CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES

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CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 2014

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson, Manchin, Shaheen, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Kaine, King, Inhofe, McCain, Chambliss, Ayotte, Fischer, Graham, Vitter, Lee, and Cruz.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. The committee meets this morning to hear testimony on current and future worldwide threats to the U.S. national security. We welcome James R. Clapper, Jr., the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn, USA, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Gentlemen, thank you for coming today. Your testimony is especially important at a time of diverse and complex national security threats and an era of fiscal pressures.

The Department of Defense (DOD) faces difficult choices about how to allocate scarce resources in this environment of reduced budgets. Although the recently adopted budget agreement provides some relief, that relief is partial and temporary. Today’s testimony will, I hope, illuminate the dangers our Nation faces and underscore the continuing urgency of reaching an agreement to fully and permanently deal with the threat of sequestration to our Nation’s interests.

Perhaps foremost among the diverse challenges we face is our effort to prevent Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. We look forward to updated information on the status of the Iranian nuclear program and the impact of the interim agreement reached by the P5+1 powers late last year.

In Afghanistan, we face an insurgency whose terror tactics continue to be deadly. I believe the situation in Afghanistan has been fundamentally improved by efforts to build the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) and Afghanistan National Police (ANP). Those forces met or exceed expectations as they took over the lead on almost all military operations during the 2013 fighting season, and
they retain control over the areas where the vast majority of the Afghan population lives. The Afghan army, and increasingly the ANP, have the support of the Afghan people, who overwhelmingly oppose a return to Taliban rule.

Without the conclusion of a bilateral security agreement (BSA), our military will not be able to continue, even in small numbers, to support the Afghan security forces after the end of this year. President Karzai has so far refused to sign the BSA that he himself agreed to, and has made a series of statements so inflammatory that they are undermining public support in the United States for continuing efforts in Afghanistan.

Whoever the next Afghan president is, he is likely to be more reliable than President Karzai, and his signature is likely to instill more confidence than would Karzai’s signature. With 2 months to go in the presidential campaign, I hope our witnesses will tell us if they agree that the United States, and the coalition of which we are a part, would be better off waiting for Karzai’s successor to sign the agreement that the Afghan people favor, as reflected by the consensus of the 3,000-member loya jirga.

In Iraq, the disturbing seizure by al Qaeda-affiliated militants of control in portions of Fallujah and Ramadi reflects in part the failure of an increasingly sectarian-influenced Maliki Government to reach out to disenfranchised Sunni groups. We would appreciate hearing your assessment of the current situation in Iraq and of how best we can support the Iraqi people without empowering the Maliki Government to further the narrow agenda that it has too often pursued.

In Syria, the world witnessed the horror of the Assad regime using chemical weapons against its own people, killing hundreds of civilians, including women and children. In response to the U.S. threat of using limited force against Assad’s chemical capability, the international community reached agreement with Syria on a plan to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons program by the middle of this year. Since then, Syria’s chemical weapons mixing and filling capabilities have been eliminated and the first shipments of Syria’s most dangerous chemicals have been transported to a port for removal from Syria.

However, Syria has missed two important deadlines to remove the rest of the chemicals, and we want to know the prospects for completing the elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons this year and the impact of this effort on the Assad regime. In light of the continuing horrific assaults by the Assad regime against its own people, I hope our witnesses will also give us their assessment of additional steps that we could take to effectively train and equip members of the vetted opposition in Syria.

We face a different, but no less complex, series of challenges in the Asia-Pacific region. North Korea has continued its cycle of provocations and belligerence, heightening tensions on the Korean Peninsula and among our allies and partners in the Pacific. Last year, the North Korean regime conducted a nuclear weapon test and engaged in cyber attacks against South Korea. The new North Korean leader is inexperienced and unpredictable, creating instability in the region. We also look forward to hearing whether the
recent willingness of North Korea to facilitate family visits signals any significant change in their policy.

China's activities in the South China and East China Seas have also raised concerns, especially among our friends in Southeast Asia. China's recent declaration of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ), that overlaps with South Korea's ADIZ and includes the air space over the Senkaku Islands, failed to follow international norms and increases probability of miscalculations which could destabilize the region. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses as to how we can appropriately respond to these actions.

China's sustained and growing campaign to penetrate our computer networks, both for military purposes and to steal intellectual property for commercial purposes, also poses a threat to our security and our relationship.

The cyber threat is not unique to China. Russia also possesses formidable cyber capabilities and Iran and North Korea have also demonstrated a willingness to initiate aggressive actions in cyber space against the United States and our allies. However, China poses perhaps a unique threat because of the combination of sophisticated cyber capabilities and a lack of restraint and respect for limits on the theft of American technology, including production of counterfeit productions. A large number of colleagues have said that China's massive cyber industrial espionage campaign is an intolerable threat to our long-term national economic prosperity and security.

We look forward to the views of our witnesses on these and many other issues. I now call upon Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I do agree with the comments you made on cyber and some of the other things, so I won't address them. But I am really concerned, I think as everyone is up here, about our national security.

Two weeks ago I returned from a trip through Africa, Afghanistan, South Asia, and Europe. It was clear from talking to the troops, the diplomats, and the foreign partners that the global security environment is more precarious and complex as any time in memory and is growing more dangerous every day.

Director Clapper, you stated last year before Congress—and I have quoted this several times: “In almost 50 years in intelligence, I don't remember when we've had a more diverse array of threats and crisis situations around the world to deal with.” Based on what we've seen since then, I think you're exactly right.

The reality is that our national security is worse off today than it was 10 years ago. Around the world, as American leadership and military capabilities decline, we're seeing the threats to our security rise. From the Middle East to Africa to East Asia, our allies don't trust us and our enemies don't fear us.

In Iran, a recent interim agreement has done nothing to stop the regime's enrichment activities. In fact, I want to submit for the record a Reuters article that was dated just yesterday talking about how “Iran's military successfully test fired two new domestically made missiles, the defense minister said on Monday, according to state television. Brigadier General Hossein Dehghan said one of them was a long-range ballistic missile with radar-evading capabilities.”
It goes on to talk about what they’re doing. They’re not really hiding that at all.

[The information referred to follows:]

**Iran test-fires long-range missile: minister**

Mon, Feb 10 2014

By Parsa Hafizi

ANKARA (Reuters) - Iran’s military has successfully test-fired two new domestically-made missiles, the defence minister said on Monday according to state television, ahead of talks with world powers to try to reach an agreement on curbing Tehran’s nuclear program.

Brigadier General Hossein Dehghan said one of them was a long-range ballistic missile with radar-reading capabilities.

“The new generation of long-range ground-to-ground ballistic missile with a fragmentation warhead and the laser-guided air-to-surface and surface-to-surface missile dubbed Bina (Insightful) have been successfully test-fired,” state television quoted him as saying.

“The Bina missile is capable of striking important targets such as bridges, tanks and enemy command centers with great precision.”

Iran already has long-range surface-to-surface Shahab missiles with a range of about 2,000 km (1,200 miles) that are capable of reaching Israel and U.S. military bases in the Middle East. However, analysts have challenged some of Iran's military assertions, saying it often exaggerates its capabilities.

President Hassan Rouhani issued a congratulatory message saying: “Iran’s children successfully test-fired a new generation of missiles,” the television reported.

The decision to carry out the test may be a sign of Iran’s political infighting. Rouhani was criticized by a group of hardline lawmakers on Sunday for blocking a planned missile exercise. However, it was not immediately clear whether the test on Monday was the same one.

**NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS**

Iran and six world powers struck an interim deal in November under which Tehran agreed to limit parts of its nuclear work in return for the easing of some international sanctions.

Hardliners, likend by the foreign policy shift since Rouhani was elected in June, have repeatedly criticized the deal. Iran’s most powerful authority, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has so far backed the deal.

Iran and the six powers will start negotiating a final agreement in Vienna on February 18. Expiring of sanctions, imposed on Iran over its nuclear activities, began in late January.

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and the lead U.S. negotiator with Iran, Wendy Sherman told a Senate hearing last week that Iran’s ballistic missile program would be addressed as part of a comprehensive nuclear deal.

Iran’s deputy foreign minister and top nuclear negotiator said Tehran had no intention of discussing its ballistic missile program with major powers.

“The Islamic Republic of Iran’s defensive issues are neither negotiable nor subject to compromise. They are definitely among our red lines in any talks,” Abbas Araghchi told state TV on Sunday.

“We will not discuss any issue other than the nuclear dossier in the negotiations.”

Iran rejects Western fears that its nuclear work has military intentions and says it needs nuclear power for electricity generation and medical research.

The U.N. nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), on Monday signaled its determination to get to the bottom of suspicions that Iran may have worked on designing an atomic bomb.

(Writing by Parsa Hafizi; Editing by Janet Lawrence)

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Senator INHOFE. Let me remind our colleagues that our intelligence reports continue to say that Iran will have this capability—by capability I mean the weapon and the delivery system—as early as 2015, less than a year away.

Further, the administration continues its head-in-the-sand approach to terrorism by pushing the false narrative that al Qaeda is on the ropes and on the run. The facts on the ground don’t tell that story. The reality is that al Qaeda now operates in more countries and more territory than ever before and poses a greater threat to American interests.

In the Asia-Pacific region, our vaunted strategic rebalance is being undermined by massive budget cuts at a time when our security interests in the region have never been more pronounced. China’s military buildup continues to dominate the region’s dynamics, as our chairman just stated. North Korea is continuing its long history of erratic and reckless behavior, threatening stability on the Korean Peninsula and the broader region. Just last week, we learned that North Korea has restarted enrichment activities at some of its nuclear facilities and is pushing forward with the development of a road-mobile missile system, and of course, they admit this.

In the face of all of this, we’re forcing our military, the backbone of our Nation’s security, to endure a steep and damaging drop in capabilities and readiness. Drastic budget cuts, some $487 billion over the last 5 years, have resulted in our naval fleet falling to an historic low level of ships, the Air Force being the smallest in history, and potentially shrinking the Army to a force not seen since the beginning of the 20th century.

Readiness is plummeting. Commanders now use the term “hollow” to define the ability of their forces to defend the United States. In recent guidance issued to the Services, the Secretary of Defense even acknowledged this stark reality and wrote: “Near-term hollowness is acceptable, but the force must be balanced at end state.” This is deeply concerning to me. It’s an admission, given that the threats we face aren’t likely to wait until our force is rebuilt at some time in the future.

So without meaningful sequester relief to reverse these reckless national security cuts, our military will accept a greater risk. When you talk about greater risk you’re talking about loss of lives.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.

Director Clapper.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Mr. CLAPPER. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished members of the committee: General Flynn and I are here today to present the Intelligence Community’s (IC) worldwide threat assessment, as we do every year. I’ll cover about five topics in approximately 11½ or 12 minutes, followed by General Flynn’s statement.

As DNI, this is my fourth appearance before this committee to discuss the threats we face. As Senator Inhofe noted, I have made this next assertion previously, but it is, if anything, even more evi-
dent and more relevant today. Looking back over my now more than half a century in intelligence, I have not experienced a time when we've been beset by more crises and threats around the globe.

My list is long. It includes the scourge and diversification of terrorism, loosely connected and globally dispersed, to include here at home, as exemplified by the Boston Marathon bombing; and by the sectarian war in Syria, including its attraction as a growing center of radical extremism and the potential threat this poses now to our Homeland.

Let me briefly expand on this point. The strength of the insurgency is now estimated at somewhere between 75,000 to 80,000 on the low end and 110,000 to 115,000 on the high end. They are organized into more than 1,500 groups of widely varying political leanings. Three of the most effective insurgent groups are the Al-Nusra Front, Ahrar Al-Sham, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), whose numbers total more than 20,000. Complicating this further are the 7,500-plus foreign fighters from some 50 countries who have gravitated to Syria. Among them are a small group of Afghanistan/Pakistan al Qaeda veterans from the Afghanistan-Pakistan area who have aspirations for external attack in Europe, if not the Homeland itself.

There are many other crises and threats around the globe, to include the spillover of the Syrian conflict into neighboring Lebanon and Iraq, the destabilizing flood of refugees in Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon, now almost 2.5 million, a symptom of one of the largest humanitarian disasters in a decade.

The implications of the drawdown in Afghanistan. This year, as the chairman noted, is a crossroads, with the drawdown of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the presidential election, and whether the BSA is signed. Key to sustaining the fragile gains we have made is sustained external financial support.

The deteriorating internal security posture in Iraq, with al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) now in control of Fallujah and violence across Iraq at very high levels. More than 5,000 civilians were killed in Iraq in 2013, which made that year Iraq's deadliest since 2007.

The growth of foreign cyber capabilities, both nation-states as well as non-nation-states.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Aggressive nation-state intelligence efforts against us.

An assertive Russia.

A competitive China.

A dangerous, unpredictable North Korea.

A challenging Iran, where the economic sanctions have had a profound impact on Iran's economy and have contributed to the P5+1 joint plan of action (JPA).

Lingering ethnic divisions in the Balkans.

Perpetual conflict and extremism in Africa, particularly in Mali, Nigeria, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan.

Violent political struggles in, among others, Ukraine, Burma, Thailand, and Bangladesh.

