PEACE OPS

MULTI-SERVICE
TACTICS, TECHNIQUES,
AND PROCEDURES FOR
PEACE OPERATIONS

ATP 3-07.31
MCTP 3-03B
AFTTP 3-2.40

MAY 2019

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FOREWORD

This multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) publication is a project of the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center in accordance with the memorandum of agreement between the Headquarters of the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force doctrine commanders directing ALSA to develop MTTP publications to meet the immediate needs of the warfighter.

This MTTP publication has been prepared by ALSA under our direction for implementation by our respective commands and for use by other commands as appropriate.

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PREFACE

1. Purpose
This multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) publication for Peace Operations (PO) is a single source, descriptive reference guide to aid planning and execution of PO at the operational and tactical levels.

2. Scope
This MTTP publication supports planners and warfighters by establishing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for training, planning, and conducting joint or multi-Service PO. It serves as the focal point guiding readers to existing TTP and provides TTP where gaps exist. It is also designed to bridge the gap between operational and tactical-level PO tasks. In general terms, the tactical level refers to operations conducted by tactical units or task forces at the O-6 level of command and below. This publication offers readers a basic understanding of joint and multinational PO, an overview of the nature and fundamentals of PO, and a detailed discussion of selected military tasks associated with PO. This publication provides references to other United States (US), United Nations, and nongovernmental resources and, to a limited extent, training objectives to enable for commanders and their staffs to properly execute PO. This publication has a worldwide application and supplements Joint Publication 3-07.3, Peace Operations.

3. Applicability
This MTTP publication applies to all commanders and their staffs that participate in PO.

4. Implementation Plan
Participating Service command offices of primary responsibility will review this publication; validate the information; and, where appropriate, reference and incorporate it in Service manuals, regulations, and curricula as follows:

   **Army.** Upon approval and authentication, this publication incorporates the TTP contained herein into the US Army Doctrine and Training Literature Program as directed by the Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Distribution is in accordance with applicable directives listed on the authentication page.

   **Marine Corps.** The Marine Corps will incorporate the procedures in this publication in US Marine Corps doctrine publications as directed by the Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration (CD&I). Distribution is in accordance with the Marine Corps Publication Distribution System.

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5. User Information
   a. US Army Combined Arms Center; Headquarters Marine Corps, Deputy Commandant, CD&I; Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education (LeMay Center); and Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center developed

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1  Marine Corps PCN: 147 000057 00
this publication with the joint participation of the approving Service commands. ALSA will review and update this publication as necessary.

b. This publication reflects current joint and Service doctrine, command and control organizations, facilities, personnel, responsibilities, and procedures. Changes in Service protocol, appropriately reflected in joint and Service publications, will be incorporated in revisions to this document.

c. We encourage recommended changes for improving this publication. Key your comments to the specific page and paragraph and provide a rationale for each recommendation. Send comments and recommendations directly to:

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SUMMARY OF CHANGES
ATP 3-07.31/MCTP 3-03B/AFTTP 3-2.40, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations.

This is a major revision of every section of this publication. It:

Updates:
- Numerous chapter and appendix alignments, and makes changes to better serve the needs of peace operations (PO) forces, and present a more logical flow within this publication.
- The distribution statement to Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release (unlimited distribution).
- PO tasks to better align with current United States (US), North American Treaty Organization (NATO), and United Nations (UN) policies and doctrine.
- By delineating between civil affairs functions, only, and civil-military operations.

Removes:
- Chapters or appendices on: control of large areas, force protection, civil-military operations, and mass atrocity response and incorporates these into other chapters.

Changes:
- Content covered in detail in other publications. This includes some staff considerations, searches, convoy operations and security. It also condenses information on civil disturbances; curfews; nonlethal weapons; search operations; force protection; civil-military operations; and conducting meetings, liaison, and interpreters.

Adds:
- Chapters on joint functions considerations and tactical tasks.
- Appendices on other US stakeholders in PO, working in a multinational force, basic information on the UN, and training.
- Content on UN PO and cross references to UN PO publications. Highlights differences in terms used by various organizations involved in PO.
- Content on understanding the PO operational environment; civilian protection, sexual exploitation and abuse, and human trafficking prevention; and detention.
PEACE OPS
MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PEACE OPS

_Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (MTTP) for Peace Operations_ establishes tactics, techniques, and procedures for planning and conducting peace operations (PO) at the tactical and operational levels. It also provides resources and references for training personnel and units assigned to a PO mission. PO include crisis response and limited contingency operations. Frequently, PO involve international military missions to contain conflict, restore peace, and shape the strategic environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding, and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. PO are conducted under the sponsorship of the United Nations (UN), other international organizations, or within a coalition of agreeing nations, but may be conducted unilaterally. PO include conflict prevention, peacemaking processes, peace enforcement operations, peacekeeping operations, and peace building. PO are conducted with various diplomatic activities necessary to secure a negotiated truce and resolve a conflict.

Chapter I Introduction to Peace Operations

Chapter I provides an introduction to the five types of PO and the framework that governs them. In addition, it outlines the core functions and tasks of PO, and the 15 fundamental principles that guide successful PO.

Chapter II Planning Considerations

Chapter II focuses on the unique design and planning factors commanders and staffs must consider to be successful when undertaking PO. PO occur in complex environments with problematic dynamics. They are politically sensitive and outside the realm of expertise and experience of most United States (US) forces. Therefore, PO require careful and thorough planning and preparation.

Chapter III Joint Functions Considerations

Chapter III highlights elements of joint function considerations important in conducting PO. The joint functions apply to PO, as in any other operation, but with special considerations and modifications. This chapter discusses command and control in a multinational or United Nations-sponsored operation. It discusses placement of forces; and modifications to intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, sustainment, and information in a PO environment.

Chapter IV Operational Tasks

Chapter IV outlines the operational-level tasks involved in PO and discusses, in detail, on how to accomplish them. The fundamental PO tasks are:

- Observing, monitoring, and reporting.
- Supervising cease fires and supporting verification mechanisms.
- Separating belligerent forces as a buffer and confidence building measure.
- Disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating combatants.
• Demining.
• Assisting civil authorities through security sector reform and other rule of law-related activities.
• Protecting civilians and promoting human rights.
• Supporting foreign humanitarian assistance operations.

Military forces serve a primary role in some PO tasks and a supporting role in others. Commanders must consider the political and operational context in which their forces conduct these tasks in support of a PO mission.

Chapter V Tactical Tasks
Chapter V outlines the tactical-level tasks involved in PO and how to accomplish those unique to PO. Tactical PO tasks include:

• Patrols.
• Observation posts.
• Checkpoints.
• Outreach and military engagement activities.
• Cordon and search.
• Convoy and escort.
• Protection of critical infrastructure and assets (site security).
• Crowd management.
• Detention.
• Quick response to sudden crises.
• Extraction or evacuation of PO forces or civilians.

Chapter V discusses the supporting lines of effort that must be accomplished in the complex, but largely nonlethal, human security and information-intensive environment of PO. For the joint force, these critical lines of effort are civil-military operations, information operations, military engagement, and conflict resolution. These lines of effort support minimizing civil harm and protecting civilians while considering substantial political concerns.

Chapter VI Conflict Resolution
Chapter VI provides techniques and considerations for conflict resolution focusing on negotiation, mediation, and arbitration.

Appendix A Other Key US Stakeholders
Appendix A provides a summary of the roles and missions of key US Government stakeholders in a PO area of responsibility including the US embassy, geographic combatant commands, and Service component commands. It provides a description of
the US embassy country team structure, and the roles and responsibilities of key figures in the embassy.

Appendix B Working in a Multinational Force
Appendix B provides instruction for handling the differences in language, culture, doctrine, equipment, and training US forces will encounter during multinational operations.

Appendix C The United Nations
Appendix C provides an overview of the UN mission and structure, and a summary of UN chapters six through eight, which govern UN peacekeeping missions. It also provides a description of UN agencies most likely to be involved or active in the PO area of responsibility.

Appendix D Key Enabling Documents
Appendix D provides a list of key documents important in conducting PO, including: United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs); status-of-forces agreements; rules of engagement; NATO documents and orders. It also covers other UN documents that guide planning and executing the mission mandate under UNSCRs; authorize the PO mission; and provide and update the mission mandate, tasks, responsibilities, and mission guidance.

Appendix E Training
Appendix E provides a summary of training considerations and a detailed list of resources and opportunities available to individuals and units. These enable commanders to prepare and train units and staff officers to conduct PO.

Appendix F Analysis Frameworks
Appendix F describes the process and provides analysis frameworks commanders and staffs may use to analyze the civil component of an area of operations and determine how it can help, hinder, or otherwise impact PO.

Appendix G Illicit Activity
Appendix G provides a synopsis of the presence and impact of criminal threats and organizations during PO, which add, significantly, to the complexity of the operational environment.

Appendix H International and Nongovernmental Organizations
Appendix H provides a description of three types of organizations (international, nongovernmental, and civil society) that are likely to be encountered in PO, and some considerations for working, effectively, with them.

Appendix I Joint Commission
Appendix I discusses joint commissions and how they facilitate the most effective PO.
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION TO PEACE OPERATIONS

1. Types of PO

a. The United States (US) participates in a broad range of military operations, including counterinsurgency, crisis response, and contingency operations, necessitating interaction with indigenous populations and institutions. Peace Operations (PO) include crisis response and limited contingency operations and involve international military missions. The main PO goals are to contain conflict, restore peace, shape the strategic environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding, and facilitate transition to legitimate governance. The United Nations (UN), or other international organizations, sponsor PO within a coalition of agreeing nations or unilaterally.

Note: The US uses the term “PO”, while others (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)) use the term “peace support operations”. The UN defines the term PO in the same way as the US, but many UN documents use the term “peacekeeping” interchangeably with “PO” in describing the whole spectrum of PO (and peacekeeping). This document distinguishes between PO (the entire spectrum), and peacekeeping. (For NATO doctrine on PO, see Allied Joint Publication 3.4.1, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support.)

b. PO include conflict prevention, peacemaking processes, peace enforcement operations (PEO), peacekeeping operations (PKO), and peace building.

(1) Conflict prevention employs complementary diplomatic, civil, and (when necessary) military means, to monitor and identify the causes of a conflict. Also, it takes timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities. Chapter VI of the UN Charter covers activities aimed at conflict prevention. Conflict prevention includes fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings, inspections, and monitoring country training or United Nation missions. An example of military support to conflict prevention is Operation ABLE SENTRY (1993–2004).

(2) Peace making is the process using diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement to arrange an end to a dispute and resolve the issues that led to it. Military support to the peacemaking process includes military-to-military relations, security assistance, or other activities which influence disputing parties to seek a diplomatic settlement.

(3) PEO apply military force, or the threat of force, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. PEO are conducted pursuant to international authorization.

(4) PKO are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties involved in a dispute. PKO forces monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (e.g., ceasefire or truce) to support diplomatic efforts reaching towards a long-term political settlement.
Peace building is the long-term, post-conflict process of creating conditions for a lasting peace. It strengthens host nation (HN) capacities to address the root causes of conflict; rebuilds institutions, infrastructure, and civic life; and maintains effective and harmonious political and societal order.

(a) Military forces' limited role in peace building is supporting other actors to foster the elements of a stable state. These include security, governance and rule of law, economic and infrastructure development, political settlement, and societal relationships.

(b) Peace building begins while PKO or PEO are underway, and continues after concluding PKO and PEO. For more information, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, and JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

c. Military forces have prominent roles in peacekeeping and PEO, and are less involved in conflict prevention, peacemaking, and peace building; however, they may conduct stability activities that directly support these efforts.

d. A peacekeeping mission may be mandated to support the extension of a HN government’s authority or build its institutional capacity. PO forces may be tasked to assist with security sector reform (SSR). This is intended to improve the accountability, professionalism, and effectiveness of HN security forces. SSR addresses institutional structure, resource management, operational capacity, and civilian oversight and governance.

e. PO forces may conduct other stability activities, support the efforts of other nonmilitary actors, or help ensure a secure environment in which other actors can operate. For more information, see JP 3-07, Stability, Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-43, Stability Operations, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-07.5, Stability Techniques, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-03, Stability Operations, and Marine Corps Information Publication (MCIP) 3-03.1i, Maritime Stability Operations.

f. The boundaries between the types of PO are blurred. Therefore, commanders must be flexible, and ready to respond in quickly changing and highly sensitive environments.

g. The UN recognizes that armed groups, criminal gangs, and other spoilers may actively seek to undermine a peace process or pose a threat to civilians. In response, it created a subcategorization of PKO termed “robust” peacekeeping.

(1) In robust UN PKO, the UN Security Council, authorizes peacekeeping forces to use all necessary means to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and assist national authorities in maintaining law and order.

(2) The UN distinguishes between robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Robust peacekeeping involves using tactical-level force authorized by the Security Council and with consent of the HN and the main parties to the conflict. By contrast, peace enforcement does not require the main parties’ consent and may involve using military force at the strategic or international level. (This is prohibited for member states under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, unless
2. The Operational Environment

a. The PO operational environment is characterized by complex and ambiguous situations which may include:
   (1) Asymmetrical threats.
   (2) Fragile or failed states.
   (3) Absence of rule of law.
   (4) Gross violations of human rights.
   (5) Collapse of civil infrastructure.
   (6) Dislocated civilians (DCs).
   (7) Intrastate conflict.
   (8) Competing narratives.

b. Political mandates or constraints affect tactical operations; and operations at the tactical level can have strategic implications.

c. Risk management is a key consideration. PO place US forces between competing forces and add a new dimension to risk management. Operating under a UN mandate adds considerations. PO are dangerous and leaders, at every level, must assess the risk to their forces and take risk mitigation actions.

d. PO involve multiple agencies within the US Government (USG), including the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and Department of Justice (DOJ). Civil-military operations (CMO) are a central focus of PO, with military forces in a supporting role. For more information on US agencies involved in PO, see Appendix A, Other Key US Stakeholders, and JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

e. Most PO are multinational. This creates challenges because each nation contributes its individual perspectives and unique capabilities. For more information on working as part of a multinational force, see appendix B, and JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, and the Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedures Version 3.11.

f. US policy determines US participation in PO. The US may participate with regional organizations (e.g., NATO) under the auspices of the UN, with other countries, or unilaterally. For information on UN entities involved in PO, see appendix C, and JP 3-08. For additional information on PO mandates that authorize deploying a UN PO mission, refer to Appendix D, Key Enabling Documents.

g. There is no standard mission for PO. Each PO is unique, with its own political, diplomatic, geographic, economic, cultural, and military characteristics.
3. Core Functions and Tasks

a. The following elements are key to a stable state and a sustainable peace. The objective of all PO is to sustain and support achieving these goals. All UN core functions and tasks are aimed at achieving progress in:

   (1) Human security (a safe and secure environment).
   (2) Governance and rule of law.
   (3) Economic and infrastructure development and a sustainable economy.
   (4) Political settlement.
   (5) Societal relationships and social well-being.

b. The UN defines these goals as the core functions of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation, which are to:

   (1) Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the state’s ability to provide security with respect for the rule of law and human rights.
   (2) Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation, and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance.
   (3) Provide a framework for ensuring all UN and other international actors pursue their country-level activities in a coherent and coordinated manner.

c. To achieve these goals, military forces in traditional UN-style PO, have the following core tasks.

   (1) Observing, monitoring, and reporting any violation of the agreed upon terms.
   (2) Supervising cease fire and support to verification mechanisms.
   (3) Separating belligerent forces (Interpositioning).

d. In addition, military forces may be called upon to execute or support the following peacebuilding supporting tasks.

   (1) Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of combatants.
   (2) Demining (see prohibitions for US forces in chapter 4).
   (3) Assisting civil authorities, SSR, and other rule of law-related activities.
   (4) Protecting civilians and promoting human rights.
   (5) Supporting foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations.

e. The end state of PO is codified and framed at the strategic and operational levels, but is executed at the tactical level. Proper planning for PO execution must begin with the end state. Synchronizing strategic, operational, and tactical objectives is essential to success. Actions at the tactical level can have positive and negative strategic implications.
4. Fundamentals of PO

a. The following are the 15 fundamentals that guide PO.

   1. Consent.
   2. Impartiality.
   3. Transparency.
   5. Freedom of movement.
   6. Flexibility and adaptability.
   7. Civil-military harmonization and cooperation.
   8. Restraint and minimum force.
   9. Objective or end state.
  11. Unity of effort.
  12. Legitimacy.
  14. Mutual respect and cultural awareness.

b. Establishing a civil-military presence during PO intends to inhibit hostile actions among disputing parties and bolster confidence in the peace process. The 15 fundamentals form the foundation for this process, although not all are necessary for success in every case. For example, due to the coercive nature of PEO, consent, impartiality, and restraint and minimum force may not apply. The 15 fundamentals are general considerations which are relevant in most cases. For detailed definitions and discussion of these fundamentals, see JP 3-07.3, *Peace Operations*.

c. The UN is guided by similar fundamentals called “basic guiding principles”. They are: consent of the parties, impartiality, and nonuse of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate. It recognizes three additional factors for success: legitimacy, credibility, and promotion of national and local ownership.

d. These fundamentals help maximize strategic goals and minimize unintended tactical mistakes by being culturally astute and respectful of local traditions, norms, customs, and modes of collaboration that promote principles of impartiality, transparency, and credibility. Nonetheless, unintended events may occur. Leaders must seek to manage these crises and keep their chain of command informed of unfolding events which may have detrimental consequences.

e. PO forces leverage the fundamentals and engage local populations and governments to gain trust and influence and build enduring relationships. They should seek to develop the HN’s willingness and capability to share responsibility in establishing and maintaining public order. PO forces employ ethical and measured
use of force. Their ability to treat people fairly and humanely enhances their ability to build trust, confidence, and legitimacy among populations. All this is essential in maintaining long-term order, and is more effective than compulsion, intimidation, and coercion.

f. Through applying the fundamentals of PO, US forces reinforce mutual respect, trust, and credibility. This engenders the perceptions of fairness and legitimacy to the local populace.
1. Introduction

a. The goals of PO are to contain conflict, restore peace, and shape the strategic environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding. Also included in its goals are to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance and, in some circumstances, facilitate a transition from military to civil control. To accomplish these, PO forces endeavor to create a secure environment to set the conditions for political and economic stability and effective governance. The latter is defined as government that is responsive to its citizens and capable of providing essential services.

b. PO require careful and thorough planning and preparation. They are politically sensitive operations outside the normal realm of expertise and experience of most US forces. PO also occur in complex environments with problematic dynamics. Guidance and mandates may differ, significantly, from other military operations.

c. As in any operation, distinct military operations and activities may occur simultaneously with, or independently of, others even within the same operational area. For example, a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) may be conducted in the same operational area where US forces are conducting PO. (See JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.)

d. Planning must address the core tasks of:
   (1) Observing, monitoring and reporting.
   (2) Supervising cease fires and supporting verification mechanisms.
   (3) Separating and neutralizing belligerent forces.
   (4) Ensuring public security and the rule of law.
   (5) Establishing or maintaining freedom of movement, and protecting humanitarian assistance (HA) activities.

e. Success in these areas (in addition to legitimacy, credibility, and promotion of national and local ownership) may be defined as a sustainable, durable peace. However, for peace to be sustained, military actions in PO need to contribute to conflict resilience. Conflict resilience is a situation where conflict issues are dealt with through political and social processes rather than violence. Planning considerations should take into account the key characteristics of a society resilient to violent conflict. These include:
   (1) Political and social institutions which are inclusive, equitable, and accountable.
   (2) Economic, social, and ethnic diversity rather than polarization and dominance.
   (3) Growth and development that provide equitable benefits across the society.
(4) A culture of dialogue rather than violence. Conditions in the area of operations (AO) need to reflect the characteristics of a society resilient to violent conflict.

f. Key areas that bear special consideration, and will be discussed in the following paragraphs, include:

(1) Training.
(2) Understanding the operational environment.
(3) Interorganizational considerations.
(4) Civil considerations.
(5) Gender considerations and protection of vulnerable populations.
(6) Interpreters and linguists.
(7) Information operations (IO).
(8) Technological considerations.
(9) Assessments.
(10) Transitions.

2. Training

PO differ enough from regular operations to require specific skillsets and mentality. Units should conduct PO training to develop familiarity and proficiency in PO prior to deployment. PO personnel should be trained in tasks they expect to conduct. (Many of these may be unique due to a needed cooperation with a variety of actors and agencies, as well as being theater-specific.) Priorities should be developed for training activities based on the type of PO and the expected environment. Training should incorporate recent developments and current best practices. A detailed discussion of training and training resources is found in appendix E.

3. Understanding the Operational Environment

a. The complex operational environments and unique challenges of PO require careful analysis, planning, and accountability. US forces may be required to work with various US agencies, foreign militaries, UN agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and HN authorities. The PO staff should develop a firm grasp of the operational environment using planning and analysis tools. The PO staff can use the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) analytical framework. PMESII enables the staff to determine relevant and critical relationships among the various actors and aspects of the operational environment. The staff can use analysis tools to ascertain variables that may affect tactical, operational, and strategic-level operations. (Tools may include mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available plus civil considerations and areas, structure, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE)). Appendix F, Analysis Frameworks, has a detailed discussion of PMESII and ASCOPE.
Note: The Army uses the acronym mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) when conducting mission analysis of the operational environment.

b. Predeployment site surveys (i.e., sending a team to the AO to conduct on-the-ground assessments) are useful tools to assess the operational environment. Site surveys should identify key stakeholders and examine the HN’s relationship with neighboring countries.

