

**OPEN HEARING ON THE NOMINATION
OF SUSAN GORDON TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AT THE
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE PRECEDED BY ROBERT P. STORCH
TO BE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
SECURITY AGENCY, AND ISABEL PATELUNAS
TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTELLIGENCE
AND ANALYSIS AT THE DEPARTMENT
OF THE TREASURY**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
WEDNESDAY, JULY 19, 2017

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WEDNESDAY, JULY 19, 2017

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:06 a.m. in Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Burr (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Committee Members Present: Senators Burr, Warner, Feinstein, Wyden, Heinrich, King, and Harris.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, CHAIRMAN, A
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA**

Chairman BURR. I'd like to call this confirmation hearing to order.

I understand the Vice Chairman is in the building, so he should be here before I finish my opening statement. I'd like to welcome all members.

And I know this is out of the ordinary to do these in the morning. But the schedule right now doesn't give us the luxury of taking an afternoon as we get ready for our authorization bill.

So I'd like to welcome our witnesses today: Robert Storch, President Trump's nominee to be the next Inspector General of the National Security Agency; and Isabel Patelunas, the President's nominee to be the next Assistant Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis at the Department of Treasury.

Robert and Isabel, congratulations to both of you on your nominations. I'd like start, though, by recognizing the families that you've brought here with you today. Robert, I understand your wife, Sara, is here and your two children Charlotte and Hannah.

Would you—guys, thank you for your commitment to your dad and to your mother, because she has traveled extensively with him and is a partner both in life and in work, as I understand.

Sara, you must be a strong woman.

And Isabel, I believe you brought your husband, Paul, here as well as your sons Brian and Brandon, Correct? Good. Just Brian. Well, we welcome both of you.

Both of you have served your country with distinction in your previous posts, primarily Department of Justice for you, Robert, and CIA for you, Isabel. And we appreciate your continued willingness to serve.

Our goal in conducting this hearing is to enable the Committee to consider Mr. Storch and Ms. Patelunas' qualifications and to allow a thoughtful deliberation by our members.

Robert already has provided substantive written responses to 77 questions presented by the Committee and its members, while Isabel has answered 63. Today, of course, the members will be able to ask additional questions and to hear firsthand from Mr. Storch and Ms. Patelunas in this open session.

Mr. Storch graduated magna cum laude from Harvard College in 1982 and earned his J.D. from Columbia Law School in 1985. He began his legal career as a clerk for U.S. District Judge William Keller in Los Angeles, California.

Following his clerkship, Mr. Storch worked at Covington and Burling before joining the Department of Justice, where he worked for over 24 years. Mr. Storch was an assistant U.S. attorney for over 17 years, working on both criminal and civil cases.

Robert held a variety of leadership roles in the U.S. Attorney's Office, including anti-terrorism coordinator, deputy criminal chief, counsel to the United States attorney appellate chief, senior litigation counsel, and civil rights and hate crime coordinator.

In 2012, Mr. Storch joined the Office of Inspector General at the Department of Justice, where he served as counselor to the IG, the OIG whistleblower ombudsman, and acting deputy IG. In 2015, Mr. Storch was selected to serve as DOJ's deputy inspector general. And I think you told me when we met that you kept the ombud—you kept the whistleblower thing with you. We thank you for that.

Ms. Patelunas graduated from the University of Notre Dame in 1989, received her master's in international relations from the University of Maryland in 1987. Ms. Patelunas began her career at the CIA in 1989 and is a member of the Senior Intelligence Service at the CIA, where she served in a variety of leadership roles, including deputy director of CIA's Office of Middle East and North Africa Analysis and director of advanced analysis training program.

Ms. Patelunas also worked in the National Counterproliferation Center and the weapons intelligence nonproliferation—Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control offices. Ms. Patelunas also completed a rotation at the ODNI, serving as the director of the President's daily brief staff. Isabel currently is the chair of the CIA's Publications Review Board.

Robert, independent and empowered inspector generals are critical to the integrity and the efficient management of the intelligence community. I would also note that this is Robert's third

nomination to a position in under a year, an indication of not only bipartisan support, but a commitment to the post as well.

And, Isabel, as you and I have discussed, you've been asked to lead the Treasury Department's intelligence arm at a time of profound threat and challenge.

As both of you are aware, we're facing threats from state and non-state actors alike and are engaged in a robust debate at home on the scope and scale of intelligence collection and what authorities are right, appropriate and lawful. I expect both of you to support the government's mission to protect the Nation in the face of these threats, while maintaining an unwavering respect for the rule of law. I have complete trust that both of you will lead the community with integrity and will ensure that the intelligence enterprise operates lawfully, ethically, and morally.

As I've mentioned to other nominees during their nomination hearings, I can assure you that this Committee will continue to faithfully follow its charter and conduct vigorous and real-time oversight over the intelligence community, its operations, and its activities. We will ask difficult and probing questions of you and your staff, and we will expect honest, complete, and timely responses.

I look forward to supporting your nominations and ensuring their consideration without delay. I want to thank you again for being here, for your years of service to the country, and I look forward to your testimony.

I'd like to recognize the Vice Chairman for any comments he might have.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA**

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, Mr. Storch and Ms. Patelunas, and congratulations on your nominations.

Mr. Storch, you have served as Deputy Inspector General of the Department of Justice, so I know you understand well the functions of the Inspector General. But if you are confirmed as the Inspector General of the National Security Agency, you'll be charged with overseeing a large and complex and necessarily secretive organization.

Because of the nature of the work of the NSA, you will have a higher level of responsibility to ensure that the agency's programs and activities are effective, appropriate, and comport with U.S. law and regulations. In today's hearing, I would like to hear reassurances that you will take this duty on with the gravity and sense of purpose it requires.

We all know the NSA is home to some of the world's greatest minds in the field of cryptology. They continue to improve our ability to understand the plans and intentions of our adversaries in order to protect and defend this Nation. As they harness the power of new technology and data analytics, we must be careful to ensure that the clearly defined line between our adversaries and our citizens is not crossed. Part of your charge will be to confirm that it is not.

I also very much appreciate your background as related to whistleblower protections. I know the Chairman's already mentioned this. You stated that one of your bedrock principles is, quote, "whistleblowers perform a valuable service to the agency and to the public," unquote. I agree with that sentiment, and I'm not sure that we have given them adequate protections, in the IC that they deserve.

Today, I'll ask you about some of the proposals this Committee is considering to enhance those protections, to ensure that anyone that does come forward through approved processes will not suffer reprisals as a result.

Mr. Storch, I look forward to today's discussion and working with you, if confirmed.

Ms. Patelunas, your experience at the Central Intelligence Agency will serve well if confirmed to the position of Undersecretary of Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis. Your 28-year career at the CIA is impressive and includes a wide variety of important positions and responsibilities. If confirmed as Undersecretary, you will have significant opportunities to continue your contributions to our Nation's security.

This morning, I'd like to talk more about your background in threat finance and financial intelligence. The past decade has seen a dramatic increase in the leveraging of financial tools to counter threats. That includes following the money to counter terrorist groups, as well as the use of sanctions to influence other Nations' behaviors.

At the same time, our adversaries are constantly developing new and innovative ways to evade our detection. It is vital that the United States stay one step ahead of our enemies in this regard.

I'll expect to hear your plans for ensuring that we maintain our competitive edge when it comes to collecting, analyzing, and responding to matters of financial intelligence.

Additionally, this Committee is deeply engaged with its investigation into Russian meddling in our 2016 elections. Treasury has a role in supporting this effort. This morning, I want to hear assurances from you that you will fully support any request this Committee makes of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis.

Ms. Patelunas, Mr. Storch, I note that you are both, as is the nominee that we'll hear from in the next panel, Sue Gordon, career public servants. You are both highly qualified for the positions to which you have been nominated.

Today, perhaps more so than in the past, I believe that it is especially important to make a point of saying thank you to the men and women of the intelligence community for the work that they do each and every day to keep our Nation safe. We seldom hear about your successes or your sacrifices, but members of this Committee see your dedication and hard work. So I want to thank both of you for accepting these new opportunities to serve our country.

But I also have something to ask in return. I ask that you commit today that you will always speak truth to power by giving your best honest assessment and speaking that truth and telling it, telling it like it is to those in power, whether they want to hear it or not.

I'll ask for your assurances that you will cooperate fully and unreservedly with any requests from this Committee by providing documents, e-mails, cables and other materials as requested.

And I'll ask for your promise that, if confirmed, you will faithfully represent the professional men and women of the intelligence community with dedication and integrity every day that you're charged.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the hearing.

Chairman BARR. Thank you, Vice Chairman.

Mr. Storch, would you stand, please? Would you raise your right hand? Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. STORCH. I do.

Chairman BARR. Please be seated.

Ms. Patelunas, would you please stand and raise your right hand? Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Ms. PATELUNAS. I do.

Chairman BARR. Please be seated.

**TESTIMONY OF ROBERT P. STORCH, NOMINATED TO BE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY**

Chairman BARR. To you, Mr. Storch—and then I'll come to you, Mrs. Patelunas—I'll ask you to answer five standard questions that the Committee poses to each nominee who appears before us. They just simply require a yes or no answer.

One, do you agree to appear before the Committee, here and in other venues when invited?

Mr. STORCH. Yes, sir.

Chairman BARR. If confirmed, do you agree to send officials from your office to appear before the Committee and designated staff when invited?

Mr. STORCH. Yes, sir.

Chairman BARR. Do you agree to provide documents or other materials requested by the Committee in order for it to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities?

Mr. STORCH. Yes, sir.

Chairman BARR. Will you both ensure that your office and your staff provide such materials to the Committee when requested?

Mr. STORCH. Yes, sir.

Chairman BARR. Do you agree to inform and fully brief, to the fullest extent possible, all members of this Committee of intelligence activities and covert action, rather than only the Chairman and the Vice Chairman?

Mr. STORCH. Yes, sir.

Chairman BARR. Thank you.

**TESTIMONY OF ISABEL PATELUNAS, NOMINATED TO BE AS-
SISTANT SECRETARY OF TREASURY FOR INTELLIGENCE
AND ANALYSIS**

Chairman BARR. Ms. Patelunas, the same questions. Do you agree to appear before the Committee, here or in other venues, when invited?

Ms. PATELUNAS. Yes, sir, I do.

Chairman BURR. If confirmed, do you agree to send officials from your office to appear before the Committee and designated staff when invited?

Ms. PATELUNAS. Yes, sir.

Chairman BURR. Do you agree to provide documents or any other materials requested by the Committee in order to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities?

Ms. PATELUNAS. Yes, sir.

Chairman BURR. Will you both ensure that your office and your staff—will you ensure that your office and your staff provide such materials to the Committee when requested?

Ms. PATELUNAS. Yes, sir.

Chairman BURR. Do you agree to inform and fully brief to the fullest extent possible all members of the Committee of the intelligence activities and covert action, rather than just the Chair and Vice Chair?

Ms. PATELUNAS. Yes, sir, I do.

Chairman BURR. With that, I thank you, and we'll proceed to opening statement. Mr. Storch, you are recognized for your statement.

Mr. STORCH. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Warner, and members of the Committee: Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today regarding my nomination to be the Inspector General at the National Security Agency. I believe that this position presents an exciting opportunity to further independent oversight at a critically important government agency.

I would like to take the opportunity to recognize my family and others who have come to be with me today: my brilliant and wonderful wife of more than 25 years, Sara Lord, and our children, Charlotte and Hannah, who, as I always tell them, are the center of the universe. I would like to thank my other family, colleagues, and friends for being here with me today.

I want to express my great appreciation to my Inspector General, Michael Horowitz. I've had the privilege of working side by side with him, and I learn from him on a daily basis. He provides, I believe, a tremendous example, both as to how to conduct vigorous, independent oversight and how an IG should be responsive to Congress.

I also want to thank you, Chairman Burr, for taking the time out of your busy schedule to meet with me yesterday. And, Vice Chairman Warner, I greatly appreciate the efforts of your staff to schedule a meeting as well.

I'm sorry there wasn't time, given the prompt scheduling of the hearing—which, let me quickly say, I appreciate very much—for me to meet in advance of the hearing with you and with the other members of the Committee. But if confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to meet with each of you and your staffs on a regular basis.

I believe strongly in the importance of Congressional oversight, which is particularly critical in an area where so much of what happens occurs outside the public eye.

As this Committee well knows, in 2014 Congress determined that the NSA IG should be a presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed

position, clearly reflecting the importance of independent oversight and responsiveness to Congress. I hope that, if confirmed, my background would position me well to work with the staff of the OIG to meet the challenges of this position.

As detailed in my prehearing submissions, I spent some two dozen years working as a Federal prosecutor at two United States attorney's offices and at the DOJ here in Washington. This taught me a great deal about how to gather and consider evidence, about following the evidence wherever it leads, and about pursuing allegations and outcomes vigorously but fairly and in the interest of justice.

Immediately following the September 11 attacks, I was selected as my district's initial Anti-Terrorism Coordinator, working closely with criminal and intelligence components of the FBI and other agencies in helping to organize and direct our antiterrorism efforts and standing up our first Anti-Terrorism Task Force.

In 2012, my wife and I decided to move back to Washington and I accepted a position in the front office at the OIG. One of the things I came to understand early on is that OIGs are part of their agencies, but they're also separate, our independent oversight role requiring that we maintain the distance necessary for our work.

I've been involved in reviewing a number of reports, examining the exercise of national security authorities by the FBI and DOJ as well as their interaction with other parts of the intelligence community. I also have participated in the deputies' meetings of the IC IG forum and attended its conferences.

If confirmed, I hope that my experiences and perspective as a prosecutor and at the OIG would be helpful in working with the personnel of the NSA OIG to carry out the significant responsibilities entrusted to it by the Congress.

If confirmed, I would anticipate meeting regularly with personnel from across the OIG to facilitate open communications and obtain their perspectives. One area that I know to be of importance for all OIGs is furthering whistleblower rights and protections. As was mentioned, at DOJ we've developed a robust program that's built on one bedrock principle: Whistleblowers perform a valuable public service to the agency and the public when they come forward with what they reasonably believe to be evidence of wrongdoing, and they never should suffer reprisal for doing so.

I founded and still serve as chair of the CIGIE working group in this area and have been pleased to work with the Congress on it, including helping to organize a program with the bipartisan Senate Whistleblower Protection Caucus, at which we were grateful to hear from Senator Grassley and you, Senator Wyden. If confirmed, I will do everything in my power to further whistleblower rights and protections at the NSA.

In closing, I cannot think of an agency with a more important mission than the NSA and I have tremendous respect for the dedicated men and women who are critical to its success. I would be privileged to have the opportunity to lead the NSA OIG to further the integrity and efficiency of the agency's operations, which, as the NSA's name makes clear, are essential to our national security.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Storch follows:]

Statement of Robert P. Storch

before the

U.S. Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence

concerning

Nomination to be Inspector General of the National Security Agency

July 19, 2017

Chairman Burr, Vice-Chairman Warner, and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today regarding my nomination to be the first Presidentially appointed Senate confirmed Inspector General at the National Security Agency (NSA). I believe that this position presents an exciting opportunity to lead the development of the Office of the Inspector General's independent oversight at a critically important government agency. I would like to take the opportunity to recognize my family and colleagues who have come to be with me today. [Recognition of family members and colleagues]

I cannot go forward without expressing my great appreciation to my Inspector General, Michael E. Horowitz. IG Horowitz hired me out of the U.S. Attorney's Office to work in the Front Office at the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG) back in 2012, and he selected me to be Deputy IG in 2014. I have had the privilege of working side by side with him, and I have tried to learn from him on a daily basis. He is a remarkably gifted IG, and provides which I believe to be a tremendous example both as to how to conduct vigorous independent oversight on a wide range of sensitive and important issues, and how an IG should be responsive to Congress and keep Members and staff appropriately informed so as to further the Congress' important constitutional and oversight functions and ensure that the work of the OIG is directed appropriately. In his capacity as Chair of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), Michael was the one who initially asked if I would be open to being considered for an IG position and, if I am confirmed as the IG at NSA, I intend to do my best to emulate his example both within the agency and with Congress.

I also want to thank you, Chairman Burr, for taking the time out of your busy schedule to meet with me, and Vice-Chairman Warner, I greatly appreciate the efforts of your staff to schedule a meeting as well. I am sorry that there was not time given the prompt scheduling of the hearing – which let me quickly say I appreciate very much – for me to meet in advance of the hearing with you and with the other Members of the Committee. But I want to assure the Committee that, if confirmed for this position, I would welcome the opportunity to meet with each of you and your staffs on a regular and ongoing basis to ensure the sort of robust and appropriate communication that I believe the Inspector General Act contemplates. I believe strongly in the importance of Congressional oversight, which seems particularly critical in an area such as this where so much of what happens occurs outside the public eye and, therefore, the public's confidence depends to a great extent on knowing that their elected representatives are fully and timely informed regarding the operations of the agency and steps being taken or that should be taken to improve those functions.

In that regard, as this Committee knows well, in 2014, the Congress determined that the IG at the NSA should a Presidentially appointed Senate confirmed position, clearly reflecting the importance of independent oversight and responsiveness to Congress. I recognize that this position presents significant challenges. I hope that, if confirmed, my background as a federal prosecutor and in helping to lead the operations of the OIG at DOJ, and my various interactions with

the intelligence community in those capacities, would position me well to work with the staff of the NSA OIG to meet those challenges and, thereby, to provide independent oversight that detects and deters waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct, and helps to ensure that the NSA meets its essential functions with integrity and efficiency and, of course, consistent with civil rights and civil liberties.

The pre-hearing materials that I have submitted to the Committee detail my background. Following a federal judicial clerkship and a brief stint at a large law firm here in Washington, I became an Assistant United States Attorney in May 1987. Over the next twenty-five years, I worked as a federal prosecutor at two U.S. Attorney's Offices (USAO) -- in my hometown of Jacksonville, Florida, and later in my wife's hometown of Albany, New York -- and in between for several years at the DOJ Criminal Division's Public Integrity Section, followed by another brief stint in private practice when we first moved to upstate New York. I believe that my two dozen years as a federal prosecutor handling various types of complex criminal cases taught me a great deal about how to gather and consider evidence, about following the evidence where ever it leads, and about pursuing charges and outcomes vigorously but fairly and in the interests of justice.

Immediately following the September 11 attacks, I was selected by the U.S. Attorney to be the Northern District of New York's initial Anti-Terrorism Coordinator. In that position, I worked closely with criminal and intelligence components of the FBI and other agencies in helping to organize and direct anti-terrorism efforts in the District, and in standing up our first Anti-Terrorism Task Force. I also held a number of other positions at different times at the USAO, including serving for many years as Civil Rights and Hate Crimes Coordinator, and later as Senior Litigation Counsel and Chief of our Appellate Division. In the latter position, I honed my writing skills in preparing and helping others to prepare appellate briefs, skills that I have since found valuable in reviewing and working with OIG teams on many of our written reports to ensure that they are comprehensive, comprehensible, and impactful. While at the USAO, I served for over a decade on the Department's Evaluation and Review Staff, participating in periodic peer reviews of other U.S. Attorney's Offices -- my first real experience with that type of work. I also have worked abroad on behalf of the FBI and DOJ, teaching at a number of anti-corruption and other programs, and I was detailed with my family for two years in Ukraine on a DOJ program that provided technical assistance in the development of measures to address official corruption, including helping to create the framework for internal investigation units modeled on OIGs.

In 2012, with our youngest daughter heading off to college, my wife and I decided to move back to Washington and I accepted a position in the Front Office at the OIG, where I hoped that I could use my varied experiences within the Department in a different but important way. While I already had spent many years at DOJ, one thing I came to understand early on is that OIGs are part of their agencies, but they also are separate from them -- our independent oversight role requiring that we maintain the distance necessary to permit the objective analysis and perspective that is, in itself, one of the most valuable aspects of the IG system. In this regard, I have had the opportunity to participate with the IG in various meetings and briefings with

the highest levels of Department leadership, where I have seen and, I hope, learned how to maintain that relationship regardless of the nature or sensitivity of the issues. On a number of occasions, I also have participated in meetings where we informed Department leadership about issues of which they were not previously aware, something that is inevitable within any large organization and a key benefit of having an independent IG to uncover such concerns and recommend solutions to agency management.

During my time at DOJ OIG, I have been involved in the review of a number of reports that have continued our office's long record of conducting independent oversight regarding the exercise of intelligence and national security authorities by DOJ, in particular by the National Security Division and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as well as their interaction with other parts of the intelligence community. I also have participated in the Deputies meetings of the Intelligence Community Inspector General (IC IG) Forum and attended its annual conferences. Through these experiences, as a prosecutor and then at the OIG, I have had the opportunity to interact with various aspects of the intelligence community, but I am not a product of it. If confirmed, I hope that my experience and perspective would be of assistance in working with the personnel of the NSA OIG to carry out the significant responsibilities that Congress has entrusted to it.

If confirmed, in addition to maintaining regular lines of communication with agency leadership and the Congress, I would anticipate meeting early on with personnel from across the OIG to facilitate open communications within the office and obtain their perspectives on potential areas for improvement. This is something that I do with the IG on a regular basis at DOJ OIG, and have found to be very valuable in working with him to lead change within the organization. One area that I know to be of importance for all OIGs is furthering whistleblower rights and protections. When I first discussed coming to the OIG with IG Horowitz, we spoke about starting up a new Whistleblower Ombudsperson program and, under his leadership, we have developed a robust program that I am proud to say has been widely recognized a leader across the OIG community. I have put in place a number of educational efforts and other mechanisms that are detailed in my responses to the Committee's additional prehearing questions, all of which efforts are built on one bedrock principle: whistleblowers perform a valuable service to the agency and the public when they come forward with what they reasonably believe to be evidence of wrongdoing, and they should never face reprisal for doing so. Agencies are too big and their operations too varied for oversight to function without people on the front lines being willing to come forward when they see something they believe is wrong. This I think is particularly true within the intelligence community, where it seems to me it is critical that employees and contractors know that there are avenues available for them to bring forward such information, that their disclosures will be taken seriously, and that they will not face reprisal for performing the often difficult act of coming forward to report what they believe to be problems or wrongdoing within their own organization.

In addition to leading our whistleblower efforts at DOJ OIG, I also founded and continue to serve as chair of the CIGIE Whistleblower Ombudsman Working Group,

which meets quarterly to share best practices, discuss current developments, and interact with presenters from within and outside government. I have been pleased to work with Congress on whistleblower issues, including helping to organize a program with the bipartisan Senate Whistleblower Protection Caucus at which we were grateful to have Senator Grassley and Senator Wyden speak as the Chair and Vice-Chair of that important group. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to work with the Committee to continue such efforts, and I will do everything in my power to further whistleblower rights and protections at the NSA.

I cannot think of an agency with a more important mission than the NSA, and I have tremendous respect for the dedicated men and women who are critical to its success. If confirmed, I would be privileged to have the opportunity to lead the NSA OIG to further the integrity and efficiency of the agency's operations, which as the NSA's very name makes clear, are essential to our national security.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this morning, and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman BARR. Thank you, Mr. Storch.

Ms. Patelunas, floor is yours.

Ms. PATELUNAS. Thank you, Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Warner and members of the Committee, for allowing me to appear before you as the nominee for Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis. I also appreciate the opportunity to have met with several of you earlier this week. I am honored to have been nominated for this position by President Trump, and with the support of Secretary Mnuchin, Director of National Intelligence Coats, and Undersecretary of Terrorism Finance and Intelligence Mandelker.

None of the steps in the journey to this Committee room would have been possible without my family. They have been my unfailing supporters throughout my career. First, my husband, Paul, of three decades has supported me and has eaten many meals alone during my 28 years at CIA. He has been my steadfast partner in raising my two wonderful sons, Brian and Brandon. Those three men have been my cheerleaders and my conscience, the reason I work so hard to protect our great Nation, and the ones who have helped me to balance being both a hard-charging public servant and a sports and band mom.

My mom, Carol Keenan, was a role model as a working mother and ensured that I always took care of myself. My father, Thomas Keenan, started me on the road to public service. Although he lost a hard-fought battle to cancer over a decade ago, I feel his strong presence and his commitment to his country, first as an Air Force staff sergeant in Korea, followed by a 45-year career as a beloved high school social studies teacher. He is indeed smiling today.

My brothers, Kevin and Sean, have always supported me personally, professionally. Sean's wonderful wife Beth and their three children, Ryan, Victoria, and Andrew, are here as well today. My sister Chris, also a teacher, and her wonderful husband John and four children were unable to attend today. I also want to thank friends and coworkers who have been so supportive during my career.

The Keenan and Patelunas families have a profound love of God, country, and family, and have never been embarrassed by our patriotism and dedication to public service. This started with my grandfather, who served in both the U.S. Army and Navy and as a Philadelphia policeman. My father, uncles, father-in-law, brother Sean, and my nephew Danny all served in the military. My mother, father, sister, and brother spent many years in public education.

If confirmed as assistant secretary, I will continue to strive to be an efficient and effective public servant, to use taxpayer dollars wisely, to leave a lasting positive impact on those whom I serve and those who I serve with, to have a bias and a passion for action and getting the mission done. And finally, I will be devoted to developing a strong and expert workforce and to taking actions to leave that job to my successor in even better shape than I received it.

Twenty eight years as a CIA analyst and manager have prepared me well to lead OIA. And if confirmed, I'm looking forward to taking on that important mission, one in which we cannot fail: stemming the flow of funding to those who wish to do our Nation harm

and remaining vigilant to threats against our financial infrastructure.

The threats are many, but the dedicated women and men of OIA are more than up to the challenge. OIA, because of its position within Treasury and access to expertise and information, has been a leader in threat finance issues. I feel that the office's work is becoming even more important as the U.S. Government is directing more efforts to take financial action against those who wish to do us harm.

OIA has other important missions that I look forward to leading. It is very serious about information sharing and focuses on relationship building, partnership and integration.

OIA has an important mission to ensure that its people, infrastructure and data are secure and protected from insider threats.

If confirmed, I will use my expertise, leadership and strong analytic tradecraft to continue to position the Office of Intelligence and Analysis to stem current threats, as well as to position it well to take on future threats. I am committed to being an effective public servant, having a bias for collaborative action, working with colleagues throughout the United States Government, including this Committee, and ultimately leaving OIA even stronger than it is today.

Thank you again for your time, and I look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Patelunas follows:]

**Opening Statement – Isabel Patelunas, Nominee for
Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis
19 July 2017**

Thank you, Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Warner, and Members of the Committee, for allowing me to appear before you as the President's nominee for Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis (OIA), and for the opportunity to have met with several of you earlier this week. I am honored to have been nominated for this position by President Trump and with the support of Secretary Mnuchin, Director of National Intelligence Coats, and Undersecretary for Terrorism Finance and Intelligence Mandelker.

None of the steps in the journey to this committee room would have been possible without my family. They have been my unfailing supporters throughout my career. First, my husband of three decades, Paul, has supported me—and has eaten many meals alone—during the decades of my career. He has been my steadfast partner in raising our two wonderful sons, Brian and Brandon. Those three men have been my cheerleaders and my conscience, the reason I work so hard to protect our great nation, and the ones who helped me to balance being both a hard-charging public servant and a sports and band mom. My mom, Carol Keenan, was a role model as a working mother and has ensured that I always took care of myself. My father, Thomas Keenan, started me on the road to public service. Although he lost a hard-fought battle with cancer over a decade ago, I feel his strong presence every day in his commitment to his country as an Air Force staff sergeant in Korea, followed by a 45 year career as a beloved high school social studies teacher. He is indeed smiling today.

My brothers, Kevin and Sean, have always supported me personally and professionally. Sean's wonderful wife Beth and their three children Ryan, Victoria, and Andrew are here as well. My sister, Chris, also a teacher, and her wonderful husband, John and four children were unable to attend today. I also want to thank my friends and co-workers who have been so supportive during my career.

The Keenan and Patelunas families have a profound love of God, country, and family, and have never been embarrassed by our patriotism and dedication to public service. This started with my grandfather, who served in the US Army and Navy and as a policeman in Philadelphia; my father, uncles, father-in-law and brother, Sean, and my nephew Danny all served in the military. My mother, father, sister, and brother have spent many years in public education.

If confirmed as Assistant Secretary, I will continue to strive to be an efficient and effective public servant — to use tax dollars wisely, to leave a lasting positive impact on those whom I serve and serve with, and to have a bias and a passion for action in getting the mission done. Finally, I will be devoted to developing a strong and expert workforce, and to taking actions that leave the job to my successor in even better shape than I received it.

Twenty-eight years as an intelligence analyst and manager, including providing high-level policy support, have prepared me well to lead OIA in its important mission, one in which we cannot fail: stemming the flow of funding to those who wish to do our nation harm, and remaining vigilant to threats to our

financial infrastructure. The threats are many, but the dedicated women and men of OIA are more than up to the challenges.

OIA, because of its position within Treasury and access to expertise and information, has been a leader on the threat finance issue. Its analysts provide all-source analytic support for Treasury and national-level actions. I feel that the Office's work is becoming even more important, as the USG is directing more effort to take financial action against those who wish to do us harm. OIA leaders and its workforce are proud of their high standard of analytic tradecraft, and work hard to meet the highest standards for quality, timeliness, and impact of their products.

- And indeed, OIA's hard work has impact. The office's expertise and analytic support inform efforts to disrupt the finances of terrorist groups such as ISIS, of North Korea proliferation and regime finance networks, and of Mexican transnational criminal networks. OIA's efforts also support targeting of financial institutions that threaten the US financial system.

OIA has other important missions that strengthen its leadership in the area of threat finance.

- It is very serious about information sharing, and focuses on relationship-building, partnership, and integration.
- OIA has an important mission to ensure that its people, infrastructure, and data are secure and to protect them from insider threats.

If confirmed, I will use my expertise, leadership, and strong analytic tradecraft to continue to position the Office of Intelligence and Analysis to stem current threats as well as to take on the threats of the future. I am committed to being an effective public servant, having a bias for collaborative action—working with colleagues throughout the USG, including this committee—and ultimately leaving OIA even stronger than it is today.

Thank you again for your time. I look forward to answering your questions.

Chairman BURR. Thank you to both of you for your statements. Before I recognize myself for questions, let me inform the members that our plan is to have the Committee vote on these nominations on Tuesday, July 25th. Also, if any members wish to submit questions for the record, please do so by the close of business today.

With that, Senators will be recognized for up to five minutes by seniority.

Ms. Patelunas, we live in an innovative world where nefarious state and non-state actors continue to identify new and discreet ways to finance illegitimate and illicit activities. How's the Treasury's Office of Intelligence and Analysis poised to assess cash-free financial networks like Bitcoin and other web-based currencies?

Ms. PATELUNAS. Sir, thank you for that question, and we discussed this a little bit yesterday. The good news is that there is very deep expertise in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Because their portfolios are niche analysis, they really are able to become deep experts in a wide variety of financial intelligence, both gathering and analysis, and they have a strong program of mentoring, of training, and they go out on rotations to further their knowledge. So in many of my discussions with the officers and the leadership over in OIA, I feel very strongly that we are well-positioned to go after a wide variety of actors, including crypto-financial issues.

Chairman BURR. Great, thank you.

Mr. Storch, the Inspector General at NSA is going to be responsible for overseeing a large organization at multiple physical locations, probably as challenging as any agency that's out there.

How do you plan to ensure that all NSA employees and contractors are fully aware of the function of the NSA OIG, regardless of their physical location?

Mr. STORCH. Thank you very much, Chairman Burr. I very much appreciate the question.

You know, it obviously is incredibly important that an OIG get out word to all of the employees regarding what the OIG does and how to provide information. I think that's particularly important in a world like that of the NSA.

And so I can just tell you, what we've done at the Department of Justice is we've employed virtually every strategy available to us, honestly. We've done videos. We've done brochures, flyers, put things out on our Internet. We've done programs within the agency. We've worked with the agency to have material posted in buildings so that there are flyers on how to provide information to the OIG and also related to what to do if there's reprisal for doing that or for providing any whistleblower information. And so we've even gone as far as to use social media, and we have a Twitter account and we've tweeted out information on how to provide information.

