularly if the enemy forces required to be fixed are similarly separated in disposition and location. A fixing force could consist entirely of affiliated irregular forces conducting discrete attacks on logistics, C2, or other systems to fix an enemy.

**DECEPTION FORCE OR ELEMENT**

2-45. A KPA deception unit conducts deception actions that lead the enemy to act in ways prejudicial to enemy interests or favoring the success of a KPAGF action unit. When the EIW plan requires combat forces to conduct deception actions, such as a feint or demonstration, these forces will be designated as deception forces. Operational security measures protect the actual purpose of these forces, and allocated resources support the practical conduct of tasks to deceive an enemy leader of mission intent.

**DISRUPTION FORCE OR ELEMENT**

2-46. A disruption unit typically operates in the KPA security zone to disrupt enemy preparations or actions; destroy or deceive enemy reconnaissance; or begin reducing the effectiveness of key components of the enemy’s combat system. The KPAGF security zone is normally 16–20 km in width and 10–15 km in depth for a KPAGF field army, and is in front of the first defense zone found in the main defense area. In the offense, the disruption unit could be a disruption force that already existed in a preceding defensive situation. For example, the disruption force for a division is typically a regiment with additional assets task-organized
for the disruption function. Battalions or subordinate headquarters typically serve as disruption forces for regiments and can require task-organizing as a detachment.

ASSAULT FORCE OR ELEMENT

2-47. An assault unit, as an enabler, supports the success of an action unit. One or more enablers could be directed to assault to destroy an enemy force or seize a piece of terrain that supports the conditions for an action unit to achieve the overall objective. At regimental level, the commander may employ one or more assault forces.

2-48. The purpose of an assault force may be to create or help create the opportunity for an action force—such as an exploitation force—to accomplish the primary mission. In this instance, an assault unit would have an enabling function. For example, a unit that breaches an obstacle and enables an assault unit to attack through the breach is a breaching unit. In such an offensive action, the breaching actions require an assault to enable the breaching to occur. Since the term “breaching” is more descriptive of the supporting function than the term “assault,” the former is used instead of the latter. The breaching units serve as an enabler for an action force to continue the attack and accomplish the KPAGF’s primary mission objective. In this mission, the role of the supporting assault force is to create the tactical conditions for an exploitation unit—the action unit—to accomplish the mission objective.

SUPPORT FORCE OR ELEMENT

2-49. A support unit provides support to action units. Support units can be designated by their specific functions and may include—
- Support by fires. (See Appendix A for more information on fires support operations.)
- Types of other combat support.
- Types of rear service.
- C2 functions for parts of a unit or organization.

PROTECTED FORCE OR ELEMENT

2-50. In tactical missions, there may be a particular organization(s) that the KPA commander wants to be protected from enemy observation or fire to ensure that it will be available after the current operation is over. This is designated as a protected unit. A protected unit is a capability preserved by a commander for a specified purpose. This type of unit is typically located in the rear of the main defense area.

RESERVE

2-51. In initial orders, some KPA subordinate units are held in an uncommitted status. At the KPA commander’s discretion, some forces or elements may be retained under direct control, in reserve, as a means to influence unforeseen events or take advantage of emergent tactical opportunities. These capabilities are designated as a reserve. If and when such reserves are subsequently assigned a mission to perform a specific function, they receive the appropriate functional unit designation. For example, a reserve force might be ordered to become a counterattack unit. As another example, a unit with a mission task of demonstration or feint can be designated a deception unit.

FUNCTIONAL TACTICS IN OPERATIONS

2-52. Functional tactics are the integrated employment of units by task and purpose to achieve a desired mission outcome. As the KPA conducts cyclic functional analysis, it continues to assess and evaluate what functions must occur in order to achieve the mission purpose and outcomes that support a commander’s intent.

2-53. The functional tactics for a given operation are based on decision making by KPA leaders with prudent risk taking, combat power and force protection assessment, confidence in effective RISTA capabilities, acknowledgement of mission assignment from a higher echelon commander, and a clear understanding of mission success that supports the higher echelon commander’s intent.
2-54. The offensive and defensive mission tasks introduced in chapter 1 are the foundation of how the KPA operates. In addition to offense and defense actions, the complement in many operations is counterstability actions. EIW is integral to all KPA actions.

**OFFENSE**

2-55. The offense is the decisive form of conflict. Success over an enemy eventually necessitates, in almost all situations, offensive actions. The primary purpose of the offense for the KPA is to defeat, destroy, or neutralize a stated enemy in order to accomplish success within a mission purpose and intent. Tactical conditions and tasks may require the KPA to be on the defense for periods of time before transitioning to the offense. Offensive and defensive actions in a mission can be conducted in a simultaneous, parallel, or sequential manner.

**DEFENSE**

2-56. The defense is a form of conflict that creates conditions for the KPAGF to obtain, sustain, or regain the initiative in operations. Tactical conditions and tasks may require the KPAGF to defend in order to support offensive actions by other KPAGF units operating in an AO, fix or isolate an enemy in preparation of offensive actions, or create vulnerabilities in enemy combat power. Tactical conditions and tasks may require the KPAGF to defend with the expectation of significant casualties or loss of particular system capabilities. Defensive and offensive actions are often conducted simultaneously in a mission. The defense, as a temporary or long-term tactic, can be directed to support success of a higher headquarters’ intent, even if actions at a subordinate echelon do not appear successful. Defensive actions retain and display an aggressive posture in achieving the intent of a defense.

**COUNTERSTABILITY**

2-57. KPA counterstability actions typically integrate with other offensive and defensive actions to create multiple situational conditions that its enemy is forced to confront. Multiple concurrent dilemmas can stress the ability of a foe to adequately address all of its tactical stability requirements while also conducting offensive or defensive operations. Counterstability actions contest and disrupt a foe’s campaign to ensure a safe and secure OE, fair and just governance in an area or region, or a relevant population supportive of a foe’s presence. Counterstability actions are conducted with a keen sense of physical and cognitive impacts on enemy military forces and a relevant civilian population that can affect overall KPA success. Tactical actions can create vulnerabilities in a foe’s stability actions that can be further attacked, overtly or covertly, with a KPA intent to degrade the success of OE conditions that the foe is attempting to promote. EIW is particularly important in support to and conduct of all KPA counterstability actions.

**EXECUTION OF MISSION TASKS**

2-58. The KPA acknowledges several expectations in executing offensive and defensive mission tasks and associated counterstability tasks that can differ significantly from norms and values of an enemy. KPA leader decisions and actions do not necessarily comply with international law of war conventions, South Korean laws and regulations, or multinational and coalition agreements during conflict. The KPA can act in ways that might normally limit or constrain operations by the forces it is facing on the battlefield. Several significant considerations in KPA conduct can include the following—

- Apply EIW in an integrated local, regional, and global strategic communications campaign.
- Shield KPA systems by embedding within a civilian population and infrastructure.
- Employ C2 capabilities that preclude electronic/sensor acquisition.
- Direct decentralized C2 methods to enhance distributed execution of mission intent.
- Sustain complex battle positions adaptive to OE conditions.
- Demonstrate strategic patience in tempo, pace, and duration of operations.

2-59. KPA rules of engagement while operating in relevant populations of an OE are adjusted to best serve North Korea’s mission. The KPA will actively seek to identify restrictions and constraints in enemy rules of engagement that provide opportunities to take advantage of in overt and covert actions. The KPA understands
fundamental aspects of how to affect South Korea’s and its allies’ will and resolve in order to achieve KPA results. Considerations are as follows:

- Mission focus is typically to fix or isolate enemy combat power, in order to attack and defeat/destroy enemy sustainment and C2.
- Combat action by KPA forces is not casualty averse, as the KPA is willing to accept significant casualties in order to achieve mission task success.
- Noncombatants in North and South Korea may be coerced to support KPA operations.
- Noncombatants in North and South Korea may be manipulated as passive or unknowing participants in support of KPA operations.
- Recurring physical violence and cognitive trauma from acts of terrorism can degrade or defeat enemy military forces and their supporting entities.
Chapter 3

North Korean Force Structure and Formations

This chapter addresses North Korean force structure and command and control (C2) of formations. It reviews Korean People’s Army (KPA) service component organizations, command and support relationships, and C2 of military forces. A concise description of force structure at the tactical echelon addresses regular and irregular forces, with the former primarily at the tactical echelons of division, brigade, regiment, battalion, and company.

FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF NORTH KOREAN FORCES

3-1. As discussed in chapter 1, the KPA forces are organized functionally and named accordingly. At regimental and higher headquarters, units performing these functions are referred to as forces. At battalion and subordinate headquarters, units are called elements. When applicable to both forces and elements, the term used is unit.

SERVICE COMPONENT ORGANIZATIONS

3-2. All North Korean military forces, except the internal security forces, belong to the KPA. There are no separate military services per se. KPA armed forces are typically structured into six service components and various types of paramilitary reserve personnel, as indicated in figure 3-1.

![Figure 3-1. KPA armed forces service components](image)

Note. The order of battle illustrations throughout this document are representative examples of KPA units. Due to the tiered nature of the KPA, where frontline and higher-priority units receive the most modern equipment and reserve units operate less-capable equipment, the same type of KPA unit may not operate the same type of equipment. For example, units along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) may field T-62 or even newer domestically produced tanks, while reserve units may operate T-54 or even vintage T-34/85 tanks. Any change to a subordinate organization would change the composition of the represented unit.
Chapter 3

ARMY

3-3. The army is the largest of the six services, and relies on mobilization of reserve and militia forces to conduct sustained military operations. To avoid the confusion between the overall military forces and the ground forces, the army units will be called the Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF), while the entire military will be called the KPA. The KPAGF are composed of approximately 1.02 million active duty and 600,000 reserve personnel.

NAVY

3-4. The navy includes naval forces for both oceanic and littoral missions. The Korean People’s Army Navy (KPAN) is composed of 60,000 active duty personnel with no reserve.

AIR FORCE

3-5. There are approximately 120,000 active duty personnel supporting 1,600 aircraft. There are no reserve units within the Korean People’s Army Air Force (KPAAF).

STRATEGIC FORCE

3-6. The Strategic Force, formerly the Strategic Rocket Forces Command, is now on the same level as the army, navy, and air force. This command fields 7–8 brigades of surface-to-surface missiles of different types with various ranges.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

3-7. There is no single command responsible for KPA special operations forces (SOF). Command of SOF units is divided between the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau, and the Strategic Operations Forces. The latter is also responsible for the SOF that will call in deep fires for the artillery. There are also SOF units that receive their training guidance from the RGB, but are assigned on a habitual basis to train with the four KPAGF forward-deployed corps. While many military forces field SOF and commando units in their military, the KPAGF do not use commando units; however, several of the light units belonging to the SOF forces would contain characteristics normally found in such units. The North Korean armed forces field approximately 200,000 SOF personnel divided among the KPAGF, KPAN, and KPAAF, with most belonging to the KPAGF.

PARAMILITARY FORCES

3-8. The Worker-Peasant Red Guard and People’s Guard—also known as the Red Guard Army—is a militia of approximately 5.72 million personnel organized by military district with units down to the village level. While some of the units are armed, many do not possess weapons and would be used as a labor force or as replacement soldiers. These personnel receive approximately 160 hours of annual training. The Red Youth Guard is just under one million secondary-school students who regularly receive basic military instruction and marksmanship training. There are also approximately 620,000 members of reserve military training units—also known as the Instruction Guidance Units—who normally serve as instructors.

INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

3-9. These 189,000 personnel serve as a national police force and border guards that are subordinate to the Ministry of People’s Security in peacetime, but could be used for military purposes in time of war. Internal security forces personnel possess light arms to use in their work. There is also a Guard Command, sometimes called General Guard Bureau, responsible for the protection of Kim Jong Un, his family, and other senior officials. Composed of approximately 100,000 personnel, the Guard Command contains three combat brigades, several bodyguard divisions, and a single construction battalion. It is equipped like military units, with antiaircraft artillery (AAA), multiple-launch rocket systems, armored vehicles, tanks, limousines, and trucks.
3-10. In wartime conditions and when subordinate to a military force commander, internal security forces can be assigned tactical combat or combat support mission tasks within organizational capabilities. Mission tasks can include limited offensive and defensive actions, but are typically more oriented to security and civilian population control. Other related tasks can include tactical support to prisoner-of-war processing and control missions, or support to traffic control and regulation. Intelligence collection can also be assigned to internal security forces, as the units operate within the North Korean population and would work within the South Korean populace if war were to occur on the peninsula.

COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

3-11. Each of the KPA units, even when it involves a grouping of multiple units, organizations, or cells, has an identified leader or commander. These command and support relationships may change during the course of an operation in order to best accomplish the assigned tasks. The general category for C2 includes constituent and dedicated relationships, and supporting and affiliated responsibilities. KPA units organize using four command and support relationships as summarized in table 3-1.

Table 3-1. KPA command and support relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Commanded by</th>
<th>Logistics from</th>
<th>Positioned by</th>
<th>Priorities from</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituent</td>
<td>Gaining</td>
<td>Gaining</td>
<td>Gaining</td>
<td>Gaining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedicated</td>
<td>Gaining</td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Gaining</td>
<td>Gaining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting</td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliated</td>
<td>Self</td>
<td>Self or &quot;parent&quot;</td>
<td>Self</td>
<td>Mutual agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONSTITUENT

3-12. Constituent units are those forces assigned directly to a unit and forming an integral part of it. They may be organic to the KPA administrative force structure forming the basis of a given unit, assigned at the time the unit was created, or attached to it after its formation.

DEDICATED

3-13. Dedicated is a command relationship identical to constituent, with the exception that a dedicated unit still receives logistics support from a parent headquarters of similar type. An example of a dedicated unit would be a specialized unit, such as an attack helicopter company, allocated to a maneuver brigade. The maneuver brigade does not possess the technical expertise or repair facilities for the aviation systems. The dedicated relationship, however, permits the company to execute missions exclusively for the brigade while receiving its logistics support from its parent aviation organization.

SUPPORTING

3-14. Supporting units continue to be commanded by and receive their logistics from their parent headquarters, but are positioned and given mission priorities by their supported headquarters. The KPA calls this administrative control. This relationship permits supported units the freedom to establish priorities and position supporting units while allowing higher headquarters to rapidly shift support in dynamic situations. An example of a supporting unit would be a multiple rocket launcher battalion supporting a brigade for a particular phase of an operation, but ready to rapidly transition to a different support relationship when the brigade becomes the division reserve in a later phase. The supporting unit does not necessarily have to be within the supported unit’s area of operations (AO).

AFFILIATED

3-15. Affiliated status is mutually agreed-upon cooperation with an organization in support of another unit operating in a common AO. Affiliation infers the coordination to influence actions towards outcomes that
benefit both actors and is usually temporary in time and limited in scope. No command relationship exists between an affiliated organization and the unit in whose AO it operates. Affiliated organizations are typically nonmilitary or paramilitary groups such as criminal organizations, guerrilla units, or insurgent cells. In some cases, affiliated forces may receive combat support or rear service from a division or brigade as part of the agreement under which they cooperate.

_Note._ In organization charts, the affiliated status is reflected by a dashed line—rather than solid—connecting the affiliated unit to the organization with which it is affiliated. This dashed line is not to be confused with dashed unit symbols, which indicate additional units that may or may not be present. Although there is typically no formal indication of this relationship in KPA plans and orders, the acronym for affiliated (AFL) can be used as a free text description next to a unit symbol.

**COMMAND POST COMMAND AND CONTROL**

3-16. The KPA exercises tactical control over its wartime forces from an integrated system of command posts (CPs). The design of this system enhances the capability of uninterrupted C2 of forces.

3-17. The CPs are typically formed in three parts: a control group, a support group, and a communications group. The control group includes members of the command group or section and staff. The support group consists of the transport, logistics, and security/guard elements. Whenever possible, the communications group is remoted from the control and support groups in order to minimize C2 physical and electromagnetic signatures.

3-18. KPA military planners create a CP structure that emphasizes survivability through dispersal, stringent security measures, redundancy, and mobility. A CP system is organized to sustain damage with minimum disruption to the actual C2 process. In the event of disruption, subsystems reestablish C2 as soon as possible. Tactical CPs are typically designed to be mobile, with a physical and electronic signature smaller than comparable enemy CPs. The number, size, and types of CPs depend on the level of command and operational environment conditions.

**COMMAND POST TYPES**

3-19. KPA ground maneuver forces use several basic and special types of CPs. Not all levels of command use all CP types at all times, as shown in table 3-2. Redundancy provided by multiple CPs enhances resilient C2 operations. The KPA will allow a CP to move only after approval by its next higher commander. For brevity, acronyms are used for the various types of CPs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command Post Type</th>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Regiment</th>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Company</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear area</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>Optional</td>
<td>Optional</td>
<td>Optional</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command observation post</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deception</td>
<td>Optional</td>
<td>Optional</td>
<td>Optional</td>
<td>Optional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airborne</td>
<td>Optional</td>
<td>Optional</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary</td>
<td>Optional</td>
<td>Optional</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Main Command Post**

3-20. The KPA main CP is normally located within the second echelon area, in a key sanctuary area, or in a fortified position that provides easy access, communications with higher and lower units, and defensibility. The main CP contains the majority of the staff, with the chief of staff directing its operation. The primary purpose is to simultaneously coordinate the activities of subordinate units not yet engaged in combat and plan for subsequent missions. Particular emphasis in the main CP is planning details of transitioning between current and future operations. The main CP is the central point to control mission execution. It is less mobile and much larger than the forward CP, and may use hardened sites when practical for a particular mission.

3-21. The chief of staff directs the staff in implementing the commander’s decisions as plans and orders; coordinates the movement and deployment of all subordinate units not yet in combat; and monitors their progress and combat readiness in conjunction with the sustainment CP. In addition to the chief of staff, there is a political section, specialty staff sections, tactics section, unified communications section, counteraviation section, and the naval and air services. Additional staff personnel present at the main CP may include the liaison teams from subordinate, supporting, allied, and affiliated units, unless their presence is required at another CP.

3-22. The KPA main CP is often located in an accessible valley that encompasses 4–6 square kilometers and within 3–5 km of a landing strip. The main CP will contain communications equipment, including that necessary for retransmission operations.

**Forward Command Post**

3-23. A commander often establishes a forward CP with a small group of selected staff members. The forward CP is deployed at a point from which the commander can more effectively and personally observe and influence the tactical operation. Location of the forward CP provides the commander with current or near real-time information, intelligence, and effective communications that facilitate situational awareness and understanding and enhance command decisions.

3-24. The personnel at the forward CP are not permanent designations. Assignment of forward CP members to accompany the commander is dependent on the mission, situation, and availability of functional experts, communications, and transportation means. Officers who may typically accompany the commander may include the operations officer and the chief of reconnaissance. Other primary or secondary staff officers may also deploy with the forward CP, depending on the tactical situation. This may include a fires coordinator linked to the integrated fires system (IFS), signals and codes chief, branch of service chiefs, forward air controllers, the political commissar, operations section members, communications section, and sister-service liaisons. The secondary staff contains enough personnel to man the forward CP without degrading the ability to operate the main CP or IFS CP. When a forward CP forms, the commander is typically located where C2 of ongoing operations can best be performed. The chief of staff in the main CP has the authority to issue directives in the commander’s absence.

**Rear Area Command Post**

3-25. The deputy commander for rear service establishes and controls resources and support of the force from a rear area CP. This CP operates from a position within the unit’s rear area to permit the effective supervision and execution of sustainment procedures for all classes of supply, as well as transportation and movement of resources. The location should allow for ease of transportation of supplies into the area and the evacuation of wounded personnel. The rear area CP contains staff officers for subsistence; clothing and equipment; petroleum, oils, and lubricants; construction and barrier material; ammunition; major end item provision, repair, and maintenance; medical material and health service support; nonmilitary program support; and other miscellaneous support to the command’s mission. The post coordinates with higher-echelon support headquarters and subordinate units to ensure sustained capabilities for combat, combat support, and rear service units. Multiple rear area CPs may be formed based on tactical requirements.

**Reserve Command Post**

3-26. The reserve CP, sometimes called an auxiliary CP by the KPA, is established by the KPA deputy commander for military affairs and consists of a few signal and staff personnel along with a fires section. It
is located in the best position to facilitate the movement of the antitank (AT) reserve, antilanding designated units, or the maneuver reserve. Normally, the reserve CP is to the rear or possibly the flank of the main CP.

3-27. If the KPA commander’s CP becomes nonoperational, the reserve CP could serve as an alternate CP. The KPA commander establishes which CP will act as an alternate if the main (or forward) CP is destroyed or disabled. For situations that require reconstitution or major reorganization, a sustainment CP might be temporarily designated as the alternate command CP.

Command Observation Post

3-28. The deputy commander for artillery for each echelon of command down to the infantry regiment will establish a command observation post (OP) that is considered an IFS CP. From this post, the artillery commander and staff will observe the enemy situation, study the terrain and potential targets, perform fire direction duties, and coordinate indirect fire on the enemy.

3-29. The IFS CP possesses limited means to synchronize communications, airspace control, and automated fire control systems required to integrate reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) means and execute long-range fires. Sections of the IFS headquarters and IFS CP typically locate in dispersed sites. The IFS CP is typically separated from the main CP. Each secondary staff subsection and some functional staff subsections have an element dedicated to the IFS CP. The IFS CP includes liaison teams from fire support, army aviation, and long-range reconnaissance or SOF elements.

3-30. At times, a KPA maneuver unit may establish command OPs. Such posts are usually composed only of reconnaissance and operations personnel. The command OP is established in a location for ease of observation of the entire front or important terrain.

Deception Command Post

3-31. While not specifically stated, it is expected as part of the overall electronic intelligence warfare (EIW) operations that the KPA will employ deception CPs. Capabilities must present realistic and robust multisensor signatures to deceive the enemy and support the commander in creating tactical opportunities to exploit for mission success.

Airborne Command Post

3-32. It is highly unlikely that a KPA commander will establish an airborne CP due to the likelihood of the enemy’s control of the airspace. If this were to happen, however, it would be to maintain control in rapidly evolving tactical situations, when subordinate operations are dispersed over a wide geographic area, or when the other CPs are moving between locations. This capability for C2 situational awareness and understanding is at divisional and higher level commands. Helicopters are a typical mode for this mobility and effective communications.

Auxiliary Command Post

3-33. Only in the most remote circumstances will the KPA commander create an auxiliary CP to provide C2 over subordinate units, such as when operations are isolated or may be on remote axes. The commander may also use an auxiliary CP in the event of disrupted C2 or when adequate control cannot be maintained from the main CP.

COMMANDERS’ DUTIES

3-34. The KPAGF place a stressful amount of responsibility on their unit commanders. The KPAGF expect their commanders to—

- Conduct detailed planning and preparation for all operations.
- Exploit the terrain, weather, and time to the KPA’s advantage.
- Achieve surprise during the initial phase of each attack and at decisive times during the course of battle.
- Concentrate overwhelming forces at the decisive time and place.
• Conduct timely, fast, and daring maneuvers.
• Maintain control over subordinate elements’ actions to ensure bold, determined, and exact execution of plans.

COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES
3-35. While the KPA does have improved radio communications equipment, it is likely that it will routinely avoid using the radio for operational security reasons and because it has less communications equipment than most other militaries of its size and capabilities. In static situations, the KPA will likely use wire and fiber-optic communications, if available, to reduce radio traffic that is more susceptible for compromise. The KPAGF will likely use unsophisticated communications means such as signal flags, bugles, and whistles to communicate on the battlefield. However, some KPA units will have access to emerging technological capabilities and will use them for communications. In case of a communications break with higher headquarters, KPA units will continue operations within previously planned missions or prescribed alternatives.

TACTICAL-LEVEL ORGANIZATION OF REGULAR FORCES
3-36. KPAGF tactical units fight battles and engagements, with the largest organizations conducting tactical operations being divisions and regiments. The KPAGF field a limited number of brigades, primarily in their armor or mechanized forces. In peacetime, KPAGF divisions are subordinate to a corps headquarters. There are some units that remain under direct control of a North Korean governmental bureau during peacetime and some KPA units may report directly to their service headquarters.

3-37. Major tactical-level commands of the KPAN, KPAAF, Strategic Force, and SOF units often remain under the direct control of their respective parent component headquarters while supporting the KPAGF. The KPA retains centralized command or control of certain elite elements of the ground forces, including airborne and SOF units. This command arrangement permits flexibility in the employment of these specialized capabilities in response to mission requirements.

Note. The KPA may task-organize its forces for a particular mission down to the squad level, but does not identify this type of unit with a different term. Generic unit terms (squad, platoon, company, battalion, regiment, and division) or task-organized unit terms will be used throughout ATP 7-100.2. When there is no known KPA descriptive term, a U.S. term with similar meaning is used to provide a better understanding of the KPA unit’s capabilities.

CORPS
3-38. The corps is a typical C2 headquarters above the division echelon for the KPAGF. Each corps headquarters is capable of controlling combined arms, joint, or interagency operations necessary to execute its mission. In peacetime, the four corps along the DMZ have permanently assigned divisions. Any division assigned to a forward corps is augmented with an additional artillery battalion and a military police battalion. The active duty KPAGF field two mechanized corps, 10 infantry corps, one capital defense (Pyongyang) corps, an air defense command, and a SOF corps assigned to the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau. The KPAGF maintain four infantry corps (I, II, IV, and V) along the DMZ in their first strategic echelon. The second strategic echelon contains their tank brigades and mechanized corps. The remainder of the KPAGF are scattered throughout the northern half of the country and along the borders with China and Russia. Table 3-3 on page 3-8 and figure 3-2 on page 3-9 show the peacetime locations of these various units.
Table 3-3. KPAGF corps and locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Army Unit</th>
<th>Headquarters Location</th>
<th>Province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I District Command</td>
<td>Wonsan</td>
<td>Kangwon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Corps</td>
<td>Hoeryang</td>
<td>Kangwon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Corps</td>
<td>Hanpori</td>
<td>South Hwanghae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Corps</td>
<td>Kaechon</td>
<td>South Pyongan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Corps</td>
<td>Haeju</td>
<td>North Hwanghae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V Corps</td>
<td>Huppyong-ni</td>
<td>Kangwon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII Corps</td>
<td>Tongsin</td>
<td>South Hamgyong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII Corps</td>
<td>Tongrim</td>
<td>North Pyongan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX Corps</td>
<td>Information not available</td>
<td>North Hamgyong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X Corps</td>
<td>Information not available</td>
<td>Ryanggang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII Corps</td>
<td>Information not available</td>
<td>North Hamgyong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108 Mechanized Corps</td>
<td>Hamhung</td>
<td>South Hamgyong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>425 Mechanized Corps</td>
<td>Chongju</td>
<td>North Pyongan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyongyang Defense Command</td>
<td>Soannaes-san</td>
<td>Pyongyang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense Command</td>
<td>Pyongyang</td>
<td>Pyongyang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance General Bureau</td>
<td>Information not available</td>
<td>Information not available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A corps consists of those division-, brigade-, regiment-, battalion-size, and other units allocated to the command to accomplish mission tasks. The units assigned to a corps will depend on its mission(s). If a particular corps has contingency plans for participating in more than one tactical mission, it could receive a different set of forces under each operational plan. Typical units assigned to a corps include—

- Infantry divisions.
- Mechanized divisions.
- Motorized divisions.
- Infantry divisions (partial reserve).
- Infantry divisions (reserve).
- Light infantry divisions.
- Tank divisions (105th).
- Tank brigades.
- Artillery brigades.
- Light infantry brigades.
- Sniper brigades (KPAGF, KPAN, KPAAF).
- Missile regiments.
- Engineer regiments (bridge).
- Signal regiments.
- AT battalions.
- Reconnaissance battalions.
- Long-range reconnaissance battalions.
- Engineer battalions (general and construction).
- Nuclear-chemical defense battalions.
- Signal battalions (wire, radio, or telephone).
- Electronic warfare/military intelligence companies.

**COMBAT DIVISION FORCE STRUCTURE**

**3-41.** In the KPAGF, the largest tactical formation is the division. Divisions are able to—
- Conduct operations as part of a corps or higher organization without being task organized.
- Sustain independent operations for a designated period of time.
- Integrate interagency forces up to brigade- or group-size formations.
- Execute all actions as directed by a higher headquarters.

**3-42.** The KPAGF field one armored division, four mechanized divisions, 27 infantry divisions, and 40 additional infantry divisions assigned to the reserves. Figure 3-3 shows the various types of divisions that the KPAGF field, and figure 3-4 on page 3-11 illustrates the structure of a KPAGF infantry division. Mechanized infantry divisions are very similar except the squads ride in armored personnel carriers (APCs) or infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), depending on the priority of the unit for equipment.

**Figure 3-3. Different types of KPAGF divisions**

**3-43.** A KPA infantry division would field approximately 12,800 personnel, including about 1,600 officers. Major equipment for the division includes the following:
- T-55/62 tanks: 31
- B-10 (82-mm) or B-11 (107-mm) recoilless rifles: 54
- AT-3 (Sagger) AT launchers: 27
- 76.2-mm AT guns: 48
- RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers: 630
- 152-mm howitzers: 24
- 122-mm howitzers: 72
- 107-mm multiple rocket launchers: 27
- 120-mm mortars: 54
- 82-mm mortars: 99
- 60-mm mortars: 12
- SA-7b man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS): 42
- S-60 (57-mm) AAA machine guns: 6
- 37-mm AAA machine guns: 12
- ZPU-4 (14.5-mm) AAA machine guns: 87
- Heavy machine guns: 370
- AK rifles: 9,085
3-44. Division structure will be dependent upon the unit’s mission and location. Units along the DMZ will receive an additional artillery battalion and a military police battalion. Artillery could be self-propelled or towed, based on priority, location, and availability of equipment. KPA tank divisions will have less infantry, but the infantry will likely be mounted on APCs or IFVs. Mechanized divisions will be similar to standard infantry divisions, but with more vehicles with the infantry in APCs or IFVs. When dismounted from their APCs or IFVs, KPA infantry will likely operate in the same manner as a standard KPA infantry unit.

3-45. Besides the normal types of units found in most army divisions, KPAGF divisions contain a security company that focuses on internal unit security to ensure all soldiers are politically reliable. All units down to company level have at least a political officer that is separate from the unit commander. The size of this political security unit increases with parent unit size.

3-46. Selection to serve as a political officer is stringent and based on prior military service, party loyalty, and belonging to a politically reliable family. Political officers receive their training at various institutions in North Korea, including the Kim Il Sung Political College and the Kumsong Political College. The training focuses on politics, economics, party history, juche philosophy, and party loyalty. Upon graduation, the students receive a commission as a lieutenant and serve as a political officer in a KPA unit. Political officers receive advanced training as they move up in rank.

3-47. Political officers may have as much power as the KPA unit commander. They are to ensure that the soldiers in the unit remain supportive of the Kim family and the current regime. Political officers will conduct investigations of anyone accused of disloyalty—including saying negative things about the country or its leaders—and can have the individual arrested and charged with crimes. During combat operations, political officers must approve all the unit commander’s plans and any subsequent changes. At the lowest level, company political officers will ensure that the unit’s soldiers carry out their duties diligently, and will execute any soldiers that attempt to flee the battlefield or retreat without orders. Cowardice is not tolerated in the KPA, and the political officer is the enforcer.
3-48. Divisions in the four forward corps (I, II, IV, and V) receive additional augmentation beyond the standard units in the form of a second artillery battalion and a military police battalion. These forward corps also may receive additional reconnaissance assets that may be attached to subordinate divisions.

Integrated Fires System

3-49. The KPA uses an IFS based on the Soviet/Russian model of a regimental artillery group or division artillery group, and consists of a standing C2 structure and task-organized constituent and dedicated fire support units. While not specifically stated or named, most division-level and higher KPAGF organizations possess at least one IFS C2 structure—staff, CP, communications and intelligence architecture, and integrated/automated fire control system—at their headquarters, while brigade-level units and below do not. The unit commander will coordinate all available indirect fire resources through one leader, while consolidating the assets in a regimental or division artillery group for maximum effect. Figure 3-5 shows an example of a possible division IFS.

![Figure 3-5. Division integrated fires system possible task organization components](image)

3-50. The IFS exercises C2 of all constituent and dedicated fire support assets retained by its level of command. This can include army aviation, artillery, and missile units. It also exercises C2 over all RISTA assets allocated to it. EIW is a norm in all mission conduct, and such units are included in the IFS structure. See chapter 5 for more detail on IFS missions.

*Note.* The order of battle illustrations in this ATP are provided to give the reader the appropriate context for the tactical discussion in part II. For more detailed information on possible orders of battle and tables of organization and equipment, see the force structures available on the Operational Environment Data Integration Network (ODIN).

Integrated Support System

3-51. The integrated support system is the aggregate of rear service units, possibly some combat support units organic to a division, and additional assets allocated from higher headquarters to form a task-organized organization, as shown in figure 3-6. An integrated support system contains units that the division does not suballocate to lower levels of command. The division may allocate part of its integrated support system units as an integrated support group to support its IFS or one of its major divisional units. An integrated support system or group can also include units performing combat support tasks such as chemical warfare, engineer, or law enforcement.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

3-52. Difficult though it is to estimate exact numbers of North Korean SOF units and their personnel strength levels, most recent reports assign a figure of between 180,000 and 200,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen as part of North Korea’s SOF units. See Appendix I for additional information on the SOF. Figure 3-7 illustrates the organizational structure of the KPA SOF units.

3-53. There are two primary organizations responsible for training and executing missions assigned to the KPA SOF—the RGB and the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau. The former is the new name for what
was once called “Second Bureau (Reconnaissance),” while the latter is also known as the “Training Unit Guidance Bureau.” The KPA SOF includes ground, air force, and maritime SOF units. In wartime or in transition to war, the KPA will maintain some SOF units under the C2 of their respective service headquarters or political bureau. Some SOF units that are under bureau or service-command control in peacetime, however, can also be provided to operational- or tactical-level commands during the task-organization process to perform designated missions or mission support.

3-54. SOF are not permanently subordinate to tactical-level units at divisional or subordinate headquarters. Relationships for C2 of SOF operating in a regular-force tactical commander’s AO vary. Command and support relationships for SOF may be constituent, dedicated, supporting, or affiliated. Relationships between SOF and paramilitary or nonmilitary personnel or groups are typically affiliation.

**MANEUVER BRIGADES**

3-55. The basic combined arms unit of the KPAGF is a regiment. The KPAGF, however, do field 15 separate armored brigades, 14 infantry brigades, and 21 artillery brigades. Normally when brigades are constituent to divisions, they are called divisional brigades. Brigades that are structured as separate brigades possess the ability to conduct independent missions without additional allocation of forces from higher-level tactical headquarters. Figure 3-8 illustrates the structure of a typical KPAGF tank brigade.

![Figure 3-8. KPAGF tank brigade (example)](image)

3-56. A KPA tank brigade would field approximately 2,500 personnel, including around 230 officers. Major equipment for the tank brigade includes the following:

- T-55/62 tanks: 93
- IFVs/APCs: 58
- BRDM patrol cars: 3
- M-1985/Type 62/63/PT-76 light tanks: 40
- 152-mm self-propelled howitzers: 18
- 122-mm self-propelled howitzers: 18
- AT-3 (Sagger) AT launchers: 3
- RPG-7 RPG launchers: 43
- 82-mm mortars: 9
- SA-7b MANPADS: 12
- M-1983/BTR-152 AAA vehicles: 6
North Korean Force Structure and Formations

- 37-mm AAA machine guns: 12
- Type 80/ZSU-57 (57-mm) AAA guns: 6
- Radar systems (FIRECAN or others): 3
- 2 1/2-ton trucks: 162
- Tank retrievers: 6
- Light machine guns: 70

3-57. Maneuver brigades are designed to be able to—
- Serve as the basic organization for forming a task-organized brigade.
- Fight as part of a division.
- Fight as a separate unit in a corps, as an organization from the AFS, or in subordination to a field army.
- Sustain independent combat operations over a period of several days.
- Integrate interagency forces of up to battalion size.
- Execute all actions as assigned.

REGIMENTS

3-58. The basic combined arms unit of the KPAGF is an infantry regiment. Figure 3-9 illustrates the structure of a KPAGF infantry regiment.

3-59. KPA infantry regiments would field approximately 2,500 personnel, including around 185 officers. Major equipment for an infantry regiment includes the following:
- B-10 (82-mm) or B-11 (107-mm) recoilless rifles: 9
- AT-3 (Sagger) AT launchers: 12
- 76.2-mm AT guns: 6
3-60. Besides infantry, the KPA infantry regiment contains artillery, mortar, AT gun, engineering, signal, air defense, reconnaissance, chemical, and logistics units. Maneuver regiments are designed to be able to—

- Fight as part of a division.
- Sustain independent combat operations for a short period of time.
- Execute all actions as assigned.

**BATTALIONS**

3-61. The basic unit of action in the KPAGF force structure is the battalion. An example of an infantry battalion is shown in figure 3-10.

![Figure 3-10. KPAGF infantry battalion organization (example)](image)

3-62. KPA infantry battalions would field approximately 555 personnel, including around 30 officers. Major equipment for an infantry battalion includes the following:

- B-10 (82-mm) or B-11 (107-mm) recoilless rifles: 4
- SA-7b MANPADS: 3
- 82-mm mortars: 9
- RPG-7 RPG launchers: 54
- 40-mm underbarrel grenade launchers (40-mm): 40
- AGS-17 (30-mm) automatic grenade launchers: 6
- Heavy machine guns: 8
- Light machine guns: 81
- AK rifles: 412
- SVD sniper rifles: 27

3-63. Battalions are designed to be able to—
  - Serve as the basis for forming a task-organized battalion-size unit.
  - Fight as part of a regiment or division.
  - Execute basic combat missions as part of a larger tactical force.
  - Execute tactical actions as assigned.

COMPANIES

3-64. In KPAGF force structure, the largest unit without a staff is the company. An example of an infantry company can be seen in figure 3-11.

![Figure 3-11. KPAGF infantry company organization (example)](image)

3-65. KPA infantry companies would field approximately 120 personnel, including around six officers. One of these officers is the political officer. Major equipment for an infantry battalion includes the following:
  - RPG-7 RPG launchers: 18
  - Underbarrel grenade launchers (40-mm): 18
  - Light machine guns: 27
  - AK rifles: 75
  - SVD sniper rifles: 9

3-66. In KPAGF fire-support units, this level of command is called a company, unlike U.S. doctrine where it is a battery. Companies are designed to be able to—
  - Serve as the basis for forming a task-organized company-size unit.
  - Fight as part of a battalion, regiment, or division.
  - Execute tactical tasks. Of note, a company will not normally be asked to perform two or more tactical tasks simultaneously.

DETACHMENTS

3-67. A detachment is a tactical element organized on either a temporary or permanent basis for special duties (ADP 3-90); for the KPAAF this normally means the unit is augmented with additional forces to conduct a specified mission. Detachments are typically the smallest combined arms formations and are by definition task-organized. A detachment that is subordinate to a battalion headquarters is titled battalion detachment, and one at company level is termed a company detachment. Detachments can accept dedicated and supporting SOF, aviation (combat helicopter, transport helicopter), and possibly unmanned aircraft system units. While the KPAGF do not differentiate between a standard battalion or company and one that is task organized, the term detachment will be used throughout this publication to designate a unit that
contains assets different from its normal force structure. Figure 3-12, below, and figure 3-13 provide examples of a possible KPAGF battalion or company detachment. The capabilities allocated to a detachment can include—

- Artillery or mortar units.
- Air defense units.
- Engineer units with obstacle, survivability, or mobility assets.
- Heavy-weapons units including heavy machine guns, automatic grenade launchers, and AT guided missiles.
- Units with specialty equipment such as flame weapons, specialized reconnaissance assets, or helicopters.
- Interagency forces up to company size for battalions or up to platoon size for companies.
- Chemical defense, AT, medical, logistics, signal, and electronic warfare units.

![Figure 3-12. KPAGF battalion-size detachment (example)](image)

3-68. A basic type of KPAGF detachment—whether formed from a battalion or a company—is an independent mission detachment. These detachments are formed to execute missions that are separated in space or time from those being conducted by the remainder of the forming unit. Independent mission detachments can be used for a variety of missions, such as—

- Seize key terrain.
- Linkup with airborne or heliborne forces.
- Conduct tactical movement on secondary axes.
- Pursue or envelop an enemy force.
- Conduct a raid or ambush.

3-69. Other types of specialized detachments and their uses are discussed in chapter 5. These specialized detachments could include—

- Counterreconnaissance detachment.
- Security detachment.
- Reconnaissance detachment.
- Movement support detachment.
- Urban detachment.
- Mobility obstacle detachment.
**PLATOONS AND SQUADS**

3-70. In the KPAGF organizational structure, the smallest unit typically expected to conduct independent fire and maneuver is the platoon. Figure 3-14 provides examples of unit symbols at the platoon level and below.

3-71. KPA infantry platoons are normally composed of 39 personnel, including a single officer. A typical KPA infantry platoon contains the following weapons:

- RPG-7 RPG launchers: 6
- Underbarrel grenade launchers (40-mm): 6
- Light machine guns: 9
- AK rifles: 25
- SVD sniper rifles: 3

3-72. Platoons are designed to be able to—
- Serve as the basis for forming a functional element or patrol.
- Fight as part of a company, battalion, or detachment.
- Execute tactical tasks.
3-73. KPA infantry squads are normally composed of 12 personnel, led by a sergeant. The duty positions and their standard weapons are shown below:

- One squad leader: AK rifle
- One deputy squad leader: AK rifle with G-25 (40-mm) underbarrel grenade launcher
- Three machine gunners: light machine gun (RPD)
- Three assistant machine gunners: AK rifle
- Two AT gunners: RPG-7 and AK rifle
- One grenadier: AK rifle with G-25 (40-mm) underbarrel grenade launcher
- One sniper: SVD rifle

3-74. Platoons and squads within a platoon can be task-organized by function for specific missions. Figure 3-15 displays examples of unit symbols for various types of KPAGF task-organized platoons and squads. This task-organized status can be temporary for a specified mission task, or semi-permanent for conduct of mission tasks during an extended period of time. A patrol is typically a platoon- or squad-size unit task-organized to accomplish a specific reconnaissance or security mission. A platoon or smaller element will not be ordered to perform two or more simultaneous functional tasks.

![Figure 3-15. KPAGF small unit symbols with task-organized amplifiers](image)

**TACTICAL-LEVEL ORGANIZATION OF IRREGULAR FORCES**

3-75. Irregular forces addressed as threats to South Korea and its coalition partners in ATP 7-100.2 are categorized in several primary groupings of insurgent organization/cells, guerrilla units, or criminal organizations. Terrorist groups can be distinct from other irregular forces in some situations, but are often linked to one or more of these paramilitary or criminal activities. Irregular forces can be individuals or groups, typically armed, that are not members of the regular armed forces, law enforcement agencies, or other forms of governmental organizations such as internal security forces. Nonetheless, the distinction of being armed or unarmed can include a wide range of people and groups capable of being categorized as potential irregular forces. After the threat of the massive KPA fires capabilities, strategic irregular forces may be the biggest threat the KPA can create on the Korean Peninsula.

3-76. Various organizations can be termed irregulars, correctly or incorrectly, by participants in a conflict. Any of these forces can be affiliated or associated with North Korean regular forces. The issue of who is a combatant or noncombatant, and who operates within lawful protection of international conventions and law of war protocols, is often a legal determination in a specific political and military setting and may be difficult to determine in North Korea, where all the people are directed to defend their country from outside invaders.

3-77. Militias, as a force, can acquire an identity at times of an irregular force based on actions, how the organization self-proclaims itself in EIW announcements, or how general social media portrays a naming convention for a group. In contrast to an irregular force connotation, militia as a category of regular forces is the mobilization of civilian, commercial, or paramilitary capabilities into the regular force structure of North Korean armed forces. For example, during mobilization, North Korean commercial trucking companies could be organized as militia transportation units subordinate to military authority in order to provide transportation of military cargo and personnel in support of military operations. Another example could be the mobilization of civilians, with or without previous military training, into an infantry militia unit, and incorporated into the C2 of a regular force.
3-78. Irregular forces can be augmented with support from regular forces, SOF, or other North Korean governmental agencies. Support can include training, RISTA, communications, fires support or other direct action assistance to plans, preparation, and conduct of mission tasks by irregular forces.

**INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS**

3-79. There are no known insurgent organizations operating inside of North Korea. It is very likely that there are North Korean clandestine operatives operating in South Korea that could be classified as insurgents against the South Korean Government prior to hostilities commencing, during combat operations, or during the post-hostilities phases. In the event that there is a war on the Korean Peninsula, it is likely that North Korea would activate these clandestine operatives to conduct their missions against high-value targets. It is likely that most of the clandestine cells are quite small, but South Korea did discover one such cell of five North Korean supporters in 2011.

3-80. It is likely that some KPA SOF personnel will be inserted into South Korea or that North Korea will activate clandestine operatives already living in South Korea before hostilities begin. Their task would be to help gain any North Korean advantage that would slow down the mobilization or movement of South Korean reserves. The SOF or clandestine operatives would likely perform counterstability actions to achieve this goal. See paragraphs 1-159–1-162 and chapter 8 for more information on counterstability actions.

**GUERRILLA UNITS**

3-81. While North Korea has no operational guerrilla units in South Korea, clandestine operatives currently operating in South Korea or SOF members operating in South Korea during a war could be considered guerrilla units under certain circumstances. A guerrilla unit organizes a paramilitary force structure, within its available resources, similar to that of a regular force military unit. Guerrilla units, however, have no standardized organizational structure. A guerrilla is a combat participant, and typically conducts actions in enemy-occupied or hostile territory. During a war, guerrillas in South Korea would most likely be clandestine operatives or North Korean sympathizers supported by KPA SOF personnel. If invaded by enemies, guerrillas in North Korea would likely consist of members of the Worker-Peasant Red Guard, People’s Guard, and Red Youth Guard, along with a cadre of KPA SOF and/or KPA regulars from destroyed conventional units.

3-82. The force structure for guerrilla units is at brigade level and subordinate headquarters. Guerrilla forces can be as large as several independent or affiliated brigades or as small as independent guerrilla teams. Organization and capabilities depend on factors including physical environment, sociological demographics and relationships, economics, and support available from an indigenous or relevant populace, organizations internal to a geographic area, and states or groups external to a region in conflict. See figure 3-16 on page 3-22 for an example of a possible battalion-size guerrilla unit organization.

**CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS**

3-83. There are no known major criminal organizations operating in North Korea, but there is criminal activity, including smaller gangs. North Korea is the second-most corrupt country in the world, mostly due to government officials taking bribes. It has become a way of life for those living in the country to give local officials small bribes to look the other way, whether it is to conduct entrepreneurial activities that are officially banned by the government or to cross the border into China. Bigger bribes are needed to obtain bigger favors from regional or national government officials. Due to the government’s activities, there are several North Korean officials on the US Treasury Department’s Transnational Criminal Organizations Designation list.

3-84. Violent criminal activity is relatively low in North Korea and is seldom seen in either urban or rural areas. Since the famine in the early 1990s, criminal activity has centered on smuggling, and a larger black market emerged as the people struggled to prevent starvation. The black market occurred more often in rural areas and in regions away from Pyongyang, as the governmental supply system continued to feed the elites living in the capital city.
3-85. A criminal organization is a group of individuals with an identified C2 structure engaged in illegal activities for purposes of obtaining power, influence, and monetary or commercial gains. Criminal organizations have no standardized structure. The organization protects its activities through patterns of corruption, coercion, or violence. Criminal networks vary in size, scope, structure, communications means, and commodity ventures. These networks can range within a local community, national/regional areas, or international/transnational activities. Due to the illegal activities that are sanctioned by Kim Jong Un, the North Korean Government could be considered a criminal network. The Kim regime is involved in drug trade, counterfeiting, human trafficking, and cybercrime.

3-86. Many armed forces recognize the utility of using criminal organizations at every level of society and every operational environment. Criminals may cooperate with either regular or irregular forces. Criminal organizations will almost always, however, pursue their activities independent of other actors’ goals.

3-87. Criminal organizations, embedded in relevant populations, can create conditions for the active or passive support of criminal activities and other irregular force actions. North Korean civilians, as noncombatants, can be coerced to directly support irregular as well as regular forces. Other civilians may be aware of irregular-force activities and decide to remain passive and not report information to a governing authority. Other civilians may be sympathetic and know of irregular-force activities, but remain uninvolved in any overt activity. Other noncombatants may unknowingly support irregular-force initiatives. Some members of a relevant population may elect to willingly participate in or actively support criminal or other irregular-force actions. In these type of cases, status as a combatant or criminal may complicate how an irregular force sustains support within South Korea if North Korea launched a ground attack or in North Korea if the country was invaded. See figure 3-17 for possible forms of support within a relevant population to irregular forces.

3-88. A criminal organization establishes its hierarchy of C2 within North or South Korea. Mutual interests of criminals, insurgents, or guerrillas can include preventing extraregional or local government forces from interfering in their respective agendas. By agreement when interests coincide, criminal organizations may become affiliated with insurgents or guerrillas controlling and operating in the same geographic or functional areas. Such affiliations can provide security and protection against enemy forces or support to criminal organization activities. The amount of mutual protection depends on the size and sophistication of each criminal organization and its level of influence on a state’s government, the local military forces, and the relevant civilian population.
TERRORIST GROUPS

3-89. Terrorism is a tactic. Acts of terrorism demonstrate an intention to cause significant psychological or physical effects on a relevant population through the use or threat of violence. Terrorism strategies are typically long-term commitments to degrade the resilience of an opponent in order to obtain concessions from the same. International conventions and law of war protocols on armed conflict are often not a constraint on terrorists. Whether acts of terrorism are deliberate, apparently random, or purposely haphazard, the physical, symbolic, or psychological effects can diminish the confidence of a relevant population in its key leaders and governing institutions. Social and political pressure, internal or external to a relevant population and governing authority, is frequently exploited by terrorists with near real-time media coverage in the global information environment. The local, regional, international, or transnational attention on acts of terrorism by state or nonstate actors can often isolate a government from its relevant population and foster support of organizations, units, or individuals who feel compelled to use terror to achieve their objectives. The themes and messages promoted by terrorists can accent anxiety, demoralize the resolve of a relevant population and its leaders, and eventually defeat an opponent.

3-90. There are no known terrorist groups active in North Korea working against the Kim regime. In November 2017, the U.S. President placed North Korea back on the list of state sponsors of terrorism for its nuclear and missile programs and assistance to the government in Syria. Previously, North Korea had been removed from the list in 2008. North Korea has conducted many acts that placed it on the list originally, such as:

- **1969.** Two North Korean MiG-17s shot down a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft that never violated North Korean airspace and killed 31 U.S. crewmembers.
- **1974.** A Japanese-born North Korean killed Yuk Young-soo during an assassination attempt on her spouse, South Korean president Park Chung-hee.
- **1976.** North Korean soldiers ambushed a United Nations team trimming a tree, killing two U.S. officers.
- **1983.** North Korean agents attempted to kill South Korean president Chun Doo-hwan with explosives during a visit to Rangoon, Burma.
- **1987.** Two North Korean spies planted a bomb on Korean Airlines Flight 858 that exploded, killing all 115 people on the plane.
- **2000.** North Korean agents crossed into China and kidnapped Reverend Kim Dong Shik, who was running several underground shelters for North Korea refugees. North Korea tortured and starved him to death.
- **2010.** According to South Korean and U.S. reports, North Korea sank the ROKS CHEONAN, a South Korean Navy ship, killing 46 sailors during a training exercise.
NONCOMBATANTS

3-91. Noncombatants are persons not actively participating in combat or actively supporting any of the forces involved in combat. Noncombatants can be either armed or unarmed. Figure 3-18 shows examples of various categories of noncombatants, and the complexity of identifying friend from foe in a relevant population. While military personnel are a small minority in most countries, the opposite is true in North Korea. In addition to large reserve and paramilitary forces, the civilian populace is subject to mandatory war work, thus making only the very old or the very young actual noncombatants.

![Figure 3-18. Armed and unarmed noncombatants (examples)](image)

**Armed Noncombatants**

3-92. There are few armed noncombatants in North Korea, as no civilians may lawfully acquire, possess, or transfer a firearm or ammunition. Over seven million North Koreans belong to a military reserve unit or a paramilitary organization. These would be mobilized during a war and would be considered a paramilitary organization with access to weapons and ammunition. Firearms in North Korea are exclusively reserved for use by the military or police. There is an estimated 130,000 guns, licit and illicit, held by civilians in North Korea, making the gun possession rate less than 0.6 per 100 people in the country. There are no private security contractors, business owners and employees, or private citizens and groups with guns. Since gun ownership by civilians is a crime in North Korea, possessing a gun would make the individual a criminal who, if caught, would most likely be sent to a prison camp as a minimum sentence.

**Unarmed Noncombatants**

3-93. Very few unarmed noncombatants exist in North Korea. Besides the persons belonging to the paramilitary organizations, all other North Koreans are still subject to mandatory war work, thus making them combatants—whether armed or unarmed. There is no free media in North Korea, as the government controls all information outlets including newspapers, radio stations, and television stations. There are few nongovernmental organizations working in the country, as the government previously expelled most of them. Due to the trade restrictions against North Korea, there are few transnational corporations with offices in North Korea, most of which would be from China.
PART TWO

North Korean Actions

Part Two addresses tactical tasks and drills in Korean People's Army Ground Forces (KPAGF) reconnaissance and security, offensive, defensive, and counterstability actions. Electronic intelligence warfare (EIW) is integral to all Korean People's Army (KPA) operations. Each chapter presents specified tasks, subtasks, and tactical action models to convey the types of sequential, parallel, or simultaneous actions required to successfully accomplish a mission task.

Chapter 4

Battle Drills

This chapter describes the standardized execution of several fundamental KPAGF tactical tasks based on conditions and situational cues during mission performance. After a discussion of the purpose of battle drills, actions covered include actions on contact, fixing enemy forces, breaking contact, conducting situational breaches, and fire and maneuver. During the conduct of each of these drills, complementary combined arms actions occur, such as disruption actions, all-arms air defense (AAAD), and air assault defense actions. The chapter concludes with complex terrain operations.

PURPOSE OF BATTLE DRILLS

4-1. A battle drill is a collective task initiated by a situational cue that requires minimal leader orders to execute. It consists of previously rehearsed integrated actions that become reflex-like responses to conditions that may suddenly appear during a mission, resulting in a desired outcome. Battle drills are unit tactical tasks at detachment level or lower, and are carried out by functionally-organized elements performing various subtasks. The composition of such elements will vary depending on the type of force and the operational environment (OE); however, the subtasks performed will be the same for any tactical unit. Most battle drills focus on enabling functions that facilitate the primary action of a larger tactical mission task.

Note. While the literature on the KPA does not have a specific term for “battle drills,” its ground forces will rehearse tactical drills common to reconnaissance and security, offensive, defensive, and counterstability actions.

4-2. Battle drills are conducted in offensive, defensive, and counterstability operations. Their purpose is to achieve advantage in controlling the tempo of combat. Drills allow KPAGF units to perform basic combat functions without hesitation or need for further coordination. They are a baseline of tactical competence. Once able to execute all battle drills, KPAGF units can be instructed to act with concise and rapidly directed combat orders.
Note. Any battalion or company receiving additional assets from a higher command becomes a battalion-size detachment or company-size detachment. Therefore, references to a detachment throughout this chapter may also apply to a battalion or company, unless specifically stated otherwise.

**TASKS**

4-3. A **drill** is a synchronized group of actions that achieve a specific task with minimal guidance or orders as a reaction to a particular set of conditions. Drills and subtasks are applicable for the individual soldier or a weapon system or platform crew, and can also apply to specialized equipment or capabilities.

4-4. A **task** is an action or activity to be performed with the expectation of a clearly defined tactical outcome. The KPAGF describe tasks and state critical subtasks that must be performed to accomplish the task to a standard.

**CONDITIONS**

4-5. Conditions in training represent the probable situational environment requiring execution of a particular drill. The KPAGF train in graduated levels of condition difficulty in order to prepare individuals and units for particular missions based on a unit’s required state of readiness.

4-6. In KPAGF training, a practical description of conditions could include the following:
- Operating independently or as part of a larger unit.
- Receiving an operation order or fragmentary order with a mission task, purpose, intent, and applicable overlays or graphics.
- Receiving an adequate task organization that provides the combat power capabilities to accomplish the task.
- Understanding KPAGF forces and enemy forces, noncombatants, government agencies, nongovernment organizations, and local and international media may be operating in an OE.
- Acting in a manner that is not constrained by standardized rules of engagement and does not always comply with international conventions or agreements on the conduct of warfare.
- Acknowledging some tasks may be performed in a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) environment.
- Implementing command and control (C2) with communications to higher, adjacent, subordinate, and supporting elements.

**STANDARDS**

4-7. The KPAGF conduct tactical actions in accordance with the operations order and a commander’s intent. Units conduct drills, with associated tasks and subtasks that are typically universal throughout the KPAGF when confronted with particular, but similar, circumstances. Execution of drills by the KPAGF, however, can include actions conducted purposely in close proximity to a civilian population as a human shield advantage. In addition, North Korea may not be as casualty averse as its enemy or associated governing authority, and KPA tactical decisions will reflect this.

4-8. Measures of performance determine a satisfactory level of conduct of drill tasks and subtasks. A standard provides criteria for determining the minimum acceptable proficiency of task performance in the designated tactic. Acceptable proficiency to standards includes an evaluation of leader, soldier, and unit performance.

**ACTIONS ON CONTACT**

4-9. **Actions on contact** is a force-oriented battle drill to fix, bypass, or destroy an enemy, and is designed to ensure KPAGF units retain the initiative and fight under circumstances that they determine. When a KPAGF element makes contact with an enemy, the element executes an actions on contact drill; this helps
provide the KPAGF commander with the flexibility to either continue with the planned course of action (COA) or rapidly adopt a new one more suited to situational conditions. This battle drill is designed to ensure the KPAGF element retains the initiative in circumstances supporting mission success.

4-10. The KPAGF recognize seven typical forms of contact:
- Direct fire.
- Indirect fire.
- Obstacle.
- Air.
- CBRN.
- Electronic warfare (EW).
- Sensor.

4-11. The actions on contact battle drill is primarily intended for an element making sensor or direct fire contact with an enemy unit. When making undesired contact—indirect fire; air; CBRN; EW; or ground contact by a noncombat unit—the break contact battle drill is employed instead. Actions on contact can also include a drill to situationally breach an obstacle. Figure 4-1 on page 4-4 provides an example of actions on contact.

4-12. The actions on contact drill has six subtasks:
- Plan.
- Prepare.
- Execute.
- Fix.
- Isolate.
- Continue mission.

**PLAN**

4-13. The plan subtask includes the following:
- Identify enemy unit capabilities and limitations that may be encountered.
- Identify mission objective(s).
- Analyze action and enabling functions that must be performed to achieve mission success. Consider tasks to deceive, disrupt, suppress, neutralize, fix, contain, breach, defeat, or destroy.
- Determine the functional tactics to be applied by action and enabling elements.
- Identify situational awareness and understanding requirements for collection and analysis.
- Anticipate forms of contact and identify means of retaining freedom of maneuver under those conditions.
- Task-organize units for the mission by function.
- Determine how and when functional elements perform or enable action on contact or transition to other tasks or subtasks.
PREPARE

4-14. The prepare subtask includes the following:

- Provide situational understanding of the enemy and OE from current reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence reports.
- Execute EIW in support of actions on contact.
• Report regular, periodic, and unexpected information updates in a timely manner to satisfy the commander’s critical information requirements and mission intent.
• Coordinate the integration of available reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) assets for continuous and overlapping coverage of designated areas, zones, routes, or special objectives in the area of operations (AO) and zone of reconnaissance responsibility (ZORR).
• Conduct counterreconnaissance actions preventing enemy situational understanding of KPA intentions or offensive actions.
• Tailor unit capabilities, considering anticipated complex terrain, survivability measures, and camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D).
• Conduct mission and task rehearsals of action and enabling units.
• Confirm redundant C2 communications requirements and capabilities.

EXECUTE

4-15. The execute subtask includes the following:
• Conduct undetected and sequenced movement by reconnaissance elements through or into an area occupied by enemy units in order to locate and report them.
• Conduct undetected and sequenced movement by security elements through or into an area occupied by enemy units in order to deceive, disrupt, fix, delay, suppress, neutralize, defeat, or destroy enemy security or response units.

FIX

4-16. The fix subtask includes the following:
• Report contact and critical details of enemy location, disposition, composition, and assessment of enemy combat power in contact.
• Report the commander’s assessment of the tactical situation and whether making contact with the enemy constitutes a change in the KPAGF primary COA.
• Designate security elements making contact as fixing elements.
• Prevent the enemy from moving any part of its unit from a specific location for a specific period of time in order to keep it from influencing KPAGF COAs.
• Reinforce the fixing elements with the minimum support necessary to sustain the fixing task.
• Provide early warning of additional approaching enemy units and prevent them from gaining further information on the KPAGF units not in contact.

ISOLATE

4-17. The isolate subtask includes the following:
• Deny the enemy freedom of movement and maneuver along ground or air avenues of approach that could be used to reinforce the enemy or interfere with friendly maneuver. Ambush, block, canalize, contain, delay, destroy, disrupt, fix, suppress, neutralize, interdict, or isolate as required.
• Prevent the enemy from gaining further information on the KPAGF unit’s intentions.
• Position a reserve element for rapid movement or maneuver, on order of the higher KPA commander, to support the mission.
• Conduct direct and indirect fires and EIW to suppress or neutralize designated targets.
• Employ continuous reconnaissance and surveillance with security elements in the AO to sustain situational understanding and provide early warning of enemy activities that can influence the mission.
• Employ continuous counterreconnaissance with security elements to destroy enemy reconnaissance units and to prevent the enemy from obtaining situational understanding of KPAGF intentions.
Influence (deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, or exploit) enemy tactical decision making through EIW capabilities.

Conduct undetected and sequenced movement by support elements through or into an area occupied by enemy units and occupy a direct or indirect fire position(s) in order to isolate designated enemy units.

**CONTINUE MISSION**

4-18. The continue mission subtask includes the following:

- Maneuver to bypass or destroy designated enemy in contact.
- Continue rapid forward momentum of elements to assigned objective(s).
- Report regular, periodic, and unexpected information updates in a timely manner to satisfy the commander’s critical information requirements and mission intent.
- Inform follow-on units of any situational countermobility obstacles on mission route or axis of advance.
- Coordinate for logistics linkup points for combat support and rear service units in support of rapid offensive momentum and objectives.
- Recommend if current tactical conditions require an adjustment to mission actions.
- Report accomplishment of subsequent mission task(s).

**FIXING**

4-19. A fixing drill is to prevent the enemy from moving any part of its force from a specific location for a period of time. Actions can appear similar to tasks that isolate, block, or contain an enemy; however, a fixing drill differs in that it focuses on a specific location and time period. EIW components such as perception management activities, deception techniques, and EW can be used to manipulate situational understanding of an OE. The KPAGF apply a fixing drill to deny an enemy unit the ability to physically move from a location or to psychologically convince it to remain stationary. Tactical intelligence on the enemy situation, understanding the natural conditions of the AO, and anticipated tactical actions shape how a KPAGF leader uses available resources to fix the enemy. Figure 4-2 provides an example of a KPAGF fixing drill.

4-20. Fixing is often a subtask found in other battle drills. The ability to fix the enemy at crucial points in time or location is a fundamental way to maintain freedom to maneuver and retain the initiative. An enemy becomes fixed in one of three basic ways:

- The enemy cannot physically move.
- The enemy does not want to move.
- The enemy does not think it can move.

4-21. An enemy that cannot physically move is constrained. An enemy does not want to move when it feels that doing so invites greater risk to casualties and damage or loss of materiel. Fires or EIW actions can also achieve the effects of physically fixing the enemy when feasible.

4-22. EIW actions support fixing the enemy by convincing it that it cannot or does not want to move. Examples of EIW used to fix the enemy include—

- Propaganda claiming the enemy will be destroyed if it moves in the open.
- Sniper team employment and use of substantial countermobility obstacles to reinforce KPAGF ability to cause casualties or damage enemy combat power.
- Deception communications that simulate the enemy higher commander ordering the enemy unit to remain in place.
- Information attack on enemy sensors to register that the KPAGF fixing element has significantly more combat power than it actually possesses.
Figure 4-2. Fixing (example)

4-23. The fixing drill has five subtasks:
- Plan.
- Prepare.
- Execute—prevent movement.
- Execute—fix.
- Continue mission.

**PLAN**

4-24. The plan subtask includes the following:
- Identify reconnaissance and surveillance objectives for collection and analysis in support of AO situational awareness and situational understanding requirements.
- Identify enemy units to be fixed in support of the mission.
- Collect current information on enemy unit capabilities, limitations, locations, and other OE information.
- Analyze action and enabling functions that must be performed to achieve mission success.
• Determine the functional tactics to be applied by action, enabling, and support elements.
• Identify task-organization requirements for units by function.
• Determine how functional elements perform or enable security tasks, fix the designated enemy units, perform other offensive actions, or transition to other tasks or subtasks.
• Identify time constraints or restrictions on accomplishing the mission and supporting requirements.

PREPARE

4-25. The prepare subtask includes the following:
• Provide situational understanding of the enemy and OE from current reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence reports.
• Report regular, periodic, and unexpected information updates in a timely manner to satisfy the commander’s critical information requirements and mission intent.
• Task-organize units providing capabilities to fix the enemy.
• Coordinate the integration of available RISTA assets for continuous and overlapping coverage of designated areas, zones, routes, or special objectives in the AO and ZORR.
• Conduct counterreconnaissance actions that prevent enemy situational understanding of KPA intentions or offensive actions.
• Tailor unit capabilities, considering anticipated complex terrain, survivability measures, and C3D.
• Conduct mission and task rehearsals of action and enabling units and action subtasks to fix an enemy unit.
• Coordinate required direct and indirect fires.
• Coordinate and prepare to emplace selected countermobility obstacles in conjunction with C3D actions.
• Confirm redundant C2 communications requirements and capabilities.
• Execute EIW in support of offensive actions.

EXECUTE—PREVENT MOVEMENT

4-26. The execute—prevent movement subtask includes the following:
• Confirm current conditions at the enemy location and direction, speed, and tempo of movement or maneuver of enemy units to be fixed.
• Coordinate with friendly units in adjacent AOs to ensure overlapping coverage of ZORRs and provide early warning of enemy activities or OE conditions that could impact the drill.
• Conduct counterreconnaissance tasks to destroy or defeat enemy security units that could influence the drill.
• Detect enemy units along ground or air avenues of approach in the vicinity of unit(s) to be fixed who could influence success, and coordinate to disrupt, delay, or deny access of those units to the fixed enemy.
• Maintain contact with the enemy to be fixed through observation or technical sensor reconnaissance and surveillance means to sustain current situational information.
• Emplace selected stationary countermobility obstacles in conjunction with C3D actions.
• Position a reserve element for rapid movement or maneuver, on order of the KPAGF commander, to support the mission.
• Conduct undetected movement by action and enabling elements to occupy simple battle positions or support locations for the drill and associated security tasks.
• Execute actions convincing the enemy that it cannot move from the present location.
• Execute EIW convincing the enemy to not move from its present location.
EXECUTE—FIX

4-27. The execute—fix subtask includes the following:
- Provide security for action and enabling elements executing the drill.
- Engage enemy units with direct and indirect fires in the fix location or kill zone.
- Suppress or neutralize enemy units in the fix location or kill zone.
- Execute selected mobile countermobility obstacles in conjunction with direct and indirect fires and obscuration.
- Conduct EIW perception management activities to convince the enemy that it cannot move or not to move from the present location.
- Employ, when appropriate, EW activities to block or disrupt enemy C2 and communications in support of fixing the enemy unit.
- Employ, when appropriate, a relevant population in the target area to physically block, contain, or disrupt an enemy unit.
- Deny enemy units freedom of movement and maneuver in a designated location or kill zone for a specified period of time.
- Achieve the fixing purpose, which can include an intent to contain, isolate, suppress, neutralize, interdict, defeat, or destroy selected enemy units.

CONTINUE MISSION

4-28. The continue mission subtask includes the following:
- Report regular, periodic, and unexpected information updates in a timely manner to satisfy the commander’s situational awareness and situational understanding requirements.
- Execute tasks with stay-behind elements, when required, including but not limited to surveille, disrupt, delay, suppress, neutralize, defend, defeat, or destroy.
- Report reorganization and combat effectiveness of KPAGF units.
- Recommend if current tactical conditions require an adjustment to the time or tempo of current or subsequent mission tasks.

BREAK CONTACT

4-29. Break contact is designed to remove the enemy’s ability to maintain contact with and decisively engage a KPAGF unit, a primary objective of which is to prevent the enemy from placing destructive or suppressive fires. This is accomplished by implementing protective measures to include fixing the enemy; employing fires, C3D, and countermobility; and regaining freedom to maneuver. A security element initially fixes the enemy and, if appropriate, isolates it. Related actions protect the KPAGF unit while it maneuvers to a position out of contact. These may be as simple as placing obscuring smoke between the enemy and the KPAGF unit or, depending on the time available, as complex as a deception plan employing decoys. Countermobility actions can include emplacement of dynamic obstacles or destruction of manmade structures to restrict an enemy’s ability to maneuver and maintain contact.

4-30. The KPAGF will routinely break contact in order to—
- Maneuver into predesignated defensive positions.
- Maneuver to a position of advantage against an enemy.
- Draw the enemy force into an ambush.
- Retain the ability to conduct its chosen COA.
- Move away and continue an assigned mission.

4-31. Breaking contact ensures KPAGF units retain the initiative and fight under circumstances of their choosing. It also provides the commander with the flexibility to either continue with the planned COA or to rapidly adopt a new COA more suited to changed conditions. Figure 4-3 on page 4-10 provides an example of a break contact drill.
Figure 4-3. Break contact (example)

4-32. The break contact drill has six subtasks:

- Plan.
- Prepare.
- Execute—protect.
- Execute—fix.
- Execute—isolate.
- Continue mission.
PLAN

4-33. The plan subtask includes the following:

- Identify enemy unit capabilities and limitations that may be encountered.
- Determine an order of movement for each subordinate element or unit, its departure time(s), and direction of movement.
- Identify mission objective(s) for subordinate and attached units, to include how long each unit will occupy a position and any specific methods to break contact.
- Analyze action and enabling functions that must be performed to achieve mission success.
- Consider tasks to deceive, disrupt, suppress, neutralize, fix, contain, breach, defeat, or destroy.
- Determine the functional tactics to be applied by action and enabling elements.
- Anticipate forms of contact and identify means of retaining freedom of maneuver under those conditions.
- Identify situational awareness and understanding requirements for collection and analysis.
- Task-organize units for the mission by function.
- Determine how and when functional elements perform or enable action on contact or transition to other tasks or subtasks.

PREPARE

4-34. The prepare subtask includes the following:

- Provide situational understanding of the enemy and OE from current reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence reports.
- Execute EIW in support of break contact.
- Report regular, periodic, and unexpected information updates in a timely manner to satisfy the commander’s critical information requirements and mission intent.
- Coordinate the integration of available RISTA assets for continuous and overlapping coverage of designated areas, zones, routes, or special objectives in the AO and ZORR.
- Conduct counterreconnaissance actions preventing enemy situational understanding of KPA intentions or offensive actions.
- Tailor unit capabilities, considering anticipated complex terrain, survivability measures, and C3D.
- Conduct mission and task rehearsals of action and enabling units.
- Confirm redundant C2 communications requirements and capabilities.