4. Interorganizational Considerations

a. There are varied agencies and organizations in a country during a conflict, and many stay after military PO forces are withdrawn. Their agendas cover a range of issues. These include:

   (1) Human rights.
   (2) Refugee resettlement.
   (3) Disaster relief.
   (4) Economic development.
   (5) Conflict resolution.
   (6) Election support.
   (7) Peacebuilding.
   (8) Education.
   (9) Child welfare.

b. Communication between PO organizations is essential. Communication enables both sides to understand various objectives and may lead to organizational compromise. JP 3-08 provides additional information about it.

c. Many humanitarian agencies operate under the Red Cross principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence. The principle of independence states that humanitarian action must be autonomous from political, economic, military, or other objectives. This means, most international organizations want distinct and independent consideration from one another and separation from military PO forces. Sometimes, they will avoid alignment with political entities, such as the UN. Commanders should cooperate with international agencies and establish common civilian-military goals. Also, they should establish a civil-military stability working group for information exchange and coordination. Achieve an appreciation for the capabilities and limitations of these organizations through briefings, talking with leaders, and conducting training together prior to deployment. Some NGOs or organizations may not want to be seen associating with the US military, to avoid a perception of bias or influence. Appendix H is a detailed discussion of international organizations and NGOs.
5. Civil Considerations

a. Civil considerations are of particular concern during PO and include infrastructure, civilian institutions, and the attitudes and activities of civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an AO. During PO, awareness of the potential impact of operations on civilians enhances the commander’s decision process for selecting objectives, locations, movement, control of forces, use of weapons, and force protection (FP) measures.

b. Civil considerations affect large, long-term diplomatic, economic, and informational issues. Discounting these issues taxes military or government resources and hinders transiting operations to follow-on elements. Civil considerations are continually analyzed by staff intelligence and operations planners during the mission. CMO planners coordinate with numerous organizations and provide conduits for information sharing and support requests. The operational planning teams or CMO planners also synchronize and integrate civilian activities with military operations, compile relevant information on the civil environment, and perform an analysis supporting the commander’s assessment.

c. During PO, two important considerations in the planning process are DCs and FHA. It is likely persons will be displaced and may be in critical need of basic resources (such as food, water, shelter, and medical attention). While this is the HN’s primary responsibility, the HN may not have the capacity to deal with the issues and may request US military assistance. Also, other UN, NGO, or interagency organizations may ask for DOD assistance. The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) will, upon government request, provide material assistance and protection to refugees. US forces may be tasked to provide a portion of this assistance.

d. DCs. The term DC is unique to DOD and is not used by DOS, NGOs, or intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). These organizations use the term “internally displaced persons (IDPs)” for civilians displaced within their country, and “refugees” or “migrants” for people who flee their country of origin and cross an international border. The following distinctions exist among the various categories of DCs.

(1) DP refers to internally and externally displaced persons, collectively.

(a) Returnees are DPs who voluntarily return to their former place of residence.

(b) Resettled persons are a subset of DPs. (They are civilians who have resettled in a third country, with the assistance of UNHCR and the government of their new country of residence, rather than returning to their previous home or land within the country or area of original displacement.) Resettled persons are a very small subset of the original displaced population, as opportunities for third-country resettlement are rare.

(c) Evacuees are civilians who are removed from their places of residence by military direction, for reasons of personal security or the requirements of a military situation.
Note: The term “evacuee” is unique to DOD and not used by DOS (except for NEOs), NGOs, or IGOs.

(d) IDPs are persons who have been forced to flee or their home. This is as a result of, or to avoid the effects of, armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or man-made disasters. These are persons who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.

(2) Migrants are persons who cross national boundaries or have fled their native country for economic reasons (stagnation and poverty) rather than fear of political or ethnic persecution.

(3) Refugees are persons who are outside the country of their nationality and are, essentially, stateless because they believe they can no longer rely on their country of origin to protect them. They are refugees owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or having a particular political opinion. It is important to understand the differences among refugees and other categories because of legal ramifications.

(a) Refugees are entitled to special protection because they can no longer avail themselves of the protection of their country of nationality.

(b) International law prohibits forcibly returning refugees to their country of origin or to any country where life or freedom would be threatened based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or having a particular political opinion. (DOS provides guidance as to what groups of people are classified as refugees. This description is general guidance.)

(c) DOD personnel should request specific DOS guidance when involved in operations that require classifying groups of DPs. Per Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, and agreed to by the 1967 Protocol to the Refugee Convention, it is not permitted to forcibly return refugees to a place where their lives or freedom may be threatened (nonrefoulment).

(4) Stateless persons are civilians who either have been denationalized, whose country of origin cannot be determined, or who cannot establish their right to the claimed nationality.

e. FHA. FHA activities include foreign disaster relief and other activities that directly address a humanitarian need. An assessment of an FHA operation should include a description of the relief organizations (i.e., NGOs, interorganizational entities, HN, and private sector), foreign government and military forces, UN agencies, or any other entities involved in the effort. Determine what relationship exists among them and the effectiveness of the organizations. For more information on FHA, see JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

f. Civil considerations should be addressed early in the planning process and assessed routinely throughout the operation. For further civil considerations analysis information, see ATP 3-57.60, Civil Affairs Planning.
6. Gender Considerations and Protection of Vulnerable Populations

a. PO forces should pay attention to the needs of at-risk groups such as women and children and elderly, infirmed, or disabled people. At-risk refers to groups within a population who are susceptible to diseases due to poor health or may be economically disadvantaged. PO forces should ensure their activities account for the potential vulnerabilities and risks these groups may experience within a conflict-affected environment. Integrating a gender perspective into assessments can lead to a good picture of the operational environment and increase mechanisms available for conflict prevention. For example, engaging only male leaders in a particular environment will offer one perspective while engaging females will offer more context about the nature of the conflict and how it affects family and community conditions.

b. Conflict-related Sexual Violence (CRSV). CRSV refers to rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, forced sterilization, forced marriage, and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity. These may be perpetrated against women, men, or children and are directly or indirectly linked (temporally, geographically, or causally) to a conflict by parties engaged in the conflict. CRSV frequently occurs in PO operational environments and impacts women, men, girls, and boys differently. During patrols and other operations, PO forces may encounter victims of CRSV and be required to intervene to prevent sexual violence, in accordance with the PO mandate. It is important to mitigate CRSV through key leader engagements and IO and assist victims in obtaining medical treatment, or if necessary, identify other organizations able to provide psychological treatment. (See Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-related Sexual Violence (S/2016/361).)

c. Trafficking in Persons (TIP). Trafficking is the recruiting or transferring persons for exploitation (by force, abduction, or deception). Trafficking includes forced labor and forced prostitution. Traffickers take advantage of environments destabilized by conflict. PO forces should learn the signs of trafficking victims, implement security mechanisms to prevent or remove trafficking incentives, and understand reporting requirements. The DOD Combating Trafficking in Persons Management Office (http://ctip.defense.gov/) and State Department Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (TIP Office, https://www.state.gov/j/tip/) have helpful online resources. The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) Human Trafficking Resource Package has tips to help identify and prevent TIP.

d. Children in Armed Conflict. In PO, protecting children in armed conflict is a focus of cooperation between PKO forces and international humanitarian agencies, such as the United Nations Children’s Fund. PKO operations support prevention of, and response to, the following violations of children’s rights in armed conflict.

   (1) Killing and maiming children.
   (2) Recruiting and using children as soldiers.
   (3) Attacking schools and hospitals.
   (4) Raping and committing sexual violence.
(5) Abducting children.
(6) Denying humanitarian access.

e. Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) is a UN Security Council mandate and internationally-recognized framework that highlights the different ways men and women experience conflict. Commanders must understand the mandate when participating in a UN operation, and ensure PO forces can respond to and support, these differences. WPS includes preventing unwanted incidents and protecting women and girls from them. PO forces provide support to the WPS mandate by including women in security sector reform activities, ensuring access to HA, engaging women during civil-military and IO, leveraging women’s perspectives during operational planning.

f. PO forces should demonstrate and uphold a code of conduct, with other PO and local security forces, which does not tolerate gender-based violence or sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). Also, PO forces should engage with HN security sectors and demonstrate the operational need for male and female HN forces to aid stabilization efforts.

g. SEA. Peacekeeping occurs in destabilized environments where there is an increased potential for unethical or criminal activity, including SEA. Commanders, staff, and PO forces participating in PO must understand US and UN standards of conduct and be trained to recognize, and respond to, SEA within or by the PO force. Such actions by PO personnel and personnel in partner organizations undermine the mission’s legitimacy. In UN mandated PO, forces operating under the UN umbrella are expected to abide by UN standards of behavior and conduct with regard to SEA.

(1) The UN defines sexual exploitation as any actual or attempted abuse (by military, police, or other personnel under the UN mandated PO) of a position of vulnerability, differential power or trust, for sexual purposes. This includes profiting monetarily, socially, or politically from the sexual exploitation of another.

(2) Sexual abuse is defined as the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions.

(3) SEA includes transactional sex (sex in exchange for money, employment, goods, services, or assistance), solicitation of transactional sex, and exploitative relationships. (See the United Nations Glossary on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse for additional information.)

(4) The UN prohibits sexual relationships between UN staff personnel and beneficiaries of assistance and protection.

(5) The UN’s policy on child abuse prohibits sexual activity between its staff and children under the age of 18, regardless of the local age of consent. Mistaken belief in the age of the child is not a defense. (See the UN Fact Sheet on SEA.)

(6) The UNDPKO has a conduct and discipline unit that investigates allegations of unethical or criminal activity (including SEA) within peacekeeping forces. The UN forwards their findings to the suspect’s national government for prosecution and disciplinary action.
7. Interpreters and Linguists
   a. During PO, achieving trust, legitimacy, and consent requires forces to interact with the local populace by speaking their language and being sensitive to, or adhering to, their customs, norms, and traditions. In most instances, individual Service members and civilians lack the linguistic ability to communicate personally and effectively with the local populace. Therefore, using linguists and interpreters in the right roles becomes essential for accomplishing the mission. Identifying, selecting, employing, and caring for linguists and interpreters requires command emphasis and ongoing involvement.
   b. A linguist is an expert in the nature of language, its origins, and history. Linguists do more than simply translate; they strive to understand deep meanings and nuances of a language. Use linguists to translate agreements and other significant documents or to conduct media analyses. Linguists work at higher echelons (i.e., above the brigade or group level).
   c. An interpreter is someone who translates from one language to another. Some are more adept at translating written products, others are adept at verbal exchanges, and some are adept at both.
   d. For detailed information on working with interpreters, planning for their use or selection, sources of interpreters, interpreter training, and considerations (such as “do's and don'ts”), see ATP 3-55.4, Techniques for Information Collection During Operations Among Populations, Appendix B.

8. Technological Considerations
   a. Technologically advanced equipment can improve the ability of the force to perform its mission. This includes the probability of detecting agreement violations, enhancing weapons verifications, supporting weapons destruction, and enhancing FP. Special equipment may be required to support zones of separation, checkpoints (CPs), and observation posts (OPs).
   b. Planners must recognize, technology can be leveraged to change the thinking and behavior of people, groups, organizations, and human institutions. Technology is valuable in overcoming operational and tactical challenges, such as shortfalls in countering improvised explosive devices. PO forces collaborate with the cyber community to ensure cyber tools and expertise are accessible. Additionally, forces may work directly with UN, NATO, or HN partners to identify technological requirements for successful mission accomplishment. Some of the main technological fields increasingly incorporated into PO include the following.
      (1) Nonlethal Weapons (NLW). NLW are weapons, devices, or munitions designed and employed to incapacitate targeted personnel or material while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property in the target location or surrounding environment.
         (a) NLW are not required nor expected to have a zero probability of producing fatalities or permanent injuries. NLW add flexibility to all types of operations and are useful, especially, in civil disturbances and PO because they limit the risk of casualties and collateral damage.
(b) Successfully accomplishing an operation in which NLW are employed requires extensive individual and unit training and preparation. Training should be intensive and realistic and enable forces to function efficiently as a unit and independently. This ensures forces employ their capabilities confidently and proficiently.

(c) For more information on NLW, see ATP 3-22.40/Marine Corps Tactical Publication (MCTP) 10-10A [Marine Corps warfighting publication (MCWP) 3-15.8]/Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures (NTTP) 3-07.3.2/Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.45/Coast Guard tactics, techniques, and procedures (CGTTP) 3-93.2, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Employment of Nonlethal Weapons*.

(2) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Capabilities, such as manned and unmanned ground and aerospace systems, assist in maintaining situational awareness, monitoring compliance with peace agreements, FP, protecting civilians, and other PO activities.

(3) Biometrics. Biometrics can help authenticate individuals and gain situational understanding in complex environments where there are dynamic populations of innocent civilians, criminals, opportunists, and spoilers. Forensically enabled, biometrically enabled, and weapons technical intelligence can verify identities of individuals and link them to networks and past events. Biometrics can support handling DCs, including providing humanitarian relief. Biometrics and forensics support population control and threat identification.

(4) Energy, Water Production, and Waste Management. PO use technological initiatives in these areas to improve sustainment in austere locations and support HA, especially in DC camps.

c. Another technology consideration is, the least technologically advanced nation in a coalition often constrains interoperability. Many multinational units do not have adequate communications equipment, and meeting mission requirements depends on the availability, compatibility, and security of communications equipment. Technological incompatibility can be an issue for multinational units operating under US control. Therefore, commanders and staffs must consider how they will share electronic information with coalition partners, the HN, the UN, and NGOs.

9. Assessments

a. As in all military operations, an effective assessment mechanism is necessary to monitor and evaluate a situation and recommend or direct action. Assessments should measure the force’s effectiveness in implementing the 15 fundamentals of PO (listed in chapter I), HN capacity and behavior, civilian vulnerabilities, activities of spoilers, and the effectiveness of the PO force and other actors involved in PO. Assessments offer perspective and insight and further an opportunity for self-correction and adaptation to modify force employment to seize initiative from belligerent forces.
b. Obtain data to inform assessments from intelligence activities and military reporting channels, and other sources (such as civilian agencies, NGOs, media, and the local population).

**NOTE**

Military personnel should carefully handle information received from NGOs, because it could jeopardize their status as neutral actors. Furthermore, HN personnel may be in jeopardy if they provide information and their identities become known to corrupt officials, criminal groups, or other spoilers.

10. Transitions

a. Effective PO establish conditions for an uninterrupted transition of responsibility from US forces to other authorities or sanctioned organizations, such as the UN, African Union (AU), NATO, or HN civil authorities. Similar to a traditional relief-in-place, the PO forces should carefully plan, coordinate, and manage the transition to the relieving force, an agency, civilian police (CIVPOL), or other legitimate authority. PO require lengthy commitments by the international community. US forces set conditions for the relieving force to sustain mission effectiveness by:

   (1) Establishing positive relations with legitimate governmental authorities.

   (2) Managing expectations of HN civilians.

   (3) Avoiding over-commitment to public services and public works which the HN government is not prepared to sustain.

b. Commanders plan for the transition phase before deployment or during the initial phase of PO. Transitions between military forces take the form of relief-in-place or transition-by-function (e.g., medical and engineer services, communications, logistics, or security).

c. Transitions may involve transferring certain responsibilities from military to civilian control. Examples include passing DC assistance missions to international organizations (e.g., the UNHCR); or passing military law enforcement missions to CIVPOL.
Chapter III
JOINT FUNCTIONS CONSIDERATIONS

1. Introduction

Joint functions are applicable to PO, but with special considerations and modifications. Joint functions include command and control (C2), intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, sustainment, and information. This chapter highlights elements of joint function considerations that are important in conducting PO.

2. C2

a. C2 encompasses the exercising authority and direction by a commander over assigned and attached forces to accomplish mission.

b. The US may participate in PO under various command authority arrangements. These arrangements may include:
   (1) Unilateral US operations.
   (2) Multinational operations with the US as the lead nation.
   (3) Multinational operations with the US as a contingent nation.

c. In any of these arrangements, the US Armed Forces remain in the chain of command of US military authorities. By law, the President retains command authority over US forces. However, as Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to place US forces under the operational control (OPCON) of a foreign commander, referred to as the head of military component (HOMC). This action only occurs when doing so assists specified military objectives. (See DOD Directive 2065.01E, DOD Personnel Support to the UN; and UN Policy Ref. 2008.4, Authority, Command and Control in UN Peacekeeping Operations, for more information.)

   (1) In multinational PO, the US force may report to the sponsoring entity, such as the UN, NATO, AU, Organization of American States, or European Union.

   (2) Within the limits of OPCON, a foreign commander cannot change the mission or deploy US forces outside the operational area agreed to by the President. The foreign commander may not separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change the US forces’ internal organization.

   (3) UN OPCON allows the HOMC to assign separate tasks to units and subunits, as required, within the mission area of responsibility, in consultation (not meaning negotiation) with the senior national officer of the affected unit/subunit. The HOMC does not retain any responsibility for US military personnel administration matters (i.e., pay, promotion, and discipline) outside the specified purposes and periods within the Memorandum of Understanding between the President and the UN.

   (4) The greater the anticipated US military role, the less likely it will be the US will agree to have a non-US commander exercise OPCON over US forces. Any
large-scale US force participation in a PEO that is likely to involve combat will be conducted under US command authority.

(5) PO sponsored and conducted by the UN are planned, managed, directed and supported by UNDPKO and the UN Department of Field Support.

(6) The UN Head of Mission, titled the Special Representative of the Secretary General, is in charge of a UN peacekeeping mission. The highest ranking UN official in a UN country team, which includes UN development and humanitarian organizations, is the UN Resident Coordinator (UN-RC). The UN-RC is responsible to coordinate, exchange information, and seek a consensus on UN related development and humanitarian activities. While the PKO mission and country team are usually separate entities, the UN-RC serves as the humanitarian coordinator and is a deputy special representative of the Secretary General of the UN PKO mission, if one is present.

d. C2 planning considerations include:

(1) Identifying UN agencies, NGOs, and international organizations active in the area of responsibility; and key representatives from the HN. Close coordination with multinational military forces contributing to the PO help eliminate duplication of effort. Additionally, PO planners may analyze surveys and studies conducted by UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and other humanitarian and developmental organizations with historical engagements in the area. Surveys identify potential tasks for providing support to civil missions, such as infrastructure and DC.

(2) Placing forces in the command structure. This carries significant meaning in PO and can either enhance or impede the peace process. Planners must consider the local political reality and the desires of each contributing nation when designing the command structure of lower echelons. The UN mandate, or multinational agreements already in-place, may limit or predetermine the command structure. Consider HN politics when determining:

   (a) Which forces are better at gaining rapport with the HN.

   (b) Local political, social, and economic agendas.

   (c) PO force boundaries, which capitalize on the administrative and political boundaries of the HN.

(3) Transiting functions to civilian organizations at the appropriate points in the operation.

(4) Nesting and synchronizing special operations forces (SOF) with PO objectives.

(5) Accommodating for communications requirements and equipment needed to liaise with nonmilitary or multinational forces. This may require multiple liaison teams with communications capabilities that integrate military and civilian communication systems. Interoperability may be constrained by the least technologically advanced nation. Also, many foreign military units do not have adequate communications equipment. The ability to meet mission requirements
will be significantly impacted by the availability, compatibility, and security of communications equipment. This is an issue for units operating under US control and US forces operating under UN or foreign control.

(6) Establishing a methodology for preparing transitional records. PO may last for several years. Records capture the civilian-military work a unit has conducted and provide context for the next commander.

3. Intelligence

a. Intelligence is critical to PO success. When identifying the significant characteristics of the operating environment, consider all aspects that might affect accomplishing the joint forces’ mission. Depending on the situation, these may include ethnic groups, ideological and political factions, religious groups and sects, age distribution, income groups, public health issues, and economic issues. Staffs use this information in shaping operations and aligning activities for successfully attaining a commander’s desired end state. (See JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.)

b. Direct or indirect intelligence sources for PO planning include:

(1) SOF, civil affairs, and psychological operations (PSYOP) units (which may have access to historical studies about the AO) and any other organizations which have been in the area for many years.

(2) The leaders of disputing parties.

(3) Military and political leadership from the regions bordering the AO.

(4) Civilian populations (including expected level of support, indifference, or hostility to the force, and the potential for violence between different segments of the population).

(5) Insurgent elements.

(6) Police and paramilitary forces.

(7) Personnel from UN agencies, NGOs, and civil society (such as religious groups, youth groups, and women’s organizations). These organizations provide general information and corroborate with other sources. However, active intelligence collection against these types of organizations is discouraged.

c. Units use these intelligence sources to determine:

(1) Patterns of criminal activity.

(2) Historical context (i.e., relationships, gender, cultural, ethnic, and religious factors).

(3) Economic conditions.

(4) Unique environmental threats.

(5) Internal and external political factors.

d. The peace mandate stipulates activities for the disputing parties. Tracking and recording these activities becomes essential to achieving peace.
e. A successful intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance plan leverages the unique capabilities of the military police (MP), criminal investigation division (CID), Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, multinational partners. It includes information gathered by civil affairs (CA), combat camera, and PSYOP forces, and using biometrics.

f. The following are intelligence synchronization considerations. It is important to:

   (1) Understand information management and intelligence sharing issues. These aspects may be critical to bridge commonalities and enable peace operations.

   (2) Consider multinational participants who do not have intelligence sharing agreements with the US. Knowing who the US can share with and to what level provides background and context for meetings between various participants.

   (3) Pay special attention to human intelligence organizations so that the peace operations do not jeopardize the existing structures within the area of operations.

4. Fires

   a. With the exception of PEO, using fires during most types of PO is limited. Fires are only employed when absolutely necessary to keep the peace, prevent mass atrocities, and protect civilians. Additionally, fires may be necessary for self-defense of US forces.

   b. Insomuch as fires include nonlethal effects (such as those achieved through IO), PO forces employ the targeting process to support attaining unit objectives. For more information on targeting, see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

5. Movement and Maneuver

   a. Movement and maneuver are essential to gaining a position of relative advantage and exploiting that advantage. In PO, advantage is achieved by being at the right place, at the right time.

   b. The location of command elements and forces can have a significant meaning in PO and can either enhance or impede the peace process. Planners must consider the local political reality and desires of each contributing nation when determining the location of ground contingents, and capitalize on the administrative and political boundaries of the HN.

   c. Patrols, convoys, searches, and separating opposing factions are all forms of movement and maneuver. They are designed to ensure PO forces control their environment and the situation at hand to effect peace.