So, you know, no OIG can function without information and it's important that people within an agency like the NSA understand that there are avenues for them to come forward when they see something they think is wrong; and that they're taken seriously; those complaints are reviewed thoroughly; and that people get back to them, to the extent they can; and also that they don't suffer reprisal.

So I think you employ a multi-tiered strategy to try to get out the word so that people understand what the OIG does, and you do it any way you can.

Chairman BURR. What do see as your biggest challenge of being the NSA Inspector General?

Mr. STORCH. Thank you very much for the question. It's something I've thought a lot about, and we chatted a little about it yesterday. You know, I think that—I think there are a few. One is obviously the transition to being a presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed IG. Clearly, that reflects Congress's intent that there be aggressive, appropriate, independent oversight and responsiveness to Congress in performing that. That's something we certainly do at the Department of Justice and certainly, if confirmed, something I would intend to do in my position at the NSA. So that'll be a change, but one that I'm confident, working with the good folks at the OIG, that we'll be able to tackle.

Another one that we talked about yesterday is the pace of change and dealing with that. Particularly in a place like the NSA, where technology—where things are changing on a constant basis, it's really important that an OIG be agile, be nimble, and provide its reviews in a prompt fashion.

Frankly, this is a challenge we face at our OIG and I think at all OIGs. I thought about it some since we chatted yesterday. There's a tension, I think, between OIGs being thorough in their work and being authoritative, but not taking so long to do it that it no longer is relevant or impactful.

And so I think that challenge is particularly great at an agency like the NSA, which is in the business of dealing with technology and change and things that are moving constantly. And so that's something we'll have to work at. I'm sure they're working at it now, and hopefully I'll be able to aid in that process.

And finally, you've mentioned it, I've mentioned it: whistleblowers. I think they're fundamental to the whole OIG system. You know, since I've come over to the OIG my impression is really that the agencies we serve are really just too big and their programs are just too varied for oversight to really work effectively without people who are at the front lines feeling comfortable coming forward with information.

That doesn't mean they're always right, but we want to make sure that they can come forward, that they have means to come forward, and that they know that that's going to be taken seriously. I think that's a challenge for all OIGs, is getting that word out and not just having words and training, but actually doing it in action and showing to whistleblowers that we mean what we say, that we take the allegations seriously, and that we're going to pursue them appropriately.

So those are all challenges that I think we would face. Hopefully I'll be well-positioned to help achieve success with them.

Chairman BURR. Thank you very much.

Vice Chairman.

Vice Chairman WARNER. Ms. Patelunas, first, we—as I'm sure you're aware, this Committee is deeply involved in the Russia investigation. I just want to reiterate, should you be confirmed, that we would want your cooperation as this Committee continues to

pursue all activities related to Russia's 2016 intervention in our presidential elections, and that will mean we would be working closely with your office.

Will you commit to continue to work with this Committee on that investigation?

Ms. PATELUNAS. I certainly will, sir.

Vice Chairman WARNER. You've got an extraordinarily impressive background, 28 years at the CIA, and I see you've had background doing the PDB, deputy director of the Middle East Analysis Office, time at the National Counterproliferation Center. Yet you don't have formal background in finance or financial threats, financial crimes. Do you want to speak about your background, how it might be suited for this particular assignment?

Ms. PATELUNAS. So while I don't have a background in terrorism threat financing, I spent about the first ten years of my career doing nonproliferation work and looking at North Korea, Russia, Iran, a variety of actors. And so a lot of what we did, while we looked at, you know, building of weapon systems, we also had to follow the money and look at how the weapons were built.

So we did spend a lot of time supporting policymakers as they were developing sanctions packages and looking for other opportunities to stem the flow of money in the proliferation arena. So that's where my background is in that.

Vice Chairman WARNER. We do think following the money in a variety of these areas—

Ms. PATELUNAS. Right.

Vice Chairman WARNER [continuing]. Is going to be very important.

Mr. Storch, I appreciate your comments about whistleblowers. I share your value in that role. We have seen in the IC sometimes efforts where a whistleblower, rather than being celebrated, actually ends up with demotions or a black mark on their record.

One of the tools that have been used throughout the rest of the Federal Government are the stay authority, which gives that whistleblower some protection during the period of the investigation. The IC is one area where we don't have that stay authority. I know Senator Collins and I are working on potentially changing that.

Do you think that stay authority that is granted to whistleblowers in other parts of the Federal Government ought to be granted to members of the IC?

Mr. STORCH. Thank you very much for the question, Vice Chairman Warner.

You know, as was mentioned from the beginning, we really have put a great emphasis on whistleblower issues at DOJ OIG, and after becoming deputy, in discussions with our IG, we decided I would retain the ombudsperson role because of the importance of that work to what we do.

We don't have stay authority at DOJ OIG. That doesn't mean it's not a good idea. It's something that, honestly, I haven't dealt with personally. OSC, obviously, has that ability in some circumstances, in Title 5 cases.

So what I would appreciate the opportunity to do, if confirmed, is to have the opportunity to consult with people in the IC regard-

ing how stay authority would play out and what the different equities are there that might be present.

You know, one of the things I always want to be careful of in my time in the OIG is not expressing opinions without having the opportunity to really review the situation and provide an authoritative answer. So I very much appreciate the question. And what I would pledge to do, if confirmed, is to look further into it, and would really appreciate the opportunity, and welcome it, to work with you and the other members of the Committee to discuss it.

Vice Chairman WARNER. Well, it's my initial impression that it is a tool that we ought to grant to the IC, but I'd be anxious to get your reflections when you're—once you get settled into this job.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BURR. Senator Feinstein.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

You both seem to be very well-qualified for your positions. I look forward to supporting them.

Mr. Storch, I'd like to ask you a question. You look like a pretty tough guy. And—

Mr. STORCH. My wife might disagree, but—

Senator FEINSTEIN [continuing]. I want to express a concern I have about NSA. Beginning with Mr. Snowden, we have had three major thefts of—people walking out with classified material. I have spoken to the heads of the agency on a number of occasions about it.

I think some things have been done, but not adequately. This comes down to contractors, and the three big thefts are done—were performed by contractors. I'd like to ask that you take a look at that situation, evaluate the security at the agency and the ability of people to walk in and out who are contractors with classified materials. Would I have your agreement to do so?

Mr. STORCH. Absolutely, Senator. Really, the points you make are very well-taken. Obviously, it's a great concern whenever there are—whether it's contractors or others, where there's information that's not properly secured.

I can't, frankly, imagine a place where that would be a greater concern than the NSA. And so, you know, I absolutely would pledge to you that that is something that we would explore, and happy to engage with you and the other members of the Committee on that.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BURR. Senator Wyden.

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you both for your professionalism. I've got a lot of ground to cover in five minutes, so if you all could be brief, that'd be great.

Mr. Storch, to begin with you, Senator Grassley and I are co-chairs of the Whistleblower Caucus. And how important, in your view, is it that whistleblower protections apply to contractors?

Mr. STORCH. Thank you very much for the question, Senator Wyden. I mentioned—I recalled, we had the event with the bipartisan Senate Whistleblower Caucus, and we very much appreciated your and Senator Grassley's speaking at it.

You know, I think it's important that people throughout the government, whether they be employees or whether they be employed as contractors hired by the government, feel comfortable coming forward with information. And honestly, analytically it's difficult to see why there's a difference in terms of the public benefit of coming forward. What may differ somewhat—may be different somewhat, is because of the different relationships, what the appropriate remedies are in different situations.

You know, on the Title 5 side at DOJ, as you know well, we have the NDAA, recently expanded, and some very expansive protection for contractors. On the intel side, I know PPD-19, part B, regarding security clearances, has been applied to contractors. But there are other places where I understand the protections are not as great.

So it's a long answer. You asked me to be brief. The answer is, I recognize the importance of it. Regarding the particular protections, that's something that I would have to look at and will be happy to do so.

Senator WYDEN. You'll hear from me again on this topic. I think it's got to be a priority.

Ms. Patelunas, you and I talked yesterday. You've been nominated for a position that stands at the center of the government's effort to understand Russian corruption, the way they move funds illicitly, and its use of shell companies and other forms of money laundering. Will you make this a top priority?

Ms. PATELUNAS. As we discussed yesterday, sir, I will certainly go back, I will work with the women and men of OIA and do our best. And then, I actually welcome the opportunity to come back and discuss it with you.

Shell companies are concerning. Again, they're—we need to make sure that things that we can't see readily by nefarious actors are not impacting our national security interests.

Senator WYDEN. I still want to know from you before we vote that this is going to be a top priority, number one.

Number two, will you make it a top priority, even if the intelligence leads in the direction of Russian ties to the President's business, family or campaign?

Ms. PATELUNAS. Sir, I will commit to making it a top priority. And, as an intelligence official, we always believe in unbiased intelligence and speaking truth to power. So I will take the intelligence where it leads, sir.

Senator WYDEN. Even if it leads in the direction of Russian ties where I mentioned, the President's businesses, family or campaign? I think you gave a good answer. I just want to make sure we nail it down.

Ms. PATELUNAS. I will take the intelligence wherever it goes. Again—

Senator WYDEN. Okay.

Ms. PATELUNAS [continuing]. Unbiased analysis is the only standard by which all intelligence officers—

Senator WYDEN. How are you going to go about bringing together foreign intelligence from the community, the intelligence community, with financial intelligence from other parts of the Treasury Department?

The reason that that's so important is it lets us connect the dots here, which is absolutely key to following the money and really understanding how Russia and other foreign money-laundering corrupts our country.

So tell me, if you would, how you're going to bring together the foreign intelligence from the IC with financial intelligence from other parts of the Treasury Department?

Ms. PATELUNAS. So the beauty of Treasury being embedded—or OIA being embedded in Treasury is that it does give us access to a lot of data, and we all fall under the Terrorism and Finance Intelligence Office under Undersecretary Mandelker, so that gives us access.

The financial intelligence community is a very strong community. I've talked to a number of them in preparation for this hearing, and they work well together as a team to ensure that we are putting all of the resources we have available, and then thinking very smartly about how we pursue different leads. So I again look forward to the challenge and to working with you.

Senator WYDEN. How do you intend to work with our allies in bringing together the fullest possible picture of how Russian governments go about undermining allies' democracy?

Ms. PATELUNAS. Well, it's my understanding that there are a lot of well-established ties already. So I look forward to working with allies and those who have—I mean, that's the national security. That's how we work in making sure that we have access to the appropriate data.

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. PATELUNAS. I look forward to that.

Chairman BARR. Senator Harris.

Senator HARRIS. Thank you.

Mr. Storch, as a prosecutor it is often the case that we will respond after something has happened, and then that's when our job kicks in. Will you talk with me a bit about how you would divide your priorities in this role, if confirmed, as it relates to prevention versus detection versus responding to a whistleblower in cases that are brought to your attention?

Mr. STORCH. Yes, of course. Thank you for the question, Senator. You know, it really is a great point. You know, as prosecutors you're coming in, you're coming in after the fact, you're looking at a set of evidence, and then you're making determinations as to whether to bring charges and how to pursue them and how they should be resolved.

At the OIG, we do that sort of work, obviously, but we also have a responsibility to get out information within the agency. So for instance, we do things like fraud awareness briefings at DOJ and things like that to get out information that can help the agency in a preventative fashion.

You have to be careful, obviously, because we're not part of the agency management. One of the things I've learned after all those years as a prosecutor is that, at the OIG we refer to the Department in the third person. We talk about "it is doing that" or "they are doing that," because, even though I still am proud to work for the Department of Justice, I have a different, independent role.

Having said that, there are ways to get out information so that the agency can see what's coming and perhaps, you know, take steps to address it.

One other thing we do that I'll mention, which is sort of a hybrid, is in the course of reviews, if we come upon information that we think the agency needs to address immediately, we can issue management advisory memoranda. And as you I'm sure know, under the IG Empowerment Act now, if we make recommendations, within three days those actually are made public.

And I think that's a very important tool and something that I've seen us using increasingly during my time at the DOJ OIG, because it provides us with a more time-sensitive way to get information to the agency.

So a lot of the work is still reactive, but there are, I think, ways to get out information to people about what we're finding so that they can take action in a preventative way.

Senator HARRIS. Great. I appreciate that.

Mr. STORCH. Yes, ma'am.

Senator HARRIS. Thank you.

And, Ms. Patelunas, you have an incredible amount of experience in your background, but I don't see a lot in threat finance. So can you talk a bit about how you will kind of get up to speed on that, and in particular as it relates to, for example, North Korea and its ballistic missile program and what we can do to detect and figure out where the money is coming from and stem the flow as it relates to sanctions and other methods?

Ms. PATELUNAS. Well, one of the positions that wasn't mentioned in my broad resume was that I was the chief of the missile and space group, and we spent an awful lot of time on North Korea.

So there are two aspects to it. The first is, of course, the systems development, but the second and maybe more important part was watching how the money flowed and all of the different secondary and tertiary actors they used in enabling that program.

It was very challenging work. It took a lot of painstaking efforts to look at letters of credit and who those actors were. So again, it's a long part of my history in the nonproliferation world. Following the money is very important and I've spent a lot of time doing that.

Now, on the terrorism side, I do have some work to do and I will look forward to lots of briefings that will be queued up if I'm confirmed.

Senator HARRIS. And I have no doubt you will be a fast learner.

Ms. PATELUNAS. Thank you.

Senator HARRIS. And then, Leslie Ireland was dual-hatted and had dual responsibilities in this position and at ODNI.

Ms. PATELUNAS. Correct.

Senator HARRIS. What is your perspective on what this will be going forward if confirmed? Do you expect that you're going to have both responsibilities? Or are they—are we going to bring in someone else?

Ms. PATELUNAS. So I've talked to the ODNI about it. They are in the middle of reviewing all of their positions, including NIM positions, and they're really looking at savings. I think they've had some feedback that maybe there's some opportunities for leveraging some smaller staffs.

And so they're not going to make any decisions. They'll talk to me when I get on board, and so we'll see. If the position is still available, I think it's important for Treasury to have a central role in that, but Treasury has a very important and strong role in threat finance and so I am committed to working with ODNI in whatever solutions they come up with.

Senator HARRIS. And will you commit to reporting back to this Committee if this becomes—

Ms. PATELUNAS. Absolutely.

Senator HARRIS [continuing]. Too much—

Ms. PATELUNAS. Either way, I will. Yes.

Senator HARRIS [continuing]. That the other position be filled by a separate leader?

Ms. PATELUNAS. Correct.

Senator HARRIS. Okay. Thank you.

I have nothing else.

Chairman BARR. Thank you, Senator Harris.

Before I dismiss you, Robert, I've got one more question. Can you ever envision any work that the Inspector General would do at NSA that wasn't relevant to the oversight responsibilities of this Committee?

[Pause.]

Mr. STORCH. Thank you very much for the question, Chairman Burr. I'm pausing because it's a difficult question. I think that, to the extent I understand the scope of the NSA IG's work, that it would be relevant to this Committee. I don't want to rule out, honestly, that there might be some review that would be conducted or some particular issue that would perhaps fall more closely under the jurisdiction of another of the committees.

But I think as a general matter that's right. And it's certainly something I would be happy to discuss with you further regarding any specific matter should I be confirmed.

I will tell you, and I mean this sincerely, that I will commit to this Committee that I will be responsive and engage with you, with the Vice Chairman, with the other members, on an ongoing basis so that you know appropriately what it is the OIG is doing and so that we can hear from you what it is you think we should be looking at.

And so I think that much I can say definitively. With regard to the jurisdiction, I just—I think that's right, but it's something I'd want to think about a little more, and I'd be happy to continue that discussion.

Chairman BARR. I appreciate that, and I hope you'll think about that as you conduct your business, and I'm appreciative of the offer. And I will reiterate what I think I said to you in my office and, Isabel, what I said to you. The Committee takes oversight extremely—as an extremely important part of our function. And oversight works much better when people on an ongoing basis share with us what it is they're working on, come to us early in areas that look like they're going to be concerns and brief the Committee as early as possible, so that it's not an end-of-the-process dump where all the questions deal with, "why didn't you come in?"

So I encourage you, even though, as, Isabel, I shared with you, that we probably have the least amount of contact with Treasury

Intelligence and Analysis of anybody within the community that we deal with, that doesn't have to be the way going forward.

And, as the Vice Chairman expressed, more and more the financial records that transfer around the world are of greater and greater importance to us, from a standpoint of connecting the dots and looking at the threats and understanding the scope of it.

By the same standpoint, Robert, on your side, it's the individuals that search out to find that information. And our confidence in you that we're living within the letter of the law and that we're not crossing the line is absolutely crucial to us.

So, to both of you, we thank you for your years of service. We thank you in advance for the years that you're going to give us in this new capacity. I thank your families for their buy-in and for their willingness to support you.

I now dismiss the first panel and call up the second panel.

[Recess from 9:55 a.m. to 9:58 a.m.]

Chairman BURR. I'd like to call us back into session for the second panel.

Sue, welcome. Sue Gordon is President Trump's nominee to be the next Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. Sue, congratulations on your nomination.

I'd like to take this moment to recognize your family in attendance today, many of whom have served or continue to serve this country: your father, Vice Admiral Robert "Bob" Monroe—Admiral, welcome—your mother, Charlotte, welcome; your husband, Jim, a career intelligence officer; your son, Jay, his wife Bethany, both assistant district attorneys.

And I hear you have two captains from the Marine Corps with you, your daughter Casey and her husband Eric. Wave. Trust me; in North Carolina we love Marines.

[Laughter.]

Let me thank all of you for your service to the country. I also want to especially thank your sister Nancy for coming today, because I understand she was a cheerleader at my alma mater, Wake Forest, when I played football there. Some of my colleagues don't believe that that's the case, but—

Vice Chairman WARNER. You played football?

Chairman BURR. I also want to have your teammates from the Duke basketball team, Barbara Krause and Margo Walsh—I welcome them. I'm also pleased when the ACC is so well represented.

Our goal in conducting this hearing is to enable the Committee to consider Ms. Gordon's qualifications and to allow for thoughtful deliberation by our members. She already has provided substantive written response to questions presented by the Committee and its members. Today, of course, members will be able to ask additional questions and hear from Ms. Gordon in open session.

Sue Gordon has served our Nation as a member of the intelligence community for more than 30 years. I'd like to note that before Sue launched her career she wisely sought wisdom in North Carolina, where she earned her bachelor of science degree from Duke University. She reminded me that she could equip me with a darker blue tie today. Had I actually been thinking, there's no way I would've worn this one today.

[Laughter.]

After joining the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence in 1980, Sue worked her way up the ranks and ultimately served in various management positions before becoming leader in the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology.

In 1998, Ms. Gordon became Special Assistant to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and was responsible for designing and implementing In-Q-Tel, a private nonprofit company whose primary purpose is to deliver innovative technology solutions for the intelligence community.

Sue rounded out her career at the CIA by serving as the Director of the Directorate of Support and the Director of Information Operations Center and finally as CIA's director of senior—Director's Senior Advisor on Cyber.

In 2015, Ms. Gordon became the Deputy Director of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. In that role, Sue has ably assisted the director in fulfilling the NGA's mission to provide timely, relevant and accurate and actionable geospatial intelligence to the intelligence community, the Department of Defense, the President, and this Committee.

Sue, you've been asked to help lead the intelligence community at a time of profound threat and challenge. As I said during Director Coats's nomination hearing, we're facing threats from state and non-state actors alike and are engaged in a robust debate at home on the scope and the scale of intelligence objectives and collection and what authorities are right and appropriate and lawful.

I expect you to be a forceful advocate for the intelligence community in those discussions, while maintaining an unwavering respect for the rule of law. And I have no question you will. I have complete trust that you'll lead the community with integrity and will ensure that the intelligence enterprise operates lawfully, ethically, and morally.

Sue, our Committee has had the opportunity to work with you many times during your career, and I believe your breadth of service in so many areas of the intelligence community, as well as your commitment to serving our Nation, make you a natural fit to help Director Coats lead our intelligence community.

As I told Dan Coats, I can assure you that this Committee will continue to faithfully follow its charter and conduct vigorous and real-time oversight of the intelligence community, its operations and its activities. We'll ask difficult and probing questions to you and your staff, and we'll expect honest, complete and timely responses.

I look forward to supporting your nomination. I look forward to having you as a partner with Director Coats, and I will ensure to you that we are going to consider you without delay. I want to thank you again for being here, for your years of service, and to your family who has committed as well to that service.

I now recognize the Vice Chairman.

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It's also my great honor to welcome Sue, someone who's helped educate me as I have learned this—learned about the intelligence community. Matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter into the record a publication called The Cipher Brief, the title of which is "The Great Expectations for Susan M. Gordon," where she

is called—"Gordon might just be the woman for the job." She's "said to be widely liked by members of both political parties, deeply respected," "straight shooter," and a whole series of other wonderful compliments. So if you screw up, this is going to come back and bite you.

[Laughter.]

Chairman BURR. So ordered.

[The material referred to follows:]

The Great Expectations for Susan M. Gordon

By Suzanne Kelly

July 19, 2017

The Cipher Brief

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column/state-secrets/the-great-expectations-for-susan-m-gordon?utm_source=Join+the+Community+Subscribers&utm_campaign=574c2f9b8f-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_07_19&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_02cbee778d-574c2f9b8f-122486681

As Susan M. Gordon sits before the Senate Intelligence Committee for her confirmation hearing to be the next Principal Deputy Director to the Director of National Intelligence, it's difficult to ignore the enormous expectation being placed on her shoulders.

For starters, the role of PDDNI (as its more affectionately referred to within the Intelligence Community) is an enormously influential position. As the right hand of the head of the organization created after 9/11 to make sure all sixteen U.S. Intelligence agencies do a better job of sharing information, the position is among the most instrumental in the IC. But if confirmed, (and she's widely expected to breeze through the process), Gordon will inherit a messy global threat landscape and an even messier political landscape at home.

So, here's a picture of the battlespace she's entering, where challenges, both internal and external, abound.

First, a little context: multiple sources report that her future boss, Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats, remains in close contact with President Trump on a daily basis -mostly because the President actively engages in his morning briefing. That's a good thing – but even Coats himself told Congress in May that he's been spending more time in the Oval Office than even he anticipated. So, what does that mean for Gordon, who will be navigating a range of both external and internal challenges?

Coats laid out the external challenges clearly during May's Worldwide Threats Hearing: cyber attacks, emerging and disruptive technologies, the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence – used not just by the U.S. but by its adversaries – the ethical and national security implications of genome editing, terrorism both at home and abroad, weapons of mass destruction that range from Russia's development of a ground-launched cruise missile to China modernizing its nuclear forces, to North Korea's ongoing missile tests, space and counter space, transnational organized crime, the list goes on.

Internally, well, the threats hit much closer to home. The very future of her expected new office, the ODNI, is rumored to be in the sights of President Trump, and in particular, Jared Kushner, amid allegations that ODNI has become – well – too bloated. For months now, Steve Fineberg, the CEO of Cerberus, who was reportedly brought in by Kushner, has been holding meetings all over Washington, DC with former and current intelligence officials in hopes of leading an official review of how efficiently the IC does or does not operate. Multiple sources say the meetings last for hours, and attendees are told to come prepared to spend some time. But while Fineberg is – according to the same sources – highly patriotic and passionate about lending his expertise to the mission, he hasn't been granted an official role and Dan Coats is reportedly adamant that any internal review be led internally. Navigating that political storm will be a prime task for a woman who has spent a career working with, and understanding the Intelligence Community but also understanding where it fails in its ability to pursue innovative approaches to problems.

But the issue of who leads an IC review might be the least of Gordon's worries in a heated political environment fueled via Twitter. Keep in mind that Gordon would be leading an intelligence community that is badly bruised. The President – intentionally or not – has repeatedly slapped the IC in the face, particularly by his public questioning of the IC finding that Russia did indeed carry out an information influence campaign during the 2016 presidential election. And don't think for a moment that the IC isn't equipped for revenge via a series of leaks that have come out over the past several months. Gordon might be just the woman for the job, though. Said to be widely liked by members of both political parties and deeply respected by her colleagues in the IC, she brings a reputation of being a straight shooter, albeit one sometimes criticized for trying to bring

about change within government agencies not well-equipped for it. Gordon is known as an innovative thinker, evidenced by her comments at The Cipher Brief's Annual Threat Conference earlier this summer, when she told a public-private crowd that the government *has* to be more innovative in its approach to threats, which is a tough thing, she said, because "it wasn't actually designed for that."

But the American people should consider Gordon well equipped for the challenge. She has spent the bulk of her career at the CIA, where she most recently served as Director of the Information Operations Center while also serving as the CIA Director's chief advisor on cyber. She previously served as Director of Support, where she was responsible for worldwide security, logistics, finance, information technology, and personnel for the Agency's domestic and overseas positions.

Gordon started at the CIA in 1980 as an analyst in the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research – the part of the CIA that's responsible for technical analysis of foreign space and missile systems. She then went on to the Agency's Directorate of Science and Technology, and later was named the first Director of the Office of Advanced Analytic Tools.

In the 90s, she was named special assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence. That's when George Tenet – the Director at the time – tasked his team with finding a way to bring more innovative ideas inside the walls of Langley. Gordon cast her eye on Silicon Valley and became a driving force behind what would become a new approach to public-private partnership for the development of information technology. Today that company is known as In-Q-Tel.

Hopefully all of that will help Gordon navigate the new challenge of assisting Dan Coats in leading the IC, and in navigating a new war of 'tweets and leaks.'

Vice Chairman WARNER. But I'd like to enter that into the record.

And I just want to reiterate what the Chairman said. I think you're going to be a great partner with Dan Coats. We've talked about IC ITE and how important trying to get that implemented, that process implemented will be. We've talked about acquisitions, particularly in terms of overhead, and very much appreciate the fresh approach you brought at NGA; and now, in this new, enhanced role, how we will try to bring that same kind of forward-leaning acquisition process to NRO and the balance of the community.

I also think one of the things that we're going to need to work through is the security clearance process, how we move people from the community in and out as they move from public sector to private sector and back, back, back and forth.

Again, I can't think of a better person to partner with Dan Coats, and look forward very much to supporting your nomination.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BARR. Thank you, Vice Chairman.

Sue, would you please stand? Raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Ms. GORDON. I do.

Chairman BARR. Please be seated.

**TESTIMONY OF SUSAN M. GORDON, NOMINATED TO BE
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE**

Chairman BARR. Sue, before we move to your statement, I'd like to ask you five standard questions the Committee poses to each nominee who appears before us. They require a simple yes or no answer for the record.

Do you agree to appear before the Committee here or in other venues when invited?

Ms. GORDON. Yes.

Chairman BARR. If confirmed—would you cut on your microphone, just to make sure he picks it up.

If confirmed, do you agree to send officials from your office to appear before the Committee and designated staff when invited?

Ms. GORDON. Yes.

Chairman BARR. Do you agree to provide documents or any other materials requested by the Committee for it to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities?

Ms. GORDON. Yes.

Chairman BARR. Will you ensure that your office and your staff provide such materials to the Committee when requested?

Ms. GORDON. Yes.

Chairman BARR. Do you agree to inform and fully brief to the fullest extent possible all members of the Committee of intelligence activities and covert action, rather than just the members—the Chairman and the Vice Chairman?

Ms. GORDON. Yes, I will.

Chairman BARR. Thank you very much.

We'll now proceed to your opening statement. The floor is yours.

Ms. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, members of the Committee. I am honored to appear before you as the nominee for the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. I'd like to begin by thanking the President for nominating me to this position and Director Coats for his faith in my experience and my passion to help him lead the intelligence community.

I love America. I love being here today as we do the Nation's work, as our founders envisioned. I never thought I'd say that I would enjoy being here, testifying in front of this Committee, to anticipate your gentle, gentle questioning—

[Laughter.]

But I do.

As a career intelligence officer, to lead the women and men of the world's finest intelligence enterprise in service of the Nation at a time of challenge is both humbling and exciting.

We are who we began as. Today, I'm so pleased to be joined by my family, some by birth, some by choice, who helped bring me to this day:

My mom and dad, who instilled in me a love of country, the drive to always do my very best, and the responsibility to work for something bigger than myself;

My big brother and sister, who allowed me to live through childhood and who keep me in line to this day;

My husband, who has been the love of my life and my best friend for actually today 37 years. And the fact that he is also a career intelligence professional means we not only get to share our life, but our life's work.

My remarkable children and their spouses, as you mentioned, two assistant district attorneys from Houston and two Marine pilots currently stationed in Southern California, who have also chosen to serve their term for their country;

My Duke basketball teammates, who taught me how to be depended upon and to learn how to depend on others, and to win with respect and to lose with dignity;

And finally, my intelligence community colleagues, who are really the heroes of my story. It is their work that brings me here. Thank you all for standing with me today, as you always have.

These are interesting times, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, as the Nation faces a wide variety of security challenges, whether it's the cyber threat faced by an ever-expanding digital environment, the threat posed by nation-states like Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, the threat of terrorist groups who continue to threaten the United States and her interests, or simply the pace of change that demands we move ever faster.

The intelligence community is challenged every day to deliver and at its best we provide decision-makers with the advantage to meet these and all threats and identify the opportunities to act before events dictate.

I'm incredibly proud to be considered for this position at exactly this moment. I feel that perhaps my broad experience, my love of a good challenge and my reputation for finding new solutions, my penchant for rolling up my sleeves and getting to work, and my understanding that the only way we get things done is through our people and with them will be useful.

It may seem surprising to some that a career Central Intelligence Agency officer would extol the virtues of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. But I believe it performs a vital role in ensuring that the Nation always has access to the best intelligence, delivered at exactly the right time.

The intelligence community best serves the Nation when we work together, and leveraging the work of the community and integrating it at its highest level is exactly where the ODNI is meant to perform.

When Director Coats appeared before you he described the role of the DNI as a head coach, and I think that's an apt analogy. So let me briefly share my view of the role of the assistant coach, the principal deputy, and to offer some perspective on what I would bring to the job if confirmed.

The first role is integration, work well begun by my predecessor, but no less a focus today. It is necessary, but not sufficient, that each organization delivers excellence in its responsibility and craft. But we must also be able to share that work appropriately, in a seamless, timely fashion, so that the community and consequently the Nation, benefits from the collective.

My more than two decades of service at the CIA across various disciplines—analysis, technology, operations and support—and my last two years as deputy director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency have allowed me to see the strengths of various disciplines and organizations and the power of using them together.

I understand different risk equations. I see how tactical military requirements both differ from and complement strategic intelligence, and I know how to find common ways forward.

My second role is to support innovation. The community not only has delivered great capability to the Nation, but what it brings to bear today is the best I've ever seen. And yet it is not enough. We cannot stand still, lest we lose our advantage; and we must improve at an increasing rate, because the world is turning ever faster and global connectedness is transforming our advantage from being grounded simply in technology, but more in its clever use.

If confirmed, I will help create the impetus and the room for this to happen, and I will look forward to this Committee helping in this necessary quest.

Somewhere along the way I've become comfortable with leading change, sometimes big change, like asking a group of private citizens to form a company like In-Q-Tel; sometimes smaller change, like changing the support model of how we provide facilities, finance, and security worldwide so it can be more effectively and efficiently delivered; and sometimes simply changing perspective that allows geospatial intelligence to both benefit from and provide benefit to work going on in the open.

I know that if you focus on maintaining relevance rather than simply preserving the status quo, you can always find your way.

The third role and my favorite is leading the women and men of the intelligence community in creating the environment in which they can thrive. I've had the joy of leading thousands of incredible intelligence professionals, from those leading operations to those inventing our future to those who support mission execution.

Our people are our greatest asset, our base of talent, and the real answer to what we need. Our future is bright because more and more, better and better, continue to arrive at our door and ask to serve.

If I'm confirmed as the PDDNI, I intend to be their champion, ensuring they have the opportunities, tools and support they need to continue the great work of this Nation. And I will advance diversity and inclusion, not simply because it is decent, but because I know that, in order for us to deliver our best, we must create an environment where everyone can bring their best, truest selves to the task at hand.

