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*1st Session* }

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R E P O R T  
OF THE  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
COVERING THE PERIOD  
JANUARY 4, 2019  
TO  
JANUARY 3, 2021



MARCH 23, 2021.—Ordered to be printed

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## PREFACE

The Select Committee on Intelligence submits to the Senate this report on its activities from January 4, 2019, to January 3, 2021. This report also includes references to activities underway at the conclusion of the 116th Congress that the Committee expects to continue into the future.

Under the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress, the Committee is charged with the responsibility of carrying out oversight of the programs and activities of the Intelligence Community (IC) of the United States. Most of the Committee's oversight work is conducted in secret and cannot be discussed publicly to protect sensitive IC sources and methods. Nevertheless, the Select Committee on Intelligence has submitted activities reports on a biennial basis since 1977 to provide the American public with information about its intelligence oversight activities. We submit this report to the Senate, in observance of this practice.

We also take this opportunity to thank all of the members of the Committee in the 116th Congress. In particular, we take special note of a colleague who completed her service on the Committee. Senator Harris served on the Committee from the 115th Congress until she retired from the U.S. Senate on January 18, 2021, in order to assume the office of Vice President of the United States. Her commitment to the important work of the Committee has helped to ensure a strong IC and a secure nation. We are grateful for her contributions.

We also express our deep gratitude for the work of all members of the Committee's staff during the 116th Congress. Their vigilance, professionalism, and perseverance in the face of unprecedented public health challenges were essential to the Committee's fulfillment of its oversight obligations.

MARK R. WARNER,  
*Chairman.*

MARCO RUBIO,  
*Vice Chairman.*



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## COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES

MARCH 23, 2021.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. WARNER, from the Committee on Intelligence,  
submitted the following

## R E P O R T

### I. INTRODUCTION

The activities of the Committee during the 116th Congress included passage of critical enabling legislation, confirmation of appointees to key intelligence leadership posts, inquiries on the performance and activities of the Intelligence Community (IC), and completion of the Committee’s investigation of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

As detailed in Part II of this report, the Committee’s paramount legislative priority in the 116th Congress was enactment of the *Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) for Fiscal Years (FY) 2018, 2019, and 2020, and the IAA for FY 2021*.

The Committee also dedicated considerable effort to completing and publishing a comprehensive, five-volume report on Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election. The investigation underlying this report comprised witness interviews, hearings, staff briefings, site visits, and frequent interactions with IC leadership and personnel from across the counterintelligence enterprise.

Notably, the COVID–19 global pandemic had a direct impact on the Committee during the second session of the 116th Congress. The Committee adapted to the coronavirus during 2020, prioritizing protection of public health, while continuing to perform its critical oversight mission. While most Senate offices shifted to mostly or fully remote operations, the Committee did not have that option because of the requirements for physical access to classified spaces and communications networks to perform its oversight of sensitive intelligence activities.

Despite the challenges that the pandemic posed, the Committee committed to a schedule that physically separated staff while continuing to meet its oversight obligations—passing authorizing legislation, conducting regular hearings, processing presidential nomi-

nations, and meeting routinely with representatives of the IC to conduct oversight. Member events complied with Office of the Attending Physician guidelines. Staff were provided greater information technology tools to enhance their ability to work remotely. Staff were also given additional access to secure Senate office space to conduct their work.

## II. LEGISLATION

### A. DAMON PAUL NELSON AND MATTHEW YOUNG POLLARD INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019, AND 2020

In the 116th Congress, the Committee emphasized the continued enactment of annual intelligence authorization acts as a primary means of its oversight. During the prior term, the individual Intelligence Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019 were not enacted. The Committee re-introduced the *Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019* (S. 245) on January 28, 2019. (Messrs. Nelson and Pollard were staff members of the House and Senate intelligence committees, respectively, who had recently passed away.) The Senate did not act on that bill. Therefore, at the start of the 116th Congress, the Committee continued to work with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and pursue passage of an Intelligence Authorization Act that covered Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020.

The intelligence entities covered by the annual budget reviews included: the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); the intelligence capabilities of the military services and the U.S. Coast Guard; and, the intelligence-related components of the Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI), as well as the Departments of State, Treasury, Energy, and Homeland Security, and the Drug Enforcement Administration.

As part of its budget review, the Committee received testimony from senior IC officials in closed hearings. Committee budget monitors evaluated classified budget justifications submitted by the Executive Branch. Based on those reviews, the Committee prepared a classified annex to its annual authorization bill and report. This annex contained a classified schedule of authorizations and classified direction to IC elements.

The Committee also reviewed the Administration's legislative proposals for the bill, which included new or amended legislative authority requested by the IC.

The Committee passed the *Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020*, reported the bill (S.1589) on May 22, 2019, and subsequently issued an accompanying report (S. Rpt. 116-47) on June 11, 2019. The full Senate passed the *Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020* as Divisions F and G of the Senate-passed *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020* on June 27, 2019 (S.1790), by a vote of 86-8.



The House of Representatives passed the *Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020* (H.R. 3494) on July 17, 2019, by a vote of 397–31. The Committee proceeded to work with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and other congressional committees on a final version of the legislation.

Subsequently, the Senate and House intelligence committees included the joint *Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020* as Division E of the *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020* (S. 1790). The House passed S. 1790 on December 11, 2019, by a vote of 377–48. The Senate passed S. 1790 on December 17, 2019, by a vote of 86–8. The President signed S. 1790 into law on December 20, 2019 (Public Law 116–92).

As enacted, the *Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020* authorizes fiscal year 2020 funding for intelligence and intelligence-related activities across the U.S. Government and includes a classified schedule of authorizations and a classified annex.<sup>1</sup> It also retroactively authorized funding for fiscal years 2018 and 2019. The Act contained a number of legislative provisions, including:

- A provision that seeks to deter foreign influence in U.S. elections and counter aggression from Russia and other foreign actors by increasing capabilities to detect Russian activities, including active measures campaigns and illicit financial transactions;
- A provision requiring assessments of Russian cyber threats and influence campaigns, and facilitating information sharing among state, local, and Federal officials;
- A provision creating an independent Social Media Data and Threat Analysis Center to support the IC’s role in countering Russian propaganda;
- A requirement for the DNI to designate a national counterintelligence (CI) officer within the National Counterintelligence Security Center (NCSC) to lead election security-related CI matters;
- A provision requiring ongoing notifications of travel by certain Russian Federation personnel in the U.S. and any potential active measures campaigns conducted by those individuals;
- A provision requiring reporting on Chinese influence campaigns directed at Taiwan, including United States actions to disrupt such operations, as well as reporting on surveillance technologies;
- A provision requiring a plan for reducing the security clearance background investigation backlog;
- A requirement for a DNI-led task force to protect IC supply chains from foreign CI risks from Russia, China, and other adversaries;
- A provision requiring the IC to account for foreign threats to our infrastructure before entering into foreign intelligence sharing agreements;

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<sup>1</sup>The Act deemed as authorized the funds already appropriated for fiscal years 2019 and 2019.