6. Protection

   The protection function encompasses FP, force health protection, and other protection activities (such as protecting civilians). Include the following key considerations.

   a. Specific FP measures and postures may change, significantly, depending on the type of PO. In PKO, a threat to the force may range from benign to severe. In all cases, strict impartiality may help reduce the threat to the force. The nature of PEO means forces will likely face a great threat.
b. Rules of engagement (ROE) are essential to providing guidelines to protect the force. Similar to stability operations, military capability must be applied more prudently in PO because of the political sensitivity of the mission. The actions of military personnel and units are framed by the disciplined application of force, including ROE. ROE will be more restrictive and detailed when compared to those for sustained combat operations due to national policy concerns. Moreover, these ROE may change, frequently, during operations. Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence characterize the environment. (See JP 3-0, Joint Operations.)

c. FP is a key command consideration when designing PO. FP and ROE considerations are central to all aspects of PO planning and execution, particularly when the mission is a PEO or PKO that involves positioning between former belligerent forces. Local perceptions of the mission forces’ credibility and impartiality may affect threat levels. The US commander is responsible for setting and enforcing standards of physical security for US forces, in coordination with the PO force commander and the supported combatant commander.

   (1) Some passive elements of FP employed in combat operations will not be applicable in most types of PO. For example, making friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, is not applicable in PKO, because the objective is for the force to be visible.

   (2) Plan and train for personnel recovery in case an isolating event occurs.

   (3) FP considerations, in all types of PO, address antiterrorism measures due to the potential threat from violent extremist organizations.

   (4) Peacekeeping forces may have a limited ability to check the backgrounds of local employees hired to work with the PO force, and should have plans and procedures in place to ensure force security.

   (5) International organizations, NGOs, other government departments and agencies, media, and others may request that military forces provide protection.

   (6) Military forces conduct demining in PO, primarily, to protect and enable the freedom of movement for friendly forces. (Humanitarian demining assistance is addressed in JP 3-29, appendix B.)

   (7) An FP consideration in PO environments is unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO). Identifying, marking, securing, in disposing of UXO requires proper training. Ensure the appropriate information is gathered to support UXO and explosive ordnance disposal teams. (For more information on UXO, see ATP 4-32.2/Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-17.2B/NTTP 3-02.4.1/AFTTP 3-2.12, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Explosive Ordnance.)

   (8) The FP plan should be modified, at irregular intervals, to avoid predictable behavior patterns that can be exploited by adversaries.

d. Mission personnel may be vulnerable to accidents and illnesses because of poor infrastructure, local driving habits, and diseases that are common in an area. (For force health protection information, refer to JP 3-0.)
e. Protecting civilians refers to activities that reduce civilian risks from physical violence, secure their rights to access essential services and resources, and contribute to a secure, stable, and just environment over the long-term (see JP 3-07.3).

f. The provost marshal advises the commander on MP support to PO through the MP disciplines (i.e., police operations, detention operations, and security and mobility support). Police intelligence operations are not standalone functions, and are continuous and integrated within all MP operations.

Note: For the purposes of this publication, MP encompasses the terms “military police” used by the Army and Marine Corps, and “security forces” used by the Air Force.

(1) Police operations in support of PO ensure stability and security and are maintained throughout the AO. MPs perform various tasks under this discipline. They:

(a) Enforce the law.
(b) Employ forensic analysis or biometric identification capabilities support.
(c) Conduct criminal investigations.
(d) Provide support to civil security and civil control.
(e) Restore and maintain order.
(f) Support border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement.
(g) Establish an interim criminal justice system.
(h) Conduct HN training support.
(i) Conduct traffic management and control.
(j) Conduct police engagement.

(2) MPs support the commander, during PO, through security and mobility support operations in a variety of ways, including:

(a) Area and local security.
(b) Populace and resource control, which includes DC operations, NEO, and logistics security.
(c) Military working dogs.
(d) PO through detention operations discipline.
(e) US military prisoner confinement.
(f) HN corrections training and support.

(3) Police intelligence operations support commanders, at all levels, by integrating police intelligence activities within MP operations. It enables MPs, the US Army CID command staff, and police intelligence analysts to identify connections and correlations among people, places, patterns, and problems pertinent to criminal activity. Police intelligence operations support the operations
process and protection-supporting task by proving police information and intelligence products to enhance situational understanding, protect the force, and enable the rule of law.

7. Sustainment

Sustainment includes transportation; maintenance; medical, infrastructure, and food services; and fuel support and ensures PO forces’ ability to conduct PO.

a. Logistics.

(1) The logistic support concept includes multinational force support and anticipated NGO and international organization requirements. In addition, it identifies what areas fall under multinational control or US unilateral control, and what areas remain under HN control. In coalitions, differing multinational logistics processes may present additional challenges.

(2) The magnitude of the DC situation, status of the nation’s infrastructure, and requirements mandated in the peace implementation agreement may increase demand for necessities, compared to requirements of military operations. These include food, water, billeting, waste disposal, movement control, environmental and safety concerns, and HN supplies and services.

(3) DCs pose a significant logistical challenge. Coordination with NGOs and interorganizational entities is critical when planning logistical support for DCs.

(4) Logistics staffs have fiscal responsibilities to:
   
   (a) Determine the military’s authority for providing coalition support to the local procurement process.
   
   (b) Determine the additional financial support needed for peace-related programs.
   
   (c) Recommend proactive measures that will feed determining the amount of UN or alliance fiscal shortfalls.
   
   (d) Understand common funding arrangements.

(5) Understanding the logistics capabilities of the multinational force assists in organizing and structuring logistical support. Other considerations for the logistical organization and structure are:

   (a) Requirements, shortfalls, and necessary arrangements, including support for multinational elements and civil-military operations.

   (b) The availability of HN support and contracting.

   (c) Redeployment and recovery plans for transitioning to a UN force, if appropriate.

   (d) Special agreements, such as environmental cleanup, customs duties exemption, hazardous materials storage, and transit restrictions.
b. Personnel.

(1) Many PO include multinational personnel, and leaders must be prepared to integrate these personnel into a military PO force. The personnel staff officer faces multinational issues for attached units and must understand and anticipate requirements.

(2) In a multinational PO environment, consider caveats that stipulate restrictions to coalition partners can and cannot do based on their national interests and laws.

(3) Other considerations for integrating other nations into a military PO force include rank structure, language, and training differences. For example, some countries assign rank based on the knowledge of a service member, rather than based on time in grade. Language and training differences also apply to integrating other components. The key for successful integration is to harness the strengths of each contributing nation or organization and avoid focusing on differences.

(4) Carefully, select Service members to serve as sole US representatives on UN or HN staffs. A high level of technical and tactical competence, the ability to build cross-cultural relationships and trust, and a degree of cultural fluency are important for success in these roles.

(5) PO involve a myriad of foreign and domestic statutory, regulatory, and policy considerations. Some instances involve conflicting bodies of law.

(6) The presence of the force may stimulate growth in the local economy, but there are potential negative impacts. Consider economic impacts of leave, pass, liberty, and rest and relaxation policies. Develop procedures reducing the negative impacts. Two examples are regulating the amount of US dollars personnel may convert to local currency, and keeping pay for local civilians hired to support the peacekeeping force the same as prevailing wages for the area.

c. Other Sustainment Considerations.

(1) Transportation. If the peace effort is a NATO-led operation, a US and NATO joint movement center (JMC) exists. In this case, the NATO JMC (sometimes called a multinational deployment agency) is the lead agency. In other multinational operations, the US JMC and liaison officers from national contingents coordinate directly with the JMC.

(2) Joint Task Force-Port Opening.

(a) Although all Services have the organic capability to execute theater-opening functions, traditional Service port opening and operating forces may be insufficient in situations that require rapid response or joint integration. The United States Transportation Command’s (USTRANSCOM’s) joint task force-port opening aerial port of debarkation provides the supported geographic combatant commander (GCC) a rapid assessment of potential aerial ports and their distribution infrastructures. It also provides a port opening capability to facilitate crisis response in established or austere
environments. It is designed to be in place in advance of a force deployment or sustainment, humanitarian, or relief supply arrival.

(b) Joint task force-port opening is a joint expeditionary capability that enables USTRANSCOM to rapidly establish, operate, and clear a port of debarkation. Additionally, joint task force-port opening forces can conduct cargo-handling operations to a forward distribution node and facilitate port throughput in support of a GCC-executed contingency. For planning considerations for each Service, refer to ATP 3-17.2/MCRP 3-21.1B/NTTP 3-02.18/AFTTP 3-2.68, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airfield Opening*.

(3) Medical. Medical considerations include knowing when to provide medical support beyond the PO force, patterns of illness or disease in the area of operations, and cultural sensitivities to medical support that will affect care of indigenous populations. Of concern are possible perceptions of fairness among the factions involved that one side may benefit more than the other. Therefore, carefully coordinate medical support with civil-military operations and IO.

(4) Religious Support. Chaplains and enlisted religious support personnel provide religious support for PO personnel operating under austere and isolated conditions. Also, they are the principle advisors to the command on religion, ethics, morals, and morale as they impact the mission. Their advisement internal (to assigned, attached, or authorized personnel) and external (concerning indigenous people’s religious practices, customs, and traditions).

(5) Engineering. Military engineers play a significant role in the initial stages of PO by establishing physical boundaries and barriers, OPs, and other infrastructure. Over time, their role transitions to civilian contractors (e.g., logistics augmentation programs or other sustainment contractors).

8. Information

a. The information function encompasses managing and applying information and deliberately integrating it with other joint functions to influence actor perceptions, behavior, and action; and supports human and automated decision making. The information function helps commanders and staffs understand and leverage the pervasive nature of information, its military uses, and its application during military operations. This function provides commanders the ability to integrate generating and preserving friendly information while leveraging the informational aspects of military activities to achieve the commander’s objectives and end state.

b. This multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) publication addresses information as IO and information-related capabilities. This function’s scope is still emerging but will have significant implications for PO. Therefore, PO leaders should monitor evolving information doctrine, starting with JP 3-0, Change 1.

c. Units use IO, military information support operations (MISO), cyberspace operations, electronic warfare (EW), and space operations to maneuver in the information environment and achieve cognitive and psychological objectives.
d. Achieving PO objectives requires commanders and PO forces to understand how to integrate information-related capabilities to generate desired effects in the information environment, and consolidate security-related gains to achieve political-military objectives.

e. The Information Environment.

   (1) In PO, the friendly or adversarial factions involved use information to their advantage by employing tactics (such as censorship, propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation) to gain this advantage.

   (2) Local and international media operate before, during, and after PO forces arrive and depart, and are sources to leverage for information.

   (3) Allies and coalition member countries participating as a multinational force may have troops in the designated country before US military involvement. Those nations potentially may reconcile their ongoing IO campaign with the US campaign. Successful operations result from synchronizing and aligning IO with all partners.

   (4) Individual Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen broadcast information and shape perceptions by interacting directly with media representatives or online through social media platforms (such as Facebook and Twitter). The messages either enhance or inhibit operational objectives. Commanders must balance transparency with security when deciding whether to manage or restrict these activities. Minor or local events have rapid international significance since global media broadcasts them around the clock and across multiple platforms.

   (5) Enemies and adversaries exploit gaps between what PO forces say and do.

   (6) The demonstrated behavior and conduct of military personnel in PO is the most effective and efficient way to communicate IO messages. It can lend to PO forces’ credibility and legitimacy.

f. IO Fundamentals for PO.

   (1) IO are focused on affecting adversary decision making, but recognize that influencing foreign audiences is a means to this end, especially with indigenous audiences in the AO.

   (2) IO seek to reassure, persuade, and influence communities within the AO to support PO efforts toward attaining a sustainable peace.

   (3) The fundamentals of transparency and legitimacy demand military commanders engage openly and routinely with multiple audiences in gaining support for PO.

   (4) PO forces should consider the effects of actions, operations, and activities carefully before undertaking them. The aim is to avoid unintended consequences. For example, destroying a belligerent person's radio or television broadcast capability diminishes the means of spreading propaganda and brings favorable tactical results, but it may have a destabilizing effect on the peace process.
If the population is subject to propaganda by adversaries, PO forces quickly provide the population with objective, factual, and credible information.

Multinational forces may use the terms strategic communication and information activities to define IO.

g. Information-related Capabilities (IRCs).

(1) IO are the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities used with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversaries’ and potential adversaries’ decision making while protecting US concerns. (See JP 3-13, Information Operations.)

(2) IRCs are the tools, techniques, or activities that affect any of the three dimensions (physical, informational, and cognitive) of the information environment.

(3) IRCs are diverse. In some cases, they are parts of the force structure (i.e., PSYOP, CA, or combat camera units). In other cases, IRCs are tasks or activities managed by a staff section (i.e., military deception, operations security (OPSEC), or special technical operations).

Note: The Marine Corps has combined public affairs (PA) and combat camera into a unit and activity within the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Group.

(4) Commanders consider the potential of all military capabilities to contribute to IO during the planning process. Additionally, they consider select activities to complement the effects of IRCs, such as information assurance, counter-deception, physical security, EW support, and electronic protection.

(5) Various IRCs are required to perform PO, and will be task organized depending on initial assessments. Staff planners from IRCs, such as PA and MISO, should be integrated early in IO planning.

(6) Information-related capabilities support a commander’s ability to inform and influence audiences and shape desired outcomes. IO integration specialists or planners synchronize and integrate IRCs bringing about, and enhancing, desired effects throughout the information environment. All capabilities send a message or make an impression. Therefore, commanders consider all capabilities when devising plans and solutions.
Chapter IV
OPERATIONAL TASKS

1. Background
a. This chapter discusses the specific tasks required to contain conflict, restore peace, and shape the strategic environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding, and facilitate transition to legitimate governance. These are the main PO goals.
b. Additionally, the international community has agreed to take concerted action during PO against gender-based violence, human rights violations, trafficking in persons, and mass atrocities.

2. PO Tasks
a. The joint force conducts an array of operational and tactical-level tasks in support of PO. Many are the same as, or similar to, those already conducted across the range of military operations. They are discussed in detail in other MTTP publications. This publication focuses on the unique considerations for conducting these tasks during PO.

Note: PO are not combat operations. Consequently, there are significant differences in mentality, approach, and execution of these operations. Also, PO “tasks” are not always analogous to Service definitions of “tasks.”

b. Commanders must consider, carefully, the political and operational context in which their forces conduct tasks in support of a PO mission. Key considerations in applying PO tasks include:

(1) Consistently, applying the 15 fundamentals of peacekeeping. Applying the fundamentals may change the force’s approach to traditional activities and operations. For example, PKO are conducted in an open and conspicuous manner in keeping with the transparency fundamental of transparency. Therefore, OPs and patrols are conducted differently in PKO than in traditional operations. In PKO, these activities are meant to be seen.

(2) Contrasting PO tasks with operational- and tactical-level tasks, which necessitate:

(a) The greater role of political considerations in PO.
(b) Greater restraints on the use of force in PO.
(c) Considering the implications of a UN mandate in PO.
(d) Applying generally accepted UN peacekeeping principles (such as consent of the HN; impartiality; and not using force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate).

(3) Recognizing the intense, interorganizational, and multilateral setting in UN mandated operations.

(4) Emphasizing civilian protection.
(5) Realizing a requirement for an adaptive application of PO tasks that considers the differences among conflict prevention, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding.

3. Operational Tasks
The following list constitutes the core operational PO tasks. Military forces serve a primary role in some PO tasks, and a supporting, training, or as-needed role in others.

a. Observing, monitoring and reporting.
b. Supervising cease fires and support to verification mechanisms.
c. Separating belligerent forces as a buffer and confidence building measure.
d. DDR combatants.
e. Demining (training HN forces only; specific prohibitions exist for US forces).
f. Assisting civil authorities through security sector reform and other rule of law-related activities.
   (1) Create a secure and stable environment and uphold the rule of law.
   (2) Provide electoral assistance.
   (3) Support restoring and extending state authority.
g. Protecting civilians and promoting human rights.
   (1) Minimize civil harm during military movements and exercises.
   (2) Provide designated protected areas.
   (3) Support DC operations.
h. Supporting FHA operations.

4. Observing, Monitoring, and Reporting
a. Observing and reporting are the cornerstones of PO. Observers, military and civilian, gain information by using OPs, patrols, and other methods and report information on activities within their AO. Observers provide timely, accurate, and relevant reports on every situation or incident that develops in their AO. Factual and impartial reporting constitutes the basis of all successful PO and, when required, includes maps, field sketches, diagrams, videotapes, photographs, and references to specific agreements or instructions. Inaccurate and biased reporting may adversely affect the operational situation, potentially damaging the image and credibility of the PO force. Observation requires a complete understanding of the situation and the political and military implications resulting from PO actions.
b. Observation tasks cover:
   (1) Reviewing the status of military installations.
   (2) Monitoring activities within the AO related to personnel or weapons.
   (3) Being aware of violations of international agreements or conventions.
(4) Monitoring and supervising truces and ceasefire agreements.

(5) Observing buffer zone (BZ) and demilitarized zone (DMZ) restrictions and adhering to approved local agreements by the parties of the dispute.

c. Observers report agreement violations, such as:

(1) Movement of disputing forces.

(2) Shootings, hostile acts, or threats made against PO forces or civilians.

(3) Overflights by military or civilian aircraft when air movement in the BZ is restricted.

d. Observers exercise discretion when communicating official information to the HN or other non-US units in the course of their duties. Information, official or unofficial, may be sensitive to the international community.

5. Supervision of Cease Fires and Support to Verification Mechanisms

a. General. Commanders must understand their responsibilities under cease-fire agreements. Peace agreements, or subsequent international accords, establish parameters for verifying the location, movement, readiness, and numbers of weapons and forces, and force reduction specified by an agreement (such as a cease fire).

b. Principles.

(1) HNs and belligerent forces are responsible for compliance with, and accountability for, peace agreements.

(2) The PO force is responsible for verifying compliance, and for peace enforcement, compelling compliance.

(3) The PO force must have total access to all locations in the country which the mission occurs.

c. Weapon and Force Levels. To facilitate prioritization and reporting, divide military sites and weapons storage areas into the following four categories.

(1) Combat Sites. These consist of heavy weapons, air defense, airfields, naval ports, barracks, operational munitions stocks, and combat loads.

(2) Police Sites. These consist of weapons, vehicles, and munitions.

(3) Infrastructure Sites. These consist of support activities such as logistics, communications, headquarters, and depots.

(4) Ordnance Sites. These consist of civilian production plants and factories, production storage, and new weapons holding areas.

d. Procedures.

(1) Commanders establish the priority of inspections based on the four site categories. Combat sites and police sites should be given the highest priority.

(2) Types of inspections include a combination of pre-inspections, announced inspections, and unannounced inspections.
(3) The inspection schedules must be available to all parties of the agreement.

(4) A verification board coordinates inspections and develops a collection plan.

(5) Reporting on monitoring and verification activity and results should include nonmilitary organizations, when feasible (e.g., Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, International Police Training Force, or agents of international bodies overseeing the agreement).

6. Separation of Belligerent Forces

a. The process of physically separating belligerent forces is referred to as interpositioning by the UN. It involves disengaging disputing parties and placing PO forces between them. PO forces supervise disputing parties forces' withdrawal and establish a BZ between them to prevent further conflict. This operation requires careful and accurate timing to reduce risks to the PO force, ensure the disputing parties withdraw into designated areas, and ensure the PO force has adequate maneuver space to enforce the separation. Interpositioning aids in defusing sensitive or explosive situations and allows withdrawal of the disputing parties without either side gaining an advantage. The PO force interposes as the parties in the conflict disengage, taking advantage of a lull in hostilities while maintaining credibility and impartiality.

b. Separation and interpositioning use a distinct set of control measures and the following terms.

Note: “Cease-hostilities line” and “armistice demarcation line” are not joint, US terms, but are useful in defining force separation in PO and have been used in agreements and treaties. Terms may vary depending on the governing political agreement.

(1) Cease-hostilities Line. This is where the fighting stopped. This line marks the forward limit of the positions occupied by opposing troops at the suspension of hostilities. The exact location of this line can be contentious and a topic of discussion during the peacemaking process. This is a reference point and not a control measure, unless otherwise negotiated during the settlement agreement.

(2) Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL) (or Cease-fire Line). This is a geographically defined line from which disputing or belligerent forces disengage, and withdraw to their side following a truce or cease-fire agreement. (It is also called a cease-fire line in some UN operations.)

Note: A cease-fire agreement paves the way for establishing a BZ (area of separation) or DMZ, and force withdrawal.

(3) BZ (or Area of Separation). This is a defined area controlled by a PO force from which disputing or belligerent forces have been excluded. (It is also called area of separation in some UN operations.) A BZ creates an area of separation between disputing or adversarial forces and reduces the risk of conflict. A BZ may contain residences, businesses, farmland, or other assets which PO forces patrol and monitor. If it is the sovereign territory of one of the adversaries, coordinate the administration and policing of the inhabitants with the sovereign
authority. The supervising authority controls and limits access to the BZ. Maritime zones specify infringements on international shipping rights.

(4) DMZ. This is a defined area in which it is prohibited to station or concentrate military forces, or retain or establish military installations (of any description).

(5) Line of Demarcation. This is a line defining the boundary of a BZ used to establish the forward limits of disputing or belligerent forces after each phase of disengagement or withdrawal has been completed.

c. The principles for successfully separating belligerents are:

(1) Focusing the operation on the tactical level.

(2) Obtaining consent to the separation from the disputing parties.

(3) Keeping the operation transparent.

(4) Providing liaison with key parties and local authorities. (This is essential.)

(5) Requiring full adversary participation. (This is necessary for success.)

(6) Ensuring the PO force has freedom of movement.

d. The processes of disengagement and interpositioning are conducted in the following stages.

(1) Establish and mark the agreed ADL, BZ, or DMZ on maps. The first, and most important, task after a truce or cease fire goes into effect, is determining the location of the ADL, BZ, or DMZ and marking it on a common map.

(a) The unit commander negotiates the details with the belligerent forces. In PKO, ensure consensus before physical preparations begin.

(b) Belligerent forces provide maps and overlays of the disposition of their forces and equipment.