I've been an LGBTQ ally and champion for years and the experience has let me see the magic that happens when people of all races, religions, sexual orientation and experiences receive our support.

In closing, I'd like to thank the Committee again for your consideration of my nomination. If confirmed, I intend to work with all of you with clarity, candor and energy to make sure that the IC has the support it needs to tackle whatever the opposing teams bring our way; that the ODNI is focused only on its primary mission and we deliver on that mission effectively and efficiently; and that the Congress has the information needed to conduct necessary oversight responsibilities.

I'm proud to be here, to represent the women and men of the intelligence community and to work alongside Director Coats to lead us. This is a humbling experience and I'm grateful for the opportunity, and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Gordon follows:]

**Statement for the Record
Ms. Susan M. Gordon
Nominee for the Position of
Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence**

July 19, 2017

Introduction

Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Warner, Members of the Committee – I am honored to appear before you as the nominee for the position of Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.

I'd like to begin by thanking the President for nominating me for this position, and Director Coats for his faith in my experience and passion to help him lead the Intelligence Community.

Simply put, I love America. I love being here today as we do the nation's work as our founders envisioned. I never thought I'd say that I love being here to testify before the Senate, but I do.

And as a career intelligence officer, this opportunity to lead the women and men of the world's finest intelligence enterprise in service of the nation at a time of great challenge is both humbling and exciting.

We are who we began as. Today I am so pleased to be joined by my family—some by birth, some by choice—who helped bring me to this amazing moment.

My mom and dad, who instilled in me a love of country, the drive to always do my best, and the responsibility to work for something bigger than yourself.

My big brother and sister, who “allowed” me to live through childhood, and who keep me in line to this day.

My husband, who has been the love of my life and best friend for—today—37 years. That he is also a career intelligence officer is just icing on the cake.

My remarkable children and their spouses—two assistant district attorneys and two Marine Corps pilots—who have also chosen to serve their turn for their country.

And my Duke Basketball teammates who taught me how to be depended upon, and how to depend on others.

And finally, to my Intelligence Community colleagues, who are the real heroes in my story. I would never have gotten here without their drive and support.

Thank you all for standing with me today, as you always have.

The Job

These are interesting times as the nation faces a wide variety of threats and challenges to its security. Whether it is the cyber threat faced by an ever-expanding digital environment, the threat posed by nation states like China, North Korea, Russia, or Iran, or the threat of terrorist groups who continue to target the United States...the Intelligence Community is challenged each

day to be our best. And at its best, intelligence provides decision-makers with an advantage to meet these and all threats, and in identifying opportunities to act before events dictate.

I am incredibly proud to be considered for this position of great responsibility at exactly this moment. I feel that, perhaps, my broad base of experience, my love of a good challenge and reputation for finding new solutions, my penchant for rolling up my sleeves and getting to work, and my recognition that the only way we get things done is through and with our people, will be useful.

It may seem surprising for a career Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer to extol the virtues of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), but I believe it performs a vital role in insuring that the nation always has access to the best intelligence delivered at exactly the right moment.

The Intelligence Community is at its best, and best serves the nation, when we work together. Leveraging the work of the Community and integrating it at the highest level is exactly where the ODNI is meant to have effect.

When Director Coats appeared before you, he described the role of the DNI as a “head coach” for the Intelligence Community. I agree this is an apt analogy.

So let me share my view of the role of the “assistant coach”—the Principal Deputy—and to offer some perspective on what I would bring to the job, if confirmed.

The first is integration—work well begun by my predecessor, but no less important a focus today. It is necessary, but not sufficient, that each organization delivers excellence in its responsibility and craft. We must also be able to share that work, appropriately, in a seamless, timely fashion so that the Community and, consequently, the nation benefits from the collective.

My more than two decades of service across the various disciplines of the CIA—analysis, technology, operations, and support—and my last two years as the Deputy Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (a combat support agency in addition to an intelligence organization) have allowed me to see the strength of our various disciplines and organizations, and the power of using them together. I understand different risk equations, I see how tactical military requirements both differ and complement national strategic requirements, and I know how to find common ways forward.

The second is innovation. The Community not only has delivered great capability to this nation, but what it brings to bear today is the best I’ve ever seen. And yet it is not enough. We cannot stand still, lest we lose our advantage. And we must improve at an increasing rate because the world is turning ever faster, and global connectedness is transforming our advantage from being grounded in technology to being grounded in how we use it, sometimes in uniquely clever ways. If confirmed, I will help create the impetus and the room for this to happen, and I will look for this Committee to help in this necessary quest.

Somewhere along the way in my career, I became comfortable with leading change. Sometimes big change, like asking a group of private citizens to help us find a new way to

provide access to the energy and innovation happening in Silicon Valley that became In-Q-Tel. Sometimes smaller change, like changing the support model so that facilities, logistics, and finance could be more effectively and efficiently delivered worldwide. And sometimes simply a change in perspective, that allows geospatial intelligence to both benefit from, and provide benefit to, work going on in the open and with different partners. I know that if you focus on maintaining relevance rather than the status quo, you can always find your way.

The third, and my favorite, is leading the women and men of the Intelligence Community and creating the environment and the opportunity for them to thrive. They are our greatest asset, our base of talent, and the real answer to what we need. They are where our best analysis, our most creative solutions, and the source from which our most inspiring innovations come. If confirmed, you will be hearing a lot from me on what we, together, can do for them.

I've had the joy of leading thousands of incredible intelligence professionals—from those leading operations, to those inventing our future, to those who support mission execution. Our people are the finest and most dedicated I have ever seen, and our future is bright because more continue to come and seek to serve, every day.

If I am confirmed as PDDNI, I intend to be their champion—ensuring they have the opportunities, tools, and support they need to continue the great work of this Nation. And, I will advance diversity and inclusion, not simply because it is decent, but because I know that in order for the IC to deliver its best, we must create the environment where everyone can bring their best, truest selves to the task at hand. I have been an LGBTQ champion and ally for years, and the experience has let me see the magic that happens when people of all races, religions, sexual orientations, and experiences receive our support.

Conclusion

In closing, I'd like to thank the Committee again for your consideration of my nomination.

If confirmed, I intend to work with all of you to ensure that the IC has the support it needs to tackle whatever the opposing teams bring our way; that the ODNI is focused only on its primary mission and we deliver on that mission effectively and efficiently; and that Congress has the information needed to conduct its necessary oversight responsibilities.

In my discussions with many of you prior to today's hearing, you have asked how you can be helpful. If confirmed, I will seek your support for the women and men of the IC, as well as the critical operations and efforts they undertake on behalf of the nation.

I am proud to represent the women and men of the IC, and work alongside Director Coats to lead a Community that has never been more vital to national security than it is today. This is truly a humbling experience, and if confirmed, I will work every day to be worthy of this opportunity and your support.

Vice Chairman WARNER [presiding]. I believe Senator King will go first.

Senator KING. I appreciate it.

Perhaps you could ask the IC if they could design a way we could do our hearings here without conflicts. Both Senator Heinrich and I have bills before another Committee that we have to go and—

Ms. GORDON. Then I will be clear and direct.

Senator KING. Thank you. I appreciate that.

First, I just want to emphasize, number one, how pleased I am that you're undertaking this position, given your history and background. And I think, as you testified, you come at a particularly important moment. The threats are varied and vast, complex. You're joining Director Coats, who all of us know well, and who is extremely able and thoughtful, but does not have the deep background in the IC that you have. And I think you'll make an extraordinary team.

My one question of concern is at the beginning of the new Administration there was a lot of talk about perhaps abolishing the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. A fellow named Steve Feinberg was assigned to look into it.

So my first question is, how do you feel as an intelligence professional about the role of this office? And, secondly, have you met with Mr. Feinberg? Has he—have you had any exchanges with him? Do you know whether he's met with Mr. Coats? Where does that question stand?

So first question is your views on the role of this, not your position necessarily, but the ODNI generally? And then, secondly, where this analysis stands.

Ms. GORDON. Thank you, Senator King, for your question. I see the role of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence pretty simply, as I stated. It's to make sure that we always deliver the best intelligence that all the members of the community have to offer at the right time, unbiased, brought together at the moment of decision so that we can make it.

Senator KING. Given the fact that there are 16 agencies, do you think it's necessary to have such an institution like the ODNI, which was created as I understand it after September 11th, because of the problem of lack of communication between the agencies?

Ms. GORDON. As a CIA officer, I think, when it was formed I couldn't imagine why we needed something. Heck, we were the Central Intelligence Agency; how could you need anything more than that? That was formed, interestingly, with kind of the same premise of bringing other intelligence together.

As I look at it now, the integrative functions that the ODNI provides, particularly over time, have been remarkable in bringing us together in ways that we couldn't have. And I'll just cite one example of—the FBI at the same table, from an intelligence perspective, has allowed us to tackle some of our most difficult threats because we have the mechanisms to bring them together. DHS similarly.

As we look at cyber threats, if we aren't partners with those organizations as well and have the ability to have them in the same room—but you need an organization to drive this to happen. And you don't want different types of intelligence to be subordinate to

any one opinion of what the right thing is. And I think that is the right, proper, just role. And then there are things that we do to ensure that that happens.

What I think everyone has been concerned about is, have we grown too big? Do you over time suck up too many other responsibilities, exceed your brief? Director Coats is committed to looking at it. I think he has suggested to me that that will be a special opportunity I have, to lead that look.

But do I believe we need it in order to make sure that we can integrate the best we have and deliver it, rather than putting a bunch of data on people's desks—but rather, give the best chance? I think so.

To your second question, sir, about any presidential review that might or might not happen, I don't believe that that has taken shape yet. I'm a career intelligence officer. I believe that scrutiny is a good thing. If that were to come to bear—

Senator KING. That's what you do—that's what you do for a living.

Ms. GORDON. It is, right. And you have to be comfortable with it. It's not always pleasant, but it is what makes us better, whether it is program reviews or audit or IG inspectors, Congressional oversight, or just questioning that the American people have of us.

Senator KING. You haven't met with Mr. Feinberg? Or have you?

Ms. GORDON. I have, briefly, before I was nominated, as he was talking to members of the intelligence community. But I don't believe that that has been resolved yet. If it happens, we'll absolutely work with him, because we share a quest. But I don't have any sense of whether or how it will shape. And so any comment I might have would be premature.

Senator KING. Thank you. Thank you very much, and—

Ms. GORDON. Thank you, Senator.

Senator KING [continuing]. Thank you again for your willingness to serve.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BURR. Vice Chairman.

Vice Chairman WARNER. Two or three quick questions. One, you know, obviously this Committee's very engaged and involved in the investigation into Russian meddling in our 2016 elections. Should you be confirmed, we'd want your commitment that you will work with this Committee as we need documents or other information.

Ms. GORDON. Director Coats, I think, has been very clear in his support, and I absolutely support that.

Vice Chairman WARNER. Excellent.

One of the areas that we discussed—a little nerdy but terribly important—and that's the IT backbone for the whole intelligence community. IC ITE was something that Director Clapper was a huge advocate of. It's our hope that you'll take on that responsibility and see that mission through to its completion. Comments?

Ms. GORDON. Yeah. I don't see how we get to our future if we don't complete the work of IT modernization to make sure we have the infrastructure that allows us to take advantage of technologies that are appearing that are useful, and doing so in a secure, managed fashion across all our organizations. There is nothing diminished about that imperative.

I do think that there are—there's work we need to do to increase the rate of adoption, because we have answers we need to provide and partners and customers we need to reach when this is in place.

So not only will you have my commitment to continue it, but I will look forward to coming back to this Committee and talk about how we might advance it at even a greater rate.

Vice Chairman WARNER. Well, this will be the ultimate lay-up question. You—

Ms. GORDON. Yes, Duke women's basketball will win the national championship.

[Laughter.]

Vice Chairman WARNER. My father, who's a UConn women's basketball fan, might disagree.

But, obviously you've been a champion at NGA in terms of smaller sats and commercial use. One of the things I want to give public accolades to the Chairman, he's really become a huge believer, particularly as we try to get our requirements done in a much faster way, move in a much more aggressive way.

Stephanie O'Sullivan carried on a lot of that champion role when she fulfilled the principal deputy's role. My hope would be that you would continue to be that advocate. Do you want to speak to that briefly?

Ms. GORDON. I will. I've gone on the record many times saying that one of our greatest competitors is simply time, and that's because intelligence is about advantage and you just have to keep up to continue to provide advantage.

For as great as our intelligence collection capabilities are—and they are stunning, eye-watering, and we deliver great security to this Nation—you just can't stand still. And if you're not excited about what's happening in the private sector and the opportunity that affords for us to not only provide additive capability, but imagine how we can do things differently, you're just not thinking.

You will have my commitment to continue to push that, even as we both recognize that the confidence, availability, and reliability of the data that those things connect is always something that we'll have to balance the speed with which we might pursue things. But you and I will be absolutely pushing on that same rope together.

Vice Chairman WARNER. Well, now that the minority has given you totally lay-up questions, I'll turn the floor back over to the Chairman.

[Laughter.]

Ms. GORDON. But Wake Forest might do well, too.

[Laughter.]

Chairman BURR. I've never known Warner to suck up quite as much as he just did.

[Laughter.]

Sue, you referenced yourself to Dan's assistant coach. Let me just remind you, they don't know anything about college sports in Indiana.

[Laughter.]

Listen, a few questions: Where do you see the most opportunity to innovate within the intelligence community?

Ms. GORDON. One easy answer: This is a data world, not a world of data scarcity, but data abundance. It's what intelligence is. The

data that are available just should make us drool with excitement, but only if we can command it in a way that is not the manual processes that have dominated our past.

So to me artificial intelligence, automation, augmentation, those things that allow us to look at data and be able to turn it from noise into some signal that then our analysts can look at and advance is probably where, not only is it the greatest opportunity because of what is going on in the private sector for the exact same reason, but also our greatest need.

There are just no ways for us to continue to understand all that we have available to us if we don't advance in these technologies. So I think that's really the one.

The more surprising answer might be that I think innovation in business processes—the world has turned so much that the ways in which we do things are driven by what we constructed at a time that is some time past. So looking at our business processes, our policies, the way in which we move things, move people, consider security, I think are all the things in which we can innovate in order to achieve the same objective that you already talked about, which is speed and efficiency.

So those two areas I think are great, but it's in all. It's in all, and how we think about training our officers and about how we move them, about how we consider classification. This is a great moment, because the need is so sure and the opportunities provided by that which is available should allow us to find some great solution, if we just have the will and time.

Chairman BURR. I agree with you, and I think the Committee does, on data. I will share with you one concern that I have. When we came off of September the 11th, the buzzword then was “analytics.” We've got to get more analysts. And we created analysts in every inch of the whole of government. And I've questioned for the past number of years whether we've got tremendous duplication.

As I look at the ability to manage and utilize big data, I begin to see different streams of funding from different agencies. I think it's important from an ODNI standpoint that, at least through the IC community, that there be a coordinated approach to it where we don't look back in hindsight and say, “We had different agencies duplicating the work,” and that that's something that you will take on as a primary role, to make sure that all of the efforts complement themselves.

And I know you're—as you leave NGA, you leave at a time where I think there's a proposal on the table for a very unique approach—

Ms. GORDON. Yes.

Chairman BURR [continuing]. To leveraging data that is available and open for individuals that need data to build their base, and maybe a trade-off of them sharing their algorithms with NGA. So it's a fascinating approach that I think I want to talk to you offline, not just about that, but how we take In-Q-Tel and is there an additional role for In-Q-Tel to play in the whole of government. And as Mark and I have talked several times, we have no technology clear-house within the whole of government.

Ms. GORDON. Right.

Chairman BURR. Every agency considers that they've got their own IT people to do that. I'm hard-pressed to find anything that government does well, and I'm being serious when I say that, in business practice.

Ms. GORDON. If you'll allow, I—that's what I was alluding to in terms of our business processes. I think public-private partnership is something that the intelligence community has done exceptionally well over its history.

As a matter of fact, I'm old, so I've seen a lot, and I can tell you I can't think of any of the accomplishments of my career that I have seen that haven't been done without a partner from the private sector. We've done it differently over time. Around World War II we formed FFRDCs, where we brought in talent and held it essentially for government use, in a special place so that it was available to us.

In the seventies, it was going to a company and forming Skunk Works, so that we could do something remarkable that then the U.S. government would have unique advantage.

In the nineties, with In-Q-Tel, we were like, "well, that model isn't going to work for the government to hold the innovation." And I think we now need to continue to look for ways that we solve the value proposition of both ends in order to advance us.

But this moment, because of what is so openly available, we should be able to do it, but I agree with you we should do it in an organized fashion. There are times when a thousand flowers should bloom, when you have great uncertainty. There are other times when you know you need to advance that you should do so in a purposeful fashion and to husband your resources, and I think that's a great example of what the ODNI can provide value for.

Chairman BURR. I'm going to approach the conversation on IC ITE a little bit different than Mark did.

Ms. GORDON. Okay.

Chairman BURR. In our conversation, I told you I was charging you—

Ms. GORDON. Yes.

Chairman BURR [continuing]. Personally with making sure that this was implemented and that you shared with us any process hurdles that are in the way or funding limitations, that we could clear the brush to allow this to become reality. So I hold—

Ms. GORDON. I so commit.

Chairman BURR [continuing]. I hold you to it.

One other area, just for any comments that you might have. The community is plagued with leaks right now. I would say the Committee has had a rash of problems that we haven't experienced in the past. And from a Committee to the IC community, I think the integrity of this Committee's—of how we handle things is absolutely vital to the willingness to share information with us.

By the same standpoint, when we see, as Senator Feinstein alluded to in the last panel, three significant breaches from the NSA, that brings great concern and consternation to the Committee, and I know it does to the whole IC community.

Do you commit to us, from a standpoint of the ODNI's efforts, to try to get into this leak problem and figure out how we plug this?

Ms. GORDON. Senator, I believe that unauthorized disclosures of classified information are always damaging. There are so many processes by which we can serve the American people transparently through oversight that leaks, people deciding to go their own way, are not in this Nation's interests. And we will be a good partner with you on addressing that issue.

Chairman BURR. Thank you. I know the Vice Chairman and I would love to get with you at some point, once you've got your sea legs there, to talk about some concepts that we have for the whole of government that minimize the potential for tools that are used today.

And I find it odd, but I'm not surprised, that I think this Committee is probably more esteemed in technology, current technology, than any Committee on Capitol Hill, not because we're jurisdictionally there, but because it's that same technology that presents us the greatest threat around the corner. So we've had to—we've had to spend a lot of time learning it.

Ms. GORDON. I do think there—I look forward to, when I have my sea legs at the end of next week—

[Laughter.]

Coming to see you. But seriously, I think it's a problem, but I think there are a number of things going on that offer great potential, and we've talked about it before.

You know, cloud computing is sometimes such a buzzword, but there is great security potential in that advance; continuous evaluation, looking at our employees, looking at some of the insider threat work that's going on.

I think there are a number of good things, from technological solutions, to policy solutions, that should give us increasing advantage over this. But I look forward to coming and speaking with you, hearing your ideas and then advancing those.

Chairman BURR. Great. Thank you very much.

Seeing no additional members that are here to ask you the tough questions that Senator Warner didn't, let me once again—

[Laughter.]

Ms. GORDON. I'm so disappointed, sir.

Chairman BURR [continuing]. Let me once again thank you. I thank your family for their service to the country, and can tell you personally that we are just absolutely thrilled to have you in this new role. It's my expectation that we will move your confirmation as quickly as we possibly can and that Dan will have a committed assistant coach there.

This hearing's now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 10:34 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

Supplemental Material

SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE

UNITED STATES SENATE



QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES

**SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE**

**QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES**

PART A - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

1. FULL NAME: Robert Phillip Storch
OTHER NAMES USED:
2. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: Jacksonville, Florida
CITIZENSHIP: USA
3. MARITAL STATUS: Married
4. SPOUSE'S NAME: Sara Matilthe Lord
5. SPOUSE'S MAIDEN NAME IF APPLICABLE: N/A
6. NAMES AND AGES OF CHILDREN:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>AGE</u>
Charlotte Lord Storch	24
Hannah Lord Storch	22

7. EDUCATION SINCE HIGH SCHOOL:

<u>INSTITUTION</u>	<u>DATES ATTENDED</u>	<u>DEGREE RECEIVED</u>	<u>DATE OF DEGREE</u>
Harvard University	9/78 – 6/82	A.B.	1982
Columbia University School of Law	9/82 – 5/85	J.D.	1985

8. EMPLOYMENT RECORD (LIST ALL POSITIONS HELD SINCE COLLEGE, INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE. INDICATE NAME OF EMPLOYER, POSITION, TITLE OR DESCRIPTION, LOCATION, AND DATES OF EMPLOYMENT). [Most recent positions listed for each employer]

EMPLOYER	POSITION/TITLE	LOCATION	DATES		Present	Est
U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General	Deputy Inspector General	Washington, D.C.	July 2012	Est <input type="checkbox"/>	Present <input type="checkbox"/>	Est <input type="checkbox"/>
U.S. Attorney's Office, Northern District of New York (USAO/NDNY)	Counsel to the U.S. Attorney and Deputy Criminal Chief	Albany, NY	December 2009	Est <input type="checkbox"/>	June 2012	Est <input type="checkbox"/>
U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Office of Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (on detail from USAO/NDNY)	Resident Legal Advisor	Kyiv, Ukraine	December 2007	Est <input type="checkbox"/>	December 2009	
U.S. Attorney's Office, Northern District of New York (USAO/NDNY)	Assistant U.S. Attorney	Albany, NY	May 1995	Est <input type="checkbox"/>	December 2007	Est <input type="checkbox"/>
Bond, Schoeneck and King	Litigation Associate	Albany, NY	March 1994	Est <input type="checkbox"/>	May 1995	
U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Public Integrity Section	Trial Attorney	Washington, DC	July 1990		March 1994	
U.S. Attorney's Office, Middle District of Florida (USAO/MDFL)	Assistant U.S. Attorney	Jacksonville, FL	May 1987		June 1990	
Covington and Burling	Litigation Associate	Washington, DC	September 1986		April 1987	
U.S. District Judge William D. Keller, Central District of California	Law Clerk	Los Angeles, CA	September 1985		August 1986	
Morrison and Foerster	Summer Associate	San Francisco, CA	May 1985		August 1985	
Ropes and Gray	Summer Associate	Boston, MA	May 1984		August 1984	
Shipman and Goodwin	Summer Associate	Hartford, CT	May 1983		August 1983	

9. GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCE (INDICATE EXPERIENCE IN OR ASSOCIATION WITH FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING ADVISORY, CONSULTATIVE, HONORARY, OR OTHER PART-TIME SERVICE OR POSITION. DO NOT REPEAT INFORMATION ALREADY PROVIDED IN QUESTION 8).

See above

10. INDICATE ANY SPECIALIZED INTELLIGENCE OR NATIONAL SECURITY EXPERTISE YOU HAVE ACQUIRED HAVING SERVED IN THE POSITIONS DESCRIBED IN QUESTIONS 8 AND/OR 9.

At the DOJ OIG, I have been involved in the review of a number of reports related to the exercise of intelligence and national security authorities, particularly by the DOJ National Security Division and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as well as reports related to coordination by DOJ and the FBI with other components of the intelligence community in various contexts. I also have participated as Deputy Inspector General in the Deputies meetings of the IC IG Forum relating to cross-cutting issues across the OIGs in the intelligence community, and attended the annual IC IG Conferences, and I have provided advice to the DNI regarding PPD-19 whistleblower training required by the White House's Third National Action Plan for Open Government. Previously, as an Assistant United States Attorney, I served as the Northern District of New York's initial Anti-Terrorism Coordinator, working with law enforcement and intelligence components of the FBI and other agencies as we stood up our program in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.

11. HONORS AND AWARDS (PROVIDE INFORMATION ON SCHOLARSHIPS, FELLOWSHIPS, HONORARY DEGREES, MILITARY DECORATIONS, CIVILIAN SERVICE CITATIONS, OR ANY OTHER SPECIAL RECOGNITION FOR OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE OR ACHIEVEMENT).

Harvard University (undergraduate)

Graduated *magna cum laude* with a double major in History and Government
Harvard College Scholar

Columbia University School of Law

Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar (all three years)
Lawrence Wein Scholar for the Eleventh Circuit
Class of 1912 Prize in Contracts
President, Columbia Law School Student Senate

U.S. Attorney's Office, MDFL

Commendation from DOJ Criminal Division AAG Mueller for work on Jacksonville Public Corruption Task Force
Commendation from FBI Director Sessions for work on multi-state bombing investigation

Public Integrity Section

Commendation from FBI Director Sessions for Arkansas election fraud prosecutions
DOJ Special Achievement Award

U.S. Attorney's Office, NDNY

Commendation from FBI Director Mueller for career contributions
Commendation from U.S. Attorney for work as Appellate Chief and Senior Litigation Counsel
Commendation for U.S. Attorney for work as District's first Anti-Terrorism Coordinator
Legal Evaluator in the DOJ Evaluation and Review Staff
Arson Prosecutor of the Year, New York State Fire Investigators Association
Commendation from DOJ Civil Rights Division AAG Patrick for work on prison beating case
Various case related commendations, including from the U.S. Department of the Interior OIG, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the U.S. Department of Transportation OIG, and the U.S. Department of Labor OIG

Department of Justice OIG

OIG Whistleblower Ombudsperson, and Founder and Chair of Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Whistleblower Ombudsman Working Group
Chair, OIG Report Standardization Committee
OIG Diversity Committee and Employee Engagement Subcommittee

12. ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS (LIST MEMBERSHIPS IN AND OFFICES HELD WITHIN THE LAST TEN YEARS IN ANY PROFESSIONAL, CIVIC, FRATERNAL, BUSINESS, SCHOLARLY, CULTURAL, CHARITABLE, OR OTHER SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS).

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>OFFICE HELD</u>	<u>DATES</u>
New York State Bar Association, Criminal Justice Section	Member of the Executive Committee of the Criminal Justice Section, and Co-Chair, Committee on Federal Criminal Practice	2006-07
New York State Bar Association, Committee on Attorneys in Public Service	Member	2005-07

13. PUBLISHED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES (LIST THE TITLES, PUBLISHERS, BLOGS, AND PUBLICATION DATES OF ANY BOOKS, ARTICLES, REPORTS, OR OTHER PUBLISHED MATERIALS YOU HAVE AUTHORED. ALSO LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEECHES OR REMARKS YOU HAVE MADE WITHIN THE LAST TEN YEARS FOR WHICH THERE IS A TEXT, TRANSCRIPT, OR VIDEO). IF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE A COPY OF EACH REQUESTED PUBLICATION, TEXT, TRANSCRIPT, OR VIDEO? **Yes**

Training Video entitled "Reporting Wrongdoing: Whistleblowers and their Rights and Protections" (available online at https://oig.justice.gov/multimedia/video-10-10-13.htm#top)	DOJ OIG Website	October 13, 2013
Panelist discussing the DOJ OIG Whistleblower Ombudsman Program and the CIGIE Whistleblower Ombudsman Working Group (available online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=UNU2jnpdT3E&list=PLHTeSSdPRRyM7p87avmq2Zsyfz20Sc_0&start=18430)	OGE National Government Ethics Summit	September 23, 2014
Podcast with IG Michael Horowitz discussing the OIG's report on DEA's Management of its Confidential Sources Program (available online at https://oig.justice.gov/multimedia/podcast-07-21-15.htm#top)	DOJ OIG Website	July 21, 2015
Testimony regarding OIG's Oversight of the Public Safety Officers' Benefit (PSOB) Program (available online at https://oig.justice.gov/testimony/t160426.pdf)	Senate Judiciary Committee	April 26, 2016
Discussion of the DOJ OIG Whistleblower Ombudsman Program and the CIGIE Whistleblower Ombudsman Working Group (no written or prepared remarks submitted)	Panel discussion at initial meeting of the bi-partisan House Whistleblower Caucus, Rayburn HOB	July 22, 2016
Podcast discussing the OIG's report on the National Security Division's Enforcement and Administration of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (available online at https://oig.justice.gov/multimedia/podcast-09-07-16.htm#top)	DOJ OIG Website	September 7, 2016
Update on the work of the CIGIE Whistleblower Ombudsman Working Group (no written or prepared remarks submitted)	CIGIE Meeting	November 15, 2016

Appeared at request of the U.S. Embassy, Department of State and DOJ in open session before the Rada Committee on Combating Organized Crime and Corruption with regard to the selection of the independent commission to audit the work of the National Anticorruption Bureau of Ukraine (no written or prepared remarks submitted)	Kyiv, Ukraine	December 21, 2016
Five Years Later: A Review of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (available online at https://oig.justice.gov/testimony/t170201a.pdf)	House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on Government Operations	February 1, 2017
Panelist at DC Bar Labor and Employment Law Section program on "Whistleblower Rights, Protections, and Challenges" (no written or prepared remarks submitted)	DC Bar	April 4, 2017
Video discussing the OIG's audit of the United States Marshals Service Contract with CoreCivic, Inc. to Operate the Leavenworth Detention Center, Leavenworth, Kansas (available online at https://oig.justice.gov/multimedia/video-04-25-17.htm#top)	DOJ OIG Website	April 25, 2017
Podcast discussing the OIG's report on the DOJ Civil Division's Handling of Sexual Harassment and Misconduct Allegations (available online at https://oig.justice.gov/multimedia/podcast-06-01-17.htm#top)	DOJ OIG Website	June 1, 2017
Panelist on FEDTalk program on Federal News Radio discussing Whistleblower Programs and Enhancements (available online at https://custom.federalnewsradio.com/interviews-shows/fedtalk-enhancements-and-whistleblower-programs)	Federal News Radio	June 16, 2017
Appeared at request of the U.S. Embassy, Department of State and DOJ by Skype in open session before the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine with regard to the selection of the independent commission to audit the work of the National Anticorruption Bureau of Ukraine (no written or prepared remarks submitted)	By Skype from Washington, DC	May 24, 2017

PART B - QUALIFICATIONS

14. QUALIFICATIONS (DESCRIBE WHY YOU BELIEVE YOU ARE QUALIFIED TO SERVE AS THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY).

I have had the privilege and opportunity over the past five years to serve in the senior leadership of the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, spending over half that time as the Deputy Inspector General. In that capacity, I have had the opportunity to work closely with and learn on a daily basis from our highly respected and extraordinarily talented Inspector General in directing the work of our office overseeing the varied operations of the Department of Justice. This has included significant oversight work regarding the intelligence activities of the DOJ, particularly by the National Security Division and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as well as their interaction with other components of the intelligence community. I also have participated in the Deputies (DIG) meetings and other functions of the IC IG Forum, giving me a window on cross-cutting issues faced by the Intelligence Community and their OIGs. Here at DOJ, I have developed substantial experience and practical understanding regarding the operations of the Office of the Inspector General in handling sensitive and complex matters of substantial public interest and importance, and in working independently to ensure the integrity and efficiency of the Department's myriad operations with appropriate reporting to the head of the agency and to

Congress, all of which I believe would be of assistance in serving at the first Presidentially appointed Senate confirmed IG at the NSA.

At DOJ OIG, I also founded and continue to lead our Whistleblower Ombudsman Program, and I have served as chair since its inception of the Whistleblower Ombudsman Working Group of the Council of the Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency. In these capacities, I have led efforts across the OIG community, and partnered in various efforts with the bipartisan Senate and House Whistleblower Caucuses, to ensure that whistleblowers are recognized for the critical role they play in bringing forward information about possible wrongdoing, and that they are educated regarding their rights and protections from reprisal for performing this important public service. This extensive body of work on whistleblower issues has provided me with perspectives and priorities that I believe would be of great value should I be confirmed as the Inspector General at the NSA.