EXECUTE—PROTECT

4-35. The execute—protect subtask includes the following:

- Determine the forms of contact—direct fire, sensor collection, obstacles, CBRN, air, indirect fire, or EW.
- Take immediate steps to protect the unit from these forms of contact.
- Select alternate routes, assembly areas, and positions.
- Select routes and positions that make use of covering and concealing terrain.
- Employ mobility and countermobility actions.
- Employ manmade concealment and obscuration.
- Employ deception.
- Retain freedom of maneuver.
- Reduce units in contact to only security element(s).
- Select one or more routes permitting continued maneuver out of contact while continuing the mission.
- Fix and isolate enemy maneuver units.
EXECUTE—FIX

4-36. The execute—fix subtask includes the following:

- Report contact and critical details of enemy location, disposition, composition, and assessment of enemy combat power in contact.
- Report the commander’s assessment of the tactical situation and whether making contact constitutes a change in the enemy’s anticipated primary COA.
- Designate security elements making contact as fixing elements.
- Prevent the enemy from moving any part of its unit from a specific location for a specific period of time in order to keep it from influencing KPA COAs.
- Reinforce the fixing elements with the minimum support necessary to sustain the fixing task.
- Provide early warning of additional approaching enemy units and prevent them from gaining further information on the KPA units not in contact.

EXECUTE—ISOLATE

4-37. The execute—isolate subtask includes the following:

- Deny the enemy freedom of movement and maneuver along ground or air avenues of approach that could be used to reinforce the enemy or interfere with friendly maneuver.
- Ambush, block, canalize, contain, delay, destroy, disrupt, fix, suppress, neutralize, or interdict as required.
- Prevent the enemy from gaining further information on KPAGF intentions.
- Position a reserve element for rapid movement or maneuver, on order of the KPAGF commander, to support the mission.
- Conduct direct and indirect fires and EIW to suppress or neutralize designated targets.
- Employ continuous reconnaissance and surveillance with security elements in the AO to sustain situational understanding and provide early warning of enemy activities that can influence the mission.
- Employ continuous counterreconnaissance with security elements to destroy enemy reconnaissance elements and to prevent the enemy from obtaining situational understanding of KPAGF intentions.
- Influence (deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, or exploit) enemy tactical decision-making through EIW capabilities.
- Conduct undetected and sequenced movement by support elements through or into an area occupied by enemy elements and occupy a direct or indirect fire position(s) in order to isolate designated elements of the enemy force.
- Assess and report.
- KPAGF commander reports to the chain of command the form of contact made, critical details of its composition, and an assessment of the situation.

CONTINUE MISSION

4-38. The continue mission subtask includes the following:

- Maneuver to avoid, bypass, or destroy designated enemy in contact.
- Continue rapid forward momentum of elements to assigned objective(s).
- Report regular, periodic, and unexpected information updates in a timely manner to satisfy the commander’s critical information requirements and mission intent.
- Inform follow-on elements of any situational countermobility obstacles on route or axis of advance.
- Coordinate for logistics linkup points for combat support and rear service units in support of rapid offensive momentum and objectives.
• Recommend if current tactical conditions require an adjustment to mission actions.
• Report accomplishment of subsequent mission task(s).

SITUATIONAL BREACH

4-39. A situational breach is the rapid reduction of and passage through an obstacle encountered in the execution of another tactical task. A breach drill is a combined arms tactical task executed by functionally organized elements performing various subtasks. Figure 4-4 provides an example of a situational breach.

- ISOLATE
  • Locate obstacles/ENY
  • Observe obstacles/ENY
  • Suppress ENY with fires:
    • Direct fires
    • Indirect fires
    • Initiate breach

- SECURE
  • Reduce obstacles:
    • Grapple triggers
    • Bangalore reduce
    • Direct fires
  • Neutralize ENY with fires
  • Mark lane
  • Secure lane

- PENETRATE
  • Lift and shift fires
  • Secure lane exit
  • Assault through lane
  • Pass rapidly to OBJ
  • Exploit momentum

Figure 4-4. Situational breach (example)

4-40. The purpose of a situational breach is to achieve tactical advantage, maintain the momentum or tempo of offensive operations, and sustain organizational combat power in order to achieve the mission task. The decision to conduct a situational breach is based on the KPAGF leader’s knowledge of the enemy, the surrounding OE, and the expected tactical advantage to accomplishing the mission. The unit conducting a situational breach may or may not have expected an obstacle but, in either case, conducts the breach with readily available resources and does not wait for specialized equipment and other support. The unit typically attempts to breach an obstacle from tactical movement with minimal delay, assault through the passage lane,
and press the attack without first halting on the far side of the obstacle to consolidate. KPAGF elements following the breach and assault elements proof and improve the initial passage lane as needed.

4-41. The situational breach drill has six subtasks:

- Plan.
- Prepare.
- Execute—isolate.
- Execute—secure.
- Execute—penetrate.
- Continue mission.

**PLAN**

4-42. The plan subtask includes the following:

- Identify reconnaissance and surveillance objectives for collection and analysis in support of AO situational awareness and situational understanding requirements.
- Collect current information on enemy unit capabilities, limitations, and an OE.
- Analyze action and enabling functions that must be performed to achieve mission success.
- Determine the functional tactics to be applied by action, enabling, and support elements.
- Identify task-organization requirements for units by function.
- Determine how and when functional elements perform or enable security tasks, offensive actions, or transition to other tasks or subtasks.
- Identify time constraints or restrictions on accomplishing the mission and supporting requirements.

**PREPARE**

4-43. The prepare subtask includes the following:

- Provide situational understanding of the enemy and OE from current reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence reports.
- Report regular, periodic, and unexpected information updates in a timely manner to satisfy the commander’s critical information requirements and mission intent.
- Task-organize units by function, which typically includes security, support, breach, assault, and reserve.
- Coordinate the integration of available RISTA assets for continuous and overlapping coverage of designated areas, zones, routes, or special objectives in the AO and ZORR.
- Conduct counterreconnaissance actions preventing enemy situational understanding of KPA intentions or offensive actions.
- Tailor element capabilities, considering anticipated complex terrain, survivability measures, and C3D.
- Coordinate for required direct and indirect fires.
- Conduct mission and task rehearsals of action and enabling units and action element subtasks.
- Confirm redundant C2 communications requirements and capabilities.
- Execute EIW in support of offensive actions.

**EXECUTE—ISOLATE**

4-44. The execute—isolate subtask includes the following:

- Infiltrate security elements to conduct reconnaissance of obstacles.
- Conduct counterreconnaissance to destroy or defeat enemy security units.
- Report when a practical bypass exists to obstacles.
- Provide early warning of enemy actions that can influence the situational breach.
• Detect other enemy units and prevent them from contacting the enemy near the breach site.
• Deny the enemy freedom of movement and maneuver along ground or air avenues of approach that could be used to reinforce the enemy at the breach site or interfere with the tasks of the breach or assault elements.
• Ambush, block, canalize, contain, delay, destroy, disrupt, fix, suppress, neutralize, interdict, or isolate as required.
• Prevent the enemy from gaining further information.
• Execute EIW in support of the situational breach.
• Position a reserve element for rapid movement or maneuver, on order of the KPAGF commander, to support the mission.
• Obscure the breach site and surrounding terrain from enemy visual and technical observation.
• Conduct direct and indirect fires and EIW to suppress or neutralize designated targets.
• Initiate breach element actions at the breach point.

EXECUTE—SECURE

4-45. The execute—secure subtask includes the following:
• Target enemy units in vicinity of the breach site.
• Neutralize enemy defending the breach site.
• Continue direct and indirect fires to suppress designated targets.
• Coordinate continued obscuration of breach site and surrounding terrain to prevent enemy visual and technical observation.
• Report progress as each obstacle is reduced.
• Lift or shift fires as the breach element progresses through the obstacles.
• Report the initial passage lane marked and secure.
• Call forward the assault element to continue attack momentum.

EXECUTE—PENETRATE

4-46. The execute—penetrate subtask includes the following:
• Guide the assault element quickly through the marked passage lane.
• Support the rapid advance of the assault element and follow-on elements through the passage lane.
• Report when trail element of the action element has exited the far side of passage lane.
• Inform follow-on elements of any enemy explosive obstacles marked and bypassed along passage lines.
• Seize or secure far side of breaching objective beyond passage lane exit.
• Report status of casualties and location of friendly element casualty collection point in vicinity of the passage lane.

CONTINUE MISSION

4-47. The continue mission subtask includes the following:
• Continue rapid forward momentum of elements to assigned objective(s).
• Report regular, periodic, and unexpected information updates in a timely manner to satisfy the commander’s critical information requirements and mission intent.
• Inform follow-on elements of any situational countermobility obstacles emplaced during the breach to protect the passage lane and route or axis of advance.
• Coordinate for logistics linkup points for combat support and rear service units in support of rapid offensive momentum and objectives.
• Recommend if current tactical conditions require an adjustment to mission actions.
• Report accomplishment of subsequent mission task(s).
Chapter 4

**FIRE AND MANEUVER**

4-48. Fire and maneuver is a tactical drill designed to ensure the KPAGF retain the initiative to move and fight. Fire and maneuver is how the KPAGF make contact with, or react to contact by, an enemy. The action element is the movement or maneuver element, and the support element is the fixing element. Figure 4-5 provides an example of fire and maneuver.

![Figure 4-5. Fire and maneuver (example)](image)

(1) The CDET is moving rapidly to the west into a new area of operations. A security squad detects the approach of ENY mechanized elements from the southeast, probably a mechanized battalion. The CDET commander orders a fire and maneuver drill. (2) The lead platoon occupies an attack by fire position as the action element. (3) A security squad observes the lead ENY elements and adjusts for indirect fires. (4) The ENY receives coordinated direct fires by the initial fixing element and indirect fires by mortar high explosive and smoke support. Indirect fires suppress the lead ENY platoon and neutralize the follow-on ENY platoon. The lead ENY platoon is fixed and isolated from follow-on ENY elements. (5) The CDET platoons maneuver to successive fighting positions to fix the lead ENY platoon and successively shift from the fix subtask to the continue maneuver and support subtasks. (6) The CDET continues its fire and maneuver sequence and continues momentum. (7) The CDET maneuvers and attempts to break contact with the ENY. (8) The security units in the area locate and report on lead and follow-on ENY elements to support calls for indirect fires.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CDET</th>
<th>company detachment</th>
<th>ENY</th>
<th>enemy</th>
<th>HE</th>
<th>high explosive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>neutralize</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>suppress</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4-49. A deliberate decision is the preferred way of conducting fire and maneuver in order to provide the commander with the flexibility to continue with a planned COA or rapidly adopt a new one suited to changed conditions. A fixing element suppresses the enemy while an action element moves or maneuvers against the enemy being fixed. When necessary, the action element occupies an advantageous position and transitions to the fixing element. The former fixing element becomes the action element and maneuvers to a successive position of advantage against the enemy. Fire and maneuver is usually used to destroy the enemy being fixed and maneuvered against, but can also be used to fix and bypass an enemy unit. Fire and maneuver purposes can be to destroy the enemy; defeat or repel an enemy attack; or another intention, such as seizing an enemy unit or location.

4-50. The collective actions of fire and maneuver involve setting conditions to fix or isolate an enemy unit. This typically requires a KPAGF element to engage, suppress, or neutralize the enemy with fires so another KPAGF element can maneuver against the fixed or isolated enemy. Effective control measures, C2, and communications shift KPAGF fires to allow the maneuver element to assault and seize or secure the enemy position. Fire and maneuver actions can also cause the enemy to withdraw from a location.
4-51. The KPAGF leader determines combat power to employ for the fire element and the maneuver element. A security element typically makes first contact with the enemy, observes it, and reports on enemy activity. This element may be designated as a fixing element that employs initial fires on the enemy. Once fires fix the enemy, the maneuver element typically uses an indirect approach to a position of advantage against the enemy.

4-52. Fire and maneuver KPAGF elements can also exchange functional roles if a sequence of fire and maneuver action is required to close with the enemy in order to achieve a mission task, such as assault or raid. On order, the fire element can become a maneuver element once an initial maneuver element establishes a position to provide fires. When successive maneuver is required, the fire and maneuver functions continue to alternate between the two KPAGF elements.

4-53. The fire and maneuver drill has seven subtasks:

- Plan.
- Prepare.
- Execute—make contact.
- Execute—fix.
- Execute—isolate.
- Execute—maneuver.
- Continue mission.

**PLAN**

4-54. The plan subtask includes the following:

- Identify enemy unit capabilities and limitations that may be encountered.
- Identify mission objective(s).
- Analyze action and enabling functions that must be performed to achieve mission success. Consider tasks to deceive, disrupt, suppress, neutralize, fix, contain, breach, bypass, defeat, or destroy.
- Determine the functional tactics to be applied by action and enabling elements.
- Identify situational awareness and understanding requirements for collection and analysis.
- Coordinate the integration of available RISTA assets for continuous and overlapping coverage of designated areas, zones, routes, or special objectives in the AO and ZORR.
- Conduct counterreconnaissance actions preventing enemy situational understanding of KPAGF intentions or offensive actions.
- Determine how and when functional elements perform or enable fire and maneuver or transition to other tasks or subtasks.
- Task-organize units for the mission by function.

**PREPARE**

4-55. The prepare subtask includes the following:

- Provide situational understanding of the enemy and OE from current reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence reports.
- Execute EIW in support of fire and maneuver.
- Report regular, periodic, and unexpected information updates in a timely manner to satisfy the commander’s critical information requirements and mission intent.
- Tailor unit capabilities considering anticipated complex terrain, survivability measures, and C3D.
- Conduct mission and task rehearsals of action and enabling units.
- Confirm redundant C2 and communications requirements and capabilities.
EXECUTE—MAKE CONTACT

4-56. The execute—make contact subtask includes the following:

- Conduct undetected and sequenced movement by reconnaissance elements through or into an area occupied by enemy units in order to locate and report them.
- Conduct undetected and sequenced movement by security elements through or into an area occupied by enemy units in order to deceive, disrupt, fix, delay, suppress, neutralize, defeat, or destroy enemy security or response units.
- Designate security elements making contact as fixing elements.
- Initiate fires with fixing element to fix enemy unit.

EXECUTE—FIX

4-57. The execute—fix subtask includes the following:

- Report contact and critical details of enemy location, disposition, composition, and assessment of enemy combat power in contact.
- Report the commander’s assessment of the tactical situation, and whether making contact with the enemy constitutes a change in the KPAGF primary COA.
- Prevent the enemy from moving any part of its unit from a specific location for a specific period of time in order to keep it from influencing KPAGF COAs.
- Reinforce fixing elements with the minimum support necessary to sustain the fixing task.
- Provide early warning of additional approaching enemy units and prevent them from gaining further information on the KPAGF units not in contact.

EXECUTE—ISOLATE

4-58. The execute—isolate subtask includes the following:

- Conduct undetected and sequenced movement by support elements through or into an area occupied by enemy units and occupy a direct or indirect fire position(s) in order to isolate designated enemy units.
- Deny the enemy freedom of movement and maneuver along ground or air avenues of approach that could be used to reinforce the enemy or interfere with friendly maneuver.
- Ambush, block, canalize, contain, delay, destroy, disrupt, fix, suppress, neutralize, or interdict as required.
- Position a reserve element for rapid movement or maneuver, on order of the KPAGF commander, to support the mission.
- Conduct direct and indirect fires and EIW to suppress or neutralize designated targets.
- Employ continuous reconnaissance and surveillance with security elements in the AO to sustain situational understanding and provide early warning of enemy activities that can influence the mission.
- Employ continuous counterreconnaissance with security elements to destroy enemy reconnaissance units and to prevent the enemy from obtaining situational understanding of KPAGF intentions.
- Influence (deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, or exploit) enemy tactical decision making through EIW capabilities.

EXECUTE—MANEUVER

4-59. The execute—maneuver subtask includes the following:

- Maneuver to defeat, destroy, or bypass designated enemy in contact.
- Report regular, periodic, and unexpected information updates in a timely manner to satisfy the commander’s critical information requirements and mission intent.
- Inform follow-on elements of any situational countermobility obstacles emplaced during maneuver.
- Continue rapid forward momentum of elements to assigned objective(s).

**CONTINUE MISSION**

4-60. The continue mission subtask includes the following:
- Coordinate for logistics linkup points for combat support and rear service units in support of rapid offensive momentum and objectives.
- Recommend if current tactical conditions require an adjustment to mission actions.
- Report accomplishment of subsequent mission task(s).

**COMPLEMENTARY COMBINED ARMS ACTIONS**

4-61. Several combined arms actions complement execution of varied tasks and drills to enhance the comprehensive tactical effects when conducted in an integrated and synchronized manner. Combined arms action is the norm in KPAGF operations and occurs throughout the security and battle zones of an AO. Several combined arms actions occurring regularly in tactical operations include but are not limited to—
- Disruption actions.
- AAAD.
- Air assault defense actions.
- Complex terrain operations.

**DISRUPTION ACTIONS**

4-62. The purpose of disruption actions by the KPAGF is to significantly degrade an enemy capability or prevent an enemy from effectively conducting its mission. Disruption actions focus offensive actions against designated components or subsystems to disaggregate the enemy combat system and create vulnerabilities for exploitation. Disruption actions may be directed to—
- Force the enemy to alter its preparations and tactical actions.
- Gain and maintain reconnaissance contact with the enemy.
- Support KPAGF reconnaissance and security tasks.
- Support KPAGF counterreconnaissance effort.
- Deceive the enemy on the disposition and locations of KPAGF units.

4-63. A disruption tactical task is an offensive action intended to upset an enemy’s formation or tempo, interrupt its operational timetable, cause it to commit forces prematurely, or cause its operations to occur in a piecemeal manner. A primary task of a disruption unit is to initiate an attack against a designated enemy combat system. Disruption tasks can occur anywhere in an AO; however, the KPAGF commander typically plans and executes specific actions in a security zone to create tactical advantages for mission success. Actions can be centralized or purposely decentralized in order to mass KPAGF combat power at a designated time and location, or cause an enemy to address multiple independent threats throughout an operational area. Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance defeat enemy reconnaissance and security operations. Countermobility obstacles channel the enemy into disadvantageous terrain and kill zones, and long-range direct and indirect fires degrade enemy formations or positions. EIW components are KPAGF combat multipliers employed to limit effective enemy C2 and communications in defensive and offensive operations. Destruction of a designated combat system equates to the system being combat ineffective until the capability is reconstituted. Any KPAGF level of command and any type of units that are conducting a disruption task have the same basic subtasks. Figures 4-6 and 4-7 on pages 4-20 and 4-21, respectively, provide an example of a disruption action.
Figure 4-6. Disruption actions (example; part 1 of 2)

(1) The KPA battalion disrupts the enemy with long-range fires and obstacles and suppresses the lead enemy units' approach. (2) The delay in the west slows the enemy advance. (3) The KPA withdraws under pressure in the east, deceiving the enemy of a failing defense; the enemy shifts its main effort eastward and rapidly advances to the north. (4) The KPA fixes the enemy in the west with direct and indirect fires and obstacles. (5) The enemy continues its rapid advance in the east with purposefully light KPA contact to the north and flanks.

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<td>WP</td>
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Note. Only select units shown for clarity purposes.
Figure 4-7. Disruption actions (example; part 2 of 2)

(6) The KPA contains enemy units in kill zones and destroys the lead unit with direct and indirect fires.
(7) The KPA exploits success in the northern kill zone and counterattacks follow-on enemy units in the central kill zone. (8) KPA elements fix, defeat, or destroy enemy units with attack by fire or antitank defensive positions. (9) KPA stay-behind elements ambush enemy command and control and logistics.

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Note. Only select units shown for clarity purposes.
4-64. KPAGF elements may be assigned offensive, defensive, or security mission tasks to disrupt an enemy force. A disruption element executes a combination of tactical tasks or drills to set the conditions for KPAGF success. These execution tasks include but are not limited to—

- Cover.
- Delay.
- Disrupt.
- Fix.
- Ambush.
- Contain.
- Canalize.
- Isolate.
- Neutralize.
- Interdict.

4-65. The disruption task has six subtasks as follows:

- Plan.
- Prepare.
- Execute—find.
- Execute—contain.
- Execute—destroy.
- Continue mission.

Plan

4-66. The plan subtask includes the following:

- Identify reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance objectives.
- Identify deception objectives.
- Collect current information on enemy unit capabilities, limitations, and OE information to be obtained or confirmed.
- Analyze action, enabling, and support functions that must be performed to achieve mission success. Consider tasks to deceive, suppress, delay, fix, contain, breach, neutralize, defeat, or destroy.
- Determine the functional tactics to be applied by action, enabling, and support elements.
- Identify situational awareness and understanding requirements for collection and analysis by ground maneuver, aviation, and other technical capabilities.
- Task-organize elements by function.

Prepare

4-67. The prepare subtask includes the following:

- Evaluate ongoing reconnaissance, surveillance, and counterreconnaissance actions to provide situational understanding and shape OE conditions required for destruction of enemy reconnaissance units and capabilities.
- Coordinate the combined arms integration of available RISTA assets for continuous and overlapping coverage of designated areas, counterreconnaissance zones, routes, predicted enemy locations, kill zones, and special objectives in a security or battle zone.
- Coordinate for situational awareness and understanding among friendly elements in an AO and associated ZORR, such as long-range reconnaissance; special operations forces; mounted, aerial, and dismounted elements operating in the AO or ZORR; and signals reconnaissance intelligence.
- Assess current counterreconnaissance actions to prevent enemy RISTA from obtaining situational understanding of KPA intentions.
- Conduct mission and task rehearsals of action, enabling, and support elements.
• Confirm secure communications requirements and capabilities.
• Execute EIW in support of the mission.

Execute—Find

4-68. The execute—find subtask includes the following:

• Coordinate reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance ground maneuver, aviation, and other technical collection, disruption, or EW assets of KPAGF RISTA to locate, monitor, and set the conditions for actions against designated enemy units and capabilities.
• Conduct undetected and sequenced movement and maneuver by reconnaissance elements through an AO in order to locate enemy reconnaissance, surveillance, and other security units in counterreconnaissance zones, reconnaissance zones, routes, predicted enemy locations, kill zones, and special counterreconnaissance objectives. Report enemy security units, main forces, reserves, rear service units, and C2 and communications nodes.
• Conduct undetected and sequenced movement and maneuver by counterreconnaissance elements through and into an area occupied by enemy units in order to locate and act on intelligence as tasked in mission order.
• Conduct actions with counterreconnaissance elements in order deceive, suppress, delay, fix, contain, breach, neutralize, defeat, or destroy enemy security or response units.
• Report regular, periodic, and situational collection updates in a timely manner to satisfy the commander’s critical and recurring reconnaissance, surveillance, and counterreconnaissance information requirements supporting the mission intent.
• Destroy enemy RISTA.
• Recommend if current tactical conditions require an adjustment to the time or tempo ordered for tasks to disrupt the enemy operation.
• Conduct security tasks to provide early warning and protect. Other tactical tasks may include but are not limited to: block, canalize, contain, delay, destroy, fix, interdict, suppress, or neutralize.

Execute—Contain

4-69. The execute—contain subtask includes the following:

• Use surprise, limited visibility, complex terrain, emplaced obstacles, C3D, and fires to restrict and channel the enemy combat system into the kill zone(s).
• Conduct EIW activities to convince the enemy it cannot move or not to move from the present location.
• Employ, when appropriate, EIW activities to block or disrupt C2 and communications of the enemy unit or combat system being disrupted.
• Employ, when appropriate, a relevant population in the target area to physically block, fix, or contain an enemy unit.
• Deliver lethal and nonlethal suppression effects on the designated combat system to isolate it from contact with other enemy units.
• Conduct direct and indirect fires and EIW to suppress or neutralize designated targets.
• Execute selected countermobility obstacles in conjunction with direct and indirect fires and obscuration.
• Block, fix, or contain enemy units in the kill zone(s), cause enemy units to center their activity to a given front, and prevent them from withdrawing any part of a unit for use elsewhere.
• Deny enemy units freedom of movement and maneuver in a designated location or kill zone for a specified period of time when in concert with mission intent.
• Deprecate designated enemy units to temporarily prevent them from assisting the isolated enemy unit.
• Position a reserve element for rapid movement or maneuver, on order of the KPAGF commander, to support the mission.
Deny the enemy freedom of movement and maneuver along ground or air avenues of approach that could be used to reinforce the enemy or interfere with friendly movement and maneuver.

**Execute—Destroy**

4-70. The execute—destroy subtask includes the following:
- Attack with sudden and massed effects by action, security, and support elements to destroy enemy units.
- Destroy designated enemy combat systems.
- Destroy designated enemy units.

**Continue Mission**

4-71. The continue mission subtask includes the following:
- Consolidate and reorganize KPAGF elements to minimize the impact of combat losses and functional capabilities.
- Reorganize KPAGF elements quickly to adjust to changing conditions.
- Retain a reserve element.
- Conduct timely undetected movement from or into areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means.
- Execute tasks with stay-behind elements, when required, including but not limited to: surveille, fix, delay, suppress, neutralize, defend, defeat, or destroy.
- Conduct continuous reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance in designated zones and areas.
- Report information and intelligence updates to satisfy the commander’s mission intent.
- Coordinate for logistics linkup points for combat support and rear service units in support of rapid offensive or defensive momentum and objectives.
- Recommend if current tactical conditions require an adjustment to the time or tempo ordered for tasks to disrupt the enemy operation.

**ALL-ARMS AIR DEFENSE**

4-72. The all-arms air defense (AAAD) task is the coordinated employment of various arms and weapons systems to achieve an effect against the enemy air threat, whether originally designed for that purpose or not. The primary effect is to destroy or disrupt enemy air threats and cause the enemy to change its intended use of air assets. The KPAGF recognize that air defense is an all-arms effort at all echelons of task organization. It possesses numerous air defense artillery units that operate not only missile systems, but a large number of antiaircraft artillery. While much of this equipment is dated, there will be a large quantity of these systems throughout the battlefield. In addition, all KPAGF units above the company level possess some type of an organic air defense capability dependent on the type, size, and echelon of the unit. All elements are prepared to conduct AAAD as a fundamental way to support and protect freedom to maneuver, defensive posture, and the ability to retain the initiative. The KPAGF adapt ways of employing traditional air defense systems and other systems not typically associated with air defense. Machine guns on armored personnel carriers and the automatic cannon on infantry fighting vehicles can engage both ground and aerial targets. The heavy antiaircraft machine guns on tanks are specifically designed for air defense. Most antitank guided missiles can be effective against low-flying rotary-wing aircraft. Field artillery and small arms can also be integral parts of the air defense scheme. Weapons systems that can be part of a functional AAAD include—
- Small arms.
- Automatic weapons.
- Medium and heavy machine guns.
- Automatic cannons.
- Rocket-propelled grenades.
- Antitank guided missiles.
- Artillery.
• Air defense missiles.

4-73. The KPA considers every soldier with a man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) to be an air defense firing element. These weapons are widely proliferated throughout the KPAGF force structure. Rocket-propelled grenades can be an effective AAAD system. Tactics usually employ a form of volley or successive fires in a layered air defense approach to airspace, based on effective ranges and height of available weapon systems and electronic interdiction and warning systems.

4-74. Many maneuver units have modified selected infantry vehicles into fire-support vehicles equipped for multirole use with cannons, antitank guided missiles, and MANPADS. These vehicles are employed in air defense or antitank platoons with dismounted MANPADS teams to engage aerial and other targets and weapons systems that can act in an antitank role.

4-75. AAAD measures support a range of tactical capabilities from self-protection to key components of an integrated air defense system. The KPA recognizes that air defense is a combined arms effort. Air defense supports combined arms combat by the comprehensive integration of a large number and variety of weapons and associated equipment into an effective, redundant air defense system. Figure 4-8 provides an example of KPA AAAD.

Figure 4-8. All-arms air defense actions (example)

4-76. The KPA will typically operate without the tactical or operational advantage of air superiority or air parity against an enemy. A norm of enemy air dominance and overconfidence can be manipulated to KPAGF advantage by skillful use of active and passive air defensive measures. Passive measures such as C3D in
dispersed or multiple locations and battle positions hinder enemy detection and situational understanding of the KPA. Active air defense measures at the tactical echelon apply all arms and available resources to achieve effective combat power against aerial threats—aviation assets, rockets, and missiles—within the task-organized capabilities allocated to a commander. KPA sensors within RISTA capabilities are an integral complement to inform decision making for direct and indirect air defense fires against an enemy aerial threat. EIW systems can provide the capabilities of—

- EW.
- Deception.
- Physical destruction.
- Protection and security measures.
- Perception management.
- Information attack.
- Computer warfare.
- Reconnaissance.
- Cryptanalysis.
- Intelligence collection.
- Disinformation operations.

4-77. Active measures include suppressive or neutralization fires, air and terrain countermobility obstacles, and other direct or indirect capabilities to mass AAAD effects of KPA combat power. Employment of integrated AAAD assets is simultaneous, sequential, or selective, and is conducted in accordance with higher-echelon approved mission-specific rules of engagement. These restrictions acknowledge the norm of a KPA integrated air defense system; however, at the lower tactical-maneuver unit echelon, the norm is decentralized C2 and the right of self-defense to an imminent or attacking enemy air threat.

4-78. KPA air defense doctrine emphasizes three interrelated concepts. These concepts are:

- Air defense is an integral part of KPA combined arms combat.
- Every KPA unit is responsible for continuous air surveillance in its AO in order to alert and warn of enemy aerial observation, flight activities, and pending probable air attack.
- Air defense weapons, radars, and associated acquisition and tracking systems are a critical component of an integrated KPA C2 and communications system to provide integrated air defense capabilities into an integrated firing system. (See appendix D for more information on air defense operations.)

4-79. The AAAD task has five subtasks:

- Plan.
- Prepare.
- Execute.
- Report.
- Continue mission.

Plan

4-80. The plan subtask includes the following:

- Identify situational awareness and understanding requirements for air defense collection and analysis.
- Collect current information on enemy unit capabilities, limitations, and OE information to be obtained or confirmed.
- Identify or predict locations of enemy airfields; forward arming and refueling points; drop, landing, and pickup zones; and helicopter firing positions in the KPAGF AO and ZORR.
- Identify or predict locations of enemy probable or possible air avenues of approach, air infiltration routes, and air routes into and throughout the KPAGF AO.
- Identify KPA units to be protected in point or area air defense in tactical sector.
● State priorities of air defense support to the mission.
● Determine decision points for simultaneous, sequential, or selected engagement by KPA air defense systems—
  ▪ In enemy air avenue or route and before entering the airspace over KPAGF units within an AO.
  ▪ In the airspace above KPA battle positions or designated point or area locations for air defense.
● Analyze action and enabling functions that must be performed to achieve drill success. Consider the requirements for air defense of possible follow-on tasks to deceive, disrupt, suppress, fix, contain, breach, defeat, or destroy.
● Identify affiliated units, such as guerrilla units, criminal organizations, or coerced or willing relevant populations, that can perform air defense warning or air defense functions.
● Determine the functional tactics to be applied by action and enabling elements.
● Plan for mutually supporting and overlapping air defense coverage to air defense priorities in support of the mission.
● Task-organize units for the AAAD drill by function.

Prepare

4-81. The prepare subtask includes the following:
● Evaluate ongoing reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence updates to provide situational understanding of the enemy and OE.
● Coordinate the integration of available RISTA assets for continuous and overlapping coverage of designated areas, aerial zones and sectors, routes, or special objectives in the AO and ZORR.
● Confirm mutually supporting and overlapping dedicated air defense systems coverage to air defense priorities.
● Coordinate direct and indirect fire weapons into integrated air defense for all tactical-echelon maneuver units.
● Coordinate and emplace selected countermobility obstacles in conjunction with C3D actions.
● Confirm how and when functional elements act to enable or achieve the designated effects on an enemy aerial unit and transition to other tasks or subtasks.
● Confirm communications requirements and capabilities.
● Conduct air defense mission and drill rehearsals.
● Conduct rehearsals of rules of engagement changes and C2 and communications acknowledgement procedures.
● Execute EIW.

Execute

4-82. The execute subtask includes the following:
● Detect and track enemy air asset approach into the AO.
● Report enemy aircraft by type, number of aircraft, direction of movement or maneuver, and other situational information in predicted enemy locations or kill zones.
● Confirm any restrictions to KPA AAAD rules of engagement.
● Engage enemy aircraft with appropriate weapon systems and in accordance with the unit air defense rehearsals for simultaneous, sequential, or selective fires or EIW attack.
● Maintain observation or technical sensor contact with enemy aircraft to confirm AAAD effects.
● Observe for additional or successive enemy aircraft in AO.
● Coordinate with counterreconnaissance units in order to deceive, disrupt, delay, fix, suppress, neutralize, defeat, or destroy enemy ground, aerial security, or other units responding to the KPA air defense.
Chapter 4

Report

4-83. The report subtask includes the following:

- Report AAAD effects on enemy aircraft.
- Report enemy aircraft effects on KPA area or point locations.
- Determine if current tactical conditions require an adjustment to the AAAD concept of operations support.
- Influence (deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, or exploit) enemy tactical decision making before and during execution of the air defense through coordination of EIW capabilities.
- Report regular, periodic, and unexpected information updates in a timely manner to satisfy the commander’s air defense information requirements.
- Execute tasks with stay-behind or security elements, when required, including but not limited to: surveille, disrupt, delay, suppress, neutralize, defend, defeat, or destroy.
- Report reorganization and combat effectiveness of dedicated air defense elements and other units providing AAAD capabilities.

Continue Mission

4-84. The continue mission subtask includes the following:

- Continue air defense of assigned area and point objectives.
- Report regular, periodic, and unexpected information updates in a timely manner to satisfy the commander’s critical information requirements and mission intent.
- Recommend if mission task requires adjustment.
- Coordinate logistics linkup for combat support and rear service units to replenish ammunition and for other sustainment actions.
- Recommend if current tactical conditions require an adjustment to mission actions.
- Report accomplishment of subsequent mission task(s).

AIR ASSAULT DEFENSE ACTIONS

4-85. The purpose of the KPA’s air assault defense actions is to defeat landings of enemy airborne or heliborne units through destruction of the transport aircraft in flight or destruction of the enemy immediately after the air assault or airborne landing occurs. The KPA places so much emphasis on preventing enemy aerial assaults in its rear area that this section in the KPAGF manuals usually comes before the sections on offensive and defensive actions. This may be a response to the fear of regime change by foreign forces landing in Pyongyang or the view of recent training emphasis by a regional enemy on “decapitation capabilities” and the creation of units specializing in such missions. The KPA conducts air assault defense actions as a combined arms effort. The primary effect is to destroy enemy air assault threats. Disrupting enemy air assault operations causes the enemy to lose operational momentum and alter tactical operations. All KPA units are prepared to conduct AAAD; however, an air assault defense action is a mission task typically assigned to an air assault defense reserve.

4-86. An air assault defense reserve operates within an assigned zone, or may have a zone activated for the duration of an air assault action. Air assault defense actions typically include action elements to destroy the enemy air assault units in the assigned zone; disruption elements to delay the tempo or effectiveness of enemy actions; security elements to fix or isolate designated enemy units; and support elements to assist the overall success of air assault defense actions.

4-87. Air assault defense actions focus on probable or possible drop zones and landing zones. RISTA actions of a higher headquarters are critical to interdiction, integrated air defense, and early warning of enemy airborne and air assault operations. RISTA provides situational awareness and understanding of enemy aerial and ground maneuver actions in a KPAGF security or battle zone. Predicted enemy locations on enemy avenues of approach can indicate maneuver direction, types and density of formations, speed of movement, and probable objectives. Enemy activity in predicted enemy locations indicate axes of advance and inform KPAGF commander decisions to activate kill zones along axes and at enemy landing and drop zones.
4-88. The KPA typically operates without the tactical or operational advantage of air superiority or air parity against an enemy. A norm of enemy air dominance and overconfidence can be manipulated to a KPA advantage by skillful use of active and passive air defensive measures. Passive measures such as C3D in dispersed or multiple locations hinder enemy detection and situational understanding of the KPA forces. Air defensive and offensive measures at the tactical echelon apply all arms and available resources to achieve effective combat power against aerial threats—enemy rotary-, fixed-wing, and unmanned aircraft—within the task-organized capabilities allocated to a KPA commander. Active measures include direct and indirect suppressive or neutralization fires, air and terrain countermobility obstacles for air drop and air assault sites, and other support capabilities to mass the effects of KPA combat power. KPA rules of engagement acknowledge the norm of decentralized C2 and the right of self-defense against an imminent or attacking enemy threat. The primary method to prevent landings by enemy airborne or heliborne troops is to destroy transport aircraft in flight before they can deliver combat power to the ground. When aerial destruction of an enemy airdrop or air assault operation is not feasible, air assault defense actions destroy landing and landed enemy units on the ground as soon as possible.

4-89. An air assault defense action is a combined arms action typically assigned to an air assault defense reserve as a mission task. Any KPA unit with the capability to affect enemy aircraft or landing of enemy units conducts air assault defense actions. Air assault defense units are assigned an attack zone to control actions against enemy airborne or air assault forces. The attack zone may only be activated for the duration of an air assault defense action or may be permanently assigned to an air assault defense reserve. Kill zones are used to control ground, aerial, and air defense engagements. Anticipated enemy landing or drop zones focus intelligence collection priorities, tactical plans, and preparations for immediate on-order execution.

4-90. Air landing reserves are typically detachments; however, such a reserve for an anticipated major enemy landing operation may be a brigade or even a division. Figure 4-9 on page 4-30 shows an example of an air assault defense action within the KPAGF’s rear area.

4-91. The air assault defense actions task has six subtasks:

- Plan.
- Prepare.
- Execute—make contact.
- Execute—air assault defense actions.
- Report.
- Continue mission.
(1) A task-organized company protects a bridge from enemy antiairdrop actions. Augmentation includes SOF, MANPADS, mortar, and heavy machine gun elements. (2) Probable landing zones are targeted as kill zones with direct and indirect fires. Mines and obstacles are set on each landing zone and the main road. Enemy unmanned aircraft are allowed to enter and depart unhindered in support of camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception. (3) Security elements focus on probable enemy locations and aerial avenues of approach. (4) Units placed on ground approaches prevent linkup of enemy ground and air landing elements. (5) The unit confirms two enemy helicopters approaching from the north. Action elements allow the lead helicopter to continue to the landing zone and track the trailing one. (6) On order, action and support elements engage the lead helicopter as it hovers to disembark enemy infantry, destroying it with all enemy aboard. (7) Other action elements simultaneously engage the trailing helicopter, causing it to crash. (8) Elements not in the engagement remain in location to protect the bridge site, with security and fixing elements prepared to ambush any ground maneuver toward the bridge.

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<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
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F | MANPADS | man-portable air defense system
---|---------|-----------------
RES | reserve
U | utility

Figure 4-9. Air assault defense actions (example)
Plan

4-92. The plan subtask includes the following:

- Identify situational awareness and understanding requirements for air assault defense collection and analysis.
- Collect current information on enemy unit capabilities, limitations, and OE information to be obtained or confirmed.
- Identify or predict locations of enemy airfields; forward arming and refueling points; drop, landing, and pickup zones; and helicopter firing positions.
- Identify or predict locations of enemy probable or possible air and ground avenues of approach, air infiltration routes, and air routes into and throughout the KPA AO.
- Identify KPA units to be protected by point or area air defense systems.
- State priorities of air assault defense support to the mission.
- Determine decision points for simultaneous, sequential, or selected engagement by KPA air assault defense systems.
- Analyze action and enabling functions that must be performed to achieve task success. Consider the requirements for air assault defense actions to deceive, disrupt, suppress, fix, contain, breach, defeat, or destroy designated enemy units.
- Identify regular and affiliated elements, such as guerrilla units, criminal organizations, and coerced or willing relevant populations that can perform air assault defense warning or other air assault defense functions.
- Determine the functional tactics to be applied by action and enabling elements.
- Plan for mutually supporting and overlapping air assault defense coverage to air assault defense priorities in support of air assault defense actions.
- Task-organize units for air assault defense actions by function.

Prepare

4-93. The prepare subtask includes the following:

- Evaluate ongoing reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence updates to provide situational understanding of the enemy and OE.
- Coordinate for the situational awareness and understanding of designated landing and drop zones, aerial axes and routes, and objectives in the security or battle zones and the ZORR.
- Confirm support relationships and priorities of effort of higher headquarters fires and air assault defense to the mission.
- Coordinate direct and indirect fires and air assault defense measures for air assault defense actions by the tactical-echelon maneuver unit.
- Coordinate and emplace selected countermobility obstacles in conjunction with C3D actions.
- Coordinate tactical plans with regular and affiliated elements.
- Confirm how and when functional elements act to enable or achieve the designated effects on an enemy aerial element and transition to other tasks or subtasks.
- Confirm communications requirements and capabilities.
- Conduct air assault defense action rehearsals of combined arms capabilities and C2 and communications procedures.
- Position a reserve for rapid maneuver on order of the KPAGF commander to support air assault defense actions.
- Execute EIW.
Execute—Make Contact

4-94. The execute—make contact subtask includes the following:

- Detect and track enemy aerial approach in coordination with tactical updates from higher headquarters.
- Report enemy aircraft by type, number of aircraft, direction of movement or maneuver, and other situational information in predicted enemy locations and kill zones.
- Coordinate with higher headquarters to deceive, disrupt, delay, fix, suppress, neutralize, defeat, or destroy enemy ground or aerial maneuver prior to enemy entry.
- Report any enemy airborne or heliborne unit landings by echelon, type, location, and capability.

Execute—Air Assault Defense Actions

4-95. The execute—air assault defense actions subtask includes the following:

- Engage enemy aircraft prior to air drop or air assault of enemy units.
- Maintain observation or technical sensor contact with enemy aircraft to confirm air assault defense action effects.
- Report and update details of enemy location, disposition, composition, and assessment of enemy combat power in contact.
- Conduct direct and indirect fires and EIW to suppress or neutralize designated targets.
- Fix enemy units at a specific location for a specific period of time.
- Isolate enemy units.
- Report additional and successive enemy aircraft.
- Destroy enemy air drop or air assault units.

Report

4-96. The report subtask includes the following:

- Report air assault defense action effects on enemy aircraft.
- Report enemy aircraft effects on KPA units.
- Report destruction of enemy air drop or air assault operations.
- Determine if current tactical conditions require an adjustment to the KPA concept of operations support.
- Report reorganization and combat effectiveness of dedicated air assault defense elements and other capabilities.

Continue Mission

4-97. The continue mission subtask includes the following:

- Report regular, periodic, and unexpected information updates in a timely manner to satisfy the commander’s critical information requirements and mission intent.
- Execute tasks with air assault defense units, when required, including but not limited to reconnoiter, surveille, disrupt, delay, suppress, neutralize, defend, defeat, and destroy.
- Coordinate logistics linkup for combat support and rear service units to replenish ammunition.
- Continue air assault defense actions.

Complex Terrain Operations

4-98. The KPA realizes creating complex physical and cognitive conditions in combat can be a critical advantage to tactical success. Luring or canalizing an enemy along and into axes, restrictive corridors, or routes in order to fix or isolate it improve opportunities for enemy destruction or defeat. Survivability and force protection are additional KPAGF considerations when defensive or offensive actions are conducted in tactical actions. The application of massed combat power typically concentrates effects in designated kill zones. Complexity is particularly stressful in confined spaces and when an attack can occur from any spatial...
dimension of frontal, flank, rear, overhead, or subsurface. Figure 4-10 provides an example of the above-ground and below-ground nature of complex terrain within both an urban and a rural environment.

![Diagram of complex terrain]

**Figure 4-10. Complexity in complex terrain (example)**

4-99. Terrain conditions can be manipulated to create additional complexity of natural topography and obstacles in a mission area. Infrastructure and obstacles of manmade construction can also be used to
compound complexity, as can the presence of a local relevant population. Terrain and complex conditions are generally categorized in one of three categories:

- Surface.
- Subsurface (subterranean).
- Supersurface.

4-100. Complex terrain exists in both rural and urban environments. The KPA optimizes naturally occurring terrain relief, vegetation, or waterways as obstacles, and commits significant resources to creating grouped battle positions, defensive arrays, and facilities to retain terrain; protect critical assets; restrict enemy movement and maneuver; and prevent an enemy from achieving its mission. The KPA integrates each level of complex terrain into its combat system to cause an enemy to operate in multiple vectors simultaneously, disperse its employment of combat power, and reduce relative advantages of superior technology and systems the enemy might otherwise normally be able to employ.

4-101. The KPA can use a relevant population to provide C3D for its operations, enhance its mobility in proximity to enemy positions or maneuver, and shield itself from enemy precision fires and area indirect fires. The relevant population of a particular area is often a consideration of how a KPA will attack or defend. The KPA knows enemy rules of engagement, understands enemy social culture, and manipulates enemy moral norms that typically set limitations on applying massed combat power that may cause disproportional collateral damage to infrastructure or noncombatants.

4-102. KPA special operations forces, reconnaissance and security teams, or clandestine operatives may infiltrate and move among civilian groups in assigned RISTA efforts, conduct covert actions such as sabotage, or engage in direct actions such as assassinations or kidnapping, either on order of a KPA commander or based on pre-specified tactical conditions. The civilian population can act as a key intelligence source for the KPA. Local hires serving among enemy soldiers, civilians with access to enemy-controlled areas, and refugees moving through enemy-controlled sectors can all be manipulated by the KPA to provide information on enemy dispositions, readiness, movements, and intent.

4-103. The aim of tactical actions in these types of restrictive terrain environments is to defeat or destroy the enemy. Defeat of an enemy can be a combination of excessive casualties; an inability to extract forces in contact because they are fixed or isolated; disruption of C2 and logistics; loss of tactical initiative; or KPA EIW effects indicate continuation of tactical operations is not worth the additional loss in combat power; and convincing the enemy commander that his or her force has culminated and is defeated.

4-104. Tactical operations in complex terrain may occur sequentially or—more likely—as simultaneous and multiple parallel actions. Whether conditions include an underground irrigation tunnel system; hilly or mountainous terrain; a megacity core of high-rise buildings, dense surface infrastructure, and a developed subsurface transportation network; or an underground facility protecting indirect fires systems or components of weapons of mass destruction, the actions to attack or defend such terrain by units at the team, squad, platoon, company detachment, and battalion detachment echelon will employ functional tactics and tactical drills in conducting mission tasks.

4-105. The following tactical examples in complex terrain—urban and subterranean environments—are descriptive and not prescriptive. In either situation, tactical considerations determine how the KPA masses combat power in location and time for effective tactical execution.

4-106. At the tactical level of combat, action norms are small-unit collective drills executed immediately as integrated actions in reaction to an immediate tactical condition. Functional tactics typically employ drills in some combination of actions on contact, fixing (which can include isolation), situational breach, or similar actions to penetrate an obstacle, break contact, or fire and maneuver.

**Urban or Rural Area Actions**

4-107. The KPA plans and actions for both urban and rural combat include continuous EIW. The integrated parts of EIW degrade enemy situational awareness and understanding, and cause physical and psychological limitations of enemy actions in combat. See chapter 9 for additional information on EIW.
4-108. Perception management and media manipulation in EIW can be KPA advantages with significant planning and effective deception and misinformation actions. The influence of EIW on the enemy and a relevant population manipulates societal or cultural norms that can shape or misguide behaviors. Densely populated urban areas present EIW opportunities less likely in rural environments due to easier multiple media reporting and access to social media and the Internet.

4-109. Urban environment actions incorporate offensive, defensive, and counterstability mission tasks. Urban considerations include complex manmade physical terrain and natural terrain, such as waterways and severe topography slopes in elevation or depression that can transist an urban area. Other urban aspects are demographics of the population, manmade support systems existing within the urban area in building complexes and surface thoroughfares, and trafficability in subsurface or deep subterranean systems.

4-110. Operations conducted in urban or rural areas often require precise application of fires to avoid unnecessary civilian casualties. The KPA uses this typical restriction by enemy forces to support its force protection. KPA units will have fewer restrictions on weaponry use and less likelihood of concern for causing civilian casualties. Collateral infrastructure damage and civilian casualties can be a KPA-expected or intended outcome when employing fires on an enemy.

4-111. Many weapons have enhanced effectiveness in a complex terrain environment due to the often confined spaces of combat. Other weapon types can pose significant disadvantages, such weapon backblast zones or lack of system maneuverability in particular topography. Weapons systems in complex terrain combat can include but are not limited to—

- Small arms and automatic weapons with enhanced optics.
- Sniper rifles for precision point engagements.
- Grenades (hand-thrown, rifle-mounted, automatic launchers).
- Antitank rockets and antitank guided missiles.
- Flame and incendiary weapons.
- Obscurants, chemical agents, toxic industrial materials, toxic industrial chemicals.
- Military mines, demolition charges, and improvised explosive devices.
- Breaching demolitions or explosive line charge systems.
- Mortars for high-angle indirect fires.
- Mounted weapons with wide-angle depression and elevation.
- Main battle tank gun systems and artillery pieces in direct fires.

**Executing Urban Combat**

4-112. The KPAGF typically shape defenses of an environment with consideration given to elevation advantages when emplacing weapon systems; how to best employ and intersect surface direct and indirect fires into kill zones; and how to enhance maneuverability of forces among multiple fighting and battle positions through use of subterranean passageways. Upper floors, roofs, or other terrain at varied elevations provide excellent observation points and battle positions above the maximum elevation of many enemy weapons in restrictive corridors. An enemy armored vehicle is more vulnerable at less-armored top, flank, or rear areas rather than its heavily armored frontal glacis or turret armor. Direct or grazing fires from upper floor and surface infrastructure, or ground-level fighting positions, can also disrupt and affect enemy momentum. Basement apertures and surface fighting positions provide fires below the minimum depression angle of many weapons, and can provide direct fire into vulnerable flank or rear locations of an enemy force. Sewers, communications conduit tunnels, and subways provide covered and concealed access throughout the subsurface tactical area and allow rapid KPA movement or maneuver among successive or alternate positions.

4-113. The KPAGF typically conduct deliberately dispersed actions to limit enemy ability to physically mass combat power against a main concentration of the KPA. The KPAGF often maneuver to remain very close to enemy units to avoid the effects of enemy precision fires. They will maintain a large reserve when practical, often dispersed throughout an AO, in order to minimize the signature of readily available forces and to sustain flexibility of options for the KPA commander. Maintaining significant enemy units in
continuous or dispersed operations increases enemy susceptibility to stress-induced fatigue, reduces flexibility of enemy maneuver options, and degrades overall enemy tactical performance.

4-114. Area combat typically involves disruption and actions to fix or isolate. Once an enemy is fixed or isolated, fires and maneuver are massed to defeat or destroy it. Figure 4-11 provides an example of a complex battle position (CBP) within a both an urban and a rural OE.
Disrupt

4-115. Disrupting enemy forces approaching or in complex terrain occurs initially in a security zone, as it is integral to security tasks. Initial tasks include but are not limited to—

- Report contact and critical details of enemy location, disposition, composition, and assessment of enemy combat power in contact.
- Influence (deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, or exploit) enemy tactical decision making through EIW capabilities.
- Designate units as security elements making contact or supporting fixing elements.

4-116. Repositioning KPA units in a timely manner enables tactical initiative and contact with the enemy and maintains KPA freedom of action to prevent exploitable gaps or seams with nearby KPA units. An aim is to defeat the attacking enemy units piecemeal as they arrive in the security zone, and continue to degrade the enemy as it attempts to approach and enter the main battle zone.

Fix or Isolate

4-117. To fix or isolate the enemy is a critical task requiring persistent, continuous RISTA and integrated fire and maneuver. Actions may occur in a security zone or a main battle zone. Fixing an enemy prevents it from moving any part of its unit from a specific location for a specific period of time. The KPAGF integrate fires and obstacles in kill zones to slow and stop enemy units, and continue fires to defeat or destroy a fixed enemy.

4-118. The KPAGF may decide to physically, electronically, and psychologically isolate an enemy from sources of support, deny the enemy freedom of movement, and prevent the isolated enemy from having contact with other enemy unit that could otherwise influence KPA tactical action.

4-119. Fixing or isolating the enemy includes but is not limited to—

- Fix the enemy from moving any part of its unit from a specific location for a specific period of time to prevent it from influencing KPA COAs.
- Reinforce fixing elements with the minimum support necessary to sustain the fixing task.
- Conduct undetected and sequenced movement by support elements through or into an area occupied by enemy units and occupy a direct or indirect fire position(s) in order to isolate designated enemy units.
- Isolate and deny the enemy freedom of movement and maneuver with fires and EIW.
- Position reserve elements for rapid movement or maneuver to support the mission.
- Ambush, block, canalize, contain, delay, destroy, disrupt, fix, suppress, neutralize, or interdict, as required.

Defeat or Destroy

4-120. Actions to defeat or destroy an enemy maintain situational awareness and understanding of enemy movements, maneuver, and dispositions. Concurrently, KPA actions deny the enemy accurate knowledge of KPA movements, maneuver, dispositions, and the ability to predict how the KPA will tactically act. Actions will typically include but are not limited to—

- Employ continuous counterreconnaissance and RISTA.
- Conduct defensive actions to defeat or destroy designated enemy units.
- Fire and maneuver to defeat or destroy designated enemy.
- Continue tactical mission.

Subterranean Area Actions

4-121. KPA plans and actions for subterranean combat, similar to rural or urban complex environments, include continuous EIW. The integrated elements in EIW degrade enemy situational awareness and understanding of subterranean conditions, which may exacerbate the physical and psychological limitations of enemy actions.
4-122. Subterranean actions use common tactics and drills in varied types of subterranean complexes. Subterranean environments used for military purposes can include—

- Natural terrain with cave or basic tunneling systems.
- Manmade subterranean complexes such as interconnected building basements and foundation networks, transportation systems, or other urban subsurface infrastructure networks.
- Underground facilities, typically constructed for specified military functions.

4-123. From a military perspective, all of these subterranean environments can be militarized as a subterranean CBP. This battle position provides a level of protection for its functional purpose such as, but not limited to—

- C2.
- Storage of critical assets.
- Production of materiel.
- Specified tactical, operational, or strategic capabilities.

4-124. Similar to a defensive strongpoint and with a purpose to retain terrain or block or canalize enemy forces, the complexity of a subterranean CBP can be combined with surface CBPs as a defensive array. Complex surface and subsurface arrays incorporate C3D for survivability and employ other engineer and obstacle efforts to protect key activities within the complex from detection and attack and, when located, deny seizure and occupation by an enemy. Figure 4-12 shows the masked surface signature of a subterranean CBP.

![Figure 4-12: Surface signature of a subterranean complex battle position (example)](#)

This subterranean complex battle position includes the following: (1) Ten artillery firing ports. (2) Four reinforced observation surface shelters. (3) Two entrances. (4) Two surface support facilities areas. (5) Seven underground shelter and surface fighting positions.

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4-125. The KPA integrates subterranean CBPs into its defenses throughout its sovereign territory, and may use them as a significant factor in a system of tactical area or positional defenses. KPA forces operate subterranean CBPs in both urban and rural environments, and often use a relevant population to shield the location from enemy precision fires or area indirect fires. Natural irregularities in topography, such as restrictive serpentine canyon walls or severe narrow valley slopes, can also preclude accurate enemy
precision fires. Decoy subterranean CBP signatures deceive or slow enemy identification of vulnerabilities and concentration of combat power for an attack. Figure 4-13 displays the complexity of subterranean facilities, which challenge the ability of an enemy to seize or secure.

Figure 4-13. Subterranean complex battle position configuration (example)

4-126. A subterranean CBP typically has several entrance portals and exits with barrier and blast protection. Berms and other terrain can prevent direct fires on or into the entrance portals. A tunnel system interconnects galleries, alcoves, mission spaces, silos, shafts, and protective measures throughout the surface and subsurface footprint of the complex. The connecting tunnels of a system incorporate severe direction changes in passageways to slow or stop enemy movement within a complex and shape multiple kill zones within the tunnel and interior system.

4-127. The defense of a subterranean CBP typically integrates surface and subsurface security zones and battle zones. The CBP commander designates subordinate functional elements in defenses and options for offensive actions. Subterranean CBPs commonly employ a defense with mission tasks of disruption, main defense, reserve, and support elements. Figure 4-14 on page 4-40 shows a side view of a possible subterranean CBP, illustrates how it can be viewed functionally, and indicates the complexity of a system that may have limited indirect approaches for seizure or securing.
Disruption elements position and reposition to—

- Provide early warning of an enemy approach.
- Prevent enemy observation of defensive preparations.
- Defeat infiltrating enemy reconnaissance units.
- Prevent enemy direct fires or observed indirect fires from reaching the main defensive area of the subterranean CBP.
- Disrupt enemy momentum.

Main Defense Unit

4-130. The main defense unit defends the complex position with integrated obstacles and fires focused on multiple kill zones throughout the surface and subsurface areas of the complex and array. Designated units fix or isolate the enemy in kill zones inside and outside of the subterranean CBP so KPAGF units can attack by fire or support by fire to defeat or destroy the enemy. KPAGF defensive units support each other in repositioning within the CBP in order to continue the defense.

4-131. The KPAGF may maneuver bypassed subterranean CBP units to create a directional dilemma for an enemy assault force. Passageways of various height and width can typically have impediments such as mesh or nets, depression traps, and other obstacles to preclude effective enemy use of remote-controlled wheeled, tracked, or aerial systems to conduct reconnaissance and other actions within the CBP tunnel complex. As an enemy attempts to conduct a methodical breach in tunnels with only limited knowledge of complex...
structural configuration, some subterranean CBP units fix or isolate enemy initial assault units, while other units attack enemy support units in rearward locations in or near the CBP. Surface direct and indirect fires are incorporated into the concurrent subsurface and surface combat.

Reserve Unit

4-132. A reserve unit as a support capability, provides the KPA subterranean CBP commander with tactical flexibility. Location of reserves in the CBP ensures rapid response to portals or barriers of the complex in jeopardy of being penetrated by an enemy. Tasks typical for contingencies and use of a reserve include—

- Block a penetration.
- Fix an enemy unit.
- Isolate an enemy unit.
- Defend a mission space.
- Counterattack.

Support Unit

4-133. A support unit can be located inside or outside of the subterranean CBP for support of KPA units within, or at a combination of surface and subsurface locations in or at some distance from the CBP. C2 to interior and exterior units for fires and maneuver options, power generation, potable water, and proper ventilation within a subterranean CBP are critical considerations in maintaining a subterranean environment and conducting defensive and, as necessary, offensive actions.
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Chapter 5
Reconnaissance and Security

This chapter covers Korean People’s Army (KPA) reconnaissance and security—essential components to any mission. It discusses how the KPA uses reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) as essential elements to successfully meet its reconnaissance and security requirements. It also addresses the KPA intelligence process. The section on security provides information on how the KPA protects its units from being surprised by the enemy. Examples of reconnaissance and security organizational structures and the types of missions conducted by both types of units are found throughout the chapter.

RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY OPERATIONS

5-1. Reconnaissance and security operations are integrated functions to obtain information and create practical knowledge in order to enhance tactical decision making and actions and protect designated units, activities, and KPA combat power. Reconnaissance and security measures continuously sustain situational awareness and understanding of an operational environment (OE), including friendly forces, enemies, adversaries, and civilian populations. Security operations provide early and accurate warning of adversarial actions, intent, or other OE conditions that could impact mission accomplishment, and provide KPA leaders with time and maneuver space to preempt or react to conditions. The KPA considers reconnaissance and security as primarily offensive actions.

5-2. Reconnaissance and security missions are typically interwoven in combined arms mission tasks. While the KPA considers reconnaissance to be a military activity, it requires a variety of information not only about the enemy’s military, but its politics and economics, as well as an OE’s geography and weather. Reconnaissance is a specified or implied task for all KPA activities. In addition to the inherent continuum of reconnaissance and security actions, KPA leaders designate specified missions with appropriate capabilities and ensure that reconnaissance and security efforts complement the coordinated intelligence mission effect with higher- and lower-echelon headquarters and units.

5-3. Reconnaissance and security tasks combine the functional capabilities of organizations to provide the best possible collection and tactical effects to achieve assigned purpose and intent. Capabilities are typically a combination of ground and aerial resources and sensors. An extensive suite of technical sensor systems at various KPA echelons supports specified reconnaissance, surveillance, information collection, intelligence production, target acquisition, and fires tasks. Resource capabilities can overlap in coverage to provide redundancy or mitigate possible shortcomings of a particular system. Functional areas often integrated for reconnaissance and security operations include but are not limited to—

- Cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum.
- Artillery rangefinding and signals target acquisition.
- Aircraft collection systems.
- Space system collection downlinks and interface into tactical systems.
- Air defense integrated early warning and target acquisition.
- Engineer mobility and countermobility.
- Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN).
- Human observation and collection.

5-4. Mission tasks occur for the KPA within an area of operations (AO) and can include a zone of reconnaissance responsibility (ZORR). See chapter 2 for more discussion on control measures. Special
Chapter 5

Reconnaissance missions can occur in areas contiguous or noncontiguous to other KPA operations. The basic mission of KPA reconnaissance is to not only to gather necessary information about the enemy’s military, but also local geography, waterways, ports, and weather, to better understand trends that influence civilian population, politics, and the economy.

Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition System

5-5. The KPA retains a simple concept and effective description of enabling leader decision making and application of combat power. Situational awareness and understanding are products of a functional system of RISTA. The KPA continues to refine an integrated system to collect information, create and update timely intelligence, and identify capabilities to monitor, target, and strike an enemy at an advantageous time and location. An attack with fires in tactical operations can often require near real-time or immediate execution to achieve effective results. The RISTA system also provides subsequent data and analysis to estimate or confirm battle damage assessment on targets.

5-6. RISTA unites the individual functional systems to create a system of systems. The reconnaissance, intelligence, and surveillance of an area or point of interest are an integrated group of functions and activities that prioritize and optimize available sensors to locate, study, and exploit a potential or assigned target. These capabilities combine to indicate when and how to most effectively attack an acquired target. The decision to attack is often a time-sensitive action, but can also be a decision conducted only when specific conditions are confirmed.

5-7. The KPA recognizes that defeating the ability of enemy maneuver, RISTA, or fires systems can be problematic without pinpointing or monitoring the location of the enemy’s units. Notwithstanding the tactical challenges, RISTA combines KPA capabilities and actions to apply relevant intelligence in compressed decision cycles to achieve selective situational understanding of an enemy, adversary, or an OE to complete the desired intent to achieve a specific mission. The KPA also considers a more inclusive use of multiple RISTA capabilities. In addition to providing a high degree of reliability to committing fires on high-payoff targets, RISTA and its complement to electronic intelligence warfare (EIW) effects can cause predictable impacts on the cognitive agility of an enemy. Deceiving or decreasing the skills, moral resolve, and ability of an enemy to act effectively is a fundamental aspect of the KPA seizing the initiative, creating tactical opportunities, and applying combat power in an integrated and synchronized manner.

Reconnaissance Fires System

5-8. The reconnaissance fires system is a fires-executing entity of the RISTA system and integrated fires system (IFS) in tactical-echelon operations. The intelligence and situational understanding resulting from RISTA processes enable KPA decision makers to conduct precise point or area targeting with near real-time fire missions on high-value and high-payoff targets. Selective capabilities can provide semiautonomous or autonomous fire mission execution or can be controlled in a standardized approval process by authorized KPA leaders. Semiautonomous or autonomous fire missions are pre-approved fire missions that a maneuver commander can execute upon the identification of a target or a specific target without going through the standard fire-request chain. Precision fires are a norm for attacking targets in dynamic tactical situations; however, massed artillery fires often have effects beyond destruction of a particular target. Massed fires can cause a profound paralysis or psychological trauma on individuals experiencing or witnessing such an attack. Selected targets are typically engaged with fires of short duration that are task-organized for maximum destruction or other effects. In either point target or area fire missions, the coordinated firing units quickly disperse from firing locations to alternate sites within a firing position area to avoid effective enemy counterfires. The exception is when the Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF) fire their artillery from hardened artillery sites—reinforced firing positions built into mountains, which lessens their susceptibility to counterartillery fire. See chapters 4 and 7 for more information on subterranean operations, including hardened artillery sites.

5-9. High-payoff targets are detected, monitored, and selected in conjunction with RISTA for attack throughout an AO, and can include but are not limited to:

- Condensed groupings of tactical maneuver formations.
- Command and control (C2) and communications nodes.
- Artillery or rocket unit concentrations.
- Systems with precision-guided munitions.
- Logistics sites with critical bulk commodities, such as ammunition and fuel.
- Air defense weapon or target acquisition nodes.
- Systems specialized for space downlink of navigational or other C2 data.
- Sensor systems with specialized optical, electro-optical, radar, thermal-imaging, acoustic, or other collection and targeting devices.

5-10. The integration and timely coordination of fires in support of tactical missions uses a suite of redundant C2 and communications, complemented by the presence of KPA fires force commanders at critical locations to make timely decisions with and for the maneuver force commander. This fires support is typically a tactical artillery commander in a command observation post (OP) co-located with or near a supported maneuver commander. Technical system capabilities assist both commanders in mutual situational awareness and understanding, and often include both manned and unmanned sensors to augment real-time human observation and integrated digital communications at forward observation locations.

5-11. An IFS and its reconnaissance fires system links enhance semiautomated or automated C2 and communications systems to provide effective fires support. High-payoff targets in operational-echelon operations and at far distances from a tactical AO are typically engaged by an operational- or strategic-echelon headquarters and its reconnaissance strike system. The IFS for these fires uses appropriate long-range reconnaissance and strike systems as a norm under the C2 and communications of an operational- or strategic-echelon headquarters, but can also direct a tactical-echelon IFS to support fires as part of a reconnaissance strike system fire mission.

5-12. Both of these fires systems form a network-centric system that integrates operators, reconnaissance assets, C2, communications, selective semiautomated or automated decision-making capabilities, and a full range of fires systems that include cannon and gun artillery, mortars, multiple launch rocket artillery, surface-to-surface ballistic or cruise missiles; attack aviation; and may include naval or coastal seaborne fires.

**INTEGRATED FIRES SYSTEM**

5-13. The IFS is the combination of standing C2 and communications structures and the task organization of constituent and dedicated fire support units, as well as other capabilities—such as an integrated air defense system—to enable effective fires in support of military operations. Selective centralized and decentralized options exist for semiautonomous or autonomous fires based on RISTA engagement criteria. When near real-time or immediate fires is not required, a standardized approval process by authorized KPA leaders can also be employed.

5-14. A KPAGF division and higher headquarters operate an IFS with functional staff, command posts, communications and intelligence architecture, and automated fire control system. Task-organized divisions can have rotary-wing attack assets in a supporting role and can also request fixed-wing sorties for direct air support through the IFS to higher-echelon headquarters. At regimental level, attack helicopters supporting a mission would typically remain under control of the KPAGF division commander.

5-15. Support of fixed- or rotary-wing assets for a battalion mission would come from a higher-echelon headquarters. A battalion does not have constituent rotary-wing assets and normally does not have a dedicated forward air controller. If aviation support is provided for a mission to a battalion, the brigade or division would provide a forward air controller to the battalion for air support coordination in conjunction with the IFS.

5-16. An IFS exercises C2 of all constituent and dedicated fire support assets retained by its level of command. This includes army aviation, artillery, and missile units. It also exercises C2 over RISTA assets allocated to it. Components of EIW apply to all plans and actions of an IFS. Based on mission requirements, a division or higher-headquarters commander can place maneuver forces under the C2 of the IFS commander.

5-17. Conditions could exist that require fire support relationships among service, joint, or combined forces. An example of possible task organization would be to direct an IFS to command a division-echelon disruption force, an exploitation force, or any other functional force whose actions must be closely coordinated with fires delivered by the IFS.
RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY METHODS

5-18. KPA leaders determine the appropriate combination of dismounted, mounted, aerial, and other technical sensor systems to employ in order to accomplish a mission. Reconnaissance and security methods apply the KPA fundamentals and principles for efficient and effective configuration and employment of resources over the duration of a reconnaissance or security mission. The configuration of capabilities and timing of employment consider at least three key aspects of collecting information: cueing, mixing, and redundancy.

5-19. Cueing is integrating one or more types of reconnaissance or surveillance systems so that one system prompts another to collect additional or more-detailed information on an objective or target. A particular reconnaissance or surveillance action, once prompted for execution by a pre-identified condition, also needs to be timed in conjunction with the KPA leader priorities of effort and systems availability.

5-20. Mixing is combining two or more different capabilities to collect against the same intelligence requirement. Employing two or more systems increases the probability of effective collection and the ability to determine deceptive measures by a foe.

5-21. Redundancy is using two or more similar assets to collect against the same intelligence requirement. Redundancy improves the probability of collecting required information and indicators and provides depth in the event that one unit becomes compromised.

DISMOUNTED RECONNAISSANCE

5-22. KPAGF dismounted reconnaissance can provide detailed information collection about the enemy, terrain, civil considerations, and infrastructure, using human observation and technical systems. While dismounted action is typically the most time-consuming method by ground and air units, the terrain on the Korean Peninsula—with mountain ranges that typically run north-south—makes it an excellent method for reconnaissance with a lesser chance of detection by enemy units. There are four primary dismounted reconnaissance formations used by KPAGF reconnaissance squads, with the standard squad being 10 soldiers, based on the terrain: semi-open, open, defile, or hilltop.

Semi-open

5-23. In semi-open terrain and at night, the KPAGF reconnaissance squad moves in a column formation with the squad leader in front, leading the group. The interval between each soldier is 10 to 20 paces in the daytime and 3 to 5 paces at night, depending on terrain and visibility.

Open

5-24. In open terrain or when an area reconnaissance is needed, the squad breaks into three teams. The squad leader takes one team, the assistant squad leader leads a second team, and one of the more experienced soldiers takes charge of the third team. The distance between the squad members remains the same. The squad leader designates a route for each of the three groups to take and then a linkup point for the three groups. The three groups communicate with each other through hand and arm signals, clapping hands, whistling, lighting matches, or using blinking flashlights. After meeting at the linkup point, the patrol reforms and continues its reconnaissance mission.

Defile

5-25. If the reconnaissance patrol knows it will pass a chokepoint, the squad will use a defile formation. The squad leader will send a three-soldier team ahead while the others wait in a hidden location and provide security. If the lead team receives enemy fire, the squad leader will decide what to do based on the amount of enemy fire. If the enemy weapon fire is light, the remainder of the patrol may move forward to fire and maneuver on the enemy. If the fire is too heavy, the lead team will attempt to break contact and return to the rest of the reconnaissance patrol. The squad leader will then decide what to do based upon the volume of fire and the patrol’s mission.
Hilltop

5-26. When a squad wants to reconnoiter a hilltop or a ridgeline, the squad leader will assign two soldiers to cover a side of the hill or ridge. The rest of the squad will move to another side of the hill in column, usually 90 degrees from the security team, and walk single-file to the military crest of the hill. At the military crest, the squad will spread out to both flanks of the squad leader and, together, the soldiers will top the hill. If occupied, the reconnaissance squad will take the hill from the enemy and then have the two soldiers from the security team join it. If there is contact on the hilltop, the squad leader will decide whether to attack or withdraw based on the mission, with the security team providing covering fire.