- A provision increasing pay scales for IC employees with science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) expertise in cyber missions;
- A provision intended to improve retention and recruiting for underrepresented populations;
- A requirement for the DNI to establish an advisory council to incorporate climate security analysis across IC components, and to facilitate coordination with non-IC agencies;
- A provision establishing a pilot program with the National Labs and energy sector to partner with covered entities and protect against security vulnerabilities;
- A provision establishing requirements to strengthen the oversight function performed by the IC Inspector General and promote consistency in IC whistleblower processes and procedures; and
- A requirement for ODNI, FBI, and DHS to conduct a strategic intelligence assessment of domestic terrorism, consistent with U.S. Person protections.

#### B. INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021

In early 2020, the Committee began consideration of the President's request for funding levels and legislative authority for fiscal year 2021. The Committee's budget monitors evaluated the requests submitted by the Executive Branch. Committee staff received a number of briefings, and the Committee conducted classified budget hearings.

The Committee reported the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021* (S. 3905) on June 8, 2020, and subsequently reported an accompanying report (S. Rpt. 116–233) on June 17, 2020. The Committee subsequently incorporated its *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021* as Division F of the *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021* (S. 4049), which passed the Senate on July 23, 2020, by a vote of 86–14.

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence passed its version of the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021* (H.R. 7856) on July 31, 2020, and then reported the bill to the full House and issued an accompanying report (H. Rpt. 116–595) on October 30, 2020. The Committee proceeded to work with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and other congressional committees on a final version of the legislation.

The product of the two committees' efforts, the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021*, was incorporated as Division W of the *Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2021* (P.L. 116–260). The *Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2021* passed the House on December 21, 2020, in two separate measures by votes of 359–53 and 327–85, and passed the Senate that same day as a consolidated measure by a vote of 92–6. The President signed the consolidated bill into law on December 27, 2020.

The *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021* authorized funding for intelligence and intelligence-related activities across the U.S. Government and included a classified schedule of authorizations and a classified annex. The Act as incorporated in the *Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2021* ensures accountability and integrity from our IC agencies, which undertake

our most sensitive intelligence programs and activities, and contained a number of legislative provisions, including:

- A provision requiring assessments on risks to national security from consumer genetic testing, and mitigation efforts being taken in response by the IC and DoD;
- A provision requiring complex, extensive assessments of current U.S. critical technologies and their requisite supply chains;
- A provision intended to afford IC agencies the tools and resources their respective workforce hiring and retention objectives require;
- A provision requiring reporting on intelligence sharing with “Five Eyes” foreign partners that have or intend to use adversary telecommunications or cybersecurity equipment;
- A provision requiring reporting on foreign governments’ use of commercially-available cyber intrusion and surveillance technology;
- Provisions requiring reporting on Chinese Community Party (CCP) corruption, CCP influence operations against technology sectors, and potential CCP information suppression and/or exploitation relative to COVID-19;
- A provision requiring reporting on Russian and Eastern European oligarchs’ corruption and illegal activities; and
- Provisions intended to strengthen open source information capabilities across the IC, in part by requiring IC strategies for coordinated collection and analysis of open source information.

### III. OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

#### A. HEARINGS

##### 1. *Worldwide Threats Hearing*

Since 1994, the Committee has held annual open hearings to review the Intelligence Community’s assessment of the current and projected national security threats to the United States. There was only one year (1999) when the Committee did not hold a Worldwide Threats hearing. It is one of the few open hearings that the Committee has regularly conducted to share the work of the IC with the public. These “Worldwide Threats” hearings cover national security concerns in all geographic regions, as well as transnational threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

On January 29, 2019, the Committee held an open Worldwide Threats hearing on the current and projected threats to the United States. The lead witness before the Committee was DNI Daniel R. Coats. He was joined at the witness table by the Honorable Gina Haspel, Director of the CIA; the Honorable Christopher Wray, Director of the FBI; General Paul Nakasone, Director of the NSA; Lieutenant General Robert Ashley, Director of the DIA; and Mr. Robert Cardillo, Director of the NGA. The open hearing was followed by a closed hearing session with the Committee. Director Coats’ unclassified prepared statement for the record is available in the Hearings section of the Committee’s website and the record of the open hearing is printed as S. Hrg. 116-75. A video recording of the full hearing can also be found on the Committee’s website.

At the hearing, Director Coats identified election security as a top priority for the IC, adding the IC's assessment that "foreign actors will view the 2020 U.S. elections as an opportunity to advance their interests." He also noted the IC's expectation that foreign actors would "refine their capabilities and add new tactics as they learn from each other's experiences and efforts in previous elections."

Director Coats also explained the principal "state actor" threats facing the United States in terms of a "big four," comprising China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Director Coats highlighted China's exercise of its intelligence and influence apparatus to shape international views and gain advantages, in furtherance of Beijing's intent to "diminish U.S. influence and extend its own economic, political, and military reach." On the subject of Russia, Director Coats indicated that Moscow was escalating its campaign to "divide Western political and security institutions and undermine the post-World War II international order," in part, by waging an "information war against democracies, and [using] social media to attempt to divide our societies." Regarding North Korea, Director Coats noted that the regime had "halted its provocative behavior related to its WMD program," however tempering the observation with the assessment that Pyongyang "will seek to retain its WMD capabilities and is unlikely to completely give up its nuclear weapons and production capabilities because its leaders ultimately view nuclear weapons as critical to regime survival." Director Haspel later added that the North Korean regime "is committed to developing a long-range nuclear armed missile that would pose a direct threat to the United States."