Prior to joining the DOJ OIG, I worked for more than two dozen years as a federal prosecutor, handling a wide range of complex criminal cases in two U.S. Attorney's Offices and at the Public Integrity Section of the DOJ Criminal Division, working on behalf of DOJ to help develop anti-corruption mechanisms overseas, and serving as the first Anti-Terrorism Coordinator for the Northern District of New York. In the latter capacity, I worked closely with criminal and intelligence components of the FBI and other agencies in helping to organize and direct anti-terrorism efforts in the District following the September 11 attacks. My background as a career prosecutor gives me what I have found to be a valuable perspective on handling complex issues and a focus on reaching results that are demonstrable, provable and understandable -- making them, in the context of the work of the OIG, more valuable to the agency and to Congress. I believe that this background has served me well as part of the senior leadership team at the DOJ OIG, and that it similarly would be of great assistance should I be confirmed as the NSA IG.

As described above, at different times during the course of my career at DOJ, I have had the opportunity to interact in various ways with the intelligence community, but I am not a product of it. As a result of this background and experience, I have both tremendous respect for the importance of the work performed by our intelligence community and an understanding of the critical role played by independent and effective oversight in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of those efforts. This gives me a perspective that I believe would be very valuable in serving as the Inspector General at the National Security Agency, should I be confirmed for that position.

PART C - POLITICAL AND FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS

15. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES (LIST ANY MEMBERSHIPS OR OFFICES HELD IN OR FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OR SERVICES RENDERED TO, ANY POLITICAL PARTY, ELECTION COMMITTEE, POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE, OR INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATE DURING THE LAST TEN YEARS).

No memberships, offices held, or services rendered; financial contributions: 2012 – Obama for America, \$250; 2008 – DNC, \$250, Obama Victory Fund, \$250, Obama for America, \$500.

16. CANDIDACY FOR PUBLIC OFFICE (FURNISH DETAILS OF ANY CANDIDACY FOR ELECTIVE PUBLIC OFFICE).

None

17. FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS

(NOTE: QUESTIONS 17A AND B ARE NOT LIMITED TO RELATIONSHIPS REQUIRING REGISTRATION UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT. QUESTIONS 17A, B, AND C DO NOT CALL FOR A POSITIVE RESPONSE IF THE REPRESENTATION OR TRANSACTION WAS AUTHORIZED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR OR YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYMENT IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE.)

- A. HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER REPRESENTED IN ANY CAPACITY (E.G. EMPLOYEE, ATTORNEY, OR POLITICAL/BUSINESS CONSULTANT), WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR AN ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE FULLY DESCRIBE SUCH RELATIONSHIP.

No

- B. HAVE ANY OF YOUR OR YOUR SPOUSE'S ASSOCIATES REPRESENTED, IN ANY CAPACITY, WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR AN ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE FULLY DESCRIBE SUCH RELATIONSHIP.

During my work as an associate with Covington and Burling in 1986-87, and with Bond, Schoeneck and King in 1994-95, and as well as I can recall, as a summer associate during and immediately after law school in the summers of 1983, 1984, and 1985, I did not represent any foreign governments or entities that to my knowledge and belief were controlled by a foreign government. I have no knowledge as to whether any of these firms have engaged in such representation.

My wife, who is a partner in the law firm of Arnall Golden Gregory, has informed me that she has not represented any foreign governments or entities controlled by a foreign government, other than a brief project earlier this year for a company controlled in part by an entity within the German government. At my request, she checked with the firm's headquarters and was informed that others in the firm represent entities that are owned, in whole or in part, by entities within the German government and the government of Northern Ireland, and previously represented a member of the Ukrainian legislature.

- C. DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS, HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE RECEIVED ANY COMPENSATION FROM, OR BEEN INVOLVED IN ANY FINANCIAL OR BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR ANY ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

- D. HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER REGISTERED UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

18. DESCRIBE ANY LOBBYING ACTIVITY DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS, OTHER THAN IN AN OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT CAPACITY, IN WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE ENGAGED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY INFLUENCING THE PASSAGE, DEFEAT, OR MODIFICATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION, OR FOR THE PURPOSE OF AFFECTING THE ADMINISTRATION AND EXECUTION OF FEDERAL LAW OR PUBLIC POLICY.

None

PART D - FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST

19. DESCRIBE ANY EMPLOYMENT, BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP, FINANCIAL TRANSACTION, INVESTMENT, ASSOCIATION, OR ACTIVITY (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, DEALINGS WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ON YOUR OWN BEHALF OR ON BEHALF OF A CLIENT), WHICH COULD CREATE, OR APPEAR TO CREATE, A CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE POSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED.

None

20. DO YOU INTEND TO SEVER ALL BUSINESS CONNECTIONS WITH YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYERS, FIRMS, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES AND/OR PARTNERSHIPS, OR OTHER ORGANIZATIONS IN THE EVENT THAT YOU ARE CONFIRMED BY THE SENATE? IF NOT, PLEASE EXPLAIN.

Yes

21. DESCRIBE THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS YOU HAVE MADE OR PLAN TO MAKE, IF YOU ARE CONFIRMED, IN CONNECTION WITH SEVERANCE FROM YOUR CURRENT POSITION. PLEASE INCLUDE SEVERANCE PAY, PENSION RIGHTS, STOCK OPTIONS, DEFERRED INCOME ARRANGEMENTS, AND ANY AND ALL COMPENSATION THAT WILL OR MIGHT BE RECEIVED IN THE FUTURE AS A RESULT OF YOUR CURRENT BUSINESS OR PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS.

N/A

22. DO YOU HAVE ANY PLANS, COMMITMENTS, OR AGREEMENTS TO PURSUE OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT, WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, DURING YOUR SERVICE WITH THE GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

23. AS FAR AS CAN BE FORESEEN, STATE YOUR PLANS AFTER COMPLETING GOVERNMENT SERVICE. PLEASE SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBE ANY AGREEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS, WRITTEN OR UNWRITTEN, CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT AFTER LEAVING GOVERNMENT SERVICE. IN PARTICULAR, DESCRIBE ANY AGREEMENTS, UNDERSTANDINGS, OR OPTIONS TO RETURN TO YOUR CURRENT POSITION.

I have no plans, agreements, or understandings regarding employment after leaving government service, and presently would intend to retire when my government employment has concluded.

24. IF YOU ARE PRESENTLY IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE, DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS OF SUCH SERVICE, HAVE YOU RECEIVED FROM A PERSON OUTSIDE OF GOVERNMENT AN OFFER OR EXPRESSION OF INTEREST TO EMPLOY YOUR SERVICES AFTER YOU LEAVE GOVERNMENT SERVICE? IF YES, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

In or about 2013, I received a cold call from a legal recruiter, but the discussion did not progress further.

25. IS YOUR SPOUSE EMPLOYED? IF YES AND THE NATURE OF THIS EMPLOYMENT IS RELATED IN ANY WAY TO THE POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE SEEKING CONFIRMATION, PLEASE INDICATE YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYER, THE POSITION, AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THE POSITION HAS BEEN HELD. IF YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYMENT IS NOT RELATED TO THE POSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED, PLEASE SO STATE.

My spouse is employed, but her work is not related to the position for which I have been nominated.

26. LIST BELOW ALL CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, FOUNDATIONS, TRUSTS, OR OTHER ENTITIES TOWARD WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS OR IN WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE HELD DIRECTORSHIPS OR OTHER POSITIONS OF TRUST DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS.

<u>NAME OF ENTITY</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>SELF OR SPOUSE</u>	<u>DATES HELD</u>
Family Trust #1	Uncompensated Trustee	Self	1/13 to present
Family Trust #2	Uncompensated Trustee	Self	1/13 to present
Family Trust #3	Uncompensated Trustee	Self	1/13 to present
Family Trust #4	Uncompensated Trustee	Self	1/13 to present
Family Trust #5	Uncompensated Trustee	Self	1/13 to present

27. LIST ALL GIFTS EXCEEDING \$100 IN VALUE RECEIVED DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS BY YOU, YOUR SPOUSE, OR YOUR DEPENDENTS. (NOTE: GIFTS RECEIVED FROM RELATIVES AND GIFTS GIVEN TO YOUR SPOUSE OR DEPENDENT NEED NOT BE INCLUDED UNLESS THE GIFT WAS GIVEN WITH YOUR KNOWLEDGE AND ACQUIESCENCE AND YOU HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THE GIFT WAS GIVEN BECAUSE OF YOUR OFFICIAL POSITION.)

Reimbursement of airfare for me to attend as a spouse for my wife's firm holiday functions in Atlanta, GA, in December 2013 (\$374), December 2014 (\$626), December 2015 (\$461), and December 2016 (\$315).

28. LIST ALL SECURITIES, REAL PROPERTY, PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS, OR OTHER INVESTMENTS OR RECEIVABLES WITH A CURRENT MARKET VALUE (OR, IF MARKET VALUE IS NOT ASCERTAINABLE, ESTIMATED CURRENT FAIR VALUE) IN EXCESS OF \$1,000. (NOTE: THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO SCHEDULE A OF THE DISCLOSURE FORMS OF THE OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS MAY BE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE, PROVIDED THAT CURRENT VALUATIONS ARE USED.)

<u>DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY</u>	<u>VALUE</u>	<u>METHOD OF VALUATION</u>
Interest in time share with Hilton Grand Vacations Club	Approx. \$23,000	Purchase Price

29. LIST ALL LOANS OR OTHER INDEBTEDNESS (INCLUDING ANY CONTINGENT LIABILITIES) IN EXCESS OF \$10,000. EXCLUDE A MORTGAGE ON YOUR PERSONAL RESIDENCE UNLESS IT IS RENTED OUT, AND LOANS SECURED BY AUTOMOBILES, HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE, OR APPLIANCES. (NOTE: THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO SCHEDULE C OF THE DISCLOSURE FORM OF THE OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS MAY BE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE, PROVIDED THAT CONTINGENT LIABILITIES ARE ALSO INCLUDED.)

<u>NATURE OF OBLIGATION</u>	<u>NAME OF OBLIGEE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
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None

30. ARE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE NOW IN DEFAULT ON ANY LOAN, DEBT, OR OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATION? HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE BEEN IN DEFAULT ON ANY LOAN, DEBT, OR OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATION IN THE PAST TEN YEARS? HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER BEEN REFUSED CREDIT OR HAD A LOAN APPLICATION DENIED? IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THESE QUESTIONS IS YES, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

31. LIST THE SPECIFIC SOURCES AND AMOUNTS OF ALL INCOME RECEIVED DURING THE LAST FIVE YEARS, INCLUDING ALL SALARIES, FEES, DIVIDENDS, INTEREST, GIFTS, RENTS, ROYALTIES, PATENTS, HONORARIA, AND OTHER ITEMS EXCEEDING \$200. (COPIES OF U.S. INCOME TAX RETURNS FOR THESE YEARS MAY BE SUBSTITUTED HERE, BUT THEIR SUBMISSION IS NOT REQUIRED.) [Federal tax returns for 2012 through 2016 submitted herewith]

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
SALARIES					
FEES					
ROYALTIES					
DIVIDENDS					
INTEREST					
GIFTS					
RENTS					
OTHER					
TOTAL					

32. IF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE THE COMMITTEE WITH COPIES OF YOUR AND YOUR SPOUSE'S FEDERAL INCOME TAX RETURNS FOR THE PAST THREE YEARS?

Yes

33. LIST ALL JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH YOU AND YOUR SPOUSE FILE ANNUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS.

Federal
District of Columbia

34. HAVE YOUR FEDERAL OR STATE TAX RETURNS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF AN AUDIT, INVESTIGATION, OR INQUIRY AT ANY TIME? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS, INCLUDING THE RESULT OF ANY SUCH PROCEEDING.

No

35. IF YOU ARE AN ATTORNEY, ACCOUNTANT, OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL, PLEASE LIST ALL CLIENTS AND CUSTOMERS WHOM YOU BILLED MORE THAN \$200 WORTH OF SERVICES DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS. ALSO, LIST ALL JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH YOU ARE LICENSED TO PRACTICE.

I have not billed any clients or customers during the past five years. I am licensed to practice in the State of New York, the District of Columbia (inactive), and the State of California (inactive).

36. DO YOU INTEND TO PLACE YOUR FINANCIAL HOLDINGS AND THOSE OF YOUR SPOUSE AND DEPENDENT MEMBERS OF YOUR IMMEDIATE HOUSEHOLD IN A BLIND TRUST? IF YES, PLEASE FURNISH DETAILS. IF NO, DESCRIBE OTHER ARRANGEMENTS FOR AVOIDING ANY POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.

I do not intend to place any of my financial holdings or those of my spouse or dependent members of my immediate household in a blind trust. If an actual or apparent conflict of interest should arise, I will consult with the OIG General Counsel and the Designated Agency Ethics Official as appropriate, and take appropriate steps to mitigate or eliminate same.

37. IF APPLICABLE, LIST THE LAST THREE YEARS OF ANNUAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORTS YOU HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO FILE WITH YOUR AGENCY, DEPARTMENT, OR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT. IF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE A COPY OF THESE REPORTS?

I have filed an annual OGE-278 for the last three years. If asked, I will provide copies of these reports.

PART E - ETHICAL MATTERS

38. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING OR CITED FOR A BREACH OF ETHICS OR UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BY, OR BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A COMPLAINT TO, ANY COURT, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION, DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE, OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL GROUP? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

In December 1993/early 1994, the DOJ Office of Professional Inquiry conducted a review following the dismissal of the initial indictment in a criminal case, which resulted in a finding of no misconduct. In 1987, the District of Columbia Bar dismissed a complaint filed by a *pro se* plaintiff regarding civil discovery practices in a case on which I worked as an associate at Covington and Burling, also with a finding of no misconduct.

39. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN INVESTIGATED, HELD, ARRESTED, OR CHARGED BY ANY FEDERAL, STATE, OR OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY FOR VIOLATION OF ANY FEDERAL STATE, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPAL LAW, REGULATION, OR ORDINANCE, OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC OFFENSE, OR NAMED AS A DEFENDANT OR OTHERWISE IN ANY INDICTMENT OR INFORMATION RELATING TO SUCH VIOLATION? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

40. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN CONVICTED OF OR ENTERED A PLEA OF GUILTY OR NOLO CONTENDERE TO ANY CRIMINAL VIOLATION OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC OFFENSE? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

41. ARE YOU PRESENTLY OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A PARTY IN INTEREST IN ANY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PROCEEDING OR CIVIL LITIGATION? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

42. HAVE YOU BEEN INTERVIEWED OR ASKED TO SUPPLY ANY INFORMATION AS A WITNESS OR OTHERWISE IN CONNECTION WITH ANY CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION, FEDERAL, OR STATE AGENCY PROCEEDING, GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION, OR CRIMINAL OR CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE PAST TEN YEARS? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

43. HAS ANY BUSINESS OF WHICH YOU ARE OR WERE AN OFFICER, DIRECTOR, OR PARTNER BEEN A PARTY TO ANY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PROCEEDING OR CRIMINAL OR CIVIL LITIGATION RELEVANT TO THE POSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. (WITH RESPECT TO A BUSINESS OF WHICH YOU ARE OR WERE AN OFFICER, YOU NEED ONLY CONSIDER PROCEEDINGS AND LITIGATION THAT OCCURRED WHILE YOU WERE AN OFFICER OF THAT BUSINESS.)

No

44. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN THE SUBJECT OF ANY INSPECTOR GENERAL INVESTIGATION? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

PART F - SECURITY INFORMATION

45. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DENIED ANY SECURITY CLEARANCE OR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION FOR ANY REASON? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN IN DETAIL.

No

46. HAVE YOU BEEN REQUIRED TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION FOR ANY SECURITY CLEARANCE OR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN.

Yes – in February 2017, following my prior nomination for this position.

47. HAVE YOU EVER REFUSED TO SUBMIT TO A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN.

No

PART G - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

48. DESCRIBE IN YOUR OWN WORDS THE CONCEPT OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN PARTICULAR, CHARACTERIZE WHAT YOU BELIEVE TO BE THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES OF THE CONGRESS RESPECTIVELY IN THE OVERSIGHT PROCESS.

Congressional oversight plays an essential role in ensuring that the activities of the intelligence community – much of which must be performed outside the public eye if they are to be fully effective – are appropriately overseen and accountable to the public through informed review conducted by their elected representatives. Inspectors General, by virtue of their dual reporting responsibilities under the Inspector General Act, play a key role in facilitating this oversight function, providing Congress as well as agency leadership with essential information regarding waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct, so that Congress can consider that information in carrying out its critical constitutional oversight function over the agencies' activities and the leadership of the agencies can consider the OIG's findings and recommendations in addressing problems and improving the integrity and efficiency of its operations. Because of the OIGs' access to information – as recently underscored in the IG Empowerment Act – and the independence with which we perform our investigations, audits, inspections, and reviews, we often are able to obtain information that is not otherwise available and reach conclusions and recommendations for change that can be particularly valuable in helping to inform Congressional oversight over the agencies' operations. Given the paramount importance to the national security of our country of the mission and activities of intelligence agencies like the NSA, and the significant investment of financial and human resources in these important efforts, such informed and effective oversight is critical in providing Congress with the information that it needs so that it and the public can be assured that the taxpayer dollars that Congress appropriates in this area are spent wisely, and that the activities of the NSA are carried out appropriately and consistently with all constitutional and statutory requirements and the civil rights and civil liberties of the public that they protect.

49. EXPLAIN YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.

Pursuant to the Inspector General Act, the Inspector General of the National Security Agency is responsible for conducting independent investigations, audits, inspections, and reviews to detect and deter waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct, and ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the NSA's operations. The Inspector General furthers the important mission of the NSA by conducting rigorous independent oversight that can provide agency leadership and Congress with critical information regarding the NSA's operations and impactful recommendations for their improvement and savings of taxpayer funds. The OIG also has the important role of receiving and responding appropriately to information brought forward by whistleblowers, and ensuring that NSA employees are fully informed regarding whistleblower rights and protections and that individuals who have made or are contemplating making protected disclosures are given appropriate information so that they can come forward with what can be very valuable information and not face adverse actions or reprisal for doing so. I believe that the work of the OIG at the NSA is particularly important given that so much of the agency's critical work must necessarily take place outside broader public scrutiny, making the OIG's independent oversight work pivotal in ensuring the agency and its personnel are appropriately accountable and that Congress and the public have the greatest possible transparency regarding the NSA's activities, as well as the assurance that they are being conducted properly.


AFFIRMATION

I, ROBERT P. STORCH, DO SWEAR THAT THE ANSWERS I HAVE PROVIDED TO THIS QUESTIONNAIRE ARE ACCURATE AND COMPLETE.

July 5, 2017
(Date)


Robert P. Storch





(Notary)



TO THE CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE:

In connection with my nomination to be the Inspector General of the National Security Agency, I hereby express my willingness to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.



Signature

Date: July 5, 2017

SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE

UNITED STATES SENATE



QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE

**QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES**

PART A - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

1. NAME: Isabel Patelunas
2. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 01-22-1963, Sellersville, PA
3. MARITAL STATUS: married
4. SPOUSE'S NAME: Paul Patelunas
5. SPOUSE'S MAIDEN NAME IF APPLICABLE: n/a
6. NAMES AND AGES OF CHILDREN:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>AGE</u>
<u>Brian Patelunas, 28</u>	
<u>Brandon Patelunas, 21</u>	

7. EDUCATION SINCE HIGH SCHOOL:

<u>INSTITUTION</u>	<u>DATES ATTENDED</u>	<u>DEGREE RECEIVED</u>	<u>DATE OF DEGREE</u>
<u>University of Notre Dame</u>	<u>1980-85</u>	<u>BA</u>	<u>Jan 1985</u>
<u>University of Maryland College Park</u>	<u>1986-87</u>	<u>MA</u>	<u>Aug 1987</u>

8. EMPLOYMENT RECORD (LIST ALL POSITIONS HELD SINCE COLLEGE, INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE. INDICATE NAME OF EMPLOYER, POSITION, TITLE OR DESCRIPTION, LOCATION, AND DATES OF EMPLOYMENT.)

<u>EMPLOYER</u>	<u>POSITION/TITLE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATES</u>
<u>Central Intelligence Agency</u>	<u>Intelligence Officer</u>	<u>Langley, VA</u>	<u>April 1989-present</u>

- April 2017 to present: Chairman, CIA's Publication Review Board
- August 2015 through March 2017: On rotation to ODNI as Director of the President's Daily Brief Staff
- May 2011 through July 2015: Deputy Director of CIA's office of Middle East analysis
- December 2008 through April 2011: Director of the advanced analysis training program at CIA's Sherman Kent School

- May 2007 through November 2008: On rotation to the ODNI as Chief of Staff of the National Counterproliferation Center
- September 2002 through April 2007: Deputy, then Chief of CIA's Missile and Space Group in the Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Office (WINPAC)
- 1997 through 2002: Held various analytic and team lead positions in WINPAC
- 1996 until early 1997: In the Directorate of Operation's Counterintelligence Center, performed sensitive counterintelligence research supporting the USG
- 1989 through 1996: Imagery analyst at the predecessor to the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency covering Russian weapons systems and arms control

9. GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCE (INDICATE EXPERIENCE IN OR ASSOCIATION WITH FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING ADVISORY, CONSULTATIVE, HONORARY, OR OTHER PART-TIME SERVICE OR POSITION. DO NOT REPEAT INFORMATION ALREADY PROVIDED IN QUESTION 8):

n/a

10. INDICATE ANY SPECIALIZED INTELLIGENCE OR NATIONAL SECURITY EXPERTISE YOU HAVE ACQUIRED HAVING SERVED IN THE POSITIONS DESCRIBED IN QUESTIONS 8 AND/OR 9.

I am an accomplished member of CIA's Senior Intelligence Service with over 15 years of successful management experience—and 28 years total of Intelligence Community experience—in difficult jobs. I have supported the highest levels of government, driving analytic programs on the Middle East and counterproliferation, and leading the President's Daily Brief (PDB) staff through the last year of the Obama Administration and into the Trump Administration. I have demonstrated exemplary analytic tradecraft and a passion for developing our officers to their fullest potential using honest feedback and mentoring while ensuring focus on mission.

11. HONORS AND AWARDS (PROVIDE INFORMATION ON SCHOLARSHIPS, FELLOWSHIPS, HONORARY DEGREES, MILITARY DECORATIONS, CIVILIAN SERVICE CITATIONS, OR ANY OTHER SPECIAL RECOGNITION FOR OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE OR ACHIEVEMENT):

- Dozens of Exceptional Performance Awards and Meritorious Unit Citations from CIA
- The National Intelligence Superior Award from the DNI in 2016

12. ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS (LIST MEMBERSHIPS IN AND OFFICES HELD WITHIN THE LAST TEN YEARS IN ANY PROFESSIONAL, CIVIC, FRATERNAL, BUSINESS, SCHOLARLY, CULTURAL, CHARITABLE, OR OTHER SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS):

ORGANIZATION

OFFICE HELD

DATES

none

13. PUBLISHED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES (LIST THE TITLES, PUBLISHERS, BLOGS AND PUBLICATION DATES OF ANY BOOKS, ARTICLES, REPORTS, OR OTHER PUBLISHED MATERIALS YOU HAVE AUTHORED. ALSO LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEECHES OR REMARKS YOU HAVE MADE WITHIN THE LAST TEN YEARS FOR WHICH THERE IS A TEXT, TRANSCRIPT, OR

VIDEO.) IF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE A COPY OF EACH REQUESTED PUBLICATION, TEXT,
TRANSCRIPT, OR VIDEO?
None

PART B - QUALIFICATIONS

14. QUALIFICATIONS (DESCRIBE WHY YOU BELIEVE YOU ARE QUALIFIED TO SERVE IN THE POSITION FOR WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED):

During my career in the Intelligence Community (IC), I have developed and demonstrated a breadth of skills and experiences, including as a manager, leader, and tradecraft expert, which will serve me well if I am confirmed to lead Treasury's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA). I have demonstrated the ability to lead the IC by taking positions of increasing responsibility during my 28-year career at CIA, including two joint duty positions in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). I strive to lead by example through hard work and dedication to excellence, which has been reflected in outstanding performance evaluations from my supervisors.

- I have worked across the IC and US Government to ensure the offices and groups that I have led are providing sophisticated, timely, relevant, and unbiased analysis for customers at the highest levels of the USG.
- Most recently as Director of the President's Daily Brief (PDB) Staff—a rotation to the ODNI—I ensured the highest quality, most relevant, and timely analysis was prepared for POTUS and senior national security advisors six days per week. I demonstrated a superb knowledge of all key analytic lines supporting policy customers, using exemplary tradecraft as final reviewer for most PDBs and outstanding relationships with analytic leadership in the IC to accomplish this mission.
- I have shown a commitment to recruiting and developing the workforces I have led, ensuring that officers receive training, opportunities, guidance, and feedback to meet and exceed mission.
- I have strong, collaborative relationships with colleagues across CIA and the IC to ensure we are focused on customers' needs.
- I have demonstrated the ability to lead change, most recently when I led the PDB Staff and IC through the transition of Presidential power.

I am both humbled and excited to be considered to lead such a fine organization as Treasury's OIA. The mission is fascinating—and vital to US national security interests—and the people are dedicated to that important mission.

PART C - POLITICAL AND FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS

15. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES (LIST ANY MEMBERSHIPS OR OFFICES HELD IN OR FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OR SERVICES RENDERED TO, ANY POLITICAL PARTY, ELECTION COMMITTEE, POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE, OR INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATE DURING THE LAST TEN YEARS):

None

16. CANDIDACY FOR PUBLIC OFFICE (FURNISH DETAILS OF ANY CANDIDACY FOR ELECTIVE PUBLIC OFFICE):

None

17. FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS

(NOTE: QUESTIONS 17A AND B ARE NOT LIMITED TO RELATIONSHIPS REQUIRING REGISTRATION UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT. QUESTIONS 17A, B, AND C DO NOT CALL FOR A POSITIVE RESPONSE IF THE REPRESENTATION OR TRANSACTION WAS AUTHORIZED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR OR YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYMENT IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE.)

A. HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER REPRESENTED IN ANY CAPACITY (E.G. EMPLOYEE, ATTORNEY, OR POLITICAL/BUSINESS CONSULTANT), WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR AN ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE FULLY DESCRIBE SUCH RELATIONSHIP.

No

B. HAVE ANY OF YOUR OR YOUR SPOUSE'S ASSOCIATES REPRESENTED, IN ANY CAPACITY, WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR AN ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE FULLY DESCRIBE SUCH RELATIONSHIP.

No

C. DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS, HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE RECEIVED ANY COMPENSATION FROM, OR BEEN INVOLVED IN ANY FINANCIAL OR BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR ANY ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

D. HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER REGISTERED UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

18. DESCRIBE ANY LOBBYING ACTIVITY DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS, OTHER THAN IN AN OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT CAPACITY, IN WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE ENGAGED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY INFLUENCING THE PASSAGE, DEFEAT, OR MODIFICATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION, OR FOR THE PURPOSE OF AFFECTING THE ADMINISTRATION AND EXECUTION OF FEDERAL LAW OR PUBLIC POLICY.

None

PART D - FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST

19. DESCRIBE ANY EMPLOYMENT, BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP, FINANCIAL TRANSACTION, INVESTMENT, ASSOCIATION, OR ACTIVITY (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, DEALINGS WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ON YOUR OWN BEHALF OR ON BEHALF OF A CLIENT), WHICH COULD CREATE, OR APPEAR TO CREATE, A CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE POSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED.

None

20. DO YOU INTEND TO SEVER ALL BUSINESS CONNECTIONS WITH YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYERS, FIRMS, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES AND/OR PARTNERSHIPS, OR OTHER ORGANIZATIONS IN THE EVENT THAT YOU ARE CONFIRMED BY THE SENATE? IF NOT, PLEASE EXPLAIN.

If I am confirmed, I will resign from the CIA in order to accept the Treasury position.

21. DESCRIBE THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS YOU HAVE MADE OR PLAN TO MAKE, IF YOU ARE CONFIRMED, IN CONNECTION WITH SEVERANCE FROM YOUR CURRENT POSITION. PLEASE INCLUDE SEVERANCE PAY, PENSION RIGHTS, STOCK OPTIONS, DEFERRED INCOME ARRANGEMENTS, AND ANY AND ALL COMPENSATION THAT WILL OR MIGHT BE RECEIVED IN THE FUTURE AS A RESULT OF YOUR CURRENT BUSINESS OR PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS.

None.

22. DO YOU HAVE ANY PLANS, COMMITMENTS, OR AGREEMENTS TO PURSUE OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT, WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, DURING YOUR SERVICE WITH THE GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

23. AS FAR AS CAN BE FORESEEN, STATE YOUR PLANS AFTER COMPLETING GOVERNMENT SERVICE. PLEASE SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBE ANY AGREEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS, WRITTEN OR UNWRITTEN, CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT AFTER LEAVING GOVERNMENT SERVICE. IN PARTICULAR, DESCRIBE ANY AGREEMENTS, UNDERSTANDINGS, OR OPTIONS TO RETURN TO YOUR CURRENT POSITION.

CIA has prepared a memo allowing me to return to service there if I choose to. Otherwise, I have no employment plans if I were confirmed.

4. IF YOU ARE PRESENTLY IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE, DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS OF SUCH SERVICE, HAVE YOU RECEIVED FROM A PERSON OUTSIDE OF GOVERNMENT AN OFFER OR EXPRESSION OF INTEREST TO EMPLOY YOUR SERVICES AFTER YOU LEAVE GOVERNMENT SERVICE? IF YES, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

25. IS YOUR SPOUSE EMPLOYED? IF YES AND THE NATURE OF THIS EMPLOYMENT IS RELATED IN ANY WAY TO THE POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE SEEKING CONFIRMATION, PLEASE INDICATE YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYER, THE POSITION, AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THE POSITION HAS BEEN HELD. IF YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYMENT IS NOT RELATED TO THE POSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED, PLEASE SO STATE.

My spouse's position is not related to the position for which I have been nominated. .

26. LIST BELOW ALL CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, FOUNDATIONS, TRUSTS, OR OTHER ENTITIES TOWARD WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS OR IN WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE HELD DIRECTORSHIPS OR OTHER POSITIONS OF TRUST DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS.

<u>NAME OF ENTITY</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>DATES HELD</u>	<u>SELF OR SPOUSE</u>
Patelunas Data Systems Consulting (PDSC, LLC)	President/Owner	1/2006 to present	spouse

27. LIST ALL GIFTS EXCEEDING \$100 IN VALUE RECEIVED DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS BY YOU, YOUR SPOUSE, OR YOUR DEPENDENTS. (NOTE: GIFTS RECEIVED FROM RELATIVES AND GIFTS GIVEN TO YOUR SPOUSE OR DEPENDENT NEED NOT BE INCLUDED UNLESS THE GIFT WAS GIVEN WITH YOUR KNOWLEDGE AND ACQUIESCENCE AND YOU HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THE GIFT WAS GIVEN BECAUSE OF YOUR OFFICIAL POSITION.)

None

28. LIST ALL SECURITIES, REAL PROPERTY, PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS, OR OTHER INVESTMENTS OR RECEIVABLES WITH A CURRENT MARKET VALUE (OR, IF MARKET VALUE IS NOT ASCERTAINABLE, ESTIMATED CURRENT FAIR VALUE) IN EXCESS OF \$1,000. (NOTE: THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO SCHEDULE A OF THE DISCLOSURE FORMS OF THE OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS MAY BE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE, PROVIDED THAT CURRENT VALUATIONS ARE USED.)

<u>DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY</u>	<u>VALUE</u>	<u>METHOD OF VALUATION</u>
Our single-family home in NoVa	approx. \$700,000	comparable sales

Information provided in response to Parts 5 and 6 of the disclosure forms of the Office of Government Ethics is hereby incorporated by reference.