(c) The negotiated boundaries should follow easily identifiable, natural terrain features (where possible). If not, all parties should be conducive to placing visible markers. Survey-qualified units or personnel (such as artillery units or engineers) are responsible for carrying out demarcation duties.
WARNING
Whenever negotiating boundaries or geographic points, it is critical to ensure all parties are referring to the same maps and using the same geodetic datum plane and coordinate system. The US and NATO use World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS 84) as the official positional coordinate reference system. However, many countries still use maps produced with older datum. Plotting geographic coordinates from a different datum on a WGS 84 map, or vice versa, can result in positional errors of up to 24 miles. Incorrectly plotted or positioned lines or OP locations can result in confusion, misunderstandings, danger from hazardous areas (minefields, etc.), mistrust, delays, or renewed hostilities. (See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3900.01D, Position (Point and Area) Reference Procedures for more information.)

(2) Move PO forces into position as quickly as possible after disengagement or withdrawal has begun to reduce the risk of clashes, which may lead to a conflict renewal or cease fire breakdown.

(3) Establish surveillance, verification, and collection systems to monitor and demonstrate progress. Monitoring the ADL is required to prevent anyone from moving the markings.

(4) Coordinate the efforts of ground, air, maritime, and technical assets for the participating nations. The collection plan focuses on named areas of interest and monitors key belligerent force locations.

(5) Ensure all elements of the interposing PO force have communication with the belligerent forces, and liaisons are located in the tactical operation centers of PO.

(6) Physically, establish and mark the ADL, BZ, or DMZ on the ground.
   (a) Clear key areas of mines, obstacles, and fortifications. Minefields, craters, tank ditches, berms, bunkers, and fortifications may block roads and access into and out of the zones. The PO force cannot separate belligerent forces or establish freedom of movement until cleared areas are established. The PO force supervises and assists the belligerents in clearing minefields and removing obstacles, bunkers, and fortifications. PO forces may provide material or equipment to accomplish this task.
   (b) Survey and physically mark the ground using an acceptable means, such as placing painted barrels, stakes, barbed wire, or concertina wire along the lines.
   (c) Use precision during initial marking to reduce the possibility of disagreements and misunderstandings.
(d) Clearly, identify markers so they are visible from 100 meters in daylight and from both directions of travel. Locate markers in heavily trafficked areas.

(e) During the negotiation process, ask the belligerent forces to place the markers. By placing the markers, they gain a sense of ownership in the peace process and provide labor to speed the marking process.

(7) Establish access and control measures.

(a) Establish CPs, OPs, access routes, processing areas, and weapons storage sites (used for DDR), where necessary.

(b) Ensure all control measures are visible and known to the local population.

(8) Deploy PO forces along the ADL, between the disputing forces, and supervise the disengagement and withdrawal of the disputing forces behind their sides of the ADL. Ensure the size of the PO force is credible to provide the disputing parties the confidence needed to disengage and withdraw safely from their positions. Peacekeeping tasks were discussed in detail in chapter 1. The ADL becomes the forward limit for the disputing forces. Figure 1, Deployment of PO Forces Along an ADL, illustrates a recommended location of PO forces, such as PK elements.

![Diagram of Deploying PO Forces Along an ADL](image)

**Figure 1. Deployment of PO Forces Along an ADL**
(9) Establish lines of demarcation on each side of the ADL.

(10) Supervise the withdrawal of disputing forces to positions behind their lines of demarcation, as shown in figure 2. When required:

   (a) Withdraw forces via designated routes to assembly areas where initial disarmament takes place.

   (b) Move belligerent soldiers to barracks.

   (c) Transfer confiscated weapons to weapons storage sites, or destroy them.

![Figure 2. Withdrawal of Disputing Forces Behind Lines of Demarcation](image)

(11) PO forces establish the BZ and begin observation and patrol activities, as shown in figure 3. The lines of demarcation are now the forward limits for each of the disputing forces, which constitutes the leading edge of the BZ.
Control the BZ. A series of observation and control measures (supported by active ground, air, and maritime patrolling) is essential for controlling the area of separation.

(a) The PO force controls access with CPs and can restrict the operating hours, as required. Commanders decide whether, and when, to permit people or vehicle traffic to pass into or through a BZ.

(b) OPs provide visual coverage within the BZ.

(c) Patrols can provide coverage of areas not visible to the OPs.

(d) Ensure access to the BZ is restricted to the PO force or observer group and authorized civilians. The PO force and belligerent parties should agree to clearly defined guidelines governing the BZ. They should include:

- The authorities and role of CIVPOL in the zones.
- Who and what has access to, transits, or stops in the zones (e.g., local civilians, such as farmers or fishermen).
- Regulations for agricultural, industrial, transportation, government, local commerce, and other activities inside the zones.
• Procedures for handling violators, confiscated weapons, and ammunition.

(13) Promptly, mediate localized disagreements and address potential clashes at the lowest practical level, to prevent a recurrence of conflict.

(14) Use joint military commissions or other consultative bodies to settle disputes arising from controlling the zones. A detailed discussion of joint commissions is in appendix I.

e. Based on negotiated diplomatic agreements, the disputing parties may agree to extended areas of supervision called areas of limitation (AOLs). AOLs allow peacekeepers to inspect the strength and fortifications of disputing parties. An arrangement is when disputing parties agree to maintain equal numbers of small, lightly armed forces in the area immediately adjacent to the BZ. Agreements between disputing parties allow larger forces in other parts of the AOL, but the agreement specifies an upper limit for the number and type of formations, tanks, antiaircraft weapons, and artillery (by caliber) permitted in the area. The PO force or observer group monitors each side’s compliance. Lines of demarcation define outer boundaries of the AOLs. The AOLs constitute additional measures for improving security of the BZ and increasing confidence in the process by the disputing parties.

f. The BZ may become a DMZ following further diplomatic activity. PO forces do not occupy DMZs, but observe and patrol them with observer groups. A DMZ creates neutral areas, free from military occupation and activity. A DMZ in an area claimed by two or more disputing sides and controlled by one party constitutes a direct threat to the others. Lines of demarcation define DMZ boundaries. These boundaries should be easily recognizable and not run counter to locally accepted political and cultural divisions. The airspace over a DMZ is restricted from disputing party aircraft.

7. DDR

a. DDR actions may form part of a peace agreement and are conducted as part of a wider, post-conflict recovery process. Military PO forces play a supporting role, with the primary responsibilities of creating and maintaining a secure environment. DDR seeks to increase stability by ensuring combatants and their weapons are taken out of the conflict, successfully return to civilian life, and forego returning to arms.

b. The complex DDR process has dimensions that include culture, politics, security, humanity, and socioeconomics. DDR can provide incentives for commanders and combatants to enter negotiations to facilitate political reconciliation, dissolve belligerent force structures, and present opportunities for former combatants and other DDR beneficiaries to return to their communities. Implementing DDR requires a careful examination of the desired end state and environmental variables to determine the best approach to increase stability.

c. Within the context of DDR:

(1) Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control, and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of former combatants, belligerents, and the local populace.
(2) Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces and groups, including identifying and gathering former combatants for processing and pre-discharge orientation.

(3) Reintegration is the process by which former combatants, belligerents, and displaced civilians receive amnesty, reenter civilian society, gain sustainable employment, and become contributing members of the local populace. It is a political, social, and economic process with an open timeframe. It, primarily, takes place in local communities.

d. DDR is conducted in three phases; they are:

(1) Initial Response.
   (a) Negotiate terms.
   (b) Establish weapons control programs.
   (c) Reassure disarmed factions.
   (d) Establish a monitoring program.
   (e) Establish demobilization camps.
   (f) Ensure belligerents’ needs are met.

(2) Transformation.
   (a) Disarm combatants.
   (b) Reduce unauthorized weapons.
   (c) Ensure safety of personnel and families.
   (d) Reintegrate combatants and DCs.

(3) Fostering Sustainability.
   (a) Manage DDR.
   (b) Transition responsibility to the HN.
   (c) Secure, store, and dispose of weapons.
   (d) Develop HN arms control.

e. PO forces should coordinate with international and local organizations to ensure DDR activities are informed by the unique needs of the entire population.

f. Detailed information on DDR can be found in ATP 3-07.5, Stability Techniques. For additional information, see JP 3-07; JP 3-07.3; JP 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies; and United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards.
8. Demining
   a. Humanitarian demining is a key part of the disarmament process, but is an HN responsibility. IGOs and commercial companies that specialize in eradicating mines conduct the majority of worldwide humanitarian demining.
   b. The US military only clears mines for mobility during tactical operations. They may assist in training others in demining techniques and procedures.

   NOTE
   “In accordance with Title 10, US Code, Section 407, no member of the Armed Forces of the United States, while providing humanitarian demining assistance, will engage in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of land mines or other explosive remnants of war (unless the member does so for the concurrent purpose of supporting a US military operation); or provide such assistance as part of a military operation that does not involve the Armed Forces of the United States.” (United States Code).


9. Assisting Civil Authorities (SSR, Rule of Law Activities)
   a. Assist in SSR.
      (1) For PO to be successful, it is important for the HN to have the will and capability to assume responsibility for security, governance, and development for the local area. This can be complicated when a nation lacks effective institutions and is struggling to remedy many of the problems that necessitated PO. SSR is the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. This reform aims to provide an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civil authority, and responsive to the needs of the public.
      (2) PO forces may be tasked to support SSR to improve the HN’s military and police capacity. The mission may be mandated to help build HN capacity in other sectors. However, HN authorities may demonstrate limited commitment to following the agendas of outsiders.
      (3) SSR is discussed in JP 3-07, appendix C; Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-07 Stability; MCWP 3-03; and DOS Security Sector Reform document located at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/115810.pdf.
   b. Create a Secure and Stable Environment. PO forces endeavor to create a secure environment to set conditions for political, economic, and humanitarian stability
allowing a transition from military to civil control. Units create a secure environment by:

1. Cultivating and sustaining consent for the operation from involved parties through ongoing engagements.
2. Keeping the operation transparent.
3. Liaising key parties and local authorities.
4. Encouraging both parties’ active participation in the peace process.
5. Ensuring the PO force has freedom of movement.
6. Assisting in maintaining law and order.
7. Creating desired effects in the information environment through IO integration of IRCs.

c. Enable the Rule of Law.

1. PO forces seek to create an environment that allows the HN to establish a self-sustaining public law and order system, in accordance with internationally recognized standards. It would respect human rights and freedoms, be operated inside a safe and secure environment.

2. The rule of law is key to legitimate governance. The principle of the rule of law holds that all individuals and institutions, public and private, and the state itself are accountable to the law, which is supreme. The rule of law, in a country, is characterized by just, legal frameworks, public order, accountability to the law, access to justice, and a culture of lawfulness. It requires laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated and are consistent with international human rights principles. The rule of law requires measures to ensure adherence to the principles of the supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in applying the law, separation of powers, participation in decision making, and legal certainty.

3. Civilian organizations have the primary responsibility to work with the HN to train, advise, and support its efforts to establish a viable rule of law system and apparatus (such as a criminal justice system), and facilitate social recovery. However, the PO force may be required to provide limited and focused support, during the initial phases of the operation, until civilian capacity can be developed.

4. The following are considerations for the PO force commander supporting the rule of law:

   a. Include rule of law and public security issues in intelligence preparation of the operational environment.

   b. Establish coordination and information sharing mechanisms. These include:

      • Fusion cells to integrate intelligence from military units.
      • Special gendarmerie-type units.
• Special police units.
• US or UN CIVPOL trainers.
• DOJ advisors.
• HN institutions.
• Security contractors.
• Other public security organizations.

(c) Understand legal constraints and restraints and request clarification, as necessary.

(5) For additional information, see the JCS Handbook For Military Support to Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform; JP 3-07; ADP 3-07 Stability; and MCWP 3-03, Stability Operations.

d. Assist in the Electoral Process and Support the State Authority. PO forces may be called upon to support elections and restoring and extending state authority. For further details on these tasks, refer to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Handbook for Military Support to Governance, Elections, and Media; and JP 3-07.

10. Protecting Civilians and Promoting Human Rights

a. Protecting civilians refers to activities that reduce civilians’ risks from physical violence, secure their rights to access essential services and resources, and contribute to a secure, stable, and just environment over the long-term. Protecting civilians is a moral, legal, and strategic priority during military operations. Communities around the world expect military personnel to protect the population; failure to do so jeopardizes the credibility and legitimacy of an operation and will undermine other objectives.

b. Protecting civilians has military and nonmilitary aspects and may be viewed as a layered set of issues. These include:

(1) Preventing negative effects while conducting operations.
(2) Providing physical protection from imminent violence caused by others.
(3) Providing basic necessities.
(4) Supporting HA delivery.
(5) Protecting human rights.
(6) Ensuring political, economic, and social conditions that enable civilian well-being are adequate.

c. Military forces may perform a supporting role for some civilian protection efforts. In many cases, they will support police and civilian organizations tasked with ensuring civilian protection is effective and lasting.

d. Military forces support civilian protection in two ways. They:
(1) Avoid Civilian Harm. Forces act in accordance with the law of war and other relevant bodies of law to minimize civilian harm during their military operations. Additionally, military forces avoid actions that undermine efforts to improve human security by other actors.

(2) Conduct Deliberate Actions to Protect Civilians. Forces conduct actions intended to mitigate harm to civilians caused by others, including operations intended to create an environment conducive to civilian protection.

e. Protecting civilians in UN PO is structured in accordance with three tiers:

   (1) Providing protection through dialogue and engagement.

   (2) Providing physical protection.

   (3) Establishing a protective environment.

f. Military forces adhere to three fundamentals which support effective civilian protection and encompass a wide variety of potential tasks. They include:

   (1) Understanding civilian risks.

   (2) Protecting civilians during operations.

   (3) Shaping a protective environment.

g. For a detailed discussion on the fundamentals of civilian protection, see JP 3-07.3, appendix B (Protection of Civilians); the Protection of Civilians Military Reference Guide; and ATP 3-07.6, Protection of Civilians.

h. Minimize civil harm during military movements and exercises.

   (1) PO forces have ongoing operational and training requirements that cause them to move in, and among, population centers. This requires careful planning and coordination to minimize harm to civilians. Commanders and staffs are should be sensitive to perceptions of the local populace surrounding all movements or operations.

   (2) Considerations when planning movements, training exercises, or support to civic events, include:

      (a) Protecting property rights of landowners.

      (b) Avoiding damage to structures or vehicles (especially cultural or religious buildings or shrines).

      (c) Observing protocol and practices of the local population.

      (d) Avoiding the potential for civilian casualties.

      (e) Adhering to local national laws.

i. The following information concerns protected areas.

   (1) Commanders may require the PO force to establish and maintain a protected area. A protected area is a geographic area where the military force provides security and facilitates HA for at-risk people. Other names for protected areas include security zone, safe area, and humanitarian zone.
(2) Principles for Protected Areas.
   (a) The commander may force compliance. The PO force uses the appropriate ROE and capability for the situation.
   (b) The local population should perceive the PO force as impartial. This will require a significant IO plan and constant command attention.
   (c) The commander should enforce military prohibitions aggressively within the DMZ.
   (d) The PO force ensures freedom of movement to and from the area.
   (e) The commander uses all means to build consent to eliminate the need for a protected area.

(3) Military Tasks Regarding a Protected Area.
   (a) Establish the protected area.
   (b) Establish and enforce weapons exclusion zones.
   (c) Establish and maintain encampment or quartering areas, and weapons holding areas.
   (d) Dominate avenues of approach.
   (e) Establish CPs, OPs, and other control access measures.
   (f) Establish a curfew.
   (g) Conduct presence patrols.
   (h) Develop and rehearse reinforcement contingency plans.

(4) Planning Principles for Protected Areas.
   (a) The commander provides clear and unambiguous guidance, mission objectives, and criteria for success.
   (b) Political factors significantly influence selecting protected areas. Conduct analyses to determine the feasibility of maintaining a protected area.
   (c) Assign quick response forces (QRFs) and criteria for their employment. Staff and operational forces must understand and rehearse QRF employment.
   (d) Coordinate humanitarian support with NGOs, IGOs, and the HN. Adjust the level of support, accordingly, if the military assists.
   (e) Coordinate and understand the responsibilities for villages and towns within an area.
   (f) Understand the media plan.
   (g) Understand the ROE and rehearse actions which would comply.
   (h) Establish a liaison officer with local law enforcement officials.

j. The following apply to DC support missions.
(1) The term DC is a broad term, used by DOD, that refers to several categories of civilians, such as a displaced person, an evacuee, an IDP, a migrant, a refugee, and a stateless person. UN agencies and NGOs may use different terminology. Legal and political considerations define these categories and some carry specific rights under international humanitarian law. (See JP 3-29.)

(2) HN authorities are responsible for protecting their civilian population, but are often unable or unwilling to support DCs.

(3) Military leaders should be cognizant of DC camps if they have been formally or spontaneously set up. They should note their populations, conditions, and groups controlling them. DC camps provide basic assistance and services to the affected population. When US military support is requested, DC support missions include security; camp organization (basic construction and administration); care (food, supplies, medical treatment, and protection); and placement (movement or relocation to other countries, camps, and locations). An important priority for managing DCs is using non-DOD services and facilities, if possible. DC operations are long-term and require sources that are not available, immediately, through DOD sources.

(4) The UN High Commissioner for Refugees is mandated to lead and coordinate international action to protect refugees worldwide and resolve their problems. Other organizations, such as International Organization for Migration or ICRC, provide expertise in migration, camp coordination, and camp management.

(5) DC situations are defined by population movement. The stages of movement are preflight and flight, arrival, asylum, repatriation, and reintegration.

   (a) Preflight and Flight. Military forces can provide intelligence support to determine the timing, magnitude, and direction of population movement.

   (b) Arrival. Depending on timing and the security at the arrival location, the military may assist international organizations, NGOs, and the HN during the initial arrival of the refugees.

   (c) Repatriation. When conditions in an area improve and the displaced community returns to its native country, military support may be needed for securing repatriation crossing points, screening points, transit sites, and returnee movement to local communities.

   (d) Reintegration. During reintegration, military forces may assist with DCs security as they are absorbed into their communities. This support is critical in the absence of a capable HN public safety establishment, or in the presence of active resistance to resettlement. International CIVPOL assumes primary responsibility for community law and order.

(6) These are six conditions necessary for successful resettlement. They are:

   (a) Security.

   (b) Shelter.
(c) Adequate local infrastructure.
(d) Functioning institutions.
(e) Economic potential.
(f) Voluntary acceptance.

(7) Coordinate the following with UN Agencies, the HN, and NGOs to control population movement. (See ATP 3-57.10, *Civil Affairs Support to Populace and Resources Control*, and ATP 3-57.20/MCRP 3-03A.2 *Multi-Service Techniques for Civil Affairs Support to Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, for detailed information about population control and DC movement operations.)

(a) Selecting Routes. CA personnel, with MPs and the transportation officer, coordinate routes with the international support community.

(b) Marking Routes. Ensure routes are marked in languages and symbols that are easily understood by civilians and US forces and allied forces. Establish control and assembly points at key intersections. Coordinate the locations of these points and include them in the traffic circulation plan.

(c) Establishing Emergency Rest Areas. Humanitarian agencies establish these points. Coordinate with NGOs and determine if water, food, fuel, maintenance, and medical services are available.

11. Supporting FHA Operations

FHA, provided by US forces, is limited in scope and duration. It is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN with the primary responsibility for providing that assistance. FHA may support other USG departments or agencies. DOD is not the lead for FHA. The UN has the lead role, in the international community, to respond to natural and man-made disasters that are beyond the capacity of national authorities. For more information on FHA, see JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*. 
Chapter V
TACTICAL TASKS

1. General

a. Core operational tasks are broken into tactical tasks which support various operational tasks. Like operational tasks, some are primary tasks and form the core of tactical-level PO activities, and some are support tasks in which PO forces may be called upon to assist HN forces or other agencies. See the UN Infantry Battalion Manual, volume I and II, for analogous UN tactical tasks.

b. Commanders must consider, carefully, the political and operational context in which their forces conduct tasks in support of a PO mission. Key considerations in applying PO tasks are:

   (1) Consistently applying the 15 fundamentals of peacekeeping (discussed in JP 3-07.3 and chapter I of this MTTP). Applying these fundamentals may significantly change the force’s approach to traditional activities and operations.

   (2) Recognizing the role of politics, increased restraints on the use of force, implications of a UN mandate, and applying UN peacekeeping principles of consent of the HN, and impartiality. Also, consider not using force except in self-defense or in defense of the UN mandate.

   (3) Recognizing intense interorganizational and multilateral settings in UN-mandated operations.

   (4) Acknowledging the emphasis on protecting civilians.

   (5) Realizing the requirement for applying PO tasks that consider the differences among conflict prevention, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding.

2. Tactical Tasks

a. Primary Tactical Tasks.

   (1) Patrols.

   (2) OPs.

   (3) CPs.

   (4) Outreach and military engagement activities.

   (5) Cordon and search.

   (6) Convoy and escort.

b. Supporting Tactical Tasks.

   (1) Protecting critical infrastructure and assets (site security).

   (2) Managing crowds.

      (a) Populace control measures.

      (b) Curfews.
(3) Detention.

c. Other Tactical Tasks.
   (1) Quick responses to sudden crises.
   (2) Extracting or evacuating PO forces or civilians.

3. Patrols
   a. Patrolling is a core peacekeeping task and can create or support a number of tactical effects required by the commander. It is a means and method to promote a visible presence of the PO force in a mission area. The purposes of patrolling are providing outreach, restoring and maintaining a safe and secure environment, establishing mission credibility and legitimacy, and acting as a deterrence.

   b. PO forces use patrols to create security throughout the AO by their presence within it. PO forces plan and conduct patrols in a manner that supports and strengthens the 15 fundamentals of PO. Forces should conduct routine patrolling to establish a presence, provide security, gather atmospherics among the population, and mitigate outside interference or influence. For further information on patrolling, refer to MCTP 3-01A, Scouting and Patrolling.

4. OPs
   a. A primary means of accomplishing the observing and reporting missions is by using OPs. An OP is the basic working platform for military observation. An OP in PO can be permanent or temporary, static or mobile.

   b. The purposes of OPs are to:
      (1) Demonstrate the presence of the peace force to all parties and the population.
      (2) Enhance confidence in the peace process.
      (3) Monitor, record, and report actions supporting the stipulations of the peace agreements and discourage violations of it.

   c. OP site selection planning consideration criteria answer the following questions. Conduct reconnaissance as required to address these factors.
      (1) What is the purpose of the OP?
      (2) What information requirements will be observed? Which commander’s critical information requirements will be answered?
      (3) What is the duration of the observation?
      (4) What are the manning and logistics requirements?
      (5) Is a QRF required to support the OP?
      (6) Will the OP be overt or covert?
      (7) If it is an overt OP:
          (a) From what distance can the OP site be seen?
(b) How many people will see it?