While the Committee repeatedly engaged with the IC to arrange for a Worldwide Threats Hearing to be held in the second session of the 116th Congress, scheduling conflicts, sustained assertions of witness unavailability, and an apparent general reluctance by Administration officials to appear before the Committee to discuss publicly intelligence threat assessments prevented the Committee from holding a Worldwide Threats Hearing in 2020.

## *2. Russia*

During the 116th Congress, the Committee focused extensively on the Russian threat to U.S. national security. In addition to its report on Russian active measures campaigns and interference in the 2016 U.S. election, the Committee continued robust oversight of intelligence relating to the threat posed by Russia's other malign activities around the world. These threats include Russia's traditional and cyber espionage; its continued reliance on misinformation and disinformation to target global audiences and interfere with elections and democratic processes in the United States and around the world; the buildup of its conventional, strategic, and asymmetric arsenals; its increasingly assertive military deployments on its periphery and to wider regions, including the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America; its use of mercenary groups and private military and security corporations such as the Wagner Group; its support of like-minded authoritarian regimes; and its use of corruption and criminal networks to further its strategic goals. The Committee held a number of closed hearings on these

and other issues to assess the IC's posture to warn of, analyze, understand, expose, and counter the Russian threat.

### *3. Afghanistan*

The IC's contribution to the U.S. effort in Afghanistan has been a constant focus of the Committee since 2001. As the U.S. neared the 20-year mark of its latest involvement in Afghanistan, the Committee continued its oversight—through hearings, briefings, roundtables, and pre-pandemic staff travel to the region—on the IC's operations and analysis in support of U.S. policy. Following the signing of the February 29, 2020, U.S.-Taliban agreement, the Committee focused on the IC's collection on Taliban adherence to its stated commitments, as well as the IC's coordination with DOD and State Department plans for an eventual drawdown of the U.S. presence.

### *4. Western Hemisphere/Latin America*

The Committee focused its efforts on monitoring the ongoing crisis in Venezuela, travelling to meet with allies in the region to deepen bilateral engagement, and maintaining an awareness of elections in several key Latin American countries. The Committee continued to monitor illicit trafficking; narcotics production; the threat posed by violent transnational criminal organizations to the United States and the stability of the region; the military and intelligence activities of U.S. adversaries in Latin America, including an increase in Chinese and Russian engagements; and the mystery illnesses (including brain injuries) contracted by U.S. Government personnel in Havana, Cuba, and elsewhere, which are likely the result of a directed energy attack by a foreign adversary. Oversight activities included numerous staff and Member briefings, additional hearings, and visits to the region.

### *5. Iran*

The Committee held a number of hearings on Iran with the purpose of overseeing the IC's ability to collect intelligence and provide assessments to policymakers on Iran's intentions and evolving capabilities in areas such as its nuclear program, role in the Middle East, and support to terrorist groups. In addition to hearings, the Committee consistently held briefings related to Iran's nuclear program and its destabilizing activities in the region and beyond. Over the course of significant developments related to Iran, the Committee examined U.S. security and that of U.S. allies and partners in the region, monitored reporting on evolving threats, and probed the adequacy of the IC's posture to defend against those threats. Committee members and staff also engaged officials from partner countries on dynamics related to Iran.

### *6. Asia-Pacific Region*

The Asia-Pacific region was the focus of considerable Committee time and attention throughout the 116th Congress. Intended to facilitate a continual evaluation of the IC's collection posture and analytic capabilities relative to the national security threats emanating from the region, the Committee traveled to the region, held numerous Member and staff briefings, and dedicated nine Committee hearings to China, North Korea, regional geopolitical dy-

namics, and counterintelligence related topics. The Committee also received briefings and reports on the region from the National Intelligence Council, CIA, the Defense Department, the State Department, and nongovernmental organizations.

These activities were central to the Committee fulfilling its oversight mandate to ensure the IC duly informs the national-level policymaking process. In particular, the Committee's efforts on North Korea focused on political-military issues related to WMD programs and denuclearization. On China, the Committee spent considerable time reviewing Beijing's increasingly globalized activities, relentless pursuit of illicit technology transfer, targeted human rights abuses and repression, and lack of transparency on the initial outbreak and response to the COVID 19 outbreak.

The Chairman, Vice Chairman, and Members of the Committee also provided over a dozen classified and unclassified briefings—in partnership with the DNI, Principal Deputy DNI and top counterintelligence leaders at the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, FBI, and DHS—to the private sector on strategic economic and technological threats stemming from Beijing. Committee staff also convened meetings between the IC elements' top privacy and civil liberties officers, human resource leaders, security officials, and representatives of ethnic heritage groups to address allegations of bias and profiling in security and law enforcement practices that may have occurred as an inadvertent result of efforts to counter China's aggression.

### *7. Middle East and North Africa*

The Committee continued to focus on developments in the Middle East during the 116th Congress. The Committee held multiple hearings, hosted many briefings, and monitored events that bore on the security of the United States, our allies, and our partners. The Committee also analyzed the resources the IC devoted to understanding those developments and delivering advantage to U.S. decision-makers. In Syria and Iraq, Iran's paramilitary activity, Russia and Turkey's military deployments, Assad's war crimes, and recidivism among Islamic Statefighters risk extending and deepening the conflict. Yemen remains at risk of humanitarian catastrophe, and conflict involving Iranian supported Houthi forces, Yemeni government forces, and the Saudi-led military intervention is exacerbating the country's instability. Iran also directed or supported attacks against its neighbors, and proliferated advanced weapons throughout the region, undermining the stability and security of other nations. Committee Members and staff traveled throughout the region and met with U.S. partners to better understand and consider options related to many of these challenges.

Committee Members and staff also monitored events in North Africa with implications for U.S. security and that of our allies and partners in the region and adjacent regions through a series of hearings, briefings, and travel. The war in Libya remains a stalemate threatening the health and livelihoods of the Libyan people as well as the security of Libya's neighbors—risks that are elevated by the presence and involvement of Russian military and contract security elements. The political situation in several other North African countries is also an area of focus for the Committee, as gov-

ernments continue to evolve following the Arab Spring, and foreign governments seek to undermine these countries' sovereignty.