29. LIST ALL LOANS OR OTHER INDEBTEDNESS (INCLUDING ANY CONTINGENT LIABILITIES) IN EXCESS OF \$10,000. EXCLUDE A MORTGAGE ON YOUR PERSONAL RESIDENCE UNLESS IT IS RENTED OUT, AND LOANS SECURED BY AUTOMOBILES, HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE, OR APPLIANCES. (NOTE: THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO SCHEDULE C OF THE DISCLOSURE FORM OF THE OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS MAY BE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE, PROVIDED THAT CONTINGENT LIABILITIES ARE ALSO INCLUDED.)

<u>NATURE OF OBLIGATION</u>	<u>NAME OF OBLIGEE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
none		

30. ARE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE NOW IN DEFAULT ON ANY LOAN, DEBT, OR OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATION? HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE BEEN IN DEFAULT ON ANY LOAN, DEBT, OR OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATION IN THE PAST TEN YEARS? HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER BEEN REFUSED CREDIT OR HAD A LOAN APPLICATION DENIED? IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THESE QUESTIONS IS YES, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

31. LIST THE SPECIFIC SOURCES AND AMOUNTS OF ALL INCOME RECEIVED DURING THE LAST FIVE YEARS, INCLUDING ALL SALARIES, FEES, DIVIDENDS, INTEREST, GIFTS, RENTS, ROYALTIES, PATENTS, HONORARIA, AND OTHER ITEMS EXCEEDING \$200. (COPIES OF U.S. INCOME TAX RETURNS FOR THESE YEARS MAY BE SUBSTITUTED HERE, BUT THEIR SUBMISSION IS NOT REQUIRED.)

	2016	2015	2014	2013	2012
SALARIES *	\$177,058	\$172,905	\$166,220	\$163,591	\$161,236

FEES

ROYALTIES

DIVIDENDS

INTEREST

GIFTS

RENTS

OTHER

TOTAL *This is salary from the federal government.(CIA)

32. IF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE THE COMMITTEE WITH COPIES OF YOUR AND YOUR SPOUSE'S FEDERAL INCOME TAX RETURNS FOR THE PAST THREE YEARS?

Yes

33. LIST ALL JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH YOU AND YOUR SPOUSE FILE ANNUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS.

Virginia

34. HAVE YOUR FEDERAL OR STATE TAX RETURNS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF AN AUDIT, INVESTIGATION, OR INQUIRY AT ANY TIME? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS, INCLUDING THE RESULT OF ANY SUCH PROCEEDING.

No

35. IF YOU ARE AN ATTORNEY, ACCOUNTANT, OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL, PLEASE LIST ALL CLIENTS AND CUSTOMERS WHOM YOU BILLED MORE THAN \$200 WORTH OF SERVICES DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS. ALSO, LIST ALL JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH YOU ARE LICENSED TO PRACTICE.

N/A

36. DO YOU INTEND TO PLACE YOUR FINANCIAL HOLDINGS AND THOSE OF YOUR SPOUSE AND DEPENDENT MEMBERS OF YOUR IMMEDIATE HOUSEHOLD IN A BLIND TRUST? IF YES, PLEASE FURNISH DETAILS. IF NO, DESCRIBE OTHER ARRANGEMENTS FOR AVOIDING ANY POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.

Any potential conflicts of interest have been identified and resolved in accordance with the terms and conditions of my ethics agreement with the Department of the Treasury, which is documented by letter to Rochelle F. Granat, Designated Agency Ethics Official and Assistant General Counsel for General Law and Ethics. Should any potential conflict of interest arise in the future, I will seek guidance from a Treasury ethics official.

37. IF APPLICABLE, LIST THE LAST THREE YEARS OF ANNUAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORTS YOU HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO FILE WITH YOUR AGENCY, DEPARTMENT, OR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT. IF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE A COPY OF THESE REPORTS?

I have submitted Financial Disclosure reports every year since I was promoted to the Senior Intelligence Service in 2008. If requested, I would provide those reports.

PART E - ETHICAL MATTERS

38. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING OR CITED FOR A BREACH OF ETHICS OR UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BY, OR BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A COMPLAINT TO, ANY COURT, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION, DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE, OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL GROUP? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

39. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN INVESTIGATED, HELD, ARRESTED, OR CHARGED BY ANY FEDERAL, STATE, OR OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY FOR VIOLATION OF ANY FEDERAL STATE, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPAL LAW, REGULATION, OR ORDINANCE, OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC OFFENSE, OR NAMED AS A DEFENDANT OR OTHERWISE IN ANY INDICTMENT OR INFORMATION RELATING TO SUCH VIOLATION? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

40. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN CONVICTED OF OR ENTERED A PLEA OF GUILTY OR NOLO CONTENDERE TO ANY CRIMINAL VIOLATION OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC OFFENSE? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

41. ARE YOU PRESENTLY OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A PARTY IN INTEREST IN ANY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PROCEEDING OR CIVIL LITIGATION? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

42. HAVE YOU BEEN INTERVIEWED OR ASKED TO SUPPLY ANY INFORMATION AS A WITNESS OR OTHERWISE IN CONNECTION WITH ANY CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION, FEDERAL, OR STATE AGENCY PROCEEDING, GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION, OR CRIMINAL OR CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE PAST TEN YEARS? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

43. HAS ANY BUSINESS OF WHICH YOU ARE OR WERE AN OFFICER, DIRECTOR, OR PARTNER BEEN A PARTY TO ANY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PROCEEDING OR CRIMINAL OR CIVIL LITIGATION RELEVANT TO THE POSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS. (WITH RESPECT TO A BUSINESS OF WHICH YOU ARE OR WERE AN OFFICER, YOU NEED ONLY CONSIDER PROCEEDINGS AND LITIGATION THAT OCCURRED WHILE YOU WERE AN OFFICER OF THAT BUSINESS.)

No

44. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN THE SUBJECT OF ANY INSPECTOR GENERAL INVESTIGATION? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

PART F - SECURITY INFORMATION

45. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DENIED ANY SECURITY CLEARANCE OR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION FOR ANY REASON? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN IN DETAIL.

No

46. HAVE YOU BEEN REQUIRED TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION FOR ANY SECURITY CLEARANCE OR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN.

Yes, I have had numerous polygraphs for my CIA TS/SCI clearance.

47. HAVE YOU EVER REFUSED TO SUBMIT TO A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN.

No

PART G - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

48. DESCRIBE IN YOUR OWN WORDS THE CONCEPT OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN PARTICULAR, CHARACTERIZE WHAT YOU BELIEVE TO BE THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis_____ AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES OF THE CONGRESS RESPECTIVELY IN THE OVERSIGHT PROCESS.

Congressional oversight is important for the proper functioning of US Intelligence and if I am confirmed, I will comply with all such obligations, ensuring there is a close relationship between OIA and Congressional oversight committees. If I am confirmed, I will keep oversight committees fully and currently informed on OIA intelligence activities.

49. EXPLAIN YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis_____.

The Assistant Secretary is charged with leading OIA, which advances national security and protects financial integrity by informing Treasury decisions with timely, relevant, and accurate intelligence and analysis. The Office supports the American people and the priorities of President Trump, Secretary Mnuchin and other senior Treasury policymakers--in collaboration with other Treasury components and the rest of the Intelligence Community-- primarily by providing all-source intelligence analysis which targets and supports Treasury action under USG authorities. If confirmed, I will lead and guide analysis on topics of interest for high-level USG officials and ensure that our workforce continues to develop its skills and talents. If confirmed, I will also lead the IC in supporting efforts to build a stronger threat finance Intelligence Community.

AFFIRMATION

I, Isabel Patelunas, DO SWEAR THAT THE ANSWERS I HAVE PROVIDED TO THIS QUESTIONNAIRE ARE ACCURATE AND COMPLETE.

7 July 2017
(Date)

Isabel Patelunas
(Name)



Eduardo Flamenco
(Notary)

Eduardo Flamenco 07/07/2017
Fairfax County, Virginia

TO THE CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE:

In connection with my nomination to be the Assistant Secretary of Treasury's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, I hereby express my willingness to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.




Signature

Date: 7 Jul 2017

SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE

UNITED STATES SENATE



QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES

**SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE**

**QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES**

PART A - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

1. FULL NAME: Susan Monroe Gordon
OTHER NAMES USED: Susan Leslie Monroe (maiden name)
2. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: July 21, 1958; Knoxville, Tennessee
CITIZENSHIP:
3. MARITAL STATUS: Married
4. SPOUSE'S NAME: James Caldwell Gordon, III
5. SPOUSE'S MAIDEN NAME IF APPLICABLE: N/A
6. NAMES AND AGES OF CHILDREN:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>AGE</u>
James Caldwell Gordon, IV, Esq.	32
Katherine Charlotte Koepp, Capt, USMC	28

7. EDUCATION SINCE HIGH SCHOOL:

<u>INSTITUTION</u>	<u>DATES ATTENDED</u>	<u>DEGREE RECEIVED</u>	<u>DATE OF DEGREE</u>
Duke University	09/1976 – 05/1980	B.S.	1980

8. EMPLOYMENT RECORD (LIST ALL POSITIONS HELD SINCE COLLEGE, INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE. INDICATE NAME OF EMPLOYER, POSITION, TITLE OR DESCRIPTION, LOCATION, AND DATES OF EMPLOYMENT).

<u>EMPLOYER</u>	<u>POSITION/TITLE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATES</u>
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency	Deputy Director	Springfield, VA	2015 – present
CIA Office of the Director	Special Assistant for Cyber and Director, Information Operations Center	Washington, DC	2014 – 2015
CIA Directorate of Support	Director	Washington, DC	2012 – 2014
CIA Directorate of Operations	Deputy Director, Information Operations Center	Washington, DC	2009 – 2012

CIA Directorate of Scientific and Weapons Research	Director, Office of Special Activities	Washington, DC	2007 – 2009
None	Unemployed	Vienna, VA	2005 – 2007
Self	Independent Contractor	Washington, DC	1999 – 2004
CIA Office of the Director	Special Assistant to DCI for Enterprise	Washington, DC	1998 – 1999
CIA Director of Science and Technology	Director, Office of Advanced Analytic Tools	Washington, DC	1996 – 1998
CIA Office of Scientific and Weapons Research	Various leadership positions	Washington, DC	1988 – 1995
CIA Office of Scientific and Weapons Research	Office of Development & Engineering, Program Manager	Washington, DC	1985 – 1988
CIA Office of Scientific and Weapons Research	Satellite Technical Analyst	Washington, DC	1982 -- 1985
CIA Office of Scientific and Weapons Research	Current Events Analyst	Washington, DC	1980 -- 1982

9. GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCE (INDICATE EXPERIENCE IN OR ASSOCIATION WITH FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING ADVISORY, CONSULTATIVE, HONORARY, OR OTHER PART-TIME SERVICE OR POSITION. DO NOT REPEAT INFORMATION ALREADY PROVIDED IN QUESTION 8).

In addition to the above question 8, as an independent contractor, my sole client was the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

10. INDICATE ANY SPECIALIZED INTELLIGENCE OR NATIONAL SECURITY EXPERTISE YOU HAVE ACQUIRED HAVING SERVED IN THE POSITIONS DESCRIBED IN QUESTIONS 8 AND/OR 9.

I have been an intelligence officer for my entire professional career (with exception of time spent away raising my children). As a nearly 30-year career CIA officer, I served in numerous positions including as an analyst, a research scientist, and a program manager. I held multiple senior leadership positions in Analysis, Science and Technology, Operations, Support, and now, most recently as Deputy Director of a Department of Defense (DoD) Combat Support Agency—the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). My career in public service has afforded me tremendous experience and expertise in technical analysis, satellite and collection system design, information systems and technology, information operations (cyber), security, and geospatial intelligence. I have, over the course of my career, had the opportunity to work closely with all elements of the Intelligence Community (IC), with particular emphasis on the CIA, NGA, National Security Agency (NSA) and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). I have had access to, and responsibility for, some of the nation's most sensitive programs. Further, I have established strong relationships with our industrial and academic partners, mostly recently through my participations on the boards of the Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA) and the United States Geospatial Intelligence Foundation (USGIF).

11. HONORS AND AWARDS (PROVIDE INFORMATION ON SCHOLARSHIPS, FELLOWSHIPS, HONORARY DEGREES, MILITARY DECORATIONS, CIVILIAN SERVICE CITATIONS, OR ANY OTHER SPECIAL RECOGNITION FOR OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE OR ACHIEVEMENT).

Presidential Rank Award, Distinguished	2016
Presidential Rank Award, Meritorious	2014
Distinguished Intelligence Medal, CIA	2014
Director's Award, CIA	2013
Doñovan Award for Excellence in Operations, CIA	2012
George Tenet Award for Leadership, CIA	2012
Distinguished Intelligence Medal, CIA	1999
Director's Award, CIA	1998
Director's Award, CIA	1996
Arthur S. Fleming Award	1995
(Top 10 Outstanding Federal Employees under 40)	

12. ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS (LIST MEMBERSHIPS IN AND OFFICES HELD WITHIN THE LAST TEN YEARS IN ANY PROFESSIONAL, CIVIC, FRATERNAL, BUSINESS, SCHOLARLY, CULTURAL, CHARITABLE, OR OTHER SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS).

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>OFFICE HELD</u>	<u>DATES</u>
USGIF	Board Member (advisory)	01/2015 – present
INSA	Board Member (advisory)	01/2015 – present

Of note, both positions are associated with my position as Deputy Director, NGA, and will end at the end of my tenure in that position.

13. PUBLISHED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES (LIST THE TITLES, PUBLISHERS, BLOGS AND PUBLICATION DATES OF ANY BOOKS, ARTICLES, REPORTS, OR OTHER PUBLISHED MATERIALS YOU HAVE AUTHORED. ALSO LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEECHES OR REMARKS YOU HAVE MADE WITHIN THE LAST TEN YEARS FOR WHICH THERE IS A TEXT, TRANSCRIPT, OR VIDEO). IF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE A COPY OF EACH REQUESTED PUBLICATION, TEXT, TRANSCRIPT, OR VIDEO?

See Attachment I

PART B - QUALIFICATIONS

14. QUALIFICATIONS (DESCRIBE WHY YOU BELIEVE YOU ARE QUALIFIED TO SERVE AS THE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE).

As noted in question 10, the nature of my nearly 30 years of public service provided me with the substantive foundation and the perspective to serve as the Principal Deputy Director for Intelligence (PDDNI). The positions I held spanned all the disciplines of intelligence, crossing the various "INTs" and mission areas within the IC.

I understand what it takes to provide relevant, sound analysis. I was involved with establishing intelligence requirements for major system acquisitions. I led or participated in some of the nation's most sensitive programs and understand the special oversight required. I developed and delivered information technology systems while bearing the responsibility for the protection of our own cyber systems. I understand the importance of support functions—from finance, to security, to facilities, to human resources—on a global scale. I have partnered with IC partners on various operations, including cyber activities, major system acquisition, or worldwide support. My most recent position as the Deputy Director of NGA has given me

unique, significant understanding of the intersection of combat support and strategic intelligence with IC elements resident within the DoD, like NGA, DLA and NSA.

I have a history of recognizing and supporting innovation, both in and out of government. As part of the CIA leadership team, I was responsible for the stand up of In-Q-Tel in 1999 to be a non-profit strategic investor and champion, bringing venture capital to cutting-edge technologies that could potentially support U.S. national security needs.

My greatest professional passion continues to be leading the women and men of the IC, which I have done throughout most of my time in intelligence. Our diverse workforce is the means to every end, and recognize that developing their capability, providing them opportunity, and ensuring their value is what will take us into the future.

In sum, my career has been made navigating those moments when existing capability isn't enough, when innovation is required, when sure action must result, and when none can go alone.

PART C - POLITICAL AND FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS

15. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES (LIST ANY MEMBERSHIPS OR OFFICES HELD IN OR FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OR SERVICES RENDERED TO, ANY POLITICAL PARTY, ELECTION COMMITTEE, POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE, OR INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATE DURING THE LAST TEN YEARS).

None

16. CANDIDACY FOR PUBLIC OFFICE (FURNISH DETAILS OF ANY CANDIDACY FOR ELECTIVE PUBLIC OFFICE).

None

17. FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS

(NOTE: QUESTIONS 17A AND B ARE NOT LIMITED TO RELATIONSHIPS REQUIRING REGISTRATION UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT. QUESTIONS 17A, B, AND C DO NOT CALL FOR A POSITIVE RESPONSE IF THE REPRESENTATION OR TRANSACTION WAS AUTHORIZED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR OR YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYMENT IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE.)

- A. HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER REPRESENTED IN ANY CAPACITY (E.G. EMPLOYEE, ATTORNEY, OR POLITICAL/BUSINESS CONSULTANT), WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR AN ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE FULLY DESCRIBE SUCH RELATIONSHIP.

No

- B. HAVE ANY OF YOUR OR YOUR SPOUSE'S ASSOCIATES REPRESENTED, IN ANY CAPACITY, WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR AN ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE FULLY DESCRIBE SUCH RELATIONSHIP.

No

C. DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS, HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE RECEIVED ANY COMPENSATION FROM, OR BEEN INVOLVED IN ANY FINANCIAL OR BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR ANY ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

D. HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER REGISTERED UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

18. DESCRIBE ANY LOBBYING ACTIVITY DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS, OTHER THAN IN AN OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT CAPACITY, IN WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE ENGAGED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY INFLUENCING THE PASSAGE, DEFEAT, OR MODIFICATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION, OR FOR THE PURPOSE OF AFFECTING THE ADMINISTRATION AND EXECUTION OF FEDERAL LAW OR PUBLIC POLICY.

None

PART D - FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST

19. DESCRIBE ANY EMPLOYMENT, BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP, FINANCIAL TRANSACTION, INVESTMENT, ASSOCIATION, OR ACTIVITY (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, DEALINGS WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ON YOUR OWN BEHALF OR ON BEHALF OF A CLIENT), WHICH COULD CREATE, OR APPEAR TO CREATE, A CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE POSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED.

None

20. DO YOU INTEND TO SEVER ALL BUSINESS CONNECTIONS WITH YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYERS, FIRMS, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES AND/OR PARTNERSHIPS, OR OTHER ORGANIZATIONS IN THE EVENT THAT YOU ARE CONFIRMED BY THE SENATE? IF NOT, PLEASE EXPLAIN.

Aside from my continued Federal service within the U.S. government, yes.

21. DESCRIBE THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS YOU HAVE MADE OR PLAN TO MAKE, IF YOU ARE CONFIRMED, IN CONNECTION WITH SEVERANCE FROM YOUR CURRENT POSITION. PLEASE INCLUDE SEVERANCE PAY, PENSION RIGHTS, STOCK OPTIONS, DEFERRED INCOME ARRANGEMENTS, AND ANY AND ALL COMPENSATION THAT WILL OR MIGHT BE RECEIVED IN THE FUTURE AS A RESULT OF YOUR CURRENT BUSINESS OR PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS.

If confirmed, I would continue to serve as an employee of the U.S. government.

22. DO YOU HAVE ANY PLANS, COMMITMENTS, OR AGREEMENTS TO PURSUE OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT, WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, DURING YOUR SERVICE WITH THE GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

23. AS FAR AS CAN BE FORESEEN, STATE YOUR PLANS AFTER COMPLETING GOVERNMENT SERVICE. PLEASE SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBE ANY AGREEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS, WRITTEN OR UNWRITTEN, CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT AFTER LEAVING GOVERNMENT SERVICE. IN PARTICULAR, DESCRIBE ANY AGREEMENTS, UNDERSTANDINGS, OR OPTIONS TO RETURN TO YOUR CURRENT POSITION.

It is my intent to retire from Federal Service.

24. IF YOU ARE PRESENTLY IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE, DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS OF SUCH SERVICE, HAVE YOU RECEIVED FROM A PERSON OUTSIDE OF GOVERNMENT AN OFFER OR EXPRESSION OF INTEREST TO EMPLOY YOUR SERVICES AFTER YOU LEAVE GOVERNMENT SERVICE? IF YES, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

25. IS YOUR SPOUSE EMPLOYED? IF YES AND THE NATURE OF THIS EMPLOYMENT IS RELATED IN ANY WAY TO THE POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE SEEKING CONFIRMATION, PLEASE INDICATE YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYER, THE POSITION, AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THE POSITION HAS BEEN HELD. IF YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYMENT IS NOT RELATED TO THE POSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED, PLEASE SO STATE.

Yes. My spouse is a CIA employee (1986 to present) within the Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T). Given the oversight role the PDDNI traditionally holds as it relates to significant IC acquisition and investments, if confirmed, I will consult with the ODNI ethics officials to determine what, if any, steps are necessary to mitigate even the appearance of favoritism with regard to the programs he supports.

26. LIST BELOW ALL CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, FOUNDATIONS, TRUSTS, OR OTHER ENTITIES TOWARD WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS OR IN WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE HELD DIRECTORSHIPS OR OTHER POSITIONS OF TRUST DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS.

<u>NAME OF ENTITY</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>DATES HELD</u>	<u>SELF OR SPOUSE</u>
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None

27. LIST ALL GIFTS EXCEEDING \$100 IN VALUE RECEIVED DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS BY YOU, YOUR SPOUSE, OR YOUR DEPENDENTS. (NOTE: GIFTS RECEIVED FROM RELATIVES AND GIFTS GIVEN TO YOUR SPOUSE OR DEPENDENT NEED NOT BE INCLUDED UNLESS THE GIFT WAS GIVEN WITH YOUR KNOWLEDGE AND ACQUIESCENCE AND YOU HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THE GIFT WAS GIVEN BECAUSE OF YOUR OFFICIAL POSITION.)

As a senior government official, I received a variety of hats, mugs, photographs, and other non-reportable gifts and trinkets. Any reportable gift was listed in my agency disclosure reports, or paid for consistent with U.S. government ethics regulations.

28. LIST ALL SECURITIES, REAL PROPERTY, PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS, OR OTHER INVESTMENTS OR RECEIVABLES WITH A CURRENT MARKET VALUE (OR, IF MARKET VALUE IS NOT ASCERTAINABLE, ESTIMATED CURRENT FAIR VALUE) IN EXCESS OF \$1,000. (NOTE: THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO SCHEDULE A OF THE DISCLOSURE FORMS OF THE

OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS MAY BE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE, PROVIDED THAT CURRENT VALUATIONS ARE USED.)

DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY VALUE METHOD OF VALUATION

Please see OGE-278.

29. LIST ALL LOANS OR OTHER INDEBTEDNESS (INCLUDING ANY CONTINGENT LIABILITIES) IN EXCESS OF \$10,000. EXCLUDE A MORTGAGE ON YOUR PERSONAL RESIDENCE UNLESS IT IS RENTED OUT, AND LOANS SECURED BY AUTOMOBILES, HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE, OR APPLIANCES. (NOTE: THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO SCHEDULE C OF THE DISCLOSURE FORM OF THE OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS MAY BE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE, PROVIDED THAT CONTINGENT LIABILITIES ARE ALSO INCLUDED.)

NATURE OF OBLIGATION NAME OF OBLIGEE AMOUNT

Please see OGE-278

30. ARE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE NOW IN DEFAULT ON ANY LOAN, DEBT, OR OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATION? HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE BEEN IN DEFAULT ON ANY LOAN, DEBT, OR OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATION IN THE PAST TEN YEARS? HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER BEEN REFUSED CREDIT OR HAD A LOAN APPLICATION DENIED? IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THESE QUESTIONS IS YES, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

31. LIST THE SPECIFIC SOURCES AND AMOUNTS OF ALL INCOME RECEIVED DURING THE LAST FIVE YEARS, INCLUDING ALL SALARIES, FEES, DIVIDENDS, INTEREST, GIFTS, RENTS, ROYALTIES, PATENTS, HONORARIA, AND OTHER ITEMS EXCEEDING \$200. (COPIES OF U.S. INCOME TAX RETURNS FOR THESE YEARS MAY BE SUBSTITUTED HERE, BUT THEIR SUBMISSION IS NOT REQUIRED.)

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
SALARIES	165502.72	197836.00	186742.00	222300.00	197185.80
FEES	0	0	0	0	0
ROYALTIES	0	0	0	0	0
DIVIDENDS	318.00	0	0	0	0
INTEREST	81.00	29.00	23.00	42.00	52.00
GIFTS	0	0	0	0	0
RENTS	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	166,103.72	197,892.00	186,765.00	222,342.00	197,237.80

32. IF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE THE COMMITTEE WITH COPIES OF YOUR AND YOUR SPOUSE'S FEDERAL INCOME TAX RETURNS FOR THE PAST THREE YEARS?

Yes

33. LIST ALL JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH YOU AND YOUR SPOUSE FILE ANNUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS.

Virginia

34. HAVE YOUR FEDERAL OR STATE TAX RETURNS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF AN AUDIT, INVESTIGATION, OR INQUIRY AT ANY TIME? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS, INCLUDING THE RESULT OF ANY SUCH PROCEEDING.

No

35. IF YOU ARE AN ATTORNEY, ACCOUNTANT, OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL, PLEASE LIST ALL CLIENTS AND CUSTOMERS WHOM YOU BILLED MORE THAN \$200 WORTH OF SERVICES DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS. ALSO, LIST ALL JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH YOU ARE LICENSED TO PRACTICE.

Not applicable

36. DO YOU INTEND TO PLACE YOUR FINANCIAL HOLDINGS AND THOSE OF YOUR SPOUSE AND DEPENDENT MEMBERS OF YOUR IMMEDIATE HOUSEHOLD IN A BLIND TRUST? IF YES, PLEASE FURNISH DETAILS. IF NO, DESCRIBE OTHER ARRANGEMENTS FOR AVOIDING ANY POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.

No. I have ensured my financial holdings meet U.S. government ethics requirements, and I do not believe any current holdings would present a conflict of interest. If confirmed, I will execute and abide by an agreement with ODNI to avoid any conflicts of interest under the applicable statutes and regulations.

37. IF APPLICABLE, LIST THE LAST THREE YEARS OF ANNUAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORTS YOU HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO FILE WITH YOUR AGENCY, DEPARTMENT, OR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT. IF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE A COPY OF THESE REPORTS?

2016 Agency Financial Disclosure Report
2014 Agency Financial Disclosure Report
2012 Agency Financial Disclosure Report

I will provide copies upon request.

PART E - ETHICAL MATTERS

38. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING OR CITED FOR A BREACH OF ETHICS OR UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BY, OR BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A COMPLAINT TO, ANY COURT, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION,

DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE, OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL GROUP? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

39. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN INVESTIGATED, HELD, ARRESTED, OR CHARGED BY ANY FEDERAL, STATE, OR OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY FOR VIOLATION OF ANY FEDERAL STATE, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPAL LAW, REGULATION, OR ORDINANCE, OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC OFFENSE, OR NAMED AS A DEFENDANT OR OTHERWISE IN ANY INDICTMENT OR INFORMATION RELATING TO SUCH VIOLATION? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

40. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN CONVICTED OF OR ENTERED A PLEA OF GUILTY OR NOLO CONTENDERE TO ANY CRIMINAL VIOLATION OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC OFFENSE? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

41. ARE YOU PRESENTLY OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A PARTY IN INTEREST IN ANY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PROCEEDING OR CIVIL LITIGATION? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

42. HAVE YOU BEEN INTERVIEWED OR ASKED TO SUPPLY ANY INFORMATION AS A WITNESS OR OTHERWISE IN CONNECTION WITH ANY CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION, FEDERAL, OR STATE AGENCY PROCEEDING, GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION, OR CRIMINAL OR CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE PAST TEN YEARS? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

I was interviewed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence as part of its investigation into the events leading up to and during the 2012 terrorist attack on the U.S. temporary mission facility in Benghazi, Libya.

43. HAS ANY BUSINESS OF WHICH YOU ARE OR WERE AN OFFICER, DIRECTOR, OR PARTNER BEEN A PARTY TO ANY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PROCEEDING OR CRIMINAL OR CIVIL LITIGATION RELEVANT TO THE POSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. (WITH RESPECT TO A BUSINESS OF WHICH YOU ARE OR WERE AN OFFICER, YOU NEED ONLY CONSIDER PROCEEDINGS AND LITIGATION THAT OCCURRED WHILE YOU WERE AN OFFICER OF THAT BUSINESS.)

No

44. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN THE SUBJECT OF ANY INSPECTOR GENERAL INVESTIGATION? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

I have not been the subject of any such investigation. However, as a long-term government employee, organizations in which I have held supervisory or management positions have been the subject of routine Inspector General audits, reviews and inspections.

PART F - SECURITY INFORMATION

45. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DENIED ANY SECURITY CLEARANCE OR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION FOR ANY REASON? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN IN DETAIL.

No

46. HAVE YOU BEEN REQUIRED TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION FOR ANY SECURITY CLEARANCE OR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN.

Yes, both counterintelligence and full-scope polygraphs consistent with my employment in the Central Intelligence Agency.

47. HAVE YOU EVER REFUSED TO SUBMIT TO A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN.

No

PART G - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

48. DESCRIBE IN YOUR OWN WORDS THE CONCEPT OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN PARTICULAR, CHARACTERIZE WHAT YOU BELIEVE TO BE THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES OF THE CONGRESS, RESPECTIVELY, IN THE OVERSIGHT PROCESS.

I strongly support congressional oversight of the intelligence committee by the appropriate committees of Congress.

In a broader sense, the budget and activities of the IC are necessarily withheld from public and media scrutiny, and so the oversight is left to appropriate committees of Congress. As such, it is incumbent on the IC to ensure those committees of jurisdiction, particularly the intelligence oversight committees, have the information and intelligence needed to conduct their oversight in a manner that provides public accountability and confidence that the men and women of the IC are engaged in activities that are legal, sanctioned, necessary for national security, efficient in their execution, and provide the appropriate privacy and civil liberties safeguards consistent with the law. As Chair of the IC Deputies Committee, the PDDNI has visibility into cross-cutting issues of the IC. If confirmed, I commit to keeping the intelligence committees fully and currently informed of intelligence activities as required by law, and support existing IC policy by demanding the same of other intelligence community elements.

More narrowly, the position of PDDNI oversees the day-to-day activities of all ODNI components. As such, the PDDNI is in the unique position to ensure that ODNI continues to be compliant with its statutory obligation to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of significant intelligence activities, anticipated activities, and failures.

49. EXPLAIN YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

The Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence is responsible for assisting the DNI in fulfilling the various duties of the Director of National Intelligence as directed in statute, Executive Order, Presidential Memoranda, or policy. The PDDNI must step in to discharge all authorities and responsibilities of the DNI

when needed. Also, the PDDNI provides key direction to IC elements on via the IC Deputies Committee, driving the integration of the IC.

Additionally, the PDDNI serves as the "Chief Operating Officer" of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ensuring the ODNI is meeting its mission efficiently and appropriately.