(8) What observations are tasked?

(9) Where are the opposing parties located?

(10) Where are the borders and frontiers?

(11) Where are the villages and refugees’ or DCs’ camps?

(12) What is the geography of the location?

(13) Where are the access routes?

(14) What tactical and logistical support will be available to the site?

(15) What are the locals’ traffic and movement patterns?

d. Once the OP site is selected, plan and prepare for establishing it.

(1) Inform the conflicting parties and local population of the location and purpose of the OP, as required by the mandate or operations order.

(2) Develop detailed standard operating procedures for the OP, including tasks, contingency plans, and QRF requirements.

(3) Obtain materials for construction and FP.

(4) Coordinate construction support, as required.

(5) Conduct a risk assessment of the site.

e. Establish the OP.

(1) Establish communication.

(2) Occupy the site.

(3) Establish FP measures.

(4) Clearly, mark the location as required by the mandate or operations order.

(5) Rehearse reaction force responses.

f. Improve the OP.

(1) Continue to improve the position.

(2) Maintain contact and an active information program with the local community and dissenting parties.

(3) Maintain constant, reliable, redundant, and secure communications with the next higher authority and other OPs, as the situation dictates. Reporting activities timely, is the key to success. Plan for communication security.

g. The type and amount of equipment and support depends on the mission and the following guidelines.

(1) Maintain sufficient observation equipment to support a 24-hour mission.

(2) Keep sufficient supplies on hand to sustain the OP if it is cut off from support. This includes Class I (food), Class III (fuels, petroleum, oils, and lubricants),
Class IV (construction materials), and Class V (ammunition). The unit commander determines levels of each class.

(3) Locate firefighting and first aid material onsite.

(4) Provide power and lighting support, if necessary.

(5) Provide signs and identification markings.

h. C2 of OPs.

(1) Establish clear lines of C2, especially with a multinational OP.

(2) Conduct reaction drills ensuring everyone understands the authorities and responsibilities of the OP. This includes a media plan addressing informational content for any type of crisis.

(3) Understand the ROE and rehearse actions which would comply.

(4)

5. CPs

a. Establish CPs to control, regulate, and verify movement, enforce BZs, and prevent movement of illegal items (e.g., weapons or drugs) or persons.

b. There are two types of CPs: deliberate and hasty. Position all CPs in locations where walking and mounted traffic cannot easily bypass them.

(1) Deliberate CP.

(a) A deliberate CP is a fixed position constructed and employed to protect or control access to an operating base camp, a main supply route, existing borders or frontiers (internationally recognized), cease fire lines, infiltration routes, towns and villages, or any vital ground. Deliberate CPs are associated with fixed- or semi-fixed structures (e.g., guard shacks or barriers). When planning the location of a deliberate CP, consider road network and traffic patterns in and out of the AO by one or more of the belligerent parties.

(b) Establish deliberate CPs where unit personnel can observe and react to traffic in a timely fashion. Conduct a thorough reconnaissance of the area determining if a shift in the CP location is required. Unlike the traditional warfighting scenario, clearly mark CPs in a PO for easy recognition from the ground and air. This practice applies to OPs, but it is important for CPs because belligerents frequently set up illegal CPs.

(2) Hasty CP.

(a) Units activate a hasty CP as part of a larger tactical plan or in reaction to hostile activities, and can close the CP on the command of the controlling headquarters. A hasty CP always has a specific task and purpose. Hasty CPs are effective because belligerents do not know when and where PO forces will establish them.
(b) Based on information received from OPs, other units, patrols, or the local populace, a hasty CP is established where suspected mandate or treaty violations occur. A unit can establish a mobile CP on short notice (within 30 to 60 minutes). Units set up hasty CPs to achieve surprise, similar to a CIVPOL speed trap. It is important to clearly mark the CP, however, units establish hasty CPs where they cannot be seen by approaching traffic until it is too late for traffic to withdraw. Ideal locations immediately follow a hairpin turn or other concealing terrain features.

c. Collocating CPs and OPs is an effective technique in PO. Terrain features or fields of observation that preclude the relocation of the OP to a CP site determine the location of an OP. Collocating the OP and CP increases security for both. Organizing a combined OP and CP, conserves forces, equipment, and facility considerations (e.g., communication equipment, generators, shelters, water tanks, showers, or latrines).

d. The frequency of checks and CP locations are part of a cease-fire agreement. Alternating the CP type of search is important. Total- and spot-check methods are effective, because incoming traffic is unaware which procedure is being used. Categorize CP operations as individual personnel checks or vehicle checks. Further categorize operations by method of search.

   (1) Total checks involve searching everyone passing through the CP. This form of checking is resource-intensive (time and personnel) and is performed only in selected circumstances, such as when the CP is located on borders, frontiers, or cease-fire lines.

   (2) Spot checks refer to searching only a certain number of persons or vehicles. The remainder pass freely, stop briefly for questioning, or show their identification cards. Over a period of time, spot checks are effective in curtailing illegal people or material movement in the AO. This method conserves resources compared with the total-check method.

e. Reliable communications among each CP, higher headquarters, and adjacent units is important for a variety of reasons, including advanced warning of vehicles attempting to force passage. Unit standard operating procedures should cover communication requirements.

f. For more information on CPs see ATP 3-39.30, *Security and Mobility Support*; and MCTP 3-01A, *Scouting and Patrolling*.

6. Outreach and Military Engagement Activities

a. Military engagement is the routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the US and those of another nation’s armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence (per the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms). Engagements may occur as chance, face-to-face meetings while on a patrol in a local village, or as scheduled meetings with HN government or military leaders. As a supporting activity in CMO and IO in PO, commanders and staffs must understand and integrate multidisciplinary
perspectives (e.g., sociocultural, medical, religious, or gender) to address civil-societal needs and problems and drivers of conflict and instability.

Note: Also, chance and scheduled engagements are referred to as Soldier and leader engagements (Army) and key leader engagements.

b. To employ engagement activities and provide guidance, commanders and their staff must conduct a thorough civil considerations analysis, develop key narratives and messaging, and ensure all military personnel understand them.

c. Properly planned and conducted engagements:

(1) Establish or maintain relationships with relevant entities.

(2) Enhance civil and military cooperation.

(3) Provide information to influence attitudes, perceptions, and behavior. Provide a venue for building relationships, resolving conflict, conveying information, calming fears, and refuting rumors, lies, or incorrect information.

(4) Help build a common operating picture between civil and military actors.

(5) Convey the commander’s decisions for future operations.

(6) Further the national security interests of the US and the HN.

(7) Shape the operational and informational environments to influence the outcome of operations.

(8) Deny the adversary the support of the population.

d. The following are principles of engagement and characterize effectively conducting engagements in support of operations. They must be:

(1) Consistent. Engagements must be consistent and communicate the same meaning as other PO force activities. When audiences perceive the engagement dialogue (words) as being inconsistent with observable behavior (actions), the US, US leaders, and individual Service members lose credibility.

(2) Culturally Attuned. Engagements must be conducted in the context of local cultural customs, beliefs, and methods of communicating. This builds understanding and cooperation while mitigating insensitivities and mistrust.

(a) Developing messages, unilaterally, from US cultural perspectives and translating them into the local languages may be ineffective, or destructive. Much may be lost in translation or conflict with local views and norms.

(b) Trust (at personal, team, and organizational levels) is earned differently in different cultures based on the predominant cultural attributes and norms. The following are three types of cultures.

- Achievement oriented cultures may grant credibility and trust based on demonstrated competence, credentials, or level of expertise. They may expect to get right down to business, without pleasantries, and expect every agreement to be bound by a written contract.
• Relationship oriented cultures may expect to invest a significant amount of time in, seemingly, unrelated discussions or activities focused on developing a relationship with the other party, the basis of their trust. They may become offended by a “getting down to business” approach. Often, their word is more important than a written contract. Though, at first it might seem these types of interactions require more time and effort, once the relationship and trust are established, subsequent agreements may be as simple as giving one’s word.

• Cultures may be anywhere between these two extremes. Multiple cultures, with significantly different norms, may exist in the same country, which further highlights the importance of developing a thorough understanding of the local cultures.

(c) Leveraging key leaders or actors from target audiences allows units to draw on their familiarity and credibility with these audiences. It increases the likelihood that an interaction will inform or influence audiences, as desired. Units must balance using these individuals against security concerns.

(3) Adaptive. Operational adaptability is the ability to respond to a changing operating environment with appropriate, flexible, and timely actions. Successful engagements depend on adaptability, and rely on leaders’ abilities to rapidly adjust to evolving situations.

(4) Credible. Successful engagements depend on credibility. A fundamental criterion for credibility is the degree of confidence a population has in forces with whom they interact. Credibility results from an observable, sustained, and consistent pattern of true words and principled deeds attuned to the local culture. Openness and transparency, with consideration for OPSEC, are fundamental to this effort.

(5) Balanced. A balanced approach to engagements helps ensure both parties benefit from an event. Engagement efforts have to be balanced between the inclination to create the desired effect and the requirement to listen actively and understand the other’s point of view. A perception that an audience’s ideas are irrelevant, disrespected, and marginalized may prove to be a significant obstacle to future engagements and achieving a commander’s intent.

(6) Pragmatic. Leaders must have a realistic, “down to earth” approach to engagements. Participants in a pragmatic engagement accept the unpredictable nature of personal interactions and communications and operate with realistic expectations. HN officials do not always act in the people’s best interest due to corruption, incompetence, or both; and, at times, may be uncooperative. Leaders should accept prudent risks and understand that small setbacks may occur. Leaders cannot control how others interpret messages and actions.

e. CMO.

(1) Within PO, CMO foster a cooperative relationship between PO forces and indigenous populations and institutions in the operational area (see JP 3-57). Tactical-level CMO include support of local-level stakeholders and promoting the
legitimacy and effectiveness of the US presence and operations among locals. At the same time, tactical-level CMO minimizes friction between military and civilian organizations in the field. These operations include local security operations, processing and moving DCs, project management and nomination, civil reconnaissance, civil engagement, and basic health service support.

(2) Properly executed, CMO tactical actions provide an environment that enables military commanders, at all levels of command, to achieve the unified action objectives of PO. The UN Policy book, Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC 2010.02), outlines the UN’s approach to CMO. It states that, in a peacekeeping context, UN civil-military coordination is a military staff function that facilitates the interface between military and civilian components of the mission, and humanitarian and development actors in the AO. For NATO, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is coordination and cooperation in support of the mission, between the NATO commander and civil actors. This includes national populations and local authorities and national and NGOs and agencies. CMO, supported by civil affairs operations (CAO), are an information-related capability when integrated with other IRCs, and provide the commander the ability to affect the operational environment.

(3) At the tactical level, timely and effective coordination (with all relevant stakeholders) is essential for mission success. To compare US and UN approaches, see the Peace Operations Training Institute guide, Civil-Military Coordination in Peace Operations.

(4) Establishing committees and action groups supports coordination and robust liaison with agencies and organizations involved in the operational area and builds respect for their roles and missions. Commanders assist in coordinating activities by creating a civil-military operations center or a NATO civil-military cooperation center that is a potent resource for tactical-level commanders to effect coordination and ensure unity of effort. (For more information, see NATO CIMIC Field Handbook, 3rd Edition 2012 at the Civil-Military Cooperation Center for Excellence).

f. CMO shape the operational and information environments and achieve the commander’s intent and desired end state.

g. A complete discussion of CMO and related functions is in JP 3-57; Field Manual (FM) 3-57, Civilian Affairs Operations; and MCTP 3-03A, Marine Air Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations. Commanders and staffs use the CA area assessment and study contained in ATP 3-57.20/MCRP 3-03A.2, as the basis for all planning analysis and mission execution.

h. The following are CMO objectives.

(1) CMO activities establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships among military forces, governmental and civilian organizations, authorities, and the civilian populace. These relationships may be in a friendly, neutral, or threat operational area and facilitate military operations and achieve US operational
objectives. Military forces perform CMO activities and functions which are the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or after other military actions. They also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Designated CA units, other military forces, or a combination of CA and other forces, perform CMO.

(2) CA personnel conduct CAO in support of CMO, and provide expertise in:

(a) Populace and resources control (PRC).

(b) FHA.

(c) Civil information management (which is the process whereby civil information is gathered, analyzed, and entered into a central database). It contributes to the common operational picture and unified action.

(d) For a complete list of CA core competencies, see FM 3-57 and MCTP 3-03A.

7. Cordon and Search

a. There is a continuous need to employ search procedures. A search is systematic reconnaissance of a defined area so all parts of the area have passed within visibility. A search can orient on people, material, buildings, or terrain.

b. Establishing a cordon prevents withdrawal from, or reinforcement to, a search area by targeted individuals. Cordon implies occupying or controlling terrain, especially mounted and dismounted avenues of approach.

c. In PO, a cordon and search operation is launched on specific information and designed to secure and isolate a location to accomplish an objective. For instance, it may be used to search locations or subjects suspected of hiding contraband, or to locate civilian personnel being held against their will.

d. In the context of PKO, searches should include a messaging plan to inform the public and minimize misinformation and rumors. Do not use force during searches, except in self-defense and to protect own troops, property, and civilians, in compliance with ROE and the PO mandate.

e. The purpose of a search is to send a clear signal that attempts to ignore applying regulations and laws will not be accepted. A search also increases the stability in an area by removing weapons or other warlike stores that can be used against civilians, parties to the conflict, or PO personnel. Military peacekeepers engaging in cordon and search operations adhere to human rights standards and have a clear understanding of applicable laws, acceptable courses of action, and effective tactics.

f. Cordons and searches are covered in-depth in multiple Service manuals. PO forces are expected to adapt Service tactics, techniques, and procedures to ensure actions are aligned with the 15 fundamentals of PO. (See ATP 3-21.11, SBCT Infantry Rifle Company.)
8. Convoy and Escort
   a. PO forces organize convoys to ensure the safe movement of forces, supplies, humanitarian aid; and support or escort for civilian or commercial movement authorized or required to implement a peace agreement or mandate. The composition of security escorts depends on the threat, size of the convoy, and forces available.
   b. Maneuver forces will be tasked with conducting convoy operations throughout all phases of PO. (For more information on convoy operations and security, refer to JP 4-09, Distribution Operations; and ATP 4-01.45/MCRP 3-40F.7/AFTTP 3-2.58 MTTP for Tactical Convoy Operations.)

9. Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Assets (Site Security)
   a. PO forces may be required to provide site security at various locations within their AO. Units, at these sites, shape and manage the messages their presence sends. These include:
      (1) Religious sites (e.g., mosques, temples, churches, or shrines).
      (2) War crime sites.
      (3) Governmental buildings.
      (4) Election sites.
      (5) Schools.
      (6) Culturally or historically significant sites.
   b. Commanders conduct a joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment and determine which sites require security. Based on threat conditions and available forces, the commander conducts a risk assessment and determines what security is required.
   c. The type of site requiring security determines the amount of coordination required with local authorities, owners, NGOs, and international organizations. School and church officials may assist guards at entrances during periods of high volume (e.g., start and end of the school day or scheduled services). Sites with limited access, such as war-crimes sites, may require entrance rosters.

10. Crowd Management
    a. Crowd management is a sensitive operation requiring human rights compliance, training, equipment, and clear C2 arrangements to manage a calibrated and appropriate response to a potentially volatile situation. It is important to allow a crowd the legitimate expression of views while preventing violence, casualties, and collateral damage.
    b. US forces may be faced with crowd management in four types of situations, when:
       (1) Charged with securing the perimeter of the tactical area of operation within which the host-nation’s or UN’s police are managing public order.
(2) The situation is beyond the control of the host-nation’s or UN’s police and has evolved into public disorder.

(3) The host-nation’s or UN’s police are unavailable or present and cannot reach the area in a reasonable period of time.

(4) Called upon to protect UN staff, facilities, equipment, installations, or institutions.

c. Crowd management is followed by civil police legal action, which may be reflected in procedures like criminal case registration, arrests, search and seizure, and subsequent prosecution in court. Civil and UN police are trained and equipped to handle these activities and US military commanders should use this expertise wherever necessary. (See the UN Infantry Battalion Manual, volumes I and II for more information.)

d. Populace Control Measures.

(1) Populace control measures implemented during PO directly support reestablishing a safe and secure environment, and set conditions for progress towards a long-term political settlement. The authority to impose populace control measures originates from the political mandate that established the force and is refined by mission-specific ROE.

(2) Populace control measures include identification cards, biometrics and databases, barrier systems, curfews, and population movement restrictions (such as travel passes, control points, licensing, and vehicle registration).

(3) Using NLWs may enhance the PO force’s ability to respond, appropriately, to civil disturbances and afford the commander options when containing and deescalating situations.

(4) The threat of civil disturbances during PO may be high. How the PO forces handle incidents may have a decisive effect on mission accomplishment. Poorly handled reactions to civil disturbances can quickly escalate situations out of control, with potential long-term negative effects for the mission. Conversely, a well-handled situation leads to an enhanced view of the PO force’s discipline and professionalism, and may result in fewer incidents.

(5) For further information on populace control measures and civil disturbances, refer to JP 3-57; ATP 3-39.33, Civil Disturbances; ATP 3-57.10; and ATP 3-57.20/MCRP 3-03A.2. For further information on using NLWs in response to civil disturbances, refer to ATP 3-22.40/MCTP 10-10A [MCWP 3-15.8]/NTTP 3-07.3.2/AFTTP 3-2.45/CGMTTP 3-93.2, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Employment of Nonlethal Weapons.

e. Curfew.

(1) Commanders use curfews to:

(a) Reestablish control after rioting and serious disturbances.

(b) Prevent civil movement in a selected area while conducting a search or incident investigation.
(c) Disrupt hostile groups by making individuals’ movement difficult.  

(2) Commanders impose general curfews over a wide, clearly defined, area (e.g., a city, district, or region) or restrict them to a small area (e.g., a town center, housing estate, or series of streets). Work with HN civil authorities to establish and enforce curfews, rather than imposing them unilaterally. The area size and curfew duration depend on the situation.

11. Detention  

a. Sometimes, PO forces are required (under the terms of their mandates) to detain people by applying mission-specific, military ROE or police directives on the use of force.

b. Detention involves keeping an individual, population, or group in custody who poses a threat to military operations. MPs may be tasked with detaining, interning, and confining detainees (e.g., enemy combatants, civilian internees, or retained persons). MP units are tasked with coordinating shelter, protection, accountability, and sustainment for detainees.

c. The detention operations discipline ensures the humane treatment of all detainees and is of significant tactical and strategic importance. In any conflict involving US forces, safe and humane treatment of detainees is required by international law. Respect for individual human rights and humanitarian concerns are the bases for the Geneva Conventions and the Law of Armed Conflict. These codify the ideal that even in the most trying circumstances, US forces are bound to treat others with dignity. Failure to conduct detainee operations in a humane manner and according to international law can result in significant adverse strategic impacts for the US military.

d. The Army is the DOD executive agent for detainee operations and for long-term confinement of US military prisoners. Detention operations is addressed under the protection warfighting function (see ADP 3-37, Protection; and FM 3-39, Military Police Operations, 26 August 2013).

12. Quick Response to Sudden Crises  

a. Commanders ensure the PO force maintains a rapid-reaction capability, such as a quick response force, that is able to deploy on short notice.

b. PO forces should maintain a dedicated, task oriented, tactical group at each major operating location, as well as a central QRF at the battalion level as a reserve for quick response. QRFs should maintain operational readiness for instantaneous action. They should be grouped with adequate mobility and operational capability, including enablers.
13. Extracting PO Forces or Evacuating Civilians

a. Extraction.

(1) The PO force may be confronted with, or tasked for, extracting military peacekeepers, UN personnel, or civilians (e.g., personnel from international organizations, NGOs, or HNs) who are detained, taken hostage, or under imminent threat of physical violence. In such situations, the force is required, subject to the ROE, to ensure rapid and spontaneous action to safeguard and extricate the military member or associated personnel. To initiate an extraction operation:

(a) Mobilize the appropriate force level to the place of the incident/action.
(b) Negotiate a release (if appropriate).
(c) Isolate, contain, and dominate the location.
(d) Conduct a physical extraction by military means, according to ROE and guidelines on the use of force.
(e) Conduct an organized move out from the location.

(2) For detailed information, see ATP 3-50.10/MCRP 3-05.3/NTTP 3-57.6/AFTTP 3-2.90, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For Personnel Recovery.

b. Evacuation.

(1) PO forces may be required to evacuate civilians from conflict areas or other situations in which they are at risk. The evacuation could be for short or extended periods of time.

(2) The evacuees could include all civilians in the area or members of a particular group (such as humanitarian workers, third-country nationals, or members of an ethnic group). An operation may entail ground evacuation to a safe haven several miles away, or it may be a complex endeavor using multiple modes of transportation to other countries. In some cases, all evacuees will be transported at once; while in others, small groups will have to be shuttled because of a shortage of available transportation. Diplomatic negotiations, which could lead to an event (such as a temporary ceasefire), may provide the time and conditions required to evacuate large numbers of civilians. An evacuation could occur under hostile or permissive circumstances, and may be structured in the following phases.

(a) Phase I: Preparatory Operations. Prior to a mission, intelligence is gathered. The evacuation force and supporting logistics are assembled and prepared. Planning, training, and rehearsals are conducted. Notifications are made and other administrative preparations are accomplished.

(b) Phase II: Insertion Operations. The evacuation force is deployed (including forcible entry if necessary, as well as other operations to shape the environment). Forces will ensure necessary sites are secured.
(c) Phase III: Evacuation Operations. Evacuees are assembled, marshaled, and transported to an intermediate staging base (ISB) or a final reception center at a safe haven.

(3) A military force may be responsible for the overall operation or other organizations may be in control once evacuees have departed from the risk area. An ISB may be appropriate to stage units and evacuation resources or remove evacuees from immediate risk and free transportation assets to return, quickly, for more civilians. Civilian organizations (such as national embassies or international organizations) may be involved in an evacuation, also. Ensure responsibilities, authorities, and command relations are understood beforehand. The civilian organizations will determine who should be evacuated.

