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PREWAR |
1984
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The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) sends a team to United
States Central Command (CENTCOM) to study its intelligence support requirements
and the feasibility of attaching a DIA intelligence production element to
CENTCOM headquarters.
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1985 |
DIA becomes one of the first national agencies to assign a
permanent representative at CENTCOM. Also, an eleven-man DIA intelligence
production element is attached to CENTCOM headquarters.
DIA opens a US Defense Attache Office (USDAO) in Baghdad to expand access
to developments in Iraq and obtain information on the Iran-Iraq War.
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1987 |
The Defense Attache (DATT) in Baghdad gains unprecedented
access to senior Iraqi military leaders in the wake of the attack on the
USS STARK and sets up procedures to deconflict Iraqi and US operations in
the Gulf.
DIA establishes the Operational Intelligence Crisis Center (OICC) to enhance
its capability to respond to crisis situations. DIA designed the OICC to
muster resources quickly to surge on a problem and then convert analysis
to operationally relevant products and support.
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1988
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DIA augments the Persian Gulf Working Group (PGWG) in the
National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) at the Pentagon with additional
personnel to track on a 24-hour basis the tanker war, the Iran-Iraq ground
war, the air threat, the SILKWORM threat, and other developments.
DIA initiates the National Military Intelligence support Team
(NMIST) concept to augment intelligence support to commands during crisis
operations. NMISTs are mobile support teams deployed to commands to provide
analytical support and rapid dissemination of time-sensitive intelligence
information and products.
DIA's all-source threat assessments provide critical intelligence
for the US retaliatory strikes against the Iranian owned and occupied Rashadat
oil platform.
DIA intelligence support to US forces and allies in the Persian Gulf intensifies
as the Iran-Iraq War expands in a renewed "War of the Cities"
and spills into the Gulf. DIA provides operational elements predeployment
briefings and support for retaliatory strikes against Iran.
Iraqi ground forces launch a series of five crushing offensive
operations catching the Iranians ill-prepared and destroying their will
to fight. |
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Iran accepts United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 598,
leading to the 20 August cease-fire that ends the bloody eight-year war
with Iraq.
DIA upgrades and renovates the NMIC as an integrated, state-of-the-art
intelligence facility. NMIC components include the Alert Center, Collection
Coordination Facility, and intelligence tasks forces area. |
| 1989 |
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| April |
CENTCOM assesses that Iraq will be the next likely regional threat in
the wake of the Iran-Iraq War and the decline of the Soviet threat. |
| August |
DIA military capability analysts disseminate Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
scenario to CENTCOM and other commands. CENTCOM concurs with analysis by
late 1989. It becomes the scenario for CENTCOM¹s Command Post Exercise
(CPX) INTERNAL LOOK, in July 1990.
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| November |
A Defense Intelligence Brief (DIB), The Iraqi Threat to the GCC [Gulf
Cooperation Council] States, presents an assessment of Iraqi military capabilities
and options to take military action against Kuwait, without dealing with
the likelihood of such actions.
A Defense Intelligence Assessment, Iraqi Military Developments Through
1992, asserts: "Iraq is unlikely to launch military operations against
any of its Arab neighbors over the next three years with the possible exception
of Syria....To protect its image of moderation, Iraq is unlikely to take
military action against Kuwait." |
| 1990 |
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February |
DIA publishes an Intelligence Study,Iraqi Ground and Air Forces
Doctrine, Tactics, and Operations, based on Iraqi Army and Air Force performance
during the Iran-Iraq War.
DIA analysts participate in a war game of Iraqi invasion of
the Arabian Peninsula organized by the Naval War College (NWC) Strategic
Studies Group. |
24 April |
CENTCOM establishes Iraq Regional Warning Problem and assumes
Watch Condition (WATCHCON) Level IV (defined as "potential threat"
to US citizens, interests, and operating forces), and thereby increasing
the intelligence collection priority against Iraq. (WATCHCON is an expression
of intelligence interest and concern relative to the potential threat outlined
in a Warning Problem. A Warning Problem for a country or region is a set
of detectable events that might lead to a threat or crisis.) |
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NOTE: When a specific date is not known, a monthly entry will
be indicated. |
April |
JSW (Directorate for Indications and Warning) adds Iraq as
a "regional threat" to the Indications and Warning (I&W) System
based on concerns voiced by CENTCOM and DIA. DIA and US Commands formally
begin monitoring Iraqi activities for indications of war preparations. |
May |
DIA participates in CENTCOM's war game of Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. |
11 June |
CENTCOM issues first status change to Warning Problem. (A
status change to a Problem is made whenever detectable events arise which
change the likelihood that the threat might ensue.) |
July |
DIA analysts participate in a three-week-long NWC war game
of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The war game mirrors reality as crisis approaches
in Iraq and Kuwait. |
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17 July
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Saddam Hussein delivers a strongly worded speech condemning
Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) oil policies.