The specter of mass atrocities.

The increasing stress of burgeoning populations.

The urgent demands for energy, water, and food.
The increasing sophistication of transnational crime.
The tragedy and magnitude of human trafficking.
The insidious rot of invented synthetic drugs.
The potential for pandemic disease occasioned by the growth of drug-resistant bacteria.

I could go on with this litany, but suffice to say we live in a complex, dangerous world. The statements for the record that we've submitted, particularly the classified version, provide a comprehensive review of these and other daunting challenges.

My second topic is what has consumed extraordinary time and energy for much of the past year in the IC, in Congress, in the White House, and, of course, in the public square. I'm speaking, of course, about potentially the most massive and most damaging theft of intelligence information in our history by Edward Snowden and the ensuing avalanche of revelations published and broadcast around the world.

I won't dwell on the debate about Snowden's motives or his legal standing or on the supreme ironies occasioned by his choice of freedom-loving nations and beacons of free expression to which he fled and from which he rails about what an Orwellian state he thinks his country has become.

But what I do want to speak to as the Nation's senior intelligence officer is the profound damage that his disclosures have caused and continue to cause. As a consequence, the Nation is less safe and its people less secure. What Snowden stole and exposed has gone way, way beyond his professed concerns with so-called domestic surveillance programs. As a result, we've lost critical intelligence collection sources, including some shared with us by valued partners.

Terrorists and other adversaries of this country are going to school on U.S. intelligence sources, methods, and tradecraft, and the insights they're gaining are making our job in the IC much, much harder. This includes putting the lives of members or assets of the IC at risk, as well as those of our Armed Forces, diplomats, and our citizens. We're beginning to see changes in the communications behavior of adversaries, particularly terrorists, a disturbing trend which I anticipate will continue.

Snowden for his part claims that he's won and that his mission is accomplished. If that's so, I call on him and his accomplices to facilitate the return of the remaining stolen documents that have not yet been exposed to prevent even more damage to U.S. security.

As a third related point, I want to comment on the ensuing fallout. It pains me greatly that the National Security Agency (NSA) and its magnificent workforce have been pilloried in the public commentary. I started in the intelligence profession over 50 years ago in signals intelligence. Members of my family, my father, father-in-law, brother-in-law, and wife and I have all worked at NSA, so this is deeply personal to me.

The real facts are, as the President noted in his speech on January 17, that the men and women who work at NSA, both military and civilian, have done their utmost to protect this country and do so in a lawful manner. As I and other leaders in the community have said many times, NSA's job is not to target the emails and phone calls of U.S. citizens. The agency does collect foreign intel-
ligence, the whole reason that NSA has existed since 1952, performing critical missions that I’m sure the American people want it to carry out.

Moreover, the effects of the unauthorized disclosures hurt the entire IC, not just NSA. Critical intelligence capabilities in which the United States has invested billions of dollars are at risk, and will likely be curtailed or eliminated, either because of compromise or conscious decision. Moreover, the impact of the losses caused by the disclosures will be amplified by the substantial budget reductions we’re incurring.

The stark consequences of this perfect storm are pretty evident. The IC is going to have less capacity to protect our Nation and its allies than we’ve had in the past.

In this connection, I’m also compelled to note the negative morale impact that this perfect storm has had on the IC workforce, which are compounded by sequestration, furloughs, the shutdown, and salary freezes.

This leads me to my fourth point: We’re thus faced collectively—and by “collectively” I mean this committee, Congress at large, the executive branch, and, most acutely, all of us in the IC—with the inescapable imperative to accept more risk. It’s a plain, hard fact and a circumstance that the community must and will manage, together with you and those whom we support in the executive branch. If dealing with reduced capabilities is what is needed to ensure the faith and confidence of the American people and their elected representatives, then we in the IC will work as hard as we can to meet the expectations before us.

That brings me to my fifth and final point. The major takeaway for us and certainly for me personally from the past several months is that we must lean in the direction of transparency wherever and whenever we can. With greater transparency about these intelligence programs, the American people may be more likely to accept them. The President set the tone and direction for us in his speech, as well as in his landmark Presidential Policy Directive, a major hallmark of which is transparency.

I have specific taskings, in conjunction with the Attorney General, to conduct further declassifications, to develop additional protections under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act governing collection of non-U.S. persons overseas, to modify how we conduct bulk collection of telephone metadata under section 215 of the Patriot Act, and to ensure more oversight of sensitive collection activities. Clearly, we’ll need your support in making these changes.

Through all of this, we must and will sustain our professional tradecraft and integrity, and we must continue to protect our crown jewel sources and methods so that we can accomplish what we’ve always been chartered to do, to protect the lives of American citizens here and abroad from the myriad threats I described in the beginning of this statement.

With that, I’ll conclude my statement and turn it over to General Flynn.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Clapper follows:]
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to offer the U.S. Intelligence Community’s 2014 assessment of threats to U.S. national security. My statement reflects the collective insights of the Intelligence Community’s extraordinary men and women, whom I am privileged and honored to lead. We in the Intelligence Community are committed every day to provide the nuanced, multidisciplinary intelligence that policymakers, warfighters, and domestic law enforcement personnel need to protect American lives and America’s interests anywhere in the world.

Information available as of January 15, 2014 was used in the preparation of this assessment.

GLOBAL THREATS

Cyber

Critical Trends Converging

Several critical governmental, commercial, and societal changes are converging that will threaten a safe and secure online environment. In the past several years, many aspects of life have migrated to the Internet and digital networks. These include essential government functions, industry and commerce, health care, social communication, and personal information. The foreign threats discussed below pose growing risks to these functions as the public continues to increase its use of and trust in digital infrastructures and technologies.

Russia and China continue to hold views substantially divergent from the United States on the meaning and intent of international cyber security. These divergences center mostly on the nature of state sovereignty in the global information environment and states’ rights to control the dissemination of content online, which have long forestalled major agreements. Despite these challenges, the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts concluded in a June 2013 report that international law and the U.N. Charter apply to cyberspace. This conclusion represents a substantive step forward in developing a legal framework and norms for cyber security.

Threat Environment

We assess that computer network exploitation and disruption activities such as denial-of-service attacks will continue. Further, we assess that the likelihood of a destructive attack that deletes information or renders systems inoperable will increase as malware and attack tradecraft proliferate. Many instances of major cyber attacks manifested themselves at home and abroad in 2013 as illustrated by the following examples.

- In March 2013, South Korea suffered a sizeable cyber attack against its commercial and media networks, damaging tens of thousands of computer workstations. The attack also disrupted online banking and automated teller machine services. Although likely unrelated to the 2012 network attack against Saudi Aramco, these attacks illustrate an alarming trend in mass data-deletion and system-damaging attacks.

- In early 2013, the U.S. financial sector faced wide-scale network denial-of-service attacks that became increasingly difficult and costly to mitigate.

In response to these and similar developments, many countries are creating cyber defense institutions within their national security establishments. We estimate that several of these will likely be responsible for offensive cyber operations as well.

Russia presents a range of challenges to U.S. cyber policy and network security. Russia seeks changes to the international system for Internet governance that would compromise U.S. interests and values. Its Ministry of Defense (MOD) is establishing its own cyber command, according to senior MOD officials, which will seek to perform many of the functions similar to those of the U.S. Cyber Command. Russian intelligence services continue to target U.S. and allied personnel with access to sensitive computer network information. In 2013, a Canadian naval officer confessed to betraying information from shared top secret-level computer networks to Russian agents for 5 years.

China’s cyber operations reflect its leadership’s priorities of economic growth, domestic political stability, and military preparedness. Chinese leaders continue to pursue dual tracks of facilitating Internet access for economic development and commerce and policing online behaviors deemed threatening to social order and regime survival. Internationally, China also seeks to revise the multi-stakeholder model
Internet governance while continuing its expansive worldwide program of network exploitation and intellectual property theft.

Iran and North Korea are unpredictable actors in the international arena. Their development of cyber espionage or attack capabilities might be used in an attempt to either provoke or destabilize the United States or its partners.

Terrorist organizations have expressed interest in developing offensive cyber capabilities. They continue to use cyberspace for propaganda and influence operations, financial activities, and personnel recruitment.

Cyber criminal organizations are as ubiquitous as they are problematic on digital networks. Motivated by profit rather than ideology, cyber criminals play a major role in the international development, modification, and proliferation of malicious software and illicit networks designed to steal data and money. They will continue to pose substantial threats to the trust and integrity of global financial institutions and personal financial transactions.

Other Potential Cyber Issues

Critical infrastructure, particularly the Industrial Control Systems and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems used in water management, oil and gas pipelines, electrical power distribution, and mass transit, provides an enticing target to malicious actors. Although newer architectures provide flexibility, the capability, and resilience, large segments of legacy architecture remain vulnerable to attack, which might cause significant economic or human impact.

Physical objects such as vehicles, industrial components, and home appliances, are increasingly being integrated into the information network and are becoming active participants in generating information. These “smart objects” will share information directly with Internet-enabled services, creating efficiencies in inventory supervision, service-life tracking, and maintenance management. This so-called “Internet of Things” will further transform the role of information technology in the global economy and create even further dependencies on it. The complexity and nature of these systems means that security and safety assurance are not guaranteed and that threat actors can easily cause security and/or safety problems in these systems.

The U.S. health care sector, in particular, is rapidly becoming networked in ways never before imagined. As health care services become increasingly reliant on the cross-networking of personal data devices, medical devices, and hospital networks, cyber vulnerabilities might play unanticipated roles in patient outcomes.

Virtual currencies—most notably Bitcoin—are fast becoming a medium for criminal financial transfers through online payment companies. In May 2013, Costa Rica-registered Liberty Reserve—no longer in operation—processed $6 billion in suspect transactions and sought to evade enforcement action by moving funds into shell companies worldwide prior to being indicted by U.S. authorities.

Emerging technologies, such as three-dimensional printing, have uncertain economic and social impacts and can revolutionize the manufacturing sector by drastically reducing the costs of research, development, and prototyping. Similarly, they might also revolutionize aspects of underground criminal activity.

Counterintelligence

Threats posed by foreign intelligence entities through 2014 will continue to evolve in terms of scope and complexity. The capabilities and activities through which foreign entities—both state and nonstate actors—seek to obtain U.S. national security information are new, more diverse, and more technically sophisticated.

Insider Threat/Unauthorized Disclosures

In addition to threats by foreign intelligence entities, insider threats will also pose a persistent challenge. Trusted insiders with the intent to do harm can exploit their access to compromise vast amounts of sensitive and classified information as part of a personal ideology or at the direction of a foreign government. The unauthorized disclosure of this information to state adversaries, nonstate activists, or other entities will continue to pose a critical threat.

Priority Foreign Intelligence Threats

Attempts to penetrate the U.S. national decisionmaking apparatus, defense industrial bases, and U.S. research establishments will persist. We assess that the leading state intelligence threats to U.S. interests in 2014 will continue to be Russia and China, based on their capabilities, intent, and broad operational scope. Sophisticated foreign intelligence entities will continue to employ human and cyber means to collect national security information. They seek data on advanced weapons systems and proprietary information from U.S. companies and research institutions that deal with energy, finance, the media, defense, and dual-use technology.
Terrorism

Terrorist threats emanate from a diverse array of terrorist actors, ranging from formal groups to homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) and ad hoc, foreign-based actors. The threat environment continues to transition to a more diverse array of actors, reinforcing the positive developments of previous years. The threat complex, sophisticated, and large-scale attacks from core al-Qa’ida against the U.S. Homeland is significantly degraded. Instability in the Middle East and North Africa has accelerated the decentralization of the movement, which is increasingly influenced by local and regional issues. However, diffusion has led to the emergence of new power centers and an increase in threats by networks of like-minded extremists with allegiances to multiple groups. The potential of global events to instantaneously spark grievances around the world hinders advance warning, disruption, and attribution of plots.

Homeland Plotting

Homegrown Violent Extremists. U.S.-based extremists will likely continue to pose the most frequent threat to the U.S. Homeland. As the tragic attack in Boston in April 2013 indicates, insular HVEs who act alone or in small groups and mask the extent of their ideological radicalization can represent challenging and lethal threats.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Operating from its safe haven in Yemen, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has attempted several times to attack the U.S. Homeland. We judge that the group poses a significant threat and remains intent on targeting the United States and U.S. interests overseas.

Core al Qaeda. Sustained counterterrorism (CT) pressure, key organizational setbacks, and the emergence of other power centers of the global violent extremist movement have put core al Qaeda on a downward trajectory since 2008. They have degraded the group’s ability to carry out a catastrophic attack against the U.S. Homeland and eroded its position as leader of the global violent extremist movement. It probably hopes for a resurgence following the drawdown of U.S. troops in Afghanistan in 2014.

Terrorist Activities Overseas

Persistent Threats to U.S. Interests Overseas. We face an enduring threat to U.S. interests overseas. Most Sunni extremist groups will prioritize local and regional agendas, but U.S. embassies, military facilities, and individuals will be at particular risk in parts of South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

Syria’s Impact. Syria has become a significant location for independent or al Qaeda-aligned groups to recruit, train, and equip a growing number of extremists, some of whom might conduct external attacks. Hostilities between Sunni and Shia are also intensifying in Syria and spilling into neighboring countries, which is increasing the likelihood of a protracted conflict.