Mounted Reconnaissance

5-27. KPAGF mounted reconnaissance can typically employ systems with greater collection range and stand-off capabilities, and can enhance collection abilities based on the speed or range of mounted systems. Mounted and dismounted methods are usually configured as a mixed method. The KPA normally uses dismounted patrols, but in certain circumstances may use a combination of motorcycles, trucks, or armored vehicles to conduct reconnaissance.

Aerial Reconnaissance

5-28. KPA aerial reconnaissance enhances mounted and dismounted ground capabilities to collect, with increased speed, range, and altitude of its systems. Tactical reconnaissance incorporates fixed-wing and rotary-wing aerial platforms along with an expanding role for unmanned aircraft (UAs), from low-level micro-platforms to high-altitude or space platforms with downlinks to other reconnaissance, surveillance, and weapons systems. The KPA may employ multiple rotary- and fixed-wing UAs. See appendix B for additional information on UAs.

Electromagnetic Spectrum Technical Sensors Reconnaissance

5-29. The KPA possesses older sensor systems that complement its abilities to monitor, intercept, track, and collect information for reconnaissance and surveillance purposes. Electromagnetic radiation is classified by wavelength into radio wave, microwave, terahertz (or submillimeter) radiation, infrared, the visible region (perceived as light), ultraviolet, X-ray, and gamma ray. Dismounted, mounted, aerial, cyberspace, and electromagnetic sensors provide flexibility for the mixture and redundancy of technical assets and methods in order to focus special or unique capabilities on a comprehensive reconnaissance task. While North Korea lacks some capabilities, such as space assets, the KPA would likely be assisted by partners and allies with such capabilities. The KPA could also augment space-based intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance through commercially purchased imagery.

Reconnaissance by Fire

5-30. Reconnaissance by fire is a method in which direct or indirect fires are placed on a suspected enemy position to cause the enemy to disclose its presence by movement or return fire. This type of engagement can be direct, indirect, or a combination of direct and indirect fires. When available, indirect fires support a KPA reconnaissance unit that remains undetected as it observes possible enemy reactions. Reconnaissance by fire does not ensure that an enemy will disclose itself, and is typically used only when other reconnaissance means are not available or timeliness of intelligence collection requires this action.

Reconnaissance Ambush

5-31. A KPAGF reconnaissance ambush is a method accomplished by surprise attack from cover for the purpose of seizing prisoners, documents, and samples of weapons or equipment. Typical targets for ambush are solitary enemy soldiers or small groups moving on foot or in vehicles. The more favorable conditions for finding such isolated targets are when the enemy is preparing for an attack or when it is regrouping or relieving units. Information collection is the most common purpose of an ambush conducted by reconnaissance patrols. Patrols also may execute an ambush, however, to delay reserves or to inflict damage
on a target of opportunity. Reconnaissance ambushes can occur in all kinds of battle, on any terrain, at any time of day or year, and under various weather conditions.

**RECONNAISSANCE ATTACK**

5-32. The reconnaissance attack is the most ambitious—and least preferred—method to gain information. When other means of gaining information have failed, a reconnaissance unit can undertake an attack. The attack may be force-, terrain-, or facility-oriented, but the overall objective is force-oriented. The KPA commanders understand that their enemy will take necessary measures to prevent them from gaining critical intelligence, so their reconnaissance assets will need to fight to gain that information. See chapter 6 for how to execute a reconnaissance attack.

**RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY PLANS, PREPARATION, AND EXECUTION**

5-33. For the KPA, reconnaissance is a critical component of combat support. In modern combat, especially on the Korean Peninsula, the battlefield will not always develop in a contiguous manner. Units cannot rely on the security of their flanks or rear—in fact there may not be “flanks” or a “rear.” Friendly and enemy units can become intermingled, with the combat situation developing and changing quickly. Reconnaissance units must warn KPA commanders of developing threats and identify enemy strengths and vulnerabilities. The KPA organizes reconnaissance to acquire continuous, timely, and accurate information on the OA. This includes information about—

- The enemy’s CBRN and precision weapons, unit disposition, and intentions.
- Terrain and weather.

5-34. This information is vital to the KPA decision-making and planning process. Reconnaissance can decisively influence the outcome of a battle. Since the enemy typically defends vital information with security actions and camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) measures, KPA reconnaissance plans will always contain a provision for defeating the enemy’s efforts to protect itself.

**RECONNAISSANCE PLANNING**

5-35. The purpose of reconnaissance planning is to thoroughly coordinate the actions of all reconnaissance organizations and levels of command. Ultimately, the planning must ensure that missions, targets, times, forms of action, ZORRs, and the exchange of information are fully coordinated.

5-36. Each tactical-level unit down to the battalion level has one or more ZORRs. This zone is a combination of the unit’s AO and the area outside of the AO that can be observed by the unit’s technical sensors. The ZORR may extend into adjacent unit AOs. This results in overlapping coverage, which can prevent surprise and the KPAGF’s enemy exploiting the seams between AOs. Within its ZORR, the unit must be able to monitor enemy activity sufficiently to ensure that unexpected enemy moves do not disrupt its own plans. Reconnaissance in this zone should provide early warning of potential enemy movement into the AO from any direction.

5-37. The chief of reconnaissance develops a reconnaissance plan for the commander within the framework of the higher headquarters’ mission and the higher commander’s decisions. The chief of reconnaissance combines this information with—

- The higher headquarters’ instructions regarding reconnaissance missions.
- Information currently available on the enemy.
- The status of reconnaissance assets.

5-38. Depending on the situation, the reconnaissance plan may include—

- The AOs of KPA units.
- The commander’s concept and mission.
- All available information regarding known and suspected enemy groups and intentions.
Reconnaissance and Security

- A list of tasks—including obtaining new information, confirming previously available information, battle damage assessment, and calling for fire on targets of opportunity.
- A list of priority targets for reconnaissance.
- The deployment of reconnaissance assets in terms of these tasks and targets.
- The time and sequence for executing the tasks.
- Restrictions on reconnaissance actions during specific times or in certain areas.
- The method and time for reporting.

5-39. The content of reconnaissance missions depends on the KPA commander’s information requirements. These, in turn, depend on the nature of the KPA unit’s combat mission. In offense, reconnaissance must establish the enemy’s effective combat strength, affiliation, combat effectiveness, and whether or not it has CBRN or precision weapons. Reconnaissance must discover firing positions for weapons, strong points, gaps, and the nature of engineer preparation of defensive positions. It is also important to locate and track enemy reserves and possible axes for counterattacks. Reconnaissance must also identify terrain that may present trafficability problems for advancing KPAGF units.

5-40. In the defense, reconnaissance must cover enemy preparation for an attack and determine the possible time of the attack. The reconnaissance effort must establish the makeup of the enemy grouping and identify the axis of its main attack and the nature of its maneuver. It is especially important to determine the locations of firing positions of artillery and other weapons, as well as locations of C2 and communications facilities, the combat effectiveness of enemy troops, and their affiliation. The plan should include reconnaissance tasks for the entire course of defensive actions as well as tasks that support an eventual transition of the KPAGF back to the offense.

INFORMATION FLOW AND COMMUNICATIONS

5-41. The KPAGF commander’s instructions, the unit’s reconnaissance plan, and the unit’s combat orders to reconnaissance units identify information requirements and specify how and when to report this information. To minimize radio traffic from overloading a certain frequency, the flow of information both up and down the chain of command will normally take place on a designated reconnaissance channel. KPA commanders determine how frequently they wish to receive various types of situational data.

5-42. KPA reconnaissance units typical report to the commander of their parent reconnaissance unit, the chief of reconnaissance, or the chief of staff of the maneuver unit that dispatched the reconnaissance unit. In exceptional cases, however, a reconnaissance leader may skip an echelon and report to a higher level if directed in the unit’s specific instructions. There are two types of reconnaissance reports. Periodic reports are submitted regularly at a set time, and aperiodic reports are submitted when there are significant changes in the situation. The reconnaissance subsection under the chief of reconnaissance’s direction conducts the following activities—

- Evaluates and summarizes incoming information for its unit commander.
- Disseminates this information to other command and staff elements in the unit, including higher headquarters, and adjacent units.
- Studies all available information from all sources before reaching conclusions.
- Studies even false information, as it contradicts information from other sources or does not correspond to the developing situation; this false information can reveal the enemy’s deception plans.

5-43. KPA commanders and staffs receive reports from reconnaissance units or chiefs of reconnaissance. Depending on the situation, these reports may be in the form of briefings, radio communications, or written reports. The term reconnaissance report applies to a specific document prepared by a KPA headquarters for reporting information about the enemy to a higher headquarters. It may be a periodic reconnaissance report forwarded every few hours as specified in instructions. It may also be an aperiodic report prepared at the initiative of the subordinate commander or upon special request from the higher KPA commander. In any case, the report includes, at a minimum, the following components—

- The general nature of enemy activities throughout the reporting unit’s entire ZORR.
- The disposition and grouping of enemy units in each area or axis within the ZORR.
• Significant changes that have occurred since the previous report.
• The reporting unit’s conclusions about possible enemy actions based on its analysis of indications within its ZORR.
• The source of the data and the time received.

5-44. The reconnaissance summary is a report, prepared by a KPA unit at regimental level or above, that contains information about the enemy covering a given period of time. The reporting unit sends this summary to the higher headquarters at times established in its instructions. It is normally provided no more than once per day as a narrative of the highlights of the past 24 hours. The reconnaissance summary is also sent to adjacent and subordinate headquarters for information purposes. The reconnaissance summary normally contains the following components—

• The general nature of enemy activities in the KPAGF unit’s ZORR.
• Data about the enemy’s CBRN and precision weapons and their employment.
• The positions of enemy units at the time of the preparation of the summary.
• Information about the enemy’s air and naval forces, air defense, command posts, radar equipment, logistics installations, obstacles, and field fortifications.
• The KPA reporting unit’s general assessment of the disposition, activities, and condition of enemy units and the nature of forthcoming enemy activities.
• Information gaps to be addressed during further reconnaissance activities.

5-45. The summary may also include significant results from prisoner interrogation or from the exploitation of captured enemy documents or equipment.

RECONNAISSANCE FUNDAMENTALS

5-46. Reconnaissance fundamentals focus plans and actions to effectively employ reconnaissance and associated security tasks. These fundamentals complement the general principles stated in chapter 1.

RECONNAISSANCE OBJECTIVE

5-47. The reconnaissance objective focuses a reconnaissance task as a clearly stated requirement for specified information. The object of the requirement is often a terrain feature, geographic area, enemy unit, adversary capability or limitation, or information on a different variable of an OE. The requirement may also include a professional assessment based on human observation and data collection. The available resources and priorities of effort will determine what specific objectives are assigned to units to inform the commander or confirm or deny information on the enemy in order to conduct intelligence preparation of current and projected operations. In achieving the reconnaissance objective, the KPA leader understands the risk expected in developing the tactical situation while retaining freedom of movement and maneuver. This assessment of risk and decision making in reconnaissance operations includes higher-headquarters guidance on engagement, disengagement, displacement, tactical task handover, or bypass criteria for a particular mission.

CONTINUITY

5-48. Reconnaissance provides constant coverage of selected variables in an OE. Continuous reconnaissance improves the corroboration or confirmation of accurate and reliable information and intelligence, and provides multiple indicators to suspect and then counter adversary or enemy deception efforts. The KPAGF unit maintains contact with its reconnaissance target with overlapping, successive, or alternating resources.

5-49. KPA leaders determine how and when to commit capabilities to ensure constant reconnaissance. If coverage gaps emerge during preparation or execution of a mission, the KPA leader informs higher headquarters, acknowledges the gap and risk, and coordinates for capabilities to remedy the potential collection vulnerability. Reconnaissance plans and actions are a continuum focused by the KPA commander on critical information requirements and priority tactical issues.
AGGRESSIVENESS

5-50. Aggressiveness is a vigorous behavior to identify and collect required information in order to produce specified intelligence. KPAGF reconnaissance activities willingly fight for information when other forms of collection are inadequate to achieving a reconnaissance objective. KPAGF reconnaissance units may be required or directed to transition from reconnaissance to direct action tasks against a reconnaissance target.

TIMELINESS

5-51. Timely information reporting is critical to situational awareness and understanding in rapidly changing OEs. The ability to acquire, report, target, and deliver capabilities in near real-time with RISTA, a C2 element, and an IFS provides the KPA commander with the greatest opportunity to successfully complete the unit mission. Timely reporting enables a KPA commander and subordinate leaders to exploit temporary tactical opportunities and enemy vulnerabilities.

5-52. Timeliness also considers the speed, pace, and tempo required to efficiently and effectively collect and report information, decide on action, and act. Tempo, pace, and speed relate to the time period allowed to conduct a reconnaissance mission, the intent of covert and overt reconnaissance activities, and the level of detail anticipated from a focused collection effort.

ACCURACY

5-53. The KPA uses all available reconnaissance means to verify the accuracy and reliability of reported information. A KPA commander bases decisions on accurate and reliable reconnaissance information and professional experience in deciding and taking action. The accuracy and reliability of reconnaissance information are critical to the targeting and destruction of high-value targets, such as enemy CBRN capabilities, precision weapons, attack aviation, logistics centers, C2, and communications. The KPA achieves accuracy and reliability through the creation of overlapping coverage and the use of improved technologies.

RELIABILITY

5-54. Reconnaissance must reliably clarify the enemy situation in spite of enemy C3D and counterreconnaissance activities. Actions tailor reconnaissance efforts to the tactical situation. KPA commanders select and allocate reconnaissance units in accordance with their capabilities in terms of missions and targets. Subsequent actions are to compare, validate, and integrate reconnaissance reports from multiple sources. The study and integration of reconnaissance information collected by multiple sources can assist in identifying and assessing false targets and other false indicators of enemy actions or intentions.

MULTIDIRECTIONAL

5-55. Reconnaissance must occur in all directions. KPA units cannot become so focused on one direction that a unit is surprised from another direction. The KPA is limited in the number of sensors available and will likely use them on its reconnaissance objectives. It will use units, however, to perform reconnaissance, surveillance, and/or security tasks to protect the main body from surprise while still accomplishing primary reconnaissance missions.

RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS

5-56. KPA reconnaissance missions are usually grouped into three broad categories: area, zone, and route. A fourth category is special reconnaissance, which is typically conducted by special operations forces (SOF) or other designated units operating in the depth of an enemy AO or at selected sites. Table 5-1 on page 5-10 provides concise descriptions of reconnaissance missions.
Table 5-1. Reconnaissance mission descriptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area reconnaissance</td>
<td>Obtain detailed information within a specified area identified by a boundary that includes terrain, enemy units, and relevant population considerations that can impact on mission success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone reconnaissance</td>
<td>Obtain detailed information within a zone identified by a boundary that includes all routes, obstacles, terrain, enemy units, and relevant population considerations that can impact on mission success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Route reconnaissance</td>
<td>Obtain detailed information on a specified route, trafficability, lateral routes, terrain, enemy units, and relevant population on or along the route that an enemy could use to impact movement or maneuver.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5-57. KPA doctrine further categorizes the different reconnaissance missions by branch or function. These categories include—

- Infantry.
- Armor.
- Field artillery.
- Signal corps.
- Engineers
- Chemical.
- Wireless technology.
- Rear area.
- Geographic.

AREA RECONNAISSANCE

5-58. KPAGF area reconnaissance is a mission to obtain detailed information about the terrain, adversary or enemy activity, civilian activities, infrastructure, or other OE features within a designated geographic area. The area may be identified as a single geographic point or a specified area defined by a boundary. One difference between an area reconnaissance and a zone reconnaissance is that an area reconnaissance focuses typically on a geographic area smaller than a zone.

5-59. Figure 5-1 provides an example of a reconnaissance platoon reinforced with engineer reconnaissance squads conducting an area reconnaissance oriented on possible river crossing sites. The reconnaissance may include the following requirements—

- Trafficability of primary and alternate access, approach, and exit routes to crossing sites.
- Sustainability of routes based on soil and slopes.
- Concealed locations for crossing support units.
- Lateral and overhead restrictions to staging, support, and readiness areas.
- Riverbank slope and reinforcement material.
- Water flow characteristics, velocity, and probable near- and far-bank saturation areas in heavy rains.
- River bottom characteristics.
- Seasonal wind direction for smoke obscuration use considerations.
- Bypass routes if two planned crossing areas become untenable.
ZONE RECONNAISSANCE

5-60. KPAGF zone reconnaissance is a mission to obtain detailed information on all routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy units in a zone defined by boundaries. Operations validate the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process by confirming or denying items of interest such as natural and manmade obstacles, trafficability of routes, viability and utility of key terrain, and areas with possible or known CBRN contamination or other limitations that can affect a mission. Zone reconnaissance is a deliberate and intensive operation that takes more time to conduct than other forms of reconnaissance in order to refine detail and
understanding of an OE, adversary or enemy composition, disposition, and readiness, or civil considerations of a relevant population. Figure 5-2 provides an example of a zone reconnaissance with its associated tactical tasks.

**Table 5-2. Zone reconnaissance and tactical tasks (example)**

**ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE**

5-61. KPAGF route reconnaissance is a mission to obtain detailed information of a specified route and all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement or maneuver on or adjacent to a designated route. The route may be a manmade transportation feature, cross-country mobility corridor, or several routes in an axis of advance. A route reconnaissance can be a discrete mission task or a specified task within a zone or area reconnaissance. Route reconnaissance is not a route classification mission, which requires technical measurements and analysis typically performed by mission-tailored engineer reconnaissance teams. Basic route classification information can be collected, however, by other than engineer teams. Figure 5-3 provides an example of a platoon echelon route reconnaissance mission.
Figure 5-3. Route reconnaissance and tactical tasks (example)
Chapter 5

SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE

5-62. KPA special reconnaissance includes reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance. This type of reconnaissance usually employs military capabilities not resident in regular units. SOF typically provide this type of reconnaissance operations support and liaison to a senior KPA commander of regular or combined forces. Special reconnaissance can occur prior to, during, or after regular forces entering an AO. These actions provide an additional capability for commanders to supplement other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions. Irregular units affiliated to KPA regular or SOF can employ a wide range of reconnaissance skills from simple human observation and collection to use of sophisticated sensor systems. Surveillance by irregular units can occur over extended periods of time and complement SOF or regular units at selected points in time as regular and irregular units operate within an AO or ZORR.

RECONNAISSANCE METHODS

5-63. The KPA employs a variety of different methods when conducting reconnaissance. Many of these types of reconnaissance are very specific, but a unit may conduct more than one at the same time. These reconnaissance methods include—

- Surveillance: either direct observation or through surveillance equipment (binoculars, night-vision scopes, or similar equipment).
- Listening: hear the enemy or use wiretapping equipment.
- Raid: make contact with enemy static position to acquire weapons, supplies, or technical equipment.
- Ambush: make contact with moving enemy to acquire weapons, supplies, or technical equipment.
- Searching: find targets during a specific mission, such as engineers searching for information for a bridge crossing.
- Filming: use photography or video to report on a target.
- Combat: at brigade or divisional level, attack the enemy to acquire data on how the enemy reacts.
- Acoustic: measure the sounds of artillery to determine locations of firing batteries.
- Direct inspection: unit(s) conduct a detailed investigation of a particular enemy unit.
- Electromagnetic detection: used often by antiaircraft units to determine target’s location with electromagnetic equipment.
- Radio direction-finding: method used to determine the location and operational procedures of enemy electronic equipment.
- Artillery fires: fire artillery so the enemy reveals its positions.
- Interrogation (questioning): question enemy prisoners in order to obtain timely information on their unit.
- Examination of enemy papers, weapons, and technical equipment: examine captured enemy equipment and documents for intelligence value.

RECONNAISSANCE FORMATIONS

5-64. KPA reconnaissance exists as a function at every echelon of KPA formations, beginning with an individual observer and extending to all KPA activities, task organizations, and unit echelons. Some KPA reconnaissance formations are designated reconnaissance units. Functional maneuver units, such as infantry or tank units, can be augmented with additional capabilities for specified reconnaissance mission tasks. In either case, reconnaissance formations are typically combat or combat support capabilities task-organized to conduct reconnaissance operations.

5-65. KPA reconnaissance mission analysis and guidance on reconnaissance methods identify the capabilities to be provided to a designated unit headquarters. Formations may receive a mission to operate independently, or be directed to conduct synchronized reconnaissance actions as a task-organized unit with specialized capabilities not organic to the unit. KPAGF reconnaissance requirements may necessitate
augmentation for additional combat power such as infantry, armor, aviation, artillery, engineer, chemical, or other combat support and rear service expertise. Sustained logistics support is a factor in designating task organization and asset allocation for a mission.

**OBSERVER TEAM AND OBSERVATION POST**

5-66. KPA reconnaissance observation is an expectation of every member of a unit or activity. At a small unit activity such as squad or platoon, a recurring task is reconnaissance in conjunction with security measures. Although one individual can act as an observer, the typical configuration is to use at least two individuals as a team in order to observe and report, with specified responsibilities, as well as sustain team security.

5-67. An OP is a position within which a team of varied size and capability conducts surveillance of activities in a given zone or location. An OP receives communications assets and sensors based on mission requirements to ensure the ability to locate, track, and report on its reconnaissance targets and assigned areas of interest. An OP can be stationary or may periodically shift location to accomplish its purpose and intent.

5-68. The size, number, and location of OPs depend on the mission, duration of tasks, and available capabilities in the KPA force. While all units practice security, KPAGF battalions and regiments normally establish one to two OPs. KPAGF divisions will establish two to three OPs and the soldiers assigned to them will receive observation equipment and a compass. The number of corps OPs will depend on the mission, but these soldiers will also carry a sketch of the target plus an observation journal, map, communications equipment, and a watch. The location of the OPs will only be known to the soldiers manning it, the commander, and those intelligence officers with a need to know.

**RECONNAISSANCE TEAM**

5-69. A KPAGF reconnaissance team is an element, typically at squad or platoon level, tasked from units such as SOF, an operational or strategic reconnaissance battalion, reconnaissance brigade, sniper brigade (army, air force, or navy), or a deep artillery reconnaissance battalion. Missions are typically conducted as independent actions at significant distances deep in adversary-occupied or enemy-held terrain. For SOF units, a team and detachment have a versatile ability to quickly task organize. Missions are often conducted with a very small number of task-organized individuals, but can also temporarily combine functional capabilities to conduct a mission as a large-scale grouping of combat power and subsequently dispersing back into smaller teams or detachments.

5-70. Other units can organize reconnaissance teams from within their task organization for tactical tasks in their AO. Typical tasks for a team can be to identify and collect information on targets such as precision munitions and weapon sites, CBRN capabilities, C2 and communications facilities, reserves, airfields, or other assigned priorities. A reconnaissance team may infiltrate dismounted or mounted, or be inserted by aerial or naval assets. Recovery of a team can use similar methods. Reconnaissance tasks for this type of team do not typically include direct combat action to collect reconnaissance. Figure 5-4 on page 5-16 provides an example of the composition of a long-range reconnaissance platoon.

5-71. The smallest KPAGF reconnaissance element is normally a 10-soldier patrol consisting of a squad leader with small arms. The patrol may receive additional equipment, such as a rocket-propelled grenade launcher or medium machine gun, if the patrol is part of the division reconnaissance company or the corps reconnaissance battalion. Approximately half the patrol may be dressed as civilians or in the enemy’s uniforms to travel unimpeded or get closer to its assigned targets. If available and operating in a sector where the enemy speaks English, some of the reconnaissance members will understand that language. Those in KPAGF uniforms might wait in a hidden location for the others to return. Patrol squads operating semi-independently could come together to conduct an attack on a high-value target. The reconnaissance element provides its own security while on the move, at halts, or during actions on an objective.

5-72. A KPAGF reconnaissance patrol may consist of one or more of the following specialized teams. In smaller reconnaissance elements, some members may be assigned to one or more of the teams and serve more than one function. These teams are clearing and scouting, raiding, destruction, capture, security, and interdiction.
5-73. The mission of the clearing and scouting team (clearing element) is to lead the patrol to traverse obstacles, participate in the raid, and cover the other teams’ actions.

5-74. The raiding team (action element) is responsible for actions on the objective and to provide support to the capture and destruction teams.

5-75. The capture team (action element) is responsible for capturing enemy prisoners for future interrogation, collecting enemy documents, and taking control of equipment designated in the reconnaissance element’s orders.

5-76. Members of the destruction team (action element) are skilled in the use of explosives and are responsible for blowing up the objective if that is part of the element’s mission.

5-77. During the raid, the security team (security element) provides overwatch to those teams involved in the raid on the objective. Members of this team are especially skilled marksmen.

5-78. The interdiction team’s (fixing element) primary mission during the actual raid is to prevent reinforcements from arriving at the target site. This could be by executing an ambush or by setting up mines or booby-traps on the most likely avenues that reinforcements would take. During the exfiltration of the reconnaissance element, the interdiction team (deception element) attempts to deceive any enemy following from the actual route or to block the enemy’s pursuit through the use of obstacles, booby-traps, or ambushes.

**RECONNAISSANCE PATROL**

5-79. A KPAGF reconnaissance patrol is generally a platoon-size tactical reconnaissance element with the mission of acquiring information about the enemy and the terrain. The general intention of a patrol is to avoid direct fire action with an enemy; however, it is capable of self-defense and engagement with limited combat power. While a reconnaissance patrol varies in size depending on the commander’s requirements, units available, and tactical situation, mission focus determines the functional capabilities and task organization of a patrol. Typical mission options and equipment are as follows:

5-80. KPA signals reconnaissance assets include radio intercept, direction-finding, and radar intercept systems. Technical equipment exploits signals from cellular, digital, satellite, fiber-optic, and computer network systems.

5-81. KPAGF engineer capabilities are usually configured as engineer specialists at squad or platoon level. Engineer reconnaissance focuses primarily on aspects of terrain in support of the mission and generally analyzes for mobility or countermobility tasks.
Reconnaissance and Security

5-82. KPA chemical defense assets can establish chemical and radiological OPs to complement mobile CBRN reconnaissance to confirm or deny CBRN contamination. Chemical defense reconnaissance identifies and marks areas of CBRN contamination, determines the extent and nature of any contamination, locates potential bypass routes around contaminated areas, and conducts doctrinal CBRN monitoring to report and warn of terrain and downwind CBRN hazards. See appendix G for more information on CBRN operations.

5-83. KPAGF artillery reconnaissance capabilities can be included in a patrol or detachment with artillery-specific capabilities such as battlefield surveillance radars, target acquisition radars, counterfire radars, or sound-ranging and flash-ranging systems. Direct or indirect fires can be used for reconnaissance by fire with risk considerations for unmasking of KPA locations.

5-84. The KPAGF distinguishes between various types of patrols under the general descriptive term of reconnaissance patrol. Patrols are tasked with specialized functional capabilities when required, such as signals sensors, engineer mobility or countermobility assessments, or reconnaissance of CBRN presence. Figure 5-5 provides an example of the composition of a KPAGF reconnaissance platoon. Other types of reconnaissance patrols include:

- Commander’s reconnaissance patrol.
- Officer reconnaissance patrol.
- Combat reconnaissance patrol.
- Independent reconnaissance patrol.

![Figure 5-5. Task-organized reconnaissance patrol (example)](image)

**Commander’s Reconnaissance Patrol**

5-85. KPAGF tactical commanders typically conduct a personal reconnaissance as part of a mission planning and execution process. A KPAGF commander goes to a site in the vicinity of planned actions to conduct a visual study of the adversary, enemy, terrain, and other OE conditions. Subordinate KPAGF commanders and leaders, and special staff members or subject matter experts, accompany the commander in support of the reconnaissance task and purpose. During the reconnaissance, the KPAGF commander issues guidance to continue plans and actions as anticipated, or adjusts orders and coordination to enhance mission accomplishment.

**Officer Reconnaissance Patrol**

5-86. A KPAGF commander or staff activity can order an officer reconnaissance patrol to update information on tactical conditions and OE variables with on-site observation and sensor collection. A KPAGF officer reconnaissance patrol is typically small in size and can comprise one to three officers and two to five other members for operating communications equipment, providing specialized expertise, or ensuring local security to the patrol. This type of reconnaissance is limited in task scope and time duration.
Combat Reconnaissance Patrol

5-87. A KPAGF combat reconnaissance patrol is a platoon-size element that is typically task-organized from within a maneuver unit with an expectation that direct action combat may occur in order to achieve its reconnaissance objective. Nevertheless, the patrol typically avoids direct fire action with an enemy if possible. It normally operates within an area that can be supported by the indirect fires of the parent headquarters. When required to support a particular mission task, specialized capabilities such as engineer or CBRN can be allocated to the patrol. KPAGF units employ one or more patrols based on the tactical situation. Mission tasks may be to reconnoiter, conduct security, or conduct security functions for the unit the patrol supports. The KPAGF security function anticipates direct action combat and indirect fire support when an enemy is in the area of the patrol mission. Figure 5-6 provides an example of a combat reconnaissance patrol task-organized from within a maneuver unit.

Independent Reconnaissance Patrol

5-88. A KPAGF independent reconnaissance patrol is typically a reconnaissance or combat arms platoon, often augmented with engineers, CBRN specialists, or other task-organized expertise. A KPAGF tactical-level command at battalion or higher headquarters echelon can task and organize an independent reconnaissance patrol to conduct reconnaissance of an enemy, designated terrain, or other specified collection of OE conditions. These patrols can operate on multiple axes or focus on a primary axis, zone, area, or route. Figures 5-5 and 5-6 on pages 5-16 and below, respectively, provide examples of KPAGF independent reconnaissance patrols.

5-89. An independent reconnaissance patrol operates typically at greater distances than a reconnaissance patrol operates from its parent headquarters, and can remain on mission in an assigned area for longer time periods. Although reconnaissance is the priority mission, these patrols recognize that they may have to fight to obtain the information to be collected. An independent reconnaissance patrol can also support air assault defense actions in its mission area against enemy airborne or heliborne insertions. Detailed continuous communications by the headquarters controlling the patrol occurs with higher headquarters for coordinating or informing other units operating in the patrol zone of an AO.

RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON

5-90. The KPAGF infantry and mechanized infantry regiments are organized with a reconnaissance platoon. The infantry regiment’s reconnaissance platoon operates primarily on foot, but is authorized trucks for long-distance transportation. The KPA sometimes tasks an infantry maneuver battalion to divide its subordinates units and for these units to perform duties as reconnaissance platoons. Additional capabilities may be task-organized to the reconnaissance platoon based on mission requirements. Figure 5-6 provides an example of a platoon task-organized into an independent reconnaissance patrol.
RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY

5-91. The KPAGF infantry or mechanized infantry division is organized with a reconnaissance company with significant capabilities. All division-size maneuver units have at least a reconnaissance platoon in their unit structure. Lead divisions in an attack may receive additional reconnaissance assets from higher headquarters. Figure 5-7 provides an example of an infantry division reconnaissance company with additional units added for a specific mission.

![Figure 5-7. Reconnaissance company detachment, infantry division (example)](image)

RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION

5-92. The KPA Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) fields eight reconnaissance battalions to conduct strategic, operational, or tactical missions in support of the overall KPA mission. The RGB may field another battalion that is tailored to conduct clandestine operations in other countries. This type of specially designed reconnaissance unit may, while highly unlikely, attempt to attack US military targets in Guam, South Korea, or Japan. Each of the four forward-deployed KPAGF corps (I, II, IV, and V) arrayed along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) receives an additional reconnaissance battalion from this group of eight battalions, in addition to its organic reconnaissance assets and any assets from the reconnaissance brigades. Each of these 500-man battalions will likely serve as the lead unit if an army corps crosses the DMZ into South Korea. These units’ missions will be to gather tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence, attack strategic targets, and assassinate military and political leaders. Other missions could include sniper shootings to create panic among the civilian populace, attacks against C2 and communications centers, and assessing the reactions of the civilian population.

RECONNAISSANCE DETACHMENT

5-93. The reconnaissance detachment is the largest element that KPAGF maneuver units typically employ at the tactical level to supplement other reconnaissance units. A combat arms company or battalion is the basis for a detachment task organization. The primary mission is reconnaissance; however, a reconnaissance detachment is task-organized with the capabilities to fight for information in order to accomplish its mission. A division or regiment that forms a reconnaissance detachment normally employs it in a security zone of an AO; however, missions can be assigned throughout a security or defense zone. Figure 5-8 on page 5-20 provides an example of an RGB reconnaissance battalion.
5-94. The KPAGF reconnaissance brigade is a separate SOF brigade at the operational- or strategic-echelon headquarters, and has capabilities that can be selectively task-organized to support tactical operations. KPAGF reconnaissance brigade forces operating in or beyond a tactical force’s AO can include long-range reconnaissance, long-range sensor reconnaissance, intelligence and electronic warfare, mounted and dismounted reconnaissance. When directed, these brigades can augment capabilities with selective mechanized, armor, antitank, artillery, air defense, sniper, or engineer support. Aviation, air assault, and unmanned aircraft system units of a reconnaissance brigade can also be in support of tactical operations.

5-95. The KPAGF fields three brigades comprised of a total of 17 reconnaissance battalions, all distributed among the KPAGF’s forward-deployed corps and mechanized divisions. Often a long-term relationship exists between the reconnaissance battalion and the unit it supports, with a view toward engendering an improved quality of performance. It is likely that the operational SOF units will rely on ground infiltration along predesignated routes, since strategic SOF units will receive a higher priority for air support. Some of this infiltration could be through preconstructed tunnels under the DMZ, with just the final few yards needing to be dug to reach an egress point. An estimated 16–30 tunnels may exist under the DMZ; four tunnels have already been discovered and blocked by South Korea. SOF personnel used in this manner may wear enemy coalition uniforms or civilian attire to avoid confrontation with enemy units. It is believed that most of the reconnaissance brigades’ soldiers can speak English, and some subordinate units are comprised exclusively of females. The reconnaissance battalions will attempt to determine the enemy coalition’s disposition and intentions, and serve as indirect fire observers. Reconnaissance battalion missions may also include attacking high-value targets such as airfields, naval bases, port facilities, petroleum, oils, and lubricants storage facilities, or missile sites. Figure 5-9 provides an example of the structure of a possible RGB reconnaissance brigade.
SECURITY FUNDAMENTALS

5-96. KPA security operations protect a supported unit with a designated level of early warning and combat power. KPA security and reconnaissance complement each other in developing and sustaining situational awareness and understanding of an OE and conditions that impact on mission success. The intent of KPAGF security operations is to give the KPAGF commander the freedom to select the best course of action to complete the mission without enemy interference.

5-97. KPA security operations focus on several tactical missions, the primary ones being screen, guard, and cover. Other KPA security tasks include area security and local security. Counterreconnaissance is a mission task inclusive to security actions. See table 5-2 for a comparison of the three types of security missions.

Table 5-2. Security mission functions by mission type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Type</th>
<th>Screen</th>
<th>Guard</th>
<th>Cover</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide early warning to the supported unit</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevent observation of the supported unit</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevent direct fire on the supported unit</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevent indirect fire on the supported unit</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Become decisively engaged by the enemy unit</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Only to complete the mission</td>
<td>Only to complete the mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative distance from the supported unit</td>
<td>Within the enemy’s direct fire range</td>
<td>Outside the enemy’s direct fire range</td>
<td>Outside the enemy’s indirect fire range</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5-98. KPAGF security units are assigned an AO in support of a unit to be protected with adequate early warning of an approaching enemy and to prevent enemy ground units from observing or engaging the protected unit with direct fires. Protecting the KPAGF unit from enemy indirect fires is problematic due to the various types of long-range weapon systems that are available to an enemy.
5-99. Primary security fundamentals include an objective, timely warning, and maintenance of enemy contact.

SECURITY OBJECTIVE

5-100. The KPAGF security objective is protection of the supported unit. All actions focus on accurate and timely warning of OE conditions that can hinder the mission of the supported unit and security actions that protect the same from an enemy. A KPAGF security unit understands and acts in conjunction with the supported unit’s scheme of maneuver and mission. These factors cause the security unit to typically operate between the protected unit and suspected or known enemy units. A security unit conducts stationary or mobile actions depending on the mission of the unit to be protected. The level of combat power task-organized in a security unit is based on the level of required security and the degree of risk the tasking headquarters commander is willing to accept in assigning the mission.

TIMELY WARNING

5-101. Timely warning provides an effective alert of known, probable, or possible conditions that can adversely impact on a mission. Timeliness of reporting information and intelligence on a foe or other OE conditions enables informed decisions and actions to protect the supported unit. The KPAGF security unit detects, observes, and monitors OE conditions that can influence the protected unit’s mission, and acts within its mission guidance to protect the supported unit.

MAINTAIN ENEMY CONTACT

5-102. Real-time and accurate information requires KPAGF reconnaissance and security units to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. Developing the tactical situation involves continuous activities that provide options in reaction time, available maneuver space, and shaping or placing an enemy at a disadvantageous position in relation to the protected unit. The duration required for a security mission task depends on the KPA protected unit’s situation and mission guidance. The KPAGF security unit receives mission guidance that includes engagement, disengagement, or displacement criteria. Engagement and disengagement criteria identify when or how the security unit can attack enemy units and conditions that restrict engagement to preserve C3D measures of the protected unit. Displacement criteria state conditions, typically based on time and the tactical situation, that allow or deny movement or maneuver to subsequent locations or fighting positions.

SECURITY MISSIONS

5-103. KPAGF doctrine is unclear in differentiating between different types of security missions, but the KPAGF provide different levels of protection to varying units. The types of unit will typically relate to the positioning and distance of the security unit to the unit it protects. KPAGF security unit task-organized combat power indicates the expected level and type of contact with an enemy unit.

5-104. KPAGF units perform three basic types of security actions. Screen actions provide early warning to the main body of a supported unit without becoming decisively engaged by an enemy. Guard actions protect the supported unit main body with early warning and prevent enemy observation and direct fire on the same. A guard unit can accept decisive engagement if required to accomplish its security mission. Cover actions protect the supported unit main body from enemy observation and effective direct and indirect fires, and are typically tactical missions conducted at a significant distance from the protected unit. A cover unit accepts decisive engagement when required to accomplish its security mission.

5-105. Additional security missions that occur in an operation can include area and local security and their subsets. Area security actions protect friendly installations, routes, units, and facilities within an AO. Mission tasks identify specific requirements within a designated objective area or specified points in the area. Local security is a responsibility of all units and activities as a unit protection measure. Situational awareness and early warning to a protected unit provide time for proactive or reactive actions in support of a protected unit operation. Mission tasks identify specific requirements within a local security mission. Subsets of area and local security are route security and convoy security. See table 5-3 or the size of security unit used to protect each main body unit size.
Table 5-3. Typical type of security unit in support of main body force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Echelon</th>
<th>Screen</th>
<th>Advance Guard</th>
<th>Flank or Rear Guard</th>
<th>Cover</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battalion</td>
<td>Platoon (+)</td>
<td>Platoon</td>
<td>Squad (+)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiment</td>
<td>Company (+)</td>
<td>Battalion</td>
<td>Platoon</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>Regiment</td>
<td>Regiment</td>
<td>Battalion</td>
<td>Battalion (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps</td>
<td>Division</td>
<td>Division</td>
<td>Regiment</td>
<td>Division</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Aviation fixed-wing and rotary-wing mission support is typically provided via coordination through an integrated fires system. Rotary-wing attack or light aircraft can be in mission support for specified missions; however, aviation assets could be in mission support only down to the maneuver regiment.

n/a not applicable

COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE

5-106. Counterreconnaissance is a tactical mission task that encompasses reconnaissance and security measures taken by a KPAGF commander to counter enemy reconnaissance and surveillance efforts. Counterreconnaissance is the sum of all actions taken at each echelon of KPA headquarters to protect KPA units, mission plans and intentions, unit dispositions, and ongoing actions. The purpose of a counterreconnaissance mission is to destroy, defeat, or repel all enemy reconnaissance units throughout an assigned AO and ZORR.

5-107. The counterreconnaissance drill has four main subtasks:

- Plan.
- Prepare.
- Execute—find.
- Execute—report.
- Execute—make contact.
- Execute—destroy.
- Continue mission.

Plan

5-108. The plan subtask includes the following:

- Identify counterreconnaissance objective(s).
- Collect current information on enemy unit capabilities and limitations and OE information to be obtained or confirmed in an AO.
- Analyze action, enabling and support functions that must be performed to achieve mission success. Consider tasks to deceive, disrupt, suppress, delay, fix, contain, breach, neutralize, defeat, or destroy.
- Determine the functional tactics to be applied by action, enabling, and support elements.
- Identify situational awareness and understanding requirements for collection and analysis by ground maneuver, aviation, or other technical capabilities.
- Task-organize units for counterreconnaissance by function.
- Determine how and when functional units act, enable, or support the counterreconnaissance or transition to other tasks or subtasks.
Prepare

5-109. The prepare subtask includes the following:

- Evaluate ongoing reconnaissance, surveillance, and counterreconnaissance actions to provide situational understanding or shape OE conditions required for destruction of enemy reconnaissance units and capabilities.
- Coordinate the combined arms integration of available RISTA assets for continuous and overlapping coverage of designated areas, counterreconnaissance zones, routes, probable enemy locations, kill zones, or special objectives in a security zone or defense zones of an assigned AO.
- Coordinate for situational awareness and understanding among friendly units in an AO and its ZORR, such as long-range reconnaissance units; SOF; mounted, aerial, and dismounted units operating in the same AO or ZORR; and signals reconnaissance intelligence units.
- Assess current counterreconnaissance actions to prevent enemy RISTA from obtaining situational understanding of KPA intentions.
- Conduct mission and task rehearsals of action, enabling, and support units.
- Confirm secure communications requirements and capabilities.
- Execute EIW in support of the mission.

Execute—Find

5-110. The execute—find subtask includes the following:

- Coordinate counterreconnaissance ground maneuver, aviation, and other technical collection, disruption, or electronic warfare assets of enemy RISTA to locate, monitor, and set the conditions for actions against designated enemy units or capabilities.
- Conduct undetected and sequenced movement and maneuver by counterreconnaissance units through or into an AO to locate and report enemy reconnaissance, surveillance, and other security units in counterreconnaissance zones, reconnaissance zones, routes, predicted enemy locations, kill zones, or special counterreconnaissance objectives. When identified during counterreconnaissance, report enemy main forces, reserves, rear service units, and C2 and communications units.
- Conduct undetected and sequenced movement and maneuver by support units through or into an area occupied by enemy units in the AO to provide direct and indirect fires in order to support the counterreconnaissance mission.
- Conduct undetected and sequenced movement and maneuver by support units through or into an area occupied by enemy units in the AO to coordinate combat support and rear service units’ support to the counterreconnaissance mission.
- Conduct undetected movement and maneuver by action unit(s) through or into an area occupied by enemy units in the AO to occupy a position(s), reconnoiter along routes and sites or in designated zones and areas, to accomplish assigned and implied counterreconnaissance tasks.
- Coordinate with counterreconnaissance units in the AO in order deceive, disrupt, suppress, delay, fix, contain, breach, neutralize, defeat, or destroy enemy security or response units as part of assigned counterreconnaissance tasks.
- Determine if current tactical conditions require an adjustment to the counterreconnaissance mission.
Execute—Report

5-111. The execute—report subtask includes the following:
- Inform counterreconnaissance units with current information and intelligence to support the destruction of enemy RISTA.
- Report regular, periodic, and situational collection updates in a timely manner to satisfy the counterreconnaissance unit commander’s critical or recurring reconnaissance, surveillance, and counterreconnaissance information requirements.
- Report regular, periodic, and situational collection updates in a timely manner to the next higher-echelon headquarters staff.
- Recommend if current tactical conditions require an adjustment to the time and or tempo allowed for the counterreconnaissance mission.

Execute—Make Contact

5-112. The execute—make contact subtask includes the following:
- Employ continuous reconnaissance and surveillance to sustain situational awareness and understanding of an OE and provide early warning of enemy activities that can influence the counterreconnaissance mission.
- Gain and maintain undetected contact with enemy RISTA units.
- Engage designated enemy to disrupt enemy tempo of actions in order to accomplish the KPA commander’s counterreconnaissance mission intent.
- Engage the enemy to fix specified enemy units in order to accomplish the KPA commander’s counterreconnaissance mission intent.
- Influence (deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, or exploit) enemy tactical decision making before and during execution of counterreconnaissance tasks through coordination for and conduct of EIW capabilities.
- Maintain contact with the enemy through observation or technical sensor reconnaissance and surveillance means in order to sustain current situational awareness and understanding of an OE and enemy.

Execute—Destroy

5-113. The execute—destroy subtask includes the following:
- Destroy enemy RISTA in designated objective area, zone, or specified area.
- Defeat designated enemy counterreconnaissance, when situational conditions require engagement of these units, in order to accomplish the KPAGF counterreconnaissance mission to destroy enemy RISTA.

Continue Mission

5-114. The continue mission subtask includes the following:
- Conduct timely movement and maneuver of KPAGF counterreconnaissance units by stealth, deception, or clandestine means to enhance freedom of maneuver of follow-on KPAGF units.
- Execute tasks with stay-behind KPAGF counterreconnaissance units, as directed, that can include but are not limited to: surveille, disrupt, delay, suppress, neutralize, defeat, or destroy.
- Report information and intelligence updates to satisfy the KPAGF commander’s counterreconnaissance mission intent.
- Conduct continuous stay-behind unit counterreconnaissance in designated zones or areas, as directed, in support of the KPA commander’s counterreconnaissance mission intent.

Screen

5-115. A KPAGF security screen provides early warning to the main body of its associated force in a tactical operation. Screen mission tasks combine offensive and defensive actions to disrupt and possibly delay enemy
units and counterreconnaissance to defeat or destroy enemy reconnaissance attempting to collect information and intelligence on the main body force. The screen orients on enemy avenues of approach into the KPA unit’s assigned area as an economy-of-force action that supports security to a main body force, facility, or area. KPA units that conduct a screen will likely engage in more combat than those U.S./allied forces that conduct screens for their units.

5-116. OPs and mounted, dismounted, or aerial patrols in a zone ensure observation and surveillance of an assigned area in order to gain and maintain enemy contact without becoming decisively engaged. Indirect fires for the screening force are typically provided from the main body force as a complement to the former’s direct fires. The intent is to prevent the screening force from being decisively engaged by an enemy as it displaces and reduces its direct fire capabilities.

5-117. A screen is typically assigned to the flanks or rear of a KPAGF main body force, though it can also be forward; however, a screen does not occur forward of a moving main body force. In the case of a maneuvering force, forward security to the main body force occurs as a zone reconnaissance mission, reconnaissance in force, or guard mission. KPAGF screen missions can be assigned when tactical operations have extended flanks, coverage gaps occur between major subordinate maneuver units of a force, or when required to provide early warning in areas not considered critical enough to require security tasks of greater combat power.

5-118. The depth of a KPAGF screen zone is typically terrain dependent in order to prevent direct observation of the main body by enemy units. Depth provides the main body with more time to react to approaching enemy maneuver units and allows for reconnaissance and security handover. A KPAGF screening force employs depth by positioning OPs and other sensor collection assets between a designated forward-oriented limit of advance and the rear boundary of the security force. The number of OPs or patrols required by the screening force considers zone depth, width, duration of mission, and orientation of the screen to the main force. Available time and allowable distance from the main body are significant additional factors in planning and conducting a screen, reconnaissance handover, or battle handover of a screening force to another force.

5-119. A KPAGF screen displaces to subsequent positions based on event or time criteria stated in a mission order. A rearward passage of lines continues defensive actions and maintains enemy contact while conducting the passage and handover. These passage actions may or may not be conducted under enemy pressure. The force accepting handover typically accepts control of the AO forward of a handover line after two-thirds of the screening force’s combat units clear designated passage points. Execution of a screen requires forces proportional to the level of protection directed by the main body force commander. Execution considerations for a screen include—

- Conducting surveillance of all avenues of approach that can affect the main body’s mission.
- Detecting and reporting all enemy forces approaching the screen zone.
- Conducting counterreconnaissance to disrupt, defeat, or destroy all enemy reconnaissance units.
- Delaying enemy maneuver of ground forces in the screen zone.
- Disrupting enemy movement or maneuver of aerial forces in the screen zone.
- Identifying probable enemy main effort.
- Providing the protected force with early warning of enemy activities, locations, and movement or maneuver.

5-120. A KPAGF screen is designated as either a stationary screen or a moving screen. A screening force is typically assigned a zone with a wide frontage, with subordinate forces normally deployed abreast. A screening force conducts a moving flank or rear screen similar to a stationary screen, but employs movement and maneuver dependent on the tactical situation of the main body force. Figure 5-10 provides an example of a defensive screen with delay actions conducted by an infantry company detachment.
Figure 5-10. Company defensive screen (example)

Stationary Screen

5-121. A KPAGF stationary screen mission requires terrain-oriented and time-duration guidance. Air and ground force integration enable security-area coverage and acceptable risk as determined by the force commander. A phase line located along identifiable terrain identifies the forward limit of advance of the
screen. Phase lines also identify lateral and rear limits of advance. The screening force is responsible for the area between the screened force and the screen rear boundary. The rear limit of advance can be a reconnaissance handover or battle handover line. Other phase lines control forward, lateral, or rearward movement and maneuver of the screening force in its mission. The screening force uses checkpoints, contact points, named areas of interest, and other control measures as required to identify specific areas of interest and to coordinate RISTA and movement or maneuver. Engagement, disengagement, and displacement criteria prompt actions of the screening force.

5-122. The screen orients to a forward limit of advance and is considered a restrictive control measure that requires coordination when forces move beyond it into a ZORR. Key considerations include the maximum range of supporting indirect fires, possible fields of fire, requirements to observe specific named areas of interest or target areas of interest, and control measures for area target acquisition, fire support, and airspace or air defense support. Considerations for occupying a screen zone include time available and the KPAGF situation, and methods used are typically infiltration or tactical road march. When conditions allow, a zone reconnaissance is the norm for collecting information and intelligence as a screening force occupies terrain and identifies any enemy forces already in the screen zone.

5-123. The screening unit will receive equipment, units, and assistance to conduct its missions. These include, but are not limited to the following—

- Multiple sensors from the main body force or higher headquarters to collect and monitor an OE.
- Aerial reconnaissance acting as a supporting or independent screen for early warning of approaching enemy or enemy presence in selected areas of the security zone.
- Fire planning, including the integration of direct and indirect fire, attack aviation, and other direct air support.
- Designation of kill zones along likely enemy avenues of approach.
- Engineer assets to provide mobility, countermobility, and survivability capabilities for specific tasks, such as road and trail improvement, obstacle emplacement, or OP survivability construction.
- Coordination of KPAGF obstacles with fires to assist in the disruption or delay of enemy units.
- Mine-dispensing systems that can rapidly and precisely emplace a minefield with predetermined self-destruct times.
- Logistics support tailored to meet screening unit(s) requirements.

**Moving Screen**

5-124. Maneuver and movement of a KPAGF moving screen orients on the main body force and specified mission tasks assigned for early warning on the enemy. Coverage for a KPAGF moving flank screen begins at the front of the main body lead combat unit and ends at the rear of the protected force. Front and rear security forces are responsible for their own early warning protection. A line of departure integral to the main body force separates the screen mission from the main body force and becomes the initial rear boundary of the moving screen.

5-125. As the main body force maneuvers, its screening force occupies a series of successive screens with four basic movement method options:

- Alternate bounds by individual OPs.
- Alternate bounds by subordinate security units.
- Successive bounds.
- Continuous march.

5-126. The screening force adjusts to time and distance factors as required by the KPAGF main body force commander and as determined by the terrain. Coordination is continuous with other KPAGF security forces that may be protecting the main body force beyond the screening force, such as a guard force or covering force.
GUARD

5-127. Guard is a KPAGF security mission task to protect the main body by fighting the enemy in order to create reaction time and maneuver space for the main force. The KPAGF guard force also observes and reports information on its AO and ZORR, and prevents enemy ground observation of and direct fire on the main body force. A force conducting a guard mission cannot operate independently, as it relies on additional fires and other functional support from the main body force. A guard force expects contact with an enemy and provides protection to the main body force that a screen force cannot provide. Figure 5-11 on page 5-30 provides an example of an offensive flank guard with delay actions conducted by a mechanized infantry battalion detachment as part of a task-organized brigade attack.

5-128. A KPAGF guard force conducts multiple mission tasks, both stationary and moving, to include reconnaissance. Counterreconnaissance by a guard force is to destroy enemy reconnaissance within the security zone. A KPAGF guard force is prepared to accept decisive engagement with an enemy and can attack, defend, or delay to enable reaction time and maneuver space to the protected main body force. Three types of guard missions are—

- Advance guard.
- Flank guard.
- Rear guard.

5-129. A KPAGF guard force operates within the range of designated indirect fire weapons of the main body force and accomplishes all the tasks of a screen, but operates over a narrower zone frontage to permit the concentration of combat power. The KPAGF guard force differs from a screen in that the guard force contains sufficient combat power to defeat, cause to withdraw, or fix lead enemy forces before they can engage the protected main body force. Battalion detachment or larger-echelon groups are the norm for guard missions, based on the combat power required to counter an anticipated enemy. Aerial assets typically support a guard force by screening between gaps and in front of force arrays or battle positions that the guard force establishes in its security zone. Aviation tasks can include:

- Reconnoiter the area between the guard force and the main body force.
- Maintain contact between any security units to their front and the main body force.
- Provide early warning and a degree of security to the guard force.

5-130. Timely development of the tactical situation by a KPAGF guard force along the axis of advance of the main body force enables situational awareness and understanding of an OE. Maintaining tactical initiative in contact with the enemy allows the main body force the option to continue its primary mission, conduct an appropriate defensive task such as defend, or respond with an offensive task such as a counterattack.

5-131. A KPAGF guard force executes its mission with several tactical expectations. The intent of guard force actions include but are not limited to:

- Develop the tactical situation with early warning in order to provide the main body force commander with the optimum situational awareness and understanding for mission decisions.
- Prevent enemy observation of the KPAGF main body force.
- Prevent enemy direct fires on the protected KPAGF main body force.
- Maintain surveillance of avenues of approach into and in the security zone.
- Detect and report all enemy forces approaching the security zone.
- Conduct counterreconnaissance to destroy all enemy reconnaissance units.
- Defeat the enemy advance guard.
- Deny the enemy the ability to place effective direct fires on the protected force.
- Delay the enemy approach and cause the enemy main body to deploy.
- Defend the security zone.
A BDET conducts a flank guard to protect its Regt's attack and detect or fix ENY forces as they enter the western flank security zone. (1) The Regt attacks to the southeast. The BDET orients its tempo to the Regt main body and uses continuous march of CDETs as it reconnoiters the security zone from PL DOE to PL DORA. (2) RECON forces destroy ENY OPs as the BDET maneuvers southeast. (3) RECON forces precede the CDETs to destroy ENY elements and provide security and screen support. (4) A RECON screen identifies an ENY CDET crossing PL DOE. (5) CDET A and the FWD CP move to BP 53 as the CDET directs a tank PLT flank maneuver; direct and indirect fires neutralize the ENY CDET. (6) Another RECON screen and security element identifies ENY mechanized PLTs crossing PL DOE; the element requests call for fires. The Regt responds and the RECON force adjusts fire and suppresses the ENY. (7) CDET B maneuvers south to block the ENY avenue of approach; its tank PLT rapidly occupies BP 51 and blocks until the CDET arrives. (8) The antitank force at BP 54 destroys an ENY recon element in its vicinity. (9) CDET C maneuvers to the south to occupy BP 54 and block the probable ENY approach in coordination with CDET B. The security and RECON element continues to screen southeast in the security zone. (10) The Regt main body continues the attack; the BDET reports to the Regt that it has blocked lead ENY forces west of PL DOT. The security and RECON elements continue moving screens between PL DOE and PL DOT.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BDET</th>
<th>battalion detachment</th>
<th>BP</th>
<th>battle position</th>
<th>CDET</th>
<th>company detachment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>command post</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>destroy</td>
<td>ENY</td>
<td>enemy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>fix</td>
<td>FWD</td>
<td>forward</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>PL</td>
<td>phase line</td>
<td>PLT</td>
<td>platoon</td>
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<tr>
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<td>reconnaissance</td>
<td>Regt</td>
<td>regiment</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>suppress</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5-11. Flank guard and battalion detachment (example)
5-132. KPAGF guard forces deny enemy ground maneuver forces the ability to penetrate through the security zone. KPAGF indirect fire considerations for a guard force are similar to a screen and include, but are not limited to, the following—

- A guard force typically receives more indirect fire support.
- Engineers support the guard force with mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks.
- Other combat support and rear service units are task-organized in depth throughout the security zone.
- Immediate logistics support forces move with the flank guard force.
- Additional logistics support move with the main body force axis or as directed by the KPAGF guard force commander.

5-133. In a noncontiguous AO, advance, rear, or flank guard forces can be based on cardinal direction or general orientation to an enemy. Mission tasks of defend, delay, and disrupt are typical for a rear guard, and may include a task to fix the enemy until other forces, such as a quick reaction force, arrive to help.

**Advance Guard**

5-134. A KPAGF advance guard for a moving force is offensive in actions to locate and defeat enemy forces along the axis of advance of the main body force it protects. An intention of a KPAGF advance guard is to enable uninterrupted movement of the protected main body force. Terrain appreciation of an AO and expected tempo of maneuver of the main force are key considerations of how far the guard force operates from the same.

5-135. Task organization internal to the advance guard provides capabilities in forward units to immediately engage and defeat or fix any enemy that might impede the momentum of the main body force. Based on timely combat reconnaissance patrol intelligence, these forward units mass task-organized direct and indirect fires and engineer mobility or countermobility support to set conditions for the remainder of the advance guard to maneuver and defeat or destroy the enemy. The KPAGF main body force should not have to deploy from its march or attack formations; however, if the advance guard cannot defeat the enemy force, it fixes the enemy to enable the main body force to bypass or deploy additional forces against the enemy.

5-136. A KPAGF advance guard for a stationary force is primarily defensive in nature and deploys forward of a main body force orientation. An advance guard provides similar protection in a security zone to a main body force and main defenses in a defense zone. Once the KPAGF guard force obtains and maintains contact, it defends, delays, or disrupts in support of the main body force. Typical mission tasks include:

- Deceive the enemy as to the location of the actual main defenses of the defense zone.
- Force the enemy to deploy its main body forces.
- Target critical enemy assets such as C2 and communications, artillery groupings, and mobile logistic sites such as refuel on the move points or ammunition transfer points.

5-137. Offensive actions such as ambushes, raids, or limited counterattacks can support advance guard security in an AO.

5-138. Depending on the terrain, the KPAGF advance guard—which consists of an infantry regiment with possible attachments—operates well out in front of the division main body. The first element is a scout squad called the front area scout element. An infantry platoon trails the scouting element within a reasonable distance (300–600 m). Following approximately 3–6 km after is the remainder of the lead infantry battalion. The rest of the regiment, composing the advance guard, follows 2–3 km later. An infantry platoon guards each flank of the lead regiment’s main body.

**Flank Guard**

5-139. A KPAGF flank guard force protects a flank of the KPAGF main body force. The flank guard force responsibility typically begins at the trail element of an advance guard or at the lead combat element of the main body force, and ends at the rear of the protected main body force or at the lead element of the rear guard force.
5-140. A KPAGF flank guard force for a stationary force performs a zone or area reconnaissance when establishing its initial security positions. Upon reaching the initial battle positions or OPs, the flank guard force establishes a defensive array oriented on kill zones in probable or possible enemy avenues of approach. Once the flank guard force makes contact with an enemy force, it defends or delays to protect the main body force in compliance with the main body commander’s criteria for guard force engagement, disengagement, and displacement.

5-141. The flank guard—often a regiment for a division—normally covers 2–4 km of terrain to the flank of the KPAGF main body, depending on the terrain. In keeping with the norm to make contact with the enemy with the smallest element possible, the flank point element is an infantry platoon. Approximately 1 km closer to the main body is the remainder of that platoon’s battalion. The rest of the regiment is in column even nearer the main body, with a front area scout element and a rear area point element.

5-142. A KPAGF moving flank guard force mission task presents additional considerations and requirements. A KPAGF moving flank guard force has many of the same considerations as a moving flank screen; however, a moving flank guard can occupy a series of battle positions to protect a main body force axis of advance. The main body force commander assigns a security objective to orient the flank guard force in its security zone. Tasks for the moving flank guard include but are not limited to:

- Maintain continuous surveillance of enemy avenues of approach along the KPAGF main body force axis of advance.
- Establish a series of battle positions to guard the KPAGF main body force.
- Reconnoiter the zone between the KPAGF main body force and flank guard force battle positions and limit of advance.
- Maintain contact with the lead to rear units of the main body force and other security units protecting the KPAGF main body force.
- Conduct counterreconnaissance to destroy all enemy reconnaissance forces in the guard security zone.
- Protect the KPAGF main body force.

5-143. A KPAGF moving flank guard force conducts its maneuver in successive bounds, alternate bounds, or continuous marches. Occupation of battle positions is situationally dependent on the enemy threat to the main body force. In a sequential maneuver of a flank guard, the flank guard force crosses the line of departure separately and sequential to the main body force movement. A sequential method is typical when a main body force has already penetrated a line of contact or the main body force being protected is not in contact with an enemy. In a simultaneous method, a flank guard force crosses the line of departure within the main body force and then deploys from that same main body force axis into its flank security zone. A simultaneous action is appropriate when the main body force conducts its own penetration of enemy defenses along a line of contact. The flank guard force follows the lead combat elements of the protected main body force through the departure point(s) and deploys into its guard force array in the security zone. The lead element of a moving flank guard force conducts a zone or area reconnaissance with three key mission tasks:

- Maintain contact with the KPAGF main body.
- Reconnoiter the zone between the KPAGF main body force and moving flank guard force route or routes of advance.
- Reconnoiter the moving flank guard force routes in the flank security zone.

5-144. The KPAGF moving flank guard force maneuvers along the routes of advance to occupy battle positions and OPs parallel to the main body force axis of advance. Commanders establish phase lines that run parallel and perpendicular to the direction of the movement of the main body force. If the enemy attacks into the protected flank, the KPAGF guard force uses phase lines parallel to the main body force to control a delay or defense. Phase lines perpendicular to the main body force are used to control forward movement in the same direction as the main body force’s axis of advance. The guard force regulates movement along its routes of advance by the pace of the protected main body force. The three primary methods of movement are successive bounds, alternate bounds, and continuous movement.

5-145. If the protected force stops, the KPAGF guarding force occupies blocking positions oriented to likely enemy axes of advance toward the KPAGF main body force. As the speed, pace, or tempo of the main body forces change, the guard force adjusts its movement and maneuver to provide protection accordingly. If the
guard force anticipates being overextended in its ability to protect, the guard force commander informs the KPAGF main body force commander and recommends one of the following courses of action:

- Reinforce the flank guard.
- Reduce the AO.
- Screen a designated area of the flank security zone and guard the remaining area.

**Rear Guard**

5-146. A KPAGF rear guard protects the rear of the main body force. Rear guards are appropriate when conducting offensive tasks, when the protected main body force breaks contact with friendly flanking forces, or during a retrograde operation. The KPAGF rear guard deploys and defends to protect moving and stationary main body forces. The tasks described for a stationary flank guard apply to a rear guard mission. The KPAGF rear guard for a moving force displaces to successive battle positions along phase lines in depth as the main body force moves and maneuvers.

5-147. The KPAGF commander establishes a rear guard during a main body force withdrawal, retirement, or delaying action in one of two typical ways:

- The KPAGF guard force relieves main body force units in place and occupies battle positions as the main body force moves or maneuvers in a direction away from an enemy.
- The KPAGF guard force establishes battle positions in depth to the rear of a main body force, and conducts multiple passages of the KPAGF main body force moving or maneuvering through the guard force defensive array.

5-148. When an infantry regiment assumes a rear guard mission, it places a rear point force (normally an infantry battalion) that is to delay the enemy’s movement as the enemy attempts to pursue and catch the KPAGF main body. The rear guard infantry regiment also provides its own flank security to prevent envelopment of the main body by the enemy as well as a scout element, point company, and advance guard in the direction of movement to prevent the rear guard infantry regiment from being surprised by an enemy that manages to position itself between the rear guard and the main body. The distances between the rear, flank, and advance security elements will be terrain dependent. If a KPAGF rear guard cannot defeat an approaching enemy, it fixes the enemy force until the main body force can support additional security actions.

**COVER**

5-149. Cover is a KPAGF security mission task to protect the KPAGF main body by fighting the enemy to create reaction time and maneuver space for the KPAGF main body force. The typical mission intent is to defeat or destroy enemy forces within the covering force’s capabilities. A covering force is tactically self-contained and task-organized for extended operations, and capable of operating independently from the KPAGF main body force it protects. It typically operates at a significant distance from the KPAGF main body force in order to—

- Develop the tactical situation with early warning in order to provide the main body force commander with the optimum situational awareness and understanding for mission decisions.
- Prevent enemy observation of the KPAGF main body force.
- Prevent enemy direct and indirect fires on the protected KPAGF main body force.

5-150. The covering force collects and reports information on its AO and ZORR in support of the protected main body commander’s priorities, and may include system capabilities to disrupt or prevent selective enemy long-range indirect fires from affecting the main body force it protects.

5-151. A covering force conducts counterreconnaissance to destroy enemy reconnaissance within its security zone. As it develops the tactical situation at an extended distance from the protected main body force, mission tasks can vary between reconnoiter, screen, guard, disrupt, attack, defend, or delay in order to protect the main body force. A covering force anticipates decisive engagement with an enemy, if required, to achieve protection of the main body force, and does not allow enemy forces to bypass its force array. A KPAGF covering force expects to confront enemy combat power normally greater than that expected of a guard or screen mission force.
5-152. Integration of aerial assets is critical to task organization for a cover mission. Aviation assets assist in security tasks between a covering force and its main body force, maintain contact with the protected main body force when extended distances involve the security zone and defense zone, or screen to the front of the covering force.

5-153. A KPAGF covering force may be offensive or defensive in nature. All covering force actions employ an offensive orientation as opportunities evolve or are created in a tactical situation. The covering force executes its mission and intent as enemy-oriented reconnaissance throughout its assigned AO, and typically conducts security tasks in the context of guard or screen tasks.

**Offensive Cover**

5-154. An offensive KPAGF covering force retains or seizes the initiative to provide the main body force commander with time and the ability to maneuver. An offensive covering force can operate to the front or flanks of the main body force. Offensive covering forces conduct the following key tasks:

- Reconnoiter along the main body force axis of advance.
- Identify enemy dispositions, capabilities, and probable axes of approach.
- Maintain continuous surveillance of enemy avenues of approach.
- Destroy enemy reconnaissance and security forces in the AO.
- Deny the enemy information about the size, strength, composition, and objective of the main body force.
- Disrupt, fix, block, and defeat enemy forces in the cover security zone.
- Exploit tactical opportunities in support of KPAGF main body force fires and maneuver.
- Protect the KPAGF main body force from effective observation, surveillance, and direct and indirect fires.

5-155. The two forms of offensive cover are advance cover and flank cover. A KPAGF advance covering force is to locate and penetrate the enemy force’s security zone and forward defenses. When the enemy is a moving or maneuvering force, a KPAGF advance cover destroys enemy reconnaissance and defeats advance guard units and first-echelon units of the enemy main body force. A KPAGF flank cover is conducted similar to a flank guard mission.

5-156. Differences between a KPAGF covering force and a guard force are the larger tactical scope of the cover mission, the significant task organization of forces for tactical operations, and the greater distance from the KPAGF main body force as a semi-independent or independent security mission. A KPAGF covering force typically clears the area between its route of advance and the main body; however, the main body force commander can assign missions to other security forces with zone responsibilities to protect the KPAGF main body force.

**Defensive Cover**

5-157. A KPAGF defensive cover forces the enemy to reveal its main effort, disrupts enemy offensive actions, and creates conditions for successful KPAGF main body force tactical actions. A KPAGF defensive covering force operates to the front, flanks, or rear of a main body force deploying into an AO or already deployed to defend. Planning and execution considerations are applicable to all three types of defensive cover. Mission tasks for defensive cover include—

- Maintain continuous surveillance of enemy avenues of approach.
- Destroy enemy reconnaissance and security forces in the security zone of the AO.
- Deceive enemy situational understanding of main body force dispositions and capabilities of the main body force defensive array.
- Determine the size, strength, composition, and direction of the enemy’s main effort.
- Maintain contact with enemy forces and cause commitment of enemy second-echelon forces.
- Exploit tactical opportunities in support of main body fires and maneuver.
- Protect the main body force from effective observation, surveillance, and direct and indirect fires.
5-158. A KPAGF rear covering force protects a main body force that is moving away from the enemy. A rear covering force can be directed to conduct a relief in place of a main body force as integral to a deception plan, with covering forces deployed abreast and in depth. Another tactical option is a covering force deploying behind the main body force, supporting battle handover and passage of lines with the main body force in contact with the enemy, and conducting a defense or delay. A covering force typically displaces to subsequent phase lines in depth in accordance with the defensive mission. The KPAGF covering force maintains contact with the enemy until relieved of that task by the main body force commander.

AREA SECURITY

5-159. KPAGF area security is a security task conducted to protect friendly units, installations, routes, and actions within a specified area. Area security is essential to all operations. The security intention is to preserve the main body KPAGF force commander’s freedom of maneuver in tactical missions, ability to move reserves and position fire support assets, and provide effective logistics and other sustainment actions. Area security degrades the enemy’s ability to affect friendly actions in a specific area by denying the enemy’s use of an area for its own purposes. The KPAGF commander may task subordinate units to conduct the following actions in support of area security operations:

- Area, route, or zone reconnaissance.
- Screen or guard security actions.
- Offensive and defensive tasks.
- Route or convoy security.
- Protection of high-value assets.

5-160. KPAGF security actions at and within designated area security perimeters or areas, complemented with other reconnaissance and security tasks, are based on risk assessment of enemy-force capabilities and intentions and KPAGF units available to employ in missions assigned by the main body force commander. Area security can be assigned to a unit when tactical conditions dictate and can contain contiguous or noncontiguous perimeters and boundaries in an AO. The KPAGF commander positions reaction or reserve units in the AO for rapid response to probable enemy actions. Other missions or tasks in support of area security may include but are not limited to—

- Conducting route or convoy security of designated lines of communications.
- Monitoring and controlling movement with checkpoint or combat outpost operations in the AO or on critical lines of communications.
- Employing patrols to provide reconnaissance, intelligence, or security between secured perimeters.
- Maintaining an observable presence to the relevant population of an AO.

ROUTE SECURITY

5-161. KPAGF route security missions prevent enemy units from affecting freedom of maneuver along a protected route. A KPAGF route security unit operates on and to the flanks of a designated route. Route security operations are typically defensive in nature and are terrain-oriented to the protected route. A route security unit enables force traffic flow along a route, with actions that include—

- Conducting mounted, dismounted, and aerial reconnaissance and security tasks for designated routes and key locations along routes.
- Occupying key terrain along or near designated routes to prevent enemy observation and direct fire that could disrupt route operations.
- Conducting engineer reconnaissance and maintenance to ensure satisfactory trafficability for force operations.
- Cordonning sections of the route with periodic searches for suspected enemy materiel, actions, and intentions.
- Conducting offensive actions to ambush, disrupt, defeat, or destroy enemy units intent on affecting route security and freedom of KPAGF force movement.
Convoy security is a subset of area security and route security. KPAGF convoy security missions are offensive in nature and orient on the protected force. This type of security mission can be conducted in conjunction with route security operations. A KPAGF convoy security force operates to the front, flanks, and rear of a convoy moving along a designated route, and is typically integrated into the body of the convoy. A security force conducts tasks that include but are not limited to—

- Reconnoiter a route the convoy is to travel.
- Provide early warning of enemy presence along a designated route.
- Clear a designated route of obstacles.
- Prevent an enemy force from influencing convoy actions along a designated route.