Intelligence Community receives first unconfirmed reports
of a troop buildup in southern Iraq.
Kuwait deploys forces to defend Kuwait City and puts armed
forces on full alert in response to Iraqi threats. |
| 18 July |
CENTCOM issues a Worldwide Warning and Indicator Monitoring System
(WWIMS) status change to the DoD intelligence warning community and its
subordinate commands concerning the Iraqi propaganda and diplomatic campaign
against Kuwait.
DIA receives a request from CENTCOM for additional imagery coverage
of Iraq and Kuwait after an Iraqi demarche to Kuwait. |
| 19 July |
DIA receives first reports of movement of two Iraqi divisions to deployment
areas near the Kuwaiti border.
Defense Intelligence Officer (DIO) for Middle East, South Asia, and
Terrorism (MESAT) sends a message to the DIA Director stating that the Iraqi
activity near the Kuwaiti border is "not a rehearsal." This message
is forwarded to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). |
| (Click on Map to see image.) |
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| Iraq claimed the disputed island of Bubiyan and Warbah |
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| 20 July |
DI-6 (Foreign Exchanges and Disclosures Division) grants authorization
for CENTCOM to release data on Iraq to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
A Defense Intelligence Digest (DID) article speculates that, "Iraq
is unlikely to use significant force against Kuwait, such as the occupation
of Warbah and Bubiyan Islands.... Small-scale incursions are possible."
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) requests DIA develop a list of targets
in Iraq. OICC, located at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC),
Bolling AFB, initiates targeting support for CENTCOM.
DIA analysts detect the movement of artillery and tank battalions
in southeastern Iraq, 30 miles north of the Kuwaiti border. Some are loaded
on heavy equipment transports (HETs). |
| 20-28 July |
CENTCOM conducts CPX INTERNAL LOOK 90 to examine new Operational Plan
(OPLAN) 1002, Defense of the Arabian Peninsula, to validate operational
and logistical support concepts. |
21 July |
DC-1 (Current Operations Division, Directorate for Collection)
reports that Iraqi forces are moving closer to the border. Elements of two
additional armored divisions join the original Iraqi armored brigade, but
there are no logistics support units with these forces.
CENTCOM and DIA raise WATCHCON to Level III (defined as "increased
threat" to US citizens, interests, and operating forces). |
22 July |
DIA receives reports of more than 3000 military vehicles moving
south on the road from Baghdad toward Kuwait and 27 free rocket over ground
(FROG) transporter erector launchers (TELs) being loaded onto railroad cars.
DC-1 reports 20 FROG rocket airframes being loaded onto trucks
for transport. DIA analysts report a total of 305 T-72 tanks, 167 BMP armored
personnel carriers, and 198 artillery pieces present in assembly areas north
of the Kuwaiti border.
DIA activates the Iraq/Kuwait Regional Working Group (IZKUWG)
at the Pentagon. (A working group is activated by DIA whenever additional
manpower is needed to cover a developing crisis in a region of the world). |
23 July |
Kuwait deploys forces to the border area while the UAE increases
its combat air patrols.
DC-1 reports that more artillery and the first surface-to-air
missile unit, an SA-9 battery, have deployed to the border. DC-1 also reports
a logistics site is being established near the border.
DC-1 produces the first of many collection posture statements
(CPS) on the Iraq-Kuwait crisis. |
23-24 July |
VP (Directorate for Foreign Intelligence) and DX (Directorate
for Imagery Exploitation) analysts hold videolink meetings with JSJ (Directorate
for JCS Intelligence Support) and JCS J-3 (Operations Directorate) to discuss
targets. |
24 July |
KC-135 aircraft deploy to the UAE for Exercise IVORY JUSTICE
which was a demonstration of US concern and support.