Iran and Hizballah are committed to defending the Asad regime and have provided support toward this end, including sending billions of dollars in military and economic aid, training pro-regime and Iraqi Shia militants, and deploying their own personnel into the country. Iran and Hizballah view the Asad regime as a key partner in the “axis of resistance” against Israel and are prepared to take major risks to preserve the regime as well as their critical transshipment routes.

Iran and Hizballah

Outside of the Syrian theater, Iran and Lebanese Hizballah continue to directly threaten the interests of U.S. allies. Hizballah has increased its global terrorist activity in recent years to a level that we have not seen since the 1990s.

Counterterrorism Cooperation

As the terrorist threat is becoming more diffuse and harder to detect, cooperation with CT partners will take on even greater importance. The fluid environment in the Middle East and North Africa will likely further complicate already challenging circumstices as we partner with governments to stem the spread of terrorism.

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation

Nation-state efforts to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems constitute a major threat to the security of the United States, deployed troops, and allies. We are focused on the threat and destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation, proliferation of chemical and biological warfare (CBW)-related materials, and development of WMD delivery systems. The time when only a few states had access to the most dangerous technologies is past. Biological and chemical materials and technologies, almost always dual use, move easily in the
globalized economy, as do personnel with scientific expertise to design and use them. The latest discoveries in the life sciences also diffuse globally and rapidly.

**Iran and North Korea Developing WMD-Applicable Capabilities**

We continue to assess that Iran's overarching strategic goals of enhancing its security, prestige, and regional influence have led it to pursue capabilities to meet its civilian goals and give it the ability to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons, if it chooses to do so. At the same time, Iran's perceived need for economic relief has led it to make concessions on its nuclear program through the 24 November 2013 Joint Plan of Action with the P5+1 countries and the European Union (EU). In this context, we judge that Iran is trying to balance conflicting objectives. It wants to improve its nuclear and missile capabilities while avoiding severe repercussions—such as a military strike or regime—threatening sanctions. We do not know if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.

Tehran has made technical progress in a number of areas—including uranium enrichment, development of ballistic missiles, and stockpiling more low-enriched uranium hexafluoride (LEU6). These improvements have better positioned Iran to produce weapons-grade uranium (WGU) using its declared facilities and uranium stockpiles, if it chooses to do so. Despite this progress, we assess that Iran would not be able to divert safeguarded material and produce enough WGU for a weapon before such activity would be discovered. Iran has also continued to work toward starting up the IR–40 Heavy Water Research Reactor near Arak.

We judge that Iran would choose a ballistic missile as its preferred method of delivering nuclear weapons, if Iran ever builds these weapons. Iran's ballistic missiles are inherently capable of delivering WMD, and Iran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. Iran's progress on space launch vehicles along with its desire to deter the United States and “its allies—provides Tehran with the means and motivation to develop longer-range missiles, including an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

We assess that if Iran fully implements the Joint Plan, it will temporarily halt the expansion of its enrichment program, eliminate its production and stockpile of 20-percent enriched uranium in a form suitable for further enrichment, and provide additional transparency into its existing and planned nuclear facilities. This transparency would provide earlier warning of a breakout using these facilities.

North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to the United States and to the security environment in East Asia, a region with some of the world's largest populations, militaries, and economies. North Korea's export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria's construction of a nuclear reactor, destroyed in 2007, illustrate the reach of its proliferation activities. Despite the reaffirmation of its commitment in the Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how, North Korea might again export nuclear technology.

In addition to conducting its third nuclear test on 12 February 2013, North Korea announced its intention to “adjust and alter” the uses of existing nuclear facilities, to include the uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon, and restart its graphite moderated reactor that was shut down in 2007. We assess that North Korea has followed through on its announcement by expanding the size of its Yongbyon enrichment facility and restarting the reactor that was previously used for plutonium production. North Korea has publicly displayed its KNOB road-mobile ICBM twice. We assess that North Korea has already taken initial steps towards fielding this system, although it remains untested. North Korea is committed to developing long-range missile technology that is capable of posing a direct threat to the United States. Its efforts to produce and market ballistic missiles raise broader regional and global security concerns.

Because of deficiencies in their conventional military forces, North Korean leaders are focused on deterrence and defense. We have long assessed that, in Pyongyang's view, its nuclear capabilities are intended for deterrence, international prestige, and coercive diplomacy. We do not know Pyongyang's nuclear doctrine or employment concepts.
WMD Security in Syria

Syria acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on 14 October 2013 and is in the preliminary phases of dismantling its offensive CW program. Previously, we had assessed that Syria had a highly active chemical warfare (CW) program and maintained a stockpile of sulfur mustard, sarin, VX, and a stockpile of munitions—including missiles, aerial bombs, and artillery rockets—that can be used to deliver CW agents. Until the CW materials are completely destroyed or removed from country, groups or individuals in Syria might gain access to CW-related materials. The United States and its allies are monitoring Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile through the inspection and destruction process of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

We judge that some elements of Syria’s biological warfare (BW) program might have advanced beyond the research and development stage and might be capable of limited agent production, based on the duration of its longstanding program. To the best of our knowledge, Syria has not successfully weaponized biological agents in an effective delivery system, but it possesses conventional weapon systems that could be modified for biological-agent delivery.

Counterspace

Threats to U.S. space services will increase during 2014 and beyond as potential adversaries pursue disruptive and destructive counterspace capabilities. Chinese and Russian military leaders understand the unique information advantages afforded by space systems and are developing capabilities to disrupt the United States use of space in a conflict. For example, Chinese military writings highlight the need to interfere with, damage, and destroy reconnaissance, navigation, and communication satellites. China has satellite jamming capabilities and is pursuing antisatellite systems. In 2007, China conducted a destructive antisatellite test against its own satellite. Russia’s 2010 military doctrine emphasizes space defense as a vital component of its national defense. Russian leaders openly maintain that the Russian armed forces have antisatellite weapons and conduct antisatellite research. Russia has satellite jammers and is also pursuing antisatellite systems.

Transnational Organized Crime

Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) is an abiding threat to U.S. economic and national security. Criminals can play a significant role in weakening stability and undermining the rule of law in some emerging democracies and areas of strategic importance to the United States.

Drug trafficking will remain a major TOC threat to the United States. Mexican drug cartels are responsible for high levels of violence and corruption in Mexico. Drugs contribute to instability in Central America, erode stability in West and North Africa, and remain a significant source of revenue for the Taliban in Afghanistan.

- Synthetic drugs, notably new psychoactive substances (NPS), pose an emerging and rapidly growing global public health threat. NPS were first reported in the United States in 2008 and have emerged in 70 of 80 countries that report to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime. Although most global markets for drugs such as cocaine and heroin are stable or declining, the use and manufacture of synthetic drugs are rapidly rising.

The Department of State’s 2013 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report notes that an estimated 27 million men, women, and children are trafficking victims. Virtually every country in the world is a source, transit point, and/or destination for individuals being trafficked.

Worldwide, money laundering totals more than a trillion dollars annually. Criminals’ reliance on the U.S. dollar exposes the U.S. financial system to these illicit financial flows. Financial transfers and vehicles designed to obscure beneficial ownership, inadequate and uneven anti-money laundering enforcement and regulations, and new forms of digital financial services have the potential to undermine the international financial system.

Illicit trade in wildlife, timber, and marine resources constitutes an estimated $8–10 billion industry annually, endangers the environment, threatens rule of law and border security in fragile regions, and destabilizes communities that depend on wildlife for biodiversity and ecotourism.

Economic Trends

Global economic growth rates entered a marked slowdown with the global financial crisis that began in 2008. From 2008 to 2013, the global growth rate averaged less than 3.0 percent, well below its 30-year average of 3.6 percent. The lengthy global slowdown has meant lower job creation, income growth, and standards of liv—
ing that many came to expect before 2008. Although worldwide economic growth will likely strengthen in 2014 to 3.7 percent, it will fall well short of its 2004–2007 peak when it averaged 5.1 percent.

Although emerging and developing economies will continue to grow faster than advanced economies, the gap between their respective growth rates will probably narrow to 3 percentage points in 2014, its lowest level since the cascade of emerging-market financial crises in 11t1e late 1990s and early 2000s. Combined with faster population growth in the emerging and developing economies, the pace at which per capita incomes in that group converges to those in developed countries is slowing considerably, potentially fueling resentment of Western leadership on global issues. Growth will probably be particularly slow among some of the emerging economies of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Latin America and the Caribbean.

Stronger economic growth in certain advanced economies might mean a general tightening of global monetary conditions in 2014. Although such growth will benefit the global economy broadly, higher interest rates might pose new challenges to countries relying heavily on global capital markets to service existing debt, destabilizing outflows of international capital from emerging markets to advanced ones are possible in response to rising U.S. interest rates and sustained recoveries in the United States and Europe. Tighter monetary conditions might also increase the risk of deflation in economies with slow growth, high unemployment, and low aggregate demand. Numerous European countries, in particular, have seen annual inflation rates fall below 1.0 percent and even intermittent periods of deflation. Such deflation might worsen the fragile finances of indebted households, corporations, and governments.

Declines in many commodity prices will probably continue through 2014. Although the moderation in prices is welcome from the perspective of major commodity importers, such as China, India, and Japan, and from the humanitarian perspective related to food security, it can pose balance-of-payments problems for commodity exporters, such as Brazil, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, and Venezuela, especially those that depend on commodity export revenue to finance their governments. Forecasts in the past year project global trade volume to grow moderately in 2014 at roughly 5 percent; the World Trade Organization (WTO) notes that its growth projections are down from earlier in 2013, however.

**Natural Resources**

Competition for and secure access to natural resources (e.g., food, water, and energy) are growing security threats. Rapidly increasing unconventional energy production and ample water and agricultural resources mitigate the impact of global scarcity on the United States. However, many countries important to the United States are vulnerable to natural-resource shocks that degrade economic development, frustrate attempts to democratize, raise the risk of regime-threatening instability, and aggravate regional tensions. Demographic trends, especially increasing global population and urbanization, will also aggravate the outlook for resources, putting intense pressure on food, water, and energy. Extreme weather will increasingly disrupt food and energy markets, exacerbating state weakness, forcing human migrations, and triggering riots, civil disobedience, and vandalism. Criminal or terrorist elements can exploit these weaknesses to conduct illicit activity, recruit, and train. Social disruptions are magnified in growing urban areas where information technology quickly transmits grievances to larger, often youthful and unemployed audiences. Relatively small events can generate significant effects across regions of the world.

**Food**

Increased global supplies of grain have pushed global food prices downward in recent months, easing the risk of a price spike in the coming year. However, natural food-supply disruptions, due to weather, disease, and government policies, will stress the global food system and exacerbate price volatility. Policy choices can include export bans, diversions of arable lands for other uses, and land leases to and acquisitions by foreigners. Lack of adequate food will be a destabilizing factor in countries important to U.S. national security that do not have the financial or technical abilities to solve their internal food security problems. In other cases, important countries to U.S. interests will experience food-related, social disruptions, but are capable of addressing them without political upheaval.

Although food-related, state-on-state conflict is unlikely in the next year, the risk of conflict between farmers and livestock owners—often in separate states—will increase as population growth, desertification, and crop expansion infringe on livestock grazing areas, especially in sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia. Shrinking marine fisheries—for example, in the South China Sea—will continue to spark dip-
lomatic disputes as fishermen are forced to travel farther from shore. Terrorists, militants, and international criminals can use local food insecurity to promote their own legitimacy and undermine government authority. Food and nutrition insecurity in weakly governed countries might also provide opportunities for insurgent groups to capitalize on poor conditions, exploit international food aid, and discredit governments for their inability to address basic needs.

**Water**

Risks to freshwater supplies—due to shortages, poor quality, floods, and climate change—are growing. These forces will hinder the ability of key countries to produce food and generate energy, potentially undermining global food markets and hobbling economic growth. As a result of demographic and economic development pressures, North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia particularly will particularly face difficulty coping with water problems. Lack of adequate water is a destabilizing factor in developing countries that do not have the management mechanisms, financial resources, or technical ability to solve their internal water problems. Other states are further stressed by heavy dependence on river water controlled by upstream nations with unresolved water-sharing issues. Wealthier developing countries will probably face increasing water-related, social disruptions, although they are capable of addressing water problems without risk of state failure.

Historically, water tensions have led to more water-sharing agreements than to violent conflicts. However, where water-sharing agreements are ignored or when infrastructure development for electric power generation or agriculture is seen as a threat to water resources, states tend to exert leverage over their neighbors to preserve their water interests. This leverage has been applied in international forums and has included pressuring investors, nongovernmental organizations, and donor countries to support or halt water infrastructure projects. In addition, some local, nonstate terrorists or extremists will almost certainly target vulnerable water infrastructure in places to achieve their objectives and use water-related grievances as recruiting and fundraising tools.