KPAGF local security includes all actions to prevent or interdict enemy efforts. Local security is continuous in all missions, and essential to maintaining mission task initiative. Active patrolling and continuous reconnaissance are measures that support local security. Passive measures include C3D; noise and light discipline; standardized movement control; and concise standardized communications.

DEFENSIVE SECURITY FORMATIONS

KPAGF defensive security formations include—

- Combat reconnaissance patrols.
- Combat security outposts and OP teams.
- Counterreconnaissance detachments.
- Defensive screen forces.
- Defensive guard forces.
- Defensive cover forces.
- Forward detachments.

COMBAT RECONNAISSANCE PATROL

In the defense, the KPAGF will send out combat reconnaissance patrols to perform security and reconnaissance functions for the unit it supports. The KPAGF security function anticipates direct offensive action combat when an enemy is in the security zone of the patrol mission. As in offensive reconnaissance missions, a CRP is a typically platoon-size element that is task-organized from within a maneuver unit with an expectation that direct action combat will occur. The KPAGF CRP can be directed to avoid direct fire action with an enemy, or can be directed to initiate combat actions with an enemy for situational understanding of the enemy or to deceive an enemy. Normally within the indirect fire support range of the supported force, a KPAGF CRP can also have indirect fires task-organized within its maneuver and support units.

When required to support a particular mission task, specialized capabilities such as engineer or CBRN reconnaissance capabilities are allocated to the patrol. Forces employ one or more CRPs based on the tactical situation.

COMBAT SECURITY OUTPOST AND OBSERVATION POST TEAM

A KPAGF combat security outpost typically conducts defensive actions in a security zone in conjunction with the main body force defense zones. A grouping of such outposts, typically reinforced maneuver platoons, provides early warning along enemy probable main and secondary axes of advance in an AO. Combat actions can include—

- Identify approach and entry of the enemy into an assigned zone.
- Disrupt the momentum of enemy movement or maneuver.
- Defeat enemy reconnaissance.
- Support counterreconnaissance tasks to destroy enemy reconnaissance.
- Deceive the enemy regarding the actual location of the main body main defensive array.
• Act as a stay-behind capability to maintain situational understanding of follow-on enemy forces.
• Assist in movement and maneuver transition of the main body force between defensive and offensive missions.

5-168. A combat security outpost may receive additional support from its headquarters or higher units in order to complete its designated mission(s). These additional assets include, but are not limited to, the following—

• Engineer countermobility support and survivability construction in support of direct or indirect fire weapons that will concentrate into designated kill zones.
• Once kill zones are identified, the engineer units may help the outpost unit(s) create primary and alternate fighting positions and develop a comprehensive defensive all-round perimeter.
• Engineers may place obstacles of wire entanglements, tripwire, mines and demolitions, and other techniques to channel or contain the enemy.
• Time permitting, engineers will assist in the construction of interconnecting trench lines and overhead protection as part of cover, concealment, camouflage, and other deception and protection measures.
• Time permitting, engineers may assist the outpost(s) with the construction of subsequent and supplemental fighting positions.
• Time permitting, underground shelters within the outpost provide storage for munitions and materiel, as well as living quarters for the soldiers that are separate from their fighting positions.
• Attached weapon system positions may create or reinforce defilade protection.
• Field artillery observation teams provide visual and sensor awareness on activities in assigned areas of interest and kill zones, and support adjustment of direct and indirect fires on the enemy.

5-169. The defensive actions of combat security outposts in the security zone and security positions forward of the main defense zone enable a battle handover of the enemy to the main defensive array that continues to deceive the enemy as to the exact location of the main body force defense. The KPAGF main body higher headquarters can also direct selected outposts to remain in battle positions in the security zone or to preclude initial combat action until lead enemy forces have passed and follow-on forces are susceptible to outpost attack, disruption, defeat, or destruction of high-value targets.

5-170. The combat security outpost array can also support transition to KPAGF main body offensive actions from the defense. Sustained situational awareness of the enemy and terrain for intended tactical movement and maneuver provides the main body force with real-time human observation or sensor indications to support commander decision making and timing of actions.

COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE DETACHMENT

5-171. Counterreconnaissance can be a specified mission task and is conducted as a task-organized, combined arms action. The KPAGF often forms a counterreconnaissance detachment, typically based on a company or battalion combat arms headquarters, to accomplish this mission task. The detachment comprises constituent and dedicated units; however, a command and support relationship may be required to apply specialized capabilities for limited periods of time in execution of a mission. For example, a detachment might receive augmentation support for precision-capable fires in order to locate and destroy a critical target acquisition system and fires to an enemy fires support system. In another situation, a detachment might receive aviation support to conduct reconnaissance, confirm high-payoff target locations, and coordinate indirect fires and aerial attack missions. Figure 5-12 on page 5-38 provides an example of the structure of a mechanized (tracked or wheeled) infantry company augmented with multiple capabilities as a counterreconnaissance detachment.

5-172. A counterreconnaissance mission is integrated into all KPAGF actions. Control measures include counterreconnaissance zones, predicted enemy locations, and kill zones. Other norms can include check points, contact points, and phase lines.
DEFENSIVE SCREEN FORCE

5-173. A KPAGF screen unit provides early warning to the KPAGF main body of the force that the screening unit is subordinate to in a tactical operation. In addition to fundamental aspects of ensuring a degree of local security in all unit echelons and preventing surprise by an enemy, defensive and offensive screening actions support counterreconnaissance to defeat or destroy enemy reconnaissance from collecting information and intelligence on the main body force. A KPAGF screening force maintains contact with the enemy without becoming decisively engaged, and conducts a battle handover of the enemy to the KPAGF main body force that the screening force supports. See paragraphs 5-115–5-126 for addition information on a screen force.

DEFENSIVE GUARD FORCE

5-174. A KPAGF guard force employs a task-organized formation, typically structured around on a maneuver battalion when part of a unit organized to protect a main body force in a prepared defense with a security zone to the main body force’s front, either flank, or rear. Conditions and risk assessment can indicate that a task-organized company detachment can provide the required guard protection.

5-175. KPAGF defensive guard actions provide early warning of enemy activity in the assigned security zone, and include counterreconnaissance to destroy any enemy reconnaissance units that evade other security actions in the security zone. Protection prevents enemy situational understanding of KPAGF main body force actions and critical locations. A KPAGF defensive guard force is prepared to decisively engage enemy forces. If the guard force cannot defeat an approaching enemy, it fixes the enemy force in order to provide the KPAGF main body commander with time to decide on future defensive or offensive actions.

DEFENSIVE COVER FORCE

5-176. A defensive cover force is typically a regimental or larger force that protects a higher headquarters main body force such as a division, corps, or combined arms army in a prepared defensive position. Tactical conditions could exist for a maneuver battalion to be assigned a cover mission for a division with an additional mission task and supporting task organization. A KPAGF defensive covering force can be offensive or defensive in conduct and reflects the mission of the main body force it protects. It accomplishes all the tasks.
of KPAGF defensive screening and guard forces, but has significant additional capabilities in force capability and use.

5-177. Figure 5-13 provides an example of the structure of a KPAGF infantry regiment task-organized for a defensive cover mission with additional support from a higher headquarters IFS, as well as affiliated and associated support in the tactical AO by possible unconventional forces.

![Diagram of Regiment task-organized for a cover mission (example)]

**FORWARD DETACHMENT**

5-178. A forward detachment is typically a task-organized battalion- or regimental-size unit capable of semi-independent or independent mission execution. The KPAGF higher headquarters assigning the mission and task organization synchronizes its other reconnaissance and security forces in the AO to inform the detachment mission on directional orientation and maneuver in relation to the enemy and an assigned objective.

5-179. In offensive operations, the forward detachment maneuvers to its objective on an axis other than the KPAGF main body force axis of advance. Maintaining situational understanding from higher headquarters reconnaissance forces to its front, the detachment avoids contact with enemy forces until it nears its objective. When directed, forces within a forward detachment can conduct raids and other offensive actions that support the rapid maneuver to and seizure or occupation of the objective. An example is linkup of a forward detachment and air assault forces on key terrain deep in an AO and behind enemy forces, which enables continued momentum of the higher headquarters main body force in its attack.

5-180. A variant of a forward detachment is an enveloping detachment. Given appropriate terrain and an enemy situation that allows a rapid envelopment, the objective is to attack a flank or rear of an enemy array that is in contact with another KPAGF main body force. Whether attacking an enemy flank or rear, or seizing an objective in the depth of the defense zone or security zone, the enveloping detachment is often under the C2 of a headquarters senior to the main body force attacking the enemy frontage.
5-181. In defensive operations, a forward detachment can be assigned defend, delay, or disrupt tasks in the security zone, usually along secondary enemy axes of advance. Tactical actions slow or halt enemy advances in a security zone and deceive the enemy regarding the location of the actual main defenses of a defense zone. Forces within the detachment can be directed to conduct ambushes or limited counterattacks in support of the security zone defenses.
Chapter 6
Offensive Actions

The Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF) visualize offensive actions as the decisive form of operations and an ultimate means of imposing their will on the enemy. The KPAGF have six purposes for conducting offensive action and use seven different forms of maneuver in their attacks. They use specific combat formations at the company and platoon level, with tight control by junior leaders. At the regimental and division level, they conduct integrated, dispersed, and limited-objective attacks. At battalion and below, KPAGF units conduct assaults, ambushes, raids, and reconnaissance attacks.

PURPOSE OF THE OFFENSE

6-1. The Korean People’s Army (KPA) will likely attack and execute defenses by utilizing each and every gap between enemy forces—no matter how small. The KPA will likely endeavor to fix its enemies’ maneuver forces and then flank and turn them with light infantry on the high ground. The goal will be to isolate enemy ground forces—particularly heavy forces—and, while they may not be destroyed, they will be cut off from sustainment support. Surrounded, low on ammunition, and out of fuel is a very psychologically destructive position to be in, and is the reason why entire U.S. units were lost during the Korean War. The primary distinction between different types of offensive actions is the purpose, which depends on three things: the situation, the resources available, and the overarching mission. Purpose is defined by the KPAGF commander in a mission statement, and the unit political officer must approve all of the unit commander’s orders. The KPAGF recognize six general purposes of tactical offensive actions:

- Gain freedom of movement.
- Restrict freedom of movement.
- Gain control of key terrain, personnel, or equipment.
- Gain information (conduct reconnaissance).
- Dislocate.
- Disrupt.

6-2. KPAGF task organization of a unit for the offense is determined by function, with primary mission areas of disruption, attack, support, and reserve actions. Analysis of a primary action and enabling functions indicate how to most effectively apply available capabilities. Special mission requirements may emerge during this analysis, requiring specialized capabilities and task organization.

ATTACK TO GAIN FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

6-3. A KPAGF attack to gain freedom of movement creates a situation in location and timing to allow KPAGF units to apply fires and maneuver in support of a mission. Attack examples can include seizing an important mobility corridor to prevent a counterattack into the flank of another moving unit, destroying an enemy air defense unit so a Korean People’s Army Air Force aviation unit can use an air avenue of approach, breaching a complex obstacle to allow an exploitation force to pass through lanes, or executing security tasks to fix a designated enemy in order to create an assailable enemy flank.

ATTACK TO RESTRICT FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

6-4. A KPAGF attack to restrict freedom of movement degrades enemy ability to maneuver. Attacks can include denying key terrain, ambushing moving units, dominating airspace, or fixing an enemy formation.
Tactical tasks often associated with restricting freedom of movement are ambush, block, canalize, contain, fix, and isolate.

**ATTACK TO GAIN CONTROL OF KEY TERRAIN, PERSONNEL, OR EQUIPMENT**

6-5. A KPAGF attack to gain control of key terrain, personnel, or equipment prevents use of a designated capability by an enemy. Tactical tasks associated with this type of attack include raid, clear, destroy, occupy, retain, secure, and seize. Other means to gain control can be psychological warfare, information attack, computer warfare, electronic warfare, or other elements of electronic intelligence warfare (EIW).

**ATTACK TO GAIN INFORMATION (CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE)**

6-6. A KPAGF attack to gain information collects data to create or update situational awareness and understanding in an operational environment (OE). In this case, the purpose is not to locate to destroy, fix, or occupy, but rather to gain information about the enemy. Quite often, the KPAGF will have to penetrate or circumvent the enemy’s security units and conduct an attack in order to determine the enemy’s location, disposition, capabilities, and intentions.

**ATTACK TO DISLOCATE**

6-7. A KPAGF attack to dislocate employs units to obtain significant positional advantage, rendering the enemy’s dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant. It aims to make the enemy expose units to a more dangerous situation by forcing it to react to the dislocating action. Dislocation requires enemy commanders to make a choice: accept neutralization of part of their unit or risk its destruction while repositioning. Turning movements and envelopments produce dislocation. Artillery or other direct or indirect fires may cause an enemy to either move to a more tenable location or risk severe attrition. Typical tactical tasks associated with dislocation are ambush, interdict, and neutralize.

**ATTACK TO DISRUPT**

6-8. A KPAGF attack to disrupt interferes with the synchronization of enemy actions, plans, or tempo. Attacks to disrupt often have a strong EIW component to disrupt, limit, deny, or degrade the enemy’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum, especially its command and control (C2) and communications systems. The KPA does not limit its attacks to military targets or enemy combatants; an attack to disrupt may be carried out against noncombatant civilians and infrastructure.

**PLANNING THE OFFENSE**

6-9. Key elements of planning offensive missions are—

- Determine the offensive objective.
- Ensure there is adequate logistical support to accomplish the objective.
- Determine available time to plan and prepare actions.
- Organize units by functional mission task requirements.
- Conduct EIW activities, including psychological warfare, available and authorized at the command planning level.
- Initiate offensive actions.

**PLANNED OFFENSE**

6-10. A planned offense is an offensive mission or action conducted when there is sufficient time and situational understanding to prepare and rehearse units for specific tasks. Key considerations in offensive planning includes but are not limited to—

- Implement a plan for reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA).
- Determine the when, where, and how of enemy plans, actions, and intentions.
- Identify enemy vulnerabilities and how to exploit those weaknesses.
• Locate critical nodes of the enemy’s combat systems and when to most effectively interdict them.
• Enact functions that reinforce opportunities for offensive actions in the area of operations (AO).
• Determine the offensive method that will deny the enemy its tactical objectives.
• Task-organize units by function to attack and support with enabling functions.
• Create or take advantage of a tactical window of opportunity.
• Plan for offensive actions given success of defensive actions.

**SITUATIONAL OFFENSE**

6-11. A situational offense is an offensive action or mission conducted when temporary circumstances emerge and require rapid and timely offensive actions and drills to take advantage of a tactical opportunity against an enemy. A window of opportunity could be exploited in conditions such as—

- A key enemy unit, system, or capability is identified and vulnerable.
- An enemy repositioning of units in progress indicates a vulnerability in its formation array.
- An enemy concentration of units creates a lucrative target group.

**FORMS OF KPAGF OFFENSIVE MANEUVER**

6-12. KPAGF maneuver units use seven different types of offensive maneuvers when they attack an enemy. A unit, such as a division, may employ more than one type of maneuver, with its subordinate units using different forms. These types of maneuver are called—

- Encirclement.
- Penetration.
- Thrust.
- Holding.
- Turning.
- Infiltration.
- Besetment.

**Encirclement Maneuver (P’owi)**

6-13. The encirclement maneuver, *p’owi* (pronounced “po we”) in Korean, is conducted by the KPAGF at both the operational and tactical levels. While KPAGF corps- and army-level headquarters may use up to two divisions to conduct an operational encirclement, any encirclement done at the division and lower level will normally use the entire unit. The intent of the encirclement maneuver is to intercept the majority of the retreating enemy unit(s), encircled it, and destroyed it. During the Korean War, North Korean units consistently attempted a double envelopment of South Korean and U.S. units. The KPAGF commander will often choose a location for the intended encirclement somewhere between the location of the enemy’s front-line positions and its reserve unit. The KPAGF anticipate that successful penetration or thrust maneuvers in the area will cause units in adjacent AOs to withdraw or move to alternate positions. The KPA believes enemy units are most vulnerable during a retrograde operation, making them susceptible to encirclement and annihilation. Figure 6-1 on page 6-4 is an example of an encirclement. The KPAGF further break down their encirclement maneuvers based on the situation:

- Partitioned destruction: encirclement of large units.
- Compressed destruction: encirclement of smaller units.
- Fire power destruction: destruction of units in narrow areas and while fighting encirclement operations.
- Raid destruction: destruction of units in built-up areas.
6-14. The penetration maneuver, *tolp’a* (pronounced “dolpa”) in Korean, is normally a division-level operation to destroy a defending unit and create a maneuver corridor 2–3 km in width. The penetration is normally supported by 50 to 80 tubes of mortar, artillery, and rocket fire for each kilometer of the defensive position under attack. Along the demilitarized zone (DMZ), a penetration during an initial attack by the KPAGF would likely receive support from 150 to 180 tubes per kilometer. The purpose of the penetration is for a first tactical echelon unit to create a gap wide enough to allow a second tactical echelon unit to pass through. Once the first tactical echelon unit penetrates the front-line position, it would set up a situational defensive position while the second tactical echelon unit passes through in order to conduct a deep attack against the combat support, rear service, and C2 units in the enemy’s division or corps rear area. See figure 6-2 for an example of a penetration maneuver.
Thrust Maneuver (Ch’ŏmip)

6-15. The thrust maneuver, ch’ŏmip (pronounced “chim ip”) in Korean, is conducted by a company, battalion, or regiment against an enemy strongpoint. The normal assault area will only be 600–800 m in width, with a maximum of 1,000 m. The attacking unit will receive support from between 110 and 150 tubes of mortar, artillery, and rockets. Units along the DMZ during an initial attack would likely receive support from 150 to 180 tubes if designated to conduct a thrust maneuver. Similar to a wedge splitting a log, the small attacking unit would force an opening through the strongpoint in order to allow an exploitation force to pass through the gap. For a larger thrust maneuver, the KPAGF may use two action units, one on each side of the gap, to create a larger hole for the following exploitation force. Once the second tactical echelon force passes through the gap, it could receive one of four missions:

- Continue the attack by striking the rear or flank of the targeted enemy unit.
- Attack the rear or flank of a unit adjacent to the targeted unit.
- Open a blocked maneuver corridor.
- Assist in the passage of a larger force conducting a turning maneuver or besetment maneuver in the enemy’s division or corps rear area.

See figure 6-3 on page 6-6 for an example of a thrust maneuver.
Holding Maneuver (Kyŏnje)

6-16. The holding maneuver, kyŏnje (pronounced “kyun jae”) in Korean, is a type of dispersed attack to fix a larger force with a much smaller KPAGF unit. The KPAGF’s intent is to draw enemy reserves away from the main effort. Holding maneuvers can be conducted by any size unit, from company to division. The holding unit will often serve as part of a feint or demonstration across a larger front. It may employ small-unit raids or mass indirect fires to deceive the enemy on its actual size and cause the committal of enemy reserves to its location. If a second tactical echelon unit is successful in passing through a penetration or thrust in an adjacent AO, the holding unit may conduct an actual attack to prevent the reserves or the unit under the holding attack from going to the aid of a unit being encircled or under besetment. See figure 6-4 for an example of a holding maneuver.
Turning Maneuver (Uhoe)

6-17. The turning maneuver, uhoe (pronounced “wu hoe”) in Korean, is a precursor movement to establishing an encirclement position or conducting a besetment of an enemy defensive position. KPAGF corps- and army-level headquarters conduct operational turning maneuvers, while division and lower headquarters conduct tactical turning movements. This maneuver can be used against the enemy’s reserve or to coerce an enemy unit to abandon its primary defensive positions and fight in an undesirable direction. The turning unit may use limited visibility (night or inclement weather) or rough terrain (swamps, rice paddies, rivers, or mountains) to avoid undesirable contact with the enemy. If there is no natural gap in the enemy’s defensive position, the turning unit could be part of a second tactical echelon that has passed through a gap in the front lines created by a penetration or thrust by a first tactical echelon unit. See figure 6-5 on page 6-8 for an example of a turning movement.
Figure 6-5. Turning maneuver (example)

Infiltration Maneuver (Ch’imt’u)

6-18. The infiltration maneuver, ch’imt’u (pronounced “chim tu”) in Korean, is an attempt to pass a KPAGF unit through the enemy’s lines undetected in order to establish attack positions in the enemy’s division or corps rear area. The infiltration unit(s) will use limited visibility or rough terrain to pass through the enemy’s front lines undetected. The mountainous terrain on the Korean Peninsula, with most of the mountains running north-south, makes light infantry traversing the ridgelines an excellent method of reaching the enemy’s rear area. A KPAGF division will normally designate several light infantry companies as infiltration units. While KPAGF units lower than division do not have designated infiltration units, regular KPAGF infantry may be used in that role. KPAGF infantry regiments will normally employ a single infantry company, and infantry battalions will employ one platoon to conduct infiltration maneuvers within their AOs. KPAGF units larger than division may also use infiltration maneuvers. An infantry corps will likely use the majority of its light infantry brigade and attached sniper brigade (four battalions each) during an offensive operation to attack the enemy division or corps rear areas. These infiltrating units will normally attack enemy C2 elements or artillery positions, block enemy reinforcements, or secure chokepoints to facilitate the movement of friendly follow-on units. See figure 6-6 for an example of an infiltration maneuver.
The besetment maneuver, *p'och'o* (pronounced “po cho”) in Korean, is conducted by KPAGF units at the regimental and lower level to destroy units in defensive strongpoints. For success, the KPAGF unit making the attack desires a 3:1 ratio of friendly to enemy units, so regiments attack battalion strongpoints, battalions attack company strongpoints; and companies attack platoon strongpoints. The intent is to attack the defending unit on multiple flanks to make it impossible for the enemy unit to escape. There are four types of KPAGF besetments, but any flank not under direct fire will be covered with indirect fire. The four types of besetments are—

- Front and one flank.
- Front and two flanks.
- Front and rear.
- Front, rear, and two flanks.

See figure 6-7 on page 6-10 for an example of a besetment maneuver.
FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF FORCES—DIVISIONS, BRIGADES, AND REGIMENTS

6-20. A KPAGF divisional, brigade, or regimental commander specifies the initial required functions of a force within the command and task-organizes resources to achieve integrated functions in a mission. Given the resources available at this level, multiple functional mission tasks can be assigned to a division or lower-level unit. The KPAGF commander can adjust task organization of forces during an operation to address emergent tactical conditions.

FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF ELEMENTS—DETACHMENTS, BATTALIONS, AND SUBORDINATE UNITS

6-21. Detachments, battalions, and companies are assigned mission tasks based on a function to achieve, but differ in how task organization occurs compared to a tactical regiment, brigade, or division. The KPAGF task-organizes battalions and companies as detachments to accomplish a single tactical task; a detachment is assigned multiple functional mission tasks only when necessary.
Note. A KPAGF commander gives a detachment a functional designation based on the role it has in the overall mission or the specific function it will perform. For example, a detachment assigned to conduct a raid may be called a raiding detachment.

PREPARING FOR THE OFFENSE

6-22. In the preparation phase, the KPAGF organize an AO, zone of reconnaissance responsibility, and functional units to optimize successful offensive actions and create or seize opportunities for actions. Offensive preparations apply a systems warfare approach to degrade the enemy’s system of systems, deny integrated performance of the enemy combat system, and create vulnerabilities that KPAGF units can exploit.

MAINTAIN CONTACT

6-23. KPAGF offensive actions maintain contact with enemy units for relevant situational awareness and understanding of an OE and probable or known enemy actions. Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance actions include rapid reorganization or reconstitution of assets to ensure no gaps in situational awareness and understanding of the enemy, AO, or zone of reconnaissance responsibility. Effective RISTA guide prudent use of KPAGF combat power to achieve the KPA offensive mission.

CONDUCT MOBILITY PREPARATIONS

6-24. The KPAGF position logistics support in anticipation of offensive mission task and enemy actions. Preparations consider mobile logistics support, caches, and other sustainment requirements as lines of communications extend with the directions of offensive actions. KPA doctrine places the burden on each level of command to ensure the proper logistics are in place to complete its mission.

PREPARE FOR CONTINGENCIES

6-25. The KPAGF prepare for a primary concept of mission execution, as well as considering branches and sequels to primary plans. Plans include the possibility of other contingencies and are developed with flexible abilities in terms of priorities of effort and support. The KPA commander normally designates units as reserves or rapid response units to handle unforeseen contingencies.

REHEARSE KEY MISSION TASKS

6-26. The KPAGF commander establishes the priorities for critical action rehearsals, effort, and support. The unit rehearses those actions as realistically as possible in the time allocated for preparation. Typical actions rehearsed in preparation for an KPAGF offensive mission include but are not limited to—

- RISTA updates.
- Counterreconnaissance.
- EIW, including psychological warfare.
- Integrated fires support.
- Battle handover from security and disruption units to main- and supporting-effort attack units.
- Main- and supporting-effort attacks.
- Mission, counterattack, and exploitation options.

EXECUTING THE OFFENSE

6-27. Successful execution of a KPAGF offensive mission is often followed by continued offensive action to exploit tactical opportunities. In some situations, the offense may temporarily transition to the defense in order to consolidate gains, defeat enemy counterattacks, or avoid culmination. The intent is to continue the KPAGF’s offensive actions. The KPA commander does not only want to secure the objectives, but also to annihilate or destroy the enemy units at the same time.
Chapter 6

NATURE OF THE OFFENSE

6-28. When planning an offensive attack at the division or lower-unit level, the KPAGF base their tactics and techniques on the current posture of the enemy. Based on enemy activity, strength, and the KPAGF’s unit strength, the KPAGF commander will choose the form(s) of maneuver to use when making the attack. The KPAGF’s posture can be one of the following—

- An attack against a defending enemy. The enemy is in a defensive position and not on the move.
- An attack against an attacking enemy. The KPAGF meet the enemy when it is on the move to conduct an offensive.
- An attack against a retreating enemy. The enemy is in retreat and the KPAGF want to flank the units conducting the retrograde movement in order to rout them.

6-29. At all levels of command, the KPAGF emphasize the isolation of the objective by infiltrating units behind and to the flanks of the enemy to prevent reinforcement.

MAINTAIN CONTACT

6-30. The KPAGF ensure their units maintain contact with key elements of enemy units throughout the mission. Actions include rapid reconstitution of reconnaissance capabilities for a continuum of timely and accurate information and intelligence. The KPAGF also wants to maintain close contact with the enemy to help mitigate the latter’s superior aerial weapons systems and indirect fire capabilities. Due to the enemy’s aversion to friendly fire casualties, it may choose to not fire at KPAGF units in close proximity to its own forces for fear of killing its own soldiers.

EXECUTE MISSION TASKS AND DRILLS

6-31. The KPAGF conduct mission tasks and drills with aggressive and flexible actions that have been practiced to standards. As situational conditions evolve during a mission, clear and concise modifications to methodical and practiced combined arms actions allow the KPAGF to rapidly adapt and react to new tactical conditions.

COMPANY COMBAT FORMATIONS

6-32. There are three primary movement formations used by a KPAGF infantry company when there is the possibility of contact with the enemy: wedge, V, and line. The chosen formation is based on the terrain, the front the company must cover, and the expectation level of enemy contact. Figure 6-8 illustrates these formations.

Wedge Formation

6-33. The wedge formation consists of three infantry platoons—one forward and two trailing—with 150–200 m between any two platoons. The company headquarters locates itself in the center of the formation, with additional assets such as extra machine guns behind but near the company commander. This formation provides the most all-around security for the company as it moves forward. It allows the company commander to make contact with a small element, but maintain two maneuver elements to develop the situation.

V Formation

6-34. The V formation is the reverse of the wedge formation, and is used when the KPAGF infantry company needs to cover a wider axis of advance. Depending upon terrain, the two lead infantry platoons are 300–350 m apart, with the trail platoon 150–200 m to the rear in the center. The company headquarters is in the center of the formation, with the attached weapons behind it but in front of the trail platoon. If contact with the enemy is made, the company commander can use the trail platoon and any attached heavy weapons to maneuver while the lead infantry platoon that made contact fixes the enemy.
Figure 6-8. KPAGF primary small-unit (company and below) movement formations

**Line Formation**

6-35. The company line formation places all three KPAGF infantry platoons parallel to each other with approximately 150–200 m between platoons. The infantry platoons may be in any formation dependent upon the terrain, the likelihood of enemy contact, and the need for rapid movement. Any heavy weapons or reserve trail 150–200 m behind the infantry platoons. The KPAGF infantry company headquarters is located about halfway between the infantry platoons and the heavy weapons or company reserve.

**PLATOON COMBAT FORMATIONS**

6-36. At the infantry platoon level, the KPAGF may use the column or double column for faster movement. If enemy contact is possible, a KPAGF infantry platoon uses the same three formations as the company: wedge, V, and line. The primary difference is the distance between subordinate units.

**Wedge Formation**

6-37. In the wedge formation, one KPAGF infantry squad is forward with the two trailing squads 75–100 m to the rear of the lead squad, depending upon the terrain. There is about 50 m between the two trailing squads. The platoon headquarters is in the center between the two trailing squads. This formation allows the platoon leader to make contact with the smallest element—the squad—while allowing for the remaining two-thirds of the unit to maneuver if the leading squad makes contact with the enemy.

**V Formation**

6-38. The V formation is the reverse of the wedge formation and is used if the KPAGF infantry platoon is required to cover a wider area in its movement. Depending upon the terrain, all squads will maintain approximately 100 m distant from each other. The headquarters is in the center of the formation, about halfway between the leading and trailing squads. If contact is made with the enemy, the trailing squad can maneuver to support the squad in contact, and depending on the situation, the other leading squad could also maneuver to support the one in contact.
Line Formation

6-39. The KPAGF infantry platoon line formation places all three KPAGF infantry squads parallel to each other with approximately 50 m between them. The platoon headquarters is usually in a trailing position behind the center squad. This formation is most often used when enemy contact is imminent. The KPAGF soldiers do not go “on line” until they are approximately 150 m from the objective.

KPAGF Infantry Platoon Assault Techniques

6-40. While terrain will dictate the actual distances, a KPAGF infantry platoon will likely complete the following actions in an attack—

- Platoon moves in a wedge, V, or line formation until reaching around 900 m (actual distance based on terrain) from the known enemy position.
- KPAGF platoon leader designates three assault lines, with the third line 100 m from the enemy position found through previous reconnaissance.
- Platoon deploys in a “skirmish” line about 150 m in width.
- On the platoon leader’s signal, pairs of KPAGF soldiers “leapfrog” toward the first assault line without firing their weapons.
- Attached heavy machine guns set up around the first assault line, aimed at the enemy positions.
- When the platoon reaches the first assault line, the heavy machine guns open fire on the objective.
- Soldiers use fire and movement to assail the enemy position.
- At 30 m, soldiers throw grenades.

6-41. KPAGF soldiers are trained to fire only one-third of their allocated ammunition between the first and second assault lines, and another one-third between the second and third assault lines. The remainder of the allocated ammunition is used in the final assault from 100 m away (the third assault line) to arrival at the objective.

6-42. After the attack is launched there is no turning back, as any change of plans must be approved by the political officer. Once the platoon attacks, it will continue until the objective is taken or the last man falls. Any KPAGF soldier in the platoon that fails to continue the assault or tries to retreat will be shot by the political officer. Of note, the regiment is the lowest level within the KPAGF unit structure where the commander can order a withdrawal.

Seize Tactical Opportunities

6-43. While KPA doctrine emphasizes decentralized execution of a mission task and use of tactical initiative, actual execution of the initiative may not occur because of fear of any repercussions due to the failure of the mission. KPA units at the lower echelons of command may do nothing without orders from above. It remains to be seen whether subordinate units will take advantage of emergent opportunities and adapt tactical actions in concert with the purpose of a mission order and its intent. If a KPA commander takes initiative and acts without orders from above and succeeds, the commander will likely be rewarded. If the commander takes personal initiative and fails, the punishment will be severe. There appears to be no middle ground for KPA commanders.

Types of Offensive Action—Divisions and Regiments

6-44. The types of KPAGF offensive action are tactical methods and also guide adaptive decision making in how to best achieve a mission. An offensive mission typically includes subordinate units executing specified offensive and defensive functional actions within an overall offensive mission framework.

6-45. The two primary types of offensive missions at tactical regimental to divisional operations are integrated attacks and dispersed attacks. The KPAGF also conducts some limited objective attack variants. A KPAGF tactical commander may use both of the primary forms of offense simultaneously throughout an AO. A KPAGF offensive action or series of engagements may include subordinate units executing various combinations of mobile and area defenses, as well as offensive actions, within an overall offensive mission framework.
ATTACK

6-46. An attack is an offensive operation emphasizing the destruction of enemy units, seizure and securing terrain, or both. It seeks to achieve tactical decision through primarily military means by defeating the enemy’s military power. This defeat does not necessarily result from the destruction of systems but through the disruption, dislocation, and subsequent paralysis that occurs when combat units are rendered irrelevant by the loss of the capability or will to continue the fight.

6-47. There are two types of attack: integrated attack and dispersed attack. The KPAGF do not have a separate design for exploitation or pursuit as distinct offensive missions, but they are considered a subsequent norm to integrated and dispersed attacks. Situational conditions and timely risk assessment indicate when these actions are prudent to conduct following a successful attack. Both types of attack can use any of the seven forms of offensive movement.

Integrated Attack

6-48. The primary objective of an integrated attack is destroying the enemy’s will and ability to fight. The KPA recognizes modern militaries cannot continue without adequate logistics support or effective C2 and communications, and emphasizes an attack on these targets.

6-49. Integrated attacks are characterized by actions to—

- Target and focus attacks on enemy logistics, C2, and communications.
- Degrade enemy situational understanding with EIW elements, especially psychological warfare.
- Disrupt enemy forces with reinforced complex terrain and disruption forces.
- Fix designated enemy forces.
- Isolate targeted critical components of the enemy combat system.
- Attack targeted critical components of the enemy combat system.
- Defeat enemy forces with fires and maneuver, supported by EIW.
- Destroy enemy will and resolve to continue armed conflict.

6-50. The KPAGF prefers to conduct integrated attacks when most or all of the following conditions exist—

- Possess superior combat power over enemy forces.
- Maintain the ability to disrupt or destroy enemy aviation or missile assets in AO airspace.
- Degrade enemy standoff reconnaissance and attack systems to an acceptable levels of risk assessment as determined by the KPA commander.

6-51. Integrated attack is an offensive action where the KPAGF seeks a military decision by destroying the enemy’s will or ability to continue armed conflict through the application of combined arms effects. An integrated attack is often conducted when the KPAGF enjoys overmatch of its enemy and is able to focus significant aspects of combat power on an objective. Integrated attack can also be directed against a more sophisticated and capable opponent when a tactical opportunity emerges or is created during an operation. Figure 6-9 on page 6-16 is an example of a KPAGF mechanized division conducting an integrated attack. The numbers shown in the text below match the numbers in figure 6-9.

6-52. Though a KPAGF division can conduct an encirclement at operational level, many of its subordinate units may be involved in other forms of military movement. While the main assault forces conduct the attack in the form of an encirclement, fixing forces may conduct thrust, penetration, or holding movements in their own AO. In figure 6-9 on page 6-16, one of the assault forces also conducts a turning movement before becoming part of the encirclement force.

6-53. For an attack, KPAGF doctrine only requires a 2:1 advantage at the point of the attack. It designates the main attack advance on a much narrower attack zone than the secondary attacks, which requires the rest of the division to disperse more widely throughout the remainder of the divisional front. The KPAGF commander’s intent is to provide the appearance to enemy units that there is significant military force to their front, to keep them from assisting other units.

6-54. The KPAGF division’s artillery assets are located in the division artillery group. The division artillery group may receive additional indirect fire assets from the corps, dependent upon whether the division is
conducting the main or a supporting attack. The division artillery group initiates the attack (#1) by firing indirect artillery and rockets not only at the frontline enemy units, but at the enemy brigade command post (CP) and reserve as well. (For clarity purposes, only three artillery strikes are shown.) The division artillery group’s task is to provide adequate indirect fire in order to achieve neutralization of the brigade reserve; disrupt the C2 of the brigade CP; and harass at a minimum or neutralize, if possible, the frontline units.

Figure 6-9. Integrated attack (KPAGF mechanized division-level encirclement example)

6-55. A KPAGF division typically uses its light infantry units on infiltration missions to initiate the attack during the night, inclement weather, or poor visibility conditions. All six light infantry companies in this example take part in the integrated attack, but support three different offensive actions. On the western flank, two light infantry companies (#2) assist the mechanized battalion to clear a mountain pass chokepoint (#3). The units’ task is to conduct a thrust attack to clear the pass in order to gain freedom of movement and allow possible exploitation from second-echelon units.
6-56. Two other light infantry companies on the same flank infiltrate (#4) farther to the south to attack the enemy’s brigade CP (#5) by fire in order to destroy it, if not already destroyed by KPAGF artillery fire. On the eastern flank, the remainder of the light infantry battalion—two companies—infiltrates (#6) to serve as the support unit (#7) on the eastern flank of a planned kill zone.

6-57. Even though there are adjacent KPAGF divisions also attacking, the majority of the KPAGF division’s reconnaissance company (#8) still protects the eastern flank of the main attack with a screen, especially as the main assault force makes its turning movement to the west and then north again (#16). A single reconnaissance platoon (#9) screens the division’s western flank to prevent a surprise attack from the adjacent KPAGF division’s AO.

6-58. Away from the main attack and the light infantry battalion activities, there are three other supporting attacks occurring almost simultaneously. These include the thrust attack (#3) on the western flank already mentioned above, two holding maneuvers (#10 and #11) by fixing forces to the east and west of the main attack, and a penetration movement (#12) to the east of the main attack. The engineer battalion and the first-echelon tank company (#13) are prepared to follow the main attack along the major road or along possible secondary avenues of approach to the east. The engineer battalion is prepared to assist with any breach operations required along the main axis of advance or the secondary axis, located to the east.

6-59. The second-echelon units (#14), consisting of a tank company and two mechanized infantry battalions, serve as the KPAGF’s divisional exploitation force and are at a far enough distance to follow whichever first-echelon unit is most successful. The planned exploitation is along the main axis of advance (#15), but could possibly go through the cleared chokepoint to the west (#3) or, if the penetration attack has been more successful than the main attack, farther to the east (#12). In the tradition of old Soviet/Russian doctrine, the KPAGF will reinforce success, and any KPAGF division plan will contain different route options for the second-echelon units to follow based on the success of the first-echelon units.

6-60. The KPAGF main attack has many moving parts. A single tank company and two mechanized infantry battalions (the assault force) would then conduct a turning movement (#16) from the east to attack the enemy’s brigade reserve (#17) from the south. Its task is to get behind the enemy’s brigade reserve in order to drive it into the planned kill zone (#18). If possible, the timing of this attack would occur shortly after the brigade reserve initiated movement from its assembly area to reinforce a gap in the front lines to its north.

6-61. The planned KPAGF kill zone (#18) is located between the enemy’s frontline units and its reserve force (#17). If executed correctly, the KPAGF tank company and two mechanized infantry battalions would attack by fire from the south (#19); one mechanized infantry battalion with possibly a tank company would support by fire (#20) from the north. The intent is for the main assault force to annihilate the brigade reserve at its most vulnerable time, the moment it begins its movement from the reserve assembly area.

6-62. The two KPAGF light infantry companies that infiltrated earlier would support by fire (#7) from the east to prevent the enemy reserve from escaping in that direction. The kill zone’s fourth flank, to the west, is blocked by high ground. If necessary, indirect fire from artillery and rockets in the division artillery group (#21) could cover the western flank area not covered by direct fire from ground units. In addition to the second-echelon units designated to exploit the success of the first-echelon assaults (#14), the KPAGF division will keep approximately one battalion in reserve (#22) for other contingencies. The division’s organic air defense battalion will provide sector coverage for the AO.

6-63. Upon completion of the encirclement of the enemy brigade reserve and any frontline units falling back into the kill zone and their subsequent annihilation, the KPAGF division would continue its movement to the south. Based on its experiences during the Korean War, KPAGF commanders expect that a significant penetration of the enemy’s front lines will cause adjacent enemy units to also conduct retrograde operations to maintain contact with their flanks and to avoid being cut off.

6-64. If the first-echelon KPAGF units still maintain adequate forces, these would continue to press the attack southward. If not strong enough to remain a viable force, or based on the situation, the KPAGF division’s second-echelon forces could then pass through the first echelon to attack the enemy’s combat support, combat service support, C2, and communications units in the enemy’s divisional or corps rear area.
Functional Organization for an Integrated Attack

6-65. An integrated attack employs various types of functional units. The tactical KPAGF commander assigns subordinate units functional designations corresponding to their intended roles in the attack.

Enabling Forces

6-66. An integrated attack often employs fixing, assault, and support forces. A disruption force exists, but it is not created specifically for this type of offensive action.

6-67. The fixing force prevents enemy defending, reserve, and quick-response forces from interfering with the actions of the assault and exploitation forces. The mission task to fix a designated enemy force can be time-related or when relieved of the task by the KPAGF commander. One or more fixing forces can be employed during the attack.

6-68. The assault force is charged with destroying a particular enemy force or seizing key terrain. The assault or assaults can create a tactical opportunity for an exploitation force. The commander may employ one or more assault forces.

6-69. A support force provides the assaulting unit with one or more of the following, including but not limited to—

- C2 and communications.
- Rear service units.
- Direct fire support.
- Indirect fire support.
- Mobility support.
- EIW support.

Action Force

6-70. The most common type of action force in an integrated attack is the exploitation (second tactical echelon) force. This force must be capable of penetrating or avoiding enemy defensive forces and destroying targeted critical components of the enemy combat system. An exploitation force typically possesses a task-organized combination of mobility, protection, and firepower to accomplish the assigned exploitation objective.

Dispersed Attack

6-71. Dispersed attack is an offensive action in which the KPAGF conducts offensive actions when threatened by a superior enemy or when unable to mass or provide integrated C2 and communications to an attack. While a unit of any size can conduct a dispersed attack, it will likely be conducted by a company or larger. The primary objective of dispersed attack is to create tactical opportunities to destroy the enemy’s will or capability to continue armed conflict. Dispersed attack relies on dispersion of units and EIW effects to conduct tactical offensive actions when overmatched by an enemy. To achieve this, the KPAGF does not necessarily have to destroy the entire enemy force, but often only destroy or degrade key components of the enemy’s combat system.

6-72. The KPAGF dispersed attack concept is to conduct recurring attacks in varied timing and multiple locations to degrade vulnerable enemy capabilities. A dispersed attack can be used against peer forces when tactical opportunities emerge and support the gradual defeat of the enemy combat system. Figure 6-10 is an example of a dispersed attack by KPA special operations forces (SOF) with assistance from North Korean clandestine supporters already living in South Korea. A subordinate unit could also conduct a dispersed attack as part of its higher unit’s integrated attack. Number 3 in figure 6-9 on page 6-16 provides an example of a unit conducting a dispersed attack while the higher KPAGF unit conducts an integrated attack.
Dispersed attacks are characterized by the following activities:

- Degrade enemy situational understanding with EIW elements.
- Target and focus attacks on key components of the enemy’s combat system.
- Conduct rapid massing and use of combat power, followed by rapid dispersal.
- Disrupt enemy forces with reinforced complex terrain and disruption forces.
- Fix designated enemy forces.
Isolate targeted critical components of the enemy combat system.
Conduct recurring attacks on critical components of the enemy combat system.
Defeat enemy will and resolve with EIW.
Destroy enemy will and resolve to continue armed conflict.

6-74. To establish tactical conditions favorable for dispersed attack, actions include but are not limited to—

- Destroy enemy ground reconnaissance.
- Deceive enemy imagery and signals sensors.
- Create a vulnerable air defense environment.
- Deceive the enemy regarding situational awareness and understanding.
- Optimize use of complex terrain.

Functional Organization for a Dispersed Attack

6-75. A dispersed attack employs various types of functional units. The KPAGF commander assigns subordinate units functional designations corresponding to their intended roles in the attack.

Enabling Forces

6-76. A dispersed attack often employs fixing, assault, and support forces. A disruption force may exist, but is not created specifically for this type of offensive action. Deception forces can also play an important role in a dispersed attack.

6-77. The fixing force fixes enemy defending forces, reserves, or quick-response forces to prevent them from interfering with the actions of the assault and exploitation forces. The mission task to fix a designated enemy force can be time-related or when relieved of the task by the KPAGF commander. One or more fixing forces can be employed during the attack.

6-78. The assault force is charged with destroying a particular part of the enemy force or seizing key positions. Such an assault can create favorable conditions for the exploitation force to rapidly move from dispersed locations and penetrate or infiltrate enemy defenses. The commander may employ one or more assault forces.

6-79. A support force provides support throughout multiple dispersed sites in an AO. Support includes one or more of the following but is not limited to—

- C2 and communications.
- Rear service units.
- Direct fire support.
- Indirect fire support.
- Mobility support.
- EIW support.

Action Force

6-80. The most common type of action force in an integrated attack is the exploitation force. This force must be capable of destroying the target of the attack. An exploitation force can be a dispersed group of forces conducting multiple attacks progressively or simultaneously on designated targets or objectives.

LIMITED-OBJECTIVE ATTACK

6-81. A limited-objective attack achieves results critical to tactical operations by denying critical capabilities to the enemy. The results of a KPAGF limited-objective attack typically support the overall success of KPAGF operations, preserve KPAGF combat power, and degrade enemy capabilities. The primary objective of a limited-objective attack is to degrade a particular enemy capability, system, or group of systems, but can also be to disrupt the enemy tempo of operations.
6-82. Limited-objective attacks are characterized by actions to—
   ● Focus on disruption or destruction of a designated target or objective.
   ● Fix designated enemy forces.
   ● Isolate targeted critical components of the enemy combat system.
   ● Optimize use of systems warfare.
   ● Deny the enemy a particular capability.

6-83. There are two types of tactical limited-objective attacks: spoiling attack and counterattack. These share some common characteristics but differ in tactical purpose.

Spoiling Attack (Attack Against an Attacking Enemy)

6-84. The purpose of a KPAGF spoiling attack is to preempt or seriously disrupt an enemy attack while the enemy is in the process of planning, forming, assembling, or preparing to attack. A spoiling attack can also affect enemy defensive operations by disrupting the tempo of related enemy activities. The spoiling attack is designed to disrupt or deny enemy actions favorable to conducting an enemy attack.

6-85. Spoiling attacks are characterized with actions that—
   ● Confirm intelligence of enemy tactical plans or preparations.
   ● Identify a critical enemy vulnerability.
   ● Indicate a timely and rapid action to counter enemy plans or preparations.
   ● Retain or regain the tactical initiative.

6-86. The KPAGF shape the following conditions for a spoiling attack with—
   ● Reconnaissance, intelligence, and surveillance of enemy attack preparations.
   ● Target acquisition of enemy security, reserve, and response forces that could possibly disrupt the spoiling attack.
   ● Fixing designated enemy forces.
   ● Isolating targeted critical components of the enemy combat system.
   ● Denying, defeating, or destroying the enemy or a particular capability.

Counterattack

6-87. A counterattack is a KPAGF offensive action by a designated force against an enemy attacking force with the aim of denying the enemy its tactical objective. Typically a mission task initiated by a KPAGF defending force, it causes an enemy offensive action to culminate and allows the KPAGF to control the tempo of operations and retain or regain the tactical initiative. The KPA emphasizes to its commanders to counterattack as quickly as possible to prevent the enemy from solidifying its position and to catch it where it is the weakest physically and logistically. The KPAGF will often conduct a counterattack when the commander believes the enemy forces do not possess adequate support or are disorganized. Counterattacks can be conducted by all sizes of KPAGF units from company to regiment. During the counterattack, the KPAGF counterattack force could use any of the seven forms of maneuver previously discussed. The KPAGF counterattack will rarely extend beyond the limit of any supporting weapons.

6-88. The KPAGF conducts counterattacks to—
   ● Slow the enemy’s advance.
   ● Annihilate a portion of the attacking force.
   ● Recapture a lost position.

6-89. Counterattacks are characterized by—
   ● A shift in command and support relationships to assume an offensive posture for the counterattacking force.
   ● Proper identification that the enemy is at or near culmination.
   ● Planned rapid transition of the remainder of the force to the offense.
   ● The possibility that a counterattack may open a window of opportunity for other combat actions.
6-90. The KPAGF seek to set the following conditions for a counterattack:

- Locate and track enemy reserve forces and cause them to be committed.
- Destroy enemy reconnaissance forces that could observe counterattack preparations.
- Begin the counterattack at night, to be completed by midnight, so gains can be consolidated before daybreak.

Functional Organization for a Limited-objective Attack

6-91. Functional organization for a limited-objective attack may appear similar to either an integrated or dispersed attack. The functions of forces may differ, however, based on the tactical conditions. A spoiling attack could be ordered during offensive or defensive operations, while a counterattack would typically be ordered for execution only from a defensive operation. Limited-objective attacks are characterized by actions to—

- Focus on disruption or destruction of a designated target or objective.
- Fix designated enemy forces.
- Isolate targeted critical components of the enemy combat system.
- Optimize use of systems warfare.
- Attack to deny the enemy a particular capability or disrupt enemy tempo.

6-92. Action Forces. The most common type of action force in a limited-objective attack is an assault force or exploitation force. The primary purpose of the mission task is the description assigned to the action force.

6-93. Enabling Forces. A counterattack often employs fixing, assault, and support forces. If a disruption force is utilized, the units used are normally ones that were part of a previous KPAGF defensive posture. It is unlikely that the KPAGF commander will receive additional external forces in order to execute a counterattack.

6-94. The fixing force in a counterattack is the part of the force engaged in defensive action with the enemy. This force continues to fight from its current position and seeks to account for the key parts of the enemy array and ensure they are not able to break contact and reposition. Additionally, the fixing force has the mission of making contact with and destroying enemy reconnaissance forces and any combat forces that may have penetrated the KPAGF defense.

6-95. The assault force, an enabler when supporting an exploitation force, can be assigned tasks of forcing a penetration of enemy forces, continuing the assault, causing commitment of enemy reserves, or similar actions fixing enemy forces and degrading enemy reaction to an exploitation force.

6-96. A support force provides task-organized combat support, rear service, C2, or communications functions. Other specialized support is mission dependent.

TACTICAL OFFENSIVE ACTIONS—DETACHMENTS, BATTALIONS, AND SUBORDINATE UNITS

6-97. KPAGF commanders of detachments, battalions, and subordinate units are tasked to conduct offensive actions with a mission purpose and intent. KPAGF units at this tactical level typically execute only one tactical mission at a time. Conducting simultaneous multiple missions by a detachment or subordinate-type element would be rare. If simultaneous multiple missions are required as part of a larger mission set, more than one detachment or tactical unit will be tasked and organized for actions within the larger mission.

FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF OFFENSIVE ELEMENTS

6-98. At the detachment, battalion, and subordinate unit level, functional organizations are called elements, rather than the force descriptor used at divisional or regimental level.

6-99. An action element typically is an assault, ambush, or raid element. In a reconnaissance attack, however, the action element typically changes during the mission. This is due to the multiple actions required to find and fix selected enemy units and set conditions for a mission leader to order a decisive action, such as an attack, assault, ambush, or raid.
Note. Any battalion or company receiving additional assets from a higher command becomes a battalion-size detachment or company-size detachment. References to a detachment throughout this chapter may also apply to a battalion, company, or subordinate unit unless specifically stated otherwise.

ASSAULT

6-100. An assault is an attack that destroys an enemy unit through firepower and the physical occupation or destruction of a position. An assault is a basic form of KPAGF tactical offensive combat.

6-101. Other types of offensive action may include an element conducting an assault to complete a mission; however, that action will be given a designation corresponding to the specific mission accomplished. For example, an element conducting an assault as part of the action element of an ambush would still be designated as an ambush element. Figure 6-11 on page 6-24 provides an example of a simple assault.

Functional Organization for an Assault

6-102. A detachment conducting an ambush typically is organized into three elements: the assault element, the security element, and the support element. There may be more than one of each of these types of element.

6-103. The assault element is the action element. It maneuvers to and seizes the enemy position, and defeats or destroys any enemy units at the objective.

6-104. The security element provides early warning of approaching enemy units and prevents them from reinforcing the assaulted position or unit. The KPAGF commander may accept risk and employ a security element that can only provide early warning, but is not strong enough to halt or repel enemy response elements. Security elements can provide reconnaissance, security, and counterreconnaissance.

6-105. The support element provides the assaulting detachment with one or more of the following, including but not limited to—

- C2 and communications.
- Rear service units.
- Direct fire support.
- Indirect fire support.
- Mobility support.
- EIW support.

Organizing for an Assault

6-106. The detachment conducting an assault is assigned an AO and objective. A key coordination point with respect to the AO is whether a higher headquarters is controlling the airspace associated with the assault.

Executing an Assault

6-107. An assault is typically an integrated combined arms approach. KPAGF assaults are characterized with actions to—

- Conduct tactical security.
- Isolate the objective.
- Fix designated enemy elements.
- Suppress the objective with fires.
- Maneuver to seize the objective.
6-108. **Assault Element.** The assault element is the action element. Actions center on maneuver, supported by fires, from an assault position to and beyond the objective. Typical tactical tasks expected of the assault element are—

- Clear.
- Destroy.
- Occupy.
- Secure.
- Seize.

Reconnaissance and surveillance confirm the size and disposition of enemy positions. Security elements prepare to support the assault as fixing elements. (1) Indirect and direct fires fix the enemy units. (2) Indirect fires isolate the point of assault from the other enemy positions. (3) A security element guides the assault element along the assault axis and joins in the assault. (4) The eastern support element shifts direct fires to subsequent enemy positions as the assault element penetrates the selected enemy position. (5) The indirect fires shift to suppress the enemy in the rearward firing positions while direct fires fix enemy units. (6) The assault element seizes the initial positions and then assaults the remaining positions. (7) Indirect and direct fires contain the enemy while the assault element destroys any remaining enemy and secures the objective.
Speed of execution is critical to an assault. The assault element will use surprise and situational factors of limited visibility and complex terrain, as well as camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception.

6-109. **Security Element.** The security element is typically the first element to act in an assault. It moves to a position(s) to deny the enemy freedom of movement along any ground or air avenues of approach that can reinforce the objective or interfere with the mission of the assault element. The security element can be directed to perform other tactical tasks to include—

- Ambush.
- Block.
- Canalize.
- Delay.
- Disrupt.
- Fix.
- Contain (this task usually requires multiple elements.)
- Isolate (this task usually requires multiple elements.)
- Destroy.

6-110. **Support Element.** The support element can have a wide range of functions in an assault. The detachment commander typically exercises C2 from within a part of the support element, unless analysis deems that success requires the commander to lead the assault element personally.

**AMBUSH**

6-111. An *ambush* is an attack by fire or other destructive means from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy (FM 3-90-1). In an ambush, enemy action determines the time of attack, whereas the KPAGF unit sets the location. Figure 6-12 on page 6-26 provides an example of an ambush. Ambush effects can include but are not limited to—

- Destroy or capture personnel and supplies.
- Harass and demoralize the enemy.
- Delay or block movement of personnel and supplies.
- Canalize enemy movement by making certain routes unavailable for traffic.

6-112. The KPAGF can use an ambush as a psychological warfare enabler. Key factors in an ambush are—

- Surprise.
- Control.
- Simplicity.
- Security.
- Coordinated fires.
- Withdrawal.

**Functional Organization for an Ambush**

6-113. A detachment conducting an ambush is typically organized into three elements: the ambush element, the security element, and the support element. There may be more than one of each of these types of element. The composition of these elements may vary depending on the mission. The type of units could involve infantry, reconnaissance, armor, antiaircraft, air defense, or engineer, but are not limited to those listed.

6-114. **Action Element.** The *ambush element* is the action element. The ambush element attacks to defeat or destroy enemy units in a kill zone. An ambush can be a primary or complementary action to prevent an enemy from accomplishing its mission.

6-115. **Security Element.** The *security element* has the mission to prevent enemy units from responding to the ambush before completion of the attack. The element provides early warning, prevents the ambush element from becoming decisively engaged, and supports effective withdrawal of all ambush elements from the ambush site.
Support Element. The support element of an ambush has the same basic functions as one for an assault. Typically, the detachment commander exercises C2 from within a part of the support element.

Organizing for an Ambush

The planning and preparation of an ambush is concentrated on massing combat power into a kill zone. One or more kill zones can be employed depending on the terrain, expected size of the enemy, and KPAGF combat systems coverage of the kill zone. Firing positions provide concealment, cover, and...
favorable fields of fire into the kill zone. Manmade obstacles reinforce the restrictions of natural obstacles and the terrain.

**Executing an Ambush**

6-118. At a C2 signal or terrain-oriented point, the ambush element engages the enemy in the kill zone. Security elements engage any enemy elements not in the kill zone. After the enemy has been rendered combat ineffective, designated ambush or support elements exploit the objective area and kill zone, and then withdraw to a rally point. The KPA places emphasis on intelligence collection and the retrieval of weapons and other equipment of value by the ambush element. Successful execution of an ambush focuses on the desired effects in the mission order, which can include harassment, seizing prisoners, or annihilation of enemy elements.

**RAID**

6-119. A raid is an attack to temporarily seize a stationary or moving target in order to capture or destroy personnel or equipment. Raids can also be tasked to secure selective information or deceive an enemy. A raid concludes with the withdrawal of the raiding detachment to sanctuary. Figure 6-13 on page 6-28 provides an example of a KPAGF raid.

6-120. Raids are characterized by actions to include but not limited to—

- Destroy or damage key systems or facilities.
- Secure designated enemy materiel.
- Seize prisoners.
- Support EIW objectives.
- Support operations by creating a tactical opportunity for another KPAGF unit.

6-121. The raiding detachment typically consists of three elements: raiding, security, and support. Other functional elements may be task-organized dependent on the mission. The size of the raiding element depends upon its mission, the nature and location of the target, and the enemy situation. The composition of these elements may vary depending on the mission. The type of units could involve infantry, reconnaissance, armor, antiarmor, air defense, or engineer, but are not limited to those listed.

6-122. **Action Element.** The raiding element is the action element. It attacks to accomplish its assigned mission at a particular objective.

6-123. **Security Element.** The security element uses stealth to occupy positions in order to fix enemy security or response units that would disrupt the raiding element. Security tasks can include preventing enemy escape from the objective. The security element also protects the withdrawal as the other elements move to sanctuary.

6-124. The security element moves to positions to deny the enemy freedom of movement along any ground or air avenues of approach reinforcing the objective or interfere with the mission of the assault element. The security element can be directed to perform other tactical tasks to include—

- Ambush.
- Block.
- Canalize.
- Delay.
- Fix.
- Contain (this task usually requires multiple elements).
- Isolate (this task usually requires multiple elements).
- Destroy.

6-125. **Support Element.** The support element of an ambush has the same basic functions as in an assault. Typically, the detachment commander exercises C2 from within a part of the support element.
6-126. A reconnaissance attack is a tactical offensive action to confirm situational understanding of an enemy’s location, disposition, and actions in order to fix, defeat, or destroy a designated enemy. This offensive action can be used to gain specified information and intelligence on an enemy’s capabilities and intentions for KPAGF tactical advantage in a future mission.

6-127. The KPAGF fights for information when necessary to retain or regain the initiative. A reconnaissance attack integrates a complex set of mission tasks, and can be employed when other means do not provide accurate situational understanding of an enemy and AO.

Figure 6-13. Raid (example)
6-128. Key factors in employing a reconnaissance attack, as a complement to continuous aggressive reconnaissance, security, and related offensive actions, include but are not limited to—

- Situational awareness requirements of an evolving enemy presence or actions in an AO.
- Tempo of KPAGF conditional developments to regain situational understanding and tactical initiative.

**Functional Organization for a Reconnaissance Attack**

6-129. The detachment commander typically organizes a reconnaissance attack with reconnaissance, security, action, and support elements. More than one element of each functional type is typical in this mission due to the several simultaneous requirements and actions occurring in multiple zones within an AO.

*Note.* Based on the requirement for appropriate C2 of multiple functional elements in several simultaneous actions during the tactical phases of a reconnaissance attack, a company detachment is the smallest task-organized element to command a reconnaissance attack. The scope of this type of mission could require a C2 headquarters and a task-organized battalion or regiment.

6-130. **Reconnaissance Elements.** The reconnaissance attack employs several reconnaissance elements to confirm the location and actions of enemy units operating in the detachment’s AO and conditions of an OE. If the mission purpose is to fix or destroy enemy units when located, reconnaissance elements provide reconnaissance support to other functional elements, such as security and actions elements.

6-131. **Security Elements.** Security elements operate in conjunction with reconnaissance elements, but also conduct reconnaissance tasks during the security mission. Upon locating an enemy unit and on order of the detachment commander, actions by security elements include but are not limited to—

- Fix or isolate designated enemy units.
- Block enemy reinforcement avenues of approach.
- Ambush enemy on withdrawal routes from a target or objective.
- Protect KPAGF elements during movements, maneuver, and follow-on mission tasks.

6-132. **Action Elements.** The action elements obtain a mission descriptor that most clearly identifies the primary action task. Actions can include mission tasks such as assault, ambush, or raid. The detachment commander monitors initial reconnaissance and security actions confirming the enemy situation, and then decides on actions to fix, isolate, defeat, or destroy a designated enemy unit.

6-133. **Support Elements.** Support elements are task-organized with particular capabilities and a priority of effort and support to designated functional elements in the reconnaissance attack detachment. The detachment commander locates C2 and communications nodes in the AO to most effectively receive and report timely reconnaissance and security indicators from the detachment elements. An extended depth and width of an AO may require a detachment CP well forward in the AO for reliable real-time information and intelligence.

**Organizing for a Reconnaissance Attack**

6-134. Multiple attack routes or axes often characterize reconnaissance attacks. There may also be objective rally points and orientation objectives.

**Executing a Reconnaissance Attack**

6-135. Multiple elements normally infiltrate or maneuver separately within an AO to find and report the current enemy situation. The detachment commander then directs when to fix, defeat, or destroy enemy units.

6-136. Initial supporting functions include multiple reconnaissance and security elements operating within designated zones of action to confirm the enemy situation. Other actions include reporting on the trafficability of routes and axes for follow-on movements and maneuver of the reconnaissance attack. Figure 6-14 on page 6-30 through figure 6-18 on page 6-34 provide an example of a KPAGF reconnaissance attack.
Figure 6-14. Reconnaissance attack (example; part 1 of 5)

(1) KPA civilian supporters south of the Budo River report an increase in enemy military activity on HWY 2 and HWY 7 near the Zang Bridge, and that enemy security forces along the river are limited to team-size roving patrols and temporary observation posts. (2) KPA security elements report no indication of enemy advance north of the Budo River. The battalion commander recognizes that the enemy is in an initial phase of area occupation and decides to conduct a reconnaissance attack. (3) Higher headquarters provides the battalion with additional support units and supplies, including infantry, fires, SOF, EIW, and logistics. (4) Primary reconnaissance objectives are activity along HWY 2 and HWY 7 near the Zang Bridge. (5) Select deception elements visibly withdraw to convince the enemy that all KPA units in the area are relocating northward. (6) Security teams infiltrate the south bank of the Budo River to monitor enemy patrols and observation posts, but to not initiate contact with the enemy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EIW</th>
<th>electronic information warfare</th>
<th>HWY</th>
<th>highway</th>
<th>INFL</th>
<th>infiltrate</th>
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<td>KPA</td>
<td>Korean People's Army</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>river</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>screen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>withdraw</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(7) Task-organized platoons infiltrate south of the Budo River to perform reconnaissance along preplanned routes to assigned objectives in designated attack zones (outlined in black). (8) The KPA platoon leader in the east maneuvers to OBJ 1 and then occupies an ambush site focused on the eastern bridge. (9) Another platoon approaches OBJ 2 and identifies an enemy logistics site along the south side of HWY 7. It reports the best route for follow-on KPA forces to take, then occupies an attack-by-fire position against the logistics site. (10) The platoon farther to the west reports a squad-size combat outpost oriented north along HWY 7. It sets an attack-by-fire position and continues to OBJ 3, where a company-size enemy infantry unit is conducting road improvement near the bridge. After reporting the activity, the KPA platoon returns to its attack-by-fire position. (11) The platoon in the west observes no enemy on its route to OBJ 4, and occupies an ambush position oriented on the trail network to the south and southwest.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EIW</th>
<th>electronic Information warfare</th>
<th>HWY</th>
<th>highway</th>
<th>INFL</th>
<th>Infiltrate</th>
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<td>KPA</td>
<td>Korean People’s Army</td>
<td>OBJ</td>
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<td>river</td>
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<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>screen</td>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Only select units and objects shown for clarity purposes.

Figure 6-15. Reconnaissance attack (example; part 2 of 5)
Figure 6-16. Reconnaissance attack (example; part 3 of 5)

(12) Two companies cross the Budo River at different locations and take up attack-by-fire positions, one oriented on the enemy logistics site and the other on the enemy infantry company.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R</th>
<th>river</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>screen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Only select units and objects shown for clarity purposes.
(13) On order, elements mass fires and, within minutes, the nearly simultaneous indirect and direct fires devastate the enemy logistics site and infantry company. (14) The platoon-size element near the enemy combat outpost initiates its attack by fire and destroys the enemy squad.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>D</th>
<th>destroy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>river</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>screen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Only select units and objects shown for clarity purposes.

Figure 6-17. Reconnaissance attack (example; part 4 of 5)
Support of a Reconnaissance Attack

6-137. A reconnaissance attack requires multiple types of support collectively supporting KPAGF fires and maneuver in accomplishing the mission task. Support systems can include reconnaissance, security, direct and indirect fires support, aviation, air defense, engineer, logistics, and EIW.

Fires

6-138. Integrated fires support and integrated air defense provide responsive fires to all elements prior to and during the reconnaissance attack, and support the withdrawal of reconnaissance, security, action, or other support elements after completion of the mission. Fire support in a reconnaissance attack aims to—

- Protect reconnaissance and security elements in their zones.
- Protect action and support elements in maneuver or other offensive actions on enemy locations or terrain-oriented objectives.
- Suppress, neutralize, or destroy designated targets in an AO.
Aviation
6-139. Aviation elements can be task-organized and integrated into fires support, reconnaissance, security, or maneuver elements. Combat support and rear service aviation can also be task-organized in support. Due to the air superiority of its enemies, it is likely the KPA will only have the majority of its aviation elements available during the initial stages of any conflict. Aviation support will likely be rare in later military action.

Engineer
6-140. Engineer support focuses initially on mobility tasks to assist KPAGF movements and maneuver throughout the AO. Engineer units are also task-organized to conduct countermobility actions in support of tasks such as fix, block, or isolate designated enemy units during the reconnaissance attack.

Logistics
6-141. A reconnaissance attack typically has dispersed elements throughout an AO and often operates over extended time periods. The KPA positions task-organized logistics support with functional elements, and can create a system of logistics caches or mobile resupply points to sustain the elements during the mission.

Electronic Intelligence Warfare
6-142. EIW activities in a reconnaissance attack are primarily executed to—

- Protect KPA units from enemy detection.
- Deceive enemy units into revealing their actions and intentions.
- Assist in fixing or isolating enemy units.

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN COMPLEX OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS
6-143. The KPA expects to perform offensive operations in two primary types of complex OEs: urban and subterranean.

URBAN OPERATIONS
6-144. KPAGF offensive doctrine emphasizes speed in the attack. As such, the first operational echelon forces will likely bypass any major cities they encounter during offensive operations, leaving follow-on forces to deal with later. The KPAGF will likely isolate the bypassed cities to prevent assistance from the outside or a breakout from inside the urban area. The KPAGF has numerous small urban-warfare training facilities scattered throughout North Korea and at least one major army-level urban training facility to practice urban-warfare skills.

6-145. The major South Korean cities are densely packed urban environments with vast underground networks for communications, transportation, and utilities. There are over 320 km of track in the Seoul subway, with 70% of it located underground. There are also subways located in the four next-largest cities in South Korea: Busan, Incheon, Daegu, and Daejeon. These underground tunnels will serve as air raid shelters for local civilians.

6-146. If the KPAGF decided to conduct offensive operations in an urban area, the soldiers would face the same difficulties all military units face when confronted with operations within cities. It takes a large number of dismounted soldiers to clear each building before moving on to the next unsecured building.

SUBTERRANEAN OPERATIONS
6-147. U.S. and South Korean military units have discovered four infiltration tunnels reaching under South Korean territory. There may be other tunnels that could complement a KPAGF direct attack on South Korea. The existence of these tunnels became known in the mid-1970s when a KPAGF engineer defected to South Korea and disclosed the information during his debriefing. Of the four known tunnels, ranging in length from 1.64 km to 3.5 km, three tunnels are aimed primarily at Seoul, a strategic KPA target.
6-148. All four tunnels remained undiscovered until they actually crossed the military demarcation line (MDL) into South Korea. The length of the tunnel passageways south of the MDL ranges from 435–1,100 m. The estimated number of troops able to pass through the tunnels ranges from 4,000 soldiers per hour for Tunnel #1 to 8,000 soldiers per hour for the other three tunnels. There are sources that estimate an even higher troop movement capacity. Some of the tunnels could also move heavy weapons, such as large machine guns or small-caliber artillery. One of the tunnels even possesses a concrete interior instead of a dirt floor. Tunnel #3 is unique, as the diggers installed a rail system to remove the debris created during its excavation and a mechanical system to take the water out of the tunnel on the North Korean side of the MDL.

6-149. Some analysts, as well as the South Korean Defense Ministry, estimate as many as 17 to 21 more KPA tunnels cross the MDL into South Korea. This estimate is supported by another North Korean defector, who stated during his debriefing in the early 1970s that Kim Il Sung ordered every forward-deployed KPAGF division along the DMZ to dig and maintain at least two infiltration tunnels into South Korea. If a general war were to resume between the two Koreas, it is likely that SOF could use the infiltration tunnels as one of their methods to gain access to South Korean rear areas. The SOF would establish a “second front” by creating chaos in the South Korean strategic rear areas through attacking military CPs and key logistical centers. Table 6-1 compares the specifications of the four infiltration tunnels discovered so far, and figure 6-19 shows their locations.

### Table 6-1. Known North Korean infiltration tunnels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Point</th>
<th>Tunnel #1</th>
<th>Tunnel #2</th>
<th>Tunnel #3</th>
<th>Tunnel #4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>8 km NE of Korangpo</td>
<td>13 km N of Chorwan</td>
<td>4 km S of Panmunjon</td>
<td>26 km NE of Yanggu</td>
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<td>Invasion route</td>
<td>Korangpo-Uijongbu-Seoul</td>
<td>Chorwan-Ponchon-Seoul</td>
<td>Munsan-Seoul</td>
<td>Sohwa-Wontong-Seoul</td>
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<tr>
<td>Troop capacity, per hour</td>
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<td>8,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Length south of the MDL, m</td>
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<td>1,100</td>
<td>435</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distance from Seoul, km</td>
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<td>101</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depth below surface, m</td>
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<td>50–160</td>
<td>70–73</td>
<td>145</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunnel height, m</td>
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<td>1.95</td>
<td>1.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunnel width, m</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunnel lining</td>
<td>Concrete</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discovery date</td>
<td>15 NOV 1974</td>
<td>19 MAR 1975</td>
<td>17 OCT 1978</td>
<td>3 MAR 1990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

km = kilometers
S = south
m = meters
MDL = military demarcation line
N = north
NE = northeast
6-150. South Korean units and their allies continue to monitor suspected tunnel entrances in North Korea as well as possible exits south of the DMZ. In the past, the South Korean military built countertunnels to intercept the KPAGF tunnels and make them inoperable for use during an invasion. Countertunneling is a costly endeavor, however, and the exorbitant expense may cause South Korea to employ other countermeasures if another KPAGF underground invasion route is discovered.