## B. INVESTIGATIONS AND REVIEWS

### 1. *Investigation of Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election*

On January 24, 2017, the Committee began a bipartisan investigation into Russian interference in the U.S. elections. Unlike previous Committee investigations, there was no separate vote to initiate it; the investigation was considered a part of the Committee's regular oversight responsibilities. During the following 43 months, the Committee interviewed over 200 witnesses, reviewed over a million pages of documents, and held open and closed hearings on: election security; social media and disinformation; a review of the January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment covering Russian activities; and the U.S. Government's response to Russia's efforts to interfere in the 2016 U.S. elections. The Committee's efforts were distinctive for their investigative scope, authority, breadth, and depth, particularly in contrast to two other related investigations occurring in parallel. One was begun by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in January 2017 to investigate Russian interference in the 2016 elections, an effort that concluded in March 2018.

The other began on May 17, 2017, when the Department of Justice appointed former FBI Director Robert Mueller as a Special Counsel to investigate potential criminal activity surrounding Russian interference in the 2016 elections. The overlap among these reviews led to the Department of Justice resisting some Committee investigative activity and led to complications for witnesses to comply with the Committee inquiry.

The Committee interviewed then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions, former FBI Director James B. Comey, several high-ranking Obama administration cabinet officials, as well as members of President Trump's family, campaign, and business enterprise in order to ascertain the nature and extent of Russian influence activity in the 2016 U.S. elections. The Committee's investigation involved several novel legal and constitutional issues, including the first successful use of a congressional subpoena to obtain non-content subscriber information from telecommunications and social media companies. While the Committee was successful in obtaining voluntary testimony and document production from a vast majority of its witnesses, the Committee was required to issue multiple subpoenas to compel certain witnesses' testimony. The Committee's commitment to bipartisanship throughout the course of its investigation was integral to obtaining witness cooperation and access to documents held by the Executive Branch.

Given the large and complex nature of the investigation, the Committee adopted and released its Report, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election* (S. Rep. 116–290), in five volumes, the last of which was issued in August 2020. These volumes covered Russian efforts against election infrastructure (Volume 1), Russia's use of social media (Volume 2), the U.S. Government's response to the Russian efforts (Volume 3), a review of the Intelligence Community Assessment covering the Rus-

sian activities (Volume 4), and counterintelligence threats and vulnerabilities related to Russia (Volume 5). The Committee adopted each volume of its Report with broad bipartisan support and simultaneously adopted publicly releasable versions of each volume, posted on the Committee website. The Committee’s final unclassified Report totals 1,346 pages, and stands to date as the most complete account of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections.

### C. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ISSUES

#### 1. *Defense Intelligence Enterprise*

The Committee’s oversight of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) included travel to embassies and military bases, meetings with defense attaches, and numerous staff briefings. The Committee also held six hearings related to the DIE, its support to ballistic missile defense, and its view of global threats. DIE experts also provided critical analytic threat updates at numerous hearing.

In particular, the Committee’s oversight efforts focused on: DIA’s development of the Machine-Assisted Analytic Rapid-Repository System, a major system acquisition project; the DIE’s integration of machine learning and artificial intelligence; refreshing the IT technology platform known as the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) modernization; the transition from an IT concept of operation from network protection to data protection; reviewing defense intelligence support to federal law enforcement for First Amendment activities; DIE capabilities against hard target threats; defense and military counterintelligence reform efforts; reviewing the DIE’s open source intelligence strategy and investments profile; and COVID–19 response and workforce reconstitution plans.

#### 2. *Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017*

The Committee continued to monitor implementation of the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017 (S. 139, P.L. 115–118), as enacted on January 19, 2018, particularly the critical intelligence authorities against foreign targets, as set forth in Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 2008 (most notably against foreigners located abroad under Section 702). The Committee sought to ensure enhanced transparency and privacy protections for Americans and individuals in the United States.

#### 3. *USA FREEDOM Act*

The USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 included four foreign intelligence legal authorities that were set to expire on December 15, 2019. Those authorities included: (1) business records collection; (2) call detail records collection; (3) lone wolf targeting; and (4) roving wiretap surveillance. On November 21, 2019, Congress extended these authorities to March 15, 2020, as part of the *Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2020*, and *Further Health Extenders Act of 2019* (H.R. 3055, P.L. 116 69). Also on November 21, 2019, then-Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman Warner introduced the *Protecting Against International Terrorism Act of 2019* (S.2939), which extended all aforementioned authorities for eight years, with the exception of call detail records. (The Senate did not act on S. 2939.)



On March 11, 2020, the House of Representatives passed the *USA FREEDOM Reauthorization Act of 2020* (H.R. 6172) by a vote of 278–136. The bill extended the business records, lone wolf, and roving authorities through December 1, 2023, while repealing the call detail records collection authority. The bill also required FISA application accuracy reviews, expanded notifications of the use of business records in legal proceedings, limited business records retention periods (with certain exceptions), included penalties for FISA abuse, expanded *amicus curiae* participation in certain Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court matters, and required additional compliance and oversight.

On March 16, 2020, the Senate passed a bill to provide a 77-day extension of certain authorities for foreign intelligence and international terrorism investigations (S. 3501), which extended the business records, lone wolf, and roving authorities through May 30, 2020 (retroactive to March 14, 2020). (The House of Representatives did not act on this bill.)

On May 13, 2020, the Senate proceeded to consider H.R. 6172. Pursuant to a unanimous consent agreement requiring a 60-vote threshold, the Senate voted on three amendments: (1) an amendment cosponsored by Senators Lee and Leahy to expand the amici's authorities and access (agreed to by a vote of 77–19); (2) an amendment cosponsored by Senators Daines and Wyden to preclude the use of business records authorities to obtain Internet web browsing and search history information (not agreed to by a vote of 59–37); and (3) an amendment sponsored by Senator Paul that precluded targeting United States persons via FISA's electronic surveillance, physical searches, business records collections, and other foreign intelligence tools (not agreed to by a vote of 11–85). On May 14, 2020, the Senate passed H.R. 6172, as amended, by a vote of 80–16.

On May 28, 2020, by a vote of 284–122, the House of Representatives passed a motion to disagree with the Senate amendments and request a conference. Neither chamber has taken further action on the *USA FREEDOM Reauthorization Act of 2020*.