CENTCOM raises WATCHCON to Level II (defined as "significant
threat" to US citizens, interests, and operating forces).
DIA issues WWIMS Warning Report to policy officials and the
Intelligence Community assessing Iraq to have enough military force in place
to achieve its goals regarding Kuwait. |
25 July |
A meeting called by OPEC opens to address the Iraqi claims
of continued Kuwaiti over-quota oil production and to defuse the mounting
crisis at the Iraq/Kuwait border area.
Defense Special Assessment (DSA) states: "Iraq is using
rhetoric, diplomatic pressure, and significant military posturing to force
Kuwait to comply with recent oil and economic demands. Although unlikely
to use military pressure, Iraq is marshaling forces sufficient to invade
Kuwait. With forces currently in place, Iraq would be able to overwhelm
Kuwaiti forces and likely occupy its limited objectives within 48 hours,
or all of Kuwait in 5 days."
DIA goes to WATCHCON II and issues WWIMS Warning Report stating
Iraqi military forces fully capable of military actions against Kuwait.
DI-6 asks the Secretary of Defense for permission to begin
providing information on Iraq to Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE,
and Qatar. |
(Click on Map to see image.) |
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Iraqi Republican Guard Forces on the Kuwaiti border,
1 August 1990. |
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DI-3 (Legislative Affairs Division) arranges a briefing
for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) on the Gulf crisis.
When asked by senior members of the SSCI about indicators of an Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait, a DIA analyst replies that the indicators have already been seen. |
26 July |
Kuwait adopts a partial stand down of its infantry and armor
units as tensions diminish because of growing confidence in successful OPEC
negotiations. Saudi Arabia states it will not tolerate an Iraqi takeover
of Kuwait. |
27 July |
DID reports the tensions between Baghdad and Kuwait are subsiding,
though military forces remain deployed. Report speculates that Kuwait will
give Saddam most of what he wants to avoid military confrontation.
DIA receives reports that the logistics train to support the Iraqi Republican
Guard Forces Command (RGFC) is moving south toward the Kuwaiti border.
Both DIA and CENTCOM have intelligence sources on the ground
in Kuwait City who subsequently report first hand on developments there.
DIO for MESAT and analysts from DB-8 (Middle East/Africa Division,
Directorate for Research) meet with the Kuwaiti Ambassador to the US at
the Pentagon and tell him unequivocally that Iraq is going to invade Kuwait. |
29 July |
OICC personnel meet with RS (Directorate for Resources) in
anticipation of crisis support to prioritize resources, including: photo
lab, graphics, distribution, library, and print shop support. |
30 July |
DID states that, "Saddam will probably maintain Iraq's
military stance until Kuwait agrees to his demands. Some military action
is likely if Kuwait is resolute."
DIO for MESAT sends E-mail message to the DIA Director warning
that Iraq is not "...bluffing."
DIA begins producing operational support packages (OSP) on
primary targets and basic target graphics (BTG) on primary and secondary
targets in support of CENTCOM Target List.
CENTCOM sends DIA a request for additional imagery coverage on Iraq. |
30-31 July |
OICC recalls 17 VP analysts to work through the night to support
a Commander in Chief, CENTCOM (CINCCENT) target briefing to the JCS. |
31 July |
CINCCENT briefs CJCS and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
on deployment options.
DSA states "Unless Kuwait's negotiators can offer a sufficiently
attractive package of economic aid, reparations, or grants, ...Baghdad
may consider taking what the Kuwaitis are unwilling to offer at the negotiating
table.
DIO for MESAT sends a message to DIA Director and Deputy Director
for JCS Support (JS) warning that Saddam is not bluffing and that his force
is sufficient to conquer both Kuwait and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia.
The OPEC meeting ends in failure and the participants returned
home. The situation remains unsolved but tensions seem to be at a lower
level. |
1 August |
DIA analysts confirm the movement to forward assembly areas
of artillery units required for offensive operations. |
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Iraqi assault operations, 2 August 1990,
showing the main attack in the center, a supporting attack in the west and
an airmobile assault in the east.
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(Click on Map to see image.) |
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CENTCOM and DIA go to WATCHCON I (defined as a "clear
and immediate threat" to US citizens, interests, and operating forces).