(4) US PO forces may be called upon to support large-scale evacuations of US personnel as a NEO (see JP 3-68).
Chapter VI
CONFLICT RESOLUTION

1. Conflict Resolution

a. For the purposes of this MTTP publication, conflict resolution includes techniques that help military members resolve situations with a mutual agreement. Knowledge of these techniques does not qualify a military member to act as a hostage negotiator or a negotiator for international, national, or regional agreements. Those types of situations require specific expertise and legal statuses beyond the scope of PO activities. A military member having foundational understanding of conflict resolution may be of value during engagement operations or can enable a military member to make unbiased recommendations for key leadership.

b. There are three basic methods for reaching an agreement: negotiation, mediation, and arbitration.

   1. Negotiation is when disputing parties reach an agreement by directly conferring, discussing, and bargaining.

   2. Mediation is when disputing parties reach decisions with the assistance of a neutral third party.

   3. Arbitration is a method whereby a neutral party makes the final decision for the disputing parties.

c. When working a disagreement between parties, military members must keep the following three principles in mind.

   1. Remember, negotiations are a trust management process more than a task management process. The level of trust will influence which techniques and negotiation strategies should be pursued. Where trust is low or lacking, assess whether trust levels can be increased or established. If they need improvement, determine how to increase them to help foster collaborative efforts.

   2. Understand what the intended outcome should be. Depending on the situation and cultural norms, the outcome might be as simple, and basic, as a verbal agreement or handshake to work on the issue more as time passes. However, it could be an outcome where the problem is solved with a detailed, written contract that includes the obligations and expectations of both parties.

   3. Actively manage the people and the process. Negotiation is a dynamic process, and cannot be completed by following a checklist of activities. Planning is key, but so is being aware of the context and the people involved. So, as conditions change during a negotiation, military members can make adjustments and adapt the negotiation strategy to the situation.

d. Examples of conflict resolutions requiring military personnel include:

   1. Convincing local leaders to implement a stay-put policy, preventing displaced civilians from relocating during combat operations.
(2) Building consensus with competing vendors who disagree with HN support contracts.

(3) Assisting former belligerent people in resolving relocation agreements during post-hostility operations.

(4) Deconflicting military FHA activities with those of NGOs and IOs.

e. A successfully negotiated agreement must meet the prioritized interests of the parties involved and should be fair, efficient, wise, and enduring.

(1) Fairness implies treating all sides equitably.

(2) Efficiency refers to producing a desired outcome with minimum effort.

(3) Wisdom pertains to following a sound course of action that appeals to the rational and emotional expectations of the parties involved.

(4) Endurance refers to the agreement’s durability. With an adequate level of trust, an agreement will withstand the inevitable problems that arise during its execution.

2. Conflict Resolution Training

a. Conflict resolution training in negotiation, mediation, and arbitration is essential for military leaders at all levels. CA personnel are instrumental in this area, but the nature of PO means all leaders need effective conflict resolution skills to accomplish the mission.

b. Leaders need to build a conceptual foundation for conflict management and resolution. Conceptual skills help them analyze and select the correct approaches when dealing with conflicts. Ideally, organizations participating in PO will include conflict resolution education as part of leader development prior to a deployment. Commanders, staff officers, and selected leaders benefit from this type of training. Military training centers also offer training opportunities for resolving specific types of conflicts.

c. The following institutions provide expertise in the various types of conflict resolution. Instructors are available to travel to units. Additionally, some courses are available online.

(1) The Air Force Negotiation Center (AFNC), located at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, recognizes that adaptive negotiations are a key leadership skill. The AFNC researches, designs, and delivers in-residence and distance learning products and programs. The programs are culturally adaptable, negotiation and mediation methods and techniques which help foster collaborative relationships, build partnerships, and find interagency solutions. The AFNC program is practitioner oriented. The AFNC also publishes the “Practical Guide to Negotiating in the Military”, which can be found online. More information see http://www.au.af.mil/au/culture/NCE/, contact the center by e-mail at AFCLC.NCE.MAILBOX@us.af.mil, or call (334) 953-9544.

(2) The West Point Negotiation Project is located at the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, and conducts negotiations training at its facility
3. Negotiation

a. Negotiation involves direct discussions among disputing parties at all levels. Negotiations require tact, diplomacy, honesty, open-mindedness, patience, fairness, effective communications, cross-cultural sensitivity, and careful planning to build consensus.

b. Commanders, and their subordinates, frequently serve as negotiators during PO. Examples include: negotiating for the right of passage; bartering for facility, buildings, roads, and services usage; negotiating peaceful agreements between hostile factions; or seeking compliance with a curfew without using force. Military leaders who facilitate discussions between parties must remain neutral, when possible, to stimulate option building. They understand the desired outcome also must be consistent with the unit’s mission and objectives.

c. When military members are parties in a negotiation, the other parties see them as competitors who are not disinterested parties. If military members surrender
impartiality and their actions become suspect, it is difficult to overcome suspicion and mistrust, even by subsequent representatives or US actions.

d. Negotiations are exercises in discovering suitable alternatives to a current situation. The discovery process must be tempered by being attuned to cultural differences and expectations. The following four considerations guide preparations for negotiations.

(1) Understand the broad issues of the conflict. Leaders must understand these and their changing nature. They must maintain a dialogue with all parties, groups, organizations, and civil authorities and work to prevent any single incident from destroying that dialogue (even if force is applied). Creating a hostile atmosphere does not lead to a resolution.

(2) Get input from the disputing parties. Negotiation is a discovery process to discern the other side’s concerns and priorities, as well as a potential method to advance US interests through jointly decided actions. Optimally, both parties should cooperate, but negotiators must anticipate, and have plans to get beyond, impasse situations.

(3) Assess each party’s alternatives to a negotiated settlement.

(4) Be attuned to direct and indirect communications styles, attitudes toward power and authority, and expectations of risk. Also, be attuned to parties’ perception regarding control of their destiny, the importance of interpersonal relationships, time management, and what it means to reach an “agreement”. The negotiating parties’ culture shapes how they reason, what they accept as fact, and what principles they apply to decision making. Words and actions have different connotations to members of other cultures. At meetings, nonverbal behaviors (such as symbolic rituals or protocols) are important.

e. For successful negotiations, the process should adhere to the following guidelines.

(1) Establish trust.

(2) Identify common (or complementary) ground for building meaningful dialogue.

(3) Set preferred goals and objectives, but be aware that different cultures vary in their expectations as to what negotiations should, or can, accomplish.

(4) Set a clear and reasonable code of conduct for the negotiation process, but make accommodations for local conditions and cultural norms.

(5) Develop a plan and diagram the results of it. Be ready to adjust the plan as the negotiations unfold.

(6) Determine the composition of the negotiating forum and decision-making mechanisms.

(7) Seek a neutral venue, but expect those negotiating on the opposite side might seek environmental and cultural conditions more in their favor.
(8) Be ready to implement own-side’s part of the agreement. Have a back-up plan in case the opposite side varies from the apparent agreement.

4. Mediation

a. Mediation is a structured process in which a qualified, neutral agent assists parties in resolving a conflict. The neutral party employs principals to help the parties negotiate a mutually beneficial solution.

b. Mediation is part of the alternative dispute resolution “spectrum”. (See figure 4.) A mediation uses a third party neutral, or facilitator, who assists the parties, allowing them to retain control over the outcome. The mediator supports the parties in their effort to come up with a solution that is mutually beneficial.

c. During a mediation, it is essential the mediator uses problem solving techniques focusing on interests, not positions. Positions are predetermined outcomes or demands that the parties believe would resolve the dispute in their favor. Focusing on positions greatly increases the chances of an impasse and significantly limits options for a mutually agreeable solution. In contrast, interests are the underlying reasons a party is aspiring to a position. To help determine interests, mediators use a series of critical-thinking questions. The goal is to help the parties understand their own interests, through an open exchange of information, thus creating an environment that allows the parties to create options for mutual gain. As interests are revealed, prioritized, and developed into an agreement, mediators use objective criteria to ensure legitimacy.

d. The agreement should not conflict with goals of the USG. The mediator should not represent the aspirations of the disputing parties. Mediator bias could exist, but should be tempered to further the goals of lasting peace, stability, and cooperation within the framework of the military commander’s intent and international agreements.

e. The following are considerations for mediation.
   (1) The US military mediator assumes there may be some level of distrust between the parties. Numerous groups or individuals may hamper attempts to establish peace, either actively or passively. The mediator should attempt to understand all positions, but should not advocate for the aims or goals of any
party. Keeping an impartial or neutral position helps reduce the likelihood of animosity and aggression directed at US forces or civilian organizations.

(2) The mediator should anticipate participants' behavior and be prepared to outline possible outcomes if mediation fails. Use caution. Giving the appearance of losing one's neutrality carries the risk of upsetting a participant. The goal is to prevent long-term friction through effective communication.

d. During mediation, the mediator may speak with one party at a time, attempting to find common ground among the parties. This is called a caucus and is used to allow more direct questioning. The same direct questioning, in a joint session, could give the perception of favoritism. Also, mediators should address the following items.

(1) Mediator Best Practices. Mediators provide practical assistance to all parties by passing messages; providing a hot line; or securing a safe, practical venue for a meeting or discussion. Mediators also ensure the parties understand the meaning of an agreement and the resulting obligations of the international community and participating parties when implementing the agreement.

(2) Incentives and Disincentives. Mediators support mediation by identifying a comprehensive range of incentives and disincentives, which encourage positive steps and dissuade parties from taking action detrimental to the peace effort. This “carrot and stick” approach varies according to circumstances. Identifying effective incentives and disincentives is a vital part of in the preparatory stage. Maintain neutrality by discussing issues in a private meeting or caucus.

(3) Languages. The mediator places a premium on having basic foreign language skills. For most tactical-level mediations, a commander and subordinates work through interpreters. This improves through training. Using locally recruited interpreters provides a short-term solution; however, commanders should not rely on them indefinitely. There are pitfalls to using local interpreters (e.g., ethnic identification, political orientation, or social standing). Local interpreters may cause unintended consequences because military members can never be sure if the interpreter is working with the PO force or has an alternative agenda. In the long term, PO negotiations and mediations require the military commander to emphasize language training for the peace forces.

(4) Location. The mediator conducts meetings and negotiations at a site viewed as neutral by both parties. If individuals negotiate on their “home turf” there could be the perception that they have the upper hand. Mediators often use:

(a) UN locations.

(b) Embassies.

(c) Other neutral sites.

(5) Additional Location Factors. Beyond selecting a neutral location, mediators consider the following factors when choosing a mediation site:

(a) Security. Forces are physically able to secure the venue with protection provided by the host authorities or another agency.
(b) Accessibility. Do not waste time traveling to remote venues unless this promotes either secrecy or a positive approach to the negotiations.

(c) Communications. If necessary, provide communications for parties to liaise with their authorities.

(d) Comfort. During protracted negotiations, ensure a basic level of comfort to facilitate a successful outcome.

(6) Techniques. Do the following to optimize the mediation process.

(a) Identify the decision makers at negotiations.

(b) Use and exploit the media during and after negotiations.

(c) Maintain secrecy and confidentiality.

(d) Recognize political and military parties to the negotiation.

(e) Use interpreters and translators.

(7) Competencies. Effective mediators develop competencies in conflict management, the dynamics of conflict, verbal communications skills, and cultural awareness. Additional information is available from the Air Force Mediation Compendium, 4th Edition.

5. Arbitration

a. Arbitration is a formal process of conflict resolution in which an appointing authority (commander), or representative, appoints or designates a neutral party to oversee a conflict resolution procedure. Parties with opposing views meet to resolve their differences in a formal setting similar to the less formal methods of negotiation and mediation. The central goal of arbitration is resolving controversy among parties after negotiation or mediation efforts fail.

b. Arbitration is a method of conflict resolution where military members judge and make decisions that adversely affect one or more parties. Military members conduct arbitration at a higher level than the other forms of conflict resolution. Gaining adherence to the arbitrator’s decision may be difficult. Without mutual support for the decision, the local military commander loses influence with the party who feels slighted by the decision.

c. At the outset of the conflict resolution process, the parties in the dispute agree formally and in writing (if culturally acceptable), to the arbitration process as the chosen means of conflict resolution. This includes agreeing to the appointment of an arbitrator, abiding by the rules and procedures of the arbitration proceeding, and agreeing to respect and comply with the final decision of the arbitrator. Appointment to this position by a key leader whom both parties find agreeable adds to the arbitrator’s credibility and helps support the overall decision.

d. The arbitrator convenes sessions or hearings necessary to document the arguments of the opposing parties, listens to witnesses’ testimonies, and reviews all evidence. At the conclusion of the arbitration hearing, the arbitrator renders a final decision based on the facts presented by the parties. The arbitrator also prepares a
written decision, complete with a summary of the evidence supporting the decision, and provides the final decision to the appointing authority and parties in dispute. The guiding principle of arbitration is that the decision of the arbitrator is final.

e. Two forms of arbitration are binding and nonbinding:

(1) Binding arbitration refers to situations where local representatives agree to comply with the arbitrator's decision before the proceedings.

(2) Nonbinding arbitration refers to situations where parties are not compelled to comply with the arbitrator's decision.

f. The arbitration procedure is a useful tool in reaching finality, resolving complex issues, answering unusual questions, or reconciling matters where the parties reach an impasse. Important considerations in arbitration are:

(1) Recognizing its structured nature.

(2) Selecting an impartial and trained arbitrator.

(3) Each party begin willing to accept the finality of the arbitrator’s decision-making power.

(4) Recognizing the formal nature of the arbitration process (i.e., adherence to strict rules and procedures).
Appendix A

OTHER KEY US STAKEHOLDERS

1. United States Embassy

a. The Department of State is represented overseas by United States (US) Embassies. In an embassy, the chief of mission (COM) is an ambassador who serves as the personal representative of the President and the Secretary of State. As the principal officer in the embassy, the COM oversees all US government programs and interactions within the host nation (HN) and is charged with the operations and security of the mission and all its employees. The COM has full responsibility for directing, coordinating, and supervising all Department of Defense (DOD) personnel on official duty in the country, regardless of their employment categories or location, except those under command of a US area military commander or on the staff of an international organization. The COM chairs the embassy’s country team, which meets on a weekly basis to discuss and coordinate all activities within the mission.

b. The Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) serves as the chief of staff of the embassy and manages the daily operations of the embassy staff. In matters that cross agency lines within the country team, the DCM coordinates and facilitates decisions or recommendations to the COM. In the temporary absence of the ambassador, or during an interim period between ambassadors, the DCM assumes the temporary title of Chargé d’Affaires.

c. The COM, at each US embassy, heads the team of US government personnel (collectively known as the “country team”). The country team is a cooperative, coordinated, and well-informed staff by which a diplomatic mission comes together. A country team’s organization depends on embassy size and the nature of US interests in a country, with some including over forty agencies. Figure 5 depicts a country team organization.

   1. The political officer, or the political-military officer, is located within the embassy’s political section. This officer deals with domestic politics, human rights, external relations, international organizations, political and military issues, labor, and narcotics. Primarily, the political office is responsible for human rights vetting for international military training provided by the US.

   2. The regional security officer (RSO) has overall responsibility for security, antiterrorism, and force protection (FP) for all personnel under the authority of the COM and is responsible for the embassy’s emergency action plan. The RSO supervises the Marine Security Guard Detachment.

   3. The economic section can provide valuable information on the host country’s economy and budget. It supports military purchases and deals with trade, import/export, environment, science and technology, agriculture, energy, and communications issues.
(4) The consular operations section issues immigrant and nonimmigrant visas and provides American citizen services, such as determining citizenship; replacing lost or stolen passports; and assisting with federal benefits, arrests, deaths, and notary services.

(5) The public affairs section coordinates media, cultural, and education programs. Its leader is the primary spokesperson for the mission. All significant military events should be coordinated with the embassy public affairs section.

d. The senior defense official/defense attaché (SDO/DATT) is the COM’s principal military adviser and the senior DOD military officer assigned to a US diplomatic mission. The SDO/DATT serves as defense attaché to the partner nation and the chief of security cooperation at that US embassy. The SDO/DATT is the in-country focal point for planning, coordinating, supporting, and executing US defense issues and activities in the HN. This includes security cooperation programs under the oversight of the geographic combatant commander (GCC). The SDO/DATT is the single point of contact for all DOD matters involving the US mission or DOD elements assigned to, or working the US mission. All DOD elements under COM authority are under the coordinating authority of the SDO/DATT, except for the Marine security guard detachment. The SDO/DATT operates under the authority of the COM, and is the key figure within the US mission for establishing and fostering a security cooperation relationship with the HN.

(1) Security cooperation organizations (SCO) are all DOD elements located in a foreign country, as part of the US embassy or consulate, who are responsible for carrying out security cooperation and security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché
personnel designated to perform security cooperation or security assistance functions.

(2) SCOs in partner nations play key roles in the planning, coordinating, and executing security assistance and other security cooperation programs, especially those that involve providing education or training. SCOs are responsible for managing the HN military’s requests and sales and delivering US defense equipment, training, and services.

2. GCCs

a. GCCs are responsible for missions in their assigned geographic area of responsibility (AOR), unless otherwise directed. GCCs align military activities with diplomatic activities in their AOR with the COM and the country team. The GCC plans and implements military strategies and operations and interorganizational coordination.

b. The GCCs’ theater campaign plan incorporates engagement plans for each country within their geographic AOR. The engagement plans should align (to the greatest feasible extent) with the COM’s goals because theater campaign plan (TCP) activities and resource investments occur at the country level. Individual country plans should add details regarding the routine security cooperation activities that includes advising.

c. GCCs plan, conduct, and assess security cooperation activities. The GCCs delineate specific command authorities and relationships necessary for security force assistance missions or other regional training missions or delegate this to a Service component command. A detailed list of responsibilities for advising can be found in Training Circular (TC) 3-05.3, Security Force Assistance Deployment Handbook.

3. Service Component Commands

a. GCCs have a Service component command from each of the Services. The Service component commands provide Service-specific support and activity proposals and assist the GCC with forces, equipment, and resources and ensures they are available at the proper time. Also, Service component command staffs prepare supporting plans to the GCC’s TCP.

b. Service component commands are responsible for developing the Service-specific proposals that meet the vision written in the program of activities and milestones of the country plans. They ensure the authorities are in place to support the mission. The Service component commands will develop a concept sheet for an advising mission, liaise with the country team and unit sourced to complete the mission, assist with predeployment training, and complete vetting all planned content. Planners must ensure authorization has been granted by the GCC or Service component command prior to coordinating directly with subordinate command structures or US Embassy personnel. A detailed checklist is provided in TC 3-05.3.
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Appendix B
WORKING IN A MULTINATIONAL FORCE

1. Multinational Challenges
During multinational operations, multinational forces (MNFs) will encounter differences in language, culture, doctrine, equipment, and training.

   a. Language. Differing languages within an MNF can present a challenge to command and control, efficient communications, and unity of effort. United States (US) forces cannot assume the predominant language will be English. Also, specifying an official language for the MNF can be a sensitive issue.

   b. Culture. Each partner in multinational operations possesses a unique cultural identity. Culture is a product of values, beliefs, symbols, physical environment, and economic, political, and social outlook. Even, seemingly, minor differences (such as dietary restrictions) can have great impact. Commanders should strive to understand differences in views, religious holidays, and cultural traditions.

   c. Doctrine. When US forces participate in multinational operations, US commanders should follow the MNF’s doctrine and procedures that have been ratified by the US. For multinational doctrine and procedures not ratified by the US, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures where applicable and consistent with US law, policy, and guidance.

   d. Equipment. Commanders should understand the interoperability of each nation’s equipment and how it will affect communications, logistics, etc.

   e. Training. Nations will have different levels of training and experience. Commanders should recognize the capabilities and gaps present in the MNF.

2. Multinational Coordination

   a. Two key enhancements can mitigate these challenges and improve the coordination of MNFs. They are:

      (1) Liaison. Establish liaison early with forces of each nation to foster a good understanding of the mission and tactics, facilitate the ability to integrate and synchronize operations, assist in transferring information, enhance mutual trust, and increase the level of teamwork.

      (2) Multinational Coordination Center. US commanders should advocate creating a multinational coordination center in any multinational effort. The center will integrate the participating nations’ military forces into the multinational planning and operations processes, enhance coordination and cooperation, and support an open and full interaction within the MNF structure.

   b. For more information, see Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational Operations, and the Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedures, Ver 3.11.
Appendix C
THE UNITED NATIONS

United States (US) forces participating in peace operations (PO) will work within a United Nations (UN)-sanctioned mission. Therefore, it is important, to understand the UN mission and structure.

1. UN Charter

a. The UN Charter is an international treaty that articulates the purposes of the UN and its organization and obligates adherence by all UN member states. Three chapters of the UN Charter are relevant for PO. UN Security Council resolutions that authorize peacekeeping missions are not obligated to cite a chapter, although in recent years, it has become common practice to refer to chapter VII when the use of force beyond self-defense is contemplated.

   (1) Chapter VI, Pacific Settlement of Disputes. This chapter is associated with traditional peacekeeping missions that monitor a ceasefire or peace agreement.

   (2) Chapter VII, Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression. This chapter deals with situations in which one country invades another. Additionally, it applies to robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in which armed actors are likely to obstruct the mission’s success. Because intranational conflicts affect other countries, the UN addresses them in chapter VII. The UN Security Council must refer to chapter VII if it wants to use force for any purpose beyond self-defense. This is sometimes accomplished by authorizing the use of all necessary measures.

   (3) Chapter VIII, “Regional Arrangements”. This chapter addresses the role of regional organizations, such as the European or African Union, in regional peace and security. Regional arrangements may deploy peacekeeping operations (PKO) on their own initiative but require a UN Security Council resolution to conduct peace enforcement activities and to garner international legitimacy.

b. UN Peacekeeping Missions. The UN has no standing forces and peacekeeping missions are formed from voluntary national contributions after a specific mandate has been passed. This process is time-consuming. Consequently, UN forces are slow to deploy and their deployment often follows earlier action by a regional force or coalition in response to a crisis. Moreover, the UN does not have readily available reserve forces to deploy to a mission if it is urgently needed.