6-151. The South Korean media regularly publish articles about North Korean tunneling activities. In October 2014, a retired South Korean general claimed North Korea has drilled at least 84 invasion tunnels into South Korea, with some of these tunnels being 64 km long and capable of reaching all the way to Seoul. In all likelihood, this information is erroneous, as the South Korean Defense Ministry believes no tunnel could extend beyond 10 km south of the DMZ due to groundwater issues in South Korea and the need to pass successfully beneath the Imjin River. The South Korean Defense Ministry, however, does believe there are undiscovered North Korean infiltration tunnels in existence.

6-152. In April 2015, Israel announced one of its leading defense electronics firms, Elbit Systems, recently developed a system that could locate underground tunnels with almost 100% accuracy. Due to the difference in the soil composition between the Gaza Strip and the Korean Peninsula, the equipment may not operate at the same level of success. Some South Koreans spend their free time searching for tunnels, but no new ones have been located in over a quarter century. Still, the South Korean Government and military continue to search for additional infiltration tunnels in the DMZ, which is off limits to civilian personnel, while the amateur detectives search in areas south of the DMZ.
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Chapter 7
Defensive Actions

The Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF) only go on the defense when necessary and desire to return to the offense as soon as possible. This chapter explains the purpose behind the KPAGF fighting a defensive battle. It also explains how the KPAGF plan, prepare, and execute their defensive actions. The KPAGF can fight a mobile defense, but prefer to fight an area defense, so as not to cede any ground to the enemy. The tactical defensive actions for units are described, with detailed explanation of how the KPAGF use complex operational environments—urban and subterranean—within their defensive doctrine.

PURPOSE OF THE DEFENSE

7-1. The purpose of any given KPAGF defensive action depends on the situation, resources, and the larger mission. During the initial stages of a renewed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, the KPAGF will view defensive actions as only temporary to achieve certain tactical or operational objectives. The emphasis in the early stages of any conflict would be to return to the offense as soon as practical. The KPAGF recognize four general purposes of tactical defensive missions:

- Repulse a superior offensive force.
- Inflict grave casualties on an offensive force.
- Defend key terrain.
- Gain time.

7-2. Task organization of a unit for defense is determined by function within four main mission areas: disruption, main defense, support, and reserve. Special mission requirements may also exist that necessitate specialized capabilities.

REPULSE A SUPERIOR OFFENSIVE FORCE

7-3. The KPAGF use a defense to repulse a superior offensive force when their forces are facing an overwhelming enemy force. The KPAGF understand that their enemies prefer a 3:1 to 6:1 troop ratio at the decisive point to make an attack. Going on the defense allows the KPAGF to possibly defeat a numerically superior foe three to six times its own size. Once the enemy has suffered sufficient attrition, the KPAGF may return to the offense to achieve their desired objective(s).

INFLECT GRAVE CASUALTIES ON AN OFFENSIVE FORCE

7-4. The KPAGF may use a defense to inflict grave casualties on an offensive force when the KPAGF commander decides the defense is the best method to inflict maximum casualties on the enemy. By maximizing the terrain and the unit’s firepower, the KPAGF commander will design the defense to inflict the largest number of casualties possible on the attacking force.

DEFEND KEY TERRAIN

7-5. A defense to defend key terrain prevents the KPAGF’s enemy from seizing or using critical geographic features or facilities. Actions to defend key terrain do not necessarily require physical control, but the KPAGF unit does not want the key terrain to become controlled by its enemy.
GAIN TIME

7-6. A defense to gain time prevents the KPAGF’s enemy from successfully concluding actions, movements, and scheme of maneuver before a certain point in time or prior to a given event taking place. Actions to gain time create opportunities for the KPAGF to transition to the attack or maintain the initiative.

PLANNING THE DEFENSE

7-7. Key elements of planning KPAGF defensive missions are to—

- Identify the defensive objective.
- Determine available time to plan and prepare defenses.
- Organize units by functional mission task requirements.
- Conduct electronic intelligence warfare (EIW) activities.
- Implement defenses.

PLANNED DEFENSE

7-8. A KPAGF planned defense is a defensive mission or action employed when there is sufficient time and knowledge of the situation to prepare and rehearse units for specific tasks. Key actions in an effective planned defense include but are not limited to—

- Implement a plan for reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA).
- Determine the when, where, and how of enemy plans, actions, and intentions.
- Identify enemy vulnerabilities and how to exploit those weaknesses.
- Locate critical nodes of the enemy’s combat systems and how/when to most effectively interdict them.
- Understand and reinforce the defensive characteristics of the area of operations (AO).
- Determine the defensive method that will best deny the enemy its tactical objectives.
- Task-organize units by function to defend.
- Create or take advantage of a tactical window of opportunity.
- Plan for offensive actions given success of defensive actions.

SITUATIONAL DEFENSE

7-9. A situational defense is a defensive mission or action when circumstances require rapid and timely defensive actions and drills to protect the force and retain the initiative. Key considerations in determining when a posture of situational defense mitigates risk and is appropriate can include but are not limited to—

- An enemy unexpectedly attacks a key Korean People’s Army (KPA) unit, system, or capability.
- An enemy obtains air superiority and integrated air defense in a particular tactical situation.
- An enemy counterattacks requires temporary KPAGF defensive measures.

FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF FORCES—DIVISIONS, BRIGADES, AND REGIMENTS

7-10. A KPAGF divisional, brigade, or regimental commander specifies the initial functions of a units within the command and task organizes resources to achieve those integrated functions of a mission. Given the resources available to this level of organization, multiple functional mission tasks can be assigned to a division or regiment. The KPAGF commander can adjust task organization of units during an operation to address emergent tactical conditions. Each functional unit has an identified KPAGF commander.

FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF ELEMENTS—BATTALIONS, COMPANIES, AND SUBORDINATE UNITS

7-11. Battalions, and companies are assigned mission tasks based on a function to achieve, but differ in how task organization occurs as compared to a division, brigade, or regiment. The KPAGF task-organizes battalions and companies as detachments to accomplish a single tactical task. Assignment of a functional task
to a detachment, such as fix or isolate, is integral to a larger mission. A detachment is assigned multiple functional mission tasks only in exceptional situations.

PREPARING THE DEFENSE

7-12. In the preparation phase, the KPAGF organizes an AO, zone of reconnaissance responsibility (ZORR), and units to optimize successful defensive actions and create or seize opportunities for offensive actions. The KPAGF believe in a prepared defense in depth, with heavy emphasis upon terrain, engineering, and artillery. Defensive dispositions and tactics apply a systems warfare approach to degrade the enemy’s system of systems, deny integrated performance of the enemy combat system, and create vulnerabilities that KPAGF defensive units can exploit.

DENY ENEMY INFORMATION

7-13. Defensive preparations focus on deception or destruction of enemy units and sensors in order to limit enemy situational awareness and understanding of the KPAGF defensive plan. The KPAGF execute missions to destroy standoff RISTA means, conduct counterreconnaissance in an AO and ZORR, and employ camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) methods to improve unit protection.

CONDUCT COUNTERMOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY PREPARATIONS

7-14. Preparation of the defense is a continuum of actions to improve the defense. Engineer activities are a coordinated combination of survivability, countermobility, and mobility priorities and actions to create tactical opportunities. The obstacle plan complements the engineer effort and supports the fires and maneuver plan to produce the desired defensive effects. In conjunction with other mission tasks, engineers support the EIW plan through activities such as constructing decoy defensive positions and preparing false routes. The KPAGF create and reinforce complex terrain in all defensive actions to provide cover from direct and indirect fires, concealment, camouflage, and protection. See appendix F for more information on engineer operations.

ALLOCATE LOGISTICS

7-15. The KPAGF stock sufficient logistics support forward in caches with maneuver units and allocate appropriate logistics throughout the depth of an AO and in coordination with rearward support areas. Classes of supply, medical capabilities, and personnel support along and on lines of communications are arranged by priority to support the main and supporting defensive efforts, and in consideration of logistical requirements for transition to the offense. See appendix H for more information on logistics operations.

PREPARE FOR CONTINGENCIES

7-16. The KPAGF prepare for defensive and offensive contingencies when conducting a defensive operation. High-priority contingencies are developed for actions in the security zone and defense zones. Early warning of critical indicators in the ZORR complement probable decision points.

REHEARSE KEY MISSION TASKS

7-17. The KPAGF establishes priorities of effort and support, and rehearses critical actions of the defense based on the available time and resources. Typical actions rehearsed in preparation for a defense include but are not limited to—

- RISTA updates.
- Counterreconnaissance.
- EIW.
- Integrated fires support.
- Battle handover from disruption forces to main defense forces.
- Main defense.
- Counterattack options.
EXECUTING THE DEFENSE

7-18. Successful execution depends on units conducting their specified functions that are integral to the overall defense. A successful defense execution results in the culmination of the enemy’s offensive actions without achieving its objectives, and ideally creates conditions for the KPAGF transition to offensive actions. Success criteria for a KPAGF defense typically include but are not limited to—

- KPAGF combat formations remain capable of performing their functional roles in the defense.
- Enemy units do not achieve their mission objectives.
- KPAGF sustain ability to transition designated units to offensive mission tasks.

Note. KPA units may operate with a doctrinal expectation that significant casualties are expected and acceptable in order to achieve an assigned mission task. This acknowledgement of significant casualties may prevent effective conduct of follow-on mission tasks until a designated unit is reorganized or reconstituted.

MAINTAIN CONTACT

7-19. The KPAGF want to maintain contact with the enemy. Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance actions include rapid reorganization or reconstitution of assets to ensure no gaps in situational awareness and understanding of the enemy, AO, and ZORR. Effective RISTA guides prudent use of KPAGF combat power to achieve the defensive mission.

EXECUTE MISSION TASKS AND DRILLS

7-20. The KPAGF conduct mission tasks and drills with flexible actions practiced to certain standards. As situational conditions evolve during a mission, clear and concise modifications to methodical and practiced combined arms actions allow the KPAGF to rapidly and readily adapt and react to new tactical conditions. The KPAGF leader directs tactical adjustments to a mission task or drill to address a functional requirement in the new conditions and states the intent of the modified actions.

SEIZE TACTICAL OPPORTUNITIES

7-21. While KPA doctrine discusses decentralized execution of a mission task and use of tactical initiative, superiors expect success if a subordinate commander uses initiative different than the prescribed plan. If subordinate unit commanders decide to take advantage of emergent opportunities and modify the unit’s tactical actions to differ from the prescribed role in the orders, the unit best be successful. Successful deviations from the plan will be rewarded, but there will be severe punishment of the commander if the change in plans leads to failure.

TYPES OF DEFENSIVE ACTION—DIVISIONS AND REGIMENTS

7-22. The types of defensive action in KPAGF doctrine are both tactical methods and guides. The two basic types at divisional or regimental operations are the mobile defense and the area defense. A KPAGF commander may use both forms of defense simultaneously throughout an AO. A defensive battle or series of engagements may include subordinate units executing various combinations of mobile and area defenses, as well as offensive actions, within an overall defensive mission framework.

MOBILE DEFENSE

7-23. While not preferred, a KPAGF tactical mobile defense is designed to achieve tactical decision by skillfully using fires and mobility to destroy key parts of the enemy’s combat system and deny enemy forces their objective while preserving the friendly units. A mobile defense may be appropriate when the KPAGF
Defensive Actions

can focus their available combat power and are not completely overmatched by an enemy. EIW is a key enabler, in coordination with RISTA, to shape and conduct a mobile defense. This type of defense causes the enemy to continually lose effectiveness until its actions culminate before achieving an intended objective. Even within a mobile defense, the KPAGF commander may use area defense on some enemy attack axes to shape the battle in a security zone, the first defense zone, and even possibly the second and third defense zones.

Method

7-24. The KPAGF mobile defense inflicts losses on the enemy, trades space for time, and protects friendly units. This defense allows the KPAGF, with effective RISTA, to select the location and time for engagements. The bulk of the KPAGF unit’s combat power is normally in the second echelon, while the first echelon fights a series of delaying actions. Typically employed when an AO has significant geographic depth of its zones, the KPAGF progressively attack key nodes of the enemy combat system and create vulnerabilities to defeat or destroy the enemy. The mobile defense conducts recurring indirect and direct fires from a succession of defensive engagements, and adds additional combat power mass with timely fires and counterattacks. Figures 7-1 through 7-5 on pages 7-6 through 7-10 progressively demonstrate a KPAGF mobile defense.

Defensive Arrays

7-25. The basis of KPAGF mobile defense is to conduct fires and maneuver from battle position to battle position through a succession of defensive arrays. A defensive array is a group of battle positions in which one or more subordinate units have orders to defend for a specified time within a higher commander’s order and intent. Defensive arrays reinforce terrain and shape corridors and axes into kill zones. In the geography between defensive arrays, units conduct disruption actions and deceive the enemy as to where the successive defense is located.

Defensive Maneuver

7-26. KPAGF defensive maneuver consists of selective timing of precision fires on enemy units, defensive array of direct and indirect fires and obstacles, and coordinated movement and maneuver bounds by two types of forces. The main force divides its combat power into two forces: a contact force and a shielding force. The contact force is the force occupying the defensive array, and is in current or imminent contact with the enemy. The shielding force is the force occupying a subsequent defensive array, thus permitting the contact force to disengage and reposition to a defensive array to the rear of the shielding force. A disruption force or main defense force can perform defensive maneuver.

7-27. The contact force ideally coerces the enemy to deploy its maneuver units and begin its direct and indirect fires in preparation for the attack. Then, before the contact force becomes decisively engaged, it conducts battle handover to the shielding force and maneuvers to its next preplanned defenses. While the original contact force is moving, the shielding force maintains the enemy under continuous observation and fires, and defends its own defensive positions. When the original contact force assumes positions in its subsequent defensive array, it becomes the shielding force for the new contact force—formerly the shielding force—now in combat with the enemy. KPAGF forces continue to defend and delay the enemy. The succession of defensive arrays is designed to defeat or destroy the attacking enemy force. Arrays are close enough to each other to allow the defending units to maintain coordinated, continuous engagement of the enemy while moving from one array to another. KPAGF forces may be ordered to defend even if actions result in a decisive engagement.

7-28. A key consideration in locating defensive arrays is that the distance between defensive arrays precludes the enemy from engaging two arrays simultaneously without displacing its indirect fire weapons. This requires the enemy, having attacked one array, to reposition the majority of its firing positions and coordinate a new approach and attack on the subsequent KPAGF array.

7-29. The example of mobile defense in figures 7-1 through 7-5 on pages 7-6 through 7-10 shows actions of a contact force and shielding force. Fires and maneuver are continuous, and focus on fixing or isolating designated enemy forces, delaying other enemy forces, and defeating or destroying key systems of enemy combat power to ultimately defeat the enemy attack.
Typical defense actions (2 of 5): (1) The brigade receives intelligence updates from forward units, SOF, and observation posts. (2) Fires disrupt enemy reconnaissance and security forces. (3) Decoy battle positions and planned explosive detonations further confuse enemy reconnaissance and security as they approach. (4) A KPA reconnaissance unit falls back to avoid engagement. (5) Obstacle groups and fires force enemy reconnaissance away from the corridor walls and into antitank and antipersonnel mines. (6) A KPA CSOP calls for fires to disrupt, suppress, or neutralize enemy vehicles. (7) A small KPA unmanned aircraft reveals enemy reconnaissance vehicles approaching from the south. (8) An ambush with command-detonated mines and direct fires is set to destroy the enemy reconnaissance squad.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COP</th>
<th>command observation post</th>
<th>CSOP</th>
<th>combat security outpost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>destroy</td>
<td>KPA</td>
<td>Korean People’s Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>neutralize</td>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Only select units and objects shown for clarity purposes.
Typical defense actions (3 of 5): (1) One CSOP withdraws to main defenses and the other becomes a stay-behind OP. (2) Fires impede enemy forces while obstacles and mines channel the enemy toward the center and west of the valley floor. (3) The enemy main effort orients to the west and maneuvers into the first set of kill zones, where it is attacked by direct and indirect fires. (4) The enemy gains success in the center, a KPA deception to lure it into subsequent kill zones. (5) The CDETs and antitank platoons displace to subsequent BPs. (6) Other units displace northward as the enemy makes progress. (7) An OP reports enemy follow-on forces orienting to the northwest to perform breaching actions. (8) A SOF team engages and destroys an enemy unmanned aircraft flying north along the corridor floor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BP</th>
<th>COP</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>KPA</th>
<th>OP</th>
<th>S</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>battle position</td>
<td>command observation post</td>
<td>destroy</td>
<td>Korean People's Army</td>
<td>observation post</td>
<td>suppress</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Only select units and objects shown for clarity purposes.
Typical defense actions (4 of 5): (1) KPA fires slow the passage of follow-on enemy forces through the lanes, but adjust their tempo to draw the enemy into the area. (2) Jamming further disrupts the enemy’s attack and distort its situational awareness. (3) KPA logistics units withdraw. (4) The close fight in successive BPs focuses fires into the front and flanks of the enemy attack; enemy momentum reaches the culmination point as lead vehicles are destroyed. (5) KPA engineers prepare to defend their BPs against any undestroyed enemy forces.

**Figure 7-4. KPAGF brigade mobile defense (example; part 4 of 5)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BP</td>
<td>battle position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>destroy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FWD</td>
<td>forward command post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main</td>
<td>main command post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RES</td>
<td>reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>command observation post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIW</td>
<td>electronic intelligence warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPA</td>
<td>Korean People’s Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>neutralize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>suppress</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Only select units and objects shown for clarity purposes.
Chapter 7

Figure 7-5. KPAGF brigade mobile defense (example; part 5 of 5)

Typical defense actions (5 of 5): (1) KPA fires continue to impact at the breach lanes, suppressing and neutralizing follow-on enemy combat forces. Actions against C2 and logistics: (A) Fires destroy critical enemy C2 nodes. (B) A reconnaissance section and SOF team identify a TA radar, conduct an assault, and destroy both radar and crew. (C) A KPA unmanned aircraft reveals a suspected forward C2 node, which is destroyed by artillery fire. (D) A supply convoy drives into an ambush by a stay-behind unit, which attacks it with antitank guided missiles, rocket propelled grenades, and small arms fire.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C2</th>
<th>command and control</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>destroy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPA</td>
<td>Korean People's Army</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>neutralize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>suppress</td>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>target acquisition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Only select units and objects shown for clarity purposes.
Defensive Actions

Disruption Force

7-30. The disruption force initiates the attack on the enemy’s combat system by targeting and destroying systems that are critical to enemy effectiveness. A disruption force seeks to coerce the enemy to fight on disadvantageous terrain and at a tempo of the KPAGF’s selection. The disruption force may be able to cause culmination of the enemy attack before the enemy enters the first, second, and third defense zones. A disruption force can also set the conditions for a KPAGF spoiling attack or counterattack. The disruption force may be directed to occupy prepared battle positions in the defense zones to reinforce the main defense force. A disruption force may also be directed to remain in the security zone as bypassed units in order to attack follow-on enemy units.

Main Defense Force

7-31. The main defense force task is to complete the defeat or destruction of the enemy by employing contact forces and shielding forces. The basic considerations for employing a main defense force in the defense zones are kill zones, simple battle positions (SBPs), complex battle positions (CBPs), and—in concert with the defensive order—coordinate timing and repositioning of contact forces and shielding forces. A force within the main defense force may be directed to remain in a battle position as a bypassed unit in order to defend or attack follow-on enemy units.

Reserves

7-32. A KPAGF commander can designate a number of reserve units of varying types and capabilities. In planning, a maneuver reserve is a unit strong enough to defeat an anticipated enemy exploitation force. The commander positions a reserve in the AO to respond to probable contingencies and probable priorities of effort for reserve employment.

Area Defense

7-33. In situations where the KPAGF must deny key terrain or AO capabilities to an enemy, or access to them, a tactical area defense may be appropriate and is the KPAGF’s preferred type of defense. An area defense may also be suitable when the KPAGF is overmatched in combat power by an enemy or the enemy must not advance any farther. This type of defense is designed to achieve tactical decision by defending designated terrain with a cohesive defense of mutually supporting CBPs, channeling and stopping enemy units in kill zones, and using massed fires and other parts of combat power to defeat or destroy the enemy. This defense can also have a specified duration. An area defense retains the initiative and creates windows of opportunity to use maneuver to defeat or destroy the enemy. EIW elements are key enablers, in combination with RISTA, to shape and conduct area defense.

Method

7-34. The KPAGF area defense inflicts progressive losses on the enemy, retains designated terrain, and protects friendly units in conjunction with mission and tactical risk assessment. An area defense centers on creating kill zones and CBPs on or in the vicinity of key terrain, reinforcing defenses with significant obstacle effort on designated corridors and axes, and positioning decentralized logistics. Units conducting an area defense execute offensive and defensive actions in the security zone to degrade the enemy in its attack capabilities and momentum. Integrated fires attack to defeat or destroy key components and subsystems of the enemy’s combat system. Area defense creates windows of opportunity in which to conduct spoiling attacks or counterattacks and destroy key enemy systems. The KPAGF commander places two-thirds of the defensive units in the first echelon and one-third of the units in the second echelon. The KPAGF commander will designate one-ninth of the entire unit, taken from the second echelon units, as the reserve. Another one-ninth of the total combat unit, taken from the first echelon, will serve as the disruption unit in the security zone. Figure 7-6 on page 7-12 is a simplified pictorial representation of the KPAGF area defense.
Disruption Force

7-35. The security zone of a KPAGF area defense, approximately 16–20 km in width and 10–15 km in depth for a division, is designed to be an area of continuous contact with the enemy. The security zone is subdivided into a combat security area and a general security area. RISTA units and precision integrated fires disrupt enemy units as situational awareness confirms the enemy’s main groupings and directions and reveals probable enemy intentions. Selective KPAGF attacks deceive the enemy as to the location and configuration of defense zone main defenses, delay enemy maneuver, canalize the enemy into obstacles and kill zones, and create time for additional improvement of defense zone defenses. Within the overall context of an area defense, the disruption force might employ a mobile defense. In this case, the distance between positions in the security zone is such that the enemy will find it necessary to displace the majority of its supporting weapons to continue an attack on subsequent positions. Table 7-1 provides information on the security units found in the security zone.
Table 7-1. Security elements in a security zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Area</th>
<th>Security Type</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Location (FWD of main defensive position)</th>
<th>Unit Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General security area</td>
<td>General security outposts</td>
<td>Attack warning, delay, ambush</td>
<td>10–15 km</td>
<td>Corps: regiment (+) Division: battalion (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat security area</td>
<td>Combat outposts</td>
<td>Attack warning, raid prevention, indirect fire observation</td>
<td>1–2 km</td>
<td>Regiment: company (+) Battalion: platoon (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat security area</td>
<td>Direct security</td>
<td>Attack warning, raid prevention</td>
<td>200–400 m</td>
<td>Security outposts, security patrols, ambush patrols</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FWD forward km kilometers m meters

Combat Security Area

7-36. The combat security area is normally 1–2 km in depth in front of the first defensive zone, and is further subdivided into two areas. In the first area, from the main defensive to 200–400 m in front of the forward units, the forward battalions provide their own local security with security outposts, security patrols, and ambush patrols. The second area can extend up to 2 km in front of the other area. A platoon or larger unit sets up three to four combat observation posts; these provide early warning to their regiment, preventing surprise attacks as well as calling for and adjusting artillery fires.

General Security Area

7-37. The general security area is a KPAGF corps- or division-level operation located in front of the combat security area and extending 10–15 km in front of the first defense zone. The size of the force located in the general security area is a regiment (+) for a corps and a battalion (+) for a division. The general security outposts are tasked to provide early warning to the main defensive force, delay the enemy, and coerce the enemy to deploy into its battle formations from march formations earlier than desired.

Main Defense Force

7-38. The KPAGF main defense force defeats or destroys the enemy with fires from mutually supporting CBPs in defensive arrays. The main defense force is located in the defense zones and focuses on kill zones from simple and CBPs. KPAGF units use key terrain, reinforced with obstacles and other engineer effort, to mass combat power on kill zones. When movement and maneuver between battle positions is part of the area defense plan, repositioning routes are reconnoitered. A main defense force can conduct counterattacks in support of the defense mission and intent.

7-39. The KPAGF uses the old Soviet concept of echelons in constructing its main defensive positions. A KPAGF field army will place a single division in the first defensive zone, covering 16–20 km of the front. The field army will then place other divisions or regiments in the second and third defensive zones. Each zone will be 10–15 km in depth. Between these three defensive zones are buffer zones, 4–6 km in depth, with prepared positions if time allows their construction. Of note, the KPA has already built these defensive fighting positions in the areas north of and adjacent to the demilitarized zone (DMZ). See figure 7-7 on page 7-14 for a visual representation, but the actual deployment of the units will be based on the terrain and forces available to the KPAGF commander.
7-40. Each KPAGF infantry division will normally place two regiments in its first echelon and one regiment in its second echelon. The forward regiments—but not always the division reserve regiment—will also use the same “two up, one back” echelon concept for their maneuver battalions. Each forward regiment will be responsible for 8–10 km of frontage, with each forward battalion responsible for about half of the regiment’s front.
Reserves

7-41. A KPAGF commander can designate a number of reserve units of varying types and capabilities. The commander positions this reserve in the AO to respond to probable contingencies and probable priority of effort for reserve employment. The KPAGF do not commit the reserve in a piecemeal fashion. The KPAGF commander can use reserves to seal an enemy penetration. In some defensive operations, the reserve units may be for launching a counterattack to return the KPAGF unit to the offense. The reserves may move through the enjoined units to give new impetus to the battle, or into gaps between units.

Antitank Defense System

7-42. The KPAGF consider enemy tanks the most lethal ground attack vehicle and design their area defense to stop enemy armor through the use of antitank (AT) defensive positions and AT engagement areas. The KPAGF plans to fight an AT battle along the predictable routes the enemy’s armor vehicles will likely travel. The KPAGF breaks down its defensive plan into six phases: antiarmor obstacles, antiarmor fire plan, AT defensive positions, AT engagement areas, the AT reserve, and the counterattack unit. Phase numbers in the following descriptions correspond to the numbers in figure 7-6 on page 7-12. (See appendix C for more information on AT operations.)

Antiarmor Obstacle Plan

7-43. The KPAGF’s defense phase 1 is the antiarmor obstacle plan, with obstacles located in front of the forward defensive positions and within each AT engagement area or kill zone. The KPAGF will place these obstacle belts so they tie into the terrain and include a combination of AT and antipersonnel mines. The KPAGF will cover each concealed obstacle belt with direct fire weapons and observers to call in indirect fire. The obstacle belts will consist of several layers positioned to take advantage of the KPAGF’s various AT weapon ranges, normally 400–1,000 m.

Antiarmor Fire Plan

7-44. Phase 2 of the KPAGF AT defense system is the antiarmor fire plan, which contains four subphases conducted by disruption force. These are based on the location of the enemy as observed by security elements ahead of the forward defensive line, whose task is to call in indirect fire for the purpose of preventing an effective enemy attack.

7-45. During phase 2a, the KPAGF plan area fires at potential chokepoints along the suspected enemy’s avenues of approach, often along main roads. The KPAGF allocate two artillery battalions per each enemy company to their front. The KPAGF will fire mortars, artillery, or rockets at these chokepoints. The normal size of a company target is approximately 100 m wide by 900 m deep.

7-46. Phase 2b is a set of KPAGF planned rolling fires approximately 2,000 m in front of the forward battle positions, with the purpose to disrupt and destroy armor march units as they transition to battle formations. The normal width for these barrages is 400–700 m, and they may occur every 500–800 m for a maximum of four times.

7-47. Phase 2c of the KPAGF plan, antiarmor rectangular target fires, occurs immediately after phase 2b. The primary difference between these two types of indirect fire is that while the width is approximately the same (400–700 m), the depth of the fire is less (300–500 m), and is performed in three sequential volleys: first rockets, then artillery, and lastly mortars, as the enemy approaches the obstacle belts. Antiarmor rectangular fire will cease at the obstacle belt along the forward battle positions.

7-48. Phase 2d, the KPAGF direct-fire fight, begins at the forward defensive obstacle belts. Tanks, AT guns, recoilless rifles, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) are fired at their maximum ranges while KPAGF soldiers fight the enemy’s infantry. The KPAGF plan indirect final protective fire when the enemy closes to within 300 m of their frontline units.

Antitank Defensive Position

7-49. Phase 3 is the AT defensive position, planned by the KPAGF regimental commander and executed by a KPAGF battalion commander. The AT defensive position will be set up along the most likely armor avenue
of approach into the forward infantry regiment’s AO. The KPAGF regimental commander will often select two parallel forward ridgelines running in the same direction as the enemy’s movement, so the armor vehicles can be hit by a crossfire from two, if not three, directions.

7-50. The KPAGF battalion creating this defensive position will receive additional resources, such as AT missiles or recoilless rifles. When the enemy is within range, the KPAGF main defense force—composed of tanks and AT guns, such as Saggars—will engage the enemy with direct fire with a mission to concentrate on and destroy the enemy armor vehicles first. As the enemy armor continues to advance, it will meet an AT/antipersonnel minefield where KPAGF soldiers armed with recoilless rifles or RPGs will engage as the vehicles become bogged down in their attempted breach. The KPAGF will attempt to contain the enemy within the kill zone and prevent the armor from flanking the defensive battalion’s position.

7-51. Any armor vehicles that successfully traverse the minefield will be attacked by additional RPG teams tasked to support by fire with the mission to prevent the armor from escaping off the desired axis of advance. Any remaining operational AT weapons from the forward-position disruption units can relocate to supplemental positions to continue engaging any enemy armor that passes through the kill zone and eliminate it.

7-52. The KPAGF battalion commander will also possess a counterattack unit composed of armor or AT weapon systems, often hidden from view and shielded from direct fire on the reverse slope of a hill. On order, the counterattack unit will maneuver and attack the enemy’s flank with the purpose to destroy the remaining armor threat before the enemy escapes the battalion’s AT defensive position. Even if some enemy armor vehicles pass through this first-echelon battalion AT defensive position, those vehicles could face other battalion AT defensive positions, regimental AT engagement areas, or even possibly a divisional engagement area.

7-53. Any units or personnel in the forward battalions not killed by the enemy are trained not to retreat, but to remain behind to set up stay-behind ambushes of enemy combat support and combat service support units as they enter the overrun KPAGF battalion’s AO. Figure 7-8 is a pictorial representation of a possible KPAGF battalion AT defensive position.
**Antitank Engagement Area**

7-54. Phase 4 of the KPAGF AT defense system is the AT engagement area, which is similar to the battalion AT defensive position but occurs at the regimental or divisional level. Any enemy units successfully making it through the forward regiment’s battalion AT defensive positions will likely run into an AT engagement area set up by other KPAGF units.

7-55. The attack is similar to the AT defensive position described above, but on a much larger scale. The KPAGF commander will select a location so the enemy units will be canalized and can be attacked on three, if not four, sides. Two platoons of SU-100 howitzers will likely be allocated for a direct fire role and up to two RPG-7 platoons for a regimental or divisional AT engagement area. Any additional weapons systems available, such as tanks and recoilless rifles, can also be used.

**Antitank Mobile Reserve**

7-56. Phase 5 of the KPAGF AT defense system is the AT mobile reserve, designed to destroy any tanks appearing unexpectedly within the KPAGF’s defensive system, especially in the vulnerable rear areas. This AT mobile reserve would confront any enemy tanks managing to survive the AT defensive positions, the regimental engagement areas, and the divisional engagement area. Each KPAGF division commander normally keeps two AT companies for this role and locates them between the first- and second-echelon units.

**Counterattack**

7-57. Phase 6, and the final piece of the AT defense system, is the counterattack conducted by the counterattack unit. All regimental and higher units in the KPAGF will possess a plan to conduct a counterattack to eliminate any enemy penetrations into their lines. Only the divisional counterattack force is shown on the division defense diagram in figure 7-6 on page 7-12, but each battalion, regiment, division, and corps will designate a counterattack unit.

7-58. Once a penetration becomes a possibility, the appropriate KPAGF commander will attempt to predict the direction in which the penetration will continue and then selects a counterattack position, normally 1 km to the rear of the penetrated unit. The type of counterattack—rapid, standard, or delayed—that is chosen by the KPAGF commander will depend on the depth of the penetration toward the unit’s rear area and the criticality of the position penetrated, as shown in table 7-2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counterattack Type</th>
<th>Regiment</th>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Corps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rapid</td>
<td>First-echelon platoon penetration</td>
<td>First-echelon company penetration</td>
<td>First-echelon battalion penetration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>First-echelon company penetration</td>
<td>First-echelon battalion penetration</td>
<td>First-echelon regiment penetration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delayed</td>
<td>First-echelon battalion penetration</td>
<td>First-echelon regiment penetration</td>
<td>First defense zone penetration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7-59. The normal KPAGF procedure at divisional level is to conduct a rapid counterattack for a company-level penetration, a standard counterattack for a battalion-level penetration, and a delayed counterattack for a regiment-level penetration. The difference between the types of counterattack is how fast the mission can be executed. For example, if a KPAGF infantry regiment received the mission to counterattack the penetration of one of its first-echelon battalions, the regimental commander would need to conduct a delayed counterattack—the type of counterattack with the longest time period before the mission can be accomplish—as it takes additional time and planning to execute. The division commander, however, might be able respond quicker with a standard counterattack against the same penetration, while the corps commander could respond the fastest with a rapid counterattack. The situation at the time and the counterattack unit available could also dictate what unit receives the counterattack mission. Once the unit for the counterattack is designated, the depth of the penetration into the KPAGF’s lines will determine what method the counterattack unit employs against the penetration.
TACTICAL DEFENSIVE ACTIONS—DETACHMENTS, BATTALIONS, AND SUBORDINATE UNITS

7-60. KPAGF detachments, battalions, and companies typically participate as part of a maneuver or area defense organized by a higher tactical command. KPAGF detachments and their subordinates are structured to execute one functional mission at a time. These units conduct tactical defensive actions employing SBPs and CBPs as part of either an area or mobile defense.

SIMPLE BATTLE POSITION

7-61. A simple battle position (SBP) is a defensive location oriented on a likely enemy avenue of approach. The development and construction of a SBP is selected on terrain well-suited to an assigned mission task. A SBP typically identifies the location of a small element, unit, piece of equipment, or system. The location of a SBP is not necessarily in complex terrain or coordinated with nearby battle positions. Improving a SBP—such as increasing C3D—is a continuous action, with an understanding of how much time is allowed to initially establish the SBP, available local resources, unit capabilities, and priorities of effort and support.

COMPLEX BATTLE POSITION

7-62. A complex battle position (CBP) is a defensive location designed to employ a combination of complex terrain, C3D, and engineer effort to protect the unit(s) in the position from detection and attack, and provide capabilities to defend and deny seizure and occupation by an enemy. North Korea has had 65 years to plan and prepare defensive positions, and the majority of these only need to be reinforced prior to hostilities. CBPs typically have the following characteristics that distinguish them from SBPs:

- Limited avenues of approach.
- Existing avenues of approach are observable by the defender.
- 360-degree defensive measures and protection from attack.
- Engineer effort that provides some countermobility obstacles that do not jeopardize C3D measures or otherwise reveal the CBP location.
- Sufficient logistics caches for intended defensive operations.
- Sanctuary from which to launch local tactical actions.

7-63. The location of a CBP is not necessarily oriented to an avenue of approach, as with a strongpoint. When sanctuary is the locational purpose, a CBP occupies terrain not likely to experience regular attention or use by an enemy unit. Figure 7-9 provides examples of SBPs and CBPs.

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**Figure 7-9. Simple and complex battle position symbols (example)**
FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF A BATTLE POSITION

7-64. The KPAGF commander of a detachment, battalion, or company defending in a battle position designates subordinate units with functional responsibilities, with titles that describe each unit’s function.

Disruption Element

7-65. The disruption element operates in a security zone to—

- Defeat enemy reconnaissance efforts.
- Determine the location, disposition, and composition of approaching enemy units.
- Report on observations and situational understanding.
- Coordinate actions and fires in conjunction with RISTA.
- Coordinate actions and fires with chemical-, biological-, radiological-, or nuclear-capable weapons systems.

7-66. Combat security outposts are typical of disruption capabilities employed outside of main defensive arrays and perimeters in an AO. They are generally composed of task-organized platoon- or squad-size elements. During counterreconnaissance and other security actions, other elements of a unit may be directed to support outpost mission tasks. See chapter 5 for more information on combat security outposts. Figure 7-10 on page 7-20 is a pictorial representation of a typical platoon with its orientation within a battle position.

Main Defense Element

7-67. The main defense element is to defeat or destroy an attacking unit. Designated elements may be directed to maneuver, attack, and defeat a penetration of the main defensive positions.

Reserve Element

7-68. The reserve element provides tactical flexibility. All KPAGF leaders consider probable and possible contingencies and identify a capability to respond to emergent situations. Some types of KPAGF reserves have an assigned mission task and are a committed element, but can be redirected to other actions based on command decision for effective defenses and mission success.

Support Element

7-69. The support element of a battle position has the mission of providing one or more of the following capabilities, including but not limited to—

- Rear service units.
- Command, control, and communications.
- Direct fires support.
- Indirect fires support.
- Support to nonlethal actions such as EIW.
- Engineer support.

ORGANIZING BATTLE POSITION ACTIONS

7-70. The organization of a defense concentrates available assets to mass combat power in designated kill zones. A kill zone is typically on a likely enemy avenue of approach. A detachment, battalion, or company commander specifies the functions and task organization of elements in a security zone or the main defenses of a defense zone.
Security Zone

7-71. The security zone is the area beyond the SBP or CBP perimeter where the KPAGF defeat enemy reconnaissance efforts, detect attacking units, disrupt and delay an enemy approach, and destroy key attacking units prior to engagement in the defense zone. A defense of a battle position may or may not include a security zone.

7-72. Defenders conduct continuous and aggressive counterreconnaissance activities to prevent the enemy from effective reconnaissance. The KPAGF observe avenues of approach to provide early warning; determine location, composition, and disposition of attackers; and direct integrated fires against key enemy systems or their components.

Defense Zones

7-73. The main defenses of a defense zone are the areas for conclusive actions to defeat or destroy attacking enemy units. A SBP will have its defense-zone fires integrated with those of adjacent SBPs. In the defense of a CBP, the defense zone can be limited to the area immediately surrounding the CBP that the defending units can influence with its direct fires, but can also be a much larger geographic area depending on the RISTA and integrated fires available. Defenders in a battle position prepare actions to defeat any penetration.
The KPAGF will place its command, control, communications, rear service units, indirect and direct support fire assets, reserve, and other supporting assets in the rear of the first defense zone and throughout the second and third defense zones. For an individual SBP, such as a combat security outpost, its immediate support is normally located inside the SBP perimeter. The support elements for a unit could be located within a CBP or can occupy a location noncontiguous to a CBP.

**EXECUTING DEFENSE OF A BATTLE POSITION**

7-75. The defense includes aggressive counterreconnaissance and other security measures in the security zone and counterreconnaissance actions in all defense zones, including those with combat support or rear service units. Disruption elements conduct battle handover to elements in the defense zone, where main defense elements defeat or destroy attacking enemy units.

7-76. The KPAGF uses restrictive terrain and engineer countermobility efforts to deny the enemy the ability to approach, seize, and occupy a defensive position. Countermobility actions shape the battlefield by disrupting the enemy’s approach march, blocking avenues of approach, and turning the enemy into and fixing it in kill zones. Engineer support can shift to mobility support for reserve or other elements’ maneuver options, based on priorities of support and available time.

7-77. To keep the enemy from discovering the nature of the KPAGF defenses and to draw fire away from actual units, defenders will establish dummy firing positions and battle positions. In addition to enhancing unit protection, the KPAGF will employ deception positions as an economy-of-force measure to portray strength. A reverse slope defense can mask main defensive positions from enemy observation and direct fire. This type of defense can also isolate frontal elements of an attacking unit as they cross the topographic crest. Other considerations can include C3D and cultural standoff to deny the enemy the ability to detect or attack the defenses. Figure 7-11 on page 7-22 is an example of a CBP within an urban environment.

7-78. Continuous RISTA and integrated fires are fundamental to destroying the enemy in the defense zones. Integrated air defense systems complement the fundamental concept of all-arms air defense and fires. Direct and indirect fires mass in kill zones to cover obstacles and fix or isolate the enemy. Defenders employ fires to—

- Degrade attackers along avenues of approach and in areas of temporary concentration.
- Defeat or destroy attackers in the defense zones.
- Destroy penetration of battle positions.
- Support counterattacking units.
Certain operational environments add complexity to KPA defensive operations, both north and south of the DMZ.

**URBAN OPERATIONS**

7-80. The KPAGF will likely avoid urban operations in its own country—with the possible exception of Pyongyang—for several reasons. First, the large number of underground facilities throughout the country,
and especially along the DMZ, provide the KPAGF the capability to fight from prepared positions without concentrating in the cities, where their units would become a lucrative target. Second, the KPAGF will likely avoid concentrating units in a small area except where they are protected by underground facilities specifically designed to fight the enemy. Lastly, most the core supporters of the Kim regime can be found in the Pyongyang area. The KPAGF may decide to protect their country’s capital city and regime supporters, while having less inclination to do the same for the other two classes of North Korean citizens throughout the rest of the country.

**SUBTERRANEAN OPERATIONS**

7-81. The KPAGF may rely on subterranean operations when on the defense. The nature of the KPAGF subterranean operations will be vastly different depending on whether the defense is taking place north or south of the DMZ. There is a large number of underground facilities throughout North Korea, while defense fortifications the KPAGF build in South Korea would only be what could be accomplished in the time available. The KPAGF’s familiarity with underground facilities may give them a slight advantage against their enemies in any operations conducted underground.

**NORTH OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE**

7-82. Estimates of the number of underground facilities for military or governmental use within North Korea range from 11,000 to 14,000. The country has taken much of its military and governmental activity below ground because of the massive destruction that United Nations airplanes caused to above-ground facilities during the Korean War, and as a means to avoid enemy overhead collection opportunities. The actual amount of subterranean activity is only speculation, however, and often underground excavations are only discovered by the amount of debris generated—whether left on site or transported away.

7-83. North Korean use of underground concrete bunkers dates back to at least January 1951, when the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency located a bunker designed specifically for use by the contemporary North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung, a short distance outside of Pyongyang. Underground construction has slowed down in the last decade due to a materiel shortage, the lack of heavy equipment, and frequent electrical blackouts throughout the country. Nevertheless, work on underground facilities continues with much of it formerly done by machinery now being completed using manual labor.

7-84. The North Korean Government recruits its citizens, usually in their late teens, into distinctive military units constructing or operating specialized underground facilities. The soldiers sign a confidentiality agreement and the North Korean Government expects the individuals to work in the same facility until they turn 60 years old. The KPAGF expect the male soldiers to find wives from among their coworkers, but are forbidden to marry until they have served 10 years in the military. The KPAGF, however, allow females to marry after they reach the age of 24. The North Korean Government does not usually allow the workers outside of their facility, even to see their families, and defectors call the service in these underground facilities more like a prison sentence than an occupation.

7-85. Since the western corridor has been the traditional route used by armies moving north-south in Korea for centuries, the KPAGF have concentrated much of their subterranean construction in this western region of the country. The North Korean terrain varies widely, with the most arduous terrain generally in the eastern part of the country and less difficult terrain in the west. The eastern mountains are rugged and normally best suited for light infantry operations. The central region, containing part of the Taebak Mountains, is rugged, but there are some routes suitable for light armored vehicles. The western part of North Korea is least forbidding in terms of terrain. Both the North Korean capital city of Pyongyang and the South Korean capital city of Seoul lie on the western side of the peninsula. The region’s geological formations, with substantial granite and other metamorphic hard rock formations, provide natural protection against damage from the weapons of war—even the most modern equipment. North Korea has enhanced nature by digging underground in order to protect itself from aerial attack while hiding its activities from overhead intelligence collection efforts. All military branches and civilian agencies are involved in keeping their activities shielded from outside prying eyes. The North Koreans use their underground construction not only for defensive purposes, but as places to launch offensive operations from as well.
7-86. The KPA is the major beneficiary of North Korea’s subterranean activities. North Korean underground facilities stretch along the DMZ from east to west coasts, creating a fortified defensive belt along the entire border between North and South Korea. The bunkers and underground facilities take advantage of the mountainous terrain located along most of the mutual boundary. Due to the direction the mountains run in the Kaesong region, north of Panmunjom, the KPA opted to build many “Y” type bunkers. A Y bunker is normally built with the base of the Y along a ridgeline. Two other bunkers split off from the main bunker and are angled down each side of the ridge’s slope. When viewed from the air, the bunkers appear to be shaped similar to the letter Y. The KPAGF built many of these bunkers from precast concrete and covered them with rocks and dirt. The bunkers increase protection for KPA soldiers from the anticipated direction of attack when the terrain does not.

Hardened Artillery Sites

7-87. The KPAGF deploys 65–70% of its entire military, including artillery, in three defensive belts located within 80 km of the mutual border between the two Koreas. The KPAGF selected their current artillery positions so approximately two-thirds of each weapon’s range lies inside South Korean territory. Many of the artillery units operate from a hardened artillery site (HARTS), a robust position with a complex network of subterranean chambers connected by tunnels. It contains shelters, usually underground, for ammunition, fire direction center, barracks, mess hall, latrine facilities, bathhouse, recreation room, classroom, and outdoor recreation facilities. Typical HARTS may contain shooting positions for three to eight artillery pieces.

7-88. While North Korea’s first defensive belt contains the majority of the HARTS, the second and third defensive belts encompass some as well. These second- and third-belt sites may not be manned, depending on the tactical situation. The KPAGF artillery units have already surveyed the unoccupied HARTS, however, in order to provide immediate indirect fires once occupied by the firing unit. It is estimated that North Korea has constructed some 500 HARTS in the central and western corridors, the most likely avenue of advance for an enemy offensive from the south. The KPAGF built the HARTS in the 1950s at mountain fronts, but later switched to positions near mountain tops. Figure 4-14 on page 4-40 provides an example of a HARTS.

7-89. Based on the terrain, the HARTS could be entirely manmade or a modification of a natural cave or cave system. If needed, a HARTS may contain surface trenches for both communications purposes and internal self-defense, including machine gun pillboxes for use against ground attack. The entrance doors to the bunkers will often be made of either solid steel or hollow steel with concrete poured between the metal slabs for additional protection. The passageways in a HARTS are typically 2–3 m in height and width and lined with 20–40 cm of concrete, often reinforced with steel. HARTS are equipped with an exhaust fan and a ventilation system to remove the smoke produced when firing for long periods of time. If the artillery is of the towed variety, the artillery prime movers will likely be nearby in a covered area for protection from counterartillery or direct aerial fire attack. Tunnels will likely connect the various guns so crew members can move between the positions without being seen by their enemy or becoming vulnerable to direct or indirect fire.

7-90. Each artillery piece in a HARTS will feature its own gun platform, crew cover, and ammunition storage areas. Each firing position, as some guns will have more than one, features a sheltered location consisting, at a minimum, of a crushed rock pad surrounded by a high berm created from the rock and dirt excavated during the construction process. Some HARTS will also contain a concrete pad for the artillery pieces or concrete walls. The HARTS position will be situated in such a way that the artillery tube or multiple rocket launcher system can be fired from inside its covered position.

7-91. Each gun or multiple rocket launcher system emplacement will likely have immediate access to one to four units of fire, consisting of 120 rounds per gun. It is estimated that the KPAGF store 30–90 days of additional ammunition in the local area. In offensive operations, the KPAGF planning factor is four units of fire on day one and two units of fire for the next 2 days, before moving forward to a new position. In defensive operations, the KPAGF plan on two units of fire per day. ZPU-2 or ZPU-4 heavy antiaircraft machine gun companies in protected positions, most likely crewed by local female militia members, will protect most HARTS from aerial attack.
Fortified Tank Positions

7-92. The KPAGF not only place their infantry in underground facilities, but also place their armor in fortified tank positions for protection against indirect fire and aerial targeting. The KPAGF tanks do not expect to fight from these positions. A fortified tank position is similar to a HARTS, but must be constructed at the bottom of the hill or ridge.

7-93. There are two primary types of fortified tank positions. In the first type, the tank must enter through the front entrance. In the other type, there is a rear entrance and the tank drives through the tunnel to its firing point. Both types are built similarly, except for the entrance/exit procedures. There is an earthen or rock berm in front of the entrance to provide the tank with a hull defilade firing position.

7-94. There are prepared machine gun positions on the flanks of the tank to prevent enemy infantry from approaching. Inside the tunnels are steel doors at various points in order to close them off. The tunnels also contain a ventilation system to remove exhaust fumes and smoke. The tanks can maneuver out of their positions or flee out of the back entrance if it is available.

Infantry Company Strongpoint

7-95. There are many infantry company strongpoints that are actually CBPs located 200–1000 m north of the DMZ; these contain concrete tunnels for shelter against indirect and aerial fire and for safe storage of food and ammunition. A typical strongpoint includes three interconnected tunnels burrowed through the upper portion of a hill or ridge. Within the tunnels are living quarters, ammunition storage areas, a water storage unit or well, and perhaps a kitchen. Two of the tunnel entrances face the expected enemy’s avenue of approach, and the third is on the reverse side of the hill. All three openings are guarded with a machine gun pillbox.

7-96. The concrete and steel pillboxes take maximum advantage of natural and artificial camouflage in order to blend in with the environment. Each of the pillboxes has two or three firing ports, and some are equipped with two machine guns. Some of these strongpoints will have prepared mortar positions on the reverse slope of the hill or ridge. There are heavy steel doors with rubber gaskets at each tunnel entrance that can be sealed to protect the occupants from chemical, biological, or radiological contamination. Open communications trenches interconnect the pillboxes and contain prepared fighting positions for soldiers with small arms.

Naval Underground Facilities

7-97. The Korean People’s Army Navy (KPAN) is responsible for North Korean coastal defense and operates several subterranean activities to support its mission. Like the KPAGF, the KPAN also uses HARTS situated on likely landing spots along both coasts, near major ports, and on KPAN naval bases. HARTS have been spotted on islands off North Korea’s western coast that can cover the Northern Limit Line, the naval dividing line between North and South Korea. This line is an extension of the military demarcation line on the peninsula, but is located over the water. Evidence indicates the KPAN, sometime around November 2011, constructed 20 new artillery positions in Hwanghaedo Province capable of reaching the Northern Limit Line. It is likely that there are at least 1,000 KPAN artillery pieces designated for defensive operations, mostly 76.2-mm and 130-mm, on the North Korean west coast alone.

7-98. The KPAN also uses underground facilities to store some of its warships for protection from aerial attack. The KPAN uses its subterranean areas for ammunition and fuel storage, training, operations centers, and command posts. Some of these protected tunnels will even allow KPAN boats to travel from their underground berths all the way to the sea without being seen from the air. According to one Central Intelligence Agency report, at least 10 port cities provide underground berthing facilities for ships. Once the KPAN ships leave their protective positions, however, they become susceptible to aerial attacks.

Air Force Underground Facilities

7-99. Because the KPA does not believe the Korean People’s Army Air Force (KPAAF) can obtain air superiority in the skies, ground antiaircraft fire as well as C3D will serve as the best protection for the KPAGF against enemy aircraft. A KPA manual smuggled out of North Korea in 2010 emphasizes the protection of facilities located in cave strongholds, such as command posts, fighter jet bases, naval bases, and runways.
This realization over the last half-century caused the KPAAF to build many of its airfields with underground runways or hangers for protection from aerial attack.

7-100. The KPA takes great solace in the knowledge that 1999 NATO aerial attacks in the former Yugoslav actually destroyed only 13 of the Serbs’ 300 tanks, despite early claims that the attacks destroyed 40% of all Serbian armored targets. The KPA believes its underground facilities, paired with its C3D operations, will only further reduce its units’ vulnerability to aerial attacks. The KPAAF conducts much of its support operations from underground facilities. This includes airplane manufacturing; vehicle, fuel, and ammunition storage; aircraft repairs and maintenance; and ground training.

7-101. While many KPAAF runways may be soft-surfed, at least 20 North Korean airfields feature some type of underground aircraft shelters, dispersal facilities, or maintenance bays. North Korean airfields often feature taxiways leading away from the runways to fortified dispersal tunnels located in nearby hills. The distance to these protective locations may be as far as 1–2 km from the actual runways. The doors to these tunnels often feature moveable blast walls, concrete barriers, or earth blast barriers.

7-102. Inside the dispersal area, the tunnels may curve within the hill and contain several separate rooms. Most tunnels are 14 m wide and 10 m high, and they may be as long as 600 m in length. Some tunnels feature internal blast walls cordon off the inside rooms from the main tunnel. At Sunchon Air Base, possibly the most important KPA airfield, the KPAAF stores at least half of all its MiG-29 and Su-25s airplanes in underground hangers. The MiG-29 is the KPAAF’s most advanced fighter, and the Su-25 is the KPAAF’s only modern ground attack airplane. The KPAAF operates one “underground” air base and is in the process of constructing a second. The completed underground air strip is located near the western coastal town of Onchon-up. The base under construction is on the east coast at Kangja-ri and will serve as a replacement for the nearby Kangja-ri highway strip—a road that can be used as a runway. These two bases feature runways and concrete taxiways that extend into the nearby mountains so airplanes can take off without taxiing in the open or land directly into the protection of the mountains.

7-103. Due to the fear of aerial attack, the KPAAF operates over 50 ground-control intercept and early-warning radar facilities throughout North Korea. While the system is overlapping, there are blind spots due to the mountainous terrain. Many of these ground-control intercept and radar facilities operate from underground locations. In many cases, the actual radar system is mounted on a hydraulic lift system the KPAAF personnel can raise out of the ground when in use. When the radar is not in use or maintenance is needed, the radar operators can retract the system to reduce its vulnerability to an enemy attack.

7-104. Some of the KPAAF air defense weapon systems may also be housed in underground facilities. The air defense weapons are also situated on retractable lifts and only elevated when preparing to fire. The underground air defense complex will house additional missile launchers, support vehicles, administrative offices, and crew sleeping quarters. It is likely that 20% of the air defense bases are unoccupied at any one time, allowing the crews to change locations depending on the tactical situation.

**Logistical Facilities**

7-105. The KPA maintains a 2- to 3-month level of strategic supply reserves in case of war. These strategic stocks include food (primarily rice); petroleum, oils, and lubricants for its armored units; and ammunition of all types. The KPA stockpiles these war materiels in underground facilities constructed for this purpose. At one time it was estimated that North Korea stores 1.2 million tons of food, 1.46 million tons of fuel, and 1.67 million tons of ammunition in subterranean facilities. Reports indicate North Korea now constructs its fueling facilities underground in the missile launch sites. The KPA provides security for these below-ground facilities, as the resources are not available for general public use. It is likely that some of the supplies are colocated with units using underground facilities such as HARTS, where several days’ worth of ammunition is already on hand. The movement of supplies from these facilities, if conducted above ground, would likely to occur at night when there is limited visibility. The KPA may use trucks, civilian tractors, carts pulled by animals or people, or porters to move the supplies to where they are needed on the battlefield.

7-106. North Korea may operate up to 300 underground munitions factories supported by numerous other civilian factories, also built underground. If needed, the country could convert some of these civilian-goods factories to war production. The construction of underground manufacturing plants dates back to the Korean War, when North Korea felt compelled to do so to avoid United Nations air strikes. After the armistice in
1953, underground factory construction halted due to the fiscal reality of the increased cost of construction projects in a subterranean environment. In 1964, however, Kim Il Sung reinstated his underground facility construction policy by stating that all new major plants must be built underground instead of on the surface.

7-107. Almost all of North Korea’s critical industries are now located underground. About 180 factories dedicated for military support or capable of being converted are located in the Jagang-do region, a mountainous province adjacent to China. Often the workers do not even know the plant’s final product, but only their small role in the process. The factories’ subterranean locations may make it difficult for any military to destroy North Korea’s military production capability.

**SOUTH OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE**

7-108. If it is necessary to go on the defense within a major South Korean city containing an underground infrastructure network, it is likely the KPAGF will use those networks to move from building to building to avoid exposure above ground. This would then become an urban operation with its associated issues. It is likely the KPAGF would attempt to use CBPs built in urban South Korean areas as they would in North Korea. The primary difference would be the amount of time available to create these CBPs; therefore the level of sophistication would be less than CBPs found north of the DMZ, though the KPAGF would create the strongest CBPs possible with the time and resources available.
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Chapter 8

Counterstability Actions

No peace treaty has been signed to end the Korean War; only an armistice is currently in place. As such, North Korea has conducted counterstability operations in South Korea since the cease-fire began in 1953. The purpose of North Korean counterstability actions is to counteract the actions of an enemy to create a stable environment for the civilian population to live in and flourish. North Korean counterstability actions can include regular and irregular Korean People’s Army (KPA) activities to degrade and disrupt an enemy’s civil security, law enforcement, public services, infrastructure, and effective governance, and destroy enemy resolve to resist the eventual outcome of the unification of Korea under the Kim regime. The methodology to conduct counterstability operations will change depending on the environment, from the current semipeaceful state between North and South Korea to the possibility of renewed combat operations on the peninsula.

PURPOSE OF COUNTERSTABILITY ACTIONS

8-1. The purpose of KPA counterstability actions is to create conditions enabling the successful design and execution of operations in a particular operational environment (OE) in order to complete a mission. Counterstability actions complement other regular or irregular KPA offensive and defensive tasks to counter the stability operations of South Korea and its coalition partners or allies. Counterstability is an integral aspect of KPA military operations and often causes an impact beyond the tactical and operational effects of armed combat. Whether conducted by regular forces, irregular forces, combinations of regular and irregular forces, or willing or coerced civilians, counterstability actions focus on disrupting major areas of potential stability in an OE. The KPA plans, prepares, and executes counterstability activities to support tactical and operational missions and strategic goals in order to—

- Discredit enemy civil law enforcement or internal security forces.
- Deride enemy judicial processes.
- Damage enemy civilian infrastructure.
- Degrade enemy civil governance.
- Dissuade South Koreans from supporting the enemy.
- Disrupt coalition partner or ally support to the enemy.
- Dislocate enemy from regional or global community and diaspora support.
- Defeat enemy military and internal security operations.
- Destroy enemy civilian and military resolve to resist North Korea.

PLANNING COUNTERSTABILITY ACTIONS

8-2. The KPA, with assistance from the Korean Workers’ Party, will exploit conditions of instability to enhance achieving its goals and objectives during both conflict and non-conflict periods. Counterstability actions range from covert influence to overt violence. The KPA will create conditions, unstable and otherwise, to promote a gradual acceptance of its objectives by the South Korean people, regional powers, and even eventual acceptance and support from transnational institutions.

8-3. If war were to break out on the Korean Peninsula, the KPA would attempt to exceed South Korea’s capacity to exercise effective governance, maintain civil order and obedience, and ensure economic development. A principal aim would be to sustain recurring incidents in the South Korean population, create
disruptive conditions that threaten effective South Korean governance, and defeat South Korea’s practical resolve. Examples of instability actions that North Korea can institute or co-opt against South Korean targets include but are not limited to—

- Computer warfare aimed at civilian computer systems.
- Recurrent acts of terrorism within South Korea by North Korean supporters or special operations forces (SOF) personnel.
- Degrading or making infrastructure obsolete to diminish civilian quality of life.
- Reducing effectiveness or attempting to corrupt law enforcement forces.
- Reducing effectiveness or attempting to corrupt security forces.
- A combination of North Korean sympathizers and SOF operating similarly to guerrillas conducting paramilitary operations.
- Supporting charismatic individuals and special interest groups that disrupt effective civil governance; possibly focusing on the reunification of the country and that “brothers” should not kill each other.
- Manmade disasters by KPA SOF or North Korean sympathizers.
- Increased criminal activities, possibly agitated by KPA SOF or North Korean supporters.

8-4. Figure 8-1 provides examples of actions, targets, and the effects that North Korea hopes to achieve to destabilize the South Korean Government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task to Action</th>
<th>Enemy Target</th>
<th>Effect to Achieve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discredit</td>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
<td>Unsafe environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degradate</td>
<td>Judicial processes</td>
<td>Doubtful rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disrupt</td>
<td>Social services</td>
<td>Insufficient well-being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dislocate</td>
<td>Civil governance</td>
<td>Ineffective functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damage</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Unproductive economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disintegrate</td>
<td>South Korean population</td>
<td>Unsupportive citizenry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dislocate</td>
<td>Partnerly support</td>
<td>Isolated enemy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroy</td>
<td>Enemy resolve</td>
<td>Submissive population</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 8-1. Counterstability actions to create conditions and effects**

8-5. An integrated KPA counterstability concept would typically require a long-term framework, with tasks that expand and sustain unstable conditions until North Korea obtains the ability to achieve its plans and policies. The range of counterstability tasks and missions can include support to military operations, from small-scale military or paramilitary engagements to participation in major military operations. Related coercive activities in the civilian sector often include crime and acts of terrorism. North Korea can coordinate implementation at any point along this range of military, paramilitary, or nonmilitary civil activities in order to destabilize the operations of its enemies and enhance the electronic intelligence warfare effects of its agenda. Counterstability tasks to discredit South Korea and its allies can include but would not be limited to—

- Military engagement missions against South Korea and its allies.
- Peace operations to keep or enforce international peace agreements signed by North Korea.
- Offering civil governance and social well-being activities to make South Korea look bad if they are refused, such as participating in the Olympics, family reunions, and joint North Korea/South Korea ventures.
- Highlighting corruption and other problems within South Korea, such as the imprisonment of a former South Korean president.
- Placing pressure on the international community and South Korea regarding the humanitarian crisis caused by international sanctions through highlighting the effects on North Korean children.
- Military combat operations against South Korea and its allies.

8-6. North Korea recognizes that decisions and actions by its likely enemies are normally compliant with international conventions and legal restrictions on conduct of war activities. International forces deployed to the peninsula will typically act consistent with host-nation laws and regulations when operating as part of a coalition or alliance, and conduct operations with rules of engagement that are typically more restrictive than actions demonstrated by the KPA.

8-7. Mission planning of counterstability actions includes combinations of offensive and defensive tasks. Key elements in planning North Korean counterstability tasks include—
- Determine the goals and objectives.
- Define the time available for plans, actions, and mission completion.
- Define the amount of time allowed to plan and prepare for operations.
- Organize forces by function for particular missions.
- Coordinate electronic intelligence warfare activities in support of each mission.
- Incorporate recurring observations into refined plans and actions.

8-8. Counterstability actions require detailed reconnaissance and surveillance to collect information, develop situational awareness, and determine situational understanding of OE conditions. This continuous intelligence preparation and production, often complemented with support of a local network, provides an appreciation of how to most effectively conduct actions with available resources in order to achieve specified and implied tasks. Actions will be either offensive or defensive in nature and execution. A conceptual cycle of planning, preparation, execution, and exploitation results in continuous assessment and evaluation. Learning from this cycle is integrated into subsequent planning and action. Figure 8-2 shows the steps in the cycle and the continuous nature of the cycle itself.

8-9. Offensive counterstability actions use KPA offensive doctrinal guidance and purposes to shape the planning process. The two types of offensive action are the planned offense and the situational offense. A planned offense implements an offensive mission task when there is sufficient time and knowledge of the situation to prepare and rehearse forces for specific tasks. Typically, the enemy is in a defensive position or in a known location. A situational offense is used when tactical opportunities arise unexpectedly or on short notice. Planning and preparing for this type of action may have to be abbreviated in order to take advantage of an opportunity. See chapter 6 for more information on offensive actions.

8-10. Defensive counterstability actions also apply KPA doctrinal guidance and purposes. The two types of defensive actions are the planned defense and the situational defense. A planned defense is a defensive mission task conducted when sufficient time and knowledge of an OE and enemy situation allow preparation
and rehearsal of forces for a deliberate defense. The decision to use a situational defense can occur when conditions change quickly and the KPA must adopt a defensive posture in a limited amount of time with immediately available resources. In post-hostility periods and the occupation of their country by external forces, the most ardent Kim supporters—including those with guerrilla training—may initiate counterstability operations spontaneously, due to decades of indoctrination of a total resistance strategy by all North Korean people. See chapter 7 for more information on offensive actions.

THREATS AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

8-11. Criminal activity exists at every level of society as a destabilizing factor in all environments, whether it is in North or South Korea. In peacetime, much of the crime in North Korea is local or conducted by government officials. In wartime, it is likely that North Korea would work with criminal elements in South Korea if it was to their mutual advantage. The presence of criminals as a threat to the South Korean Government and its allies, whatever their level of capability in independent or affiliated activities, can complement other South Korean opponents conducting counterstability operations.

8-12. Whether or not criminal activities are coordinated with KPA forces for deliberate counterstability actions, the social impact of criminal actions typically degrades enemy capability to stabilize conditions in the South Korean population. Criminals can also conduct criminal actions separate from North Korean forces in support of their own goals and objectives. If North Korea is defeated and the country occupied, collaborating criminal organizations will likely continue to operate and possibly coordinate with the KPA, the Korean Workers’ Party, or their remnants.

8-13. Criminal organizations generally fall into three organizational types: gangs, large-scale criminal networks, and transnational criminal organizations. Typical examples of these types are shown in figures 8-3, below, 8-4 on page 8-5, and 8-5 on page 8-6, respectively. Gangs and criminal networks may develop into larger criminal networks, and can evolve into transnational criminal organizations. The lines of separation between echelons of capability and criminal influence can be purposely vague. Organizational structure can be relatively flat or involve multiple levels of control and commodity marketing, sales, and distribution.

![Figure 8-3. Criminal gang organizational structure (example)](image)

8-14. Basic differences exist, however, in how these three types of organizations are structured and how they typically operate. Gangs and small-scale networks tend to have an internally publicized organizational structure and leadership focused on localized crime, protection of territorial or commodity operations in a gang-declared area, and coercion of a local population. Their disruptive impact on the populace is significant, even when they are not affiliated with KPA forces.

8-15. Large-scale criminal networks expand illicit commodity operations, increase organizational profits, and typically focus on producing or acquiring and trafficking a product and protecting market distribution and territory. These networks and gangs can have an enduring association, but can also adapt to emergent opportunities to expand criminal control for profit and power. Criminal networks controlling local or regional markets may have ties to and frequently do business with criminal organizations in other regions or countries.
This enterprise expansion can lead to a larger networks of customers, intermediary outlets, access to advanced technologies, and other capabilities and resources for successful large-scale criminal ventures.

Figure 8-4. Criminal large-scale network organizational structure (example)

8-16. Criminal networks may develop into expansive criminal networks or transnational criminal organizations, depending on leadership or opportunities. These organizations may have ambitious economic or political agendas. They often fill the power vacuum in poorly governed or ungoverned geographic regions, and can challenge governmental control of a region and its population. In individual cases, this type of criminal organization can evolve into a de facto insurgency, with goals and objectives geared toward increasing wealth, power, or influence. Criminals can cooperate in transnational ventures, often taking advantage of the increasing ease and effectiveness of global communications. Globalization and the increased legitimate and illegitimate movement of people across contested borders and among nation-states add significant capabilities to criminal activities and the disruption of enemy governance or use of military forces.

8-17. The nature of shared goals or interests determines the tenure, type of tactical relationship, and degree of affiliation. Any affiliation depends on the needs of the criminal organization at a particular time. Criminals and criminal organizations may oppose other criminal actors whose activities degrade the success of a criminal enterprise. Criminal motivations vary, but are seldom from a political or religious ideology. These organizations may become affiliated with KPA military or paramilitary forces for mutual benefit if their interests coincide. Activities can range from misdemeanor acts, such as petty theft, to major felony crimes such as murder. Any of these can sap the resources and ability of the South Korean Government, military forces, nongovernmental organizations, or supporting coalition or allied forces to increase OE stability.
PREPARING COUNTERSTABILITY ACTIONS

8-18. In the preparation phase—whether in war or peacetime—North Korea will focus on ways to apply all available resources and the full range of actions to place the enemy in a vulnerable position. North Korea will prepare the South Korean OE and its own organizations to achieve a mission purpose, and considers mission requirements for branches and sequels to a designated counterstability task. Aspects of camouflage, concealment, cover, deception, or complex terrain provide degrees of force protection and operational security to KPA plans, preparations, and actions. As in typical offensive and defensive actions, key considerations include but are not limited to—

- Conduct reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition.
- Identify the mission objective.
- Coordinate functional support and logistics.
- Determine plans and actions.
- Rehearse critical actions and finalize mission order.
- Position forces and resources for mission execution.
EXECUTING COUNTERSTABILITY ACTIONS

8-19. Counterstability actions may appear as discrete events when executed; however, North Korea typically plans and operates with a comprehensive approach to conducting actions in order to achieve unity of effort toward a primary objective. Cooperation and coordination by North Korea leverages the capabilities of disparate actors to conduct a broad array of actions. Shared understanding and appreciation may be displayed as a formal organization, long-term association, or temporary affiliation for mutual benefit.

8-20. North Korean leaders understand actors are not compelled to work together toward one common goal, but can often be convinced to mutually support and benefit from select activities. One example would be individuals or groups providing goods to North Korea from overseas locations, contrary to international sanctions. A desired end state can be crafted to accommodate the best interests and goals of both North Korea and diverse participating actors.

8-21. North Korea may desire to create legitimacy for its actions, and typically seeks to establish control of a process, resources, or commodity with the acceptance of a target audience. The manner in which North Korea and cooperating organizations conduct themselves in long-term operations can either foster legitimacy or cause indirect or direct resistance to their actions. Internally, North Korea uses the creation of a cult following of the Kim family to provide legitimacy of the current government to its people. North Korea uses draconian measures, such as sending people to gulags or executing them after show trials, to stifle any dissent from its citizens. Consent or resistance to North Korea in the region is typically based on fear of a return to an active conventional war on the peninsula or the start of nuclear war. North Korea often uses the other side’s fear of these two types of warfare as blackmail to receive external support.

8-22. North Korean actions may concentrate on convincing the South Korean populace that the actions of its established governmental organizations are dysfunctional or corrupt, and a mandate proclaimed by North Korea offers an improvement. In order to increase support of North Korea’s goals and objectives on the Korean Peninsula, the country would conduct operations to destabilize South Korea’s civil and military organizational performance, disrupt support to South Korea by coalition partners or allies, and defeat South Korean military operations. North Korea may attempt to replace South Korea’s destabilized systems with demonstrated support system capabilities as a method to obtain active or passive acceptance by the South Korean population.

8-23. In addition to offensive and defensive operations by military forces, acts of crime and terrorism can be applied to increase the types and number of recurring destabilizing incidents the South Korean Government must confront. The examples in this chapter demonstrate how crime and terrorism can be integral to North Korean operations, with a cumulative effect to defeat the resolve of South Korean leaders and the populace to resist North Korea’s goals and objectives.