Attachment 1 – Publications and Speaking Engagements


Product	Event Name	Event Date
CIA External Speaking Events		
Article & TPs	Keynote address at STEM Conference	9/28/2012
Article & TPs	NBC Sisterhood of Spies Interview	11/14/2013
Article	Moderator at CIA's 2014 National Security Conference at Georgetown University	6/11/2014
Video	Duke Alumni	10/31/2014
Video	Speaker at CIA's 2016 National Security Conference at George Washington University	9/20/2016
Video	ANGLE of Ascent Event	12/6/2016
NGA External Speaking Events		
Remarks	11th Countering WMD Global Synchronization Conference	2/18/2015
Remarks	AFCEA Industry Day	3/16/2015
Remarks	Mission Users Group Forum - Intelligence Integration -- Powered by ICITE	3/17/2015
Remarks	IC LGBTA Affinity Network March Meeting: NGA Defense	3/19/2015
Remarks	12th Annual Underground Facilities R&D Technical Conference	4/14/2015
Remarks	USGIF Dayton Workshop	4/21/2015
Talking Points	Women in Aerospace	5/5/2015
Remarks	IC Legal Conference	5/6/2015
Talking Points	GEOINTeraction Tuesday	5/12/2015
Remarks	3rd IC Women's Summit	5/13/2015
Remarks	2nd African American National Security & Intelligence Summit	6/13/2015
Remarks	Oak Ridge National Laboratory SAG Meeting	6/16/2015
Remarks	2015 GEOINT Cyber-C4I Summit	7/15/2015
Remarks	INSA IC Industry Day	7/16/2015
Remarks	Future Space Leaders Conference	7/16/2015
Remarks	Esri Defense Intel Executive Track (DIET)	7/21/2015
Remarks	Space and Missile Defense Symposium	8/12/2015
Remarks	DODIIS Worldwide Conference	8/24/2015
Talking Points	Executive Mosaics	9/15/2015
Remarks	Georgetown Joint Conference	9/24/2015
Talking Points	WashingtonExec	9/30/2015
Remarks	DHS Cybersecurity Awareness Month	10/1/2015
Remarks	DigitalGlobe Discussion	10/6/2015
Remarks	Amazon Web Services re:invent	10/7/2015
Remarks	Esri Classified Day Welcome and Receiving of SAG Award	10/26/2015
Remarks	Buckhead Club Speakers Series	10/27/2015

Remarks	Business Executives for National Security (BENS)	10/28/2015
Remarks	Urban Atlanta Geospatial STEM Academy	10/28/2015
Remarks	Harvard National Security Fellow	11/3/2015
Remarks	Appalachian State Visit	11/12/2015
Remarks	SmallSat Workshop Classified Day	11/17/2015
Remarks	Geography 2050	11/20/2015
Remarks	IC Chief Human Capital Officer Summit	11/30/2015
Remarks	GEOINT Electro-Optical Technical Symposium (GEOTS)	12/7/2015
Talking Points	FWPC Women's Mentorship Initiative Kickoff	2/2/2016
Remarks	Non-Title 50 Conference	2/4/2016
Talking Points	Duke - Women in Foreign Policy	2/18/2016
Talking Points	UNC Student Lunch Engagement	2/18/2016
Remarks	Duke - Overcoming Obstacles	2/19/2016
Talking Points	NC State Student Engagement	2/19/2016
Remarks	Esri Federal GIS Conference	2/24/2016
Remarks	AFCEA Industry Day	3/16/2016
Remarks	National Counterintelligence and Security Conference	3/30/2016
Talking Points	GEOINT Symposium Sneak Peek	4/7/2016
Talking Points	GeoWomen 2016 Award	4/26/2016
Remarks	2016 Leadership Summit for Women in Security Careers Welcome (DD)	5/13/2016
Talking Points	GEOINT Symposium: YPG/NPN Luncheon	5/16/2016
Talking Points	INSA Acquisition Remarks	6/2/2016
Remarks	Data Analytics Conference	6/3/2016
Talking Points	2016 Annual IC Info Sharing Symposium Panel	6/6/2016
Remarks	In-Q-Tel/Silicon Valley Bank Discovery Event	6/15/2016
Remarks	DIA ICITE Day	6/20/2016
Remarks	AWS Public Sector Summit	6/20/2016
Remarks	IC Facilities and Logistics Conference	6/21/2016
Remarks	Advanced Campaign Cell Annual Review	6/29/2016
Remarks	IC Innovation Conference	7/6/2016
Remarks	NextGen Summit	8/2/2016
Remarks	Inaugural Insider Threat Awareness Event	8/15/2016
Remarks	WISE Symposium	9/7/2016
Remarks	IARPA Seminar	9/19/2016
Talking Points	CIA-GWU Nat'l Security Conference	9/20/2016
Talking Points	DNI COCOM Panel	9/21/2016
Remarks	NASIC Federal Women's Program Career Development Seminar	9/28/2016
Remarks	Cybersecurity Awareness Month	10/6/2016
Remarks	STEM Conference	11/11/2016
Remarks	NYC TDY: Civic Hall Panel	11/17/2016
Talking Points	NYC BENS Luncheon	11/17/2016

Remarks	Geography 2050	11/18/2016
Remarks	AWS re:Invent	11/29/2016
Remarks	Consumer Electronics Show-Gov	1/8/2017
Remarks	Geocomputation Summit	2/14/2017
Remarks	FAGA Forum on Space Intelligence	2/15/2017
Remarks	National Missions Conference	2/22/2017
Remarks	Duke Recruiting Breakfast NYC	3/2/2017
Remarks	Duke Women at AU Law	3/4/2017
Remarks	South by Southwest	3/10/2017
Remarks	AFCEA Industry Day	3/14/2017
Remarks	Powering GEOINT Analytics	4/13/2017
Remarks	Duke Alumni Event Panel Discussion	5/22/2017
Remarks	GEOINT Symposium	6/5/2017
Remarks	Cipher Brief Annual Threat Conference	6/21/2017

TO THE CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE:

In connection with my nomination to be the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, I hereby express my willingness to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.



Signature

Date: 6 July 2017

**SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE**

UNITED STATES SENATE



**Additional Pre-Hearing Questions for
Robert P. Storch upon his nomination to be Inspector General of the National
Security Agency**

Duties of the Inspector General

QUESTION 1: What is your understanding of the scope of the programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the Inspector General of the National Security Agency (NSA)?

The Inspector General has the responsibility under the Inspector General Act to conduct and supervise audits and operations relating to the programs and operations of the National Security Agency (NSA), to provide leadership and coordination and recommend policies to promote the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the NSA's programs and operations and to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in those programs and operations, and to keep both the head of the establishment and Congress fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies and the necessity for and progress of corrective action to address such issues. As a practical matter, OIGs accomplish these functions through audits, inspections, reviews, and investigations that provide impactful findings and recommendations and address the full range of the agency's operations and the activities of its personnel and programs, and through ongoing communications with the head of the agency and the Congress related thereto.

QUESTION 2: To what extent do you believe that the timeliness and responsiveness of reporting is an element of the effectiveness of an Inspector General?

Timeliness and responsiveness of reporting are both absolutely critical to the effectiveness of an Inspector General. In my time as Deputy Inspector General at the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG), I have learned that for a review to be truly useful in providing relevant information to the leadership of the agency and to Congress and impactful in helping to ensure that appropriate actions are taken to improve the integrity and efficiency of agency operations, the review must be conducted and issued in a timeframe that makes the results relevant and actionable. Investigations of misconduct by agency personnel or in connection with its programs and operations must be completed and reported to the agency in a timely fashion so that appropriate actions can be taken as a result both to address past misconduct and to enable the agency to take steps to address any related issues going forward. As the Deputy Inspector General at the DOJ OIG, I developed and put in place a tracking mechanism whereby our Divisions set milestones for completion of different stages of the report process and I am able to monitor their progress and have discussions with Division leadership as appropriate to help keep our work moving toward a timely completion. If confirmed for this position, I would similarly expect to work with the personnel at NSA OIG to make every effort ensure that we are completing our important work in a timely and, therefore, useful manner.

QUESTION 3: Do you intend to comply with the president's executive order on ethics? Will you promptly notify the committee if any waivers are granted?

I intend to comply with the President's Executive Order on ethics, and will promptly notify the Committee if any waivers are granted.

Protection of Whistleblowers

QUESTION 4: Do you believe employees and contractors at the NSA are adequately protected by current whistleblower rules and regulations?

Whistleblowers perform an invaluable service to their agency and the public when they come forward with information that they reasonably believe evidences wrongdoing, and they should never suffer reprisal for doing so. I have worked over the past five years to advance this fundamental principle, both as the OIG Whistleblower Ombudsperson at DOJ and in serving as the Chair of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Whistleblower Ombudsman Working Group. I have not had the opportunity in either of those capacities to examine in detail the protections afforded employees and contractors at the NSA or within the Intelligence Community more generally. Having said that, I believe that making sure that whistleblowers feel and are appropriately protected when they come forward with what they reasonably believe to be evidence of wrongdoing is a key function for OIGs. In my current position, I have welcomed the opportunity to work with the Members and Staff of the bipartisan Senate and House Whistleblower Caucuses on these issues and, if I am confirmed for this position, I would be pleased to work with the Committee going forward to address any issues impacting employees and contractors at the NSA.

QUESTION 5: If confirmed, what additional policies and processes will you establish or recommend to protect whistleblowers?

I have learned since initially being nominated for this position that the NSA OIG operates a Whistleblower Protection Program through its Investigations Division. I have not had an opportunity to study that program, much less to develop any additional policies or processes to enhance those efforts. However, I do feel strongly that education is critical in this area and, for example, at DOJ OIG, I developed an educational video, which is publicly available on a Whistleblower Protection page that we created with additional information and links to brochures and other resources for employees and contractors, all of which is readily available on our website at <https://oig.justice.gov/hotline/whistleblower-protection.htm>. I also prepared and worked with the Department to have posted at all DOJ facilities posters about whistleblowing and whistleblower protection, and prepared and had disseminated a brochure with specific information for Department contractors, subcontractors, grantees, and others. Should I be confirmed, I would anticipate making every effort to ensure that the OIG is providing information to employees and contractors regarding their rights and protections so that they can feel comfortable and assured in coming forward with information.

Additionally, the studies I have reviewed and discussions with experts in the field in which I have participated emphasize the importance of keeping whistleblowers informed to the greatest extent possible, and that such a sense of what is referred to as “institutional justice” is critical in demonstrating to potential whistleblowers that their disclosures are valued and that they will be handled appropriately. To further this effort at DOJ OIG, for example, I developed and put in

place a tracking system that informs me, as our OIG Whistleblower Ombudsperson, when we have responded to whistleblowers at different stages so that I am able to work with our staff to ensure that we are doing so in a timely fashion as appropriate. If confirmed for this position, I would anticipate working to ensure that measures are in place to ensure that whistleblowers are appropriately informed both generally and with regard to specific disclosures.

Access to Information

QUESTION 6: Please describe how you would resolve, including what remedies you would pursue, if a situation involves an NSA employee or contractor who refuses to provide access to records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations or other materials requested by the NSA IG.

OIGs must have timely and independent access to all relevant books and records of the agency in order to carry out their functions in a thorough and credible way. If the agency over which we have oversight responsibility has the discretion to decide what information or records to give an OIG in carrying out our functions, or delays in providing us documents necessary to do our work, the OIG's reviews and investigations necessarily will be hampered and confidence in our work undermined. The recent action of Congress in passing the IG Empowerment Act affirmed the importance of this fundamental principle by clearly stating in Section 6(a) that each Inspector General is authorized to have timely access to all necessary records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other materials available to the establishment which relate to the programs and operations with respect to which the Inspector General has responsibilities under the Act, except pursuant to any law that expressly refers to the IG and limits the right of access of the IG. Under Section 8G(d)(2) of the Inspector General Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, can prohibit the IG from accessing information available to an element of the IC, specifically including the NSA, based on a determination, communicated to the Senate and House Intelligence and Armed Services committees and with an opportunity for response from the IG, that such a prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States. Absent such an invocation under Section 8G, I believe that the OIG is entitled to the records and other materials necessary to do its work, and should agency leadership not promptly and satisfactorily resolve any refusal or undue delay in providing such records or other materials, I would notify Congress.

QUESTION 7: What is your view of the appropriate use of the NSA IG's subpoena authority?

I believe that subpoena authority is a fundamental tool for IGs to obtain documents on those occasions when compulsory process is necessary, consistent with Section 6(a)(4) of the Inspector General Act. This authority may not need to be used extensively, but it is important that it be available to IGs in order to ensure that they obtain all relevant records necessary to carry out their oversight functions.

Sources of Complaints

QUESTION 8: If confirmed, what steps would you take to inform individuals, within or outside of the U.S. Government, including contractors, of their opportunity to provide such complaints or information to the Inspector General?

I do not believe that an OIG can carry out its oversight responsibilities without receiving information from individuals, within and outside government, regarding the operations of the agency. We have recognized this at DOJ OIG, where under the leadership of our IG we have put in place a robust effort to notify people regarding the opportunity and means of providing complaints or information to the OIG, including detailed information available on our website, fraud awareness briefings conducted with Department contractors and components, brochures and other educational materials, and public appearances discussing the OIG's role and the importance of providing information to the office. We also worked with the Department to have posters regarding how to make disclosures posted in all DOJ facilities, and we have used social media to inform people more broadly about the efforts of the OIG and how to submit information to our office. If confirmed, I would explore with the current OIG staff the organization's efforts in this regard and work with them to implement any needed expansion of those efforts to ensure that we are making every effort to inform individuals, within or outside of the agency, including contractors, of their opportunity to provide such complaints or information to the OIG and the various available means of doing so.

Relationship to Other Inspectors General

QUESTION 9: Please describe your understanding, if confirmed, concerning NSA OIG's participation in the work of the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum and any measures you would recommend to improve its functions.

As Deputy Inspector General at the DOJ OIG, I have participated in the Deputies meetings of the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum (IC IG Forum), and attended the annual IC IG Conferences. These activities have given me an opportunity to participate in and observe some of the operations of the Forum, which among other things provides valuable information on cross-cutting issues, recognizes outstanding work by the OIGs within the IC, and facilitates detail opportunities across the IC community. One area where I understand there has been some work that I think may be a fertile source for future growth is in facilitating multi-OIG reviews in areas with issues or equities that extend across IC components. We have had recent experience with such joint reviews at DOJ OIG in our participation with three other OIGs (including two from IC components) in the review of the sharing of intelligence leading up to the Boston Marathon bombing and, more recently, in the joint review of the post-incident responses by the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Department of State following several fatal shootings in Honduras. I believe that facilitating such collaborative efforts where appropriate could further the work of the OIGs in this area and, if confirmed, will work to explore avenues to fully exploit the potential of the IC IG Forum.

Government Accountability Office

Pursuant to Section 348 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, the Director of National Intelligence has issued a directive on the access of the Comptroller General to information in the possession of an element of the Intelligence Community.

QUESTION 10: Please describe your understanding of the role of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in assisting Congress in oversight that relates to such information.

During my time at the DOJ OIG, I have learned that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) plays a critical role in providing information and analysis to assist Congress in performing its constitutional functions and ensuring the accountability of federal government agencies and that the taxpayer dollars that Congress appropriates are spent efficiently and wisely.

QUESTION 11: Please also describe your views on whether consultation or coordination by NSA OIG with the GAO presently occurs and, if not, what coordination would be desirable to assure full coverage of oversight requirements while avoiding any conflict or duplication of effort.

My understanding is that there has been consultation and coordination between NSA OIG and the GAO. I believe that the missions of GAO and the OIG are complimentary, and that both benefit from the greatest possible level of consultation and coordination, both to assure full coverage of oversight requirements and to avoid any conflict or duplication of effort. At DOJ OIG, we have cooperated to the greatest extent possible with GAO reviews and meet on a periodic basis with GAO to coordinate with regard to our relevant work, and we also have utilized the results of GAO reviews as a valuable source of information in our own work. With the wide range of potential work facing OIGs and the limited staffing and other resources with which to accomplish it, such coordination is particularly important in ensuring that unnecessary overlapping efforts are avoided, thereby ensuring that we are using our time and resources as effectively as possible.

Independence

QUESTION 12: If confirmed, please describe what actions you would take if a senior NSA or IC official sought to prevent you from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation within the jurisdiction of the NSA IG?

Consistent with Section 2 of the Inspector General Act, the OIG is established as an independent and objective unit with the responsibility of conducting and supervising audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations of the agency. The only basis of which I am aware for

preventing the NSA OIG from initiating, carrying out, or completing an audit or investigation within its jurisdiction would be for the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, to invoke Section 8G(d)(2) of the Inspector General Act, which provides a mechanism for the Secretary to so act based on a determination, communicated to the Senate and House Intelligence and Armed Services committees and with an opportunity for response from the IG, that such a prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States. Absent such an invocation under Section 8G, if a senior NSA or IC official sought to prevent the OIG from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation within its investigation, I would, if confirmed, immediately report the matter to the head of the agency and, if that did not resolve it promptly and satisfactorily, to Congress.

QUESTION 13: The NSA has dual reporting chains (DoD and IC); you are a political appointee; and you have statutory reporting obligations. How will you balance these competing equities and reporting obligations?

A principle that is sacrosanct for OIGs is that they report exactly what they find and make appropriate recommendations based thereon. This, of course, is entirely consistent with my many years as a federal prosecutor, where I followed the evidence where it led and brought charges accordingly. If confirmed as the NSA IG, I would report fully and accurately to the head of the establishment and to Congress, consistent with the reporting structure established in the Inspector General Act. IGs are chosen without regard to partisan affiliation as set forth in Section 3(a) of the Inspector General Act, and my own status therefore would not be relevant to the important responsibilities placed on the OIG. For their work to be credible and, therefore, useful, IGs must be, and must appear to be, completely non-partisan, and our work uninfluenced by politics in any way.

Inspector General Work Plan

QUESTION 14: If confirmed, how will you determine the investigations and audits that are necessary or desirable to complete each year? How will you engage this Committee to solicit topics for consideration?

I believe that most or all OIGs undergo a process whereby they determine their work plans based on assessments of risks, emerging events or issues, and input from the agency over which they have oversight, Congress, and other sources. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to meet with Members and Staff of the Committee on an ongoing basis to discuss areas of interest and to facilitate a continuing dialogue as to areas of potential work for the OIG.

Referrals to the Department of Justice

QUESTION 15: Please describe your understanding of the authority and responsibility of the NSA OIG to refer matters to the Department of Justice concerning possible criminal conduct, including the conduct of current or former officials.

Pursuant to Section 4(d) of the Inspector General Act, each Inspector General is required to expeditiously report to the Attorney General whenever the IG has reasonable grounds to believe there has been a violation of Federal law. This is consistent with the general requirement set forth in Title 28, United States Code, Section 535(b), as well as Executive Order 12333 dealing with United States Intelligence Activities. I believe that it is standard and appropriate for OIGs to refer information regarding possible criminal conduct to DOJ for consideration of prosecution.

Consultations about Reports

QUESTION 16: Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would be appropriate for the NSA OIG to consult with officials in the NSA, or other officials of an IC element outside an office of an Inspector General, before issuing a report, regarding the findings and recommendations in the report?

I believe that, consistent with what I believe to be common practice across the OIG community, it is appropriate to provide the agency a draft copy of a report to ensure factual accuracy before the report is finalized. Additionally, I believe it is common and appropriate to provide the report to the agency in final form with recommendations a short time before issuance for purposes of classification and to allow the agency an opportunity to prepare a written response, which would be attached to the report and analyzed by the OIG as appropriate. Importantly, the decision regarding what changes, if any, should be made in response to factual accuracy or other substantive comments is and must be solely that of the OIG. OIGs also issue what are referred to as Management Advisory Memoranda to the agency when, during the course of audits, inspections, reviews, or investigations, they discover circumstances requiring the immediate attention of the agency or prompt corrective action.

QUESTION 17: Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would be appropriate for senior NSA officials to request that the NSA OIG not investigate or review a particular matter?

It is, I believe, appropriate and helpful to have good lines of communication with senior agency leadership, including the ability for the latter to raise any concerns or issues regarding the timing, usefulness, or impact of any proposed investigation or review. However, the ultimate decision as to whether or when to initiate any investigation or review must rest solely with the OIG consistent with its independent oversight role as provided in the Inspector General Act. As discussed in response to Question 12, to my knowledge, the only basis for preventing the NSA

OIG from initiating, carrying out, or completing an audit or investigation within its jurisdiction would be for the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, to invoke Section 8G of the Inspector General Act, based upon a determination that such a prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States.

QUESTION 18: Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would be appropriate for senior NSA officials to request that the NSA OIG not issue a report on a particular matter?

As discussed in response to Questions 12 and 17, Section 8G of the Inspector General Act provides the only mechanism of which I am aware to prevent the NSA OIG from issuing a report, based upon a determination by the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, that such action is required to protect vital national security interests of the United States.

QUESTION 19: Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would be appropriate for senior officials to request that the NSA OIG change findings, recommendations, or other pertinent material in a report on a particular matter?

As stated in response to Question 16, I believe that, consistent with what I understand to be common practice across the OIG community, it is appropriate to provide the agency a draft copy of a report to ensure factual accuracy before the report is finalized. Additionally, I believe it is common and appropriate to provide the report in final form with recommendations a short time before issuance for purposes of classification and to allow the agency an opportunity to prepare a response, which would be attached to the report and analyzed as appropriate. However, the decision as to what changes, if any, are appropriate to findings, recommendations, or other pertinent material in a report rests solely with the Inspector General.

QUESTION 20: Please describe your views on the appropriate relationship between the NSA OIG and the NSA Office of Congressional Affairs when communicating with the Congress.

Consistent with its direct reporting requirement to Congress, the OIG should have direct communications with Congress. While it may be appropriate for the OIG to inform the agency regarding such communications, that is a decision that would rest solely with the OIG.

QUESTION 21: What is your position on the role of the NSA OIG to monitor NSA adherence to Congressional intent and direction?

I believe that the OIG is responsible for conducting independent oversight over all of the operations of the NSA, including its adherence to Congressional intent and direction in carrying out its broad functions and mission.

QUESTION 22: Please describe your views on the appropriate relationship between the NSA OIG and the NSA Office of General Counsel when those communications involve legal issues.

An important provision under Section 3(g) the Inspector General Act is that each IG has access to legal advice from a counsel either reporting directly to the IG or another IG. While there may be circumstances under which it is appropriate for the NSA OIG's Counsel to consult with the NSA's Office of General Counsel regarding legal matters of mutual interest, it is important for the independence of the OIG that the IG is able to obtain independent legal advice regarding the operations of the OIG without relying on agency counsel for that purpose.

Major Challenges, Problems, and Priorities

QUESTION 23: In your view, what are the major challenges facing the NSA OIG?

I am not aware of any specific major challenges that currently are facing the NSA OIG. Of course, the NSA will be transitioning to being an entity with a Presidentially appointed Senate confirmed IG, which I believe presents significant opportunities for development of the OIG's independent oversight activities with the goal of improving the integrity and efficiency of the agency's operations with appropriate responsiveness to Congress. Also, as discussed in response to prior questions, I believe that it is important that the OIG, and indeed all OIGs, demonstrate through words and actions that they recognize the importance of whistleblowers to their work, and provide an atmosphere in which such individuals feel comfortable coming forward with information, and in which reprisal for doing so is not tolerated. It seems to me that this would be particularly important given the nature of much of the information that is dealt with at the NSA and within the IC.

Personnel and Budgetary Resources of the NRO OIG

QUESTION 24: If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you expect to consider or make in the present OIG with regard to organization, staff qualifications, training, budget, or other features relevant to the effective performance of the duties of the new statutory office?

I do not currently have sufficient information to assess what changes, if any, I would expect to consider or make if confirmed, regarding the organization or other features of the OIG, apart from taking whatever steps are necessary to ensure that the office is handling matters consistent with the principles set forth in the Inspector General Act and outlined in my responses to the Committee's questions. As is the case when entering any office, I would expect there to be a period in which I learn in detail about the operations of the organization and the issues it has faced, and that I would work with the team there on an ongoing basis to make revisions and improvements as necessary to ensure the quality and timeliness of our work. In order to inform

this process, and to encourage communications within the OIG, I would anticipate that, if confirmed, I would meet early on with personnel across the OIG to obtain their perspectives on the office and areas for potential improvement. This is something that I do with the IG on a regular basis at DOJ OIG, and have found to be extremely valuable in helping him to lead change within the organization.

I also firmly believe that there is nothing more important for an organization than attracting, training, and developing the best possible talent. For example, at DOJ OIG, I worked with the IG to create a new Director of Training and Development to enhance our training and development efforts across the organization. I am not now in a position to know whether or what changes in this area might be appropriate at NSA OIG, but I do believe that such efforts are essential for developing and maintaining the capacity to produce high quality impactful work.

Finally, I believe strongly in planning ahead, and looking forward as an organization so that investments in infrastructure, information technology, and other areas are made strategically, as opposed to being largely reactive. At DOJ OIG, we recently created and hired a Chief Innovation Officer, who reports directly to the IG and me, to look ahead to where we need to be in such mission critical areas and to provide expert advice to ensure that we are spending our resources wisely to get there.

QUESTION 25: Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe that the use of contractors to perform such functions is appropriate?

I believe that it is a common practice for OIGs to use contractors to perform financial statement and related audits, and also audits pursuant to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA), both overseen and reviewed by OIG auditors. Additionally, there may be some technical support functions that can be performed by contractors, depending on the relative merits of using government employees or contractors for such work. Finally, there may be rare situations where particular expertise available in the private sector is not present within the OIG or the IG community, in which case it might be appropriate to consider utilization of a contractor to provide such services. However, as a general matter, I believe it is important that the core auditing, inspections, review, and investigations functions be performed by OIG employees.

QUESTION 26: In your view, are there any barriers or disincentives, including any created by personnel policies, that impede the recruitment or retention of qualified IG personnel? If so, please describe.

I do not have sufficient information to assess whether there currently are any barriers or disincentives in this area specific to the NSA OIG. Across the OIG community, I do believe that uncertainty in budgets makes planning difficult, including for personnel costs that constitute the greatest share of an OIG's budget. I believe that OIGs do important and interesting work, but consistent with my response to Question 24, it is important for the OIG to provide training and other opportunities for professional growth and development, and to encourage employee engagement across the board in order to create an environment that is attractive to the personnel

necessary to accomplish our mission, and I believe that this would be particularly important in conducting oversight at an agency with complex and sophisticated operations like the NSA.

QUESTION 27: Please describe how you will handle recusals for incoming OIG staff. Will you maintain the minimum floor established by OIG Management Directive 1-2?

It is important that OIG personnel uphold the highest ethical standards. If confirmed, I will work with the OIG Counsel and others to ensure that all appropriate recusals are effected, and at least the minimum floor established by OIG Management Directive 1-2 is maintained.

QUESTION 28: Please describe your views on the NSA OIG's role to oversee NSA support provided to the military commands.

I understand that support to the military commands is a critical part of the NSA's mission. The OIG has responsibility to conduct rigorous independent oversight over all of the NSA's operations in the performance of its mission.

**SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE**

UNITED STATES SENATE



**Additional Pre-Hearing Questions for
Ms. Isabel Patelunas upon her nomination to be Assistant Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis, Department of the Treasury**

1. Please describe how, if confirmed as the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis, you will be responsive to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Secretary of the Treasury.
 - *Because of its dual character as a member of the Intelligence Community and the Department of the Treasury, OIA is positioned to serve as a critical bridge between the Intelligence Community and the Executive Branch's financial policymakers on issues of financial intelligence. If confirmed, I would support the DNI by leading OIA to be an agile organization that can respond to the complex and rapidly changing national security environment the U.S. continues to face, and by further integrating OIA in the Intelligence Community as the lead organization on financial intelligence. I would support the Secretary of the Treasury as the Department formulates policy and executes authorities through all-source analysis of global financial networks, the financial vulnerabilities of U.S. adversaries, the impact of targeted U.S. financial measures, and threats to international financial stability.*
2. If conflicts arise between the priorities of the DNI and the Secretary of the Treasury, how will you act to resolve them?
 - *I am not aware of any conflicts between the priorities of the DNI and the Secretary of the Treasury. If I am confirmed and such a conflict does arise, I would work to resolve any conflicts in the best interest of the United States.*
3. Please explain your understanding of OIA's responsibilities and authorities within the IC for coordinating, facilitating, or otherwise improving financial intelligence collection and analysis. Do you see OIA as the IC's lead agency on financial intelligence issues?
 - *It is my understanding that OIA drives collection by IC counterparts on top Treasury priorities and produces all-source intelligence analysis to inform Treasury activities. Given its expertise and focus on the topic, I view OIA as the IC's leader on financial intelligence analysis, a role that also involves working collaboratively with partners across the IC.*
4. Do you intend to comply with the president's executive order on ethics? Will you promptly notify the committee if any waivers are granted?

- *If confirmed, I will comply with the President's Executive Order on ethics, including signing the ethics pledge. I will abide by any rules or procedures established by the White House with respect to any waivers granted by the President or his designee.*
5. Please describe your current understanding of OIA's participation in the CFIUS process. Do you think OIA is positioned well to support the interagency in the CFIUS process? How do you see OIA evolving to better support the CFIUS process?
- *It is my understanding that OIA provides intelligence support to Treasury's role in the CFIUS process. If confirmed, I will seek opportunities for OIA to enhance its analytic contribution to this national security function.*
 - *Background: Press reporting describes the volume of CFIUS cases as increasing "considerably" or "dramatically," some press reports describe case volume as "surging" or "skyrocketing." Exact case volumes for 2015, 2016, and 2017 have not been publicly released; 2014 case volume was 147.*
6. Please explain your understanding of how the oversight roles of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee differ from the oversight roles of other congressional committees that have oversight jurisdiction for other offices within TFI and the Treasury Department.
- *As a member of the Intelligence Community, OIA falls under the oversight of the SSCI and the HPSCI. Both committees have a unique role in their jurisdiction to review the activities of Intelligence Community entities, assure that intelligence activities are lawful and Constitutional, and authorize funds for OIA. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the intelligence committees as they fulfill their oversight role.*
7. OIA is the only component within the broader Treasury Department that is designated as an Intelligence Community element under the National

Security Act of 1947. With that comes challenges in coordination and information sharing both within the Treasury Department as a whole, and with the broader Intelligence Community.

- a. If confirmed, how would you protect IC-related information within the Treasury Department, while at the same time working with the IC and the congressional intelligence committees to ensure that we can accomplish our oversight obligations?
 - o *It is my understanding that OIA's policies and practices on protecting IC-related information align with ODNI guidance. If confirmed, I would meet with my Security leadership team early on to ensure that is the case. At the same time, I am fully committed to engaging with OIA's Congressional intelligence committees to assist you in accomplishing your oversight objectives.*
 - b. If confirmed, how will you ensure that OIA's intelligence information is protected from information requests directed to the Treasury Department writ large?
 - o *If confirmed, I will work with OIA and review the existing procedures and practices to ensure that classified information held by the Treasury Department continues to be appropriately handled and protected.*
8. In 2010, then-DNI Clapper established the National Intelligence Manager for Threat Finance (NIM-TF) and appointed Assistant Secretary Ireland to the position.

What are your views on the policy of dual-hatting the Assistant Secretary as the NIM-TF?

Treasury needs to remain as a central player in threat finance. Its workforce has significant expertise to bring to bear in this important and growing analytic and reporting area. I understand that the ODNI is doing a review of all of its positions, including NIMS, and if confirmed, I will engage early with both Treasury and ODNI leaders to determine the best use of resources to ensure that Treasury remains the focal point for Threat Finance.

- a. If confirmed, how would you use your dual-hatted role to ensure the necessary integration with the broader IC's threat finance intelligence components and efforts?

I have strong ties to many of the players in the IC, particularly ODNI and CIA. If confirmed, I will ensure that OIA leverages all IC and USG forums to ensure we are informing decisionmaking in a transparent and collaborative way, and reviewing all options and implications of USG actions. OIA will continue to take a leading role in threat finance efforts, helping to ensure that we are taking a whole-of-government approach.

9. What legal authorities does OIA primarily rely upon to identify, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist financing? Do you believe there are additional legal tools that OIA needs for its efforts against terrorist financing?

- I understand OIA supports Treasury and the U.S. Government under authorities that include Sections 311 and 312 of Title 31, U.S. Code, as well as Executive Order 12333, as amended. If confirmed, I will give careful attention to the question of whether OIA requires any additional legal authorities to enhance its mission in supporting the U.S. Government's whole-of-government approach to identify, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist financing.*

10. What terrorist organizations are of most concern to OIA? Please describe how, if confirmed, you would proceed to identify, disrupt, and dismantle the financial networks of these organizations?

- It is my understanding that OIA's terrorism priorities are driven by national terrorism priorities. Accordingly, ISIS and its branches and AQ and its affiliates would be OIA's primary concerns right now. I understand OIA is also looking with great concern at other terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, such as the Taliban and Haqqani Network, among others. It is also my understanding that OIA closely follows Iran's IRGC-Qods Force, Hizballah, and Hamas. Identifying funding networks that support these groups is a unique intelligence discipline, requiring the right mix of smart analysts, training, tools, and information. I have had the privilege of working with OIA's terrorism analysts in previous positions and I know they are some of the*

best in the IC. I would ensure that OIA retains its highly skilled workforce, that it can recruit and train top talent, and that its analysts have access to the tools and information they need to continue supporting the disruption of terrorist financial networks.