2. UN Organizations

a. Security Council. Under the UN Charter, the Security Council has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. All member states are obligated to comply with the council’s decisions. UN Security Council Resolutions form the bases for UN-sanctioned PO.

b. UN Agencies. UN agencies performing PKO may represent either the political mission of the UN to a host nation or the operational humanitarian agencies, which make up the UN cluster system. Agencies organize donors and coordinate
humanitarian organizations by function. PO forces are most likely to come into contact with the UN organizations and agencies in the following list. Participating UN agencies are formed into a country team directed by the United Nations-Resident Coordinator.

(1) The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO). The UNDPKO provides political and executive direction to UN PO around the world and maintains contact with the Security Council, troop and financial contributors, and parties to the conflict in implementing Security Council mandates. The department works to integrate the efforts of UN, governmental, and nongovernmental entities in PO. UNDPKO also provides guidance and support on military, police, mine action, and other issues for various UN political and peacebuilding missions.

(2) The UN Department of Field Support (DFS). The DFS supports peacekeeping and political field missions. It provides finance, logistics, information, communication and technology, human resources, and administration support to help missions promote peace and security.

(3) The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). This office is the focal point for disaster management in the UN system. It mobilizes and coordinates international disaster relief, promotes disaster mitigation (by providing advisory services and technical assistance), and promotes awareness, information exchange, and knowledge transfer on disaster-related matters. The UNOCHA maintains contact with disaster management entities and emergency services worldwide, and is able to mobilize specialized resources. The UNOCHA resident coordinator has a crucial role in providing leadership to the UN team at the country level and coordinates locally represented nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The resident coordinator convenes the UN disaster management team (UN-DMT) at country level and seeks unity of effort among NGOs and agencies (http://www.unocha.org/).

(4) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The UNDP promotes the long-range incorporation of disaster mitigation in development planning and funds technical assistance for all aspects of disaster management. The UNDP appoints a senior member as a regional coordinator and serves as the UNOCHA in-country coordinator. UNDP also provides administrative assistance to the resident coordinator and the UN-DMT. For more information, visit http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home.html.

(5) United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). UNICEF is a relief organization that works to “to overcome the obstacles that poverty, violence, disease, and discrimination place in a child’s path”. It attends to the well-being, health, nutrition, and education of boys and girls. The activities of this organization include:

(a) Social programs.

(b) Food (in collaboration with World Food Programme (WFP)).

(c) Water supplies.
(d) Sanitation and direct health intervention (coordinated with the World Health Organization (WHO)).

(e) Related management and logistical support. (For more information, visit http://www.unicef.org/.)

(6) The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The UNHCR, also known as the UN Refugee Agency, has a major role in coordinating aid to refugees, returnees, and displaced persons. Except in special circumstances, they conduct material assistance activities through national or local authorities of the concerned country, other organizations of the UN system, NGOs, intergovernmental agencies, or private technical agencies. Coordination with the UNHCR is critical for any humanitarian relief effort. Failure to coordinate with UNHCR before, and during, an operation (or failure to meet UNHCR standards) precludes the UNHCR from accepting equipment, supplies, and facilities transfers because the military will disengage from the operation. To prevent this, commanders establish a working relationship with the UNHCR immediately upon notification of a mission with the UNHCR. (For more information, visit: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c2.html.)

(7) The WHO. The WHO is a specialized agency of the UN concerned with international public health. It is involved in long-range programs providing advice and assistance for all aspects of preventive and curative health care. This assistance includes preparing health services for a rapid response to disasters. (For more information, visit: http://www.who.int/en/.)

(8) The WFP. The WFP is the food assistance branch of the UN. It provides targeted food aid and supports rehabilitation, reconstruction, and risk-reducing development programs. Targeted food aid is special subsistence aligned to a specific segment of a population. The WFP mobilizes and coordinates the delivery of emergency food aid from bilateral partners and other sources. (For more information, visit: http://www.wfp.org/.)

(9) The Food and Agriculture Organization (UN) (FAO). The FAO leads UN efforts to defeat world hunger through its involvement in long-range programs. It provides technical advice to reduce vulnerability and helps rehabilitate agriculture, livestock, and fisheries. The organization emphasizes local food production. It monitors food production, exports, and imports, and forecasts requirements for exceptional food assistance. (For more information, visit: http://www.fao.org/index_en.htm.)

c. For more information on the UN, see Joint Publication 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation, Annex B to Appendix B; and http://www.un.org/en.
Appendix D

KEY ENABLING DOCUMENTS

1. Introduction
The following is a list of key documents for conducting peace operations (PO). Not all documents are applicable to every operation or are important at every level.

2. Mandate
   a. A mandate is an United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) authorizing the deployment of a United Nations (UN) PO force. It provides legal and political imperatives and parameters for a mission. A UNSCR mission mandate addresses:
      (1) Reasons for the mandate.
      (2) Mission and major PO tasks.
      (3) Responsibilities of the mission, its components (e.g., civilian, police, or military), UN agencies involved, and mission partners.
      (4) The size and status of the PO force.
      (5) Special instructions regarding the mission or its mandate.
      (6) The mandate’s time limit. (The security council must produce a new UNSCR to extend a mission or provide updates to the mandate.)

3. Status of Forces Agreement
A status-of-forces agreement (SOFA), also called a status of mission agreement (SOMA) for UN forces, defines the legal status of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. These agreements are bilateral or multilateral. Agreements between a host nation, military forces, and other governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders contribute to developing the SOFA.

4. Terms of Reference (TOR)
Based on the mandate and situation, develop TOR governing PO implementation. The TOR describe the mission, command relationships, organization, logistics, accounting procedures, coordination and liaison, and responsibilities of military units and personnel assigned or detailed to the PO force. In addition, the TOR require endorsement by all parties in a dispute.

5. Memorandum of Understanding
In the context of a PO, a memorandum of understanding is an agreement between the sponsoring organization and contributing countries concerned, primarily, with logistic and administrative matters such as financial management of the PO.
6. Rules of Engagement (ROE)

a. ROE are directives issued by a military authority, delineating the circumstances and limitations under which United States (US) forces initiate or continue combat engagement with other forces. ROE reflect legal, policy, and operational considerations and should be consistent with a state’s international legal obligations, including the law of war. For more information, see Joint Publication 3-07.3, *Peace Operations*.

b. Individual nations may have different ROE, which can cause confusion and tension. In addition, PO forces may have multiple missions with separate ROE. US Service members should understand this dynamic and know US ROE takes precedence for them.

c. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE). The SROE apply to US forces during military operations and contingencies, including PO. Commanders augment the SROE for specific operations. Commanders assess the capabilities and intentions of other forces and make recommendations for supplemental ROE through the chain of command. State ROE in simple language. Use SROE for:

   (1) Implementing the right of self-defense. This is applicable worldwide, at all echelons of command.

   (2) Providing guidance governing the use of force consistent with mission accomplishment.

   (3) Using SROE in PO, during transition from peacetime to armed conflict or war, and during armed conflict in the absence of superseding guidance.

7. General Orders

Commanders issue general orders for various reasons, including how personnel should behave participating in PO.


a. The following NATO documents comprise the orders and ROE implementation process for operations. The NATO orders process, as expressed in Military Committee (MC) 133/3, *NATO’s Operational Planning Systems*, 6 September 2000, includes three NATO requests, or orders, and three responses by nations. These document formats are NATO Classified.

   (1) Activation Warning (ACTWARN). A decision taken by NATO bringing the organization to a new state of military preparedness by allowing nations to identify available militaries, if operations take place. An ACTWARN is answered by nations with informal force offers.

   (2) Activation Request. This is a decision taken by NATO to prepare identified military assets for action. This decision begins a formal force generation process by issuing a statement of requirements, which formalizes the informal request for forces made in the ACTWARN phase. An activation request is not a political
decision to use military force. It is answered with a final force preparation (FORCEPREP).

(3) FORCEPREP. These are statements made by nations, to a NATO strategic commander, of their commitment to provide forces for a specific operation.

(4) Activation Order. This is a NATO order authorizing the execution of a military operation and requesting nations transfer the authority of the forces committed via the final FORCEPREP. Approval of this order is a political decision by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which is required before executing a military operation.

(5) Transfer of Authority. This is a statement by the nations transferring authority of their units which were committed via the FORCEPREP to a NATO security committee for execution of a specific operation.

b. The NATO ROE process includes the following three requests or orders.

(1) ROE Request. This is a request by a NATO security committee to the NAC for authorization implementing ROE measures approved in an operation plan (OPLAN).

(2) ROE Authorization. This is approval by the NAC, to a NATO security committee authorizing implementation of the requested ROE measures.

(3) ROE Implementation. This is an order by a NATO security committee to forces implementing ROE measures authorized by the NAC. The NATO security committee is not required to implement all authorized ROE measures. The ROE implementation includes national caveats.

9. UN Documents

a. Documents are developed and maintained that guide planning and executing a mission mandate under the UNSCR. They authorize the PO mission; provide and update the mission mandate, tasks, responsibilities, and other mission guidance; and extend the mission.

b. These documents include:

(1) The Mission Concept document.

(2) The Integrated Strategic Framework, which provides operational and resource planning guidance based on:

   (a) A Common Humanitarian Action Plan.
   
   (b) A Common Country Assessment.
   
   (c) A UN Development Assistance Framework.


(4) The SOFA/SOMA.

c. More about UN PO is available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en.
Appendix E
TRAINING

1. General

a. Uniformed personnel must receive training and preparation, in advance of deployment, to successfully execute peace operations (PO), and as required during deployment. Training plays a significant role in the ability of uniformed personnel to establish the foundations for peace.

b. Priorities will be developed for training activities based on the expected environment in which they will conduct the PO. This publication, along with documents in the references section, provide resources to help develop training programs to prepare for PO.

c. As part of a comprehensive approach, units should understand the roles, skills, and competencies of other military contingents, police, and civilian components. These include interorganizational agencies and departments and how they relate and integrate into PO.

2. Training Considerations

a. General. Because of the unique aspects of PO, units should conduct individual and collective training to develop familiarity and proficiency in PO. Training should incorporate recent developments and current best practices.

b. Individual Training. Individual PO training should focus on the unique skills and requirements necessary to accomplish the PO mission, including cultural awareness and interacting with outside government, intergovernmental, and civilian organizations. The following are a few of the key training areas to consider.

(1) Cultural Awareness. PO demands an awareness of a culture and the ability to use a host nation’s (HN’s) culture to influence outcomes and to achieve mission success.

(2) Protection of Civilians. Training helps individuals understand the PO force’s responsibilities regarding civilian (adult and child) protection and implement these and other aspects of the human rights mandate.

(3) Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Awareness. Individuals must be trained in awareness of sexual exploitation and abuse and consequences for misconduct.

(4) Language. Ideally, all those training for PO should achieve a basic proficiency in the HN’s language. When this is impossible, ensure that PO forces can employ a few phrases, including local slang. To enhance training value and context, encourage language training from personnel who understand the HN’s language and the culture.

(5) Other.

(a) Media Engagement. There is a high probability individual Service members, regardless of rank, will encounter questions from media personnel.
Service members should receive training to understand how their engagement with media personnel will impact an operation.

(b) Using Interpreters. Service members must be trained to effectively use interpreters and translators, and understand the difference between the two professions.

c. Collective Training. Collective training develops confidence and teamwork and builds units to accomplish the PO mission. During collective training, units can train for peace and combat operations concurrently.

(1) Various specialist groups may conduct specific force preparation activities. The United Nations (UN) offers core predeployment training and specialized training materials and lessons learned from PO for UN missions. A deploying force should conduct mission rehearsal exercises that incorporate specific PO scenarios.

(2) After deploying to the HN, and before commitment to operations, a unit may receive in-country training at a HN or UN training center or at another training location. This in-country training helps personnel become psychologically and physically acclimated to the HN. It also allows commanders and staffs time to coordinate latent issues within their own command and other civilian, coalition, and multinational organizations. However, take care to maintain impartiality in peacekeeping operations, which may preclude training directly with HN government forces or at their facilities.

3. PO Training Resources

a. The military, government, and civilian institutions (listed in table 1) offer expertise and training in the field of PO, which may include resident training courses, mobile training teams, online courses and information, or language training.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. PO Training Institutions and Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The US Army Peacekeeping and Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Institute of Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Operations Training Institute (POTI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Excellence in Disaster Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Humanitarian Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Post Graduate School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language Training:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Service Institute, School of Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Language Institute Foreign Language</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

2 May 2019
Table 1. PO Training Institutions and Resources (Cont’d)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Web Site</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canada</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Support Training Centre</td>
<td><a href="https://www.peaceopstraining.org/peacekeeper-training/">https://www.peaceopstraining.org/peacekeeper-training/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Latin America and the Caribbean</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POTI list of partner Latin America and Caribbean peace operations (PO) training institutions</td>
<td><a href="http://www.peaceopstraining.org/programs/ntcelp/latin-america/">http://www.peaceopstraining.org/programs/ntcelp/latin-america/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes</td>
<td><a href="https://www.accord.org.za/about/where-we-work/">https://www.accord.org.za/about/where-we-work/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POTI list of African PO training institutions</td>
<td><a href="http://www.peaceopstraining.org/programs/ntcelp/africa/">http://www.peaceopstraining.org/programs/ntcelp/africa/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Association of Asia-Pacific Peace Operations Training Centre’s list of Asian PO training institutions</td>
<td><a href="http://www.aaptc.asia/index.php/memberss">http://www.aaptc.asia/index.php/memberss</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability Policing Centre of Excellence</td>
<td><a href="http://www.nspcoe.org/">http://www.nspcoe.org/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Australia</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>United Nations</strong></td>
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b. Table 2 lists computer-based, distance learning resources which can be accessed online. Online training can be used as a prerequisite for classroom training, exercises, or workshops to ensure all trainees gain basic PO knowledge.
Table 2. PO Online Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Web Site</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Department of Defense</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint Knowledge Online</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning and Execution of United Nations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping Missions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-Cultural Competence Trainer (3CT) V2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of Civilians (1hr)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://jkodirect.jten.mil/">https://jkodirect.jten.mil/</a></td>
<td>J5ST-US133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J3OP-US744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J3OP-US1245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Nations</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United Nations Institute for Training and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td><a href="https://www.unitar.org/event/full-catalog?&amp;delivery=24">https://www.unitar.org/event/full-catalog?&amp;delivery=24</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandatory online training for PO personnel</td>
<td><a href="https://hr.un.org/page/mandatory-learning">https://hr.un.org/page/mandatory-learning</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Not For Profit Organization</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Conferences on PO topics, which are open to all international training institutions or institutions by region, are listed in table 3.

Table 3. PO Conferences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Web Site</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>and Education Workshop</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The International Association of Peace</td>
<td><a href="http://www.iaptc.org/">http://www.iaptc.org/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keeping Training Centres</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations Training Centres</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keeping Operations Training Centres</td>
<td>Peacekeeping-Training-Through-Cooperation.pdf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The African Peace Support Trainers Association general meeting</td>
<td><a href="https://trainingforpeace.org/event/apsta-extraordinary-general-meeting/">https://trainingforpeace.org/event/apsta-extraordinary-general-meeting/</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix F
ANALYSIS FRAMEWORKS

1. Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure (PMESII)

PMESII is a framework used to describe operational variables within an area of operations (AO). PMESII analysis helps staffs determine factors in the civil environment that may affect military operations and estimate likely effects of military actions upon the AO. Using the PMESII framework is essential for understanding the operational environment, and is part of intelligence preparation if the battlespace in advance of operations. The following information provides an example of a PMESII approach to analyzing the operational environment within the context of the fifteen fundamentals of peace operations (PO).

a. Political. The political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance. Understanding the cultural, social, and political power relationships within an AO will help commanders recognize key actors, visualize their explicit and implicit aims, and identify their capabilities to achieve their goals.

(1) Commanders assess challenges that are associated with governance as they pertain to the transition of political power, legitimacy, the rule of law, social justice, corruption, and punishment. Irregular and criminal threats will attempt to drive, seize, and capitalize upon the populations’ instability, insecurity, and grievances. These are caused by political and social conflicts, rampant corruption, resource scarcity, humanitarian crises, economic challenges, and technological disruptions. Politicians promote their causes and achieve their strategic ends while undermining those of their opponents.

(2) PO forces assess indigenous police capability and capacity and relationship to local and regional political power brokers. PO forces identify and track election cycles to help protect democratic processes and determine events that may expose friendly forces and host nation (HN) personnel to unlawful or threatening activities that may affect the transition of power.

(3) Leaders must understand laws, policies, and military or political directives that guide their relationship with contract companies, personnel, and commercial operations in the AO. Leaders must understand how they can affect law, regulation, and agreement enforcement.

(a) Understanding political implications requires analyzing partnerships (i.e., political, economic, military, religious, and cultural). An analysis would capture the presence and significance of external organizations and other groups, including groups united by a common cause. Examples include private security organizations, transnational corporations, and nongovernmental organizations providing humanitarian assistance.

(b) A political analysis addresses the effect of will. Will is a primary, intangible factor; it motivates participants to sacrifice for a cause or persevere against obstacles. Understanding what motivates key groups (e.g.,
political, military, or insurgent) helps commanders comprehend groups’ goals and willingness to sacrifice to achieve them.

(c) The political variable includes the United States’ (US’) domestic political environment. Mission analysis and situation monitoring include an awareness of national policy and strategy.

b. Military. The military variable includes the capabilities of all armed forces in an operational environment. For many states, an army is the military force, primarily, responsible for maintaining internal and external security. Paramilitary organizations and guerrilla forces influence friendly and hostile military forces. Militaries of states not directly involved in a conflict, also affect them. Therefore, an analysis should include the relationships of regional land forces to the other variables. Understanding these factors helps commanders estimate actual capabilities for each armed force. Analysis should focus on each organization’s ability to field and use capabilities domestically, regionally, and globally. A military analysis examines the capabilities of enemy, adversary, HN, and multinational military organizations. Analyzed capabilities include:

1. Equipment.
2. Manpower.
3. Doctrine.
4. Training levels.
5. Resource constraints.
7. Organizational culture.
8. History.
9. Civil-military relations.

c. Economic. The economic variable encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and consuming resources. PO forces should identify predictable events and activities in the local and regional business cycles (e.g., harvests or holidays) that can lead to commodity and currency movement. Commanders must be aware that these activities can be influenced or manipulated to control populations or create wealth for illicit, unlawful, or threat purposes. PO forces engage individuals to collect information that protects essential economic activities or areas. PO forces also examine economic influences, crime, criminal threats, and corruption that affect hiring, training, equipping, and sustaining civilian police and corrections agencies required to support the rule of law. Specific factors include influence of the following on the economic variable.

1. Industrial organizations.
2. Trade.
3. Development (including foreign aid).
4. Finance.
(5) Monetary policies and conditions.

(6) Institutional capabilities.

(7) Geography.

(8) Legal constraints (or the lack of them) on the economy.

Note: Indicators measuring potential benefits or costs of changing a political-economic order enhance a commander’s understanding of the social and behavioral dynamics of friendly, adversary, and neutral entities. Differences in local economies significantly influence political choices, including individuals' decisions to support or subvert the existing order. Many factors create incentives or disincentives for individuals and groups to change the economic status quo.

d. Social. The social variable describes the cultural, religious, ethnic, and gender-related elements within an operational environment. A society is a population whose members are subject to the same political authority, occupy a common territory, have a common culture, and share a sense of identity. Societies are not monolithic. The population within a society consists of multiple subgroups, each of which has its own characteristics, objectives, and potential influence on, or reaction to, military operations. All people, regardless of their culture, share certain ways of organizing and interacting with each other based on five different dimensions: physical environment, economic, social structures, political structures, and belief systems. Analysis of the factors that make up these dimensions enables military planners to evaluate what cultural aspects within the AO are operationally relevant. Field Manual 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, discusses socio-cultural factors and social network analysis.

(1) Culture is comprised of the shared beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors which characterize a society and, which members use to cope with their world and each another. Societies have a dominant culture and may have many secondary cultures. Different societies share similar cultures, but societal attributes change over time. Changes occur in:

   (a) Demographics.

   (b) Religion.

   (c) Migration trends.

   (d) Urbanization.

   (e) Standards of living.

   (f) Literacy and nature of education.

   (g) Cohesiveness and activity of cultural, religious, or ethnic groups.

(2) Social networks, social status, and related norms and roles supporting and enabling individuals and leaders require analysis. Also, this analysis addresses societies, outside the operational area, whose actions, opinions, or political influence affect the mission.
(3) People base their actions on perceptions, assumptions, customs, and values. Cultural awareness identifies points of friction, builds rapport, and reduces misunderstandings within populations. It improves the commander’s insight into individual and group intentions and enhances the unit’s effectiveness. US forces require training in cultural awareness before deploying to an unfamiliar, operational environment and continuous updating while deployed. Commanders develop their knowledge of the societal aspects within their AOs to a higher level of cultural awareness. This gives them an understanding of how their operations affect the population and prepares them to meet local leaders face to face.

(4) PO forces identify and analyze law enforcement gaps that can create conditions conducive to crime, disorder, and fear of crime with the potential to affect military operations or political success.

(5) Education cycles, school vacations, and ethnic and religious holidays or observances are predictable events. These activities lead to fluctuations in social activity and population flows and can stress enforcement mechanisms in an area.

(6) PO forces examine relationships between men and women and within, and among, members of the population as a whole and police, and government personnel. This helps PO forces understand patterns within a society, power and decision-making dynamics, access to resources, and perspectives of a conflict; and identify hybrid, criminal, and terrorist threats.

(7) The social environment surrounding a PO may include significant religious issues. PO forces and planners must develop an understanding of the religious landscape and religions’ influences and roles within the population. Also, PO forces must understand perceptions of bias or neutrality held by the population regarding indigenous religious entities. Religious entities, if perceived as neutral, may serve as communication channels or mediators between conflicting parties. Chaplains, political advisors, and foreign area officers, with the support of civil affairs, may assist the commander by serving as a liaison to local religious leaders, nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations.

e. Information. Joint doctrine defines the information environment as the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. (See Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information Operations for more information.) Commanders use information to shape the operational environment.