NORTH KOREAN ACTIONS WITHIN THE SOUTH KOREAN POPULATION

8-24. Infiltrating governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations in South Korea is a possible way for North Korea to disrupt operations and relationships among enemy actors and institutions. Intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations are the primary sources of subject matter expertise in many essential services and governance responsibilities. They are also the primary provider of humanitarian, infrastructure, and essential services in South Korea. Intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations usually have experienced and detailed knowledge of the civil environment within which they operate. In this principally civilian context, a diverse array of noncombatants can be a significant resource to be manipulated by the KPA or the Korean Workers’ Party.

REGULAR-FORCE INSTABILITY ACTIVITIES

8-25. Since the armistice ended the fighting in 1953, North Korea has conducted activities within South Korea or in South Korean territorial waters in a number of ways. Two examples are the sinking of the South Korean corvette, ROKS CHEONAN, and the artillery attack against Yeonpyeong Island. The first may demonstrate the inability of South Korean naval forces to protect themselves from attack, while the second showed the vulnerability of South Korean civilians residing within range of North Korean artillery units.
On 26 March 2010, an explosion ripped the CHEONAN as it cruised the Yellow Sea a short distance south of the disputed Northern Limit Line. Despite the heroic efforts of the South Korean Navy, only 58 of the 104 sailors on board survived the attack. North Korea denied any role in the sinking, but a joint investigation with experts from five countries concluded that a torpedo fired from a North Korean submarine sank the ship. Russia later conducted its own investigation and determined the evidence was insufficient to determine a culprit.

On 23 November 2010, North Korean artillery units on Mudo Island and the mainland launched an attack with 122-mm multiple rocket launchers on Yeonpyeong Island. This occurred after a South Korean Marine K-9 artillery battery stationed on the island refused to stop its scheduled artillery exercise after a North Korea directive. The Marine battery conducted counterbattery fire on the firing units. The North Korean artillery barrage killed two South Korean Marines and two civilians who lived on the island. The South Korean Government decided to evacuate approximately 200 civilians to its mainland. After tensions rose throughout the day, calmer heads prevailed and the situation returned to normal.

These two incidents indicate the vulnerability of not only South Korea’s civilians, but also of its military units to surprise attacks from North Korean forces. The threat of future North Korean provocations keeps tensions high in South Korea and could result in instability within its populace.

**Special Operations Forces Instability Activities**

North Korean SOF and Korean Workers’ Party forces are active and often operate in South Korea. During the 1960s, North Korean military personnel and agents infiltrated into South Korea in an attempt to create an insurgency similar to the one occurring in South Vietnam at the same time. The most well-known SOF action was the 1968 attempt to assassinate the South Korean president in order to jump-start an insurgency. See page 8-9 for additional details on this incident.

Since 1953, North Korean has sent in SOF personnel into South Korea many times for reconnaissance, direct action missions, and attempted conversion of local civilians to communism. How many times this has happened is unknown, but there have been numerous documented incidents. One example occurred in September 1996: A North Korean submarine ran aground in South Korea while on a mission to retrieve a SOF reconnaissance team. Left on its own, the team tried to make its way back to North Korea through the demilitarized zone (DMZ). After a 50-day manhunt, South Korean forces killed or apprehended the entire team at the cost of 11 of their own soldiers’ lives.

**Irregular Forces Activities**

Irregular forces include—but are not limited to—terrorists, insurgents, guerrillas, criminals, active supporters, passive supporters, and independent actors. The Korean Peninsula is unique, as North Korea does not have most of these groups inside its own country, but in the case of a conflict these groups could arise to become a threat to the country’s government. Within North Korea, there are no known terrorist groups, insurgents, or guerrillas working against the Kim regime. While there is a high level of corruption in North Korea, there appears to be no major criminal enterprise working independently of a governmental official. These criminal groups are not known to be actively or passively operating against the Kim regime. As evidenced by the songbun system described in chapter 3, however, there are both active supporters of the Kim regime and citizens that are neutral about the government. Any North Korean who is vocal against the current government is already a political prisoner in the gulag system.

In the event of war, these groups may appear on the battlefield. North Korea, most likely through its SOF and Korean Workers’ Party clandestine agents, may work through its active supporters in South Korea to destabilize the country. There is criminal activity in South Korea, but it is unlikely that criminal elements will join North Korea against their own government. Figure 6-10 on page 6-19 demonstrates one possible role that a North Korean clandestine operative could play in conjunction with KPA SOF in a dispersed attack. If the war moved into North Korea, it is possible that individual separated North Korean units or civilians could become guerrilla units operating against the enemy.
TERRORISM AND MISSION TASK EXECUTION

8-33. Terrorism is the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political (JP 3-07.2). Terrorism strategies are typically long-term commitments to degrade the resilience of an enemy in order to obtain concessions. Whether acts of terrorism are deliberate, apparently random, or purposely haphazard, the physical, symbolic, and psychological effects can diminish a population’s confidence in its key leaders and governing institutions. The local, regional, international, and transnational attention on acts of terrorism by state or non-state actors can often isolate an enemy from its supporting population. The themes and messages promoted by acts of terrorism can accentuate anxiety, demoralize the resolve of a population and its leaders, and eventually contribute to defeat of an enemy.

North Korean Use of Terrorism

8-34. North Korea uses terrorism as a way to cause significant psychological or physical effects on the South Korean population through the anxiety or fear caused by a stated intention to use or the actual use of violence. A North Korean decision to apply terrorism will be motivated by the ideological belief that the Kim family and the North Korean Government is the legitimate government for all of Korea. Social and political pressure, internal or external to the South Korean population and its government, will be exploited by North Korea with near real-time media coverage in the global information environment. International conventions and law-of-war protocols on armed conflict and the illegality of conducting acts of terrorism are often not a constraint on KPA forces. The pursuit of goals and actions labeled as terrorism by South Koreans may be considered fully justifiable by North Korea and even some South Korean sympathizers.

8-35. Another consideration is an independent North Korean actor who may be separate and distinct from any other North Korean individual or organization. The spectrum of actors on the peninsula can range across political, public, and commercial institutions, other institutions appearing legitimate but disguising an illicit agenda, and individuals or organizations who openly declare intent to use terror as a matter of policy and practice. Any of these may choose to engage in acts that the Western world would define as terrorism.

8-36. Over the last decade or so, whether intentional or not, North Korea has used unmanned aircraft (UAs) to sow concern amongst South Korean leaders. They fear that North Korea has not only the capability to send UAs across the DMZ undetected, but also to harm South Korean governmental officials, civilians, or infrastructure by carrying chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Between October 2013 and May 2017, at least five North Korean UAs crossed the DMZ, including four that crashed on South Korean ground. Though the UAs did not harm anyone physically, each possessed the capacity to carry enough weight to do so, creating concern to the South Korean Government. Each recovered North Korean UA could have contained conventional explosives or chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons; these platforms could be used in assassination operations against South Korean leadership or to damage or disable key infrastructure. The cameras recovered from the UAs, all manufactured in Japan, contained pictures of key South Korean infrastructure, including nuclear power stations, military bases, and the Blue House—South Korea’s official presidential residence (equivalent to the U.S. White House). Historically, North Korea has conducted many terrorist-style operations in South Korea; the 1968 attempt to assassinate the South Korean president at the Blue House is one example.

Historical Example: Attack on the Blue House

8-37. In the mid-1960s, North Korea attempted to create an insurgency in South Korea, similar to what was happening in South Vietnam at the time. South Korean military and police forces killed 130 infiltrators and captured another 43 between 1964 and 1967. In 1966, the KPA started training Unit 124 for the express purpose of assassinating South Korean President Park Chung-hee. The mission’s secondary purpose was to create chaos throughout South Korea and, with assistance from clandestine North Korean supporters, launch a guerrilla campaign against the South Korean Government in order to create a regime collapse.

8-38. The KPA soldiers selected for this mission were handpicked and trained for 2 years, including the last 2 weeks at a full-scale model of the Blue House near Wonsan. The soldiers received intensive training on infiltration and exfiltration methods, weapons, land navigation, hand-to-hand combat, and concealment. They
were trained to cover 13 kph while carrying a 30-kg rucksack. The intense training resulted in numerous injuries: at the end, only 31 soldiers made the cut for the mission.

8-39. Unit 124 left Wonsan on 16 January 1968 and headed for the North Korean section of the DMZ. Each team member had dark overalls, tennis shoes, a cap, a submachine gun, a pistol, eight grenades, an antitank mine, a dagger, and a rucksack with other supplies. On the night of 17–18 January 1968, the soldiers infiltrated across the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division section of the DMZ, near Yeoncheon, in six different teams. The KPA chose the U.S. sector because its personnel were known to operate under more restrictive rules of engagement than the South Koreans and, if the assassination was successful, South Korea might have blamed the U.S. for the security failure. The lead team had cut the wire on the south barrier fence by 2300 local time and, by 0200, the six teams had assembled at camp sites near Morae-dong and Seokpo-ri.

8-40. The unit remained at these campsites until crossing the frozen Imjin River wearing white bedsheets at 0500 on 19 January 1968 and subsequently creating a single campsite on Simbong Mountain to hide in during daylight hours. At 1400 hours, four South Koreans searching for firewood stumbled across the campsite and were captured. The Unit 124 members debated on whether to kill them, but decided instead to convert them to their communist ideology. After several hours of indoctrination and threats by the KPA soldiers, the South Koreans promised not to give the team away. After being released, however, they immediately alerted the police of what had happened.

8-41. After releasing the South Koreans, Unit 124 immediately broke camp and traveled at 10 kph, crossing Nogo Mountain and arriving at Bibong Mountain at 0700 on 20 January 1968. South Korean forces had immediately started a search for the North Korean soldiers on Simbong and Nogo Mountains, but Unit 124 had long departed those areas. The South Korean authorities increased security around Seoul, including at any potential high-value targets. After spending the rest of the day and most of the night on Bibong Mountain discussing what to do since they had been detected, the Unit 124 leader devised a new plan. The unit broke into teams of two to three soldiers and continued to infiltrate to a rally point, the Seungga-sa Temple. Located on the northern side of the Seoul suburbs, the temple was less than 14 km from the Blue House.

8-42. Despite the police and military searchers, all of the North Korean soldiers made it to the temple safely. Once there, they removed their overalls—revealing a South Korean Army uniform of the local 26th Infantry Division. The Unit 124 soldiers openly marched in platoon formation along Segeomjeong Road toward the Blue House, passing several South Korean police officers and army units. Whenever questioned by authorities, the North Korean leader would say they were a South Korean platoon on a break from the search operation.

8-43. At 2200 on 21 January 1968, the unit approached the Segeomjeong-Jahamun checkpoint, less than 100 m from the Blue House. The local police chief approached the disguised KPA soldiers and asked them a series of questions. About the same time the police chief became suspicious of the KPA soldiers and pulled out his pistol, a civilian bus arrived at a nearby bus stop. The Unit 124 members assumed the bus was full of police or military reinforcements, pulled out their weapons, and started shooting at the police chief, other police officers, and the civilian bus.

8-44. The Unit 124 members then fled the scene. South Korean and U.S. forces immediately initiated a search. By 23 January 1968, 29 of the 31 soldiers had been killed in firefight. One was captured alive when his grenade failed to explode in a suicide attempt. The other soldier made it back to North Korea alive and later became a general. Between the attack at the checkpoint and the search operation, there were 26 South Koreans killed and 66 wounded. The dead included the aforementioned local police chief, his assistant, and 24 civilians, most of them on the bus by the checkpoint. Four U.S. Soldiers were also killed by the escaping infiltrators as they attempted to return to North Korea.

8-45. The North Korean Government tried to distance itself from the assassination attempt by blaming it on a rogue element within the government. The attack took a back seat to other issues when the Korean People's Army Navy captured the USS PUEBLO in international waters on 23 January 1968. Unit 124 failed its mission. Not long after this, North Korea lessened its infiltration attempts into South Korea and dismissed any hopes of creating an insurgency similar to South Vietnam. Figure 8-6 shows the route that the assassination team took from the DMZ crossing to the Blue House.
COUNTERSTABILITY IN SUPPORT OF NORTH KOREAN MILITARY OPERATIONS

8-46. Successful counterstability actions are typically evaluated as part of a long-term campaign to achieve North Korea’s goals and objectives. Counterstability in tactical-level actions orients on several major characteristics of an OE. Offensive and defensive tasks aim at creating, sustaining, and exploiting a lack of—

- Nominal safety in everyday livelihood and commerce.
- Fair and impartial judicial processes.
- Trustworthy and effective law enforcement.
- Effective military and internal security forces.
- Responsible administration, stewardship, and governance by leaders.

8-47. North Korea will likely employ criminal activities and terrorism in its actions to destabilize the South Korean population, civilian environment, and governance in order to support its goals and objectives. Although criminal organizations and terrorist groups are examples of capabilities that can conduct counterstability actions, the desired effects can also be created by KPA regular forces, irregular forces, combinations thereof, or willing or coerced civilians.
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Chapter 9

Electronic Intelligence Warfare

North Korea conducts electronic intelligence warfare (EIW) as part of all operations. This chapter covers the 11 different components of EIW and how North Korea uses it in conjunction with combat operations. North Korea conducts EIW to obtain information on its enemies, to deceive them, and to achieve effects against them. While much of North Korean EIW is conducted above the tactical level on the battlefield, EIW at all levels will affect the tactical units.

TACTICAL-LEVEL ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE WARFARE

9-1. The Korean People’s Army (KPA) defines chonja chinungjon, or electronic intelligence warfare (EIW), as specifically planned and integrated actions taken to achieve an information advantage at critical points and times. The primary goals of EIW are to—

- Influence an enemy’s decision making through its collected and available information, information systems, and information-based processes.
- Retain the ability to employ friendly information and information-based processes and systems.

9-2. Information and its management, dissemination, and control are critical to the successful conduct of tactical missions. Given today’s advancements in information and information systems technology, this importance is growing in scope, impact, and sophistication. The KPA recognizes the unique opportunities EIW gives tactical commanders, and it continuously strives to incorporate EIW activities in all tactical missions and battles.

9-3. EIW may help degrade or deny effective enemy communications and blur or manipulate the battlefield picture. In addition, EIW helps the KPA achieve the goal of dominating the tempo of combat. Using a combination of perception management activities, deception techniques, and electronic warfare (EW), the KPA can effectively slow or control the pace of battle. For example, the KPA may select to destroy lucrative enemy targets through the execution of EW. It may also execute a perception management activity that weakens the enemy’s international and domestic support, causing hesitation or actual failure of the operation. The KPA executes deception plans to confuse the enemy and conceal its true intentions. More-traditional EW activities also contribute to the successful application of EIW at the tactical level by challenging the enemy’s quest for information dominance.

9-4. EIW also supports the critical mission of counterreconnaissance at the tactical level. The KPA constantly seeks ways to attack, degrade, or manipulate the enemy’s reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) capabilities. All enemy target acquisition systems and sensors are potential targets.

ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE WARFARE TACTICAL TASKS

9-5. The effects of EIW can be multidimensional and at times hard to pinpoint. The KPA, however, highlights the following tasks and associated effects as critical to the application of EIW at the tactical level: destroy, degrade, disrupt, deny, deceive, exploit, and influence.

DESTROY

9-6. Destruction tasks physically render an enemy’s information systems ineffective. They are most effective when timed to occur before the enemy executes a command and control (C2) function or when focused on a resource-intensive target that is hard to reconstitute. Neutralizing or destroying the opponent’s
information capability can be brought about by physical destruction of critical communications nodes and links.

**DEGRADE**

9-7. Degradation attempts to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy’s information infrastructure, systems, and collection means.

**DISRUPT**

9-8. Disruption activities focus on interrupting enemy observation and sensor capabilities at critical times and locations. Disruption impedes the enemy’s ability to observe and collect information and to obtain or maintain information dominance.

**DENY**

9-9. Denial activities attempt to limit the enemy’s ability to collect or disseminate information on the KPA or deny its collection efforts.

**DECEIVE**

9-10. Deception activities strive to mislead the enemy’s decision makers and manipulate its overall understanding of KPA activities. Deception manipulates perception and causes disorientation among decision makers within their decision cycle.

**EXPLOIT**

9-11. Exploitation activities attempt to use the enemy’s C2, communications, or RISTA capabilities to the advantage of the KPA. The KPA also uses its various EIW capabilities to exploit any enemy vulnerability.

**INFLUENCE**

9-12. Influencing information affects an enemy’s beliefs, motives, perspectives, and reasoning capabilities in order to support North Korean objectives. This may be done through misinformation or by manipulating information.

**SYSTEMS WARFARE**

9-13. In the systems warfare approach to combat (see chapter 1), the KPA will focus on attacking C2, communications, RISTA, logistics units, or other critical components of selected combat systems belonging to enemy forces. It is often more feasible to attack such targets than to directly engage the enemy’s combat or combat support forces. Tactical-level EIW can be a primary means of attacking these assets, either on its own or in conjunction with other components of the KPA’s own combat system.

**WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY**

9-14. To conduct successful actions against a more-powerful force enjoying a technological overmatch, the KPA will exploit windows of opportunity. Sometimes these windows occur naturally, as a result of favorable conditions in the operational environment. Most often, however, the KPA will have to create its own opportunities for offensive or defensive action. EIW can contribute to this by executing effective deception techniques, EW, and physical destruction, including—

- Destroying or disrupting enemy C2, communications, and RISTA assets.
- Deceiving enemy imagery and signals sensors.
- Selectively denying situational awareness.
- Slowing the tempo of enemy operations by overloading or confusing enemy leaders with too much or contradictory information.
Isolating key units of the enemy force.

Putting information on the Internet that draws people, including deception operations, “click bait,” and “honey traps.”

Using its peasant class as both a direct and indirect influencer of the operational environment (deception operations, ruses, and decoys).

COMPETITION AND THE HUMAN DIMENSION

9-15. Three components compose the human dimension component during periods of conflict—cognitive, physical, and social. EIW normally attacks the cognitive and social aspects of the enemy’s soldiers. War has normally been a clash of wills between at least two sides, but has risen to new heights in the current global environment. North Korea will use all aspects of EIW to attack its enemy before any shots are actually fired on the battlefield.

COMPONENTS OF ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE WARFARE

9-16. North Korean EIW should not be confused with the U.S. view of EW or information operations. North Korean EIW contains a number of components that are part of U.S. information operations, including EW, but also includes several activities that the U.S. does not normally associate with these terms. Integrated within North Korean EIW doctrine are the following components:

- EW.
- Deception.
- Physical destruction.
- Protection and security measures.
- Perception management.
- Information attack.
- Computer warfare.
- Reconnaissance.
- Cryptanalysis.
- Intelligence collection.
- Disinformation operations.

9-17. These components do not exist in isolation from one another and are not mutually exclusive. The overlapping of functions, means, and targets requires all components to be integrated into a single, cohesive EIW plan. Effective execution of EIW, however, does not necessarily involve the use of all components concurrently. In some cases, one component may be enough to successfully execute a tactical EIW action. Nevertheless, using one component, such as camouflage, does not by itself necessarily constitute an application of EIW.

9-18. The use of EIW components is determined by the tactical situation and support to the overall operational objective. The size and sophistication of an enemy force also determines the extent to which the KPA employs the various components of EIW. The KPA commander may mix and match components to best suit tactical needs, within the bounds of guidance from higher authority.

9-19. Tools for waging EIW can include, but are not limited to—

- Conventional physical and electronic destruction means.
- Malicious software.
- Denial-of-service attacks.
- The Internet.
- The media.
- International public opinion.
- Communications networks.
- Various types of reconnaissance, espionage, and eavesdropping technologies.
9-20. The KPA can employ EIW tools from both civilian and military sources and from assets of third-party actors. Information links, such as transmitters, communications devices, and protocols, will be targeted. The KPA is extremely adaptive and will employ the best option available to degrade, manipulate, influence, use, or destroy an information link. See table 9-1 for typical examples of EIW objectives and targets.

**Table 9-1. Electronic intelligence warfare objectives**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Possible Targets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electronic warfare</td>
<td>Exploit, disrupt, deny, and degrade the enemy’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum.</td>
<td>Command and control and RISTA assets and networks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deception</td>
<td>Mislead enemy decision makers. Cause confusion and delays in the decision making process. Persuade local population or international community to support North Korea’s objectives.</td>
<td>Key military decision makers. General enemy populace and international media outlets and Internet sites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical destruction</td>
<td>Destroy the enemy’s information infrastructure.</td>
<td>Command and control nodes and links, RISTA assets, telecommunications, and power sources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection &amp; security measures</td>
<td>Protect critical information assets.</td>
<td>Enemy RISTA assets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception management</td>
<td>Distort reality or manipulate information to support North Korea’s goals.</td>
<td>Enemy RISTA assets. Local populace and leaders. Media outlets, both international and domestic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information attack</td>
<td>Alter or deny key information.</td>
<td>Decision makers and other information users. Systems reliant on accurate information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer warfare</td>
<td>Disrupt, deny, or degrade the enemy’s computer networks and information flow.</td>
<td>Enemy command and control unit, RISTA assets, and computer networks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>Obtain key information on the enemy to achieve positive results on the battlefield.</td>
<td>Enemy units and leaders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cryptanalysis</td>
<td>Decode the enemy’s coded message traffic.</td>
<td>Enemy written and electronic communications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence collection</td>
<td>Obtain key information as directed by the KPA unit leader.</td>
<td>Enemy units and leaders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinformation operations</td>
<td>Deliberately release false information, causing the enemy to make a wrong decision.</td>
<td>Enemy political and military leaders.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ELECTRONIC WARFARE**

9-21. The KPA employs both lethal and nonlethal means of EW. Nonlethal methods range from signals reconnaissance and electronic jamming to the deployment of corner reflectors, protective countermeasures, and deception jammers. The KPA can employ low-cost Global Positioning System jammers to disrupt enemy precision munitions targeting, sensor-to-shooter links, and navigation. Lethal EW activities include the physical destruction of high-priority targets supporting the enemy’s decision-making process, such as reconnaissance sensors, command posts (CPs), and communications systems. They also include activities
such as lethal air defense suppression measures. If available, precision munitions can degrade or eliminate high-technology C2 and communications assets and associated links.

9-22. EW activities often focus on the enemy’s advanced C2 and communications systems, developed to provide real-time force synchronization and shared situational awareness. The enemy relies on the availability of force composition and locations for both sides, digital mapping displays, and automated targeting data. By targeting vulnerable communications links, the KPA can disrupt the enemy’s ability to digitally transfer and share such information. The KPA enhances its own survivability through disrupting the enemy’s ability to mass fires with dispersed forces while increasing enemy crew and staff workloads and disrupting enemy fratricide-prevention measures.

9-23. EW is a perfect example of the integrated nature of KPA EIW components. It overlaps significantly with protection and security measures, deception, and physical destruction. Reconnaissance, aviation, air defense, artillery, and engineer support may all contribute to successful EW for EIW purposes. See Appendix E for additional information on KPA EW operations.

**Signals Reconnaissance**

9-24. Signals reconnaissance is action taken to detect, identify, locate, and track high-value targets through the use of the electromagnetic spectrum. It includes both intercept and direction finding, which may enable a near-real-time attack on the target. KPA commanders determine the priorities for signals reconnaissance by determining which high-value targets must be found in order to have the best chance for success. If the collected intelligence is of higher value than the destruction of the target, the KPA commander determines the best tactical course of action: destroy the target, jam it, or continue to exploit the collected information.

9-25. Signals reconnaissance targets must be detectable in some manner in the electromagnetic spectrum. The KPA operates available system(s) that perform this type of detection. Some high-value targets do not generate an electromagnetic signature and must be detected by other means. Those sought by signals reconnaissance efforts are specific to the battle, the KPA’s plan and capabilities, and the enemy’s plan and capabilities. Typical targets of KPA signals reconnaissance efforts include enemy—

- Maneuver unit CPs.
- Forward air controllers.
- Logistics CPs.
- Fire support and tactical aviation networks.
- Target acquisition systems.
- Reconnaissance and sensors networks.
- Battlefield surveillance radars.

9-26. Signals reconnaissance information is fused with information obtained from other sources. For example, the KPA can use trained reconnaissance units to—

- Put “eyes on” targets and objectives.
- Collect required information.
- Provide early warning.
- Monitor lines of communications and movement corridors in a target area.

9-27. Such reconnaissance could possibly include a signals reconnaissance capability.

**Electronic Attack**

9-28. KPA electronic attack supports the disaggregation of enemy forces. The primary form of electronic attack is jamming—interference with enemy signals links in order to prevent their proper use. Jamming priorities are similar to those for signals reconnaissance. The KPA jams maneuver units in order to disrupt coordination between and within units, especially when enemy units are achieving varying degrees of success. The KPA also will attack reporting links between reconnaissance and engineering units and their supported maneuver units, since these units attempt to exploit any KPA weaknesses detected.
Chapter 9

Targets

9-29. The KPA can and will conduct electronic attack on virtually any system connected by signals transmitted in the electromagnetic spectrum. This includes both communications and noncommunications signals and data. As with signals reconnaissance, the choice of which links to disrupt varies with the scheme of maneuver, the impact of the disruption, the enemy’s sophistication, and the availability of KPA electronic attack assets. A limited but representative list of possible targets includes—

- C2 and communications links between a key unit and its higher command.
- The link between a Global Positioning System satellite and a receiver.
- The link between a firing system and its fire direction center.
- The link between a missile or munition and its targeting system.
- Computer data links of all types.

Distributive Jamming

9-30. Instead of wide-band barrage jamming using large semifixed jammers, the KPA often fields small distributive jammers. These may be either dispersed throughout the battle area or focused on one or more select targets, and may be either fixed or mobile. Mobility can be by ground vehicle or aircraft. Jammers can be controlled through civilian cellular phone networks or by local forces. Along with known military frequencies, the KPA can target civilian radios or cellular phones of a regional neighbor, nongovernmental organizations, or other civilians from outside the region. Distributive jamming can cause—

- Loss of Global Positioning Systems, communications, and non-communications data links, such as Blue Force and personal or unit communications.
- Degradation of situational awareness and common operational picture.
- Disruption of tempo.
- Reduction of intelligence feeds to and from CPs.
- Opportunities for ambush, which is recorded and used for perception management operations.
- Units forced to use alternative, less secure communications.

Expendable Jammers

9-31. The KPA can take advantage of the time prior to an enemy attack to emplace expendable jammers, which can disrupt enemy communications nets. When used in conjunction with terrain—such as at natural chokepoints, mountain passes, or valleys—the jammers can achieve significant results despite their short range and low power. The KPA can also use them to support a deception plan without risking expensive vehicle-based systems. While limited in number, artillery-delivered expendable jammers may be employed. These jammers are especially useful in those areas where support is not available from more-powerful vehicle-mounted jammers.

Proximity Fuse Jammers

9-32. Proximity fuses used on some artillery projectiles rely on return of a radio signal reflected from the target in order to detonate the round within lethal range. Proximity fuse jammers cause the round to instead explode at a safe distance. The KPA may deploy such jammers to protect high-value assets within range of enemy indirect fire weapons.

DECEPTION

9-33. The KPA integrates deception into every tactical action. It does not plan deception measures and activities in an ad hoc manner; rather, the deception plan is typically a major portion of the KPA’s overall EIW plan. The extent and complexity of the deception depend on the amount of time available for planning and preparation. The KPA formulates its plan of action and the overall EIW plan, including the deception plan, concurrently.

9-34. The KPA attempts to deceive the enemy concerning the exact strength and composition of its forces, their deployment and orientation, and their intended manner of employment. When successfully conducted,
deception activities ensure the KPA achieves tactical surprise while enhancing force survivability. All deception measures and activities are continuously coordinated with deception plans and operations at higher levels. Affiliated forces may assist in executing deception activities.

9-35. The KPA employs all forms of deception, ranging from physical decoys and electronic devices to tactical activities and behaviors. The key to deception activities is both realism and consistency with the deception story. Due to the sophistication and variety of sensors available to the enemy, successful deception requires a multispectral effort. The KPA must provide false or misleading thermal, visual, acoustic, and electronic signatures.

9-36. When creating the picture of the battlefield that the KPA wants the enemy to perceive, deception planners have two primary objectives. The first is to cause the enemy to commit forces and act in a manner favoring the KPA’s plan. The second—and the focus of deception activities when time is limited—is to minimize friendly-force signatures, which limits detection and destruction by the enemy.

9-37. Integral to the planning of deception activities is the KPA’s identification of the deception target. This will be an individual, organization, or group with the necessary decision-making authority to take actions (or neglect to do so) in line with the KPA’s deception objective. On the tactical battlefield, this target is typically the enemy commander, although the KPA recognizes the importance of focusing actions to affect specific staff elements.

9-38. Successful deception activities depend on the identification and exploitation of enemy information systems and networks, as well as other conduits for introducing deceptive information. Knowing how the conduits receive, process, analyze, and distribute information allows for the provision of specific signatures meeting the conduits’ requirements. On the tactical battlefield, the enemy reconnaissance system is the primary information conduit and therefore receives the most attention from KPA deception planners. The international media and Internet sites may also be a target for deceptive information at the tactical level. The KPA can feed the enemy false stories and video portraying tactical-level actions with the goal of influencing operational or even strategic decisions.

**Deception Units**

9-39. The KPA battle plan or EIW plan may call for the creation of one or more deception units, meaning that nonexistent or partially existing formations attempt to present the illusion of real or larger units. When the EIW plan requires units to take some action, such as a feint or demonstration, they are designated as deception units in close-hold executive summaries of the plan. Wide-distribution copies of the plan make reference to these units according to the functional designations given them in the deception story.

9-40. The KPA deception unit is typically given its own command structure. The purpose of this is both to replicate the organization(s) necessary to the deception story and to execute the multidiscipline deception required to replicate an actual or larger military organization. The headquarters of a KPA unit that has lost all of its original subordinates to task organization is an excellent candidate for use as a deception unit.

**Deception Activities**

9-41. Deception units may use a series of feints, demonstrations, ruses, or decoys. All activities must fit the overall deception story and provide a consistent, believable, and multidiscipline representation. Basic tactical camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) techniques are used to support all types of deception.

9-42. The KPA conducts deception activities to confuse the enemy to the extent that it is unable to distinguish between legitimate and false targets, units, activities, and future intentions. Inserting false or misleading information at any point in the enemy decision-making process can lead to increased KPA survivability and the inability to respond appropriately to KPA tactical actions. Manipulation of the electromagnetic spectrum is often critical to successful deception activities as the KPA responds to the challenge posed by advances in enemy C2 and communications systems and sensors. Some example deception activities for the KPA may include—

- Executing feints and demonstrations to provide a false picture of where the main effort will be.
- Creating the false picture of a major offensive effort.
- Maximizing protection and security measures to conceal movement.
- Creating false high-value assets.

**Feints**

9-43. Feints are offensive in nature and require engagement with the enemy in order to show the appearance of an attack. The goal is to support the mission and ultimately mislead the enemy. Feints can be used to force the enemy to—

- Employ its forces improperly. A feint may cause enemy forces to move away from the main attack, or it may be used to fix enemy follow-on forces.
- Shift its supporting fires from the main effort.
- Reveal its defensive fires locations by causing premature firing.

**Demonstrations**

9-44. Demonstrations are a show of force on a portion of the battlefield where no decision is sought, for the purpose of deceiving the enemy. They are similar to feints, but contact with the enemy is not required. Advantages of demonstrations include—

- Absence of contact with the enemy.
- The possibility of using simulation devices in lieu of real items to deceive the enemy’s reconnaissance capabilities.
- Use of a smaller force due to lack of contact with the enemy.

**Ruses**

9-45. Ruses are tricks designed to deceive the enemy in order to obtain a tactical advantage. They are characterized by deliberately exposing false information to enemy collection means. Information attacks, perception management actions, and basic C3D measures all support this type of deception.

**Decoys**

9-46. Decoys are physical imitations of KPA systems or deception positions made detectable to enemy RISTA assets in order to confuse the enemy. The goal is to deceive enemy resources into reporting or engaging false targets. It is not necessary to have specially manufactured equipment for this type of visual deception. Decoys are used to attract an enemy’s attention for a variety of tactical purposes. Their main use is to draw enemy fire away from high-value assets.

9-47. Decoys are generally expendable. They can be either elaborate or simple, and either prefabricated or made from field-expedient materials. Their design depends on several factors, such as the target to be mimicked, a unit’s tactical situation, its available resources, and the time available. Except for selected types, prefabricated decoys are not widely available. A typical unit can construct effective, realistic decoys to replicate its key equipment and features through imaginative planning and a working knowledge of its electromagnetic signature emissions.

9-48. The two most important factors regarding decoy employment are location and realism. Logically placing decoys can greatly enhance their plausibility. They are usually placed close enough to the real target to convince an enemy that it has found the correct target. They must be far enough away, however, to prevent collateral damage to the real target when the decoy draws enemy fire. Proper spacing between target and decoy depends on target size, expected enemy target acquisition sensors, and type of enemy munitions likely to be used.

9-49. Decoys must include target features an enemy will recognize. The most effective decoys are those closely resembling the real target in terms of electromagnetic signatures. Completely replicating the signatures of some targets, particularly large and complex ones, can be difficult. Therefore, decoy construction should address the electromagnetic spectral region in which the real target is most vulnerable.

9-50. Smart decoys are designed to present a high-fidelity simulation of a real vehicle or other system. They may present heat, electromagnetic, electro-optical, audio, or visual signatures. They are distributed,
controlled decoys. Computerized controls turn on decoy signatures to present a much more valid signature than previous-generation “rubber duck” decoys. Smart decoys can be placed close to prohibited targets, such as churches, mosques, schools, or hospitals, and civilian populations. If the enemy engages them, the KPA can exploit resulting civilian damage in follow-on perception management activities. Smart decoys cause—

- Loss of situational awareness.
- A flood of false targets, bogging down the enemy’s targeting process.
- Expenditure of limited munitions on false targets.
- Negation of multispectral RISTA assets, such as night vision goggles, infrared scopes, and other electro-optical devices.
- Negation of critical targeting planning and allocation of assets.

9-51. The KPA EIW plan may also call for employing deception CPs. These are complex, multisensor-affecting sites that are integrated into the overall deception plan. They can assist in achieving battlefield opportunity by forcing the enemy to expend C2 and communications warfare effort against meaningless positions.

9-52. The KPA attempts to deny the enemy the ability to accurately identify its force dispositions and intentions by using false deployments. Knowing it cannot totally hide its forces, the KPA tries to blur the boundaries and composition of forces while providing indications of deception units and false targets. Specific KPA tactical actions taken to hide the exact composition and deployment of forces may include—

- Establishing deception assembly areas or defensive positions supported by decoy vehicles.
- Establishing security zones to conceal the actual battle line of friendly defensive positions.
- Concealing unit and personnel movement or maneuver.
- Creating the perception of false units and their associated activity.
- Creating false high-value assets.

9-53. By providing the appearance of units in false locations, the KPA attempts to induce the enemy to attack into areas most advantageous to itself. When the deception is successful, enemy forces may decide to attack where the KPA can take maximum advantage of terrain. False thermal and acoustic signatures, decoy and actual vehicles, and corner reflectors, supported by false radio traffic, all contribute to the appearance of a unit where in fact none exists.

9-54. The reduction of KPA electromagnetic signatures is critical to the success of any deception plan. Minimizing the thermal, radar, acoustic, and electronic signatures of people, vehicles, and supporting systems is critical to ensuring deception of the enemy and enhanced survivability. The KPA makes extensive use of a variety of signature-reduction materials, procedures, and improvised methods to provide protection from enemy sensors and target acquisition systems operating throughout the electromagnetic spectrum.

**Electronic Deception**

9-55. Electronic deception is used to manipulate, falsify, and distort signatures received by enemy sensors. It must be conducted in such a way as to replicate realistic signatures. Electronic deception can take the form of manipulative, simulative, imitative, or non-communications deception. The KPA may use one or all of these types of electronic deception.

**Manipulative Electronic Deception**

9-56. Manipulative electronic deception seeks to counter enemy jamming, signals intelligence, and target acquisition efforts by altering the electromagnetic profile of friendly forces. North Korean specialists modify the technical characteristics and profiles of emitters that could provide an accurate picture of KPA intentions to its enemies. The objective is to have enemy analysts accept the profile or information as valid, and therefore arrive at an erroneous conclusion concerning KPA activities and intentions.

9-57. Manipulative electronic deception uses communications or other types of signals to convey indicators to mislead the enemy. It can cause the enemy to fragment its intelligence and EW efforts to the point where they lose effectiveness. It can also cause the enemy to misdirect its assets and therefore cause fewer problems for KPA communications.
Simulative Electronic Deception

9-58. Simulative electronic deception seeks to mislead the enemy as to the actual composition, deployment, and capabilities of the friendly force. The KPA may use controlled breaches of security to add credence to its simulative electronic deception activities. There are a number of techniques the KPA may use. With unit simulation, the KPA establishes a network of radio and radar emitters to emulate those emitters and activities found in the specific unit or activity type. The KPA may reference the false unit designator in communications traffic and may use false unit call signs. In capability or system simulation, the KPA projects an electronic signature of new or differing equipment to mislead the enemy into believing a new capability is in use on the battlefield. To add realism and improve the effectiveness of the deception, the KPA may make references to “new” equipment designators on related communications nets. To provide a false unit location, the KPA projects an electronic signature of a unit from a false location while suppressing the signature from the actual location. Radio operators may make references to false map locations near the false unit location, such as hill numbers, a road junction, or a river. This would be in accordance with a script as part of the deception plan.

Imitative Electronic Deception

9-59. Imitative electronic deception injects false or misleading information into enemy communications and radar networks. The communications imitator gains entry as a bona fide member of the enemy communications system and maintains the role until it passes the desired false information to the enemy.

9-60. In imitative electronic deception, the KPA imitates enemy electromagnetic emissions in order to mislead its opponent. Examples include entering the enemy’s communications nets by using its call signs and radio procedures, then giving its commanders instructions to initiate actions. Targets for imitative electronic deception include any enemy receiver, ranging from cryptographic systems to simple, plain-language tactical nets. Among other effects, imitative electronic deception can cause an enemy unit to be in the wrong place at the right time, to place ordnance on the wrong target, or to delay attack plans. Imitative deception efforts are intended to cause decisions based on false information that appears to have come from the enemy’s own side.

Noncommunications Deception

9-61. The KPA continues to develop and field dedicated tactical noncommunications means of electronic deception. It can simulate troop movements by such means as use of civilian vehicles to portray the movement of military vehicles to radar, and marching refugees to portray movement of marching troops. Simple, inexpensive radar corner reflectors provide masking by approximating the radar cross sections of military targets such as bridges, tanks, aircraft, and even navigational reference points. Corner reflectors bouncing waves back at the source can be quite effective when used in conjunction with other EW systems, such as ground-based air defense jammers.

Physical Destruction

9-62. Another method for disrupting enemy control is physical destruction of the target. The KPA integrates all types of conventional and precision weapons systems to conduct destructive fires, to include—

- Fixed- and rotary-wing aviation.
- Cannon artillery.
- Multiple rocket launchers.
- Surface-to-surface missiles.

9-63. In some cases, the destruction may be accomplished by ground attack. The KPA can also utilize other means, such as explosives delivered by special operations forces (SOF) or North Korean sympathizers.

9-64. Physical destruction measures focus on destroying critical components of the enemy force. Enemy C2 and communications nodes and target acquisition sensors are a major part of the KPA fire support plan during physical destruction actions. KPA priority targets typically include—

- Battalion, brigade, and division CPs.
- Area communications distribution system centers and nodes.
9-65. The KPA may integrate all forms of destructive fires, especially artillery and aviation, with other EIW activities. Physical destruction activities are integrated with jamming to maximize their effects. Specific missions are carefully timed and coordinated with the EIW plan and actions of the supported units.

9-66. The KPA gives special emphasis to destruction of its enemy’s RISTA capabilities prior to an expected enemy attack on KPA defensive positions. Once the attack begins, the KPA heavily targets the enemy C2 and communications nodes responsible for the planning and conduct of the attack, along with supporting communications. Of note, destruction of these nodes prior to the attack may allow the enemy time to reconstitute control. Targeting the nodes once forces are committed to the attack, however, may cause a far greater disruptive effect.

9-67. The KPA does not possess the smart bombs of other modern militaries and would likely use “strap-on” guidance systems to increase the accuracy of its missiles. North Korea’s missile inaccuracy is a major issue for the KPA when conducting attacks against EIW-related targets that require precision and timing. Due to the mobility and fleeting nature of its enemy’s information operations targets, North Korea will likely focus its limited missile arsenal against high-priority targets.

9-68. The KPA continues to research and develop directed-energy weapons, to include radio-frequency weapons and high-power lasers. While North Korea has fielded no dedicated directed-energy weapons systems whose sole role is to conduct laser attacks, it may employ low-power laser rangefinders and laser target designators in a sensor-blinding role.

PROTECTION AND SECURITY MEASURES

9-69. Protection and security measures encompass a wide range of activities and incorporate some components of deception and EW. Successful protection and security measures significantly enhance tactical survivability and preserve combat power. The KPA will attempt to exploit the large number and superior technology of enemy sensors. For example, it may employ software at the tactical level to analyze the enemy’s satellite intelligence collection capabilities and warn friendly forces of the risk of detection. The use of signature-reducing and signature-altering devices, along with diligent application of operational security measures, supports deception activities in addition to denying information.

9-70. At the tactical level, protection and security measures focus primarily on—

- Counterreconnaissance.
- C3D.
- Information and operational security.

9-71. These and other protection and security measures may overlap the realms of EW or deception.

Counterreconnaissance

9-72. Winning the counterreconnaissance battle is important to the KPA, since it can limit what information the enemy is able to collect and use in operational planning and execution. KPA tactical commanders realize the enemy’s operations hinge on situational awareness. Therefore, counterreconnaissance efforts focus on destruction and deception of enemy sensors in order to limit the enemy’s ability to understand the KPA battle plan.

9-73. The KPA recognizes that, when facing a powerful opponent, it will often be impossible to destroy enemy standoff RISTA means to observe KPA forces. While the KPA may execute missions to do so, it often uses C3D as the method of choice for degrading the capability of such systems. The KPA also recognizes the reluctance of enemy commanders to operate without human confirmation of intelligence due to the relative ease with which imagery and signals sensors may be deceived. A high priority for all defensive preparations is to deny enemy ability to maintain reconnaissance contact on the ground. KPA tactical commanders
consider ground reconnaissance by enemy SOF as a significant threat, and therefore focus considerable effort to ensure the destruction of SOF reconnaissance units.

Camouflage, Concealment, Cover, and Deception

9-74. The KPA gives particular attention to protective measures aimed at reducing its enemy’s ability to target and engage KPA systems with precision munitions. Knowing the enemy cannot attack what its RISTA systems do not find, the KPA employs a variety of C3D techniques throughout the security and defense zones. These techniques range from the simplest and least-expensive methods of hiding from observation to the most modern multispectral signature-reducing technologies.

9-75. The KPA dedicates extensive effort to employing C3D to protect its defensive positions and high-value assets. All units are responsible for providing protective measures for themselves with their own assets, with possible support from engineering units. The KPA employs a variety of signature-reducing or signature-altering materials and systems, to include infrared-absorbing and radar-absorbing camouflage nets and paints.

9-76. The KPA declared 2004 as the “Year of Camouflage,” demonstrating how important C3D are to the survival of its military. A KPA manual smuggled out in 2010 discussed the failure of the U.S. Air Force to destroy Yugoslavian tanks due to the deception caused by false equipment. Instead of hitting the actual military weapons, the U.S. destroyed decoy tanks, antiaircraft guns, missile launcher sites, and aircraft made of logs, plywood, and cloth. Shortly before the November 2010 artillery bombardment of the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong-do, the KPA deployed painted plywood or inflatable 122-mm and 240-mm rocket launchers around its real launchers in an attempt to increase the difficulty of the enemy’s counterartillery fire.

Information and Operational Security

9-77. Information and operational security can protect the physical and intellectual assets used to facilitate KPA C2 and communications. Security must function continuously to be effective. It must conceal not only the KPA commander’s intentions and current locations, configurations, and actions of tactical units, but also obscure the tactics and techniques for employment and operation of information systems.

9-78. The KPA clearly understands the importance of information and operational security. Commanders understand their vulnerability to being attacked through their own information systems and develop means to protect these systems. In addition, the KPA must be capable of isolating attacks on its information systems while maintaining the ability to execute. In order to reduce its vulnerability, the KPA emphasizes strong communications, computer, and transmissions security. The KPA may even resort to using runners to avoid interception of electronic communications by enemy forces.

Perception Management

9-79. Perception management involves measures aimed at creating a perception of truth best suited to the KPA’s objectives. It integrates a number of widely differing activities using a combination of true, false, misleading, and manipulated information to steer its enemy’s commanders and staffs towards a preconceived idea. Targeted audiences range from enemy military forces, to the South Korean populace, to regional or world popular opinion.

9-80. At the tactical level, the KPA seeks to undermine an enemy’s ability to conduct combat operations through psychological warfare and other perception management activities aimed at deterring, inhibiting, and demoralizing the enemy and influencing civilian populations. The various perception management activities include efforts conducted as part of—

- Psychological warfare.
- Direct action.
- Public affairs.
- Media manipulation and censorship.
- Statecraft.
- Public diplomacy.
9-81. The last three components, while not usually conducted at the tactical level, can certainly have a great impact on how and where the KPA conducts tactical-level perception management activities. These activities must be consistent with, and contribute to, the KPA’s operational and strategic goals.

Psychological Warfare

9-82. Psychological warfare is a major contributor to perception management during pre-combat, combat, and post-conflict stages of a war. Targeting enemy military forces, psychological warfare attempts to influence the attitudes, emotions, motivations, aggressiveness, tenacity, and reasoning of enemy personnel. Specialists plan psychological warfare activities at all levels of command. In addition to enemy military forces, North Korea also conducts psychological warfare against its own people to control them.

9-83. North Korean specialists also concentrate on manipulating the local South Korean population and international media in favor of the KPA, turning opinion against its enemies’ objectives. KPA planners focus special emphasis on highlighting enemy casualties and lack of success. KPA planners also highlight enemy mistakes, especially those causing civilian casualties. The South Korean population will be a major target of these activities due to the criticality of South Korean public support for military activities.

9-84. Example: North Korea Blames U.S. for American Student’s Death. In January 2016, an American student visited North Korea as part of an organized tour group. As he was departing the country, the student took down a propaganda poster and attempted to smuggle it out of the country. The North Korean Government arrested him and sentenced him to 15 years’ hard labor in prison just two months later. Early in his sentence, the student suffered a severe neurological injury and the North Korean Government released him in June 2017 on “humanitarian grounds.” The student returned to the U.S., but died a week later.

9-85. North Korea attempted to deflect its culpability in the student’s death in a number of ways, both domestically and internationally. First, the student confessed publicly on television to breaking North Korea’s laws, reading from a handwritten script at the prompting of a local Methodist church and a university secret society. Second, the North Korean Government claimed the student was sent to the country to break its laws at the behest of the U.S. Government, doing so both before the trial and after the student’s death. Third, North Korea stated the U.S. Government was trying to exploit the student’s death for internal political purposes. Fourth, The North Korean Government denied any allegations that the student was tortured while in its country, and he had fallen into a coma due to a combination of botulism and sleeping pills. The U.S. doctor’s noninvasive autopsy did not prove the student was tortured. Lastly, North Korea released three other Americans in May 2018 to demonstrate the country’s willingness to negotiate with the U.S.

9-86. Through a variety of outlets, North Korea attempted to control the message as much as it could to create the impression that the student’s death was not due to anything government officials did or failed to do while the student was in prison.

9-87. The KPA attempts to employ media and other neutral players, such as nongovernmental organizations, to further influence public and private perceptions. If North Korea perceives the presence of nongovernmental organizations to be detrimental to its objectives, the Kim government will attempt to hinder their efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to the populace, thus discrediting them.

Public Affairs

9-88. The KPA may conduct public affairs actions aimed at winning the favor or support of the South Korean leadership and populace in the event that North Korea decides to invade South Korea. This civil support from the KPA might take many forms, such as public information and community relations. It could involve providing money, schools, medical support or hospitals, religious facilities, security, other basic services, or hope—as seen from the North Korean perspective. The KPA would accompany these support activities with the message or impression that, if North Korea loses the war or leaves the area, the local population will lose these benefits and the security provided by the KPA.
Media Manipulation

9-89. Perception management targeting the media is aimed at influencing both domestic and international public opinion. The purpose is to build public and international support for North Korea’s actions and to dissuade an adversary from pursuing policies perceived to be adverse to its interests. The willingness of the local South Korean population to either support or to oppose the KPA military effort will be critical to North Korea’s success. While most aspects of media manipulation are applicable to levels well above the tactical, the trickle-down effect can have a major effect on the KPA tactical fight.

9-90. North Korea exploits the international media’s willingness to report information without independent and actual confirmation. For example, South Korean and other international media reports state North Korea has ended its nuclear testing and has closed down its test facility. This is based on reports given to the media by the country and inviting the media, who are not knowledgeable about nuclear testing, to visit the nuclear test facility.

Note. North Korea employs media censorship to control its own population’s access to information and perception of reality. Successful preparation of the population significantly enhances public support for the KPA’s military actions. As part of this, North Korea prepares its forces and population for enemy information operation activities.

Target Audiences

9-91. North Korean perception management activities seek to define events in the minds of decision makers and populations in terms of North Korea’s choosing. Successful perception management consists of two key factors: speed and connection. Speed means reaching the target audience before the other side can provide the correct information, thus altering the perception of events. Connection means having the right media to provide the story to the target audience in a way that it will find credible and memorable. World opinion is a primary target of perception management, either to gain support for North Korean causes or to turn world opinion and support against potential foes. Reinforcement of its message (preferably by different sources) is also a powerful tool North Korea uses to convince the target audience of the veracity of its position.

INFORMATION ATTACK

9-92. Information attack focuses on the intentional disruption or distortion of information in a manner to support KPA mission completion. Unlike computer warfare attacks targeting the information systems, information attacks target the information itself. Attacks on the commercial Internet by civilian hackers have demonstrated the vulnerability of cyberspace and information systems to innovative and flexible penetration, disruption, or distortion techniques. North Korean cyberspace attackers learn from and expand upon these methods. The KPA recognizes the increasing dependence of modern armies on tactical information systems. It therefore attempts to preserve the advantages of such systems for its own use while exploiting the enemy’s reliance on them.

9-93. Information attack is a critical component of EIW, offering a powerful tool for North Korea. For example, an attacker may target an information system for electronic sabotage or to manipulate and exploit information. This may involve altering data, stealing data, or forcing a system to perform a function for which it was not intended, such as creating false information in a targeting or airspace control system.

9-94. Data manipulation is potentially one of the most dangerous techniques available to North Korea. It involves covertly gaining access to an enemy information system and altering key data items without detection. The possibilities are endless with this technique. Some examples are—

- **Navigation.** Altering position data for enemy units, soldiers, and systems, making them think they are in the right place when they are not.
- **Blue Force Tracking.** Altering position data of enemy units, soldiers, and systems to make other units, soldiers, and systems believe them to be in one place where they are not or to lose track of them entirely. Alternatively, data manipulation can make KPA units appear as enemy forces or vice versa.
• **Battlefield Information Systems.** Enhancing KPA tactical success by the ability to mitigate or influence enemy activities controlled via battlefield information systems.
• **Survey and Gun or Mortar Alignment.** Causing enemy weapons to fire on the wrong target location.
• **Targeting and Sensors.** Misdirecting sensors to have false reads, locate false targets, or identify the enemy’s own units as KPA targets.
• **Weapon Guidance.** Sending enemy weapons to the wrong location or target.
• **Timing.** Changing internal clocks, thereby disrupting synchronization.
• **Logistics Tracking.** Sending logistics packages to the wrong place or delaying their arrival. This can be done by altering bar codes on equipment or by hacking and altering logistics (delivery or request) data.
• **Aviation Operations.** Changing altimeter readings, position location data, or identification, friend or foe codes.

9-95. North Korea attempts to inject disinformation through trusted networks. The KPA tries to make its enemies distrust their RISTA and situational awareness assets by injecting incorrect information. Attacks could take the form of icon shifting (blue to red) or moving the icon’s location. Fire missions and unit control would require significant human interaction, thus slowing the enemy’s target engagement cycle.

9-96. Likely targets for an information attack are information residing in the critical tactical systems of the enemy. Such targets include—
- Telecommunications links and switches.
- Fire control.
- Logistics automation.
- RISTA downlinks.
- Situational awareness networks.
- C2 and communications systems.

**COMPUTER WARFARE**

9-97. North Korea conducts computer warfare for three primary reasons—
- Countering the superior conventional military strength of its enemies.
- As a low-cost/low-risk means of targeting enemy computer vulnerabilities.
- In peacetime, as a method to upset the status quo with little fear of retaliation.

9-98. Computer warfare consists of attacks focusing specifically on computer systems, networks, or nodes. This includes a wide variety of activities, including—
- Unauthorized access (hacking) of information systems for intelligence-collection purposes.
- Insertion of malicious software (viruses, worms, logic bombs, or Trojan horses).

9-99. Such attacks concentrate on the denial of service, disruption, or manipulation of the integrity of the information infrastructure. Distributed denial-of-service attacks use a network of slave computers to overwhelm target computers with packets of data and deny them outgoing access to networks. Such attacks could disrupt logistics, communications, intelligence, and other functions. North Korea may attempt to accomplish any of these activities through the use of agents or third-party individuals with direct access to enemy information systems. The country can also continually access and attack systems at great distances via communications links such as the Internet.

9-100. North Korea can employ various types of malicious software or “malware” on enemy computers to slow operations, extract data, or inject data. Poor enemy operational procedures can enable this type of attack, with significant loss of capability or spillage of data to North Korea. These attacks also cause the enemy to waste data time and cycles in prevention and remediation. Malware could affect internal clocks (creating positional errors and communications difficulties) and slow the functional speed of computing. Any Internet-capable or networkable system is at potential risk.
9-101. North Korean computer warfare activities may be conducted prior to or during a military action. For example, by damaging or destroying networks related to an enemy’s projected force deployments and troop movements, the KPA can effectively disrupt planning and misdirect movement, producing substantial confusion and delays. As modern armies increasingly rely on “just-in-time” logistics support, targeting logistics-related computers and databases can produce delays in the arrival of important materiel such as ammunition, fuel, and spare parts during critical phases of a conflict.

9-102. North Korea can successfully conduct invasive computer warfare activities from the safety of its own territory. It has the distributed ability to reach targeted computers anywhere in the world, as long as they are connected to the Internet. North Korea has the capability to continuously exploit the highly integrated information systems of an adversary.

9-103. The primary organization responsible for computer warfare in North Korea is Bureau 121, which fielded at least 1,000 elite hackers in 2010 who focused on other countries’ computer systems. This number is likely much higher now: as of 2009, North Korea’s Mirim College was graduating approximately 100 cyberspace hackers per year for the KPA.

RECONNAISSANCE

9-104. The KPA considers reconnaissance to be a component of its EIW campaign. At its core, reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area (JP 2-0). See chapter 5 for details on the KPA use of reconnaissance.

CRYPTANALYSIS

9-105. Cryptanalysis is the art or process of deciphering coded messages without the key. Most of this work will be done above the KPA division level or in other offices within the North Korean Government, such as the Reconnaissance Bureau. The results of cryptanalysis could be used at the tactical level.

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

9-106. Intelligence collection is the systematic process used by the KPA to meet its intelligence requirements through the tasking of all available resources to gather and provide pertinent information within a required time limit. For additional information on intelligence collection, see the RISTA section of chapter 5.

DISINFORMATION OPERATIONS

9-107. Disinformation operations is the process whereby the KPA will deliberately release false information in order to deceive the enemy. The KPA may use black propaganda as part of this campaign, which is false information and material supposedly from an enemy source, but actually from North Korea. Black propaganda is often used to misrepresent, embarrass, or disparage the KPA’s enemies. The disinformation may be directed at an enemy’s military forces, its media, or a third party.
Appendix A

Fires Support Operations

This appendix provides a doctrinal overview of Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF) fires support typically supporting a ground maneuver infantry regiment, brigade, or division formation. It provides a functional overview of fires support, the organizations providing it, capabilities and limitations, and its employment and integration in Korean People’s Army (KPA) combined arms operations.

FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW

A-1. The mission of all KPAGF artillery is to destroy or defeat enemy personnel, equipment, and facilities and to support friendly maneuver unit (infantry and armor) operations. All KPAGF artillery, including howitzers, mortars, rockets, and recoilless rifles, are organized by type and assigned to specific units to perform explicit missions. Artillery is organized at each echelon of command from regiment to corps level to form artillery groups. Because it is likely the KPA cannot create air superiority or even air parity, it emphasizes artillery support at all levels of command. The KPA relies on artillery to offset deficiencies in other aspects of its ground forces.

ORGANIZATION

A-2. The KPA fields two artillery commands and the Strategic Force can provide indirect fire support to its units. Indirect fire and rocket units within the KPA include—

- 1 artillery division.
- 21 artillery brigades.
- 3–4 FROG/KN-02/300-mm multiple rocket launcher brigades.
- 1 SCUD-B/C/D/ER missile brigade.
- 1 No Dong brigade.
- 1 Musudan brigade.
- 1 KN-08 brigade.
- Indirect fire weapons assigned to KPAGF divisions, brigades, regiments, and battalions.

Table A-1 on page A-2 provides an example of what indirect fire weapons typically support KPAGF infantry units, from battalion to corps level. The weapon variants will differ from unit to unit, with lower-quality weapons found in reserve units.

INDIRECT FIRE COMMAND AND CONTROL

A-3. The senior artillery officer within a KPAGF command normally serves as the artillery group commander for the organization. In a regiment, this is normally the regularly assigned artillery battalion commander supporting the infantry regiment. In a division, this is typically the artillery regimental commander. This artillery commander commands the artillery group and coordinates with the supported maneuver command. The artillery group commander will organize a staff from all the artillery units assigned to support the maneuver unit.

REGIMENTAL ARTILLERY GROUP

A-4. The regimental artillery group is composed of all organic and attached artillery units assigned to a regiment. The mortar battalion is normally positioned on the rear slope of a hill, approximately 1.5 km from the KPAGF frontline in the offense or the defense, but actual location will be terrain dependent. The KPAGF
intent is to place at least two-thirds of each gun’s range forward of the KPAGF’s front lines. The forward regiments along the demilitarized zone have their artillery groups prepositioned or positions prepared to move into so two-thirds of the guns’ range fire into South Korea. The 122-mm and 152-mm artillery battalions are normally deployed between a regiment’s first and second tactical echelon maneuver units. Most forward maneuver regiments will receive between two and four artillery battalions for support.

Table A-1. Typical KPAGF indirect fire weapons, corps level and below

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Regiment</th>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Corps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mortar</td>
<td>82-mm: 9 tubes</td>
<td>120-mm: 18 tubes</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recoilless rifle</td>
<td>82-mm: 3 guns</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antitank gun</td>
<td>76.2-mm: 6 guns</td>
<td>100-mm: 12 guns</td>
<td>122-mm: 18 guns</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howitzer</td>
<td>122-mm: 18 tubes</td>
<td>152-mm: 24 tubes</td>
<td>122-mm: 18 tubes</td>
<td>170-mm: 108 tubes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple rocket launcher</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>107/140-mm: 9 systems</td>
<td>122-mm: 12 systems</td>
<td>240-mm: 108 systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air defense artillery</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>14.5-mm: 20 guns</td>
<td>14.5-mm: 8 guns</td>
<td>14.5-mm: 8 guns</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| mm | millimeters | n/a | not applicable |

DIVISION ARTILLERY GROUP

A-5. The division artillery group is typically composed of three to five artillery battalions, some organic and others attached, of guns, howitzers, mortars, and multiple rocket launchers. The artillery group is located between the KPAGF division’s first and second tactical echelon maneuver regiments, but the exact location will be terrain dependent.

CORPS ARTILLERY GROUP

A-6. The corps artillery group is composed of between three and six organic and attached long-range and missile battalions, and is normally located behind the KPA lead division’s second tactical echelon. When a corps arrays its divisions abreast, it will form three artillery groups of four battalions each. If the corps has deployed its divisions in a two up and one back formation, the corps will form two artillery groups with six battalions in each.

CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

A-7. Over 70% of all KPAGF indirect fire units are deployed in the southern third of the country and are focused on South Korea. This includes the KPAGF’s artillery units usually located in fortified underground emplacements called hardened artillery sites (HARTS). From their current locations, the KPAGF artillery units can attack deep inside their enemy’s rear areas, including approximately 700 artillery and rocket systems with the capability to hit South Korea’s capital city, Seoul.

A-8. Coastal artillery, usually operated by the Korean People’s Army Navy, is also placed along both seaboard to prevent enemy amphibious assaults. Many of these artillery units are also located in HARTS, but there are recent indications that some artillery units presurvey positions along the coasts for mobile artillery units to set their guns during any invasion from the sea. The KPA has also placed artillery on islands a short distance off both coasts to protect against amphibious assaults.
A-9. The ranges for KPA artillery and multiple rocket launcher systems vary greatly. The KPA’s longest-ranged self-propelled artillery cannon is the M-1989, with a range of 35 km with conventional ammunition and 60 km with extended-range ammunition. The KPA Type 68 towed cannon can fire a maximum range of 27.2 km, but is not equipped to use extended-range ammunition. The North Korean KN-09 close-range ballistic missile possesses a range of 200 km and rockets for the KPA M-1991 multiple rocket launcher can travel 60 km. Table A-2 provides data on the longest-range weapon systems for each of four different categories of weapons in the KPAGF.

Table A-2. KPA indirect fire weapons, corps level and below

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Point</th>
<th>Self-propelled Cannon</th>
<th>Towed Cannon</th>
<th>Multiple Rocket Launcher</th>
<th>Close-range Ballistic Missile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total (all), 2018</td>
<td>5,600</td>
<td>3,440</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>INA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most capable</td>
<td>M-1989</td>
<td>Type 68</td>
<td>M-1991</td>
<td>KN-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantity on hand, 2018</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>INA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range/extended range, km</td>
<td>35/60</td>
<td>27.2/INA</td>
<td>60/INA</td>
<td>200/INA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal rate of fire, per minute</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22 (40 seconds)</td>
<td>INA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A-10. The major limitation of KPA indirect fire weapons is the age of the equipment. Most of the artillery dates to 1989 technology or before. Some artillery for KPA reserve and lower-quality units date back to World War II. The KPA artillery has been neglected in order to improve missile capabilities. Despite the lack of modern sophisticated indirect fire weapons, any army with approximately 9,000 artillery systems and 5,500 multiple rocket launcher systems is capable of massive destructive effects.

A-11. Other limitations include an over-reliance on high explosive ammunition, a limited number of smart weapons, inaccuracy—often due to a lack of crew training, and a high rate of ammunition failure. While all these limitations will further reduce the effects of KPA indirect fire weapons, any enemy ground force must respect the capabilities of the KPA indirect fire units.

EMPLOYMENT AND INTEGRATION IN COMBINED ARMS

A-12. In the offense, KPA artillery is camouflaged and normally emplaces during the night or other periods of limited visibility. Artillery batteries not firing from HARTS will occupy their firing positions at the last possible moment in order to avoid detection by the enemy. Many of these artillery batteries will normally be located 500–1000 m behind the front line, but actual distances will be terrain dependent.

A-13. KPA artillery will likely fire 10–30 minutes prior to an assault in order to destroy enemy command, control, and communications nodes and observation posts; neutralize heavy weapons; and open gaps in enemy lines. If enough ammunition is available, the KPA may conduct indirect fire against other targets in an attempt to disguise the location of the actual assault. During the assault, the artillery will shift to appropriate targets to the rear and flank of the enemy position to isolate the defending units from reinforcement and resupply, prevent a counterattack, or to deny the enemy a safe withdrawal route.

A-14. After the maneuver units successfully take an objective, the artillery will displace forward to continue support. KPA artillery normally displaces by thirds. Two-thirds of the artillery will continue to provide support while the other third displaces. When the unit that move first is ready to provide support, another third will move forward.

A-15. In the defense, the KPA uses indirect fire to disperse and neutralize enemy attacks, inflict casualties, and harass reserves. The KPA wants to separate enemy infantry from its armored support. Artillery units are
assigned to specific zones, and special attention is given to the areas between KPA strongpoints. The KPA deploys its artillery in depth to assure any penetration of a defense zone can be brought under indirect fire.

A-16. In the defense, the units assigned to the regimental artillery group are normally located behind the forward battalions and 5–7 km from the front line. The mortar positions are normally 300–800 m behind the front line and are habitually emplaced on the reverse slope of a hill, about 10 m from the crest. The division artillery group units are typically located in the same general area as the second-echelon regiment of the forward division, approximately 5–10 km from the front line. The corps artillery group units are usually located with the second-echelon division, 10–15 km behind the front line. While these are estimated distances, the actual locations will be dependent on the terrain.

A-17. There will likely be large numbers of unexploded ordnance from all the indirect fire weapons the KPA will use. During the North Korean artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island in August 2015, 60 of the initial 80 rounds hitting the island exploded, indicating a dud rate of 25%. For artillery rounds to function properly and explode on impact, they must be used in a timely fashion or the stock rotated to the factory to be rechecked. Due to cost of ammunition and the limited economic abilities of North Korea, it is likely the KPA does not fire artillery ammunition when it is close to the end of its reliable service life or rotate it out for new ammunition.
Appendix B

Aviation Operations

This appendix provides a doctrinal overview of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) aviation operations typically supporting a ground maneuver infantry regiment, brigade, or division formation. It provides a functional overview of aviation operations, the organizations providing aviation support, the capabilities and limitations of aviation support, and the employment and integration of aviation in KPA combined arms operations.

FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW

B-1. The Korean People’s Army Air Force (KPAAF) is part of the KPA. The primary mission of the KPAAF is to provide air defense capability to the North Korean homeland and its territorial waters. Other missions include tactical air support to the Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF) and the Korean People’s Army Navy, special operations forces (SOF) insertion, strategic bombing, reconnaissance, transportation, and logistical support. All aircraft, fixed- or rotary-wing, belong to the KPAAF. There are approximately 120,000 personnel, including 29,000 officers, and about 1,600 aircraft in the KPAAF. In addition, the KPAAF controls all airfields and airports within North Korea, the North Korean national airline, and all airplane-related clubs.

ORGANIZATION

B-2. The KPAAF is part of the KPA and is responsible for all its aircraft. It is divided into four combat air divisions, based at 13 major bases. There are also two transportation air divisions. The KPAAF will use any airports or runways in the country to conduct military operations. There are also a number of emergency recovery airstrips and airfields throughout the country that it can use. The KPAAF has one operational underground runway, where planes can land without observation from the air, and another is under construction. Most of the military airfields possess hangers built into mountains for protection against aerial attack. Approximately 50% of the KPAAF is deployed within 100 km of the demilitarized zone. See table B-1 for additional information on these divisions and their mission.

Table B-1. KPAAF air divisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Air Division</td>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>Kaechon Air Base</td>
<td>Regional protection</td>
<td>Northwest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Air Division</td>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>Toksan Air Base</td>
<td>Regional protection</td>
<td>East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Air Division</td>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>Hwangju Air Base</td>
<td>Regional protection</td>
<td>South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Air Division</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>Taechon Air Base</td>
<td>Transport &amp; logistics</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Air Division</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>Sondok Air Base</td>
<td>Transport &amp; logistics</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Air Division</td>
<td>Combat &amp; training</td>
<td>Orang Air Base</td>
<td>Training &amp; regional protection</td>
<td>Northeast</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n/a not applicable
B-3. The KPAAF is not only aviation-focused, but is also responsible for North Korea’s air defense. If the mission involves aviation or airspace, the KPAAF is responsible for the unit or function. KPAAF organizations include the following—

- National air defense headquarters and command elements.
- Air staff.
- 6 air divisions.
- 18 fighter regiments.
- 3 light bomber regiments.
- 1 fighter/ground attack regiment.
- 1 ground attack regiment.
- Some independent air battalions.
- Some transportation regiments.
- 1 attack helicopter regiment.
- Some helicopter transportation regiments.
- Some training regiments.
- 2 sniper brigades.
- Reconnaissance unit.
- Unknown number of unmanned aircraft system (UAS) units.
- 19–20 surface-to-air missile brigades.
- Surface-to-air missile maintenance depot.
- Antiaircraft artillery academy.
- Unknown number of antiaircraft artillery regiments.
- 3 radar regiments.
- Unknown number of searchlight battalions.
- Communications regiment.
- Air traffic control regiment.
- Unknown number of aircraft production and repair facilities.

B-4. The KPAAF operates out of its headquarters in Pyongyang, the former Mirim Air Base, and several suspected underground facilities at Majang-san, Chunghwa-gun, and Pyongyang-si.

CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

B-5. The KPAAF inventory contains approximately 1,600 fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, including some that can operate in a variety of roles on the battlefield. Although some of the equipment is quite old, the KPAAF has the capability to conduct almost all air force missions. These include strategic bombing with the H-5 Beagle, direct air support of the KPAGF with attack or multirole aircraft, airspace control, transportation, and logistical support.

B-6. Compared to most Western air forces, KPAAF pilots do not receive sufficient training time to become truly proficient in their skills. Some KPAAF pilots have conducted combat operations in other countries, but most of this was during Vietnam or the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Reports indicate that about 15 KPAAF pilots may have flown with the Syrian government forces attacking Aleppo in November 1973. Other KPAAF pilots have helped train pilots for the Ugandan Air Force. Before Kim Jong Un took power in North Korea, pilots flew only 15–25 hours per year due to the cost, a shortage of aviation fuel, and the lack of spare parts. Most training flights usually only lasted 30–45 minutes and focused mainly on taking off and landing the aircraft safely. Units flying the MiG-29, MiG-23, or Su-25 received additional training hours. After Kim Jong Un took power, pilot flight time double to 50 hours per year. The latest economic sanctions may have cut back the KPAAF pilots’ flight time, but the effects are not fully known. It is likely that KPAAF pilots are substandard when compared to other modern air force pilots who receive many more flight hours in both simulators and the actual cockpit.
Another major limitation for the KPAAF is the advanced age of its aircraft. Most of the KPAAF aircraft use technology from before 1980. While there are a few more-recent aircraft and some of them may have received upgrades over the years, most of the planes and helicopters are at least a generation behind those of North Korea’s foes in terms of technology.

EMPLOYMENT AND INTEGRATION IN COMBINED ARMS

Aviation operation types most likely to be employed by the KPAAF include direct air, airborne, SOF, UAS, and command and control (C2) support to the KPAGF.

DIRECT AIR SUPPORT

When not fulfilling its primary mission of defending the homeland from aerial attack, the KPAAF will assist the KPAGF through direct air support. This mission is to disrupt and destroy enemy forces in proximity to friendly forces. The KPAAF will provide direct air support through its attack helicopters, fixed-wing attack regiments, and its multirole fixed-wing aircraft. Due to the possibility of the KPA’s enemy maintaining air superiority—or at least air parity—over much of the battlefield, the amount of support the KPAAF provides will likely be limited, forcing the KPAGF to rely on artillery for most of their fire support to KPAGF units.

AIRBORNE OPERATIONS AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES SUPPORT

North Korea fields at least seven airborne units, ranging from battalion- to brigade-size, and the KPA regards all of them as SOF. Two such units are airborne sniper brigades that, once inserted into an enemy’s rear area, would conduct missions including the destruction or neutralization of airbases, as well as C2 elements, computers, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. The airborne sniper brigades receive priority access to aviation assets in anticipation of a requirement for airborne insertion in support of combat operations. Due to aircraft shortages, most missions will entail air drops of battalion size or smaller.