**Energy**

Increasing U.S. production of shale gas and tight oil in combination with ongoing energy efficiency gains will almost certainly provide the United States with a more secure energy future. Decreasing reliance on energy imports will reduce the economic impact on the United States of disruptions in global energy markets but will not isolate the United States from market forces. With a shrinking reliance on energy imports, an oil disruption will have a diminished impact on the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the current account deficit, and value of the dollar. The greater availability and lower price of natural gas and natural gas liquids will sustain the country’s competitive edge in petrochemicals and energy-intensive production processes. However, some key energy-producing and consuming countries, which link U.S. policy interests and energy imports, are concerned that greater U.S. oil production will reduce U.S. engagement in the Middle East and diminish U.S. protection of critical oil supply routes.

Oil from deepwater deposits, tight oil, and oil sands will be the principal sources of new global oil supplies in 2014 and beyond. Oil extraction is trending toward production that is farther offshore in deeper waters, which might lead to increasing competition for desirable areas. Conventional oil production will continue to supply the majority of the world’s oil, although discoveries are slowing and prospects for new sources are diminishing. However, conventional oil reservoirs also have the potential to supply significant increases in oil with the improvement of extraction methods. The exploitation of unconventional oil resources in the Western Hemisphere has the potential to reduce U.S., European, and Asian reliance on imports that pass through vulnerable choke points, such as the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca, or originate from less stable regions in the Middle East and Africa.

**Extreme Weather Events**

Empirical evidence alone—without reference to climate models—suggests that a general warming trend is probably affecting weather and ecosystems, exacerbating the impact on humans. This warmer atmosphere, wetter in some areas, drier in others, is consistent with increasing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. In recent years, local food, water, energy, health, and economic security have been episodically degraded worldwide by severe weather conditions. These include more frequent or intense floods, droughts, wildfires, tornadoes, cyclones, coastal high water, and heat waves. Rising temperatures, although greater in the Arctic, are not solely a high-latitude phenomenon. Scientific work in the past few years has shown that temperature anomalies during growing seasons and persistent droughts have hampered agricultural productivity and extended wildfire seasons. In addition, in-
tense storms—including typhoons, hurricanes, tornadoes, cyclones, and derechos—when exposed to growing human infrastructure, contribute to greater damage and threaten ever-increasing urban populations and economic development. This trend will likely continue to place stress on first responders, nongovernment organizations, and militaries that are often called to provide humanitarian assistance.

The Arctic

Harsh weather and relatively low economic stakes have enabled the countries bordering the Arctic to cooperate in pursuit of their interests in the region. However, as polar ice recedes, economic and security concerns will increase competition over access to sea routes and natural resources. Some states see the Arctic as a strategic security issue that has the potential to give other countries an advantage in positioning in their military forces.

Health Risks

Health security threats arise unpredictably from at least five sources: the emergence and spread of new or reemerging microbes; the globalization of travel and the food supply; the rise of drug-resistant pathogens; the acceleration of biological science capabilities and the risk that these capabilities might cause inadvertent or intentional release of pathogens; and adversaries’ acquisition, development, and use of weaponized agents. Infectious diseases, whether naturally caused, intentionally produced, or accidentally released, are still among the foremost health security threats. A more crowded and interconnected world is increasing the opportunities for human, animal, or zoonotic diseases to emerge and spread globally. Antibiotic drug resistance is an increasing threat to global health security. Seventy percent of known bacteria have now acquired resistance to at least one antibiotic, threatening a return to the pre-antibiotic era.

In addition to the growing threat from resistant bacteria, previously unknown pathogens in humans are emerging and spreading primarily from animals. Human and livestock population growth results in increased human and animal intermingling and hastens crossover of diseases from one population to the other. No one can predict which pathogen will be the next to spread to humans or where this will occur. However, humans remain vulnerable, especially when a pathogen with the potential to cause a pandemic emerges. For example, we judge that the H7N9 influenza in China that emerged from birds in early 2013 is not yet easily transmissible from person to person. However, it bears watching for its extreme severity, high death rates, and potential to mutate and become more transmissible. Between late March 2013, when the virus was first recognized, and the following May, when it was brought under control, H7N9 influenza killed over 20 percent of those infected and caused severe disease with long-term hospitalization in nearly all other cases. If H7N9 influenza or any other novel respiratory pathogen that kills or incapacitates more than 1 percent of its victims were to become easily transmissible, the outcome would be among the most disruptive events possible. Uncontrolled, such an outbreak would result in a global pandemic with suffering and death spreading globally in fewer than 6 months and would persist for approximately 2 years.

Mass Atrocities

The overall risk of mass atrocities worldwide will probably increase in 2014 and beyond. Trends driving this increase include more social mobilization, violent conflict, including communal violence, and other forms of instability that spill over borders and exacerbate ethnic and religious tensions; diminished or stagnant quality of governance; and widespread impunity for past abuses. Many countries at risk of mass atrocities will likely be open to influence to prevent or mitigate them. This is because they are dependent on Western assistance or multilateral missions in their countries. have the political will to prevent mass atrocities, or would be responsive to international scrutiny. Overall international will and capability to prevent or mitigate mass atrocities will likely diminish in 2014 and beyond, although support for human rights norms to prevent atrocities will almost certainly deepen among some nongovernment organizations. Much of the world will almost certainly turn to the United States for leadership to prevent and respond to mass atrocities.

REGIONAL THREATS

Middle East and North Africa

Arab Spring

In the 3 years since the outbreak of the Arab Spring, a few states have made halting progress in their transitions away from authoritarian rule. Nevertheless, polit-
ical uncertainty and violence will probably increase across the region in 2014 as the toppling of leaders and weakening of regimes have unleashed ethnic and sectarian rivalries that are propagating destabilizing violence.

- In Syria, the ongoing civil war will probably heighten regional and sectarian tensions. Syria has become a proxy battle between Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah on one side and Sunni Arab states on the other. Fear of spillover has exacerbated sectarian tensions in Iraq and Lebanon and will add to the unrest. The influx of over 2 million Syrian refugees into neighboring countries will continue to impose hardships, particularly on Jordan and Lebanon.

- The turmoil associated with government transitions has prompted political backsliding in some cases, most notably Egypt, where the military ousted the democratically-elected Muslim Brotherhood-dominated government in summer 2013.

- Public support for the governments that came to power across the region in 2011 is dissipating, a dynamic which will likely invite renewed unrest, increase the appeal of authoritarian or extremist solutions among Arab publics, and reduce the likelihood of the implementation of needed but unpopular economic reforms.

The following three regional trends will pose a challenge to U.S. interests in the Middle East in 2014 and beyond.

- Ungoverned Spaces. The ongoing struggles for new governments in places like Tripoli and Cairo to extend their writ countrywide and worsening internal conflict in Syria have created opportunities for extremist groups to find ungoverned spaces from where they can try to destabilize new governments and prepare attacks against Western interests.

- Economic Hardships. Many states in the region are facing economic distress that will not likely be alleviated by current levels of Western aid. The failure of governments in the region to meet heightened popular expectations for economic improvement might prove destabilizing in vulnerable regimes. Gulf States provide assistance only incrementally and are wary of new governments’ foreign policies as well as their ability to effectively use outside funds.

- Negative Views of the United States. Some of the transitioning governments are more skeptical than before the Arab Spring about cooperating with the United States. They are concerned about protecting sovereignty and resisting foreign interference, which has the potential to hamper U.S. countering terrorism and other efforts to engage transitioning governments. Additionally, the unhappiness of some Arab Gulf States with U.S. policies on Iran, Syria, and Egypt might lead these countries to reduce cooperation with the United States on regional issues and act unilaterally in ways that run counter to U.S. interests.

**Egypt**

The interim Egyptian Government has for the most part completed transition tasks on time, but Cairo’s crackdown on dissent, including designating the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as a terrorist group, has dampened prospects for stability and an inclusive government. Egypt faces a persistent threat of militant violence that is directed primarily at the state and exploits the interim government’s lack of control over the Sinai Peninsula. Since 2011, the Sinai has emerged as a growing staging ground for militants—including terrorists—to plan, facilitate, and launch attacks. The level of protests and militant violence probably will not delay Egypt’s progress toward legislative and presidential elections.

**Syria**

We assess that the Syrian regime and many insurgents believe that they can achieve a military victory in the ongoing conflict. However, given their respective capabilities and levels of external support, decisively altering the course of the conflict in the next 6 months will prove difficult for either side.

President Asad remains unwilling to negotiate himself out of power. Asad almost certainly intends to remain the ruler of Syria and plans to win a new 7-year term in presidential elections that might occur as early as mid-2014. Humanitarian conditions in Syria in the next year will almost certainly continue to deteriorate. Ongoing fighting is driving internal displacement as well as flows of refugees into neighboring countries. The UN, as of January 2014, estimated that 9.3 million Syrians are in need of humanitarian assistance in the country—including 6.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs)—and that at least 2.4 million Syrian registered refugees are in the region out of a July 2012 population estimate of 22.5 mil-
lion. International aid agencies consistently face challenges accessing parts of Syria because of checkpoints, road closures, Syrian Government restrictions, and violence.

**Iran**

President Ruhani has heralded a shift in political momentum in Iran toward the center, but we do not know whether he heralds a reversal of the authoritarian trend in Iranian politics during the past many years. Iran’s economy will continue to struggle without comprehensive sanctions relief, which drives Ruhani and his team of technocrats to pursue nuclear negotiations. Since his election, Ruhani has had the support of the Supreme Leader, which has silenced some conservative critics. Hardliners, however, have consistently argued that sanctions fatigue will eventually break the international sanctions coalition and are wary of Ruhani’s engagement with the west, as well as his promises of social and political moderation. Ruhani must maintain the backing of the Supreme Leader in order to continue to advance his political agenda. (Information on Iran’s nuclear weapons program and intentions can be found above in the section on WMD and Proliferation.)

Iran will continue to act assertively abroad in ways that run counter to U.S. interests and worsen regional conflicts. Iranian officials almost certainly believe that their support has been instrumental in sustaining Asad’s regime in Syria and will probably continue support during 2014 to bolster the regime. In the broader Middle East, Iran will continue to provide arms and other aid to Palestinian groups, Huthi rebels in Yemen, and Shia militants in Bahrain to expand Iranian influence and to counter perceived foreign threats. Tehran, which strives for a stable Shia-led, pro-Iran Government in Baghdad, is concerned about the deteriorating security situation in Iraq. Tehran is probably struggling to find the balance between protecting Shia equities in Iraq and avoiding overt actions that would precipitate greater anti-Shia violence. In Afghanistan, Tehran will probably seek its own additional security agreements with Kabul, promote pro-Iranian candidates in the 2014 presidential election to increase its influence at the expense of the United States, and maintain its clandestine aid to Afghan insurgent groups. Iran sees rising sectarianism as a dangerous regional development, but we assess that Iran’s perceived responsibility to protect and empower Shia communities will increasingly trump its desire to avoid sectarian violence. Hence, Iran’s actions will likely do more to fuel rather than dampen increasing sectarianism.

**Iraq**

Iraq’s trajectory in 2014 will depend heavily on how Baghdad confronts the rising challenge from al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and manages relations with the country’s disenfranchised Sunni population. A pivotal event will be the national elections slated for 30 April. The Sunni population in particular must be convinced that the elections will be fair in order to keep them committed to the political process and help check Iraq’s rising violence.

Iraq is experiencing an increase in the total number of attacks countrywide to levels not observed since the departure of U.S. forces in 2011. Although overall level of violence remains far lower than in 2007, high-profile suicide and vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks initiated by al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2013 returned to 2007–2008 levels, roughly 68 to 80 per month. The protracted civil war in Syria is destabilizing Iraq, hardening ethno-sectarian attitudes, and raising concerns about the spillover of violence. The Syrian conflict has also facilitated a greater two-way flow of Sunni extremists between Syria and Iraq that has contributed to AQI’s increased level of high-profile attacks.

**Yemen**

We judge that Yemen has achieved provisional success in the early stages of its transition from the regime of Ali Abdallah Salih. However, it still faces threats to its stability from a resurgent AQAP and disputes over the future structure of the state. The Government of Abd Rabih Mansur al-Hadi has completed an inclusive National Dialogue Conference, but the parties have not reached an agreement on how to implement the Federal state structure called for by the Dialogue.

- The Yemeni military’s willingness to sustain pressure on AQAP will be critical to preventing its resurgence.
- Yemen’s economy has stabilized since Hadi took office in 2012, but substantial foreign assistance will remain important to alleviate the country’s serious economic and humanitarian problems.

**Lebanon**

Lebanon in 2014 probably will continue to experience sectarian violence among Lebanese and terrorist attacks by Sunni extremists and Hizballah, which are targeting each others’ interests. The conflict in neighboring Syria is the primary driver
of the sectarian unrest and terrorist attacks in Lebanon; already this year, sectarian fighting and political assassinations in Tripoli, Beirut, and Sidon have killed more than a hundred Lebanese. Increased frequency and lethality of violence in Lebanon could erupt into sustained and widespread fighting.