This is the first time a command or agency goes to WATCHCON I in advance
of a conflict.
CENTCOM and DIA issue WWIMS Warning Reports that an Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait is imminent.
DIA establishes Iraqi Regional Intelligence Task Force
(ITF) by expanding the IZKUWG. The expanded Task Force moves into the ITF
spaces in the NMIC at the Pentagon. |
2 August |
Iraqi forces invade Kuwait and drive to the Kuwaiti/Saudi
Arabia border area.
CINCCENT presents military options to President Bush and the
National Security Council (NSC). |
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CJCS issues a Warning Order alerting military units to prepare
to deploy.
CENTCOM begins to develop courses of action and examine alternative force
levels to respond to the crisis.
OICC establishes extended manning in response to the activation
of the ITF. The OICC provides specialized targeting products, detailed and
in-depth analysis, battle damage assessments for CENTCOM, ground order of
battle (OB) information, special studies, and strategic estimates.
DAT-6 (Middle East/Africa Division) begins 24-hour operations
at Clarendon, tasking worldwide collection.
DAT-6 Country Officer is detailed to the J-5 (JCS Directorate
for Strategic Plans and Policy) Iraq Strategic Studies Group, the organization
that is to draft a national policy response for senior leaders.
DI-1 (Director¹s Staff Group Division) starts Monday
and Thursday briefings to Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) principals
and staff.
DC compiles a list of targets in Iraq to monitor chemical
warfare (CW) sites and Iraqi reinforcements.
OSC-5 (Security Programs Division) briefs JS representatives
at NMIC on Iraqi intelligence services.
FBI reinforces the DIA terrorism watch with an FBI agent.
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2-11 August |
DC-1 briefs DIA Director twice on imagery intelligence
(IMINT) system options. Also briefed is the National Security Advisor¹s
Chief of Staff. |
3 August |
J-5 Iraq Strategic Studies Group, with DIA representation,
forwards draft strategy paper to the CJCS. He passes it to the Secretary
of Defense, who delivers it to the President. The four goals set out in
this paper are identical to the four objectives mentioned by the President
in his 5 and 8 August policy speeches. ITF spaces expand. VP analysts augment
ITF. The ITF serves mainly as an administrative clearing house for taskings
and provides numerous high-level briefings.
DX-6 (Current Imagery Division) requests coverage of Scud
missile sites.
DI-3 coordinates briefing for the Defense Subcommittee and staff of the
House Appropriations Committee. |
4 August |
The President and the NSC hear CINCCENT and Air Force Component,
Central Command (CENTAF) briefings at Camp David on military options.
DM-1 (Plans, Programs, and Policy Division, Directorate for Imagery Management)
receives first National Military Intelligence Support Team (NMIST) cable
from CENTAF.
DI-3 coordinates briefing on the Gulf crisis for 67 senators. |
5 August |
President Bush states that Iraqi aggression ³shall not
stand² and frames US national policy objectives: |
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- Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces
from Kuwait;
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- Restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government
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- Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf; and
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- Safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad.
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6 August |
The USS INDEPENDENCE, in the North Arabian Sea, is within
range to launch air strikes against Iraqi forces, if necessary.
OICC provides VP augmentees to form NMISTs.
DX-5 (Regional Analysis Division, Directorate f or Imagery
Exploitation) initiates production of an Iraqi ground forces overlay and
report, providing an overview of the disposition of Iraqi forces located
in southern Iraq and Kuwait.
UN Resolution 661 calls for restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty,
independence, and territorial integrity, and for an embargo on Iraq.
SECDEF, CINCCENT, and other CENTCOM officials travel to Jiddah,
Saudi Arabia to seek King Fahd¹s agreement to deploy US forces. The
King grants permission for the operation.
DAH (Operations Division, Directorate for Attaches and Operations) begins
providing daily DESERT SHIELD DoD human intelligence (HUMINT) collection
posture and situation updates to DIA leadership.
DIA maintains daily telephonic contact with its source in
Kuwait City. This source details the Iraqi consolidation of the city and
ongoing military operations.
DI-4 (Foreign Liaison Division) begins daily intelligence
summary (INTSUM) distribution and briefings to selected foreign attaches. |
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