Of the 30,000 total airborne soldiers in the KPA SOF community, it is expected that about half would be inserted by parachute or air-mobile operations using helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft during the opening stages of any war. Once on the ground, the airborne SOF would seek out C2 and communications nodes, rear service units, or high-value targets to attack.

The KPA will use several techniques in order to deliver its airborne SOF. One is by using an ancient biplane—the AN-2 Colt—that was first flown in 1947. Due most likely to maintenance issues, the number of serviceable AN-2s for the KPA has dropped from 300 in July 2012 to 200 in April 2016. While at 160 kph the AN-2 Colt is relatively slow, it can fly at low altitudes to avoid enemy radar, and its small signature makes detection by radars more difficult than locating larger aircraft, even when the Colt increases altitude to facilitate tactical parachute drops. To avoid visual detection, in the last decade the KPA has changed the AN-2 camouflage pattern to light blue on the aircraft’s underside and a green pattern on top. This helps the Colts to blend with the sky, reducing observation from the ground, and with the terrain to avoid observation from above. The AN-2 Colt can land and take off using unimproved short runways. The easily flyable airplane can take off from a dirt runway only 650 min length or from paved surfaces, including roads, at a shorter distance—396 m.

Another aircraft capable of air-mobile insertion of SOF personnel is the MD-500, a U.S.-made helicopter that North Korea obtained by circumventing U.S. export laws. Some South Korean air defenders may be reluctant to shoot down a North Korean MD-500 because its appearance closely resembles an aircraft flown by the South Korean Air Force. Photographs also exist showing North Korean MD-500s painted with South Korean air force markings. The identification, friend or foe, confusion could delay air defense personnel long enough to allow the KPA helicopter to complete its SOF insertion mission. The KPA has even experimented with delivering SOF personnel from the air using hang-gliders, motorized paragliders, and 10-passenger gliders towed behind an AN-2 aircraft.

Depending on wind and weather conditions, KPA airborne forces can drop year-round throughout the Korean Peninsula. Air-mobile operations could be conducted as far as 48 km beyond KPA’s front lines, but most likely 14–19 km. The KPA usually conducts an airborne operation in three phases. In phase one, a reconnaissance element and a small airborne force parachute in to secure the landing or drop zone.
force arrives later and expands the landing or drop zone perimeter. The third phase occurs when the follow-on echelon lands 4–6 hours later with support units and additional supplies. KPA airborne soldiers normally carry a 3- to 4-day basic load of ammunition and rations. Resupply is considered unlikely based on the expectation that the CFC will maintain air superiority most of the time using U.S. and South Korean aircraft. Should the KPA choose to resupply its forces from the air, such operations would probably be conducted at night or in hours of limited visibility. The KPA deception plan for aerial resupply would entail dummy drops and covering 2–3 different routes with fighter escorts to protect the transport aircraft. During most airborne operations, it is expected that the airborne SOF will begin to run short of supplies within 72–96 hours and will thereafter resort to foraging.

**UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SUPPORT TO THE KPAGF**

B-15. The KPA operates most UASs in North Korea, but the Reconnaissance General Bureau and the KPAAF may control a small number of them. The KPA primarily tests and modifies imported UASs, but it is likely starting to develop its own. North Korea has portable unmanned aircraft (UA) launcher capabilities comparable to the Soviet/Russian Zil-130 cargo trucks. Due to the country’s mountainous terrain, the KPAAF UA inventory includes a significant number of runway-independent platforms that can be catapulted or rocket-launched from the ground or from a vehicle-mounted rail. The potential for North Korea to modify various types and classes of UASs into intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance or one-way strike exists. Expect North Korea to use low-altitude and short- to medium-range platforms for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and basic target acquisition operations, as well as possible attack missions in a mass kamikaze-style formation using light weapons or biological and chemical agents. North Korean UAs can carry munitions, but the specific types are unknown. Some North Korean UAs flying into South Korea are painted a spotted light-blue/dark-blue pattern with a dark nose for camouflage purposes.

B-16. The most likely tactical missions for KPA UAs include the following, not all of which are military-related or directed against enemy forces:

- Aerial reconnaissance in support of maneuver forces.
- Observation of indirect fire for adjustment.
- Target confirmation and “suicide” loitering weapon systems.
- Pre-battle information (live stream or still photo).
- Battle damage assessment.
- Communications relay in restrictive environments due to valleys, hills, or mountains.
- Monitoring and controlling unit formations.
- Monitoring camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception activities to determine level of success.
- Monitoring civil gatherings, curfew violations, or rationing violations of its own citizens.
- Monitoring weather effects on agriculture, production, and infrastructure.

**AVIATION COMMAND AND CONTROL**

B-17. The KPA and KPAAF operate a dual C2 system for aviation support. Requests go through the KPA chain of command and air force personnel on the ground direct the aircraft to the target, with the final direction provided by forward air control parties observing the target.
Appendix C

Antitank Operations

This appendix provides a doctrinal overview of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) antitank (AT) operations typically supporting a ground maneuver infantry regiment, brigade, or division formation. This appendix provides a functional overview of AT operations, the organizations providing AT support, capabilities and limitations, and the employment and integration of AT operations in combined arms operations.

FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW

C-1. AT operations are the primary concern for the Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF), and enemy tanks are a primary target for all Korean People’s Army armored forces through an AT defense system composed of six phases. See chapter 7 for a detailed account of each of these phases. The KPAGF commanders, as part of the AT defense system, will create a number of AT defensive positions, regimental AT engagement areas, and divisional AT engagement areas.

ORGANIZATION

C-2. When in the defense, KPAGF maneuver battalions will create an AT defensive position. This position is so important that the regimental commander will designate its physical location and will also create the associated plan, which the battalion commander responsible for the area’s defense will execute. The position will likely be situation on the forward slope of two or three hills in order to create a kill zone where the enemy’s tanks can be caught in a crossfire. Figure 7-8 on page 7-16 is an example of a battalion AT defensive position. Typical units used in an AT defensive position are one recoilless rifle platoon (three guns), one 76.2-mm platoon (two guns) and several RPG-7s employed in two- or three-man teams. Other weapons in an AT defensive position may use include AT or antipersonnel mines, 100-mm AT guns, and tanks.

C-3. Each KPAGF maneuver regiment and division will create at least one AT engagement area on the most likely axis of attack through the unit’s defensive position. The regimental and divisional commanders will use these engagement areas if the enemy’s armor forces get through the first echelon of defenses and the AT defensive positions. The physical construction of the regimental and divisional AT engagement areas are similar to the AT defensive positions, but the kill zone may be larger and the number of weapons involved greater. The task organization for an AT engagement area will typically consist of two platoons of SU-100 howitzers and two RPG-7 platoons augmented by additional assets such as AT or antipersonnel mines, 76.2-mm AT guns, recoilless rifles, and tanks. Figure 7-8 on page 7-16 of the battalion AT defensive position is similar to the physical layout of an AT engagement area. Table C-1 on page C-2 shows common KPAGF tanks and AT weapons systems.
Table C-1. KPAGF tank and antitank weapons systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons System</th>
<th>Type (Primary Antitank Weapon)</th>
<th>Primary Weapon Range, m</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Production Start Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T-34/85</td>
<td>Tank (85-mm)</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-54/55/Type 59</td>
<td>Tank (100-mm)</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-62 or Chonma</td>
<td>Tank (115-mm)</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1961/1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pokpung</td>
<td>Tank (115-mm/125-mm)</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Songun</td>
<td>Tank (125-mm)</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT-76</td>
<td>Light tank (76.2-mm)</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 63</td>
<td>Light tank (85-mm)</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT-85</td>
<td>Light tank (85-mm)</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 62</td>
<td>Light tank (85-mm)</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRDM-2 (Not all armed the same)</td>
<td>Recon (Sagger)</td>
<td>500–3,000</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMP-1</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicle (Sagger)</td>
<td>500–3,000</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9K11/9M14 (AT-3)</td>
<td>ATGM (Sagger)</td>
<td>500–3,000</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9K111/9M111 (AT-4)</td>
<td>ATGM (Spigot)</td>
<td>70–2,500</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9P148/PM113 (AT-5)</td>
<td>ATGM (Spandrel)</td>
<td>70–4,000</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-10</td>
<td>Recoilless rifle (82-mm)</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-11</td>
<td>Recoilless rifle (107-mm)</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIS-2/M-1943</td>
<td>Antitank gun (57-mm)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIS-3/M-1943</td>
<td>Antitank gun (57-mm)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-44</td>
<td>Antitank gun (85-mm)</td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-48</td>
<td>Antitank gun (85-mm)</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>1948</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ATGM antitank guided missile INA information not available m meters mm millimeters

CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

C-4. The KPAGF have the capability to conduct AT operations in both the offense and defense due to their large numbers of tanks and AT weapons. While many of the weapons systems are dated, the immense number of weapon systems makes the KPAGF a formidable armor force. The KPAGF fields over 3,500 main battle tanks, ranging from the 1940s era T-34/85 to the Songun tanks built indigenously in the last decade. The KPAGF also possess about 950 light tanks, 2,500 armored personnel carriers, 2,100 BRDM scout vehicles, and over 200 BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles. Some of these vehicles operate AT weapons. The KPAGF also have a large number of both self-propelled and towed AT guns, many dating back to World War II, that the soldiers could use against enemy tanks.

C-5. If necessary, the KPAGF will not hesitate to use some of their artillery guns in the direct fire mode in order to stop tanks or an armor-heavy force. This technique would only be a temporary solution before the guns returned to their primary role of providing indirect fire support to KPAGF units.
C-6. The major limitation for KPAGF AT operations is the age of the weapons. Many of the weapons systems date back several generations, as far as World War II. This creates readiness issues regarding maintenance of such aged weapons and logistical issues associated with massive ammunition requirements for all the various weapon sizes.

C-7. Some of the KPAGF towed AT guns do not have a long maximum effective range. By the time the enemy’s tanks have gotten within range, the enemy has already had sufficient time to locate and target the KPAGF AT guns with longer-ranged weapons.

C-8. Many of the KPAGF tanks are not as accurate nor the maximum effective range as long as that of the enemy’s tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. While the enemy’s tanks will not be able to fire to their maximum ranges due to the mountainous terrain, almost every one of them will have a longer range and better accuracy than the KPAGF tanks. Many KPAGF tanks cannot fire their main gun while on the move, which makes them more vulnerable to the enemy’s tanks and AT weapons systems.

EMPLOYMENT AND INTEGRATION IN COMBINED ARMS

C-9. Each KPAGF infantry division is normally assigned an armor battalion, as shown in figure 3-4 on page 3-11. The KPAGF also fields mechanized and armor units that will contain a larger number of tanks. These tanks can range from North Korea’s own locally produced Chonma, Pokpung, or Songun tanks, to vintage World War II Soviet T-34/85 tanks operated by the lowest-quality units. The most prevalent tank is the T-54/55/Type 59 tank provided to the KPAGF by the former Soviet Union or China. The KPAGF also field a number of light tanks used by reconnaissance units. In total, it is most likely the KPAGF possesses at least 3,700 tanks of all types. The commander will decide the mission and combat formations of any assigned armor units based on the terrain and enemy situation.

C-10. The KPAGF usually place their armor unit assembly areas 9–14 km from any hostile positions and designate the unit’s line of departure 1–3.5 km from its forward line of troops. A small advanced infantry party equipped with mine detectors normally reconnoiters in front of the lead tank to detect mines, warning devices, and obstacles, and to seek out enemy positions. When confronted by enemy units, the tanks’ priority of targets are tanks, AT weapons systems, and then infantry. In the absence of any AT threats, the tanks will provide support to infantry assaults by using their machine guns and main guns against hardened targets.

C-11. The intent of almost all KPAGF offensive attacks is to break through the enemy’s initial forward positions and allow its more mobile armor forces (tanks and mechanized infantry) to seek out and destroy enemy combat support and combat service support units in the enemy rear areas. The initial reduction or elimination of the enemy’s AT weapons systems is to allow the faster-moving mobile force to exploit any gaps in the enemy’s front lines. See chapter 6 for more details on how the KPAGF will likely fight while in the offense, including AT operations.

C-12. In defensive operations, the KPAGF normally position armor units in depth for flexible response to evolving tactical situations. Small numbers of tanks may be used in AT defensive positions in the forward battalions or in divisional or regimental AT engagement areas. The KPAGF normally does not use large armored units to defend terrain. In a KPAGF field army area defense, the commander will likely place the armor regiment in the second defense zone, 10–15 km behind the front edge of the first defense zone. The KPAGF commander would most likely use this armor regiment in a counterattack role or as a major unit in the resumption of the offense.

C-13. In the defense, the KPAGF will set up a number of AT defensive positions as shown in figure 7-8 on page 7-16, regimental engagement areas, and divisional engagement areas as shown in figure 7-6 on page 7-12. The KPAGF locate these engagement areas on the most likely armor avenues of approach. When initiated, the KPAGF will focus their weapons on enemy tanks and AT weapons systems before any infantry targets. If separated from their unit, KPAGF soldiers will likely continue the attack in small groups (two to five tanks) or even as a lone tank. Like the infantry, KPAGF armor soldiers learn in training to fight as long as they can, and may try to hide in order to hit enemy combat support and combat service support units from a stay-behind ambush position. See chapter 7 for more details on how the KPAGF will likely fight while on the defense.
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**Appendix D**

**Air Defense Operations**

This appendix provides a doctrinal overview of the Korean People's Army (KPA) air defense operations typically supporting a ground maneuver infantry regiment, brigade, or division formation. This appendix provides a functional overview of air defense operations, the organizations providing air defense support, capabilities and limitations, and the employment and integration of air defense operations in combined arms operations.

**FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW**

D-1. The Korean People's Army Air Force (KPAAF) is responsible for the KPA's air defense units. All KPA units, however, are responsible for all-arms air defense. (See chapter 4 for additional details.) The KPA wants to protect its most important combat positions, installations, and large troop movements from aerial attack. It expects that its forces will not control the airspace, so the Korean People's Army Ground Forces (KPAGF) must rely on surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) to protect ground forces. The KPAAF augments its air defense weapons with barrage balloons at point targets. The large number of air defense weapons operated by the KPAAF will create a high density of air defense artillery against enemy aviation.

**ORGANIZATION**

D-2. In addition to the KPAGF using its organic weapons for air defense, the KPAAF maintains 19 or 20 SAM brigades organized into three air defense sectors, along with an unknown number of AAA regiments and three radar regiments. The KPAAF is also responsible for a SAM maintenance depot and an AAA training academy. The entire KPA can field at least 11,000 antiaircraft guns that range from 14.5 mm to 100 mm. The KPAGF also field a number of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) in this type of unit and as weapons allocated to other unit types.

D-3. While some KPA defectors have stated that a single SAM brigade may operate more than one type of SAM, it is more likely each brigade is equipped with a single system type. It is estimated that there are 15 SA-2, 2 SA-3, and 2 SA-5 brigades. The KPAAF maintains approximately 1,700 launchers in operational units and the same number in storage for combat operations. The most common SAM is the SA-2, as older models have been fired during training. Table D-1 on page D-2 provides examples of various infantry and air defense units with the primary mission of providing air defense protection to KPA units.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Weapons System</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Typical Number of Units</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA-7b MANPADS 42</td>
<td></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td>SA-16 may be substituted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZPU-4 (14.5-mm) AAA</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M-1939 (37-mm) AAA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S-60 (57-mm) AAA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-5 regiment</td>
<td>SA-5 launcher (1 missile) SAM</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 AAA battery may be organic to each SA-5 regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-3 regiment</td>
<td>SA-3 launcher (2 missiles) SAM</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Probably does not have organic AAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZPU-4 (14.5-mm) AAA</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-2 regiment</td>
<td>SA-2 launcher (1 missile) SAM</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZPU-4 (14.5-mm) AAA</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored brigade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA-7b MANPADS 12</td>
<td></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td>SA-16 may be substituted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M-1993/BTR-152A (14.5-mm) AAA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K-37-2 SPAAG (37-mm) AAA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Some may be replaced with M-1992 SPAAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZSU-57 SPAAG (57-mm) AAA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanized infantry brigade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA-7b MANPADS 24</td>
<td></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td>SA-16 may be substituted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M-1993/BTR-152A (14.5-mm) AAA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K-37-2 SPAAG (37-mm) AAA</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Some may be replaced with M-1992 SPAAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZSU-57 SPAAG (57-mm) AAA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AAA = antiaircraft artillery  MANPADS = man-portable air defense systems  SAM = surface-to-air missile
n/a = not applicable  SPAAG = self-propelled antiaircraft gun  mm = millimeter
CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

D-4. The primary capability of the KPA’s air defense is the sheer number of air defense weapons systems fielded by the military—estimated at over 11,000 different weapons or systems. Many of the air defense units, especially those in static locations, are operated by female soldiers. The KPA uses an integrated air defense system with overlapping radar and air defense systems throughout North Korea. There are fewer air defense platforms in the north along the border with China and Russia than in the south along the demilitarized zone. While the KPAGF commander is the senior commander in most circumstances, it is the responsibility of the KPAAF to coordinate the integrated air defense system.

D-5. The major limitation for KPAGF air defense operations is the age of the weapons and its technology, similar to its other equipment. Much of the AAA weapons date back to the 1950s and 1960s. Most KPA radar systems are older models using vacuum tubes received years ago from China or the former Soviet Union. The missile systems, while newer, still are several generations behind the systems found in other armies. Tables D-2 and D-3 below and on page D-4, respectively, provides a list of the major antiaircraft weapons systems fielded by the KPA.

Table D-2. KPA surface-to-air missile and MANPADS weapons systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>NATO Name (Common Name)</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>On Hand</th>
<th>Vertical Target Range, m</th>
<th>Slant Target Range, m</th>
<th>Production Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S-75</td>
<td>SA-2 Guideline</td>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>&lt;270</td>
<td>3,000–25,000</td>
<td>7,000–29,000</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-125</td>
<td>SA-3 Goa (Neva/ Pechora)</td>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>140 batteries</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>1950s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-200</td>
<td>SA-5 Gammon (Angara/Vega/ Dubna)</td>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1,000–40,000</td>
<td>2,000–100,000</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9K32/ 9K32M</td>
<td>SA-7/7b Grail (Arrow)</td>
<td>MANPADS</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>50–2,300</td>
<td>50–2,300</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-300 or HQ-9 variant (9M82)</td>
<td>SA-10 Grumble</td>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>1,000–30,000</td>
<td>2,000–100,000</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9K35</td>
<td>SA-13 Gopher</td>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>25–3,500</td>
<td>50–5,000</td>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9K310</td>
<td>SA-16 Gimlet (Needle)</td>
<td>MANPADS</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>50–5,000</td>
<td>50–5,000</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9K38</td>
<td>SA-18 Grouse (Needle)</td>
<td>MANPADS</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>50–5,200</td>
<td>50–5,200</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN-5/5A</td>
<td>Red Tassel</td>
<td>MANPADS</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>50–2,500</td>
<td>800–4,400</td>
<td>circa 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIM-92A</td>
<td>Stinger</td>
<td>MANPADS</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>50–4,800</td>
<td>50–4,800</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MANPADS man-portable air defense systems
INNA information not available
mm millimeter
m meter
SAM surface-to-air missile
### EMPLOYMENT AND INTEGRATION IN COMBINED ARMS

**D-6.** The KPA unit’s chief of staff is responsible for unit air defense and determines what facilities, command, control, and communications nodes, or units are to receive priority for protection. KPA air defense weapons are often placed on high ground, but are well camouflaged. Formations can vary between linear, fan-shaped, triangular, or square. Normally, the KPAAF places its air defense weapons 50–100 m apart, with air defense units separated by at least 200 m.

**D-7.** In the offense, the KPA deploys its AAA assets to protect units in concentrated areas and key facilities. The most prevalent air defense weapon in a KPAGF infantry division is the ZPU-4. The ZPU-4 will provide coverage to maneuver units on the move and then displace forward. The ZPU-4 battery could also receive a

---

**Table D-3. KPA antiaircraft artillery weapons systems**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Common Name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>On Hand</th>
<th>Vertical Target Range, m</th>
<th>Slant Target Range, m</th>
<th>Production Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M-1938/1946</td>
<td>DShK heavy machine gun</td>
<td>12.7-mm</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>0–2,000</td>
<td>50–2,000</td>
<td>1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZGU-1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Towed, 14.5-mm</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>0–1,400</td>
<td>0–1,400</td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZPU-1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Towed, 14.5-mm</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>0–1,400</td>
<td>0–1,400</td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZPU-2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Towed, 14.5-mm</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>0–1,400</td>
<td>0–1,280</td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZPU-4</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Towed, 14.5-mm</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>0–1,400</td>
<td>0–1,280</td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1983</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Towed, 14.5-mm</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZU-23-2 (2A13)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Towed, 23-mm</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>50–2,000</td>
<td>50–2,500</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZSU-23-4</td>
<td>Shilka</td>
<td>SP, 23-mm</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>0–1,500</td>
<td>0–2,500</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1992</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Towed, 23-mm</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1990</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>SP, 30-mm</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>50–3,600</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1992</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>SP, 30-mm</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>0–3,000</td>
<td>0–3,500</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1939</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Towed, 37-mm</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>50–4,000</td>
<td>50–3,000</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 65</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Towed, 37-mm</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>0–8,500</td>
<td>0–3,500</td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 74</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Towed, 37-mm</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>0–8,500</td>
<td>0–3,500</td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1992</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>SP, 37-mm</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>0–3,500</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZSU-57-2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>SP, 57-mm</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>100–4,500</td>
<td>100–12,000</td>
<td>1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AZP S-60</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Towed, 57-mm</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>100–6,000</td>
<td>100–6,000</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Towed, 57-mm</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>100–6,000</td>
<td>100–6,000</td>
<td>INA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1985</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>SP, 57-mm</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KS-12</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Towed, 85-mm</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>100–10,500</td>
<td>100–15,500</td>
<td>INA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KS-19</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Towed, 100-mm</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>100–12,700</td>
<td>100–15,000</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AAA antiaircraft artillery

**Legend:**

- mm: millimeter
- m: meter
- n/a: not applicable
- SP: self-propelled
- INA: information not available
mission to protect a particular unit or area. The M-1939, S-60, and any corps air defense batteries would provide area coverage concentrating on the protection of high-value targets. Divisional MANPADS teams would provide local air defense protection to subordinate units. The AAA has two primary missions in the offense—

- Ensure the attacking units maintain their freedom to maneuver.
- Protect artillery, tanks, and mechanized units in the second echelon.

D-8. In the defense, KPA AAA protects key facilities, railways, and supply depots. Division AAA assets normally protect the first tactical echelon, while corps AAA protect the second tactical echelon and further into the KPA corps rear area. Division air defense assets that include ZPU-4, M-1939, and S-60 antiaircraft weapons will provide overlapping coverage for the first defense zone. Divisional MANPADS teams will provide local air defense protection. SA-2, SA-3, and SA-5 regiments with their air defense missiles and antiaircraft machine guns will operate in overlapping fans to protect designated units behind the frontline divisions. KPA AAA defensive missions include—

- Detect enemy air activity.
- Interdict enemy bombing of forward and rear areas.
- Use electronic countermeasures against enemy aviation, communications, and radar systems.
- Cover the defense in depth through overlapping engagement envelopes.
- Prevent enemy air patrol penetration.
- Fire upon airborne or air assault units.
- Provide cover for artillery and tank units.
Appendix E

Electronic Warfare Operations

This appendix provides an overview of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) electronic warfare (EW) operations typically supporting a ground maneuver infantry regiment, brigade, or division formation. This appendix provides a functional overview of EW operations, the organizations providing support, capabilities and limitations, and the employment and integration of EW in combined arms operations.

FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW

E-1. EW is one of the components of electronic intelligence warfare. The mission of EW is to deny the enemy the use of its electronic emitters while still safeguarding the use of one’s own emitters. The KPA recognizes the importance of EW in modern warfare and emphasizes its role in combat mission success.

E-2. EW is divided into three categories: electronic support measures, electronic countermeasures, and electronic counter-countermeasures. Electronic support measures evaluate the enemy’s present and future EW activities, including interception of radio and radar signals, direction finding, wiretapping, analysis, and report. Electronic countermeasures prevent or reduce the enemy’s capability to use its own electronic emitters. Countermeasure methods include active (electronic) and passive (chaff) jamming, as well as imitative and manipulative electronic deception. Electronic counter-countermeasures are the KPA’s protective measures to prevent or degrade the effectiveness of the enemy’s electronic countermeasures against its own electronic emitters.

ORGANIZATION

E-3. Much of EW occurs above the tactical level, but the EW activities conducted at the strategic and operational level still affect operations at the tactical level. The Electronic Warfare Bureau is responsible for the administration and training of all EW and signals intelligence (SIGINT) assets within the KPA. The bureau oversees offensive and defensive EW operations in coordination with the Communications Bureau, Command Automation Bureau, and the Reconnaissance General Bureau’s Technical/Radio Department.

E-4. Most EW and cyberspace warfare operations take place within the Cyber Warfare Guidance Unit, more commonly known as Bureau 121. While at the strategic and operational level, the following strategic assets can have an effect on the tactical battle. There are over 6,000 members in Bureau 121, many of them operating from other countries, such as Belarus, China, India, Malaysia, and Russia. North Korean computer hackers have even been able to access secure systems and steal South Korean war plans. There are four subordinate units below Bureau 121:

- **The Andarial Group.** 1,600 members (+/-) whose mission is to gather information by conducting reconnaissance on enemy computer systems and creating an initial assessment of the network’s vulnerabilities. This group maps the enemy network for potential attack.
- **The Bluenoroff Group.** 1,700 (+/-) whose mission is to conduct financial cybercrime by concentrating on long-term assessment and exploiting enemy network vulnerabilities. This group exploits the systems for financial gain for the regime or to take control of the system.
- **Electronic Warfare Jamming Regiment.** Located in Pyongyang, there is a single KPA EW jamming regiment composed of three subordinate EW battalions. These EW battalions are most likely located in Kaesong, Haeja, and Kumgang.
- **The Lazarus Group.** Unknown number of members whose mission is to create social chaos by weaponizing enemy network vulnerabilities and delivering a payload if directed to do so by the regime. This group preloads the network with codes for later activation that disrupt or destroy the...
network. The Lazarus Group unleashed the WannaCry malware in 2016–2017, causing massive problems around the world—including in the U.S.

E-5. Each of the four Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF) forward-deployed corps (I, II, IV, and V) are assigned a communications regiment and an EW/SIGINT battalion with administrative control by the KPAGF corps headquarters. Some of the divisions within the forward corps will contain an EW/SIGINT company, and all of the divisions will contain a communications battalion. A KPAGF division may be allotted an EW/SIGINT battalion, company, or nothing at all, depending on its mission. All KPAGF division staffs possess at least several EW/SIGINT-trained officers to help coordinate any such assets the unit is allotted. Any division deployed along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) is assigned a DMZ police battalion, which operates ground surveillance equipment, radar, infrared, and thermal imaging devices. While North and South Korea began a series of activities (DMZ guard post destruction, mine-clearing operations, and enforcing a no-fly zone around Panmunjom) to reduce the hostility level between the two sides in late 2018, as of publication there had been no open-source reporting of changes in EW/SIGINT monitoring activities by either country.

CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

E-6. The primary EW capability at all levels of the KPA is jamming of the enemy’s electronic systems. Since at least 2000, various KPA units have conducted jamming of South Korean and U.S. communications and radar systems. These attacks have affected the airports around Seoul for short periods of time. Unclassified reports do not state the specific types of jammers that the KPA operates; it is known that they are truck-mounted Russian-made systems with a range of 48–97 km. Additional reports state that the KPA is attempting to obtain jammers with even longer ranges.

E-7. The Korean People’s Army Air Force (KPAAF) is also responsible for operating over 50 early-warning radar facilities that provide overlapping coverage of the entire country, with the focus on the DMZ and the west coast. The lowest density of coverage is along the North Korea-China border. Due to North Korea’s mountainous terrain, there are gaps in low-altitude coverage below 300 m. Many of these radar sites are built into mountains on top of hydraulic lifts, so they can be lowered into the mountain for both protection from attack and to conduct maintenance. The KPAAF also operates Global Positioning System and airborne warning and control system radar jammers using the P-10 Knife Rest and the P-14 Tall King systems. The KPAAF or the KPA intelligence services also operate electronic intelligence systems against enemy air forces.

E-8. The primary deficiency with the KPA EW systems, like most of its equipment, is its age and technology level. The KPA is still using equipment several generations behind its likely enemies. Table E-1 provides a list of the most prevalent KPA radar systems and their capabilities and limitations.
Table E-1. KPA radar systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nomenclature</th>
<th>NATO/ Common Name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Band</th>
<th>Distance Range, km</th>
<th>First Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kabina 66</td>
<td>Back Net</td>
<td>Air defense/early warning</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>INA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5N87</td>
<td>Back Trap</td>
<td>Early warning &amp; acquisition</td>
<td>E &amp; F</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5N69</td>
<td>Big Back</td>
<td>Early warning &amp; ground control intercept</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>500+</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT-LBU</td>
<td>Dog Ear</td>
<td>Acquisition</td>
<td>F &amp; G</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>pre-1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNR-75</td>
<td>Fan Song A/B/C/E/F</td>
<td>Fire control &amp; tracking</td>
<td>E, F, &amp; G</td>
<td>60–120 (A/B); 75–145 (C/E/F)</td>
<td>1960s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNR-75A</td>
<td>Gin Sling</td>
<td>Fire control &amp; tracking</td>
<td>F &amp; G</td>
<td>&lt;145</td>
<td>1970s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNR-125</td>
<td>Low Blow</td>
<td>Fire control &amp; guidance</td>
<td>I &amp; D</td>
<td>40 (I); 85 (D)</td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INA</td>
<td>Moon Face</td>
<td>Early warning &amp; ground control intercept</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>INA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRV-13</td>
<td>Odd Pair</td>
<td>Height finding</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-8</td>
<td>Knife Rest A</td>
<td>Early warning &amp; ground control</td>
<td>VHF</td>
<td>150–250</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-10</td>
<td>Knife Rest B/C</td>
<td>Early warning &amp; ground control</td>
<td>VHF</td>
<td>200–250</td>
<td>1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-12</td>
<td>Spoon Rest A/C/D</td>
<td>Early warning &amp; ground control</td>
<td>VHF</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-14</td>
<td>Tall King</td>
<td>Early warning</td>
<td>VHF</td>
<td>500–600</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-15</td>
<td>Flat Face</td>
<td>Early warning &amp; acquisition</td>
<td>UHF</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-15M2</td>
<td>P-15M Squat Eye</td>
<td>Early warning</td>
<td>UHF</td>
<td>5–200</td>
<td>late 1960s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-35/37</td>
<td>Bar Lock A/B</td>
<td>Early warning</td>
<td>E &amp; F</td>
<td>250–390</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRV-11</td>
<td>Side Net</td>
<td>Height finding</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5N87</td>
<td>Back Net/Back Trap</td>
<td>Early warning</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJ-202</td>
<td>Gin Sing-A</td>
<td>Fire control &amp; acquisition</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>INA</td>
<td>pre-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5N62</td>
<td>Square Pair</td>
<td>Fire control</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36D6</td>
<td>Tin Shield</td>
<td>Early warning &amp; ground control intercept</td>
<td>E &amp; F</td>
<td>180–360</td>
<td>INA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INA: information not available
KM: kilometers
UHF: ultra-high frequency
VHF: very high frequency
EMPLOYMENT AND INTEGRATION IN COMBINED ARMS

E-9. At each level of command, the signal section leader or senior signal commander is responsible for preparing the KPAGF commander’s plan to implement EW measures based on the commander’s orders and other staff instructions. This EW plan will include—

- Ground communications reconnaissance, coordinated with the reconnaissance section leader, including methods of employing radio-intercept and radar-intercept equipment.
- Organization of all assigned and attached radio jammers.
- Measures all subordinate units will take to counteract enemy radio-jamming actions through techniques, including the following—
  - Strict observation of standard KPA communications procedures.
  - Allocation of alternate frequencies.
  - Destruction of enemy jamming equipment.
  - Detection and destruction of air-dropped enemy jamming devices.

E-10. The KPA uses a number of electronic countermeasure techniques to prevent the enemy’s EW from affecting its missions. These techniques include—

- Total or partial radio silence.
- Using directional antennas and low power outputs to ensure maximum reduction of emissions.
- Conducting electronic deception by transmitting false traffic to confuse the enemy.
- Frequently relocating equipment that emits radio signals.
- Making periodic frequency and call sign changes.
- Training radio operators in electronic jamming countermeasures.
- Verification via landline after a radio transmission.

E-11. The KPA will conduct intelligence gathering for EW operations for the following purposes—

- Radio interception to collect data on enemy organizations, equipment, movement, and intentions.
- Radio directional finding to determine the location of enemy electronic emitters.
- Wiretapping enemy landlines to monitor communications.

E-12. The primary targets for EW before, during, and after all KPA military operations include the following enemy assets:

- Command and control facilities.
- Communications facilities and relay stations.
- Aircraft early-warning radar systems.
- Coastal radar systems.

E-13. The KPA will conduct communications jamming against the following enemy targets—

- Fire control facilities.
- Ground-to-air communications links.
- Aircraft request nets.

E-14. The KPA will conduct barrage jamming against specific enemy targets including the following—

- Fire control nets.
- Ground-to-air control links.
- Aircraft request channels.

E-15. Whether the North Korean unit performing the EW mission is at the division level, above it, or below, the effects on the enemy ground forces will be the same.
Appendix F
Engineer Operations

This appendix provides a doctrinal overview of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) engineer operations typically supporting a ground maneuver infantry regiment, brigade, or division formation. This appendix provides a functional overview of engineer operations, the organizations providing engineer support, capabilities and limitations, and the employment and integration of engineer operations in combined arms operations.

FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW
F-1. Like all military engineer units, the Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF) engineers can conduct missions related to mobility, countermobility, survivability, and reconnaissance. If necessary, KPAGF engineer units can fight as infantry. Due to the large number of rivers in South Korea, the KPAGF engineer operations spend a significant amount of time conducting wet-gap crossing training.

ORGANIZATION
F-2. There are organic engineer units within KPA maneuver regiment, division, and corps levels. In addition, the KPA fields several types of specialized engineer units, including five to eight engineer river crossing/amphibious regiments and a single engineer river-crossing brigade.

F-3. Each infantry regiment is assigned a combat engineer company composed of three engineer platoons and a company headquarters. Its primary equipment includes the following:
- Four flamethrowers.
- Three RPG-7s.
- Three RPD machine guns.
- Three mine detectors.
- Thirteen mine probes.
- Five 2 1/2-ton trucks.

Figure F-1 shows a possible combat engineer company.

Figure F-1. KPA combat engineer company (example)
F-4. The engineer company commander normally attaches squad-size elements to infantry battalions to reduce obstacles during offensive operations. In the defense, the company prepares obstacles, constructs positions, and can serve as part of the antitank reserve. Priority of effort is on the creation of antitank obstacles as opposed to firing positions. The engineer company only repairs roads and bridges in its regiment’s rear area.

F-5. Each infantry division is likely to contain both a general engineer battalion and a combat engineer company; the latter is the same as for an infantry regiment. The general engineer battalion consists of a general construction company, an obstacle construction company, a road construction company, and the battalion headquarters. The engineer battalion will normally operate the following weapons and equipment:

- Ten RPG-7s.
- Six RPD machine guns.
- Twenty-five 2 1/2-ton trucks.
- Two bulldozers.
- Two cranes.
- One welder.
- Twenty-seven mine detectors.
- One decontamination apparatus.
- Two generators.
- One spotlight.

Figure F-2 shows a possible general engineer battalion.

![Figure F-2. KPA general engineer battalion (example)](image)

F-6. The general construction company engages in general construction and repair work, to include fortifications. The obstacle construction company both emplaces and removes obstacles on the battlefield. The road construction company is concerned primarily with construction and maintenance of lines of communications. Division engineer assets can perform all the functions of the regimental engineer company plus construct metal and wooden bridges, provide illumination over a limited area, and set up and manage a water supply point, as well as constructing military facilities.

F-7. Each corps will likely field a general engineer battalion, a construction battalion, and an engineer river crossing regiment. The size, equipment, and capabilities for the first two battalions are similar to those assigned to other levels of command. Most engineer river crossing units are located in the forward corps or in the western area of the country, as the western corridor is more conducive for offensive operations.

**CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS**

F-8. KPAGF engineer units can conduct the standard mobility, countermobility, and other engineering missions found in most armies. Engineer divisions field a number of standard engineer units, but may receive additional support from a higher command for a specialized mission.
The KPA fields various types of river-crossing battalions and regiments to conduct wet-gap crossing operations. Equipment used for conducting these wet-gap operations include 2 1/2-ton trucks, K-61 tracked amphibious vehicles, LPP light pontoon bridge sections, TPP heavy pontoon bridge sections, PMP or S-type floating bridges, GSP ferries, and motorboats (Russian BMK-30 or BMK-90). The K-61 can carry 60 personnel or 5,000 kg of supplies or equipment while operating on water, but only 3,000 kg on land. It can travel at 35 kph on land and 10 kph in the water.

KPA engineers transport the LPP light pontoon bridge sections by truck and launch them by gravity. The LPP load capacity comes in three weights: 12 tons, 24 tons, and 40 tons. Single pontoon sections are used as the floating supports for the 12-ton bridge, while the larger capacity bridges have 2- and 3-section pontoons as the floating supports. The length of the bridge depends on its load capacity: 160 m for the 12-ton, 88 m for the 24-ton, and 64 m for the 40-ton. The length of time to emplace the bridge is 60 minutes for the two lighter bridges and 65 minutes for the heaviest bridge; night emplacement times increase by 50–100 percent. The LPP sections from a single unit can be used to create six ferries; some can carry 12 tons while others can carry 24 tons.

The TPP heavy pontoon bridge is similar to the LPP, but with a larger carrying capacity. The TPP has various weight capacities affect the length of the bridge. The 16-ton bridge spans 163 m, the 50-ton bridge can cross 135 m, and the 70-ton bridge can cross a 103-m gap. The length of time to emplace the bridge is 60–70 minutes; up to twice as long at night. There have been reports that the TPP has been used to cross rivers where the water flow was 4 mps, but the highest normal speed for safe operations is usually 2.4 mps. The TPP sections can be used to construct ferries that can transport 50 or 70 tons of equipment or vehicles.

The PMP heavy pontoon bridge is often referred to as a ribbon bridge. The PMP comes in two carrying capacities: 20 tons can span 281 m and 60 tons can cross 119 m. By reducing the 20-ton bridge capacity by half, the engineers can create a bridge half as wide but double the distance. The construction time for the 20-ton bridge is 25 minutes, while only 15 minutes is needed for the larger bridge. The bridges can be erected safely in water slower than 2.7 mps. The PMP engineer unit can also be used to create ferries with capacities of 40, 60, and 80 tons.

The GSP heavy amphibious ferry consists of two closed-deck, tracked amphibious vehicles upon which have been mounted streamlined, closed-deck steel plate pontoons. For cross-country mobility, the pontoon is folded (top down) over the amphibious carrier. The two-propeller amphibious carrier is powered by an engine modified to provide greater horsepower. The water depth must be at least 1.2 m and the river banks cannot be higher than 51 cm. Heavy vehicles, such as tanks, can drive up onto a GSP ferry, then be transported across water, then drive off without much preparation on the far side of the wet gap. Assembly time is 20 minutes in daylight and 30–40 minutes at night. GSP ferries cannot be joined together to form a bridge. In certain circumstances, it may be possible for a KPA tank to fire its main gun while crossing the wet gap on the GSP.

The KPA normally plans wet-gap crossings at the corps level and higher, but some divisional operations are also possible. Planning normally takes 1–2 days, but the plans for the first crossings south of the demilitarized zone may already be prepared. Lead KPA units will conduct forced river crossings quickly and use whatever materials are at hand. Some of the KPA tanks and armored personnel carriers are amphibious or possess snorkeling capabilities.

When the wet gap is 120–180 m wide, KPA engineers will transport the maneuver unit vehicles using rafts such as the GSP and soldiers using K-61 amphibious vehicles. Pontoon bridges also may be used to conduct river crossings for wet gaps of the same distance, but these would be used by the second-echelon and reserve units. When the wet gap is greater than 180 m wide, the engineers would need to install a float bridge. When the water is above 59 °Fahrenheit, individual KPA soldiers may also cross wet gaps using domestically made flotation vests, which hold the soldier and personal equipment above the water surface, or field-expedient rafts made from a raincoat, poncho, or shelter half.

The KPA crosses a wet gap in four phases. Phase one begins when engineers set up four crossing lanes for the first-echelon units. Two of the lanes are designated for tanks and amphibious tracked vehicles; the other two are rafts and ferries for the infantry. During phase two, the first-echelon units cross at one of the four designated lanes. The third phase begins when the second tactical echelon units begin to cross. By this time the engineers have had sufficient time to improve the river-crossing site. There are still four lanes, but
the soldiers no longer cross by ferry, but by a foot bridge. The vehicles are now crossing using a plank system mounted on the ferries. The fourth phase begins after a couple days’ work by the engineers. There are still two foot bridges for follow-on echelon soldiers to cross, but there is a single heavy and light float bridge designated for vehicles to use.

F-17. During the mid-1970s, it was estimated that it would take a Soviet Army of four divisions—one tank division and two motorized divisions in the first echelon and one motorized division in the second echelon—between 12 and 24 hours to cross a river 400 m wide. This time was based on the assumption the tanks would use snorkels, while armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles would swim to cross the river. The difference in estimates is based on how quickly a pontoon bridge was erected and how many ferries were available. The time for the river-crossing operation did not take into account whether the crossing was opposed, or any losses in engineer equipment. A Soviet Army is somewhat similar in size to a KPA front-line corps in strength, but with less heavy equipment. Thus, it is possible a KPAGF army of four divisions could cross in a faster time.

F-18. Due to fuel shortages, it is likely the KPA seldom practices major wet-gap crossings during training exercises, so the KPA is most likely not as well-trained as the Soviet Army was in 1976. The KPA will likely not be able to protect the bridgehead and its river-crossing equipment from aerial attack. It is thus likely that a KPA corps will take more than 24 hours to conduct a major wet-gap crossing.

F-19. One of the major limitations for engineer operations is the lack of mechanical equipment. Much of the work conducted by the KPAGF engineers is performed by manual labor due to a lack of equipment from years of sanctions against the country, the shortage of replacement parts, and the lack of fuel. Because of this, training conducted by engineer units focuses on tasks that do not require mechanical equipment or the associated fuel.

EMPLOYMENT AND INTEGRATION IN COMBINED ARMS

F-20. KPAGF engineers concentrate on mobility and countermobility operations that reinforce the combat power of the KPA maneuver units. KPA engineer missions include, but are not limited to—
  ● Conducting combat operations in conjunction with other units.
  ● Emplacing and clearing demolitions and obstacles.
  ● Employing ferries and bridges in support of wet-gap crossings.
  ● Constructing and maintaining roads.
  ● Conducting engineer reconnaissance.
  ● Constructing tunnels and field fortifications.
  ● Constructing and maintaining buildings and facilities.
  ● Providing technical camouflage guidance.
  ● Providing engineer supplies.
  ● Maintaining engineer equipment.
  ● Supplying water to units.
  ● Preventing or fighting fires.
  ● Fighting as infantry, if necessary.
  ● Providing other engineer public services.

F-21. For additional information about the use of engineers in the offense and defense, see chapters 6 and 7, respectively.
Appendix G

CBRN and Obscurant Operations

This appendix provides a doctrinal overview of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) and obscurant operations typically supporting a ground maneuver infantry regiment, brigade, or division formation. This appendix provides a functional overview of CBRN and obscurant operations, the organizations providing CBRN and obscurant support, capabilities and limitations, and the employment and integration of CBRN and obscurant operations in combined arms operations.

FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW

G-1. North Korea is known to have chemical and nuclear weapons and is highly suspected of conducting research into biological weapons. It is likely the KPA will not hesitate to use chemical weapons in both offensive and defensive operations. The KPA is expected to use smoke, flame, and incendiary weapons on the battlefield.

G-2. The KPA trains in both offensive and defensive CBRN warfare. Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF) reconnaissance units, including some specialized in CBRN warfare, are aware of the CBRN threat and would provide warning for other KPA units. Normally, KPA soldiers are only be issued protective masks and clothing if a chemical attack was imminent. Hardened artillery sites and other underground facilities are typically designed to protect KPA soldiers from a chemical attack.

ORGANIZATION

G-3. The KPAGF contain chemical units at each level of command, from regiment to corps, which are similar in organization. At the national level, there is a Nuclear-Chemical Defense Bureau with battalions operating directly under it. Some of these national assets may be assigned to support a corps, division, or regiment. These units provide the KPAGF with both detection and decontamination capabilities. The corps chemical battalion has three chemical companies, each with two chemical reconnaissance platoons and two chemical decontamination platoons. The KPA infantry division chemical company has essentially the same organization. The KPA infantry regiment chemical platoon has two reconnaissance squads and two decontamination squads.

CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

G-4. KPA capabilities include chemical, biological, nuclear, and smoke and flame weapons. Tables G-1 through G-3 on pages G-2–G-3 provide the CBRN and obscurant capabilities of various KPA weapons systems. These tables are not all-inclusive.
### Table G-1. KPA CBRN- and obscurant-capable tanks and armored fighting vehicles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons System</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Capability Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M-2002/Pokpung-ho/Storm Tiger</td>
<td>Main battle tank</td>
<td>Smoke grenade launchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chonma-ho (Pegasus)</td>
<td>Main battle tank</td>
<td>Smoke grenade launchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-54/55</td>
<td>Medium tank</td>
<td>Smoke generator; smoke grenade launchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-34</td>
<td>Medium tank</td>
<td>Smoke generator; smoke grenade launchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-62</td>
<td>Medium tank</td>
<td>Smoke generator (engine exhaust); smoke grenade launchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 59</td>
<td>Medium tank</td>
<td>Smoke generator; smoke grenade launchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 62</td>
<td>Light tank</td>
<td>Smoke rounds; smoke generator; smoke grenade launchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 63</td>
<td>Light tank</td>
<td>Smoke rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT-76</td>
<td>Light tank</td>
<td>Smoke generator (engine exhaust)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMP-1</td>
<td>IFV</td>
<td>Smoke generator; smoke grenade launchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR-40</td>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Smoke grenade launchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR-50</td>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Smoke grenade launchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR-60</td>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Smoke grenade launchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR-80</td>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Smoke grenade launchers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APC armored personnel carrier  IFV infantry fighting vehicle

### Table G-2. KPA CBRN- and obscurant-capable guns, howitzers, and mortars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons System</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Capability Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M-1978/Koksan (170-mm)</td>
<td>SP gun</td>
<td>Chemical rounds; smoke generator (engine exhaust)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1989 (170-mm)</td>
<td>SP gun</td>
<td>Information not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1943/D-1 (152-mm)</td>
<td>Towed gun</td>
<td>Chemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1977 (152-mm)</td>
<td>SP gun</td>
<td>Nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1954/M-46 (130-mm)</td>
<td>Towed gun/howitzer</td>
<td>Chemical; smoke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-74 (122-mm)</td>
<td>Towed gun</td>
<td>Chemical; smoke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-19/M-1937 (122-mm)</td>
<td>Towed gun</td>
<td>Chemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1938 (152-mm)</td>
<td>Towed howitzer</td>
<td>Chemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1955/D-20 (152-mm)</td>
<td>Towed howitzer</td>
<td>Chemical; smoke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1937 (152-mm)</td>
<td>Towed gun/howitzer</td>
<td>Chemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1938 (122-mm)</td>
<td>Towed howitzer</td>
<td>Smoke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-30 (122-mm)</td>
<td>Towed howitzer</td>
<td>Chemical; smoke</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

mm millimeter  SP self-propelled
Table G-3. KPA CBRN- and obscurant-capable mortars, rocket launchers, and missiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons System</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Capability Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2S9 Anona (120-mm)</td>
<td>SP mortar</td>
<td>Smoke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1943 (120-mm)</td>
<td>Towed mortar</td>
<td>Smoke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-37 (82-mm)</td>
<td>Mortar</td>
<td>Smoke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KN-09 (300-mm)</td>
<td>MRLS</td>
<td>Chemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1985/1991 (240-mm)</td>
<td>MRLS</td>
<td>Chemical; smoke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1991 (240-mm)</td>
<td>MRLS</td>
<td>Chemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1985 (122-mm)</td>
<td>MRLS</td>
<td>Chemical; smoke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BM-21/Grad /RM-70 (122-mm)</td>
<td>MRLS</td>
<td>Chemical; smoke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMD-20/Storm-1 (200-mm)</td>
<td>MRLS</td>
<td>Chemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BM-24/Katyusha (240-mm)</td>
<td>MRLS</td>
<td>Chemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROG-3</td>
<td>SP SSM</td>
<td>Nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROG-5</td>
<td>SP SSM</td>
<td>Chemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROG-7</td>
<td>SP SSM</td>
<td>Chemical; nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scud-B/CSS-1B/C</td>
<td>SP SSM</td>
<td>Chemical; biological; nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nodong 1/2/Scud-D/E</td>
<td>SP SSM</td>
<td>Chemical; biological; nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KN-08</td>
<td>SP SSM</td>
<td>Nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musudan</td>
<td>SP SSM</td>
<td>Nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KN-01</td>
<td>Antiship missile</td>
<td>Nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mm</td>
<td>millimeter</td>
<td>MRLS multiple rocket launcher system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>self-propelled</td>
<td>SSM surface-to-surface missile</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

G-5. North Korea may possess the largest stockpile of chemical weapons in the world, with 2,500–5,000 tons. North Korea has produced and stored mustard, hydrogen cyanide, phosgene, and chloropicrin gases, as well as blood and nerve agents. The KPA possesses artillery, multiple rocket launchers, mortars, aerial bombs, and missiles capable of distributing chemical weapons.

G-6. KPAGF chemical detection units operate from vehicles equipped with warning flag emplacers, allowing the chemical reconnaissance teams to mark contaminated areas without leaving their vehicles. These emplacement systems can be mounted on various vehicles including the BRDM-RKh, BRDM-2-RKh, UAZ-69-RKh; or the Hungarian-made D-442 FUG.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

G-7. Reports indicate it is likely that North Korea began biological weapons research in the 1960s. Possible agents include anthrax, cholera, yellow fever, smallpox, typhus, and typhoid fever. Only 1 kg of anthrax could kill up to 50,000 people in Seoul. The KPAGF uses Russian detection devices to determine if biological warfare is being used.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS

G-8. It is estimated that North Korea possesses at least 20 nuclear warheads; some reports state the country could obtain as many as 100 by 2020. If exposed to nuclear fallout, KPA doctrine is to continue the mission based on the amount of exposure. The KPA uses the roentgen as the standard unit of measurement for radiation. The absorbed dose of 1 roentgen equals approximately 0.877 centigray in soft tissue. Table G-4 shows the U.S. Army’s guide for radiation exposure.

Table G-4. U.S. Army radiation exposure guide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radiation Exposure Status Category</th>
<th>Total Past Cumulative Dose</th>
<th>Additional Dose During Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RES-0</td>
<td>No exposure</td>
<td>Negligible risk: ≤50 cGy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate risk: ≤70 cGy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency risk: ≤150 cGy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RES-1</td>
<td>≤ 70 cGy</td>
<td>Negligible risk: ≤10 cGy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate risk: ≤30 cGy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency risk: ≤110 cGy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RES-2</td>
<td>&gt; 70 and ≤ 150 cGy</td>
<td>Negligible risk: any</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate risk: any</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency risk: ≤40 cGy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RES-3</td>
<td>&gt; 150 cGy</td>
<td>Negligible risk: any</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate risk: any</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency risk: any</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

G-9. The dosage allowed by both militaries is about the same, with the major difference being that KPA soldiers can return to the contaminated area after an evacuation period of 20 days. The KPA considers the following to be allowable dosages for its soldiers—

- 50 roentgens in 1 day = one-time allowable dose and then the soldier will be evacuated from the affected area.
- 10 roentgens per day = repeatable allowable dose. After 100 roentgens in 10 days, no more than 15–20 roentgens on any given day, the soldier will be evacuated from the affected area and not be allowed back into a contaminated area for 20 days.
- 1 roentgen per day = normal exposure, not to exceed 10 roentgens for the day.

SMOKE AND FLAME WEAPONS

G-10. The KPAGF may employ smoke for tactical missions, such as wet-gap crossings or tank operations. The KPAGF will also use smoke to mislead observations, disrupt direct enemy fire, protect tanks from antitank weapons, and cover withdrawals. The use of smoke requires a detailed plan and knowledge of terrain and weather, since physical conditions can heavily influence the smoke’s effectiveness in combat.

G-11. The primary methods used by the KPAGF to produce smoke are canisters and tanks. Some KPA tanks may be equipped with BDSh-5 smoke canisters operated by the tank’s driver, which can cover between 4,000 and 5,000 square meters. KPAGF tanks may also make smoke by running fuel over the exhaust system; as the heat burns the fuel, it produces thick smoke. Table G-5 provides addition information on types of smoke and their usage.
Table G-5. KPAGF smoke classifications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Usage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tactical missions</td>
<td>Camouflage</td>
<td>Conceal a unit from the enemy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deceptive</td>
<td>Confuse the enemy on the unit’s actual mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Blocking</td>
<td>Obstruct enemy observation &amp; prevent calls for fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aerial</td>
<td>Prevent aerial observation &amp; target acquisition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directional</td>
<td>Frontal smoke screen</td>
<td>Screen the forward area of a unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flank smoke screen</td>
<td>Screen the side(s) of a unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rear smoke screen</td>
<td>Screen the rear of a unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational techniques</td>
<td>Frontline maneuver smoke</td>
<td>Conceal a unit’s movement before or during combat operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Along a floating phase line</td>
<td>Provide concealment in a fixed area (must be planned in advance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entire frontal smoke screen</td>
<td>Provide concealment smoke for an entire fixed area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

G-12. Some KPAGF units possess flame weapons that are highly effective in urban or subterranean warfare, especially if on the offensive. The primary KPA flamethrower is the ROKS-3, which weighs 26 kg when filled to its 4-gallon capacity of fuel. Its firing range is 15–35 m, depending on the thickness of the fuel. The KPAGF flamethrower operator normally fires the weapon in 5- to 6-second bursts. Ten igniters set fire to the fuel; after the 10th use, they must be replaced with new igniters.

LIMITATIONS

G-13. The major limitation for the KPA is the accuracy of its missile systems. Most North Korean missile systems are not as accurate as those of its enemies. The target must be large enough that accuracy is not necessary for the success of the mission. Nuclear and chemical weapons, however, do not have to be accurate to be effective. The panic to the civilian population and the aftershocks of a KPA CBRN attack could cause significant issues for the enemy, who would need to continue to fight while mitigating the attack’s effects.

G-14. Another limitation is the effectiveness of biological weapons and the near impossibility for North Korea to limit their effects to the enemy. The release of a biological weapon through mosquitoes, spray, or other means could have as much effect on exposed KPA soldiers as on enemy soldiers.

EMPLOYMENT AND INTEGRATION IN COMBINED ARMS

G-15. If a KPAGF unit is given a CBRN warning during an assault, the soldiers will don their protective masks and continue the attack. They are told to move in short rushes, using protective mats or their capes to fall on. The KPAGF will likely increase the intensity of the attack, as the soldiers are taught the enemy would be even more vulnerable at this time. Once the attack is over, the KPAGF units will continue the mission. If a unit cannot continue its mission, a reserve unit will take over the mission and continue the attack.

G-16. If on the march and a CBRN warning is given, KPAGF soldiers will don their masks, protective capes, and uniforms; close all windows in vehicles; and block other gaps. KPA military personnel will cover all weapons and equipment with tarps or field-expedient coverings to protect them from chemical contamination or nuclear fallout. Units will move through the affected area as rapidly as possible in vehicles or on foot. KPA personnel are told not to eat, drink, or smoke in the contaminated area. They are also taught not to unnecessarily sit on, lie on, pick up, or touch anything in any contaminated zone. If digging must be done, the KPAGF soldiers are taught not to use the contaminated topsoil as part of their fighting positions.
G-17. In the defense, KPA personnel are told to take cover in tunnels and other underground fortifications if there is a CBRN warning or attack. If caught in the open, they are trained to lie prone, facing away from the nuclear blast, for 3 seconds while covering their heads. If not already on, KPA members will don their masks and put on any protective clothing issued to them.

G-18. While the KPA does possess some individual protective equipment for its soldiers, there is not enough for all the active and reserve soldiers. When the specialized equipment is not available, the KPA personnel will rely on towels, handkerchiefs, cotton, or gauze soaked in water to protect their respiratory tract system; straw or mats to prevent contamination from the ground; and bags, heavy paper, or leggings to protect the individual’s shoes and feet. North Korean does domestically produce some of its CBRN equipment.

G-19. If a KPA unit is exposed to a chemical or biological attack, the unit will only go through decontamination once its current mission is over or when there is a lull in the fighting. The KPAGF will set up cleansing stations in rear areas to decontaminate personnel and equipment. These stations include substations for personnel, animals, clothing, vehicles, weapons, and technical equipment.

G-20. Decontamination equipment includes showers, barrels of uncontaminated hot water, soap, scrub brushes, clean clothes, clean cloth for cleaning weapons, and special equipment, including brushes, for animals and equipment. North Korea produces some of this equipment, while obtaining other equipment from overseas.

G-21. Decontamination for the KPA consists primarily of washing the equipment with uncontaminated water, using brushes and soapy cloths. Before the washing, large equipment and weapons will be swept with brooms or improvised implements of straw, grass, twigs, or rope. In the absence of decontamination equipment, KPA personnel will conduct a hasty local decontamination. The affected personnel will shake, dust, or scratch with grass, twigs, or other improvised methods in order to continue the unit’s mission without delay.
Appendix H

Logistics Operations

This appendix provides a doctrinal overview of the Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF) logistics operations typically supporting a ground maneuver infantry regiment, brigade, or division formation. This appendix provides a functional overview of logistics operations, the organizations providing logistics support, capabilities and limitations, and the employment and integration of logistics in combined arms operations.

FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW

H-1. The KPAGF function with less logistical support than most other modern armies. The KPAGF emphasizes combat units over rear service units. They place great pressure on commanders to complete their missions with limited logistics resources. The emphasis is on commanders using any available resources, including civilian or enemy, to support the completion of missions as directed by the chain of command. Due to the shortage of supplies, KPAGF commanders use salvaged items to repair less-damaged equipment and captured enemy or confiscated civilian supplies to support their units.

ORGANIZATION

H-2. The General Rear Service Bureau provides most of the logistic and administrative support to its respective units at the regiment, division, and corps levels of command. The Rear Service Department (RSD) at the regimental level is responsible for food, POL, clothing, finance, transportation, and a medical station. See figure H-1 for a possible regimental RSD. Division RSD elements include a staff section, supply depot, vehicle repair station, a supply and service section, a transportation company, and a division hospital. See figure H-2 on page H-2 for a typical division RSD. The corps RSD includes a headquarters, a general hospital, a field hospital, two transportation battalions, and a vehicle repair factory. See figure H-3 on page H-2 for an example of a corps RSD. RSDs at each echelon include unit mess halls, barbers, and military stores similar to other military’s exchange facilities.

Figure H-1. Regimental Rear Service Department (example)
H-3. Battalions and companies may receive support from mobile military stores sent out by the division RSD. Each RSD maintains warehouses for food, POL, and clothing. The RSD is not responsible for all supply functions. The Artillery Department issues and maintains all artillery weapons and ammunition. The chemical, engineer, and signal sections at each staff level probably handle supplies unique to their services. The Political Department supplies musical instruments and reading material.

CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

H-4. Korean People’s Army (KPA) personnel are taught from their initial entry into the military to operate under severe logistical restraints. The KPAGF teach their soldiers to improvise and overcome, often without any technical solution. The soldiers go through a severe physical fitness training regimen, so they are mentally and physically conditioned to travel faster and cover more ground with a heavy equipment load while eating far less than the soldiers of other armies. During the Korean War, soldiers fighting for North Korea survived on three rice balls of food per day—smaller than one’s fist. Even with these scant rations, KPAGF soldiers may be able to cover up to 40 km in daylight or 29 km at night in only 6 hours, while marching for 2–3 weeks straight. This inurement to deprivation during training allows the KPA to provide less support to its fighting soldiers than other armies, and thus reduce the logistical burden on the strained North Korean economy and supply system.

H-5. The KPA will make use of any equipment found on the battlefield, including that of the enemy. During the Korean War, the U.S. was the second-largest supplier of weapons, ammunition, and equipment—
captured materiel—to the Soviet Union for the North Korean military forces. The KPA would likely use a similar strategy during another war on the peninsula.

H-6. One of the primary weaknesses of the KPA is the limited logistics capability of both the KPA and the North Korean economy when compared to other militaries. KPA units, in general, possess limited organizational transportation, forcing most units to travel on foot. Existing north-south main roads and railways are capable of supporting large-scale combat operations, but rugged terrain restricts lateral movement. The KPA would be dependent on external assistance for ammunition, fuel, armored vehicles, and artillery after initial supplies were used up, or would need to resort to using captured enemy equipment. In addition, North Korean soldiers are only allowed to carry 18 kg in total—including weapons and water—and are issued rations every three days, thus limiting the amount of supplies available at any given time.

EMPLOYMENT AND INTEGRATION IN COMBINED ARMS

H-7. The KPA company first sergeant submits all supply requests to the battalion staff. Some items may be issued on a push system, including clothing, ammunition, and fuel. The pull requests go to the appropriate staff unit at each higher echelon for approval. If approved, the equipment is issued.

H-8. The KPA has stockpiled food, ammunition, fuel, and other supplies in the event of a war. These warehouses are primarily underground to prevent both observation and destruction by enemies. It is estimated that the KPA has approximately 2 months of supplies on hand once hostilities begin.

CLASS I (SUBSISTENCE)

H-9. KPA soldiers primarily survive on a diet high in vegetables, including potatoes, cabbage, spinach, turnips, onions, cucumbers, radishes, and leeks. Fresh vegetables are provided in the summer months, while preserved or pickled vegetables are served in the winter months. All KPA battalion and higher units must operate a special support service unit. These units operate gardens, farms, fish farms, or livestock ranches controlled by the units themselves, whose purpose is to provide much of their own food requirements. Some of the larger units engage in other businesses to earn foreign currency. Military personnel may receive other food through supply channels, including rice, fish, grain, or flour. The standard daily ration is 2.3 kg of food per soldier or 23 tons per division. Soldiers conducting long-range patrols may receive dehydrated food.

H-10. Effect on combat: Units in combat will no longer be able to operate agricultural activities at their peacetime level. KPA supply units will look for other ways to feed the army, such as raiding South Korean farms and gardens or capturing enemy food supplies, as they move south in an offensive operation.

CLASS II (CLOTHING, INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT, KITS, AND HAND TOOLS)

H-11. Each KPA soldier receives two uniform issues per year: summer clothing in April and winter clothes in October. The soldier turns in two old uniforms and receives two that are appropriate for the upcoming season. One of the uniforms will be brand new, which is used during off-duty hours and for indoor training. The second uniform will have been worn by another soldier the previous season and mended to meet a certain standard, and is used for outdoor training and work details. The soldier is also authorized to receive two new sets of underwear and two new pairs of socks during each semiannual issue period. The latter is in short supply so many KPA soldiers wear socks with holes, socks darned too many times, or go sockless. Some reports suggest a general shortage of winter clothing. Other equipment and uniform items are replaced when needed, as determined by the unit’s first sergeant. Soldiers must pay for any lost items, which is often difficult on their limited pay.

H-12. KPA soldiers are expected to do much of the maintenance on their own uniforms and gear. Unit officers and sergeants carefully watch to make sure all immediate subordinate personnel are taking care of their gear properly to extend their use. Prior to the semiannual clothing exchange, KPA soldiers often spend 2–3 days fixing their equipment, including the sewing and repair of the uniforms being placed back into the supply channels. The company first sergeant determines what parts of a soldier’s clothing is serviceable and what items need replacement.
H-13. **Effect on combat:** The average KPA soldier should not expect to receive replacement for combat losses on clothing, individual equipment, kits, or hand tools. The KPA will use captured materiel, including enemy uniforms, for use by their soldiers.

**CLASS III (PETROLEUM, OILS, AND LUBRICANTS)**

H-14. North Korea is almost completely dependent on external sources for POL products. Recent economic sanctions have made this even more difficult. North Korea has one coal liquefaction plant that, when fully operational, can produce 143,000 tons of POL substitutes annually. While North Korea’s first oil refinery was completed in 1974, with the capacity of 2.2 million tons annually, reports indicate it may no longer be operational. Fuel is issued through the logistical channels and only small amounts are kept in the tactical units. Anthracite coal is issued through the supply channels for heating and cooking. It is estimated that the KPA maintains a 2- to 3-month supply of fuel on hand in case of war.

H-15. **Effect on combat:** Units needing fuel or fuel-related products will look for alternative means, such as stealing from South Korean civilian sources or using POL products captured from the enemy.

**CLASS IV (ENGINEER)**

H-16. KPA engineer units are responsible for providing engineer equipment for not only their units, but barrier material for infantry units as well.

H-17. **Effect on combat:** Once the 2–3 months’ of engineer supplies run out, engineer units will resort to field-expedient methods to continue their mission. North Koreans are resourceful due to a lifetime of poverty. They will use civilian supplies or captured enemy equipment to complete their mission requirements.

**CLASS V (AMMUNITION)**

H-18. Reports indicate it is likely that the KPA maintains a 3-month supply of ammunition. A KPAGF division would use an estimated average of 79 tons of ammunition daily. For short durations, this requirement would vary: 53 tons in light combat, 155 in moderate combat, and 332 in heavy combat. The ammunition is distributed through the Artillery Department at each KPA echelon of command. Many KPA weapons are designed to allow the firing of captured enemy ammunition, but the reverse is not true. One example is the KPAGF 82-mm mortar that could fire captured 81-mm ammunition, but 82-mm ammunition cannot be fired from the smaller 81-mm mortar.

H-19. **Effect on combat:** After the North Korean stockpile of ammunition is exhausted, the government will continue to produce what it can from its domestic factories. Other sources for ammunition could include support from foreign countries or capture of enemy ammunition depots.

**CLASS VI (PERSONAL DEMAND ITEMS)**

H-20. The KPA will only possess the most limited resources to provide personal items to its service members. This will likely be the lowest priority for the KPA logistics system, as the KPA personnel are trained to survive with few comfort items.

H-21. **Effect on combat:** The average KPA soldier has been deprived of most comfort items for his or her entire military career. This dearth of personal items will continue.

**CLASS VII (MAJOR END ITEMS)**

H-22. It is unlikely that a KPAGF unit would receive replacement vehicles and equipment on a regular basis. The KPA does not normally remove a unit from the battlefield because it becomes combat-ineffective. If a unit is no longer able to perform its mission, another unit will receive the assignment to complete it. The remnants of several combat-ineffective units may be amalgamated to form a single unit. Class VII items will likely be issued to units not already engaged in combat.
H-23. **Effect on combat**: During offensive operations, it is likely that the KPA will use civilian vehicles and any captured major weapons, such as tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, or armored personnel carriers, to serve as replacements for lost vehicles.

### CLASS VIII (MEDICAL)

H-24. Most major medical items are maintained at the corps level. Some may be found at the division-level medical facilities, but only basic medical items are found at the regimental level and below. The company level will have the most basic supplies, such as bandages, aspirin, iodine, and other first-aid items. Battalion aid stations may stock sulfadiazine, camphor, morphine, and splints. The regimental medical station would also contain penicillin, tetanus antitoxin, and sulfa drugs. Due to the international sanctions against North Korea, it is likely that many medical supplies are lacking throughout the KPA.

H-25. KPA medical care begins at the company level, with an enlisted sanitation director (medic) who administers first aid, supervises hygiene, and escorts patients to the battalion aid station. There is a doctor at the battalion aid station capable of treating minor ailments, with beds available for short-duration stays. Anyone needing more time would be transported to another medical facility. The doctors in the regimental medical section can perform emergency surgeries and treat most common disorders. Doctors at the division can conduct major surgeries if the supplies are available. Corps hospitals are large facilities with 600 beds. During war, it is expected that additional medical units would be formed.

H-26. **Effect on combat**: The KPA will attempt to provide medical care for its soldiers, but healthcare shortages throughout the country means medical treatment will likely be inadequate to maintain soldier health. Captured medical supplies will probably be of better quality than what the country’s doctors use now.

### CLASS IX (REPAIR PARTS)

H-27. The KPA is severely lacking in maintenance capabilities beyond the operator level. There are small-arms repair stations at the regimental level, supported by the Artillery Department, to do minor repairs and replacement of parts. Armor regiments have a maintenance company to maintain their vehicles. Due to the age of much of the KPA equipment and the hesitation to discard any old equipment, there is a great strain on the maintenance system. International sanctions also exacerbate the issue of lack of replacement parts.

H-28. **Effect on combat**: The KPA will use whatever means are necessary to keep its vehicles operational, even if this includes cannibalizing multiple disabled vehicles—removing components from them to facilitate the repair of other equipment—to make only one vehicle operational. The KPA will also use captured civilian and military vehicles to provide repair parts if the equipment is compatible.

### RAIL TRANSPORTATION

H-29. Much of the freight movement in North Korea was previously by rail, but no longer. There are various gauges of track, but the nonstandard gauge was undergoing a conversion to standard gauge before the country’s economic woes began in the 1990s. Freight traffic has dropped due to the closure of many factories and the international sanctions placed on the country for its nuclear activities. Passenger rail transportation is also on the decline, as 4-hour trips can now take days. About 22% of the rail is electrified, and if the electricity is not operational, the trains cannot move. Trains rarely show up on time and they are overcrowded when they do, so holding a ticket does not guarantee a seat.

H-30. There have been discussions between North and South Korea to connect their railroads through the demilitarized zone (DMZ) to improve trade between the two countries. So far, only rudimentary surveys have been done on the North Korean railroad system as part of this project.

H-31. There are two major north-south and two east-west routes. On the east coast, one north-south line runs from Namyang/Tumen to Wonsan. On the west coast, the second north-south rail line runs from Sinuiju to Kaesong. The east-west lines are Route R4 from Pyongyang to Kowon and Route R6 from Manpo to Sunchou.

H-32. **Effect on combat**: Currently there is no operational railroad connecting North and South Korea. In 2018, a South Korean train did cross the border into North Korea to conduct a survey of the North Korean
Appendix H

railroad network. Currently, any equipment arriving by rail would end its journey in the North Korean part of the DMZ, as it would be likely that the South Korean railroad connection would be destroyed in the event of hostilities between the two countries. North and South Korea are currently in discussions about rehabilitating the North Korean railroad system, including the construction of a connection over the DMZ. Once completed, the railroad would become more important for the KPA in its logistical operations if the route was not severed upon the onset of hostilities.

ROAD TRANSPORTATION

H-33. North Korea’s major network follows the main train lines and is inadequate for military transportation due to a lack of maintenance, a shortage of vehicles, and the dearth of fuel. The KPA solution to this problem, prevalent during the Korean War, is to make intense use of manpower. The KPA will not hesitate to draft older men and women of all ages to serve as porters during a time of war. While each porter can only carry a light load, the North Korean people are often in excellent physical condition. It is not unknown for family members in Pyongyang to walk 2 hours or more to a garden outside the city to tend it and still work the required 8-hour shift at their place of employment. During the famine of the 1990s, some entrepreneurs would walk 25 km in a day (round trip) to sell their goods in order to survive.