- Hizballah's secretary general, Hasan Nasrallah, has framed the conflict as an act of self-defense against Western-backed Sunni extremists who he claimed would target all Lebanese if the Asad regime fell.
- Sunni extremists have conducted multiple bombings in Beirut in 2013 and early 2014 in the Shia-dominated areas of southern Beirut that killed 75 and injured more than 500 people. Sunni extremists claimed responsibility for the suicide bombings in November 2013 against the Iranian Embassy in Beirut.
- Sunni Salafist leaders are calling for supporters to back the Syrian opposition, which threatens to escalate sectarian tensions.

Lebanon is facing increased challenges in coping with the continuing influx of numerous Syrian refugees. As of early January 2014, over 800,000 Syrian refugees were residing in Lebanon—roughly 25 percent of Lebanon’s population prior to the Syrian conflict. Syrian refugees are straining Lebanon’s fragile economy and burdening its weak healthcare and education systems. Refugees almost certainly will not return to Syria, given the continued violence and lack of economic prospects.

Libya

Nearly 3 years since the revolution that toppled Qadhafi, Libya’s political, economic, and security landscapes are fragmented and its institutions are weak, posing an ongoing threat to stability and cohesion of the Libyan state. Libya’s democratically-elected government struggles to address the many competing challenges that threaten to undermine the transition.

- Efforts by various regional, minority, and tribal groups to seek redress of grievances through violence and disruption of oil facilities are weakening national cohesion.
- Since the end of the revolution, federalist groups have declared autonomy for the east or south at least four times. The Federalist-led takeover of eastern oil facilities in July 2013 has been the most sustained and aggressive pursuit of self-rule.
- Libya’s numerous quasi-governmental militias often demonstrate little loyalty to Tripoli and challenge central government authority.
- The terrorist threat to Western and Libyan Government interests remains acute, especially in the east of the country, where attacks against government officials and facilities occur nearly daily. Regional terrorist organizations exploit Libya’s porous borders and massive amounts of loose conventional weapons, further destabilizing the country and the Maghreb and Sahel region.
- To the benefit of the government, most Libyans oppose violence by Federalists, militias, and extremists and generally support government efforts to usher in a successful democratic transition, including the drafting of a constitution and holding elections for Libya’s first post-revolution permanent government.

Tunisia

Tunisia’s long-suppressed societal cleavages and security and economic challenges will remain impediments to the country’s political transition in 2014. The political environment since the ouster of President Ben Ali in 2011 has exposed sharp divisions over the role of religion in the state and the separation of powers. However, the Constituent Assembly’s late January 2014 passage of a new constitution by a wide majority suggests an increased willingness among the parties to compromise.

South Asia

Afghanistan

The status of the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) remains unresolved despite its endorsement by Afghan leaders during the mid-November 2013 Loya Jirga. Regardless of the status of the BSA, the bilateral relationship still might be strained if Afghan officials believe that U.S. commitments to Afghanistan fall short of their expectations.

- The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that Afghanistan’s GDP growth rate fell from 12 percent in 2012 to 3.1 percent in 2013. It forecasts 4 to 6 percent growth in 2014 and beyond, largely because of reduced ISAF spending.
Afghan elections in 2014 will be an important step in Afghanistan’s democratic development. President Karzai has stated that he will step down after the election; eleven candidates are currently competing to succeed him. The Taliban, confident in its ability to outlast ISAF and committed to returning to power, will challenge government control over some of the Pashtun countryside, especially in the south and east. The Taliban senior leadership will maintain a structured and resilient leadership system. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), however, will probably maintain control of most major cities as long as external financial support continues.

Pakistan
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s primary focus will be on improving the economy, including the energy sector, and countering security threats. Sharif probably won the May 2013 election primarily because the previous government failed to improve either the economy or the generation of electricity. Islamabad secured an IMF program in September 2013. Pakistan satisfied IMF conditions for fiscal and energy reforms under its 3-year, $6.7 billion Extended Fund Facility, paving the way for a second disbursement of $550 million in December. However, continued use of scarce foreign exchange Reserves by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) to prop up the Pakistani rupee might make future disbursements difficult.

Sharif seeks to acquire a more central policymaking role for civilians in areas that the Army has traditionally dominated. His push for an increased role in foreign policy and national security will probably test his relationship with the new Chief of Army Staff (COAS), particularly if the Army believes that the civilian government’s position on the 2014 election. Sharif has publicly stated that the Army and the civilian government are “on the same page.”

Islamabad wants good relations with the United States, but cooperation with Washington will continue to be vulnerable to strains, particularly due to Pakistani sensitivities toward perceived violations of sovereignty.

• Prime Minister Sharif entered office seeking to establish good relations with the United States, especially in areas that support his primary domestic focus of improving the economy. Sharif and his advisers were pleased with his late October 2013 visit to Washington. Pakistan was eager to restart a “strategic dialogue” and its officials and press have touted results of the initial meetings of several of the five working groups that comprise the dialogue.

• Sharif also seeks rapprochement with New Delhi in part in anticipation of increased trade, which would be beneficial to Pakistan’s economic growth. Sharif will probably move cautiously to improve relations, however, and India also will probably not take any bold steps, particularly not before the Indian elections in spring 2014.

India
In this election year in particular, coalition politics and institutional challenges will remain the primary drivers of India’s economic and foreign policy decision-making. Any future government installed after the 2014 election will probably have a positive view of the United States, but future legislation or policy changes that are consistent with U.S. interests is not assured.

• Coalition politics will almost certainly dominate Indian governance. Since the 1984 national elections, no party has won a clear majority in the lower house of Parliament. We judge that this trend will continue with the 2014 election, and the proliferation of political parties will further complicate political consensus building.

• In 2014, India will probably attain a 5 percent average annual growth rate, significantly less than the 8 percent growth that it achieved from 2005 to 2012 and that is needed to achieve its policy goals.

India shares U.S. objectives for a stable and democratic Pakistan that can encourage trade and economic integration between South and Central Asia. We judge that India and Pakistan will seek modest progress in minimally controversial areas, such as trade, while probably deferring serious discussion on territorial disagreements and terrorism.

India will continue to cooperate with the United States on the future of Afghanistan following the drawdown of international forces. India also shares concerns about a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan, seeing it as a long-term security threat and source of regional instability.

India and China have attempted to reduce longstanding border tensions through confidence-building measures, such as holding the first bilateral military exercise in
5 years in November 2013 and signing a Border Defense Cooperation Agreement during Prime Minister Singh’s visit to China in October 2013. However, mutual suspicions will likely persist.

**Sub-Saharan Africa**

Sub-Saharan Africa will almost certainly see political and related security turmoil in 2014. The continent has become a battleground for the emergence of extremist and rebel groups, which increasingly launch deadly asymmetric attacks, and which government forces often cannot effectively counter due to a lack of capability and sometimes will. Additionally, a youth bulge will grow with unfulfilled economic expectations and political frustrations; conflict will increase for land and water resources; and strengthening transnational criminal networks will disrupt political and economic stability.

**The Sahel**

Governments in Africa’s Sahel region—particularly Chad, Niger, Mali, Mauritania—are at risk of terrorist attacks, primarily as retribution for these countries’ support to the January 2013 French-led international military intervention in Mali. Additionally, this region faces pressure from growing youth populations and marginalized ethnic groups frustrated with a lack of government services, few employment opportunities, and poor living standards. Limited government capabilities, corruption, illicit economies, smuggling, and poor governance undercut development and the region’s ability to absorb international assistance and improve stability and security, which would impede terrorists’ freedom of movement.

**Somalia**

In Somalia, al-Shabaab is conducting asymmetric attacks against government facilities and western targets in and around Mogadishu. The credibility and effectiveness of the young Somali Government will be further threatened by persistent political infighting, weak leadership, ill-equipped government institutions, and pervasive technical, political, and administrative shortfalls.

**East Africa**

Security has increased and ongoing counterterrorism and policing partnerships with western nations have strengthened in the wake of the September 2013 attack by al-Shabaab-affiliated extremists at the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya. Nevertheless, East African Governments will have difficulty protecting the wide range of potential targets. Al-Shabaab-associated networks might be planning additional attacks in Kenya and throughout East Africa, including in Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Uganda, to punish those countries that deployed troops to Somalia in support of its government.

**Sudan and South Sudan**

Sudan’s President Bashir and the National Congress Party (NCP) will almost certainly confront a range of challenges, including public dissatisfaction over economic decline and insurgencies on Sudan’s periphery. Sudanese economic conditions since South Sudan’s independence in 2011 continue to deteriorate, including rising prices on staple goods, which fuel opposition to Bashir and the NCP. Khartoum will likely resort to heavy-handed tactics to prevent resulting protests from escalating and to contain domestic insurgencies. The conflicts in the Darfur region and in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states (the “Two Areas”) will likely continue. Sudan will likely continue an offensive military campaign in the Two Areas that will lead to increased displacement and the continued denial of humanitarian access in the area. Darfur will likely remain unstable as militia forces and the government continue to skirmish, and as internal fighting among local armed groups, general banditry, and insecurity rise.

South Sudan will almost certainly continue to face ethnic conflict, resource constraints, and rampant corruption in 2014. Widespread clashes across South Sudan that began in late 2013 will make economic recovery difficult. Without a cessation of hostilities and a stable peace process, Juba will also struggle to rebound in 2014 because international partners will be more reluctant to invest after the emergency evacuation of foreign diplomats in December 2013 and an increasingly precarious security environment across the country. Additionally, President Kiir will likely continue his authoritarian approach to running the country and dealing with opposition groups; any peace process will likely be slow and continue despite continued attacks by anti-government forces. Ethnic conflict in Jonglei will likely continue as the South Sudanese military faces internal divisions and threats from multiple rebel groups. We assess that Juba will continue to rely on assistance from the international community, but might lose donor funding following its heavy-handed ap-
proach to suppressing political opposition groups in late 2013 and it might be conditioned on any peace process. The oil fields, South Sudan’s main source of revenue, might be threatened by anti-government forces, thereby decreasing or halting production. The South Sudanese Government will also struggle to govern regions outside of the capital and provide basic public goods. South Sudan’s economy suffered significant setbacks after Juba shut down oil production early in 2012.

Nigeria

Rising political tensions and violent internal conflict are likely in the leadup to Nigeria’s 2015 election; protests and upheaval, especially in northern Nigeria, are likely in the event of President Goodluck Jonathan’s re-election. Nigeria faces critical terrorism threats from Boko Haram and persistent extremism in the north, simmering ethno-religious conflict in communities in central Nigeria’s “Middle Belt,” and militants who are capable of remobilizing in the Niger Delta and attacking the oil industry. Unless Abuja adopts a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy, military and security forces will be in a reactive security posture and have limited ability to anticipate and preempt threats. Southern Nigeria’s economy, centered in Lagos, is among the fastest growing in the world but presents a sharp contrast to northern Nigeria, where stagnation and endemic poverty prevail amid insecurity and neglect. Given these domestic challenges, Nigeria’s ability to project leadership across Africa and deploy peacekeepers will probably decrease from what it had in past years.

Central African Republic

Civilian casualties and humanitarian needs in the Central African Republic (CAR) have been severe since the overthrow of former President Bozize in early 2013 by rebel forces from the largely Muslim northeast. Communal conflict—largely along Muslim-Christian lines—has included formation of Christian militias, reprisal killings, atrocities, burning of homes, and destruction of religious sites across the country. The former rebels have used their de facto political authority to violently monopolize the country’s most lucrative resources and territory, eroding CAR’s historically peaceful Muslim-Christian relations. New interim President Samba Panza is a more unifying figure, but the government has almost no presence outside the capital and much of the country has devolved into lawlessness. In December 2013, the U.N. Security Council authorized an African Union peacekeeping force, supported by French forces, to restore security and public order and stabilize the country.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Conflict in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has abated somewhat since the Rwandan-backed M23 rebels suffered a series of setbacks in 2013, gradually losing materiel support from Rwanda and control of its territorial strongholds. The conflict ended with M23’s military defeat and the signing of an agreement with the DRC government in December 2013. We judge that M23 will probably not reconstitute and pose a significant threat to stability in Congo in 2014 without a substantial influx of troops and other military support from an external partner. However, Rwanda will probably consider supporting other armed groups in Congo to secure areas along the border, threatening attempts by the Congolese Government and U.N. forces to consolidate control of the territory. Other armed groups, such as the Allied Democratic Forces and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, continue to pose significant risks to civilians and contribute to instability and violence.

Lord’s Resistance Army

Pursuit operations of the African Union Regional Task Force in central Africa, enabled by U.S. military assistance, has the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) on the run and in survival mode, hindering LRA’s recruiting and training. Increased cooperation between partners has facilitated information sharing and, combined with other efforts, enabled an increased operational tempo, leading to a significant number of defections. LRA still raids settlements in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and CAR and periodically abducts civilians. LRA leader Joseph Kony is often on the move and has long been able to elude capture. Getting a “fix” on his location will remain difficult in this very remote part of the world.

East Asia

China

Chinese leaders will try to focus primarily on domestic priorities during 2014 while leveraging China’s growing influence in the region. A new generation led by Xi Jinping is in place and its ambitious policy agenda is coming into focus: accel-
erate economic reforms, make governance more efficient and accountable, and tighten Communist Party discipline.