#### 4. IC Intelligence Analysis

The Committee conducted oversight of the IC's analytic enterprise during the 116th Congress, with an emphasis on analytic objectivity and duplication. Committee staff engaged with ODNI, CIA, and other agencies responsible for analytic production to ensure that IC analysis was meeting customer demands, devoid of politicization and compliant with standards for objectivity, and properly resourced. Committee staff held many engagements with the IC to better understand and reduce analytic duplication, while recognizing the virtue in analytic redundancy to promote diversity of perspective. The Committee also engaged with the IC on hiring and retention for hard-to-fill analytic positions. These topics were interwoven through multiple hearings during the 116th Congress. The most prominent hearing showcasing IC analysis, the annual Worldwide Threats Hearing, occurred in 2019, but not in 2020, due to the ODNI's reluctance to engage publicly with Congress on IC threat assessments, as discussed in Section III.A.1. of this Report.

### 5. *Fifth-Generation Telecommunications Technology (5G)*

The Committee investigated the significant national security implications posed by 5G telecommunications technology. Part of the challenge is the paucity of 5G equipment vendors, especially those that do not have a nexus with the Chinese Communist Party. The Committee convened several meetings with the leadership of several executive branch agencies and telecommunications companies to discuss the United States' strategy for 5G and opportunities to mitigate the related national security vulnerabilities.

The Committee also engaged with Five Eyes nations and other allies to develop and examine multi-national efforts to mitigate potential national security vulnerabilities. Recognizing that the United States must provide secure, competitive alternatives to Huawei's and ZTE's 5G technology, on June 8, 2020, the Committee included a provision in its Committee-reported *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021* (IAA), S. 3905, to establish:

- A Communications Technology Security and Innovation Fund to support the development and deployment of open standards-based compatible, interoperable equipment for fifth-generation wireless networks to create a more secure and diverse telecommunications vendor market; and
- A Multilateral Telecommunications Security Fund to support the adoption of secure and trusted communications technologies in key markets globally.

The Committee subsequently introduced an amendment to the Senate *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020* (NDAA) (S.4049) that established:

- A Public Wireless Supply Chain Innovation Fund for the NTIA Administrator (in consultation with other relevant agencies) to make grants that will support 5G research and its commercial application; and
- A Multilateral Telecommunications Security Fund for the Secretary of State (in consultation with other relevant agencies) to deploy funds, contingent on foreign government partners' agreement to participate in development and adoption of secure 5G technologies.

The Committee's amendment was incorporated into an NDAA Manager's Amendment, and passed as part of the Senate NDAA on July 23, 2020.

The provision was considered in the NDAA conference with other relevant Senate and House committees of jurisdiction. The NDAA conference report included a 5G provision that established the Public Wireless Supply Chain Innovation Fund and the Multilateral Telecommunications Security Fund, both of which the Committee will work to fund from future congressional appropriations. The provision further requires multiple reports to Congress for each respective fund.

The NDAA conference report passed the House and the Senate on December 8, 2020, and December 11, 2020 (H.R. 6395). The President vetoed the NDAA on December 23, 2020. On December 28, 2020, the House passed the NDAA over the President's veto by a vote of 322–87. On January 1, 2020, the Senate passed the NDAA over the President's veto by a vote of 81–13. The NDAA, with the aforementioned 5G provision, was enacted as Public Law Number 116–283.

## 6. Counterterrorism

During the 116th Congress, the Committee continued its oversight of the IC's counterterrorism efforts. This was done through a range of activities, including Committee hearings and roundtables, as well as staff-level briefings and engagement with the IC. In 2019, the Committee traveled overseas and visited multiple facilities to see firsthand the IC's counterterrorism efforts and evaluate plans, resources, and authorities.

SSCI authorized counterterrorism budgets and legal authorities accordingly based on this oversight. As the counterterrorism threat continued to evolve—both domestically and abroad—the Committee conducted multiple oversight meetings to ensure that the IC's authorities and resources align with this threat. This includes tracking transnational threats like racially and ethnically motivated violent extremist groups, as well as al-Qa'ida, ISIS core, and their global affiliates.

## 7. Cyber Domain

During the 116th Congress, Committee staff continued to monitor the IC's efforts to identify and track foreign cyber actors that pose threats to the United States and its allies. The establishment of the Cybersecurity Directorate at the National Security Agency aligns intelligence and information security resources under the Deputy National Manager for National Security Systems. The Committee conducted vigorous oversight of the establishment of this new organization to ensure its mission and resources are appropriate to advance the cybersecurity of the nation, without compromising NSA's commitment to its intelligence mission.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence also created the Cyber Executive, a new position that consolidates the National Intelligence Manager for Cyber, the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center, and the Intelligence Community's Security Center under a single responsible official. The Committee anticipates ongoing engagement with this new executive to bolster the cyber threat intelligence mission.

The Cyberspace Solarium Commission, established by section 1652 of the *John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019* (P.L. 115–232), delivered its final report on March 11, 2020, which contained a series of findings and recommendations to bolster the nation's cyber posture. The commission's report provided a series of legislative proposals that the Committee used as a basis to enhance the nation's cyber posture. One such proposal was the establishment of a National Cyber Director within the Executive Office of the President to coordinate the government's cyber activities, with the caveat that the National Cyber Director may not direct intelligence activities or resources and cannot modify classification of intelligence information.

The Committee also conducted oversight of the IC's activities to identify and track foreign cyber actors. However, the Committee faced difficulties in conducting effective oversight of joint cyber activities involving U.S. Cyber Command and the Intelligence Community.

### *8. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)*

The Committee staff conducted close oversight of ODNI as it underwent a number of personnel, organizational, and policy changes during the 116th Congress. A number of forced resignations (of DNI Dan Coats, Principal Deputy DNI (PDDNI) Sue Gordon, Acting DNI and Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Joe Maguire, Intelligence Community Inspector General Michael Atkinson, and Chief Operating Officer Deirdre Walsh), along with use of a novel position of “Principal Executive” to perform the duties of the PDDNI, created instability and leadership gaps that demanded close attention to ensure the DNI’s statutory functions could still be performed. The DNI’s unwillingness to testify at the Committee’s annual worldwide threats hearing was emblematic of the turbulence. At the close of the 116th Congress, four of the six ODNI positions subject to Senate confirmation—PDDNI, General Counsel, IC Inspector General, and Director of NCTC—were being fulfilled by “acting” officials or personnel “performing the duties of” that position, which required specific attention to ensure those offices’ missions were being fulfilled.