H-34. The KPA will most likely transport its supplies during the night to avoid detection and destruction from aerial attacks. There are three main routes in North Korea. One on the east coast connects the country to Russia. The one on the west coast connects North Korea to China. A third major route runs down the center of the country through the capital city of Pyongyang. Lateral east-west routes are few, but have been somewhat improved over the last 2 decades.

H-35. Effect on combat: It is unlikely that North Korea will use the roads except in periods of limited visibility or at night, due to the lucrative target the vehicle convoy would make for enemy aerial assets. The KPA would likely use the roads at night to move supplies and equipment from the north to the south.

AIR TRANSPORTATION

H-36. The Korean People’s Army Air Force possesses cargo rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft. When operational, the aircraft could provide logistical support to the KPA, including the transportation of special operations forces (SOF) personnel into South Korea.

H-37. Effect on combat: It is unlikely that North Korea would use its limited air transportation resources for general resupply purposes. They may be used to resupply SOF deep in the enemy’s rear area, but the Korean People’s Army Air Force has more pressing needs than resupplying the KPAGF.

WATER TRANSPORTATION

H-38. Most imports into North Korea used to come by rail or road from China or Russia, meaning the harbors received little attention to improve their infrastructure. There are some port facilities in coastal cities. The Korean People’s Army Navy can use the ports to conduct military missions. The most likely use of the ports would be as a staging facility to clandestinely transport KPA SOF into South Korea for waterborne entries.

H-39. Effect on combat: The Korean People’s Army Navy has many boats and a few ships. These could be used to resupply soldiers along both coasts if they remained operational. Some of the small boats are fast enough to avoid the enemy, but would only be able to provide limited capacity.

SALVAGE

H-40. Salvage is an important part of the KPA logistical system. Due to the lack of access—somewhat caused by international sanctions—and lack of funds, the KPA uses almost everything until it is completely worn out. When a piece of equipment is no longer operational, any serviceable parts are salvaged and used on other equipment. During combat operations, KPA units will obtain necessary supplies from the civilian populace by compulsory laws or coercion, if necessary. The transportation of disabled and captured enemy weapons, equipment, and supplies to the KPAGF rear is the responsibility of all KPA unit commanders. In practice, the commander delegates this task to the appropriate staff member responsible for that type of equipment. If
the vehicle or piece of equipment cannot be repaired at one level, it is sent to the next level. If it cannot be repaired at all, it is sent to the General Rear Service Bureau to be scrapped.

H-41. The KPA continues to stress combat units over the noncombat units throughout its forces. While the KPA can operate on lower logistical requirements than other modern armies, it still must obtain food, fuel, and ammunition to continue to operate. The KPA will use captured equipment and supplies from not only its enemy, but from South Korean civilian sources.

H-42. Effect on combat: With the KPA using captured and civilian equipment, enemy identification becomes even more difficult. This possible confusion could help the KPA surprise its enemy by fighting from a captured vehicle, or an enemy unit may initiate a friendly fire incident by accidentally shooting at a vehicle it thought was the opponent.
Appendix I

Special Operations Forces Operations

This appendix provides a doctrinal overview of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) special operations forces (SOF) operations typically supporting a ground operation. This appendix provides a functional overview of SOF operations, the organizations providing logistics support, capabilities and limitations, and the employment and integration of SOF in combined arms operations.

FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW

I-1. The SOF are the best-trained soldiers in the KPA. While some KPA SOF units are similar to the SOF in other militaries, the SOF designation indicates that these soldiers receive additional training beyond the basic training given to regular soldiers. The KPA SOF include reconnaissance units, light infantry units, sniper brigades, and airborne units. The SOF spend their time training while other military units often spend time planting and harvesting crops, working on logging operations, or involved in other nonmilitary construction projects.

I-2. The most recent estimates for the KPA SOF are between 180,000 and 200,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen. The most recent surge in KPA SOF strength estimates resulted from the conversion of seven infantry or mechanized infantry divisions into light divisions, presumably tailored to replicate tactics the KPA deemed successful based on observations of insurgents fighting conventional coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I-3. The KPA SOF include ground, air, and maritime SOF units. In wartime or in transition to war, the KPA will maintain some SOF units under the command and control (C2) of their respective service headquarters or political bureau. Some SOF units are under bureau or service C2 in peacetime, but can also be provided to operational- or tactical-level commands during task organization to perform designated missions or mission support.

ORGANIZATION

I-4. There are two primary organizations responsible for training and executing missions assigned to the KPA SOF—the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) and the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau. Table I-1 on page I-2 reflects the North Korean SOF units and their estimated strengths.

RECONNAISSANCE BATTALIONS

I-5. The RGB fields eight reconnaissance battalions to conduct strategic or operational missions in support of the overall KPA mission. The RGB may field another battalion tailored to clandestine operations in other countries. This type of specially designed unit may attempt to attack enemy military targets in other countries besides South Korea in the region. Each of the four forward-deployed Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF) corps arrayed along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) receives an additional reconnaissance battalion from this group of eight, in addition to its organic reconnaissance assets and any assets allocated from the reconnaissance brigades. Each of these 500-man battalions will likely serve as the lead element as a KPAGF corps crosses the DMZ into South Korea. These units’ missions will be to gather intelligence, attack strategic targets, and assassinate military and political leaders. Other missions could include sniper shootings to create panic among the civilian populace, attacks against C2 centers, and assessing the reactions of the civilian population to the war.
Table I-1. KPA special operations forces units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Type</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Number of Units</th>
<th>Soldiers (Estimated)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance battalions</td>
<td>Operational or strategic</td>
<td>Reconnaissance General Bureau</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance brigades</td>
<td>Tactical or operational</td>
<td>Forward Deployed Corps</td>
<td>3 (17 Battalions)</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light infantry brigades</td>
<td>Tactical or operational</td>
<td>Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau (LITGB)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>49,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light infantry brigades</td>
<td>Tactical or operational</td>
<td>LITGB (Attached to forward deployed corps)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sniper brigades</td>
<td>Operational or strategic</td>
<td>LITGB</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airborne units</td>
<td>Operational or strategic</td>
<td>LITGB</td>
<td>7 (includes 3 brigades, 2 sniper brigades, and 1 battalion)</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy sniper brigades</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Korean People’s Army Navy</td>
<td>2 (1 on each coast)</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious brigades (naval infantry)</td>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>LITGB</td>
<td>3 (13 battalions)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light infantry divisions</td>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>LITGB</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>50,000–60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deep artillery reconnaissance battalions</td>
<td>Operational or strategic</td>
<td>Strategic Force; Artillery Bureau, 518 Artillery Division; Army Corps (mechanized divisions)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Information not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>184,500+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RECONNAISSANCE BRIGADES

I-6. The KPA fields three brigades comprised of 17 reconnaissance battalions, all distributed among the KPA’s forward-deployed corps and mechanized divisions. Often a traditional relationship exists between the reconnaissance battalion and the unit it supports, with a view toward engendering an improved quality of performance. The operational SOF units will likely rely on ground infiltration along predesignated routes, since strategic SOF units will receive a higher priority for air support. Some of the infiltration could be through preconstructed tunnels under the DMZ, with the final few yards needing to be dug to reach an egress point. SOF personnel who use this manner of infiltration may wear South Korean military uniforms or civilian attire to help avoid undesired contact with enemy forces until it is too late. It is believed that most of the reconnaissance brigades’ soldiers can speak English, and some subordinate units are comprised exclusively of females. The reconnaissance battalions from the brigades will attempt to determine enemy disposition and intentions, and serve as indirect fire observers. Battalions from the reconnaissance brigades will be ordered to attack high-value targets such as airfields; naval bases; port facilities; petroleum, oils, and lubricants storage facilities; or missile sites.
I-7. A 10-person squad-size unit is the essential building block of all reconnaissance units, but the KPAGF does not hesitate to use even smaller elements if the mission requires it. An individual soldier may be part of a cell with a narrow functional focus, such as clearing and scouting, raiding, destruction, capture, security, or interdiction. See chapter 5 for additional information on reconnaissance missions.

LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADES

I-8. The KPA fields 12 light infantry brigades, which fall under the control of the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau or RGB during peacetime, but would shift to other commands prior to initiating combat operations. Three of the brigades are attached to the forward-deployed conventional KPA corps during peacetime, but the remaining eight brigades would most likely be similarly distributed among the four conventional KPAGF corps for combat operations. KPA soldiers assigned to a light infantry brigade must have previously served 4–7 years in the military and be considered politically reliable. These requirements probably stem from the likelihood that these units will operate 30–50 km from the forward edge of the battle area and away from other KPA units. Missions typically assigned to these light infantry brigades include:

- Infiltrating to seize or destroy missile sites, C2 cells, and chemical or nuclear facilities.
- Infiltrating to disrupt or destroy high-value targets such as airfields or petroleum, oils, and lubricants facilities.
- Infiltrating around enemy maneuver units to conduct encirclements or flanking attacks in support of KPAGF ground units.
- Infiltrating, seizing, interdicting, or taking control of major lines of communications to prevent the arrival of supplies or reinforcements to frontline enemy units.
- Infiltrating to seize key terrain or facilities such as dams, power plants, or enemy supply and logistics hubs.
- Providing long-range reconnaissance support to KPAGF corps and divisions.
- Serving as a rear guard during withdrawal operations, harassing the enemy or destroying bridges, tunnels, or other infrastructure that is facilitating the enemy’s advance.

I-9. Light infantry brigades will most likely disperse to operate independently, employing tailored formations ranging from platoon- to battalion-size during combat operations. These SOF soldiers will likely wear civilian clothing or enemy uniforms in an attempt to disguise their true identity. Soldiers from these units will likely cross the DMZ in small groups during hours of limited visibility, then reassemble at a designated rally point. Some brigade members may infiltrate through the DMZ via the previously mentioned tunnels or enter South Korea by using small landing craft or miniature submarines along the coasts. Although KPA light infantry brigades normally operate in platoon-size or larger units, smaller units containing as few as three to five soldiers can deploy to harass enemy forces and generally create chaos in the enemy’s rear area.

KPAGF SNIPER BRIGADES

I-10. While the light infantry brigades operate at platoon or higher levels, the three sniper brigades assigned to the KPAGF will most likely operate in five-man teams to 10-man squads. While the term “sniper” aptly describes one of their purposes, missions assigned to these units are usually broadened. Leaving larger objectives to the light infantry brigades, sniper brigade teams will attack smaller C2 posts, isolated communications relay sites, logistical bases, and other vulnerable high-value targets. If given the opportunity, the sniper units will assassinate key political or military leaders. There are four additional sniper brigades, with two each assigned to the Korean People’s Army Air Force and the Korean People’s Army Navy (KPAN).

AIRBORNE UNITS

I-11. North Korea fields at least seven airborne units, ranging from battalion- to brigade-size units, and the KPA regards them all as SOF. Two such units are the airborne sniper brigades who, once inserted into an enemy’s rear area, would conduct missions similar to those assigned to the aforementioned regular sniper brigades. Additional missions assigned to the airborne sniper units would include destruction or neutralization of enemy airbases, C2 and communications nodes, and intelligence and surveillance assets, as
Appendix I

well as reconnaissance units. The airborne sniper brigades receive priority access to aviation assets in anticipation of a requirement for airborne insertion in support of combat operations. Each of the three regular airborne brigades contains about 3,500 soldiers, with two battalions in each brigade. Due to aircraft shortages, most missions will entail air drops of battalion size or smaller.

NAVY SNIPER BRIGADES

I-12. The two navy sniper brigades, one stationed on each coast, possess about 3,000 combat troops apiece. These units have been placed under the operational control of the KPAN in order to enable amphibious operations. Construction of hovercraft bases for the brigades was previously observed at Sasulpo on the west coast and Tapchonri on the east coast, but these areas were later repurposed. The new west-coast hovercraft base will most likely be located at Yongbong-ni, and it is unknown where the east-coast hovercrafts will be based. The navy sniper brigades’ missions are similar to those of the KPAGF brigades, but the navy snipers will most likely land on the South Korean coastline. North Korea fields numerous types of landing craft, and it is estimated the KPA could deliver 5,000 to 7,000 personnel in one lift targeting both coastlines. Navy sniper brigade team missions would include:

- Supporting a KPA ground offensive by securing river-crossing sites.
- Conducting amphibious raids to destroy critical coastal targets in the enemy’s rear area.
- Harassing enemy rear area logistical operations.
- Attacking or destroying the enemy’s combat service support units.
- Attempting to delay the movement of enemy reinforcements forward to the main combat area.
- Attacking or destroying enemy airbases or naval facilities.
- Occupying or raiding critical coastal islands.
- Attacking enemy C2 and communications nodes.

I-13. Should hostilities erupt on the peninsula, a standing mission for KPAN sniper units is the capture of the five northernmost South Korean islands along the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea, called the West Sea by South Korea. Each of the navy sniper brigades may possibly contain a “manned torpedo” battalion for use against ships, a technique successfully used by Italian naval forces in December 1941 to sink two British battleships anchored in the harbor at Alexandria, Egypt.

AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADES

I-14. The KPAN fields three amphibious light infantry brigades, totaling 13 battalions. The primary differences from regular light infantry brigades are that these units routinely operate using naval landing craft and continuously practice amphibious landings on various types of beaches. One defecting navy sniper in 2011 boasted he traveled more than 32,000 km by sea on floating tubes during his training. These units train on a variety of landing craft, from the 350-ton Hantae-class utility landing craft, to hovercraft that can travel at 80 kph, to rubber rafts launched from larger ships for the purpose of infiltrating along the coast. The amphibious light infantry brigades can also use mini submarines or semisubmersible boats. The navy sniper brigades and the amphibious brigades use the same landing craft, but if all landing craft supported the amphibious brigades, the KPAN could conduct two brigade- and several battalion- or company-size landings along both coasts simultaneously. Once on the ground, these amphibious brigades would attack enemy combat service support units in the rear areas and seize key terrain to facilitate the onward movement of the KPAGF, which are advancing from the north.

LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISIONS

I-15. The newest SOF unit in the KPA is the light infantry division. Beginning around 2003, after observing U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, the KPA began converting seven regular infantry and mechanized infantry divisions into light infantry divisions. Each new division only contains about 7,000 soldiers, as the KPA stripped legacy units of most of their former organic support, including artillery, armor, and air defense units. The KPAGF then changed the focus of training within the newly created divisions to combat operations in urban and mountainous terrain, to include operating during periods of low visibility. Over time, the techniques of these units became increasingly unconventional due to the perceived success of irregular warfare techniques directed against U.S. and other Western forces in the Middle East.
DEEP ARTILLERY RECONNAISSANCE BATTALIONS

I-16. The KPA also fields specially purposed deep artillery battalions, whose mission is to infiltrate deep into enemy territory, acquire targets, guide fires, and give battle damage assessments to their units. KPA units operating this type of battalion include the Strategic Force, the KPA Artillery Bureau, the 518th Artillery Division, all frontline KPAGF corps, and all mechanized divisions.

CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

I-17. The KPA SOF primarily conduct five categories of missions. The first mission is reconnaissance—strategic, operational, or tactical, depending on unit composition and objective. The second mission type is direct combat operations conducted in conjunction with conventional operations, with the intent to facilitate the success of KPAGF main conventional forces. The third mission for the SOF is to establish a second front focused on defeating the C2 and combat service support units of the enemy. The fourth SOF mission is to counter the enemy’s SOF by providing security for KPA conventional-force combat support and rear service units in the KPAGF rear areas. The final SOF mission is to provide internal security for the regime, as the SOF are some of the most politically reliable units in the KPA. The SOF would be called upon to deal with any domestic disturbances that might break out within North Korean territory during wartime.

I-18. Based on the Russian experience in Crimea, it is likely that either some KPA SOF would be inserted into South Korea, or North Korea would activate its clandestine agents already living in South Korea before hostilities actually began. The task of the SOF, with assistance from clandestine agents, would be to slow down the mobilization of South Korean military reserves. The SOF could do this in a number of ways:

- Social media. The SOF would attempt to spread the word that war between North and South Korea was not imminent and the activation of South Korean military reserves was unwarranted.
- Antiwar protests. The SOF, with clandestine supporters, could lead or infiltrate antiwar rallies in an attempt to convince the South Korean Government not to react to any North Korean actions.
- False-flag provocations. The SOF would attempt to blame any of their actions on others, especially South Koreans who favor war preparedness.
- Political attacks. Some SOF may attempt to cause chaos and possibly advocate regime change in South Korea during any political crisis, thus diverting attention away from any North Korean war preparations.
- Terrorist-style attacks. If other means proved ineffective or as an approaching conventional attack date drew near, the SOF might launch terrorist-style attacks to spread panic.
- Attack key C2 and communications nodes. Shortly before any KPA conventional surprise attack, the SOF would attack these important centers to prevent the flow of true information throughout South Korea.

I-19. There are three primary limitations for KPA SOF units. First, there is a finite number of aircraft and watercraft to deploy the SOF, meaning most ground units deploying through infiltration or airborne and waterborne assaults would not likely be larger than a brigade. Secondly, any airborne operation will likely lose the element of surprise after the initial sortie. Any Korean People’s Army Air Force aircraft making it back safely to pick up additional SOF personnel will have to face an alerted enemy. Lastly, KPA labeling of a unit as SOF does not make it so. Many of the SOF units are more likely trained to the same standard as conventional forces in other militaries. The KPA SOF units are only special in comparison to other units in the North Korean military.

EMPLOYMENT AND INTEGRATION IN COMBINED ARMS

I-20. The KPA will use its SOF units and clandestine supporters already on the ground in South Korea to create a “second front” in the enemy’s rear areas, while its enemy must continue to deal with the conventional battle on the primary front. The SOF units will attack key enemy C2 facilities and important logistical centers, and attempt to create fratricide between enemy units located primarily in enemy rear areas. The KPA plan is likely to try to cause the enemy to divert resources to fight the SOF in its rear area, thus leaving its conventional forces at the front line more vulnerable to a conventional attack, which the KPA could perform with its limited armored forces.
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Source Notes

This division lists sources by page number. Where material appears in a paragraph, it lists both the page number followed by the paragraph number.

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## Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) or (DOD) precedes the definition. The proponent publication is listed in parentheses after the definition. Acronyms appearing in ATP 7-100.2 that are not Army or joint are marked with an asterisk (*).

### SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>antiaircraft artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*AAAD</td>
<td>all-arms air defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Army doctrine publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>affiliated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>area of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>armored personnel carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Army regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>antitank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATP</td>
<td>Army techniques publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTP</td>
<td>Army tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*C3D</td>
<td>camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*CBP</td>
<td>complex battle position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, and [or] nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCSM</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cm</td>
<td>centimeter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>command post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>demilitarized zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*EIW</td>
<td>electronic intelligence warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>electronic warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*HARTS</td>
<td>hardened artillery site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*IFS</td>
<td>integrated fires system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*IFV</td>
<td>infantry fighting vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kg</td>
<td>kilogram</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECTION II – TERMS

adversary
A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged. (JP 3-0)

air assault operation
An operation in which assault forces, using the mobility of rotary-wing or tiltrotor aircraft and the total integration of available fires, maneuver under the control of a ground or air maneuver commander to engage enemy forces or to seize and hold key terrain. (JP 3-18)

ambush
An attack by fire or other destructive means from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy. (FM 3-90-1)
antiaccess
Action, activity, or capability, usually long-range, designed to prevent an advancing enemy force from entering an operational area. (JP 3-0)

area defense
A type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright. (ADP 3-90)

area denial
Action, activity, or capability, usually short-range, designed to limit an enemy force’s freedom of action within an operational area. (JP 3-0)

area security
A type of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, lines of communications, and activities within a specific area. (ADP 3-90)

assault
To make a short, violent, but well-ordered attack against a local objective, such as a gun emplacement, a fort, or a machine gun nest. (JP 3-18)

attack
A type of offensive operation that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both. (ADP 3-90)

battle position
A defensive location oriented on a likely enemy avenue of approach. (ADP 3-90)

block
A tactical mission task that denies the enemy access to an area or prevents the enemy’s advance in a direction or along an avenue of approach. Block is also an obstacle effect that integrates fire planning and obstacle efforts to stop an attacker along a specific avenue of approach or prevent the attacking force from passing through an engagement area. (FM 3-90-1)

breach
A tactical mission task in which the unit employs all available means to break through or establish a passage through an enemy defense, obstacle, minefield, or fortification. (FM 3-90-1)

bypass
A tactical mission task in which the commander directs the unit to maneuver around an obstacle, position, or enemy force to maintain the momentum of the operation while deliberately avoiding combat with an enemy force. (FM 3-90-1)

canalize
(Army) A tactical mission task in which the commander restricts enemy movement to a narrow zone by exploiting terrain coupled with the use of obstacles, fires, or friendly maneuver. (FM 3-90-1)

clear
A tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned area. (FM 3-90-1)

clearing
A mobility task that involves the elimination or neutralization of an obstacle that is usually performed by follow-on engineers and is not done under fire. (ATP 3-90.4)

combat service support
The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of all operating forces in theater at all levels of warfare. (JP 4-0)

combat support
Fire support and operational assistance provided to combat elements. (JP 4-0)
complex terrain
A geographical area consisting of an urban center larger than a village and/or of two or more types of restrictive terrain or environmental conditions occupying the same space. (ATP 3-34.80)

concealment
Protection from observation or surveillance. (FM 3-96)

contain
A tactical mission task that requires the commander to stop, hold, or surround enemy forces or to cause them to center their activity on a given front and prevent them from withdrawing any part of their forces for use elsewhere. (FM 3-90-1)

control measure
A means of regulating forces or warfighting functions. (ADP 6-0)

counterattack
Attack by part or all of a defending force against an enemy attacking force, for such specific purposes as regaining ground lost, or cutting off or destroying enemy advance units, and with the general objective of denying to the enemy the attainment of the enemy’s purpose in attacking. In sustained defensive operations, it is undertaken to restore the battle position and is directed at limited objectives. (FM 1-02.1)

counterreconnaissance
A tactical mission task that encompasses all measures taken by a commander to counter enemy reconnaissance and surveillance efforts. Counterreconnaissance is not a distinct mission, but a component of all forms of security operations. (FM 3-90-1)

cover
(Army) 1. A type of security operation done independent of the main body to protect them by fighting to gain time while preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. (ADP 3-90) 2. Protection from the effects of fires. (FM 3-96)

defeat
To render a force incapable of achieving its objectives. (ADP 3-0)

delay
When a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy’s momentum and inflicting maximum damage on enemy forces without becoming decisively engaged. (ADP 3-90)

destroy
A tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted. Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. (FM 3-90-1)

disrupt
A tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles to upset an enemy’s formation or tempo, interrupt the enemy’s timetable, or cause enemy forces to commit prematurely or attack in a piecemeal fashion. (FM 3-90-1)

electronic warfare
Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. (JP 3-13.1)

enemy
A party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized. (ADP 3-0)

engage
To bring the enemy under fire. (JP 3-09.3)
exploitation
(DOD) Taking full advantage of success in military operations, following up initial gains, and making permanent the temporary effects already created. (JP 2-01.3) (Army) A type of offensive operation that usually follows a successful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth. (ADP 3-90)

fire plan
A tactical plan for using the weapons of a unit or formation so that their fire will be coordinated. (FM 3-09)

fix
A tactical mission task where a commander prevents the enemy force from moving any part of that force from a specific location for a specific period. Fix is also an obstacle effect that focuses fire planning and obstacle effort to slow an attacker’s movement within a specified area, normally an engagement area. (FM 3-90-1)

forward operating base
An airfield used to support tactical operations without establishing full support facilities. (JP 3-09.3)

forward operating site
A scalable location outside the United States and its territories intended for rotational use by operating forces. (JP 4-04)

friendly
A contact positively identified as a friend using identification, friend or foe and other techniques. (JP 3-01)

guard
A type of security operation done to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. (ADP 3-90)

guerrilla force
A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory. (JP 3-05)

high-payoff target
A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action. (JP 3-60)

high-value target
A target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. (JP 3-60)

hybrid threat
The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorists, or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually beneficial effects. (ADP 3-0)

integration
(DOD) The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole. (JP 1)

intelligence
1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. 2. The activities that result in the product. 3. The organizations engaged in such activities. (JP 2-0)

interdict
A tactical mission task where the commander prevents, disrupts, or delays the enemy’s use of an area or route. (FM 3-90-1)
irregular warfare
A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). (JP 1)

isolate
To separate a force from its sources of support in order to reduce its effectiveness and increase its vulnerability to defeat. (ADP 3-0)

joint
Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (JP 1)

local security
The low-level security activities conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy. (ADP 3-90)

maneuver
(DOD) A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a position of advantage over the enemy. (JP 3-0) (Army) Movement in conjunction with fires. (ADP 3-0)

military deception
Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. (JP 3-13.4)

mission
The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. (JP 3-0)

neutral
In combat and combat support operations, an identity applied to a track whose characteristics, behavior, origin, or nationality indicate that it is neither supporting nor opposing friendly forces. (JP 3-0)

neutralize
(Army) A tactical mission task that results in rendering enemy personnel or materiel incapable of interfering with a particular operation. (FM 3-90-1)

operational environment
A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

operational level of warfare
The level of warfare at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. (JP 3-0)

opposing force
A plausible, flexible, and free-thinking mixture of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements representing a composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces and capabilities (doctrine, tactics, organization, and equipment). (AR 350-2)

patrol
A detachment sent out by a larger unit to conduct a specific mission that operates semi-independently and return to the main body upon completion of mission. (ATP 3-21.8)

protection
Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area. (JP 3-0)
raid
An operation to temporarily seize an area to secure information, confuse an enemy, capture personnel or equipment, or to destroy a capability culminating with a planned withdrawal. (JP 3-0)

reconnaissance
A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (JP 2-0)

screen
A type of security operation that primarily provides early warning to the protected force. (ADP 3-90)

security area
That area occupied by a unit’s security elements and includes the areas of influence of those security elements. (ADP 3-90)

signals intelligence
1. A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. 2. Intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals. (JP 2-0)

spoiling attack
A tactical maneuver employed to seriously impair a hostile attack while the enemy is in the process of forming or assembling for an attack. (FM 3-90-1)

strategic level of warfare
The level of warfare at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, then develops and uses national resources to achieve those objectives. (JP 3-0)

support
1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1)

suppress
A tactical mission task that results in the temporary degradation of the performance of a force or weapon system below the level needed to accomplish its mission. (FM 3-90-1)

surveillance
The systematic observation of aerospace, cyberspace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (JP 3-0)

system
A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements; that group of elements forming a unified whole. (JP 3-0)

tactical level of warfare
The level of warfare at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. (JP 3-0)

tactical mission task
The specific activity performed by a unit while executing a form of tactical operation or form of maneuver. It may be expressed in terms of either actions by a friendly force or effects on an enemy force. (FM 3-90-1)

tactics
(Army) The employment, ordered arrangement, and directed actions of forces in relation to each other. (ADP 3-90)
target acquisition
The detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of capabilities that create the required effects. (JP 3-60)

task
A clearly defined action or activity specifically assigned to an individual or organization that must be done as it is imposed by an appropriate authority. (JP 1)

task organization
(Army) A temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission. (ADP 5-0)

task-organizing
The act of designing a force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission. (ADP 3-0)
techniques
Non-prescriptive ways or methods used to perform missions, functions, or tasks. (CJCSM 5120.01A)
terrorism
The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political. (JP 3-07.2)

threat
Any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland. (ADP 3-0)

unconventional warfare
Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. (JP 3-05.1)

unmanned aircraft
An aircraft that does not carry a human operator and is capable of flight with or without human remote control. (JP 3-30)

unmanned aircraft system
That system whose components include the necessary equipment, network, and personnel to control an unmanned aircraft. (JP 3-30)

weapons of mass destruction
Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties, and excluding the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon. (JP 3-40)
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DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
## Index

Entries are by paragraph number.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>accuracy, 5-53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>action and enabling functions, 2-22–2-26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>action forces functional organization, for a dispersed attack, 6-80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for an integrated attack, 6-70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>action units, assault units, 2-34–2-35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>functional tactics, 2-33–2-37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>main defense units, 2-36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mission units, 2-37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actions on contact, battle drills, 4-9–4-18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>continue mission, 4-18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>execute, 4-15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fix, 4-16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>isolate, 4-17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plan, 4-13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prepare, 4-14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actions to counter enemy consolidation, actions to counter U.S. forces, 1-139–1-143</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>change the nature of the conflict, 1-142</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>counter stability, 1-140</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employ cultural standoff, 1-143</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>redirect support, 1-141</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actions to counter U.S. forces, counter enemy consolidation, 1-139–1-143</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deter enemy augmentation, 1-127–1-131</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fundamentals, 1-121–1-143</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gain and sustain dominance, 1-135–1-138</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>influence enemy shaping, 1-122–1-126</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maintain the initiative, 1-132–1-134</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actions to deter enemy augmentation, actions to counter U.S. forces, 1-127–1-131</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>after perception of risk, 1-128</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expose U.S. and allied forces, 1-129</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mask intent, 1-130</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>slow and disrupt deployment, 1-131</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actions to gain and sustain dominance, actions to counter U.S. forces, 1-135–1-138</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disaggregate enemy formations, 1-138</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employ targeted overmatch, 1-136</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>protect key capabilities, 1-137</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actions to influence enemy shaping, actions to counter U.S. forces, 1-122–1-126</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disaggregate partnerships, 1-125</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enable targeted instability, 1-124</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prevent access facilitation, 1-126</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide an alternative understanding of an OE, 1-123</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actions to maintain the initiative, actions to counter U.S. forces, 1-132–1-134</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conduct in-theater preclusion, 1-134</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>control tempo, 1-133</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actions within South Korea, counterstability actions, 8-24–8-45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>irregular forces activities, 8-31–8-32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regular-force instability activities, 8-25–8-28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF instability activities, 8-29–8-30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>terrorism and mission task execution, 8-33–8-45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adaptive operations, 1-95–1-97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adequate logistics. See sustainment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>advance guard, 5-134–5-138</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aerial reconnaissance, 5-28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>affiliated units, 3-15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aggressiveness, 5-50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>air assault defense actions, complementary combined arms actions, 4-85–4-97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>continue mission, 4-97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>execute—air assault defense actions, 4-95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>execute—make contact, 4-94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plan, 4-92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prepare, 4-93</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>report, 4-96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>air defense operations, D-1–D-8 capabilities and limitations, D-4–D-5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employment and integration in combined arms, D-6–D-8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>functional overview, D-1 organization, D-2–D-3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>air force, 3-5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and navy employment, 1-78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>underground facilities, 7-99–7-104</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>air transportation, H-36–H-37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>airborne, command post, 3-32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>operations and SOF support, B-10–B-14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>units, I-11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all-arms air defense, complementary combined arms actions, 4-72–4-84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>continue mission, 4-84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>execute, 4-82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plan, 4-80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prepare, 4-81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>report, 4-83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>allocate logistics, 7-15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alter perception of risk, 1-128</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ambush, executing, 6-118</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>functional organization, 6-113–6-116</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organizing, 6-117</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tactical offensive actions—elements, 6-111–6-118</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ammunition. See class V</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>amphibious brigades, I-14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>annihilate, 9-6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Index

Entries are by paragraph number.

annihilation, 1-68
antiarmor, fire plan, 7-44–7-48
obstacle plan, 7-43
antitank, defensive position, 7-49–7-53
equipment area, 7-54–7-55
mobile reserve, 7-56
antitank defense system, antitank fire plan, 7-44–7-48
antiaircraft obstacle plan, 7-43
antitank defensive position, 7-49–7-53
antitank engagement area, 7-54–7-55
antitank mobile reserve, 7-56
area defense, 7-42–7-59
counterattack, 7-57–7-59
antitank operations, C-1–C-13
capabilities and limitations, C-4–C-8
employment and integration in combined arms, C-9–C-13
functional overview, C-1
organization, C-2–C-3
area, of operations, 2-3–2-4
security, 5-59–5-60
area defense, antitank defense system, 7-42–7-59
combat security area, 7-36
disruption forces, 7-35
general security area, 7-37
main defense forces, 7-38–7-40
method, 7-34
reserve, 7-41
types of defensive action—forces, 7-33–7-59
armed noncombatants, 3-92
army, 3-3
infantry platoon assault techniques, 6-40–6-42
sniper brigades, I-10
assault, executing, 6-107–6-110
functional organization, 6-102–6-105
organizing, 6-106
tactical offensive actions—elements, 6-100–6-110
assault units, action units, 2-34–2-35
enabling units, 2-47–2-48
attack, against an attacking enemy. See spoiling attack dispersed attack, 6-71–6-74
integrated attack, 6-48–6-64
on the Blue House, 8-37–8-45
to disrupt, 6-8
to gain control of key assets, 6-5
to gain freedom of movement, 6-3
to gain information, 6-6
to restrict freedom of movement, 6-4
types of offensive action—forces, 6-46–6-80
zones, 2-18
attack functional organization, for a dispersed attack, 6-75–6-80
for an integrated attack, 6-65–6-70
auxiliary command post, 3-33
aviation, 6-139
C2, B-17
aviation operations, B-1–B-17
capabilities and limitations, B-5–B-7
employment and integration in combined arms, B-8–B-17
functional overview, B-1
organization, B-2–B-4
B
battles, 3-61–3-63
battle drills, 4-1–4-133
actions on contact, 4-9–4-18
break contact, 4-29–4-38
complementary combined arms actions, 4-61–4-133
fire and maneuver, 4-48–4-60
fixing, 4-19–4-28
purpose, 4-1–4-8
situational breach, 4-39–4-47
besetment maneuver, 6-19
biological weapons. See also CBRN, G-7
break contact, battle drills, 4-29–4-38
continue mission, 4-38
execute—fix, 4-36
execute—isolate, 4-37
execute—protect, 4-35
plan, 4-33
prepare, 4-34
C
C3D, protection and security measures, 9-74–9-76
tactical doctrine, 1-75
Camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception. See C3D
capabilities and intent, fundamentals, 1-31–1-47
shape the OE, 1-42
time and tempo, 1-43–1-44
weapons of mass destruction, 1-45–1-47
capabilities and limitations, air defense operations, D-4–D-5
antitank operations, C-4–C-8
aviation operations, B-5–B-7
biological weapons, G-7
CBRN and missile limitations, G-13–G-14
CBRN and obscurant operations, G-4–G-14
chemical weapons, G-5–G-6
electronic warfare operations, E-6–E-8
engineer operations, F-8–F-19
fires support operations, A-7–A-11
logistics operations, H-4–H-6
nuclear weapons, G-8–G-9
smoke and flame weapons, G-10–G-12
SOF operations, I-17–I-19
caste system. See songbun
CBRN and missile limitations. See also capabilities and limitations, G-13–G-14
CBRN and obscurant operations, G-1–G-21
capabilities and limitations, G-4–G-14
employment and integration in combined arms, G-15–G-21
functional overview, G-1–G-2
organization, G-3
ch’im’t’u. See infiltration maneuver
ch’ŏmip. See thrust maneuver
change the nature of the conflict, 1-142
chemical, biological, radiological, and/or nuclear. See CBRN weapons. See also CBRN, G-5–G-6
class I, H-9–H-10
class II, H-11–H-13
class III, H-14–H-15
class IV, H-16–H-17
class V, H-18–H-19
class VI, H-20–H-21
class VII, H-22–H-23
class VIII, H-24–H-26
class XI, H-27–H-28
clothing, individual equipment, kits, and hand tools. See class II
Index

Entries are by paragraph number.

combat division force structure, integrated fires system, 3-49–3-50
integrated support system, 3-51
tactical-level organization of regular forces, 3-41–3-51
combat reconnaissance patrol, 5-87
defensive security formations, 5-165–5-166
combat security, area, 7-36
outpost and observation post team, 5-167–5-170
combined operations, 1-69
command and support relationships, affiliated, 3-15
constituent, 3-12
dedicated, 3-13
force structure and formations, 3-11–3-15
supporting, 3-14
command observation post, 3-28–3-30
command post C2, command post types, 3-19–3-33
commander's duties, 3-34
communications procedures, 3-35
force structure and formations, 3-16–3-35
command post types, airborne command post, 3-32
auxiliary command post, 3-33
command observation post, 3-28–3-30
command post C2, 3-19–3-33
commander's duties, 3-34
communications procedures, 3-35
force structure and formations, 3-16–3-35
command post types
company combat formations, executing the offense, 6-32–6-35
line formation, 6-35
V formation, 6-34
wedge formation, 6-33
competition and the human dimension, 9-15
complementary combined arms actions, air assault defense actions, 4-85–4-97
all-arms air defense, 4-72–4-84
battle drills, 4-61–4-133
complex terrain operations, 4-98–4-133
disruption actions, 4-62–4-71
complex battle position, 7-62–7-63
complex terrain operations, complementary combined arms actions, 4-98–4-133
executing urban combat, 4-112–4-120
subterranean area actions, 4-121–4-133
urban or rural area actions, 4-107–4-111
components of EIW, computer warfare, 9-97–9-103
cryptanalysis, 9-105
deception, 9-33–9-61
disinformation operations, 9-107
EIW, 9-16–9-107
electronic warfare, 9-21–9-32
information attack, 9-92–9-96
intelligence collection, 9-106
perception management, 9-79–9-91
physical destruction, 9-62–9-68
protection and security measures, 9-69–9-78
reconnaissance, 9-104
computer warfare, 9-97–9-103
conditions, 4-5–4-6
conduct, countermobility and survivability preparations, 7-14
in-theater preclusion, 1-134
mobility preparations, 6-24
reconnaissance. See attack to gain information
constituent units, 3-12
continue mission, actions on contact, 4-18
air assault defense actions, 4-97
all-arms air defense, 4-84
break contact, 4-38
counterreconnaissance, 5-114
disruption actions, 4-71
fire and maneuver, 4-60
fixing, 4-28
situational breach, 4-47
continuity, 5-48–5-49
control tempo, 1-133
corps, 3-38–3-40
artillery group, A-6
counter stability, 1-140
counterattack, antitank defense system, 7-57–7-59
limited-objective attack, 6-87–6-90
counterreconnaissance, continue mission, 5-114
detachment, 5-171–5-172
execute—destroy, 5-113
execute—find, 5-110
execute—make contact, 5-112
execute—report, 5-111
plan, 5-108
prepare, 5-109
protection and security measures, 9-72–9-73
security missions, 5-106–5-114
counterstability, 2-57
in support of military operations, 8-46–8-47
counterstability actions, 8-1–8-10
executing, 8-1–8-23
in support of military operations, 8-46–8-47
offensive, defensive, and counterstability actions, 1-159–1-162
planning, 8-2–8-10
preparing, 8-18
purpose, 8-1
threats and criminal activity, 8-11–8-17
within South Korea, 8-24–8-45
cover, defensive cover, 5-157–5-158
offensive cover, 5-154–5-156
security missions, 5-149–5-158
criminal organizations, 3-83–3-88
cryptanalysis, 9-105

d
deceive, 9-10
deception, command post, 3-31
components of EIW, 9-33–9-61
electronic, 9-55–9-61
units, 9-39–9-40
deception activities, 9-41–9-54
decoy, 9-46–9-54
demonstrations, 9-44
feints, 9-43
ruses, 9-45
deception units, 9-39–9-40
enabling units, 2-45
decoy, 9-46–9-54
dedicated units, 3-13
Entries are by paragraph number.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraphs</th>
<th>Entries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-8–2-16</td>
<td>defense zones, 2-8–2-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-12–2-14</td>
<td>defense zones, 2-12–2-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-9–2-11</td>
<td>security zones, 2-9–2-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-15–2-16</td>
<td>support zones, 2-15–2-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-25</td>
<td>defile, 5-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-7</td>
<td>degrade, 9-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-44</td>
<td>demonstrations, 9-44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-9</td>
<td>deny, 9-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-13</td>
<td>enemy information, 7-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-67–3-69</td>
<td>detachments, 3-67–3-69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-29</td>
<td>direct air support, B-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-138</td>
<td>disaggregate, enemy formations, 1-138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-125</td>
<td>partnerships, 1-125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-107</td>
<td>disinformation operations, 9-107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-25</td>
<td>defile, 5-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-26</td>
<td>hilltop, 5-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-24</td>
<td>open, 5-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-26</td>
<td>reconnaissance and security methods, 5-22–5-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-23</td>
<td>semi-open, 5-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-71–6-74</td>
<td>dispersed attack, 6-71–6-74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-8</td>
<td>disrupt, EIW tactical tasks, 9-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-115–4-116</td>
<td>executing urban combat, 4-115–4-116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-65–7-66</td>
<td>disruption, elements, 7-65–7-66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-46</td>
<td>units, 2-46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-62–4-71</td>
<td>disruption actions, complementary combined arms actions, 4-62–4-71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-69</td>
<td>continue mission, 4-69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-70</td>
<td>execute—contain, 4-69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-68</td>
<td>execute—destroy, 4-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-67</td>
<td>execute—find, 4-68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-66</td>
<td>plan, 4-66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-67</td>
<td>prepare, 4-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-35</td>
<td>disruption forces, area defense, 7-35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-30</td>
<td>mobile defense, 7-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-30</td>
<td>distributive jamming, 9-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-5</td>
<td>division artillery group, A-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-76–1-77</td>
<td>echelon forces, 1-76–1-77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-1–9-107</td>
<td>EIW, 9-1–9-107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-15</td>
<td>competition and the human dimension, 9-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-16–9-107</td>
<td>components, 9-16–9-107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-176–5-177</td>
<td>defensive cover forces, 5-176–5-177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-174–5-175</td>
<td>defensive guard forces, 5-174–5-175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-173</td>
<td>defensive screen forces, 5-173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-178–5-181</td>
<td>forward detachment, 5-178–5-181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-164–5-181</td>
<td>reconnaissance and security, 5-164–5-181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-12–2-14</td>
<td>defense zones, 2-12–2-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-9–2-11</td>
<td>security zones, 2-9–2-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-15–2-16</td>
<td>support zones, 2-15–2-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-10</td>
<td>deceive, 4-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-7</td>
<td>degrade, 9-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-9</td>
<td>deny, 9-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-6</td>
<td>destroy, 9-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-8</td>
<td>disrupt, 9-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-11</td>
<td>exploit, 9-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-12</td>
<td>influence, 9-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-29</td>
<td>electromagnetic spectrum technical sensors reconnaissance, 5-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-30</td>
<td>electronic attack, distributive jamming, 9-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-28–9-32</td>
<td>electronic warfare, 9-28–9-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-31</td>
<td>expendable jammers, 9-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-32</td>
<td>proximity fuse jammers, 9-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-29</td>
<td>targets, 9-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-55–9-61</td>
<td>electronic deception, 9-55–9-61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-59–9-60</td>
<td>imitative, 9-59–9-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-56–9-57</td>
<td>manipulative, 9-56–9-57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-61</td>
<td>noncommunications, 9-61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-58</td>
<td>simulative, 9-58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-21–9-32</td>
<td>electronic warfare, components of EIW, 9-21–9-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-28–9-32</td>
<td>electronic attack, 9-28–9-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-1–E-15</td>
<td>electronic warfare operations, E-1–E-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-6–E-8</td>
<td>capabilities and limitations, E-6–E-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-9–E-15</td>
<td>employment and integration in combined arms, E-9–E-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-1–E-2</td>
<td>functional overview, E-1–E-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-3–E-5</td>
<td>organization, E-3–E-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-143</td>
<td>employ, cultural standoff, 1-143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-136</td>
<td>targeted overmatch, 1-136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-6–D-8</td>
<td>employment and integration in combined arms, air defense operations, D-6–D-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-36–H-37</td>
<td>air transportation, H-36–H-37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-10–B-14</td>
<td>airborne operations and SOF support, B-10–B-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-9–C-13</td>
<td>antitank operations, C-9–C-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-17</td>
<td>aviation C2, B-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-8–B-17</td>
<td>aviation operations, B-8–B-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-15–G-21</td>
<td>CBRN and obscurant operations, G-15–G-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-9–H-10</td>
<td>class I, H-9–H-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-11–H-13</td>
<td>class II, H-11–H-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-14–H-15</td>
<td>class III, H-14–H-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-16–H-17</td>
<td>class IV, H-16–H-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-18–H-19</td>
<td>class V, H-18–H-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-20–H-21</td>
<td>class VI, H-20–H-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-22–H-23</td>
<td>class VII, H-22–H-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-24–H-26</td>
<td>class VIII, H-24–H-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-9</td>
<td>direct air support, B-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-9–E-15</td>
<td>electronic warfare operations, E-9–E-15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
engineer operations, F-20–F-21
fires support operations, A-12–A-17
logistics operations, H-7–H-42
rail transportation, H-29–H-32
road transportation, H-33–H-35
salvage, H-40–H-42
SOF operations, I-20
unmanned aircraft support to the army, B-15–B-16
water transportation, H-38–H-39

enable targeted instability, 1-124
enabling forces functional organization, for a dispersed attack, 6-76–6-79
for an integrated attack, 6-66–6-69
enabling units, assault units, 2-47–2-48
decoy units, 2-45
disruption units, 2-46
fixing units, 2-42–2-44
functional tactics, 2-38–2-51
protected units, 2-50
reserve, 2-51
security units, 2-40–2-41
support units, 2-49
encirclement maneuver, 6-13
engineer operations, F-1–F-21
capabilities and limitations, F-8–F-19
employment and integration in combined arms, F-20–F-21
functional overview, F-1
organization, F-2–F-7
engineer. See also class IV, 6-140
evolution and adaptation, 1-98–1-104
execute, actions on contact, 4-15
all-arms air defense, 4-82
execute—, air assault defense actions, 4-95
contain, 4-69
maneuver, 4-59
penetrate, 4-46
prevent movement, 4-26
protect, 4-35
report, 5-111
secure, 4-45
execute mission tasks and drills, executing the defense, 7-20
executing the offense, 6-31
execute—destroy, counterreconnaissance, 5-113
disruption actions, 4-70
execute—find, counterreconnaissance, 5-110
disruption actions, 4-68
execute—fix, break contact, 4-36
fire and maneuver, 4-57
fixing, 4-27
execute—isolate, break contact, 4-37
fire and maneuver, 4-58
situational breach, 4-44
execute—make contact, air assault defense actions, 4-94
counterreconnaissance, 5-112
fire and maneuver, 4-56
executing, a reconnaissance attack, 6-135–6-136
an ambush, 6-118
an assault, 6-107–6-110
counterstability actions, 8-19–8-23
defense of a battle position, 7-75–7-78
mission tasks, 2-58–2-59
executing the defense, defensive actions, 7-18–7-21
execute mission tasks and drills, 7-20
maintain contact, 7-19
seize tactical opportunities, 7-21
executing the offense, army infantry platoon assault techniques, 6-40–6-42
company combat formations, 6-32–6-35
execute mission tasks and drills, 6-31
maintain contact, 6-30
nature of the offense, 6-28–6-29
offensive actions, 6-27–6-43
platoon combat formations, 6-36–6-39
seize tactical opportunities, 6-43
executing urban combat, complex terrain operations, 4-112–4-120
defeat or destroy, 4-120
disrupt, 4-115–4-116
fix or isolate, 4-117–4-119
expendable jammers, 9-31
exploit, 9-11
expose U.S. and allied forces, 1-129
F
feints, 9-43
fire and maneuver, battle drills, 4-48–4-60
continue mission, 4-60
execute—fix, 4-57
execute—isolate, 4-58
execute—make contact, 4-56
execute—move, 4-59
plan, 4-54
prepare, 4-55
fires, 6-138
fires support operations, A-1–A-17
capabilities and limitations, A-7–A-11
employment and integration in combined arms, A-12–A-17
functional overview, A-1
organization, A-2–A-6
fix, 4-16
or isolate, 4-117–4-119
fixing, battle drills, 4-19–4-28
continue mission, 4-28
execute—fix, 4-27
execute—prevent movement, 4-26
plan, 4-24
prepare, 4-25
units, 2-42–2-44
flank guard, 5-139–5-145
force structure and formations, 3-1–3-93
command and support relationships, 3-11–3-15
command post C2, 3-16–3-35
functional organization of forces, 3-1
service component organizations, 3-2–3-10
tactical-level organization of irregular forces, 3-75–3-93
tactical-level organization of regular forces, 3-36–3-74
forms of army offensive maneuver, besetment maneuver, 6-19
encirclement maneuver, 6-13
holding maneuver, 6-16
infiltration maneuver, 6-18
penetration maneuver, 6-14
planning the offense, 6-12–6-19
thrust maneuver, 6-15
turning maneuver, 6-17
fortified tank positions, 7-92–7-94
forward, command post, 3-23–3-24
detachment, 5-178–5-181
## Entries are by paragraph number.

| Framework for military operations, adaptive operations, 1-95–1-97 fundamentals, 1-80–1-97 regional operations, 1-89–1-90 strategic operations, 1-86–1-88 transitional operations, 1-91–1-94 functional method, 2-27–2-32 functional organization, for a limited-objective attack, 6-91–6-96 for a reconnaissance attack, 6-129–6-133 for an ambush, 6-113–6-116 for an assault, 6-102–6-105 of offensive elements, 6-98–6-99 functional organization for a dispersed attack, 6-75–6-80 action forces, 6-80 enabling forces, 6-76–6-79 functional organization for an integrated attack, 6-65–6-70 action forces, 6-70 enabling forces, 6-66–6-69 functional organization of a battle position, disruption elements, 7-65–7-66 main defense elements, 7-67 reserve elements, 7-68 support elements, 7-69 tactical defensive actions—elements, 7-64–7-69 functional organization of elements, planning the defense, 7-11 planning the offense, 6-21 functional organization of forces, force structure and formations, 3-1 planning the defense, 7-10 planning the offense, 6-20 functional overview, air defense operations, D-1 antitank operations, C-1 aviation operations, B-1 CBRN and obscuration operations, G-1–G-2 electronic warfare operations, E-1–E-2 engineer operations, F-1 fires support operations, A-1 logistics operations, H-1 SOF operations, I-1–I-3 functional tactics, 2-1–2-59 action and enabling functions, 2-22–2-26 action units, 2-33–2-37 enabling units, 2-38–2-51 executing mission tasks, 2-58–2-59 functional method, 2-27–2-32 tactical terms, symbols, and control measures, 2-1–2-21 functional tactics in operations, 2-52–2-57 counterstability, 2-57 defense, 2-56 offense, 2-55 fundamentals, 1-1–1-162 actions to counter U.S. forces, 1-121–1-143 capabilities and intent, 1-31–1-47 evolution and adaptation, 1-98–1-104 introduction to North Korea, 1-19–1-27 major combat operations in conflict, 1-17–1-18 military principles, 1-48–1-79 motivations, 1-28–1-30 multi-domain extended battlefield, 1-105–1-120 OEs, 1-1–1-16 offensive, defensive, and counterstability actions, 1-144–1-162 G gain time, 7-6 general security area, 7-37 guard, advance guard, 5-134–5-138 flank guard, 5-139–5-145 rear guard, 5-146–5-148 security missions, 5-127–5-148 guerrilla units, 3-81–3-82 H hardened artillery sites, 7-87–7-91 hilltop, 5-26 historical example. See attack on the Blue House history and politics, 1-20–1-24 holding maneuver, 6-16 I imitative electronic deception, 9-59–9-60 independent reconnaissance patrol, 5-88–5-89 indirect fire C2, A-3 infantry company strongpoint, 7-95–7-96 infiltration maneuver, 6-18 inflict grave casualties, 7-4 influence, 9-12 information, and operational security, 9-77–9-78 attack, 9-92–9-96 flow and communications, 5-41–5-45 initiative, 1-66 insurgent organizations, 3-79–3-80 integrated, attack, 6-48–6-64 support system, 3-51 integrated fires system, combat division force structure, 3-49–3-50 reconnaissance and security operations, 5-13–5-17 intelligence collection, 9-106 internal security forces, 3-9–3-10 introduction to North Korea, fundamentals, 1-19–1-27 history and politics, 1-20–1-24 songbun, 1-25–1-27 irregular forces activities, 8-31–8-32 isolate, 4-17 isolation, 1-117–1-118 J-K kill boxes, 2-20 kill zones, 2-19 KPAAF. See air force KPAGF. See army KPAN. See navy kyŏnje. See holding maneuver L light infantry, brigades, I-8–I-9 divisions, I-15 limited-objective attack, counterattack, 6-87–6-90 functional organization, 6-91–6-96 spoiling attack, 6-84–6-86 types of offensive action—forces, 6-81–6-96 line formation, company combat formations, 6-35 platoon combat formations, 6-39 logistics, 6-141 facilities, 7-105–7-107
logistics operations, H-1–H-42
capabilities and limitations, H-4–H-6
employment and integration in combined arms, H-7–H-42
functional overview, H-1
organization, H-2–H-3

M
main, command post, 3-20–3-22
defense elements, 7-67
main defense forces, area defense, 7-38–7-40
mobile defense, 7-31
main defense units, action units, 2-36
subterranean area actions, 4-130–4-131
maintain contact, executing the defense, 7-19
executing the offense, 6-30
preparing for the offense, 6-23
maintain enemy contact, 5-102
major, combat operations, 1-17–1-18
end items. See class VII
maneuver brigades, 3-55–3-57
maneuverability, 1-65
manipulative electronic deception, 9-56–9-57
mask intent, 1-130
mass and dispersion, 1-63–1-64
media manipulation, 9-89–9-90
medical. See class VIII
method, area defense, 7-34
mobile defense, 7-24
military, ideology, 1-49
policy, 1-51–1-52
military principles, fundamentals, 1-48–1-79
military ideology, 1-49
military policy, 1-51–1-52
military strategy, 1-53–1-57
national objectives, 1-50
principles of war, 1-58–1-71
tactical doctrine, 1-72–1-79
military strategy, military principles, 1-53–1-57
mixed tactics, 1-56–1-57
quick, decisive war, 1-55
surprise attack, 1-54
mission units, 2-37
mixed tactics, 1-56–1-57
mobile defense, defensive arrays, 7-25
defensive maneuver, 7-26–7-29
disruption forces, 7-30
main defense forces, 7-31
method, 7-24
reserve, 7-32
types of defensive action—forces, 7-23–7-32
mobility, 1-70
motivations, 1-28–1-30
mounted reconnaissance, 5-27
moving screen, 5-124–5-126
multidirectional reconnaissance, 5-55
multi-domain extended battlefield, EIW, 1-119–1-120
fundamentals, 1-105–1-120
isolation, 1-117–1-118
preclusion, 1-109–1-112
sanctuary, 1-113–1-116
systems warfare, 1-107–1-108
N
national objectives, 1-50
nature of the offense, 6-28–6-29
navy, 3-4
sniper brigades, I-12–I-13
underground facilities, 7-97–7-98
noncombatants, armed
noncombatants, 3-92
unarmed noncombatants, 3-93
noncommunications deception, 9-61
north of the DMZ, air force
underground facilities, 7-99–7-104
defensive operations in complex OEs, 7-82–7-107
fortified tank positions, 7-92–7-94
hardened artillery sites, 7-87–7-91
infantry company strongpoint, 7-95–7-96
logistics facilities, 7-105–7-107
navy underground facilities, 7-97–7-98
nuclear weapons. See also CBRN, G-8–G-9
observer team and observation post, 5-66–5-68
OEs, fundamentals, 1-1–1-16
strategic environment, 1-4–1-14
threat actions within an OE, 1-15–1-16
offense, 2-55
offensive, cover, 5-154–5-156
zones, 2-7
offensive actions, 6-1–6-152
executing the offense, 6-27–6-43
offensive operations in complex OEs, 6-143–6-152
offensive, defensive, and counterstability actions, 1-146–1-151
planning the offense, 6-9–6-21
preparing for the offense, 6-22–6-26
purpose of the offense, 6-1–6-8
tactical offensive actions—elements, 6-97–6-142
types of offensive action—forces, 6-44–6-96
offensive operations in complex OEs, offensive actions, 6-143–6-152
subterranean operations, 6-147–6-152
urban operations, 6-144–6-146
offensive, defensive, and counterstability actions, counterstability actions, 1-159–1-162
defensive actions, 1-152–1-158
fundamentals, 1-144–1-162
offensive actions, 1-146–1-151
officer reconnaissance patrol, 5-86
open, 5-24
operational security, 1-67
organization, air defense
operations, D-2–D-3
airborne units, I-11
amphibious brigades, I-14
antitank operations, C-2–C-3
army sniper brigades, I-10
aviation operations, B-2–B-4
CBRN and obscurant operations, G-3
corps artillery group, A-6
depth artillery reconnaissance battalions, I-16
division artillery group, A-5
electronic warfare operations, E-3–E-5
organization (continued)
engineer operations, F-2–F-7
fires support operations, A-2–A-6
indirect fire C2, A-3
light infantry brigades, I-8–I-9
light infantry divisions, I-15
logistics operations, H-2–H-3
navy sniper brigades, I-12–I-13
reconnaissance battalions, I-5
reconnaissance brigades, I-6–I-7
regimental artillery group, A-4
SOF operations, I-4–I-16
organizing, for a reconnaissance attack, 6-134
for an ambush, 6-117
for an assault, 6-106
organizing battle position actions, defense zones, 7-73–7-74
security zones, 7-71–7-72
tactical defensive actions—elements, 7-70–7-74

P
p’och’o. See besetment maneuver
p’owi. See encirclement maneuver
paramilitary forces, 3-8
penetration maneuver, 6-14
perception management, components of EIW, 9-79–9-91
media manipulation, 9-89–9-90
psychological warfare, 9-82–9-87
public affairs, 9-88
target audiences, 9-91
personal demand items. See class VI
petroleum, oils, and lubricants. See class III
physical destruction, 9-62–9-68
plan, actions on contact, 4-13
air assault defense actions, 4-92
all-arms air defense, 4-80
break contact, 4-33
counterreconnaissance, 5-108
disruption actions, 4-66
fire and maneuver, 4-54
fixing, 4-24
situational breach, 4-42
planned, defense, 7-8
offense, 6-10
planning counterstability actions, 8-2–8-10
planning the defense, defensive actions, 7-7–7-11

functional organization of elements, 7-11
functional organization of forces, 7-10
planned defense, 7-8
situational defense, 7-9
planning the offense, forms of army offensive maneuver, 6-12–6-19
functional organization of elements, 6-21
functional organization of forces, 6-20
offensive actions, 6-9–6-21
planned offense, 6-10
situational offense, 6-11
platoon combat formations, executing the offense, 6-36–6-39
line formation, 6-39
V formation, 6-38
wedge formation, 6-37
platoons and squads, 3-70–3-74
preparation for contingencies, preparing for the offense, 6-25
preparing the defense, 7-16
preparing counterstability actions, 8-18
preparing for the offense, conduct mobility preparations, 6-24
maintain contact, 6-23
offensive actions, 6-22–6-26
prepare for contingencies, 6-25
rehearse key mission tasks, 6-26
preparing the defense, allocate logistics, 7-15
conduct countermobility and survivability preparations, 7-14
defensive actions, 7-12–7-17
deny enemy information, 7-13
prepare for contingencies, 7-16
rehearse key mission tasks, 7-17
prevent access facilitation, 1-126

principles of war, annihilation, 1-68
combined operations, 1-69
initiative, 1-66
maneuverability, 1-65
mass and dispersion, 1-63–1-64
military principles, 1-58–1-71
mobility, 1-70
operational security, 1-67
rear area protection, 1-71
surprise, 1-61–1-62
two-front war, 1-59–1-60
protect key capabilities, 1-137
protected units, 2-50
protection and security measures, 3C3D, 9-74–9-76
components of EIW, 9-69–9-78
counterreconnaissance, 9-72–9-73
information and operational security, 9-77–9-78
provide an alternative understanding of an OE, 1-123
proximity fuse jammers, 9-32
psychological warfare, 9-82–9-87
public affairs, 9-88
purpose of battle drills, battle drills, 4-1–4-8
conditions, 4-5–4-6
standards, 4-7–4-8
tasks, 4-3–4-4
purpose of counterstability actions, 8-1
purpose of the defense, defend key terrain, 7-5
defensive actions, 7-1–7-6
gain time, 7-6
inflict grave casualties, 7-4
repulse a superior force, 7-3
purpose of the offense, attack to dislocate, 6-7
attack to disrupt, 6-8
attack to gain control of key assets, 6-5
attack to gain freedom of movement, 6-3
attack to gain information, 6-6
attack to restrict freedom of movement, 6-4
offensive actions, 6-1–6-8

Q
quick, decisive war, 1-55

R
raid, 6-119–6-125
rail transportation, H-29–H-32
### Index

Entries are by paragraph number.

- **rear, area command post**, 3-25  
  area protection, 1-71  
  guard, 5-146–5-148  
- **reconnaissance**, 9-104  
  ambush, 5-31  
  by fire, 5-30  
  company, 5-91  
  detachment, 5-93  
  fires system, 5-8–5-12  
  intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition. See RISTA methods, 5-63  
  objective, 5-47  
  planning, 5-35–5-40  
  platoon, 5-90  
  team, 5-69–5-78  
- **reconnaissance and security**, 5-1–5-181  
  defensive security formations, 5-164–5-181  
  methods, 5-18–5-32  
  reconnaissance formations, 5-64–5-95  
  reconnaissance fundamentals, 5-46–5-55  
  reconnaissance missions, 5-56–5-63  
  security fundamentals, 5-96–5-102  
  security missions, 5-103–5-163  
- **reconnaissance and security methods**, 5-18–5-32  
  aerial reconnaissance, 5-28  
  dismounted reconnaissance, 5-22–5-26  
  electromagnetic spectrum technical sensors  
  reconnaissance, 5-29  
  mounted reconnaissance, 5-27  
  reconnaissance ambush, 5-31  
  reconnaissance attack, 5-32  
  reconnaissance by fire, 5-30  
- **reconnaissance and security operations**, 5-1–5-17  
  integrated fires system, 5-13–5-17  
  reconnaissance fires system, 5-8–5-12  
  RISTA system, 5-5–5-7  
- **reconnaissance and security plans, preparation, and execution**, 5-33–5-45  
  information flow and communications, 5-41–5-45  
  reconnaissance planning, 5-35–5-40  
  reconnaissance attack, executing, 6-135–6-136  
- **functional organization**, 6-129–6-133  
  organizing, 6-134  
  reconnaissance and security methods, 5-32  
  support for, 6-137–6-142  
  tactical offensive actions—elements, 6-126–6-142  
  reconnaissance battalion, organization, I-5  
  reconnaissance formations, 5-92  
  reconnaissance brigade, organization, I-6–I-7  
  reconnaissance formations, 5-94–5-95  
  reconnaissance formations, observer team and observation post, 5-66–5-68  
  reconnaissance and security, 5-64–5-95  
  reconnaissance battalion, 5-92  
  reconnaissance company, 5-91  
  reconnaissance detachment, 5-93  
  reconnaissance patrol, 5-79–5-89  
  reconnaissance platoon, 5-90  
  reconnaissance team, 5-69–5-78  
- **reconnaissance fundamentals**, 5-53  
  aggressiveness, 5-50  
  continuity, 5-48–5-49  
  multidirectional, 5-55  
  objective, 5-47  
  reconnaissance and security, 5-46–5-55  
  reliability, 5-54  
  timeliness, 5-51–5-52  
  reconnaissance missions, area reconnaissance, 5-59–5-60  
  reconnaissance and security, 5-56–5-63  
  reconnaissance methods, 5-63  
  route reconnaissance, 5-58  
  special reconnaissance, 5-62  
  zone reconnaissance, 5-61  
  reconnaissance patrol, combat reconnaissance patrol, 5-87  
  commander's reconnaissance patrol, 5-85  
  independent reconnaissance patrol, 5-88–5-89  
  officer reconnaissance patrol, 5-86  
- **reconnaissance formations**, 5-79–5-89  
- **redirect support**, 1-141  
- **regimental artillery group**, A-4  
- **regiments**, 3-58–3-60  
- **regional operations**, 1-89–1-90  
- **regular-force instability activities**, 8-25–8-28  
- **rehearse key mission tasks**, preparing for the offense, 6-26  
  preparing the defense, 7-17  
- **reliability**, 5-54  
- **repair parts**, See class IX  
- **report, air assault defense actions**, 4-96  
  all-arms air defense, 4-83  
  repulse a superior force, 7-3  
- **reserve, area defense**, 7-41  
  command post, 3-26–3-27  
  elements, 7-68  
  enabling units, 2-51  
  mobile defense, 7-32  
  units, 4-132  
  RISTA system, 5-5–5-7  
  road transportation, H-33–H-35  
- **route, reconnaissance**, 5-58  
  security, 5-161–5-163  
- **ruses**, 9-45  
- **S**  
  salvage, H-40–H-42  
  sanctuary, 1-113–1-116  
  screen, moving screen, 5-124–5-126  
  security missions, 5-115–5-126  
  stationary screen, 5-121–5-123  
- **secure secrets**, See operational security  
- **security, objective**, 5-100  
  units, 2-40–2-41  
- **security fundamentals, maintain enemy contact**, 5-102  
  reconnaissance and security, 5-96–5-102  
  security objective, 5-100  
  timely warning, 5-101  
- **security missions, area security**, 5-159–5-160  
  counterreconnaissance, 5-106–5-114  
  cover, 5-149–5-158  
  guard, 5-127–5-148  
  reconnaissance and security, 5-103–5-163
Entries are by paragraph number.

security missions (continued)
route security, 5-161–5-163
screen, 5-115–5-126
security zones, defensive zones,
2-9–2-11
organizing battle position
actions, 7-71–7-72
seize tactical opportunities,
executing the defense, 7-21
executing the offense, 6-43
semi-open, 5-23
service component organizations,
air force, 3-5
army, 3-3
force structure and formations,
2-9–2-11
internal security forces, 3-9–
3-10
navy, 3-4
paramilitary forces, 3-8
SOF, 3-7
Strategic Force, 3-6
shape the OE, 1-42
signals reconnaissance, 9-24–
9-27
simple battle position, 7-61
simulative electronic deception,
9-58
situational, defense, 7-9
offense, 6-11
situational breach, battle drills,
4-39–4-47
continue mission, 4-47
execute—isoalte, 4-44
execute—penetrate, 4-46
execute—secure, 4-45
plan, 4-42
prepare, 4-43
slow and disrupt deployment,
1-131
smoke and flame weapons, G-10–
G-12
SOF, instability activities, 8-29–
8-30
service component
organizations, 3-7
tactical-level organization of
regular forces, 3-52–3-54
SOF operations, I-1–I-20
capabilities and limitations,
I-17–I-19
employment and integration in
combined arms, I-20
functional overview, I-1–I-3
organization, I-4–I-16
songbun, 1-25–1-27
south of the DMZ, 7-108
special, operations forces. See
SOF
reconnaissance, 5-62
spoiling attack, 6-84–6-86
standards, 4-7–4-8
stationary screen, 5-121–5-123
strategic, environment, 1-4–1-14
Force, 3-6
operations, 1-86–1-88
subsistence. See class I
subterranean area actions,
complex terrain operations,
4-121–4-133
main defense units, 4-130–
4-131
reserve units, 4-132
support units, 4-133
subterranean operations,
defensive operations in
complex OEs, 7-81
offensive operations in
complex OEs, 6-147–6-152
support, elements, 7-69
zones, 2-15–2-16
support for a reconnaissance
attack, 6-137–6-142
aviation, 6-139
EIW, 6-142
engineer, 6-140
fires, 6-138
logistics, 6-141
support units, enabling units, 2-49
subterranean area actions,
4-133
supporting units, 3-14
surprise, 1-61–1-62
attack, 1-54
sustainment, 1-74
systems warfare, EIW, 9-13
multi-domain extended
battlefield, 1-107–1-108
Tactical
tactical defensive actions—
elements, 7-60–7-78
complex battle position, 7-62–
7-63
executing defense of a battle
position, 7-75–7-78
functional organization of a
battle position, 7-64–7-69
organizing battle position
actions, 7-70–7-71
simple battle position, 7-61
tactical doctrine, air force and
navy employment, 1-78
C3D, 1-75
echelon forces, 1-76–1-77
military principles, 1-72–1-79
sustainment, 1-74
terrain appreciation, 1-79
tactical offensive actions—
elements, 6-97–6-142
ambush, 6-111–6-118
assault, 6-100–6-110
functional organization of
offensive elements, 6-98–
6-99
raid, 6-119–6-125
reconnaissance attack, 6-126–
6-142
tactical terms, symbols, and
control measures, area of
operations, 2-3–2-4
functional tactics, 2-1–2-21
unit symbols, 2-21
zones, 2-5–2-20
tactical-level EIW, 9-1–9-4
tactical-level organization of
irregular forces, criminal
organizations, 3-83–3-88
force structure and formations,
3-75–3-93
guerrilla units, 3-81–3-82
insurgent organizations, 3-79–
3-80
noncombatants, 3-91–3-93
terrorist groups, 3-89–3-90
tactical-level organization of
regular forces, battalions, 3-61–
3-63
combat division force structure,
3-41–3-51
companies, 3-64–3-66
corps, 3-38–3-40
detachments, 3-67–3-69
force structure and formations,
3-36–3-74
maneuver brigades, 3-55–3-57
platoons and squads, 3-70–
3-74
regiments, 3-58–3-60
SOF, 3-52–3-54
target audiences, 9-91
targets, 9-29
tasks, 4-3–4-4
terrain appreciation, 1-79
terrorism and mission task
execution, actions within South
Korea, 8-33–8-45
attack on the Blue House,
8-37–8-45
Entries are by paragraph number.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U</th>
<th>limited-objective attack, 6-81–6-96</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>V formation, company combat formations, 6-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>water transportation, H-38–H-39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uhoе. See turning maneuver</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unarmed noncombatants, 3-93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unit symbols, 2-21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unmanned aircraft support to the army, B-15–B-16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban operations, defensive operations in complex OEs, 7-80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>offensive operations in complex OEs, 6-144–6-146</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban or rural area actions, 4-107–4-111</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>use of terrorism, 8-34–8-36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-Y-Z</td>
<td>zones, attack zones, 2-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>defensive zones, 2-8–2-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>kill boxes, 2-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>kill zones, 2-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of reconnaissance responsibility, 2-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>offensive zones, 2-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tactical terms, symbols, and control measures, 2-5–2-20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

use of terrorism, 8-34–8-36
terrorist groups, 3-89–3-90
threat actions within an OE, 1-15–1-16
threats and criminal activity, 8-11–8-17
thrust maneuver, 6-15
time and tempo, 1-43–1-44
timeliness, 5-51–5-52
timely warning, 5-101
tol’па. See penetration maneuver
transitional operations, 1-91–1-94
turning maneuver, 6-17	
two-front war, 1-59–1-60
types of defensive action—forces, 7-22–7-59
area defense, 7-33–7-59
mobile defense, 7-23–7-32
types of offensive action—forces, 6-44–6-96
attack, 6-46–6-80

windows of opportunity, 9-14

water transportation, H-38–H-39
weapons of mass destruction. See also CBRN, 1-45–1-47
wedge formation, company combat formations, 6-33
platoon combat formations, 6-37

zone reconnaissance, 5-61
zones, attack zones, 2-18
defensive zones, 2-8–2-16
kill boxes, 2-20
kill zones, 2-19
of reconnaissance responsibility, 2-17
offensive zones, 2-7
tactical terms, symbols, and control measures, 2-5–2-20
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

JAMES C. MCCONVILLE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

KATHLEEN S. MILLER
Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
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