China will probably continue its increasingly proactive approach to maritime disputes, including a hardline stance toward Japan over the Senkaku Islands. More broadly, China’s growing confidence, new capabilities, and other perceived challenges to China’s interests or security will drive Beijing to pursue a more active foreign policy.

- Growing regional competition in territorial disputes and competing nationalist fervor increase the risk of escalation and constrain regional cooperation. Sovereignty concerns and resurgent historical resentments will generate friction and occasional incidents between claimants in the East and South China Seas and slow or stall bilateral or multilateral efforts to resolve the disputes.

Beijing has highlighted its pursuit of a “new type of major power relations” with Washington, but China is simultaneously working at least indirectly to counterbalance U.S. influence. Within East Asia, Beijing seeks to fuel doubts about the sustainability of the U.S. “rebalance” and Washington’s willingness to support its allies and partners in the region.

China is pursuing a long-term comprehensive military modernization designed to enable its armed forces to achieve success on a 21st century battlefield. China’s military investments favor capabilities designed to strengthen its nuclear deterrent and strategic strike options, counter foreign military intervention in a regional crisis, and provide limited, albeit growing, capability for power projection. During 2013, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) introduced advanced weapons into its inventory and reached milestones in the development of key systems. China’s first domestically developed heavy transport plane, the Y–20, successfully conducted its initial test flight. Additionally, China has continued to develop multiple advanced ballistic and cruise missiles.

- Developments in PLA capabilities support an expansion of operations to secure Chinese interests beyond territorial issues. For example, China is pursuing more effective logistical support arrangements with countries in the Indian Ocean region.
- Elements from China’s army, navy, air force, and strategic missile forces from multiple military regions participated in Mission Action 2013 in September and October 2013. The exercise included two large-scale amphibious landings and coordinated long-range air force and naval air operations in a maritime environment.

North Korea

Two years after taking the helm of North Korea, Kim Jong Un has further solidified his position as unitary leader and final decision authority. He has solidified his control and enforced loyalty through personnel changes and purges. The most prominent was the ouster and execution of his uncle, Jang Song Thaek in December 2013. Kim has elevated the profile of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) through appointments of party operatives to key leadership positions and the convening of party conferences and plenums. Kim and the regime have publicly emphasized his focus on improving the country’s troubled economy and the livelihood of the North Korean people while maintaining the tenets of a command economy. He has codified this approach via his dual-track policy of economic development and advancement of nuclear weapons. (Information on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and intentions can be found above in the section on WMD and Proliferation.)

Russia and Eurasia

Russia

Putin’s 2012–2013 crackdown on the opposition defused the popular challenge to his hold on power; however, the Kremlin confronts a growing trend of opposition politicians taking their fight to the local ballot box. This trend was illustrated by the consolidation of support in Moscow around a single opposition leader-Aleksey Navalnyy—who finished second in Moscow’s mayoral election in September 2013.

The Kremlin also faces a rise in ethno-religious tensions—as underscored by the October 2013 riot in the outskirts of Moscow—which will probably grow as the Muslim population in Russia increases. Moscow must balance an increasing immigrant Muslim population needed to offset its shrinking labor pool against growing nationalist sentiment among the ethnic Russian population.

In February 2014, Russia will host the Winter Olympics in the Black Sea resort of Sochi—an area bordering the turbulent North Caucasus region where Russian security forces have battled a local insurgency for the past 20 years. We have seen
an increase in threat reporting just prior to the Olympics, which is not unusual for a major international event, and have offered assistance to the Russian Government.

Putin’s claim to popular support and legitimacy as head of the Russian state has rested in part on a record of economic growth and the promise of stability, increasing prosperity, and relative personal freedom. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) projects that the Russian economy will grow by 2.3 percent in 2014, putting at risk a number of ambitious Kremlin projects—including the $700 billion defense modernization plan, the 2018 World Cup, and social welfare enhancements pledged by Putin during his 2012 election campaign.

Moscow has hailed its CW initiative in Syria as a major foreign policy accomplishment. It positions Russia to play a major role in any future settlement of the Syrian conflict and adds legitimacy to the Syrian regime. Russia also will almost certainly continue to seek to fill the vacuum it believes is developing between the United States and Egypt.

The campaign to keep Ukraine from signing an Association Agreement (AA) with the European Union (EU) underscores the importance the Kremlin continues to attach to its goal of Eurasian integration. Russia will have to compete for influence with the EU in the West and increasingly with China in Central Asia; both will pose challenges to its pursuit of Eurasian integration.

The bilateral relationship with the United States will remain a priority for Russian foreign policy. We assess that Russia will continue its engagement with the United States on issues that address its priorities—Syrian CW as well as Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea.

The Russian military remains a symbol of Russia’s national power. Following measured improvements to its capabilities in the past year, it is setting its sights on the long-term challenges of professionalization and rearmament. The new leadership that assumed command of the military last November has made many tactical adjustments to the sweeping reforms the military enacted in 2008, but has largely kept the military on the same strategic trajectory.

The military, in the past year, has taken an increasingly prominent role in out-of-area operations, most notably in the eastern Mediterranean but also in Latin America, the Arctic, and other regions, a trend that will probably continue. Moscow is negotiating a series of agreements that would give it access to military infrastructure across the globe. These bases are generally intended to support “show the flag” and “presence” operations that do not reflect wartime missions or a significant power projection capability.

The Caucasus and Central Asia

Georgia’s new political leaders have inherited pressing domestic and foreign policy problems amid high public expectations for progress. The economy, which has slowed since the Georgian Dream Coalition was elected in October 2012, will be an area of greatest immediate concern. The new government will also continue to balance a series of high-profile legal cases against former government officials for past abuses. The cases, while popular inside Georgia, have generated concerns of political retribution abroad and risk polarizing Georgian politics. Tensions with Russia have eased over the past year, decreasing the risk of renewed conflict. Progress nonetheless remains unlikely on the core disputes between Tbilisi and Moscow.

The standoff between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent territories will remain a potential flashpoint. Neither side will see advantages in deliberately renewing hostilities, but prospects for peaceful resolution are also dim. Azerbaijan is willing to bide its time and wait for stronger economic growth to enable increased military spending to give it a decisive advantage. Armenia has a strong interest in maintaining the status quo because ethnic Armenians already control the separatist region of Nagorno-Karabakh and much of the surrounding territory. Nevertheless, the close proximity of opposing military forces and recurring ceasefire violations along the Line of Contact (LOC) continue to pose a risk of miscalculation.

Central Asia continues to host U.S. supply lines that support operations in Afghanistan, and its leaders remain concerned about regional instability after the coalition drawdown in 2014. Central Asian militaries fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan will likely continue to pose a threat, but sources of potential internal instability in Central Asia will probably remain more acute than external threats. Unclear political succession plans, endemic corruption, weak economies, ethnic tensions, and political repression are long-term sources of instability in Central Asia. Relations among the Central Asian states remain tense due to personal rivalries and disputes over water, borders, and energy. However, Central Asian leaders’ focus on internal control reduces the risk of interstate conflict in the region.
Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus

As Ukraine heads toward the presidential election scheduled to take place in 2015, political developments in Ukraine probably will continue to be shaped by opposition and public anger over the Yanukovych administration’s abuse of power, the need for Yanukovych to maintain the loyalty of key elites, and his efforts to balance Ukraine’s relationship with Russia and the West. Political developments in Ukraine will increasingly be shaped by public protests over Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the Association Agreement (AA) and the presidential election scheduled to take place in 2015. Yanukovych backed away from signing the AA with the EU at the Eastern Partnership Summit in November 2013, probably because Moscow offered the only option for immediate financial support to avert a financial crisis that would threaten his reelection bid. Firmly intent on maintaining his hold on power, Yanukovych will probably resort to coercion, extralegal means, and other tactics to tilt the playing field in his favor and ensure his reelection, threatening a further erosion of democratic norms.

The first tranche of Russia’s $15 billion aid package that Kyiv and Moscow signed in December will allow Kyiv to stave off a fiscal crisis in the short term but risks increasing Ukraine’s economic dependence on Moscow. Russia’s aid package removes incentives for Kyiv to enact painful economic reforms necessary to spur growth, and the ambiguous terms of the bailout leave Kyiv more vulnerable to Russian pressure, particularly on energy issues.

Moldova will continue to try to deepen its integration with the EU. Chisinau initiated an Association Agreement with the EU at the EU Eastern Partnership Summit in November 2013. It is working to formalize the AA, its associated free trade agreement, and an EU visa liberalization agreement before the scheduled November 2014 parliamentary election. However, both the EU and Moldova still need to sign the AA for it to come into full force. Moldova’s pro-European coalition government suffers from low approval ratings after a series of political scandals and coalition infighting; its loss to the opposition Communist Party in the upcoming parliamentary election could delay or derail the country’s EU integration course. A settlement of Moldova’s conflict with its separatist region of Transnistria is highly unlikely during 2014 as they remain far apart on key issues and show no real willingness to compromise. Transnistria and its primary political and financial backer Russia oppose Moldova’s EU integration; they also have little interest in resolving the ongoing conflict because it would remove a key obstacle to Moldova’s European integration and risk reducing the influence Russia retains over Moldova.

In Belarus, the Lukashenko regime has managed to obtain the acquiescence of the Belarusian public, thanks largely to his regime’s clampdown on civil society and also to Russian largesse which has enabled relatively stable standards of living. Lukashenko has done so despite a structurally flawed, centralized economy that leaves Minsk perpetually on the edge of economic crisis and in need of foreign financial assistance to stay afloat. Lukashenko’s economic model has become increasingly unsustainable since his regime’s crackdown on mass protests following the presidential election in December 2010. Continued repression of civil society has left him increasingly isolated from the West and with decreased leverage to resist Moscow’s economic conditions.

Latin America and The Caribbean

Haiti

Stability in Haiti will remain fragile due to extreme poverty and weak governing institutions. Meaningful long-term reconstruction and development in Haiti will need to continue for many years. Haiti remains vulnerable to setbacks in its reconstruction and development goals due to the possibility of natural disasters. Food insecurity, although improving, also has the potential to be a destabilizing factor. Periods of political gridlock have resulted due to distrust between President Michel Martelly, in office since May 2011, and opponents in Parliament. Martelly is generally still popular, but politically organized protests, possibly violent, might occur before the elections, scheduled for 2014.

During the next decade, Haiti will remain highly dependent on assistance from the international community for security, in particular during elections. Donor fatigue among contributors to the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), however, will likely lead to reductions in force, evident by the 2013 mandate which calls for consolidating and downsizing forces. Although the Haitian National Police is making progress on its plans to increase force size from 10,000 in 2011 to 15,000 by 2016, the larger force will probably still need support from MINUSTAH to provide for its own security.
Central America

Central America’s northern tier countries—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—will likely struggle to overcome the economic and security problems that plague the region. All three countries are facing debt crises and falling government revenues because of slow economic growth, widespread tax evasion, and large informal economies. Entrenched political, economic, and public-sector interests resist reforms. Domestic criminal gangs and transnational organized crime groups, as well as Central America’s status as a major transit area for cocaine from source countries in South America, are fueling record levels of violence in the region. Regional governments have worked to improve citizen security but with little-to-moderate success.

- The gang truce in effect in El Salvador since March 2012 has reduced the homicide rate there, mostly among gang members. However, other crimes such as kidnappings, robberies, and extortion are undermining security for many citizens.
- Guatemala still has one of the world’s highest murder rates despite lessened impunity for violent crimes during the past several years. Many areas of the country, particularly along the borders, are under the direct influence of drug traffickers.
- The homicide rate in Honduras remains the highest in the world. New Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez will likely prioritize security policy and seek to build a coalition within the divided legislature to push his economic reform agenda. However, weak governance, widespread corruption, and debt problems will limit prospects for a turnaround.

Europe

Key Partnerships

Ongoing U.S.-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations, European Parliament (EP) elections, the withdrawal of allied forces from Afghanistan, and new leadership in the EU and NATO will create new dynamics in the transatlantic partnership in 2014.

- Europeans likely recognize the need to isolate the TTIP negotiations from the other issue areas. The TTIP has high potential for generating economic growth for both the United States and Europe and for reinforcing the transatlantic link. However, data privacy will probably become a political issue in the runup to the May 2014 EP elections; some opponents of TTIP might use the unauthorized disclosures of NSA information as political cover for their opposition to the TTIP.
- The NATO Summit in September 2014 will be an opportunity to reinforce NATO’s purpose, as well as announce a new Secretary General.
- Radical nationalist and populist political parties are gaining ground in several western and central European countries and will probably do well in the May 2014 EP elections. In November 2013, two far-right parties—the Dutch Freedom Party and France’s Front National—announced that they would cooperate in the EP elections and hope to form a new Euroskeptic bloc, probably linking up with similar parties in Central Europe. Public fears over immigration and Islam, alienation from EU policies, and perceptions that centrist parties are unable to deal with high unemployment and income inequalities will increase the resonance of the rhetoric of far-right and far-left radical parties.

Imbalances in the euro zone and slow economic growth in Europe are changing the political economy in Europe, potentially spurring support for nationalist and populist political parties.