Committee staff held several briefings on organizational changes adopted by Acting DNI Ric Grenell and DNI John Ratcliffe, to include moving from four deputy DNIs to two; creating a new Director’s Adviser for Military Affairs; establishing “executives” for space, cyber, election threats, and economic security and financial intelligence; and altering the grade structure of the ODNI. Committee staff also scrutinized the impact of two Executive Orders—13950 on combating race and sex stereotyping, and 13957 regarding a new Schedule F in the excepted civil service—to ensure the ODNI could maintain a workforce ethos of inclusiveness and a commitment to objectivity.

Finally, the Committee closely reviewed a number of ODNI policy and programmatic initiatives. Staff closely monitored workforce initiatives to recruit, hire, develop, and retain a quality, diverse, and trusted workforce. Staff studied ODNI’s use of the Staff Reserve program to make temporary hires to ensure this program complied with, and did not circumvent, Office of Personnel Management guidelines. Staff continued quarterly briefings on the IC Information Technology Enterprise. Lastly, staff ensured ODNI was appropriately supporting the Biden-Harris transition once the General Services Administration ascertained the 2020 presidential election.

### *9. Covert Action*

The Committee conducted vigorous oversight of covert action programs throughout the 116th Congress. The Committee’s rules require the Committee’s Staff Director to “ensure that covert action programs of the United States government receive appropriate consideration once a quarter.” In accordance with this rule, the Committee receives a written report every quarter on each covert action that is being carried out under a presidential finding. Committee staff reviews these reports and meets with IC personnel to discuss their substance and pose additional questions. The Committee also holds periodic hearings and briefings on covert action programs, and receives written reviews of covert actions from the CIA Inspector General, which are often the basis for additional staff inquiries.

Further, under section 3093 of the National Security Act, the DNI and the heads of all departments, agencies, and entities of the United States Government involved in a covert action are required to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all covert actions that are the responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of any department or agency of the United States. Upon receiving such notifications, the Committee reviews the details of each and receives briefings to fully understand the issues.

The Committee seeks to ensure that covert action programs are consistent with United States foreign policy goals, and are conducted in accordance with all applicable U.S. laws.

### *10. Space*

During the 116th Congress, the Committee continued its oversight of the IC's role in the space domain. The Committee's ongoing efforts to ensure reliable and resilient access to, and operation in, space to provide intelligence support took on greater urgency in light of an increasingly hostile space environment. Committee oversight has been key in tracking growing requirements to improve the speed and quality of data delivered to the warfighter and other government customers, which is resulting in shifting roles and responsibilities among IC elements.

As Congress drafted legislation to establish the U.S. Space Force, the Committee supported preserving the NRO as a separate entity in the DoD, recognizing its key role in the national intelligence enterprise beyond its contributions to the DoD mission. The Committee continues to advocate for effective collaboration between NRO and the range of stakeholders in DoD.

The Committee held hearings and briefings on space launch capabilities, NRO's evolving approach to a "hybrid" space architecture, and adversary threats in space. The Committee also examined key budget and cross-cutting technology issues, such as artificial intelligence and cloud computing, and continued to encourage the NRO to capitalize on the ongoing revolution in the space sector, which has yielded reductions in the cost of launch, new kinds of sensors, smaller satellites, and more sophisticated data analytics and services.

In addition to hearings, the Committee and its staff engaged frequently on overhead architecture topics with the NRO, NGA, ODNI, and other IC and government officials, and conducted site visits to government facilities and commercial companies to meet with government officials and industry leaders. The Committee also closely monitored the establishment of the U.S. Space Force as the 18th and newest element of the IC to ensure it meets the standards set for all IC elements.

## D. OTHER MATTERS

### *1. Classification and Declassification*

The Committee continued its oversight of the government's classification and declassification systems to ensure that classified information is handled appropriately and that it is released to the public when the requirements for classification are no longer met. The Committee has exclusive oversight of the Office of the Director

of National Intelligence, which has statutory responsibilities for protecting sources and methods, as well as for developing, implementing, and overseeing security clearance policies and procedures as the federal government's Security Executive Agent. The staff met a number of times with the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) at the National Archives and Records Administration, which serves as the policy oversight mechanism for Executive Order 13526, "Classified National Security Information," and Executive Order 12829, "National Industrial Security Program." It also met with classification offices across the IC.

The Committee also met several times with the Public Interest Declassification Board (PIDB) to discuss the Board's recommendations related to the modernizing technology to make classification and declassification system more effective and efficient and creating a government-wide executive agent (specifically the Director of National Intelligence) for declassification. The Committee held a public hearing on declassification reform on September 9, 2020, with witnesses from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and a member of the PIDB. The *Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020* permanently reauthorized the PIDB, first authorized in the *IAA for Fiscal Year 2000*.

## 2. Whistleblowers and Matters of Urgent Concern

The Committee annually receives hundreds of phone calls, facsimiles, mail, and email communications from self-identified whistleblowers on matters they believe to be of urgent concern. Committee staff reviewed and, where warranted, investigated those complaints. The Committee also receives formal whistleblower complaints from IC inspectors general deemed to be of urgent concern. Among these matters was a complaint concerning a phone call between former President Trump and the President of Ukraine, which ultimately became the basis of a presidential impeachment trial. The Committee held a hearing and conducted witness interviews of the IC IG and other IC officials in furtherance of its review of the IC's handling of the complaint.

## 3. Inspectors General

The Committee continued its strong relationship with, and oversight of, the Inspectors General of agencies in the IC. Regular oversight consisted of reviews of agency Semiannual Reports and Annual Work Plans, as well as specific audits and reviews.

## 4. Committee Audits and Projects Team

The Committee's rules stipulate that within its staff there "shall be an element with the capability to perform audits of programs and activities undertaken by departments and agencies with intelligence functions. Such element shall be comprised of persons qualified by training and/or experience to carry out such functions in accordance with accepted auditing standards." This function was distributed to Committee professional staff during the 113th Congress. During the 116th Congress, the Committee reconstituted this effort under its "Audits and Projects Team." The Committee charges the Audits and Projects Team to conduct in-depth reviews

of IC-related matters and assist the Committee with its oversight obligations.