(1) Consider the sources and means by which information reaches the general population, including the adversary, in AOs and areas of interest. These may include official sources (e.g., government-controlled news media), unofficial sources (e.g., local independent news media), unauthorized internal sources (e.g., underground radio and newspapers), and third-party sources (e.g., the international press and social media outlets). Analysts should focus on how information is disseminated to, and shared within, the adversary’s leadership structure. The credibility of various media and information sources, as perceived by the groups involved, is critical. Also, analysts should examine and articulate the adversary’s narrative so PO forces can craft and make operational a credible
counter-narrative. (See JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.)

(2) Media representatives influence the information shaping the operational environment. Broadcast and internet media sources rapidly disseminate competing views of military operations worldwide. Media coverage influences US political decision making, US popular opinion, and multinational sensitivities. Adversaries use media coverage to further their aims by controlling and manipulating how audiences perceive a situation’s content and context. PO forces identify and track predictable news and media cycles for their relationship to threat or illicit activity in an AO, and remain cognizant of internet media that may incite unrest or potential flash points. PO forces engage media representatives to deliver messages and support informational themes which are consistent with friendly military goals and actions.

(3) To ensure the narrative remains consistent with PO objectives, commanders need to understand the nature of information flow within their AO, and apply the best available and timely methods when communicating with the local populace.

f. Infrastructure. Infrastructure comprises the basic facilities, services, and installations a society needs to function. Degrading infrastructure affects the entire operational environment. Infrastructure includes technological sophistication (i.e., the ability to conduct research and development and apply the results to civil and military purposes). PO forces must be cognizant of the existence of basic infrastructure shortfalls for supporting civilian or military policing and corrections institution efforts (e.g., police stations or jails); and facility requirements needed to support detainee or dislocated civilian (DC) operations in the AO. PO forces assess the quality and trafficability of roadway infrastructure necessary to support tactical movement along main and alternate supply routes, or DC flow along designated tertiary routes without interfering with military operations. They also track and monitor civilian traffic patterns to identify predictable criminal or threat movement patterns.

(1) Not all segments of society view infrastructure the same way. Some may perceive improvements viewed as beneficial by many, as threats. For example, introducing cellular networks helps a local economy, but may offend influential and conservative local leaders who view it as permitting access to salacious material.

(2) Actions affecting infrastructure require a thorough analysis of possible second- and third-order effects.

2. Areas, Structure, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events (ASCOPE)

a. General. ASCOPE represents civil considerations in the operational environment. When ASCOPE analysis is overlaid with PMESII operational variables, staffs will have a robust understanding of mission-relevant factors in the AO.

b. Areas. Areas are key localities or aspects of the terrain within a commander’s AO not categorized as militarily significant. A commander should analyze key areas from two perspectives: how they affect the military mission and how military operations
effect civilian activities in these areas. Results of analyses could dramatically influence the courses of action considered by the commander. Examples are:

(1) Locations of Government Centers. These areas are richer, more populated, better educated, and contain greater and more advanced infrastructure than outlying areas. Frequently, they are the centers of influence over the populace in outlying areas. Depending on mission priorities, commanders may consider aggressively engaging these areas rather than bypassing them.

(2) Areas Defined by Political Boundaries (e.g., districts within a city or municipalities within a region). Political boundaries are well defined and respected by political leaders and the area’s population. Commanders should consider overlaying unit boundaries on political boundaries for practical control purposes during long-term operations.

(3) Social, Political, Religious, or Criminal Enclaves. These are sources of potential problems and may threaten force protection.

(4) Agricultural, Mining Regions, and Trade Routes. Routine economic activities hinder moving or staging military resources. Interfering with operations related to the economy of an area places an unnecessary burden on military units or logistical resources in an area.

(5) Potential Sites for Temporary Settlement of DCs or Other Civil Functions. The same considerations making a site ideal for positioning a military unit also make it ideal for a DC camp or other types of settlements. Commanders should consider the long-term, practical, and environmental consequences of occupying civil areas.

c. Structures. Existing structures take on many significant roles. Some (such as bridges, communication towers, power plants, or dams) are high pay-off targets. Others (such as churches, mosques, national libraries, or hospitals) are cultural sites protected by international law or other agreements. Facilities with practical applications (such as jails, warehouses, schools, television stations, radio stations, or printing plants) are useful for military purposes. Analyzing structures involves determining their location, function, capability, and application for supporting military operations. It involves weighing the consequences of removing them from civilian use in terms of political, economic, religious, social, informational implications, reactions of the populace, and replacement costs.

d. Capabilities. View capabilities from several perspectives. The term refers to:

(1) The existing abilities of the populace to sustain itself, through public administration, public safety, emergency services, and food and agricultural systems.

(2) The resources with which the populace needs assistance (such as public works and utilities, public health, economy, or commerce).

(3) Contract resources and services supporting the military mission (such as interpreters, laundry services, construction materials, or equipment). Local vendors, the HN, or other nations provide these resources and services. In
hostile territory, military forces take and use civil capabilities and resources consistent with international law.

(4) Capabilities of partner countries and organizations involved in an operation.

e. Organizations. Organizations are groups that may be affiliated with government agencies, which can have influence upon a commander’s AO. They include church groups; fraternal, patriotic, or service organizations; community watch groups, and nongovernmental organizations. Civil organizations assist the commander by keeping the populace informed of ongoing and future activities in an AO and influencing the actions of civilians. They form the nucleus of self-help programs, interim-governing bodies, civil defense efforts, and other activities.

f. People. Individually or collectively, actions, opinions, or political influence of nonmilitary personnel affect a military operation positively, negatively, or neutrally. In PO, US forces prepare to work closely with all types of people. Consider the following questions when analyzing civil concerns.

(1) What types of civilians do PO forces encounter in the AO? There are many different kinds of civilians living and operating in, and around, an AO; it is useful to separate them into distinct categories.

(2) What civilian activities are affecting operations? Consider each category of civilian activity separately because activities have positive and negative effects on planning factors and warfighting functions.

g. Events. Many categories of civilian events affect the military mission. Some examples that create DCs are planting and harvest seasons, elections, riots, and evacuations (voluntary and involuntary). Military events also affect the lives of civilians in an AO. Some examples are combat operations, including indirect fires, deployments and redeployments, and payday. Analyze the events for their political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications.
3. Analysis of the Cultural Environment

The cultural matrix in table 4 assists in analyzing and understanding major groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Cultural Groups</th>
<th>Interests</th>
<th>Cultural Codes, Traditions, and Values</th>
<th>Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identify the major cultural groups in the area of operations.</td>
<td>Identify the things cultural groups care about or consider to be of tangible or intangible value.</td>
<td>Identify cultural codes, traditions, and values the major cultural groups live.</td>
<td>Identify how conflicts between individuals and groups have been resolved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Traditional Authorities</strong></td>
<td><strong>Disruption of Authorities and Mechanisms</strong></td>
<td><strong>How Malign Actors and Stabilizing Forces Leverage Cultural Factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify the authorities to whom the locals give respect or turn to for assistance.</td>
<td>Describe what new actors or conditions have disrupted the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms or undermined the influence of traditional authorities.</td>
<td>Describe how actors leverage or exploit cultural factors to their advantage. Also, consider how peacekeeping forces could leverage the factors.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix G
ILLICIT ACTIVITY

1. Criminal Threats

a. Criminal threats exist at every level of society and in every operational environment. Their presence during peace operations adds to the complexity of the operational environment. Criminal threats may be connected to irregular forces and, possibly, to regular military or paramilitary forces of a nation-state. However, they may pursue their criminal activities independent of other actors.

b. Nation-states may use criminals, along with other irregular threat actors, to achieve their strategic, operational, and tactical objectives while retaining plausible deniability. Non-state actors, such as terrorist networks and insurgencies, could rely upon criminal activities to accrue the finances needed to sustain their forces and operations. Terrorists and insurgents may recruit criminals as new members. State and non-state actors could collaborate with criminal networks to gain critical knowledge, skills, and abilities lacking among their forces, to and create multiple dilemmas for their opponents.

2. Criminal Organizations

a. A criminal organization can take on the characteristics of a paramilitary organization (either for self-protection or as a private army for hire). Criminals may have the best technology, equipment, and weapons available, because they have the money to buy them.

b. Criminal organizations could be gangs, large-scale criminal networks or transnational criminal organizations.

   (1) Large-scale organizations extend beyond national boundaries to operate regionally or worldwide. They may be able to adversely affect legitimate political, military, and judicial organizations. However, individual criminals or small-scale criminal organizations (gangs) cannot. Any criminal organization can affect government organizations and military operations by becoming affiliated with the irregular forces or military forces of another nation-state. Unless a criminal organization is in league with government officials, it must operate in ungoverned or poorly governed areas. Otherwise, the governing authority would interfere with the criminal activity. Criminal organizations can draw on virtual sanctuaries (such as websites, chat rooms, or blogs).

   (2) Criminal organizations desire a space where they can conduct their activities unconstrained by a government. They may seek to create or maintain a region where there is no governmental control or only governmental control they can corrupt and intimidate. Such an area allows them sufficient latitude to operate and discourage rival criminal enterprises. From a base area, they can generate more and more violence and instability over wider sections of a political map.

   (3) Criminal organizations can generate instability and insecurity within a state or across borders. They can become partners with insurgents to further their
criminal ends. A criminal organization takes on the characteristics of an insurgency when it uses subversion and violence to negate law enforcement efforts.

(4) Criminal organizations may try to corrupt political power through finances or intimidation. The more they seek freedom of action, the more they inhibit state sovereignty. A criminal organization may create its own form of government by providing protection for, and enforcing its will on, the populace. If it can challenge the governing authority’s control beyond the local level, it becomes an insurgency unto itself, although its ends are materially, rather than ideologically, focused.
INTERNATIONAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. Overview
   a. The number of organizations involved in peace operations (PO) vary from small to very large. There is a large number of agencies that conduct humanitarian relief operations. These include international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and civil society organizations (CSOs).
   b. Planners should remember, organizations try to preserve their neutrality.
   c. For detailed information on working with intergovernmental and international organizations, and NGOs, refer to joint publication (JP) 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

2. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
   a. “The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is the world’s largest humanitarian network. The movement is neutral and provides protection and assistance to people affected by disasters and conflicts.”
   b. The movement has three main components:
      (1) The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
      (2) The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).
      (3) The 190 national member Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (e.g., The American Red Cross).
   c. The ICRC, Federation, and national societies are independent bodies. Each has an individual status and exercises no authority over the others. The ICRC operates in conflict, the IFRC operates during disasters, and the national societies provide assistance to people in their own nation. While they are independent humanitarian organizations with different missions, all are guided by the same principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality. (For more information, see JP 3-08, Appendix D, and http://www.redcross.int/en/)

3. NGOs
   a. NGOs are private, self-governing, not-for-profit groups organized at the national or international level. They alleviate human suffering; promote education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution. NGOs encourage establishing democratic institutions and civil society. NGOs have different missions, but they often overlap. Some NGOs operate as short-term, humanitarian relief agencies and others operate long-term development programs. NGOs are not directly affiliated with governments, however, many are funded by government donors. For example: some United States NGOs receive funding from, and coordinate with, the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), while other NGOs are independent and do not receive funding from, or coordinate with, any government entities.

b. Be aware that not all NGOs appreciate military assistance or intervention. Some NGO charters do not allow them to collaborate with armed forces based on political mandate, neutrality, religious, or impartiality concerns. PO forces need to honor this while striving for unity of effort.

c. When working with NGOs in an uncertain or hostile operational environment, information in the United States Institute of Peace Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments may help mitigate friction between military and NGO personnel.

d. There are thousands of NGOs operating globally, hundreds of which may be active in the area of operations (AO). The United States embassy country team, USAID, and combatant command desk officers can be good resources for determining which NGOs are present and their reputations and impact on the host nation. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) is the coordinating body in-country which will have information on intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and NGOs working locally. UNOCHA representatives engage with operational and strategic level working groups. Understanding which organizations are working in the AO, and their capabilities and objectives, is essential to situational awareness and avoiding diffusion of effort. See appendix C for additional details on UNOCHA. Additional resources are available for learning about NGOs and their missions, objectives, and capabilities, including:


4. CSOs

CSOs are local groups that play a critical role in society. CSOs include all non-market and non-state organizations in which people organize themselves to pursue shared interests in the public domain. In fragile and politically transitioning states, CSOs can be stabilizing factors, because they focus on government transparency, human rights, justice, and democratic participation. Examples include community-based organizations and village associations, environmental groups, women’s rights groups, farmers’ associations, faith-based organizations, labor unions, cooperatives, professional associations, chambers of commerce, independent research institutes, or not-for-profit media.
Appendix I
JOINT COMMISSIONS

1. Background
   a. Joint commissions are established to facilitate the peace process. There is no set formula or construct for commissions. Peace processes vary widely depending on factors like groups involved, desired outcomes of high- and low-power groups, perceived wrongs to be addressed, and variables in levels of desire for reconciliation between conflicting parties. One consistent factor in successful peace processes has been the intervention of mediators who are perceived as neutral by all conflicting parties. The techniques and procedures in this appendix are applicable to military units, and help when working with host nation leaders and the local populace to bring about mutually agreed upon, peace arrangements through joint commissions.

   b. Military efforts in peace operations provide security and stability to enable peace processes. Military personnel may participate in commissions, or in some instances, convene commissions. Commanders should, however, consider factors of perceived neutrality when deciding the level of overt participation in commissions.

   c. Joint commissions operate at national, regional, and local levels. They focus on solving political, military, economic, and humanitarian issues. Because joint commissions occur at various levels, commanders attend commission meetings at a higher headquarters or other locations deemed appropriate.

   d. In peace operations, joint commissions seek to create an opportunity for disputing parties to negotiate and implement a peace agreement or a formal treaty settlement. A joint commission is composed of two or more governmental, nongovernmental, and military entities who work together to develop an agreement to reduce, prevent, or counter conflict.

2. Objectives of Joint Commissions
   a. Joint commissions synchronize efforts to implement a joint peace agreement through the joint commission system. Initially, joint commissions focus on ceasing hostilities and setting conditions for subsequent peace efforts. The terms of a settlement provide mechanisms for initiating and sustaining a peace process. When military forces seek to implement peace mechanisms, they coordinate and work with joint commission members. Joint commissions serve the following three functions.

      (1) Translate Political Agreements into Actions on the Ground. Gaps and ambiguities exist in peace agreements. Military forces work within the guidelines of these gaps to implement agreements.

      (2) Act as a Dispute Resolution Mechanism. Joint commissions help parties resolve disputes that arise over time. Some disputes are appropriate for the joint commission military channels to resolve. However, some disputes are civil and are not resolved through the joint commission’s military channels. Commanders refer these issues to long-range planning staffs and joint commission civil channels for resolution.

b. Joint commissions identify and support structures that consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and wellbeing among people. These efforts include providing disarmament programs, restoring order, repatriating displaced civilians, and providing advisory and training support for security personnel. Additionally, they advance efforts to protect human rights, reform or strengthen governmental institutions, and promote formal and informal processes of political participation.

c. At the local level, military forces use teamwork to build other mechanisms or institutions promoting a sustainable peace. However, subsequent agreements may contribute to other disputes while implementing the peace agreement.

d. The ultimate objective of joint commissions that include foreign mediators, is to establish communications between conflicting parties so the peace process can continue in the absence of foreign intervention.
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United States Institute for Peace

### GLOSSARY

#### PART I – ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

| A | ACTWARN  | activation warning |
| ADL | armistice demarcation line |
| ADP | Army doctrine publication |
| AF | Air Force |
| AFB | Air Force base |
| AFNC | Air Force Negotiation Center |
| AFTTP | Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures |
| AO | area of operations |
| AOL | area of limitation |
| AOR | area of responsibility |
| ASCOPE | areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events |
| ATP | Army techniques publication |
| AU | African Union |
| B | BZ | buffer zone |
| C | C2 | command and control |
| CA | civil affairs |
| CAO | civil affairs operations |
| CGTTP | Coast Guard tactics, techniques, and procedures |
| CID | criminal investigation division |
| CIMIC | civil-military cooperation |
| CIVPOL | civilian police |
| CJCSI | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction |
| CMO | civil-military operations |
| COM | chief of mission |
| CP | checkpoint |
| CRSV | conflict-related sexual violence |
| CSO | civil society organizations |
DC  dislocated civilian
DCM  deputy chief of mission
DDR  disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DFS  Department of Field Support (UN)
DMZ  demilitarized zone
DOD  Department of Defense
DOJ  Department of Justice
DOS  Department of State
DP  displaced person
E  electronic warfare
EW  electronic warfare
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization (UN)
FHA  foreign humanitarian assistance
FM  field manual
FORCEPREP  force preparation
FP  force protection
GCC  geographic combatant commander
HA  humanitarian assistance
HN  host nation
HOMC  head of military component
ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP  internally displaced person
IFRC  The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IGO  intergovernmental organization
IO  information operations
IRC  information-related capability
ISB  intermediate staging base
JMC  joint movement center
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>L, M</td>
<td>Marine Corps Reference Publication</td>
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<td>Marine Corps Tactical Publication</td>
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<td>MCTP</td>
<td>Marine Corps Warfighting Publication</td>
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<td>MCWP</td>
<td>military information support operations</td>
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<td>MNF</td>
<td>multinational force</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>military police (USA and USMC)</td>
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<td>multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NEO</td>
<td>noncombatant evacuation operation</td>
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<td>nonlethal weapon</td>
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<td>NTTP</td>
<td>Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<td>PO</td>
<td>peace operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>POTI</td>
<td>Peace Operations Training Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>populace and resources control</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>psychological operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>QRF</td>
<td>quick response force</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSO</td>
<td>regional security officer</td>
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<td>S</td>
<td>security cooperation organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>senior defense official/defense attaché</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>sexual exploitation and abuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
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<td>SOFA</td>
<td>status-of-forces agreement</td>
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<td>SOMA</td>
<td>status of mission agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SROE</td>
<td>standing rules of engagement</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>security sector reform</td>
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<td>T</td>
<td>training circular</td>
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<td>TC</td>
<td>theater campaign plan</td>
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<td>TCP</td>
<td>trafficking in persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIP</td>
<td>term of reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>U, V</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations disaster management team</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations development programme</td>
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<td>UNDPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN-RC</td>
<td>United Nations resident coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>United States Transportation Command</td>
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</table>
PART II – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

**assessment**—1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing capabilities during military operations. 2. Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

**buffer zone**—A defined area controlled by a peace operations force from which disputing or belligerent forces have been excluded. Also called area of separation in some United Nations operations. Also called BZ. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.3)

**civil affairs**—Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-57)

**civil affairs operations**—Actions planned, executed, and assessed by civil affairs forces that enhance awareness of, and manage the interaction with, the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills [that are] normally the responsibility of civil government. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-57)

**civil-military operations**—The activities of a commander performed by designated civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions, by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-57)

**civil-military operations center**—An organization normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States with indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-57)

**combat camera**—Specially-trained expeditionary forces from Service-designated units capable of providing high-quality, directed visual information during military operations. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-61)
conflict prevention—A peace operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and, when necessary, military means, to monitor and identify the causes of conflict, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.3)

detainee—Any person captured, detained, or otherwise under the control of Department of Defense personnel. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-63)

dislocated civilian—A broad term primarily used by the Department of Defense that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-29)

displaced person—A broad term used to refer to internally and externally displaced persons collectively. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-29)

evacuee—A civilian removed from a place of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of a military situation. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-57)

fires—The use of weapon systems or other actions to create specific lethal or nonlethal effects on a target. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-09)

force protection—Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (including family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

foreign humanitarian assistance—Department of Defense activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-29)

host nation—A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organization to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-57)

humanitarian and civic assistance—Assistance to the local populace, specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, Section 401, and funded under separate authorities, provided by predominantly United States forces in conjunction with military operations. Also called HCA. See also foreign humanitarian assistance. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-29)

information operations—The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-13)

internally displaced person—Any person who has been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their home or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-29)
interoperability—1. The ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0) 2. The condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 6-0)

law of war—That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. Also called the law of armed conflict. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 1-04)

line of demarcation—A line defining the boundary of a buffer zone used to establish the forward limits of disputing or belligerent forces after each phase of disengagement or withdrawal has been completed. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.3)

military information support operations—Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-13.2)

multinational force—A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 1)

multinational operations—A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-16)

nongovernmental organization—A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-08)

nonlethal weapon—A weapon that is explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-28)

operations security—A capability that identifies and controls critical information, indicators of friendly force actions attendant to military operations, and incorporates countermeasures to reduce the risk of an adversary exploiting vulnerabilities. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-13.3)

peace building—Stability actions that strengthen and rebuild a society’s institutions, infrastructure, and civic life to avoid a relapse into conflict. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.3)

peace enforcement—Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or
sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.3)

**peacekeeping**—Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.3)

**peacemaking**—The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that led to it. See also peace building; peace enforcement; peacekeeping; peace operations. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.3)

**peace operations**—A broad term that encompasses multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.3)

**protection**—Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

**refugee**—A person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country. See also dislocated civilian; displaced person; evacuee; stateless person. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-29)

**repatriation**—The release and return of enemy prisoners of war to their own country in accordance with the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 1-0)

**rules of engagement**—Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 1-04)

**search**—A systematic reconnaissance of a defined area, so that all parts of the area have passed within visibility. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-50)

**security sector reform**—A comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by a host nation to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07)

**stability activities**—Various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)
**status-of-forces agreement**—A bilateral or multilateral agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Also called SOFA (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-16)

**sustainment**—The provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

**terrorism**—The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political. See also antiterrorism; combating terrorism; counterterrorism; force protection condition. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.2)

**unexploded explosive ordnance**—Explosive ordnance that has been primed, fused, armed or otherwise prepared for action, and that has been fired, dropped, launched, projected, or placed in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to operations, installations, personnel, or material and remains unexploded either by malfunction or design or for any other cause. Also called UXO. See also explosive ordnance. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-42).

**verification**—1. In arms control, any action, including inspection, detection, and identification, taken to ascertain compliance with agreed measures. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-41)
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