Turkey

Turkey’s foreign and security policy will be shaped by domestic events, especially the ongoing corruption scandal. Furthermore, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), led by Prime Minister Erdogan, will be in election mode for municipal and presidential elections in 2014 and parliamentary elections in early 2015. The corruption allegations initiated in December 2013, allegedly by elements within the AKP associated with Muslim cleric Fetullah Gulen, represent the greatest challenge to Erdogan. Ankara will continue to pursue foreign policy objectives that maximize economic advantage for Turkey while proceeding with caution on issues that could alienate Turkey’s nationalist voters. Erdogan’s pursuit of a peace deal with the Turkish-Kurdish terrorist group Kurdistan People’s Congress (KGK, formerly PKK) also risks antagonizing Turkish nationalists and neighboring governments. Erdogan is pursuing a multifaceted strategy of promoting domestic reforms and engaging the
Kurds to end the armed KGK insurgency in Turkey. The protracted Syrian conflict is generating an increased extremist presence in Turkey, the primary transit country for foreign militants seeking to join the fight in Syria. It is also raising the potential for unsanctioned or opportunistic attacks by supporters of the Bashir al-Assad regime.

The Western Balkans

Despite many positive developments in the Western Balkans in 2013, the region in 2014 will continue to be characterized by deep ethnic and political divisions. The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) and ethnic cleavages in Macedonia are particularly volatile.

- In Bosnia-Herzegovina, different interpretations of the political framework, based on the 1995 Dayton Accords, as well as efforts by Bosniak, Croat, and Serb leaders to maintain control over their political and ethnic fiefdoms will continue to undermine BiH’s central state institutions. Elections in 2014 will not likely bridge these differences, diminishing hopes for BiH’s Euro-Atlantic integration that its neighbors have achieved.

- The Macedonian Government continues to push programs geared to promote ethnic Macedonian nationalism at the expense of the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration. The longer that Macedonia’s EU and NATO membership paths remain stalled over the country’s constitutional name dispute with Greece and poor bilateral relations with Bulgaria, the greater the risk that ethnic tensions will increase.

Chairman Levin. General Flynn.

STATEMENT OF LTG MICHAEL T. FLYNN, USA, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

General Flynn. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for this opportunity to testify and for your continued support to the dedicated intelligence professionals of the DIA and the entire defense intelligence enterprise, many of whom remain forward deployed directly supporting U.S. and allied military forces in Afghanistan and around the world.

Today’s global security environment, as Director Clapper just highlighted, presents a growing list of increasingly complex challenges, conventional adversaries, and numerous asymmetric threats. I completely agree with the DNI’s threat assessment, most notably the challenge of unprecedented regional upheavals and the evolving complexity of the cyber domain. To that end, I would like to highlight three areas that are of particular concern to the DIA.

Number one, the threat of WMD falling into the hands of non-state actors and the proliferation of these weapons to other state actors; number two, the emergence of foreign militaries with capabilities approaching those of the United States and our allies; and number three, increase tensions in the Pacific.

First, as they have publicly and repeatedly insisted, al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations aspire to acquire WMD to further their agenda. The current instability in Syria presents a perfect opportunity for al Qaeda and associated groups to acquire these weapons or their components. While Syria’s stockpiles are currently under the control of the regime, the movement of these weapons from their current locations for disposal or other reasons drastically increases the risk of these weapons or their components falling into the wrong hands. There is also the very real possibility that extremists in the Syrian opposition could overrun and exploit chemical and biological weapons storage facilities before all of these materials are removed.
Outside of Syria, the proliferation of WMD and associated technologies remains an ongoing challenge. State and non-state actors engaging in these activities often sidestep or outpace international detection procedures and export control regimes. These actors supply WMD and ballistic missile-related materials and technologies to countries of concern by regularly changing the names of their front companies, operating in countries with permissive environments or lax enforcement, and avoiding international financial institutions. Their techniques and activities grow more sophisticated by the day.

Shifting to more traditional military force concerns, the armed forces of China and Russia are modernizing and fielding new weapons systems that can challenge the conventional military superiority of the United States. At the same time, both countries are restructuring their militaries and improving command and control to allow themselves to better operate in an information-dominated combat environment. These efforts are a marked departure for both China and Russia and, although it will take time for each to integrate these new capabilities and force structures into their militaries, we cannot afford to ignore these developments by these two critical peers.

Along those lines, I also want to raise the issue of increasing tensions in the Pacific region. The regime in North Korea remains highly unpredictable and is perhaps the most destabilizing force in the entire region. That being said, the disputed areas in the East and South China Seas also remain important flashpoints. The announcement in November that the Chinese are establishing an air identification zone over portions of the East China Sea raised regional tensions, particularly with Japan, and increased the risk of incidents that could undermine peace and security in this vital region. Although all sides wish to avoid serious conflict, these tensions raise the prospect for further incidents that could lead to an escalation involving military force.

DIA has the broadest customer base in the IC. Our customers run the gamut from the President of the United States and Congress to our warfighting combatant commanders. However, the most important customers we serve are the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians who stand in harm’s way around the world. With that in mind, let me turn to the budget environment.

Though there is increasing pressure to reduce defense spending, and reduce it we must, if we are to address our Nation’s fiscal situation, I would note that the demands on the U.S. intelligence system have skyrocketed in recent years, and these demands are only expected to increase in the years to come. While there will have to be reductions and we will have to accept greater risk, as the DNI just highlighted, DIA must continue to be able to provide timely and actionable intelligence across the entire threat spectrum. I look forward to working with you and your staffs as we address the very delicate balance between critical defense needs and our Nation’s long-term fiscal health.

Lastly, I would like to take a moment to echo Director Clapper’s comments regarding Edward Snowden. In my professional military judgment, Mr. Snowden’s disclosures have done grave damage to DOD and go far beyond the act of a so-called whistleblower. I have no doubt that he has placed the men and women of our Armed
Forces at risk and that his disclosures will cost lives on our future battlefields. I hope that he will heed Director Clapper’s call to return any materials he has not already disclosed, for the safety and security of all Americans.

Let me close by saying what an honor and indeed a privilege it is to appear here on behalf of the men and women of the DIA and the entire defense intelligence enterprise. On their behalf, I thank you for your continuing confidence in their work. Your support is vital as well to our national security. I look forward to answering your questions.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Flynn follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LTG MICHAEL T. FLYNN, USA

Good morning, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the committee. Thank you for this opportunity to testify and for your continued support to the dedicated men and women of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), many of whom remain forward-deployed directly supporting U.S. and allied military forces in Afghanistan and other places around the world.

DIA’s mission is to prevent strategic surprise, deliver a decision advantage, and deploy globally to meet any challenge. Our goal is to help the Nation understand the threats it faces, enable decisions and actions—from the President of the United States to a private on the ground—and help our country prepare for the threats we will face in the future. With our focus on foundational intelligence and focused intelligence collection and analysis that supports warfighters as well as policy makers, we bring a unique perspective to the Intelligence Community (IC).

The United States continues to face a complex security environment marked by a broad spectrum of dissimilar threats emerging from countries and highly adaptive transnational terrorist networks. DIA is focused on immediate and long-term threats to allied forces in Afghanistan; risks posed by transnational terrorist organizations, especially as they relate to threats to military forces and facilities; the threat of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of non-state actors and the proliferation of these weapons to state actors; monitoring the potential threat to the United States from ongoing conflicts; the emergence of foreign militaries with near peer capabilities; and support for U.S. and allied forces, at sea or on the ground, deployed around the world.

Defense intelligence must be able to provide timely and actionable intelligence across the entire threat spectrum. Our assessments are based upon the agency’s worldwide human intelligence, technical intelligence, counterintelligence, and document and media exploitation capabilities, along with information from DIA’s partners in the IC and the entire defense intelligence enterprise, international allies, and open sources. In cooperation with these partners and allies, DIA is strengthening its collection and analysis as well as sharing more information across intelligence disciplines, and with our Nation’s close allies, to better understand the multitude of the threats facing the Nation.

The men and women of DIA know they have a unique responsibility to the American people and take great pride in their work. I am privileged to serve with them and present their analysis to you. On behalf of the entire defense intelligence enterprise, thank you for your continuing confidence. Your support is vital to us.

I will begin my testimony first with an assessment of Afghanistan, where the Department of Defense (DOD), the IC, DIA, and our coalition partners remain actively engaged supporting military operations against the threat of al Qaeda and other anti-government of Afghanistan forces, transition to global threats, and conclude with an overview of other regional challenges.

AFGHANISTAN

As the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) continues the transition in Afghanistan, the Afghan Government and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will seek to conduct presidential and provincial council elections in 2014 and maintain security following the ANSF’s assumption of full security responsibilities lead for all of Afghanistan in 2013.

Afghan Security Forces have shown progress in their ability to clear insurgents from contested areas, but have exhibited problems holding cleared areas long-term. As an auxiliary to Afghanistan’s formal security forces, the Afghan Local Police
(ALP) continued to support broader efforts by securing some rural areas that might otherwise lack a central government presence.

Operationally, Afghan forces have adapted to the reduction of ISAF enabler support by making better use of their own capabilities and showing tactical competence in planning and conducting security operations. However, they struggle due to the lack of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability, as well as expertise in, and technology for countering counter-improvised explosive device programs. This challenge, along with stretched ANSF airlift and logistical capacity, limits the Afghan National Army’s (ANA) ability to sustain operations outside of large urban areas and logistical hubs. They have been unable to deny freedom of movement to the insurgency in rural areas.

Uncertainty over the post-2014 security environment—U.S. presence, funding, government cohesion and Taliban strength—is likely to drive decisions at all levels over the next year as ANSF leaders are forced to prioritize objectives, while hedging against this uncertainty. Influential power brokers and regional security officials are increasing their support to ANSF units and ensuring security across their respective areas of authority. These competing priorities could result in politically driven missions that undermine the ANSF’s ability to address militarily necessary requirements.

The ANA and Afghan National Police (ANP) manning of approximately 340,000 personnel remained short of the funded ceiling of 352,000. High attrition, low recruitment, and inconsistent pay reduce the ANA’s on-hand strength and remain an impediment to the ANA’s resilience.

The number of insider attacks from within the Afghan security forces against ISAF personnel significantly decreased in 2013 (13 incidents compared to 48 in 2012). This change is likely a result of a reduced ISAF presence and improved mitigation efforts by both JSIF and the ANSF. The number of insider attacks against Afghan security force personnel increased to 76 incidents, compared to 50 in 2012. Approximately half of all attacks involved ANP as perpetrators, and the ALP accounted for the second largest share.

Afghanistan’s political stability depends on successful elections in 2014 and the subsequent transfer of power from President Hamid Karzai to his successor. Afghan preparations for the April 5th presidential and provincial council elections are on track. The lack of a consensus candidate could lead to a potentially destabilizing runoff election that would occur during the peak of the insurgent fighting season and ISAF’s drawdown. Post-election stability will depend on the new president’s ability to maintain the support of the political elite and ANSF through balanced allocation of political positions and domestic and international funding.

President Karzai remains resistant to signing the Afghan-U.S. Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) despite the approval of the November 2013 Loya Jirga and popular support, most recently insisting that pre-conditions concerning the Afghan peace process and raids on Afghan homes be met. The delay in signing the BSA increases the risk to political cohesion as the potential loss of foreign assistance prompts Afghan elites to reevaluate the viability of, and support for, the government.

Persistent human capital shortages, weak institutions, and corruption will continue to limit the reach of the central government, impede service delivery, and erode the government’s connection to the population. Powerbrokers will strengthen their patronage networks in anticipation of an uncertain future post-2014, encouraging devolution of power.

In 2013, the Taliban-led insurgency failed to seize and hold territory in two of its traditional strongholds, Kandahar and Helmand Provinces. However, we assess the insurgency was able to sustain nationwide violence levels comparable to those of the past 2 years, with attacks increasingly directed against ANSP. Taliban senior leaders likely believe that they only need to continue present levels of military engagement to be postured for victory following ISAF drawdown and withdrawal of key ANSF enablers. The Haqqani Network is a semiautonomous organization under the broader Taliban insurgency, which we judge to be the most proficient group planning and conducting spectacular and complex attacks in Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network poses a serious and ongoing threat to U.S. personnel and facilities in Afghanistan. The Taliban maintains public opposition to any negotiations with the Afghan Government and further intends to challenge its legitimacy by impeding the presidential election scheduled for April 2014, using violence and intimidation to deter prospective voters and disrupt the process. The Taliban is also making proactive efforts to build political legitimacy in advance of ISAF’s drawdown, increasingly attempting to provide limited civil services to local populations.

Reduced coalition presence will present new opportunities for the Taliban to mobilize local sentiment and increase their political influence in the rural areas, their
main constituency. We judge Taliban leaders will likely be challenged to fulfill governance roles at the national level or in major urban centers with any degree of competency in the near term. Bottom line, the Taliban offer no more than an economic and social dead end.