11. If confirmed, how would you proceed to identify, disrupt, and dismantle the charities that raise money for terrorist organizations?
 - *I understand OIA is critical to enhancing the collection, analysis, and sharing of financial intelligence across the U.S. Government on terrorist-linked charities. OIA analysts pore over all-source reporting to identify key vulnerabilities and support the application of Treasury authorities and policy tools. I plan, if confirmed, to review existing analysis on this topic and, if necessary, conduct a comprehensive evaluation of how charities may be involved in supporting terrorism.*

12. What are the challenges that OIA faces regarding virtual currencies, such as bitcoins, pre-paid cards, and other payment forms that are traditionally difficult to track? If confirmed, how would you address those challenges?
 - *Like any payment system or financial product, virtual currencies and pre-paid cards offer opportunities for both legitimate and illegitimate use. The primary reason illicit actors use these products is the potential for greater anonymity in conducting financial transactions. It is my understanding that OIA works closely with Treasury counterparts and IC colleagues to gain greater fidelity into the range of tactics, techniques, and procedures used by terrorists, drug traffickers, and other illicit actors to obfuscate their financial activity. I will ensure that OIA analysts focus on both the financial networks associated with national security threats and laundering methodologies and financial technology more broadly in order to inform Treasury policymakers of potential vulnerabilities with non-traditional payment forms.*

13. It is critical that OIA have a workforce that is positioned to address the challenges posed by virtual currency, financing on the dark web, and other, new threats. How is OIA working to train and recruit a workforce that is fluent in how illicit financial networks operate?
 - *I understand that OIA analysts receive training, mentorship, and rotational opportunities to help them develop methodological skills and*

fluency with tools and data for analyzing current and emerging illicit financial networks and mechanisms. Training and employee development would be a top priority of mine, if confirmed, including an emphasis on analytic tradecraft to ensure that OIA's products continue to exceed IC standards and deliver value to customers.

- 14.** Recent unauthorized disclosures have motivated different IC elements to focus on their insider threat programs. How does OIA confront and mitigate the insider threat challenge? Do you have any plans to revisit and readdress those programs?
- *It is my understanding that Treasury's Insider Threat Program operates in accordance with Executive Order 13587. I believe that deterring and identifying insider threats depends, among other things, on educating the workforce and maintaining robust insider threat capabilities consistent with applicable law, regulations, and policies. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Treasury Insider Threat Program continues to enhance its capabilities to confront and mitigate insider threats.*

SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE

UNITED STATES SENATE



Additional Pre-Hearing Questions for
Ms. Susan Gordon upon her nomination to be
Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence

Responsibilities of the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence

QUESTION 1: Please explain your understanding of the responsibility of the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI) in the following capacities:

- a. To assist the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in carrying out the DNI's duties and responsibilities; and
- b. To act in the DNI's place in the DNI's absence.

The PDDNI is statutorily required to assist the DNI in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the DNI, and to act for, and to exercise his/her powers in the event of an absence or disability. In practice, the PDDNI also executes the day-to-day management of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) as it engages in its Intelligence Community (IC) oversight and support functions. These include reinforcing the DNI's priorities and executing his vision for the ODNI and the IC as a whole.

QUESTION 2: Is your understanding that you and the DNI will divide responsibilities and that you will have a specific portfolio as PDDNI? If so, please describe this portfolio as you understand it. If not, please describe what you believe your primary responsibilities and activities will be, and on what areas you will concentrate.

In addition to responsibilities of the PDDNI outlined in statute, regulation, and policy, I understand from DNI Coats that if I am confirmed, I will help him lead a broad overview of the roles and missions that have been assigned to the ODNI since its creation in 2004 to ensure they are well aligned to mission, and that they are best conducted by the ODNI. I also will engage the IC elements to ensure we have the policies, processes, and structures in place that best support the innovation and calculated risk taking that is necessary to keep our edge across the various IC disciplines.

Given my background in technical and collection activities, I expect to use my expertise to appropriately help advance these activities. With the myriad threats facing the nation that have their basis in cyber activities, technical exploitation, and big data sets – to name just a few – I will also bring my years of experience to bear on these challenging issues so the Community can successfully move forward.

QUESTION 3: What do you expect to be your specific management responsibilities within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)? Is it your understanding that anyone will report to you directly, if you are confirmed?

If confirmed, I anticipate placing a strong focus on managing and leading the ODNI workforce as a whole. In my experience, I have found that the ODNI workforce is dedicated to the defense of the nation, and to best supporting the most effective integration of the IC. If confirmed at PDDNI, my focus will be to ensure they have the tools, resources, policies, and structures in place that will support them as they strive for excellence and that the focus of their efforts is appropriately placed. Under the current organizational structure, the Assistant Directors for National Intelligence, as well as the various component heads, report to the PDDNI.

QUESTION 4: What will your role and responsibilities be in relation to the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Information Integration (DDNI/II) and the officials who report to him?

If confirmed, I would oversee the ODNI staff and their interactions with the other 16 IC elements. The DDNI/II is responsible for the integration of intelligence across the IC while the PDDNI is responsible for creating the environment that allows this to happen and for ensuring the adequate and appropriate resources, policies, infrastructure, and process to maximize intelligence integration.

QUESTION 5: Please explain your understanding of the role of the DNI in overseeing elements of the Intelligence Community (IC) that reside within various departments of the federal government and for elements that are not housed within other departments.

As Director Coats stated in his confirmation, the DNI serves as the "head coach" of the intelligence community, coordinating the efforts across the various IC elements. I think this approach makes good sense. Having served in multiple agencies in the IC, I understand that the strength of the IC is with the line organizations, and if confirmed as PDDNI, my responsibility would be to enable their mission success while driving a more integrated community. The ODNI can be a force multiplier in providing the most integrated intelligence that results from strong and innovative IC elements.

If confirmed, I will ensure the perspectives and expertise of the IC elements are consistently considered and integrated, especially at the moment of decision-making.

QUESTION 6: What issues have you discovered through your general observation, professional experience, or through your preparation for your confirmation, with respect to the DNI's role in overseeing the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)? What is your understanding of these issues?

It is my strong belief that the true strength of the IC is with the many talented and varied elements who execute the mission with professionalism and an eye toward excellence every

day. The CIA is a foundational member of the IC, and has been granted special authorities and capabilities by the Congress and the President in support of its unique responsibilities. Although the Director of the CIA reports to the Director of National Intelligence, in practice it is more of a partnership, and one that continues to strengthen every day. As ODNI does with other IC elements, I expect it would partner with the Agency to enable its mission success. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that ODNI's oversight of the CIA is appropriately exercised as required by statute, and allows for the Agency's continued success.

QUESTION 7: What issues have you discovered through your general observation, professional experience, or through your preparation for your confirmation, with respect to the DNI's role in overseeing intelligence elements of the Department of Defense (DoD)? What is your understanding of these issues?

The ODNI provides the Department of Defense (DoD) guidance on IC priorities to inform the DoD's budgetary decisions as they relate to the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), to ensure unity of effort and an integrated approach to meeting IC needs. As it relates to acquisitions, the DNI serves as the milestone decision authority if NIP equities are involved, ensuring IC and DoD intelligence systems are complementary.

On a more personal level, as the Deputy Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency I was part of the leadership of a combat support agency and consequently recognize the criticality of providing timely, accurate, and actionable intelligence to the warfighter. I have seen first-hand how processes such as data availability, information security and classification can impact access and usability for the warfighters, and recognize that a balance is both necessary and achievable. I also believe the intelligence obtained by tactical DoD elements makes strategic intelligence more accurate and richer in overall detail. The ODNI works in partnership with the DoD as they collectively oversee the NRO, NGA, NSA, DIA and the intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps to enable their mission success and ensure that the intelligence necessary for mission success is accessible to the warfighter.

QUESTION 8: What issues have you discovered through your general observation, professional experience, or through your preparation for your confirmation, with respect to the DNI's role in overseeing intelligence elements of other departments of the United States Government? What is your understanding of these issues?

Over the past five years, I have observed the IC elements become increasingly integrated in a way that facilitates mission effectiveness and allows operational efficiency. The integration of information from critically important agencies, such as the FBI and DHS, has significantly improved the quality and breadth of the IC's strategic intelligence. At the same time, other

non-Title 50 agencies are making significant strides in both improving their access to IC products, as well as providing unique insights to IC problem sets and threat indicators.

In practice, the ODNI's oversight of intelligence elements in other U.S. government departments requires a coordinated approach to ensure priorities are aligned. Having come from NGA, I understand first-hand what it is like to serve Cabinet-level principals, and if confirmed, I will take that perspective with me into the position as PDDNI to ensure that the joint oversight construct enables mission.

QUESTION 9: Do you believe additional legislation is needed to clarify or strengthen the authorities and responsibilities of the DNI with respect to the IC?

At this time, I do not believe that additional legislation is needed to strengthen the authorities of the DNI. However, as we look towards the future, we may need to reexamine the legal and policy structures the Intelligence Community operate under to ensure the Intelligence Community remains agile as we respond both together and as individual elements to new and emerging threats in a timeframe demanded by the pace of change. As a career intelligence officer, I have seen firsthand the success the ODNI has had working with and supporting the Intelligence Community. If confirmed, I will work to build upon these successes and help position the Intelligence Community for the future.

Keeping the Congressional Intelligence Committees Fully and Currently Informed

QUESTION 10: Please explain your understanding of the DNI's obligations under Sections 502 and 503 of the National Security Act of 1947.

Title V of the National Security Act sets forth requirements to keep Congress informed of Intelligence Community activities. Specifically, Section 502 requires the DNI and the heads of all departments and agencies involved in intelligence activities to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities, including significant anticipated intelligence activities and any significant intelligence failures.

Section 503 requires that the congressional intelligence committees be kept currently and fully informed of all covert action programs. In extraordinary circumstances, notification of a covert actions may be limited, consistent with the need to protect national security.

QUESTION 11: Does the PDDNI have any responsibilities to ensure that all departments, agencies, and other entities of the United States Government involved in

intelligence activities in general, and covert action in particular, comply with the reporting requirements in Sections 502 and 503 of the National Security Act of 1947?

The PDDNI, like all ODNI employees, assists the DNI in carrying out his statutory authorities under the National Security Act, which includes ensuring compliance by the Intelligence Community elements with the Constitution and laws of the United States. If confirmed, I will assist the DNI in the critical responsibility of ensuring that all IC elements are in full compliance with the law, including Sections 502 and 503 of the National Security Act.

QUESTION 12: Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe notification should be limited to the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking Member of the congressional intelligence committees?

Under the law, congressional notifications must be made with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified intelligence sources and methods and other exceptionally sensitive matters. This is not a limit on whether the intelligence committees must be kept informed about intelligence activities; rather, it simply provides flexibility on how and when to bring extremely sensitive matters to the full committees' attention.

Section 503 permits the President to temporarily limit access to a Covert Action finding or notification to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting the vital interests of the U.S. I believe limited notifications should be rare and should be done only in exceptional circumstances.

National Security Threats

QUESTION 13: What do you view as the principal threats to national security with which the IC must concern itself in the coming years? Please explain the basis for your views.

In the next several years, threats will likely continue to come from a variety of sources, including nation state actors, cyber, terrorism, and humanitarian crises.

Nation State Actors

Key nation states continue to pursue agendas that pose substantial risks to U.S. interests. China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran all remain a concern, as does the situation in the Middle East. Each creates unique challenges and must continue to be examined closely by the IC to inform decisions facing the administration.

China will continue to pursue an active foreign policy—especially in the Asia Pacific region—highlighted by a firm stance on competing territorial claims in the East China Sea and South

China Sea, relations with Taiwan, and its pursuit of economic engagement across East Asia.

In 2017, Russia is likely to be more assertive in global affairs, more unpredictable in its approach to the United States, and more authoritarian in its approach to domestic politics. Emboldened by Moscow's ability to affect battlefield dynamics in Syria and by the emergence of populist and more pro-Russian governments in Europe, President Vladimir Putin is likely to take proactive actions that advance Russia's great power status.

North Korea's weapons program, public threats, and defiance of the international community, confrontational military posturing, cyber activities, and potential for internal instability pose a complex and increasingly grave national security threat to the U.S. and its interests.

Iran remains an enduring threat to US national interests because of its support to anti-US terrorist groups and militants, the Asad regime, Huthi rebels in Yemen, and its development of advanced military capabilities. Iran's leaders are focused on thwarting US and Israeli influence and countering what they perceive as a Saudi-led effort to fuel Sunni extremism and terrorism against Iran and Shia communities throughout the region.

The Syrian regime, backed by Russia and Iran, will maintain its momentum on the battlefield, but the regime and the opposition are not likely to agree on a political settlement in 2017. Damascus has committed to participate in peace talks but is unlikely to offer more than cosmetic concessions to the opposition.

Cyber

In the cyber realm, our adversaries are becoming more adept at using cyberspace to threaten our interests and advance their own. Despite improving cyber defenses, nearly all information, communication networks, and systems will be at risk for years.

Terrorism

The worldwide threat from terrorism will remain geographically diverse and multifaceted—a continuing challenge for the United States, our allies, and partners who seek to counter it. Sunni violent extremists will continue to embroil conflict zones in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia.

US-based homegrown violent extremists will remain the most frequent and unpredictable Sunni violent extremist threat to the US homeland.

A joint UN-Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons investigation concluded that ISIS used the chemical warfare agent sulfur mustard in an attack in 2015, and reports that it has used chemicals in additional attacks in Iraq and Syria suggest that such CW use continued. We also are concerned about the possibility that terrorists might develop biological warfare capabilities. Since no terrorist group will be able to conduct a nuclear

attack without first acquiring nuclear material, and no group will be able to produce its own nuclear material, the IC should remain vigilant in monitoring foreign nuclear programs for the potential loss or theft of nuclear materials or weapons.

Instability from Humanitarian Crises

Finally, severe humanitarian crises will be fueled by conflict, adverse environmental conditions, and natural disasters. These crises can, in turn, degrade political and economic stability, strain international assistance efforts, and produce significant internal and external migration. We are closely monitoring ongoing humanitarian crises in Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria, South Sudan, central Africa, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.

QUESTION 14: In your opinion, and based on your experience in the IC, how has the IC performed in adjusting its policies, resource allocations, planning, training, and programs to address these threats?

In general, I believe the IC is making good progress in addressing the dynamic and geographically diffuse threats facing our nation. Over the past five years, I have experienced a more integrated IC, and continue to be encouraged by the progress the IC as a whole continues to make.

For example, in my experiences with the "hard target campaigns" the ODNI and DoD use to focus on specific problems, I see coordinated interagency efforts across resources, plans, policies, and other areas to address complex, emerging threats.

The breadth of threats to the U.S., its allies, and its interests continues to expand; the challenge the IC faces is responding to these threats given the challenge of global coverage in a period of stagnant or declining resources. Nonetheless, our responsibility is to ensure that as a collective, we leverage those resources in the most effective manner.

Management Challenges Facing the Intelligence Community

QUESTION 15: Apart from national security threats discussed in your prior responses, and based on your experience in the IC, what do you consider to be the highest priority management challenges facing the ODNI and the broader IC?

Intelligence is about delivering advantage to the policymaker in support of U.S. national security objectives. The ODNI and the broader IC need to consider threats and problems sets just over the horizon. To do this, we need to encourage and foster innovation.

Throughout my career, I have never accepted as an answer "that is the way we have always done it." Rather, I regularly take a fresh look at how we do business to assess whether there

are better ways to approach problems through new technology, new partnerships, or streamlined processes.

This willingness to consider changed conditions that might drive different approaches also helps us evaluate whether we are spending our limited resources in the right areas to ensure we are delivering the best intelligence to policymakers. We must continue to do so, while maintaining our current missions, which is not an easy balance to achieve.

Resources in a Challenging Budget Environment

QUESTION 16: Given the Nation's current financial situation, what are your views on the intelligence budget in the short-, medium-, and long-term?

Over the past few years, building the intelligence budget has been a challenging endeavor.

Under a persistent cloud of budget uncertainty, the IC has preserved its core mission, protected our workforce and key capabilities, while taking incremental reductions across the enterprise and making hard choices to eliminate or reduce intelligence capabilities in order to have room to advance the mission.

The recent FY 2018 budget submission represents the first step in a multi-year effort to re-set and strengthen intelligence capabilities and improve readiness. I believe the IC has charted a course that will perpetuate this objective into the future. But make no mistake, without relief from Budget Control Act-mandated levels, long term planning will remain incredibly difficult and we will run the risk that our rate of change will be insufficient to keep up with the growth in mission need or adversarial capability.

QUESTION 17: From your experience as Deputy Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and in your multiple positions at CIA, please describe your understanding of the requirements and appropriate practice in obtaining Congressional concurrence for reprogrammings and releases from reserves.

I recognize that the IC can obligate or expend appropriated funds for an intelligence activity only if Congress specifically authorizes those funds for the activity.

The IC Chief Financial Officer is delegated day-to-day responsibility for the review and submission of all reprogramming and transfer actions as specified within the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, in concert with language provided within annual appropriations or intelligence authorization acts.

The IC CFO also issues Reprogramming and Transfer guidelines to all IC Program offices and

has developed a training program for the Program CFO Staff that addresses reprogramming and transfer legal requirements, policies and submission procedures.

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

There has been considerable debate in Congress concerning the appropriate size and function of the ODNI. Congress has considered various proposals to address these issues. In answering the questions that follow, please address the ODNI's staff functions and the specific ODNI components.

QUESTION 18: What is your view of the ODNI's size and function?

ODNI has a diverse set of functions and responsibilities. These have evolved since the ODNI's creation over a decade ago, and will likely continue to do so. In my initial review of the Office, I noted that the majority of the workforce is assigned to major mission centers: NCTC, NCPC, NCSC, CTIIC and the Intelligence Integration component (including the National Intelligence Council and the President's Daily Briefing staff). While the organization appears to be efficiently and effectively run, if confirmed, the DNI and I will thoroughly and carefully review each component and continue to seek ways to enhance mission effectiveness and improve efficiency.

QUESTION 19: Do you believe that the ODNI has sufficient personnel resources to carry out its statutory responsibilities effectively?

If confirmed, one of my first responsibilities will be to answer this very question as part of a broader review of the ODNI's roles, missions, and resources.

QUESTION 20: In your view, what are the competing values and interests at issue in determining to what degree there should be a permanent cadre of personnel at the ODNI, or at any of its components, and to what degree the ODNI should utilize detailees from the IC elements?

The mix of cadre and detailees is a function of the need for continuity and expertise over time (cadre), and the desire to avoid of an entrenched cadre bureaucracy (detailees). Additionally, by providing opportunities for joint duty from other IC elements, we allow these officers to understand the mission and value of the ODNI. ODNI also provides opportunities for cadre to go on detail assignments in order to grow and broaden professionally. This provides the best community expertise for key IC jobs that rest solely in ODNI (National Intelligence Officers, National Intelligence Managers, IARPA Program Managers, other subject matter experts).

QUESTION 21: Do you believe that the ODNI is adding sufficient value to justify its large staff and budget? If not, what do you intend to do to reverse that perception?

The DNI and ODNI have a diverse set of responsibilities under law and Executive Order with the majority of the ODNI workforce is assigned to the major mission centers, including the NCTC, NCSC, and NCPC, whose responsibilities are also legislatively mandated. Many of the functions performed by the ODNI are required by statute. While the ODNI appears to be an effective and efficiently run organization, I recognize the ODNI must earn the trust and support of the IC elements every day and must deliver unique value to the nation's security. If confirmed, I will do what I have done for my career and make sure that every investment of America's resources delivers mission outcome.

QUESTION 22: Describe your understanding of the role played by National Intelligence Managers (NIMs) under ODNI's current structure and organization.

NIMs serve as the principal advisor to the DNI and PDDNI on all aspects of intelligence related to their region or function and ensure IC integration and synchronization. They develop community-wide strategies that focus areas and priorities, identifies gaps, and develops initiatives to address these gaps. A key aspect of the NIM role is to ensure there are appropriate resources to address these many needs.

If confirmed, I look forward to learning how we can best balance the IC's limited resources against such needs, and leverage cross-community and cross-discipline solutions.

WikiLeaks and Information Sharing

QUESTION 23: Has information sharing expanded too broadly beyond those with a "need to know"?

No. The IC is always trying to find the right balance between information sharing initiatives and the need to safeguard classified information, and those who betray their oaths of secrecy are the most insidious of adversaries. However, we cannot and should not step backward in terms of information sharing. Instead, we should adopt the "trust, but verify" perspective.

In 2011, the Executive Branch formally established the National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF), co-chaired by the DNI and the Attorney General, to assist this effort. The NITTF promulgated the "National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs," providing an implementation framework for the departments and agencies to guard against this threat. Since that time, the Executive Branch has made significant progress in implementing this national policy, promoting the deterrence,

detection, and mitigation of compromises to classified information to ensure that we appropriately balance need to know and need to share.

QUESTION 24: What recommendations do you have to ensure that the IC does not curtail information sharing too much as a response to WikiLeaks?

Information sharing must be done in balance with effective safeguarding efforts.

In application, our insider threat programs must take a holistic approach to identifying anomalous activity, contextualizing these events, and coordinating appropriate organizational responses. The end goal is not to catch malicious insiders after the compromise, but rather to proactively engage the workforce in a manner that preempts the compromise of classified information.

However, it is also worth discussing the issue of over classification. Classifying information requires resources to manage, track, store, and archive. The more information we classify, the more resources we consume in the management of this information. We need all IC employees, from the most junior to the most senior, to make deliberate classification decisions.

QUESTION 25: What views and recommendations do you have on implementing audit systems to identify IC employees who misuse their access to information?

IC employees who misuse their access to intelligence information not only violate law and/or policy, they violate the public's trust and degrade the public's confidence in the integrity of the IC as a whole.

Further, with today's technological capability for rapidly moving massive volumes of data from information systems, it is imperative that we have safeguards in place to detect such nefarious activity as close to near real time as possible.

I support the auditing and monitoring user activity programs in place across the IC. These are a critical piece of effective insider threat programs because of the confidence we gain in knowing what is happening to information we share.

Cybersecurity

QUESTION 26: If confirmed, what will your cybersecurity-related responsibilities entail?

Given my history and experience with cyber, from both an operational and management perspective, I expect to play an active role in overseeing cyber related issues including IC policy development, operational considerations, and safeguarding IC systems. I will also be responsible for ODNI's management of threat and asset response for the integrated defense of the IC information environment.

If confirmed, I will assist the DNI in his cyber security responsibilities, and to ensure the ODNI and the entire IC has the resources needed to support intelligence integration related to cyber security.

QUESTION 27: In 2015, President Obama directed the DNI to establish the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC) to provide all-source analysis connecting foreign cybersecurity threats to the United States and our national interests, as well as to assist other federal departments and agencies in identifying, investigating, and mitigating these cybersecurity threats.

- A. Are you familiar with the CTIIC?
- B. How well do you believe the CTIIC initiative is being executed?
- C. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the CTIIC's role vis-à-vis the IC?

I am familiar with the CTIIC. While I was at CIA, I led a study for the Director of CIA that advocated for a community cyber analytic center, so I was very glad when CTIIC was established to provide the integrated analysis in support of situational awareness, cyber event response, and opportunity analysis that the cyber community and policymakers need.

I and others have been impressed by how CTIIC has established its role in a short amount of time (18 months) without going beyond its intended coordination mission. The Center has addressed our long-standing gap of rapidly providing collective situational awareness of the most significant cyber threats we face. They've done this through timely products that translate technical information for a broader audience, highlight the threats that give most cause for concern, and--perhaps most important for those without a technical background--they convey the information in a plain-English way that informs decision-making.

I think it is probably too early recommend changes to CTIIC at this time, although I'm open to the possibility as I review all ODNI entities, if confirmed.

QUESTION 28: What should the ODNI's role be, within the broader IC, to protect United States critical infrastructure and commercial computer networks from foreign cybersecurity threats, as well as from supply chain-related cybersecurity threats?

The IC is responsible for collecting, analyzing, producing and disseminating intelligence on foreign cyber threats and supply chain-related cybersecurity threats. The DNI, through various ODNI offices, leads the IC in generating and integrating information on foreign cyber threats. When threat intelligence supports the needs of critical infrastructure and other private sector entities, this information is made available to federal partners such as DHS, FBI, and USG sector specific agencies for sharing with the private sector.

QUESTION 29: What cyber threat information (classified or unclassified) should be shared with the United States' critical infrastructure managers to enable them to protect their networks from cyber attacks?

The ODNI and the wider IC supports DHS, FBI, and USG sector specific agencies to implement mechanisms for sharing both classified and unclassified cyber threat information with regulators, state and local governments, and critical infrastructure owner/operators, consistent with the need to protect sources and methods, and existing law and regulation.

Our responsibility as an IC is to produce intelligence with ever more fidelity to understand the nature of the threat and to find appropriate ways to make our data and assessments appropriately available.

Science & Technology and Research & Development

QUESTION 30: How do you assess the state of research and development (R&D) activities within the IC?

Because of our R&D investments at both Community and IC element levels, the IC has been able to maintain its technological and intelligence dominance over our adversaries by developing an outstanding set of technical capabilities. However, our adversaries are expending more money and working hard each day to overcome our intelligence advantage. We must pursue bold action in order to sustain our lead into the future and the IC can make more progress in this regard.

I am, however, encouraged by our increasing outreach to the private sector. IARPA, perhaps one of the more visible examples of the IC's R&D effort, has funded research at over 500 organizations, mostly universities and small businesses, to address key IC S&T challenges. Within ODNI, the Assistant Director for Acquisition, Technology, and Facilities formed a partnership with industry that has provided insight into novel and innovative R&D

opportunities. The IC's expanding use of prize challenges and other creative acquisition tools are drawing in non-traditional researchers to help solve our hardest technical challenges. Finally, there are some really ground-breaking activities going on at individual IC elements, like the work NGA is doing in process automation and developing artificial intelligence to help manage geospatial-intelligence collection and processing.

QUESTION 31: What changes, if any, need to be made in the IC regarding R&D?

For the IC to continue to deliver revolutionary capabilities, we need to ensure: (a) that our R&D organizations are properly resourced, (b) that our technology transition and R&D acquisition processes are agile and responsive, and (c) that our R&D strategies of the IC elements are truly forward looking.

We also need to support robust investments in R&D, particularly in classified basic research - both to develop a pipeline of cleared researchers, and to lay the foundation of new science that leads to future intelligence breakthroughs. Finally, we need to be open to disruptive ideas, and create business processes that allow us to be agile and responsive to new challenges and opportunities.

IC Missions and Capabilities

QUESTION 32: Please explain your views of the current quality of the IC's intelligence analysis.

What I saw first-hand at NGA was the quality, scope, and relevant of IC analysis consistently improving. IC elements have also improved in their efforts to incorporate effective visual information, a newly introduced tradecraft standard.

However, the massive and increasing amounts of data pose unique challenges for the IC, and we need to position ourselves to stay ahead of the swell. We must leverage leading edge data analytics, advanced data technologies, and processing speeds because we cannot grow the analytic workforce to meet the exponential growth of data in this digital age. And then we must go further.

QUESTION 33: If confirmed, what steps would you take to improve the IC's intelligence analysis?

The IC must continue to enhance integration of the analytic enterprise and enhance its relationships with other parts of the IC, academia, and the private sector. In particular, the IC must continue its commitment to shared experiences, such as joint duty and joint training,

which will enable trust, build stronger collaborative work practices, and help break down stovepipes. The IC must continue to maintain high standards for the quality and objectivity of analysis.

In my view, the analytic community must become capable “data swimmers”, able to navigate large swaths of data efficiently and effectively, with tools and technology. Our systems must assist them by making the data available and accessible, and the existing infrastructure must support the sharing of that data.

Finally, the IC must invest in future technologies that not only improve our ability to issue timely reports across a vast breadth of issues, but that also take the next step and see beyond the swell and over the horizon, and to better predict future events. The IC needs to be able to both access and assess more data so that our analysis increasingly skews towards anticipating vice reporting.

QUESTION 34: Please explain your views of the current quality of the IC’s intelligence collection.

The IC’s collection performance against a wide variety targets that threaten U.S. interests is robust, and will improve even more with the delivery of new collection systems and platforms over the next several years. However, in the IC, demand continues to outpace supply so effective collection management requires balancing sometimes conflicting requirements and maximizing the varied capabilities of our collection systems to achieve the best possible result for decision-makers.

QUESTION 35: What are your recommendations for improving the quality of the IC’s intelligence collection?

Our adversaries are constantly improving their capabilities to deny us information and we must seek innovative ways to defeat their efforts. To maintain our competitive advantage, the IC must continue to invest and re-invest in its most important collection assets. No one approach will work for the issues we face today.

If confirmed, I will lead the development of innovative collection capabilities, strengthen our abilities to process and assess data, and strengthen the skills of our people who collect information and manage our collection strategies.

And we need to look where industry can help. The explosive growth of the commercial marketplace as it relates to computing power, processing speed, and data collection is driving the government away from government-specific solutions, and it should. We must embrace what is increasingly openly available and address how it can best be accessed and used. The

growth in commercially-available imagery and communications systems are just two such examples, but I am certain there are countless others.

By investing in new technical capabilities, strengthening current critical assets, building the necessary supporting architecture, and leveraging a healthy commercial market, we will position ourselves to tackle current and future challenges.

QUESTION 36: If confirmed, what role would you have with regard to intelligence collection, and what steps would you take to improve the IC's intelligence collection?

If confirmed, I will use my position to better integrate the disparate collection functions, and drive innovation to close intelligence gaps. I will encourage initiatives aimed at improving effectiveness and efficiency, such as cross-agency collection orchestration, and to improve the data available to analysts. I would also advocate for continued partnerships across the government and with the private sector, capitalizing on their unique expertise and R&D investments to seek cost-effective solutions to the IC's most vexing problems.

QUESTION 37: Please explain your views of the IC's use of contractors.

Based on my experience at both CIA and NGA, contractors play an important role in the work we do. In fact, throughout the IC's history, it's worth mentioning that there have been few significant accomplishments without the support of industry or private sector partners.

Contract personnel are part of an integrated team of professionals who bring remarkable, often rare expertise. They support U.S. government personnel in performing mission and mission support activities. They are an excellent source of highly qualified experts, and often provide a level of technical depth not found in government. Additionally, contracting staff can help surge support to tackle and emerging needs as we engage in the slower (but necessary) process of workforce transformation.

QUESTION 38: In your view, has the IC achieved a proper balance of government and contractor personnel? Please explain the basis for your response.

I believe the crucial operating principle here is how well the government directs and oversees contractors. To do this effectively, it requires a government staff able to ensure contractors meet their contractual obligations in an ethical manner. We must have remarkable skill and capability in our government cadre; everything starts with this.

The lifting of the civilian personnel position caps in the FY17 Intelligence Authorization Act will allow for a consistent approach to strategic workforce planning and budget alignment

across the IC. If confirmed, I would support Director Coats' commitment to find the right balance of contractors and to uphold his long interest to find the best value for the taxpayer's dollars.

QUESTION 39: In your view, are there some functions that contractors should not conduct, or for which the IC's use of contractors should be discouraged or require additional approvals, including by the DNI? Please describe the basis for your response.

Yes, contractors should not perform inherently governmental functions, such as making decisions on how we use or allocate resources, conduct monetary transactions or prioritize work. Further, contractors should not be the driver for more or new work. I have believed and acted on this foundational principle throughout my career.

QUESTION 40: If confirmed, would you recommend changes to the security clearance process regarding IC contractors and/or Federal employees?

If confirmed, I would continue to advocate for the ongoing modernization efforts of the security clearance process with regard to the entire federal workforce – to include contractors, government civilians, and military personnel.