In order to institutionalize its work, the Audits and Projects Team designed a robust and standardized process for selecting and conducting its studies, audits, reviews, and investigations. The Committee also assigned the Audits and Projects Team the responsibility for managing the relationship with the Government Accountability Office (GAO), to include overseeing the development and execution of reviews that the Committee assigns to GAO.

The Audits and Projects Team began two on-going, Committee-authorized projects during the 116th Congress. The first is a lessons-learned review of a compartmented IC acquisition program. The final report will offer recommendations to improve acquisition and contracting processes to ensure acquisitions meet expectations for costs, schedule, and performance. The second is an organizational assessment of a component within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The final report will make recommendations regarding this component's resources, organizational structure, and authorities.

##### *5. Personnel Vetting Reform*

The Committee continued its close oversight of reform to the government's personnel vetting enterprise, consistent with its inclusion as part of the President's Management Agenda and the Government Accountability Office's identification of the security clearance process as "high risk." The personnel vetting framework has remained largely unchanged since 1947, and signs of its ineffectiveness, inefficiency, and fragility have grown. Insider threats such as Edward Snowden, timelines for granting clearances exceeding in some cases two years, and the inability to capitalize on modern technology to access publicly available information have demanded action.

Toward this end, the Committee held a closed hearing on this topic in January 2020 with the principal members of the inter-agency Performance Accountability Council (PAC) who lead the executive branch reform effort. Committee staff continued holding quarterly briefings for the eight House and Senate committees of jurisdiction with these PAC members, as well as separate briefings with individual agencies. Such oversight led to significant progress in reducing the backlog in background investigation to a "healthy" steady state of roughly 220,000 (from a peak of 725,000), and returning to timelines for processing SECRET and TOP SECRET clearances nearly to the standards established in the *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004*. Committee staff have engaged closely with the cleared industry community as well, to include presentations at conferences. The *Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020* contained an entire title comprised of a dozen provisions to support and enable this success. The Committee worked closely with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as the government's statutory Security Executive Agent and the Office of Personnel Management as the government's Suitability, Fitness, and Credentialing Executive Agent in their development of the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative to modernize personnel. The Committee supported issuance of policies that enabled

agility in personnel vetting practices during the COVID–19 global pandemic.

The Committee looks forward to overseeing executive branch plans for a singular framework for determining trust for security, suitability, fitness, and credentialing to enable workforce mobility; a reduced number of tiers in this framework to simplify the system’s complexity; use of a behavioral model for personnel trustworthiness that reflects today’s threats and workforce patterns of life; and use of continuous vetting model for identifying personnel risk over time, rather than time-based periodic reinvestigations.

#### 6. *Technical Advisory Group (TAG)*

During the 116th Congress, the Committee maintained its relationship with the TAG, an external group of experts that the Committee consults for substantive technical advice. Most notably, the TAG’s researchers and experts in social network analysis, social media political content and hate speech, disinformation, and algorithms were instrumental to the Committee’s understanding of Russia’s 2016 use of social media to conduct an information warfare campaign designed to spread disinformation and societal division in the United States. The efforts of these TAG researchers led to the release of two public reports on this information warfare campaign, furnishing the Committee, social media companies, U.S. law enforcement, international partners, fellow researchers and academics, and the American public with an enhanced understanding of how Russia-based actors, at the direction of the Russian government, carried out a sustained campaign of information warfare aimed at influencing how the United States’ citizens think about themselves, their government, and their fellow Americans. The TAG’s findings were foundational to the Committee’s investigation of Russia’s activities and feature prominently in *Volume 2: Russia’s Use of Social Media*.

#### 7. *IC Response to COVID–19*

The Committee exercised close oversight of the IC’s adaptation to the coronavirus pandemic to ensure public health while continuing to perform its important national security mission. The Committee closely monitored IC agencies’ implementation of public health measures, as well as their rates of infections, to ensure the safety of the workforce. It also encouraged maximal application of the flexibility for remote work allowed by the Office of Personnel Management and Office of Management and Budget, consistent with the needs for security. The Committee encouraged use of this public health crisis as a moment to reconsider what Intelligence Community work could be performed in spaces that might not be deemed a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), on unclassified networks, and even by personnel not all fully cleared to the TOP SECRET/SCI level. Such new thinking could revolutionize where work could be done across the United States; it could also significantly expand the population of personnel talent the IC could draw on and enable operation beyond the Washington Metropolitan area, which is of particular interest in areas of rapidly evolving technology such as cybersecurity.

The Committee also closely monitored the impact of COVID on the industrial base that supports the IC. It worked closely with



other committees on the development, passage, and enactment of Section 3610 of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, which allowed IC industrial partners to seek reimbursement under their contracts for activities that allowed them to remain in a “ready state.” The Committee supported the two extensions of this authority that occurred during the 116th Congress.

#### IV. NOMINATIONS

During the 116th Congress, the Committee received seven nominations from President Donald J. Trump.

Section 17 of S. Res. 400 of the 94th Congress (as amended) and a 2009 unanimous consent agreement govern referrals of nominations to the Committee. S. Res. 445, which amended S.Res.400 in 2004, required all nominations to positions in the IC requiring the Senate’s advice and consent be reported by the Select Committee on Intelligence, even when they are positions within departments that are primarily under the jurisdiction of other Senate committees, though the committee overseeing the given department or agency may hold hearings and interviews on the nomination. Notwithstanding that general guidance, the resolution directed the Assistant Attorney General for National Security be reported by the Judiciary Committee, but referred to the Select Intelligence Committee. In the wake of the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014*, which made the directors and inspectors general of the NRO and the NSA Senate-confirmed positions, the Senate adopted S. Res. 470, July 7, 2014. This resolution directed that if the nominee were a civilian, the Select Intelligence Committee would report the nomination and refer it to the Armed Services Committee, and if the nominee were a member of the Armed Forces on active duty, the reverse.

A unanimous consent agreement of January 7, 2009, refers all nominations for inspectors general to the committees of primary jurisdiction and then sequentially to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Under this consent agreement, the nominations for the NRO and NSA Inspectors General are also referred to the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. The exception to this consent agreement is the Inspector General for the CIA, which is considered exclusively by the Select Intelligence Committee.

The following nominations were referred to the Committee during the 116th Congress:

##### A. WILLIAM R. EVANINA, DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER AT THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

On January 16, 2019, President Trump nominated William R. Evanina to be the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center. At that time, Mr. Evanina was serving in that same position. (President Trump previously nominated Mr. Evanina to this position on February 5, 2018. The full Senate did not act on that nomination.)

The Committee reported the nomination favorably on February 28, 2019. The Senate invoked cloture on the nomination on May 6,

2020 by a vote of 83–7. The Senate approved the nomination on May 6, 2020 by a vote of 84–7.

B. DR. CHRISTOPHER J. SCOLESE, DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

On February 12, 2019, President Trump nominated Dr. Christopher J. Scolese to be the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. At that time, Dr. Scolese was serving as Director of the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center.

Upon primary referral, the Committee held a hearing on May 1, 2019, and reported the nomination favorably on May 9, 2019. Upon sequential referral, Senate Committee on Armed Service held a nomination hearing on June 4, 2019. Following the hearing, the Senate Committee on Armed Services reported the nomination favorably on June 10, 2019. The Senate approved the nomination by voice vote on June 27, 2019.

C. JOHN L. RATCLIFFE, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

On March 2, 2020, President Trump nominated John L. Ratcliffe to be the Director of National Intelligence. At that time, Mr. Ratcliffe was serving as a United States Representative from Texas.

The Committee held a nomination hearing on May 5, 2020. Following the hearing, the Committee reported the nomination favorably on May 19, 2020. Pursuant to the Senate's unanimous consent agreement on May 20, 2020, the Senate debated and approved the nomination on May 21, 2020 by a vote of 49–44.

D. PETER MICHAEL THOMSON, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

On April 6, 2020, President Trump nominated Peter Michael Thomson to be the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency. At that time, Mr. Thomson was a partner at the law firm of Stone Pigman Walther Wittmann LLP.

The Committee held a nomination hearing on June 24, 2020. Following the hearing, the Committee reported the nomination favorably on July 1, 2020.

E. CHRISTOPHER C. MILLER, DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

On May 4, 2020, President Trump nominated Christopher C. Miller to be the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. At that time, Mr. Miller was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combatting Terrorism at the Defense Department.

The Committee held a nomination hearing on July 22, 2020. Following the hearing, the Committee reported the nomination favorably on July 29, 2020. The Senate approved the nomination by voice vote on August 6, 2020.

F. PATRICK HOVAKIMIAN, GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE OFFICE OF THE  
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

On May 21, 2020, President Trump nominated Patrick Hovakimian to be the General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. At that time, Mr. Hovakimian was serving as an Associate Deputy Attorney General at the Department of Justice. The Committee held a nomination hearing on July 22, 2020.

G. ALLEN ROBERT SOUZA, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTEL-  
LIGENCE COMMUNITY, AT THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NA-  
TIONAL INTELLIGENCE

On September 23, 2020, President Trump nominated Allen Robert Souza to be the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. At that time, Mr. Souza was serving as the Principal Deputy Senior Director for Intelligence Programs at the National Security Council.

## V. SUPPORT TO SENATE

Under Senate Resolution 400, which established the Committee in 1976, the Select Committee on Intelligence has an important role in assuring that the IC provides “informed and timely intelligence necessary for the executive and legislative branches to make sound decisions affecting the security and vital interests of the Nation.” The Committee fulfills this responsibility by providing access to IC information and officials to the U.S. Senate.

The Committee facilitated access to IC information for members and staff outside the Committee by inviting them to participate in briefings and hearings on issues of shared jurisdiction or interest. The Committee also provided intelligence briefings by its professional staff to Members outside the Committee and assisted Members in resolving issues with intelligence agencies.

## VI. APPENDIX

### A. SUMMARY OF COMMITTEE ACTIONS

#### 1. *Number of meetings*

During the 116th Congress, the Committee held a total of 102 on-the-record interviews, meetings, briefings, and hearings, and numerous off-the-record briefings. These included multiple witness interviews, staff briefings to Committee members, hearings, and business meetings in furtherance of the Committee’s investigation of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. There were 86 oversight hearings, including nine hearings on the IC budget and six on election security, and open confirmation hearings for four administration nominees. Of these 86 hearings, 5 were open to the public and 81 were closed to protect classified information pursuant to Senate rules. The Committee also held 13 business meetings including mark-ups of legislation. Additionally, the Committee staff conducted multiple on-the-record briefings and interviews and numerous off-the-record briefings.

*2. Bills and resolutions originated by the Committee*

S. 245—Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019.

S. Res. 51—An original resolution authorizing expenditures by the Select Committee on Intelligence.

S. 1589—Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020.

S. 3905—Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021.

*3. Bills referred to the Committee*

S. 314—Modernizing the Trusted Workforce for the 21st Century Act of 2019.

S. 544—A bill to require the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a report on the death of Jamal Khashoggi, and for other purposes.

H.R. 1404—Vladimir Putin Transparency Act.

S. 838—A bill to protect integrity, fairness, and objectivity in decisions regarding access to classified information, and for other purposes.

H.R. 3494—Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020.

S. 2316—Manufacturing, Investment, and Controls Review for Computer Hardware, Intellectual Property, and Supply Act of 2019.

S. 2493—Combatting Foreign Influence Act of 2019.

S. 2528—A bill to require the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a report on the purpose, scope, and means of expanded Chinese influence in international organizations, and for other purposes.

S. 3142—Increasing Efficiency of All United States-Based Terrorism Information Sharing Act of 2019.

S. 3153—A bill to prohibit the sharing of United States intelligence with countries that permit the operation of Huawei fifth generation telecommunications technology within their borders.

S. Res. 666—A resolution honoring the faithful and unwavering service of Civil Air Transport and Air America to the United States.

*4. Committee publications*

Report 116–20—Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence covering the period January 3, 2017–January 3, 2019.

Report 116–47—Report to accompany the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 together with Additional Views (S. 1589).

Report 116–233—Report to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 together with Minority Views (S. 3905).

Report 116–290—Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election together with Additional Views—November 10, 2020.