I would specifically want to focus on improving the oversight and management of the workforce security clearance process – both contractor and Federal employee – emphasizing standardization and consistency in application to address any gaps that impact an individual's eligibility for access to classified information. I also want to ensure the IC establishes processes that effectively and prudently enable the movement of these cleared national security professionals between the private/public communities, something increasingly commonplace in today's IC careerists.

QUESTION 41: Please explain what your responsibilities would be, if confirmed, in making decisions or recommendations concerning IC officials' accountability with respect to matters of serious misconduct.

The PDDNI assists the DNI in carrying out his statutory responsibility to ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States by elements of the Intelligence Community. If confirmed, I would work with the DNI to ensure that IC elements promptly, objectively, and completely investigate any allegation that an IC official engaged in serious misconduct. These investigations might be conducted by the IC element, the applicable Inspector General, or the Inspector General for the Intelligence Community.

Although IC elements, and in turn their overarching Department or Agency, are principally responsible for addressing allegations of misconduct, I expect that IC element heads will take appropriate disciplinary actions when warranted. If I believe an IC element has failed to take appropriate action in response to allegation or evidence of misconduct, it would be my duty, if I am confirmed, to raise the issue with the DNI and, if appropriate, recommend an accountability review.

QUESTION 42: Please explain your responsibilities, if confirmed, to ensure that performance and rewards systems across the IC agencies are fair and equitable.

Rewarding employees for high performance and exceptional professionalism is a core function for leadership. Research suggests that the right rewards and recognition are important motivators and reinforce behaviors that lead to higher performance. More simply, you value what you reward. Doing this in a fair and equitable manner is of the utmost importance.

The IC is always looking for ways to influence performance and to drive the behaviors that will make us successful. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chief Human Capital Officer to ensure we are approaching the rewards process in an effective, fair, and equitable manner across the enterprise and supportive of our values and missions.

Financial Management and Infrastructure

QUESTION 43: If confirmed, what role do you expect to have in reviewing business system investments in the IC?

Each IC element has business systems in place to ensure the smooth functioning of routine administrative functions; some of these systems have been in place for decades and may no longer be responsive to current mission or operating conditions. I would expect that the IC's movement to a common Information Technology Enterprise would enhance the IC's ability to integrate some of these systems to find economies of scale, and I would look to encourage that wherever possible.

QUESTION 44: What responsibilities have you had at the NGA for producing financial statements?

As the Deputy Director at NGA, I had primary responsibility for senior engagement with our independent auditors to ensure organizational responsiveness, understand progress and remove impediments to the goal of a clean audit. Additionally, through my Enterprise

Oversight Counsel (effectively and accountability board), I reviewed regularly the goals and plans to achieve objectives, overcome deficiencies, and drive progress.

During my tenure, we made significant, steady progress toward auditability and a clean audit. Moreover, I believe I put into place a culture and process that will make a clean audit a reality in the foreseeable future.

Acquisitions

QUESTION 45: What is your assessment of the IC's current acquisitions capability?

Intelligence Community Major System Acquisitions (MSAs) are generally achieving affordable and timely capability deliveries. This year's assessment of IC MSA progress reveals the IC's continued ability to meet or exceed IC-wide cost, schedule and performance threshold goals.

Since the creation of the ODNI, the IC has shown improvements in reducing development timelines, and so I believe the ODNI acquisition policies have had a positive impact on acquisitions.

However, these successes do not mean that there is no room for further improvements – in fact, the potential to facilitate technology insertion and acquisition streamlining across the IC Agencies and within ODNI processes, provides potential efficiency improvements in the delivery of enhanced mission.

If confirmed, I would propose to the DNI a review of our current acquisition policies and practices to determine if we can introduce even more agility and innovation into our acquisition programs without introducing unacceptable mission, budget or schedule risk.

QUESTION 46: Do you believe the space industrial base specifically, and the intelligence industrial base more generally, are capable of producing the number of complex systems the IC and the DoD demand of them on time and within budget?

I believe the space and intelligence industrial base is sufficiently capable of producing the systems required of the IC. We have witnessed this through our recent success in major systems acquisitions. All of our current major space acquisitions are executing within cost and on schedule. Additionally, as we go forward with future acquisitions, we are able to compete among multiple prime vendors and are not bound to sole-source contracts.

Competition and the industrial base must be key considerations as we develop acquisition strategies and conduct milestone review for our major programs. As just one example, recent growth of the commercial space industry has improved the industrial base as some

companies are no longer reliant on the U.S. government as the sole or major source of revenue.

Department of Defense

QUESTION 47: Please explain your understanding of the need to balance the requirements of national and tactical consumers, specifically between establishing a unified intelligence effort that includes DoD intelligence elements with the continuing requirement that combat support agencies be able to respond to the needs of military commanders.

The need to balance national and tactical consumer requirements is crucial when national requirements related to long-term issues can quickly become a near-term crisis. The IC should not focus on just one or the other but ensure there is strategic planning that can be flexible enough to warn and respond to emerging threats, crises, and opportunities. Joint intelligence efforts between the IC and DoD are valuable in achieving such a balance.

The key is to always focus on needs and then to consider satisfaction of those needs across the whole spectrum of available capabilities (from IC to DoD, commercial to clandestine, overhead to ground), and not just within each individual system. It requires a "system of systems" approach.

QUESTION 48: What concerns do you have, if any, as to the IC's ability to support war zones while still retaining its full capabilities to conduct missions outside of war zones?

Over time, the IC has largely been able to adjust and balance its analytic and collection resources to cover war zone operations and other important intelligence requirements. The IC has accomplished this through better optimization of collection and analytic activities. We've sought efficiencies across agencies and worked with foreign and domestic partners to mitigate global coverage risks and ensure our responsiveness to policymakers' priorities. The IC routinely takes steps to adjust collection and analytic postures to address emerging threats and monitor potential crises. And one of the goals of IT modernization is to allow the reach necessary to provide useful intelligence to even the most disadvantaged user.

However, even in war zones, IC resources do not provide ubiquitous coverage, which results in accounting for some level of risk across all regional areas and cross cutting issues. In some cases, the IC's enhanced focus in war zones also brings resources into a region that might incidentally enhance our capabilities in adjoining countries/regions.

Covert Action

QUESTION 49: What is your view of the DNI's responsibility to supervise, direct, or control the conduct of covert action by the CIA?

By law, any decision to employ covert action as a tool of national security strategy will be made by the President of the United States. The President has charged the Director of the CIA with the responsibility for supervising, directing, or controlling the conduct of covert action programs. The DNI is responsible to oversee and provide advice to the President and the NSC with respect to ongoing and proposed covert action programs. The DNI and the heads of all departments, agencies, and entities of the United States Government keep the Congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of covert action activities.

QUESTION 50: Do you believe that any additional authorities are necessary to ensure that covert action programs are lawful, meet the public policy goals of the United States, or for any other purpose?

I do not believe that additional authorities are needed in this area.

QUESTION 51: What in your view is the appropriate role for the CIA Inspector General in auditing covert action programs?

The CIA IG is already charged with reviewing and auditing covert action programs on a regular basis. I support these regular reviews.

QUESTION 52: If confirmed, what role will you have regarding covert actions?

If confirmed, I will assist the DNI with his responsibilities as discussed, including ensuring that the congressional intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed as required by law.

Privacy and Civil Liberties

QUESTION 53: Please describe the IC's efforts to protect privacy and civil liberties, and what, if any, challenges face the IC in these areas.

Throughout my career in the Intelligence Community, I have experienced first-hand the IC's commitment to protecting privacy and civil liberties as it carries out its national security mission. We understand that our success in protecting the nation depends on our having the

public's trust. This means that the IC must ensure that its intelligence activities comply with legal safeguards, and that we do all we can to support effective oversight.

For example, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) is a vitally important statute that enables the IC to obtain critical foreign intelligence in a manner that protects civil liberties and privacy. The IC rigorously implements its requirements under the careful oversight of Congress and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.

Earning the public's trust requires not only that we follow applicable rules and that we support effective oversight, but that we also provide appropriate transparency to the public. During my time at NGA, we took a leadership role in promoting transparency to the extent possible while continuing to protect national security. It is challenging to both enhance intelligence transparency and protect sources and methods, but this is a challenge that we must continue to proactively address.

The rapid pace of technological change in our increasingly data-driven world will also pose challenges for the IC. We must find ways to innovate while also remaining mindful of the privacy and civil liberties implications posed by these changes. I am confident that the IC will continue to succeed in navigating these challenges so that we can both protect the nation's security and civil liberties and privacy of its people.

QUESTION 54: Section 102A(f)(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 provides that “[t]he Director of National Intelligence shall ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States by the Central Intelligence Agency and shall ensure such compliance by other elements of the intelligence community through the host executive departments that manage the programs and activities that are part of the National Intelligence Program.” What are the most important subjects concerning compliance with the Constitution and laws that the DNI should address in fulfilling this responsibility?

It is critical that all Intelligence Community activities are conducted in a manner consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. Of particular importance is respecting and protecting the Constitutional rights of our citizens. To that end, the Intelligence Community must always act in a manner that respects the rights and freedoms of our citizens, including protecting with vigor the First and Fourth Amendments. The Intelligence Community must act in compliance with the laws of the land, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the National Security Act, the Privacy Act, and Freedom of Information Act.

QUESTION 55: What methods, and through what officials, should the DNI use to ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws, including, but not limited to, the

Office of the General Counsel, the ODNI Inspector General, and the Civil Liberties Protection Officers?

I am personally committed to working to ensure all elements of the Intelligence Community comply with the Constitution and laws of the United States. I expect the same of every employee in the Intelligence Community. If confirmed, I would expect to work together with, and rely on, the Office of General Counsel, the Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency, the Equal Employment Office, and the Inspector General for the Intelligence Community.

Expiring Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act provisions

QUESTION 56: What is your view with respect to reauthorizing Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act provisions that expire on December 31, 2017, and, specifically, whether any of the provisions should be revised?

Section 702 of FISA has produced and continues to produce significant intelligence that is vital to protect the nation against international terrorism, cyber threats, weapons proliferators, and other threats. At the same time, Section 702 provides strong protections for the privacy and civil liberties of our citizens. Recent public testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Judiciary discuss in more detail both the value and importance of this authority. To that end, reauthorization of Section 702 is the Intelligence Community's top legislative priority.

Potential Politicization of Intelligence

QUESTION 57: How do you define the politicizing of intelligence?

Politicization of intelligence is any effort to distort the Intelligence Community's analysis by individuals or groups to support or provide justification for a policy initiative. Politicization of analysis is characterized by assessments that run counter to the information base and contravene IC analytic tradecraft standards. Politicization pressures can originate within a Community element or from external policy-makers or other intelligence consumers.

QUESTION 58: What responsibilities does the PDDNI role entail, relative to ensuring the IC's analysis remains objective and free from political consideration?

If confirmed, one of my most important responsibilities will be to ensure the intelligence the IC provides is timely, objective, and free from politicization. The Intelligence Reform and

Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 specifies that the ODNI has a responsibility to safeguard the objectivity of intelligence analysis.

QUESTION 59: In your view, how significant a concern is the risk of politicized intelligence?

Politicized intelligence is always a risk, but it is one that I think the Intelligence Community has developed safeguards to detect and mitigate. I am confident that the IC's commitment to analytic integrity and its emphasis on implementing and improving analytic tradecraft are strong defenses against the threat of politicization.

On a personal note, I can commit that I will continue to provide the IC, the ODNI, the Congress and this Committee my unbiased analysis and honest assessments without regard to outside influence, political or otherwise.

Responses to Committee's Questions for the Record
Robert P. Storch
July 21, 2017

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD FROM SENATOR KING

1. If confirmed, what policy or process changes would you recommend to ensure the Office of the Inspector General is sufficiently independent from NSA leadership?

If confirmed, I would make every effort to ensure that the NSA OIG operates with appropriate independence from NSA leadership, consistent with the Inspector General Act and, of course, the decision of Congress to make the IG at the NSA a Presidentially appointed Senate confirmed position. I would anticipate meeting early on with the staff of the OIG, and I would explore in detail the existing relationship with agency leadership and work with the leadership and counsel at the OIG to determine whether there are any policy or process changes that would help to ensure the independence of the office's work. In that regard, if confirmed, I would ensure that the OIG has policy or process in place to ensure that OIG personnel immediately notify me if there is any effort by anyone in agency leadership to interfere with the office's work. OIGs need to have good lines of communication with their agencies, including engaging in appropriate dialogue with agency leadership regarding our work. However, absent an invocation under Section 8G of the Inspector General Act, the independence of the OIG requires that the decisions regarding what work to do, and what findings and recommendations result from that work must rest solely with the OIG.

If confirmed, I also would ensure that the OIG has adequate policies and procedures in place to make sure that it has timely independent access to relevant information and that any issues regarding such access are brought promptly to my attention. An OIG cannot credibly conduct independent oversight if the entity over which it has oversight responsibility determines what information it will provide to the IG to do its work, whether that decision is made at the leadership or lower levels. This important principle was emphasized in the recent passage of the IG Empowerment Act. During my time on the leadership team at the DOJ OIG, we have been very engaged on this issue, and one thing I have seen played out on a number of occasions is the importance of elevating any access disputes promptly to the IG so that they can be addressed immediately and the office's work not unduly hampered or delayed.

2. If confirmed, would you support allowing appropriately cleared Government Accountability Office (GAO) personnel access to NSA for conducting audits and reviews at the request of this Committee?

If confirmed, I would work to ensure coordination with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) by the OIG and I would support cooperation with GAO by the agency to the greatest extent possible. As indicated in my responses to the Committee's Additional Pre-Hearing Questions, I recognize the importance of GAO's work, and strongly support a strong cooperative relationship between OIGs and GAO, as we have enjoyed at DOJ OIG. I also believe that such cooperation is consistent with Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 114, which provides in Sections D.1 and D.2, respectively, that "[i]t is IC policy to cooperate with the Comptroller General, though the GAO, to the fullest extent possible," and that "[t]o the extent consistent with national security and the protection of intelligence sources and methods, IC elements shall provide GAO access to information that relates to matters that are the subject of announced GAO reviews." With regard to physical access by appropriately cleared GAO personnel to NSA facilities, OIGs do not, of course, have any authority over access to agency facilities, which is a management function of the agency itself. Having said that, I am not aware of any issues with obtaining access for appropriately cleared GAO personnel to meet with the NSA OIG. I am not in a position to know if there are any issues with regard to NSA facilities more broadly but, if confirmed, I would support the greatest possible cooperation with GAO by the agency.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD FROM SENATOR WYDEN*Intelligence Community Contractors*

3. **According to the report accompanying S. 795, a bill To Enhance Whistleblower Protection for Contractor and Grantee Employees, “Section 1553 of The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) established whistleblower protections for all recipients of stimulus funds, including all state and local government employees and all contractors, including within the intelligence community (IC).”**
- (a) **Are you aware of any concerns associated with the ARRA’s extension of whistleblower protections to Intelligence Community contractors?**

I am not aware of any concerns having been raised about the extension of whistleblower protections by Section 1553 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) to Intelligence Community (IC) contractors. I should note that ARRA was passed several years before I joined the DOJ OIG, and I do not recall any discussions about ARRA’s extension of whistleblower protections to IC contractors during my time here or as Chair of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Whistleblower Ombudsperson Working Group. Having said that, if confirmed, I will continue to make whistleblower protections a priority, and I would welcome the opportunity to explore this issue further with the Committee to ensure that we are doing everything possible to protect people who perform the difficult act of coming forward with such information, wherever they may work.

In that regard, at DOJ OIG, I have worked to support the protection of contractor whistleblowers pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act of 2013 (NDAA), as expanded by S. 795. I believe that S. 795 was a significant piece of legislation in extending the prohibition against reprisal for making protected disclosures to subgrantees and personal service contractors, and making permanent the prior pilot program that provided procedures for independent review by OIGs of reprisal complaints made by employees of contractors and others. I have worked diligently to help effectuate these protections, including preparing and working to disseminate informational materials to make sure individuals covered by the statute are fully informed as to their rights and protections. Our brochure is publicly available, including to all DOJ employees and contractors, on the OIG’s website at: <https://oig.justice.gov/hotline/docs/NDAA-brochure.pdf>.

Whether someone works as an employee of an agency or a contractor, they still perform a valuable service when they come forward with information, and they should not suffer reprisal for doing so. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to work with the Committee to further this fundamental principle at the NSA.

(b) Do you agree with the December 6, 2011, testimony of the Chair of the Legislation Committee of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) in which she supported the extension of specific whistleblower protections in the ARRA?

I was not at the DOJ OIG or in the OIG community in 2011, but in response to this question I have read the statement excerpted in the report accompanying S. 795 from the former chair of the CIGIE Legislation Committee, and I have no issue with her testimony. I note that her statement also referenced the concern that expanding ARRA whistleblower protections to all government contracts, grants, and payments might have a significant impact on OIG resources, and I can say that in my own experience at DOJ OIG and in serving as Chair of the CIGIE Whistleblower Ombudsman Working Group, this concern has been commonly expressed as well, as these are frequently resource-intensive matters. Therefore, I believe it is important that Congress consider providing additional resources to OIGs that would be necessary to ensure compliance with any new or expanded protections in this area. As I believe our efforts at DOJ OIG reflect, I am committed to the importance of whistleblower rights and protections and will, if confirmed, similarly make them a priority at the NSA and would welcome the opportunity to work with the Committee on these issues.

Confidentiality

4. What are your views on the obligation of Offices of Inspectors General not to reveal the identities of confidential whistleblowers? Are current laws and regulations sufficient to protect the identities of whistleblowers?

I believe that Section 7(b) of the Inspector General Act provides an extremely important protection for individuals who come forward to OIGs with complaints or information. It is critical that whistleblowers feel comfortable coming forward when they see something they reasonably believe to be wrong, which enables the OIG or other appropriate recipients to look into the situation and take any necessary corrective action. Given the difficulty of coming forward with information within an organization or office or involving colleagues, it is particularly important that OIGs scrupulously honor the confidentiality of whistleblowers, and I would welcome the opportunity, if confirmed, to engage with the Committee on the issue further.

*Accountability***5. What is the appropriate form of accountability for individuals found to have reprisal against whistleblowers?**

Whistleblower reprisal is a prohibited personnel practice, and it is illegal. Individuals who violate the law by engaging in or threatening reprisal against whistleblowers should face swift and appropriate disciplinary action.

*Ombudsman***6. You serve as the chair of the CIGIE Whistleblower Ombudsman Working Group. What are your views on whether the ombudsman role can be strengthened or protected?**

I believe that the Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman positions established under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA) and codified in Section 3(d) of the Inspector General Act have performed an important role in helping to ensure that agency personnel are informed regarding the prohibitions against retaliation for making protected disclosures, and that persons who have made or are contemplating making protected disclosures are aware of their rights and remedies against retaliation. As someone who has been working as the DOJ OIG Whistleblower Ombudsperson before the positions were even required by the WPEA, we have engaged in an extensive effort to get out a wide range of information in this area, much of which is available on our robust Whistleblower Protection site at: <https://oig.justice.gov/hotline/whistleblower-protection.htm>.

I do believe that there is room for further development of this important role, and have welcomed the opportunity to engage with staff of the bipartisan Senate Whistleblower Protection Caucus, the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on this issue. I testified before the HOCR Subcommittee on Government Operations about this earlier this year -- my testimony at the hearing entitled, "Five Years Later: A Review of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act," is publicly available on the OIG's website at: <https://oig.justice.gov/testimony/t170201a.pdf>. Among the areas where I could see potential for expansion of this function, consistent with our own program at DOJ OIG, would be promoting the timely and appropriate handling by OIGs of protected disclosures and allegations of reprisal, and facilitating appropriate communications between the OIG and other entities, including the Office of Special Counsel, CIGIE, and the Congress. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to work with the Committee on these issues.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD FROM SENATOR FEINSTEIN

- 7. Will you commit to reviewing the security procedures in place at NSA and the ability of people to walk in and out with classified material?**

Specifically, I want to stop the theft of classified material from the NSA and am concerned about the three major thefts by contractors who have simply walked out of the building with classified documents.

Will you include in this review a determination of whether or not adding a physical search would be effective and appropriate in stopping these thefts?

If confirmed, I will work with the staff of the OIG to ensure that the security procedures in place at the NSA are reviewed appropriately, including the effectiveness and appropriateness of physical searches in stopping any thefts of classified documents.

Isabel Patelunas
 Treasury Nominee for Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis
 Post-Hearing Questions for the Record

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD FROM SENATOR KING

1. If confirmed, what steps would you recommend to improve the IC's knowledge of the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by foreign drug trafficking organizations to obfuscate their financial activity?

Answer:

If confirmed, I will ensure OIA continues to work closely with the rest of the IC to increase the collection and integration of financial information. This information is integral to OIA's efforts to identify the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by foreign drug trafficking organizations and other illicit financial actors to obfuscate their financial activity. I also intend to work with foreign, law enforcement, and the private sector partners to leverage their information and expertise.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD FROM SENATOR WYDEN

Anti-money laundering and shell companies

2. During his confirmation process, Secretary Mnuchin stated:

"I agree that law enforcement anti-money laundering efforts face serious challenges if they are unable to determine the beneficial ownership of the various companies and entities that utilize the U.S. financial system. It can be a real vulnerability that various bad actors, including terrorists and criminals, can exploit. I understand that FinCEN recently passed new customer due diligence requirements that are intended in part to address beneficial ownership identification, and I will direct FinCEN to steadfastly enforce these regulations. If confirmed I will be willing to work with the U.S. Congress and the various equities impacted by beneficial ownership due diligence requirements to address this challenge."

In your responses to the Committee's pre-hearing questions, you wrote "I would support the Secretary of the Treasury as the Department formulates policy and executes authorities through all-source analysis of global financial networks, the financial vulnerabilities of U.S. adversaries, the impact of targeted U.S. financial measures, and threats to international financial stability."

(a) Will you support the Secretary's stated focus on anti-money laundering efforts and, in particular, direct resources toward the challenge of determining the beneficial ownership of companies and entities that utilize, or may have links to the U.S. financial system?

(b) Will you commit to producing all-source analytical products on this topic and to making these products available to Congress, subject only to classification restrictions?

Answer:

I strongly support Secretary Mnuchin's focus on anti-money laundering efforts. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure that OIA fully supports the Secretary's priorities, including by continuing to produce all-source intelligence analysis. If confirmed, I will ensure that OIA continues to provide Congress with all appropriate access to OIA's analytical products.

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SSCI QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD**PPDNI Nominee Gordon's Confirmation Hearing
19 July 2017****QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD FROM SENATOR COLLINS**

1. **Director Gordon, since I joined the Committee in 2013, I have been briefed on case after case of leaks of highly classified and confidential information from within the Intelligence Community. These cases include Edward Snowden in 2013, the exposure of hundreds of thousands of security clearance forms held by OPM, and, according to his public Department of Justice indictment, NSA contractor Harold Martin stole highly classified information over a period of twenty years.**

After each of these cases, the Intelligence Community failed to swiftly and fully implement the necessary changes to prevent a repeat of the loss of highly classified information. Why do you believe the IC did not enact sufficient protections after each one of these cases during the past ten years?

Answer: There has been a concerted effort to address these leaks within our authorities and existing laws. I am aware of multiple initiatives that have been completed and many more underway, to include establishment of the National Insider Threat Task Force and insider threat programs within IC agencies, as well as security clearance reform.

Specifically, the IC has taken steps to respond to prior unauthorized disclosures, including:

- Improving Oversight and Management of Personnel Security;
- Defining Privileged User Risk Categories;
- Increasing the Use of Encryption and Digital Rights Management;
- Implementing enhanced User Activity Monitoring on our technology systems; and
- Accelerating Insider Threat Programs.

I believe that we need to aggressively charge forward with the initiatives underway, make sure that we are properly resourced to see them through, continuously pause to evaluate their effectiveness, and identify any remaining gaps that we need to close.

Even with redoubled effort, there will likely always be leaks with regard to classified information. The simple truths that humans need access to information in order to be able to work, that need-to-share always balances need-to-know, and that technology will never provide a perfect solution make this something we will have to continue to address. Our goal is to work, continuously, to both minimize the opportunity and to limit the

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damage that any single act might create through aggressive implementation of solutions like those listed above.

2. **What more do you believe needs to be done within the IC to address the almost routine unauthorized disclosure of highly classified and sensitive information?**

Answer: I share in your frustration and assessment of the gravity of the situation. We know that unauthorized disclosures of classified information harm our national security. I think there are several things that the IC can continue to do address this situation. First, we must aggressively address unauthorized disclosures by holding individuals accountable for their actions. Second, we should ensure we are taking steps to protect classified information and limit access to it to only those who need it to effectively accomplish the mission. Finally, it is critically important to have safe avenues for whistleblowers to raise concerns, including to this Committee, without fear of retaliation.

3. **Director Gordon, in your statement for the record, you said that at its best, intelligence helps decision-makers identify opportunities to act before events require them to do so. The Committee has repeatedly advocated for greater and faster adoption of analytic tools that have proven to improve forecasting and predictive analysis by the Intelligence Community.**

While no one can predict the future, work sponsored by the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency has resulted in an impressive body of evidence that identifies specific ways the Intelligence Community can improve the forecasting estimates and anticipatory intelligence it provides to policy makers, such as through prediction markets and increased training of analysts in analytic best-practices.

You previously were the director of advanced analytic tools at the CIA. Do you agree that the IC should do more to foster greater and more widespread adoption of these forecasting best practices so that our intelligence analysis is as accurate and useful to policy makers as possible?

Answer: Yes, ODNI's Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) has invested in several such technologies, and tested them in real-world forecasting tournaments. IARPA (and others) have found that prediction markets, analytic training, and machine learning models can be used to make more accurate and timely forecasts of significant global events. I agree, and will advance work to encourage the IC to more broadly adopt such evidence-based forecasting methods on topics where they are shown to be effective.

4. **Over the past several years, we have seen a dramatic reemergence of Russia in the Middle East. There is no doubt that Russia's entry into Syria's civil war helped turn**

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the tide of the conflict decisively in favor of the Assad-Iran-Hezbollah axis. Do you believe we have shared interests with Russia in the Middle East, and in Syria in particular?

Answer: The United States and Russia have common concerns in the Middle East, but there are significant barriers to cooperation. The Syria crisis represents both a venue for Russia-U.S. competition in the region and an opportunity for a bilateral relationship through counterterrorism (CT) cooperation and joint efforts to resolve a complex regional crisis. Russian goals in Syria are centered on finding an international political solution that: 1) preserves a Russia-friendly regime in some form; 2) protects a long-term Russian military, security, and economic presence in Syria, even if Syria is broken up into enclaves; 3) gives Moscow international “credit” for “solving” the Syria problem; and 4) eliminates the threat from ISIL and other Islamic extremists. Moscow’s emphasis on countering ISIS, coupled with Russia’s broad desire to find areas of shared interest with the United States, offer a potential opening for joint CT cooperation in Syria.

5. **The danger posed to our critical infrastructure from cyber attacks of our foreign adversaries is demonstrated most clearly by the attacks that have already taken place in the past few years. The White House recently published an Executive Order on cybersecurity and critical infrastructure that requires the Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence and other federal agency heads, to identify unique “authorities and capabilities” that can be brought to bear to improve the cybersecurity posture of Section 9 entities in the private sector.**

As you may know, the Section 9 entities refer to those critical infrastructure entities that, if a single cyber incident were to occur, could cause catastrophic harm to public safety, the economy, or national defense. Yet, despite the fact that many Section 9 entities already confront nation-state adversaries probing their networks, the U.S. government as a whole has offered little tangible help to assist them before an attack.

If confirmed, will you commit to looking into this and updating the Committee on what authorities and capabilities elements of the IC can offer in support of this White House directive to play a more helpful role in assisting owners and operators defend these vital elements of critical infrastructure?

Answer: Yes, I will commit to looking into this and updating the Committee on the authorities and capabilities the IC can offer in support of the White House cybersecurity directives, with the goal of assisting critical infrastructure owners and operators. In this regard, ODNI facilitates engagement between the IC, DHS, and other sector specific agencies, and critical infrastructure entities to share information on threats that could impair their ability to operate effectively and securely.

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QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD FROM SENATOR WYDEN

6. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recently published a report on cybersecurity threats related to mobile phones and cellular networks. In that report, DHS stated that it “believes that all U.S. carriers are vulnerable to [Signaling System No. 7 (SS7)] exploits, resulting in risks to national security, the economy, and the Federal Government’s ability to reliably execute national essential functions.” According to DHS, these “vulnerabilities can be exploited by criminals, terrorists, and nation-state actors/foreign intelligence organizations.” As the DHS report noted, the SS7 vulnerabilities can be used to “determine the physical location of cellular mobile devices, disrupt phone service from individual phones to entire networks, intercept or block SMS text messages, and redirect or eavesdrop on voice conversations.”

- (a) Do you agree with DHS’s assessment with regard to the impact of SS7 vulnerabilities on U.S. national security, the economy, and the federal government, and with regard to the threat posed by SS7 surveillance?

Answer: Yes, I agree with the DHS report regarding the risks posed by Signaling System 7 (SS7).

- (b) Do you agree with DHS’s assessment that SS7 vulnerabilities can be exploited by criminals, terrorists and nation-state actors/foreign intelligence organizations?

Answer: Yes, I agree that SS7 is vulnerable to these threat actors.

- (c) Do you support Intelligence Community efforts to address this threat and do you commit to keeping Congress informed of both the threat and efforts to address it?

Answer: Yes, I believe the Intelligence Community must manage the threat and I commit to keeping Congress informed of both the threat and countermeasure efforts.

7. In his testimony at the Committee’s March 13, 2013, Worldwide Threat Assessment hearing, then-Director of National Intelligence Clapper described the threat posed by the global market for cyber intrusion software:

“In addition, a handful of commercial companies sell computer intrusion kits on the open market. These hardware and software packages can give governments and cybercriminals the capability to steal, manipulate, or delete information on targeted systems. Even more companies develop and sell professional-quality technologies to support cyber operations—often branding these tools as lawful-intercept or defensive security research products. Foreign governments already use some of these tools to target US systems.” (Emphasis added)

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- (a) **How significant is the threat posed by foreign governments using these capabilities against targets in the United States such as individuals, businesses, and U.S. government agencies?**

Answer: The threat posed to individuals, businesses, and U.S. government targets by foreign governments using cyber intrusion software capabilities is quite significant. These cyber tools are commercially available worldwide and anyone can obtain them. The tools make it much easier for adversaries to conduct exploitation or potentially cyber attacks against U.S. equities.

- (b) **How should the U.S. government respond to this threat?**

Answer: The IC and U.S. government writ large should respond to this threat in a coordinated and effective manner, keeping Congress consistently informed about these evolving threats and any countermeasures that are implemented. It is critical for the U.S. government to track emerging cyber threats, identify the targeted vulnerabilities, identify patches and mitigations specific to these vulnerabilities, and monitor the status of the implementation of these patches and vulnerabilities to ensure cyber situation awareness across the government. Our response also needs to include U.S. private industry and universities who are often the target of foreign cyber intrusion intended to steal intellectual property or to gain economic advantage.

8. **Please describe your view of “secret law.” Should the Intelligence Community conduct programs or operations based on secret interpretations of law that are inconsistent with what the American public believes the law to mean?**

Answer: As I noted in my responses to the pre-hearing questions, I firmly believe that earning the public’s trust requires not only that the IC follow applicable rules and that support effective oversight, but also that the IC provide appropriate transparency to the public. This is no less true when it comes to legal interpretations of intelligence authorities. It is of course challenging to enhance intelligence transparency and simultaneously protect sources and methods, but it is a challenge we must continue to proactively address. There are a number of statutory provisions, including provisions in the National Security Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, that work to strike this balance by ensuring that Congress and the public are informed of significant interpretations of law consistent with due regard for the protection of classified information. I also understand that the ODNI, in partnership with all IC elements, has worked actively to make legal interpretations publicly available as part of its overall transparency efforts. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the IC to promote transparency to the extent possible while continuing to protect national security

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