Regarding Iranian influence in Afghanistan, Iran maintains a moderate degree of economic leverage over Afghanistan, which it has attempted to use to extract political concessions from the Afghan Government with limited success. Iran is a key trade partner, providing critical imports of fuel to Afghanistan. Iran also hosts approximately three million Afghan refugees and, in May of last year, threatened their expulsion if the Afghan parliament approved the U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement. Although the threat was unsuccessful in deterring the agreement, a mass deportation from Iran would cause a humanitarian crisis inside Afghanistan.

Al Qaeda leaders continue to view participation in attacks against the Coalition as central to their standing as leader of the global jihad. Despite the outflow of fighters to Syria, the historical and symbolic importance of Afghanistan remains. A small al Qaeda presence resides in the northeastern mountains, with pockets of its fighters elsewhere in the country; however, the group’s operational capacity in Afghanistan is limited. We expect al Qaeda to use media statements to hail the pending 2014 drawdown as a victory for jihadists, and continue its limited support to the Afghan insurgency.

GLOBAL THREATS

Cyber

Cyber reconnaissance, exploitation, and the potential for attacks against DOD forces around the globe is a reality. These activities indicate an interest in how DOD operates in cyberspace and may allow our adversaries to identify opportunities to try to disrupt or degrade military operations. Additionally, state actors are using cyber espionage in attempts to steal critical information from DOD and defense contractors. We remain concerned about this persistent threat to our ability to plan, prepare and ready our forces for future conflicts.

The United States, the DOD, and our interdependent defense systems and critical infrastructure continue to rely on the convergence of military networks and the Internet to enable us to perform our mission. As other nations develop military cyber warfare doctrine and cyber forces, we know they will cultivate tactics, techniques, tools, capabilities, and procedures to threaten our technological superiority. It is imperative that we understand the adversaries’ intent and capabilities.

As conflict between states evolves, the cyberspace is becoming an increasingly vital component of strategy and doctrine for warfighting. Non-state actors remain unpredictable, and the entry barrier to procure disruptive cyber tools and capabilities remains very low. We need to be vigilant to the broader set of state and non-state actors that continue to see cyber as a domain for offensive and defensive influence and opportunity. DOD must strengthen our understanding of the complexities of our adversaries, protect our systems, build resilience in our critical infrastructure, and leverage the experience and knowledge of our foreign partners.

The role the Internet and communication networks play in political stability and regime change remains a significant global cyber issue. Repressive governments are attempting to assert their control over information transmitted through cyberspace, and several nations advocate policies to centralize control over the internet though a top-down intergovernmental approach. Not only would such proposals slow the pace of innovation and hamper global economic development, they would undermine the current, successful multi-stakeholder approach to Internet governance and frustrate the interoperability of networks upon which DOD relies.

Counterintelligence

Globalization, rapid technological advancements, and an uncertain fiscal environment present new avenues of collection and threats from traditional nation-state intelligence services and non-state entities to target U.S. national security information, systems, and personnel.

Increased financial pressures due to resource cuts create potential vulnerabilities that foreign intelligence entities seek to exploit to identify vulnerable employees and contractors with access to sensitive and classified national security information. Foreign intelligence entities conduct a wide range of intelligence and clandestine activities that threaten and undermine our national security interests and objectives worldwide. Such actors target our Armed Forces; our military and national security-related research, development, and acquisition activities; our national intelligence system; and our government’s decisionmaking processes. In addition to threats by foreign intelligence entities, insider threats will also pose a persistent challenge.
Trusted insiders with the intent to do harm can exploit their access to compromise vast amounts of sensitive and classified information as part of personal ideology or at the direction of a foreign government. The unauthorized disclosure of this information to state adversaries, non-state activists, or other entities will continue to pose a critical threat.

DIA is leading an Information Review Task Force to examine grave damage caused to Department of Defense equities and U.S. national security as a result of the unauthorized NSA disclosures. An emerging threat that concerns the department involves the potential for foreign intelligence entities to compromise critical supply chains or corrupt key components bound for vital warfighting systems. Additionally, a few transnational terrorist groups have developed effective intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities—we have seen this manifest in Iraq and Afghanistan, and terrorist groups are now using and sharing the knowledge and experience they gained in those conflicts.

Transnational Terrorist Threats

Al Qaeda Command and Control

Several years of sustained counterterrorism pressure have degraded al Qaeda’s Pakistan-based leadership. Al Qaeda is now forced to rely on a limited cadre of experienced leaders, who are restricted to operating primarily inside a Haqqani Network-facilitated safehaven in North Waziristan, Pakistan. This pressure has made it difficult for al Qaeda to replenish its senior ranks with the experienced leaders, trainers, and attack planners it was able to promote in previous years. It is focused on its security and survival at the expense of operations against the Homeland.

Al Qaeda’s leadership in Pakistan continues efforts to inspire and guide some of its regional nodes, allies, and like-minded extremists to engage in terrorism against the west, but also stresses the importance of regional agendas and winning hearts and minds. Absent the death of Ayman al-Zawahiri, Pakistan-based al Qaeda will retain its role as the ideological leader of the global jihad.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

From its base of operations in Yemen, the group remains resolute in targeting the Homeland, as well as U.S. and Western interests in Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula. However, ongoing counterterrorism pressure is likely slowing and/or delaying some attack plans. AQAP’s recent attacks against Yemeni military targets highlight the group’s ability to conduct complex attacks.

Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL)

AQI/ISIL probably will attempt to take territory in Iraq and Syria to exhibit its strength in 2014, as demonstrated recently in Ramadi and Fallujah, and the group’s ability to concurrently maintain multiple safe havens in Syria. However, its ability to hold territory will depend on the group’s resources, local support, as well as the responses of ISF and other opposition groups in Syria. While most Sunnis probably remain opposed to AQI’s ideology and presence in Iraq and Syria, some Sunni tribes and insurgent groups appear willing to work tactically with AQI as they share common anti-government goals. Baghdad’s refusal to address longstanding Sunni grievances, and continued heavy-handed approach to counter-terror operations have led some Sunni tribes in Anbar to be more permissive of AQI’s presence. Since the departure of U.S. forces at the end of 2011, AQI/ISIL has exploited the permissive security environment to increase its operations and presence in many locations and also has expanded into Syria and Lebanon to inflame tensions throughout the region. For example, AQI/ISIL claimed credit for the 2 January 2014 car bombing in Beirut, in a Hezbollah stronghold, furthering sectarian conflict and demonstrating its strength throughout the region. The likelihood of more attacks in Lebanon is high. Concurrently, AQI remains in control of numerous Syrian cites such as Raqqa, Al-Bab, and Jarablus.

Al-Nusrah Front

The group is working to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad’s regime by attacking the regime and its allies in Syria while building popular support through humanitarian aid campaigns. We judge al-Nusrah Front is seeking to expand its influence in the region and to advance its long-term goals of attacking Israel and strengthening the al Qaeda footprint in the Levant.

Al Qaeda in the lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

Although counterterrorism pressure is probably compelling AQIM to consider alternative safe havens in other undergoverned areas in the region, the group most likely retains the capability to launch attacks against regional and Western inter-
ests in Mali and neighboring countries. During the next year, we expect AQIM to likely bolster its ties to al Qaeda-aligned terrorist groups in North and West Africa.

**Al-Shabaab**

The group continued to pose a threat to Western interests in East Africa as demonstrated by the September attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, which left at least 67 dead. During 2014, a regrouped al-Shabaab will continue to pose a threat to the fragile Somali Government and its regional backers. It will attempt to replicate the success of its Westgate attack with additional operations outside Somalia.

**Other Terrorist Activities of Concern**

**Al-Murabitun**

This newly formed group poses a growing threat to Western interests in North Africa, based on the network's record of sophisticated attacks against Western mineral and energy interests in Niger and Algeria in 2013.

**Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC–QF) and Hizballah**

Iran continues to support and arm terrorist and militant groups in the Middle East. The IRGC–QF has supported pro-regime fighters in Syria, including elements from Lebanese Hizballah, Iraqi Shia groups, and Syrian militias. Captured video footage suggests the Qods Force is operating artillery and lending attacks against Syrian opposition. Hizballah also continues to send operatives to other locations outside Syria to plan external attacks and operations.

**Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT)**

The group has focused on India, but has dedicated greater operational resources from Indian Kashmir to Afghanistan in the years following the 2008 Mumbai attacks. LT ideologically advocates killing Americans and other Westerners, and in previous years has advanced plots ultimately disrupted by counterterrorism authorities in Australia and Denmark.

**Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Jihad Union**

As coalition forces withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014, these terrorist groups with Central Asian links might seize the opportunity to redirect some targeting efforts against Central Asia.

**Imirat Kavkaz (IK)**

This North Caucasus-based terrorist group or IK-linked Caucasus-based militants were likely responsible for the October and December 2013 suicide attacks in Volgograd, Russia. These attacks and the July 2013 statement by IK leader Doku Umarov threatening the 2014 Winter Olympics suggests the likelihood of continued Islamic extremist attacks in Russia in this year aimed at undermining Moscow and deterring attendance at the February Winter Games in Sochi, Russia.

**Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)**

This group poses a significant and continuing threat to U.S. personnel and interests in 2014, despite peace talks with Bogota.

**European Home Grown Violent Extremists (HVE)**

Individuals will remain an ongoing security concern and challenge for Western security services as they radicalize within their home base; return home after gaining terrorist training and/or, combat experience abroad; or develop contacts domestically or abroad to plan attacks against Western interests. Although not all returning fighters will pose a threat, DIA is particularly concerned about self-initiated or “lone wolf” attacks on U.S. military and allied military members in Europe. The Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) also signaled a renewed effort to target U.S./DOD interests with its 1 February 2013 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Ankara and has proven resilient despite crackdowns on the organization in Turkey and elsewhere.

**U.S. Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs) and Insider Threats**

HVEs continue to pose the most likely terrorist threat to DOD, as evidenced by several successful attacks and numerous disrupted plots targeting DOD facilities, installations, and personnel in recent years. While they are less likely to generate complex and spectacular attacks than transnational terror groups, HVEs can conduct attacks with little or no warning, complicating efforts by law enforcement and intelligence agencies to detect and disrupt them. Since 2009, a small number of individuals working for or with access to DOD personnel and facilities have acted on behalf of or have been inspired by terrorist groups. We anticipate terrorist groups
and sympathetic violent extremists will continue seek to establish relationships with individuals associated with DOD to collect information and conduct attacks.

**Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Delivery Systems, Proliferation, and Advanced Conventional Weapons**

The proliferation and potential for use of WMD and ballistic missiles is a grave and enduring threat. Securing nuclear weapons and materials is a worldwide imperative to prevent accidents and the potential diversion of fissile or radiological materials. As technology proliferates chemical and biological weapons are becoming more sophisticated. Al Qaeda and some of its affiliate organizations aspire to acquire and employ chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials. They are most likely seeking low-level CBR agents, such as ricin, botulinum toxin, radiological dispersal devices, and toxic industrial chemicals like cyanide and chlorine as low cost alternatives.

We are concerned about the potential for terrorists to acquire Syrian WMD materials. While Syria's chemical and biological weapons stockpiles are currently under the control of the regime, al Qaeda and its regional affiliates could seek to obtain Syrian stockpiles should security be insufficient. We anticipate the movement of convoys carrying CW from its current locations for disposal could provide an opportunity for one or more of these groups to try to obtain CW agents or material.

Determined groups and individuals, as well as the proliferation networks they tie into, often work to sidestep international detection and avoid export-controls. Such entities regularly change the names of their front companies, operate in countries with permissive environments or lax enforcement, and avoid international financial institutions. Another military issue is the proliferation of advanced conventional weapons, especially air defense systems and anti-ship cruise missiles. We remain concerned especially with Russia’s exports of these arms, including the SA–17, SA–22 and SA–20 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, as well as the supersonic Yakhont anti-ship cruise missile. Russia has exported several of these systems to countries of concern, including the SA–17 to Venezuela, and the SA–17, SA–22 and Yakhont to Syria. Iran continues to press Russia to sell it the SA–20, a modern long-range SAM. The 300-km range Yakhont poses a major threat to naval operations particularly in the eastern Mediterranean. Russia continues to market the C1ub-K cruise missile system, a family of weapons deployed inside standardized commercial shipping containers similar to those found on merchant vessels, freight rail trains, and road vehicles. The covert nature of this weapon would render identifying threat platforms very difficult and reduce warning of an attack.

China is expanding as a supplier of advanced conventional weapons, supplementing its traditional exports of basic battlefield equipment such as small arms, artillery and armored vehicles to include more advanced examples of long-range multiple launch rocket artillery, improved surface to air missile systems and anti-ship cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles, several of which are armed variants. China’s rapid development of new products, aggressive marketing, and relatively low pricing will allow more countries with limited access to advanced weapons to acquire some of these capabilities.

**Theater Ballistic Missiles**

Ballistic missiles are becoming more survivable, reliable, and accurate at greater ranges. Potential adversaries are basing more missiles on mobile platforms at sea and on land. Technical and operational measures to defeat missile defenses also are increasing. China, Iran, and North Korea, for example, exercise near simultaneous salvo firings from multiple locations to saturate missile defenses. Countries are designing missiles to launch from multiple transporters against a broad array of targets, enhancing their mobility and effectiveness on the battlefield. Shorter launch-preparation times and smaller footprints are making new systems more survivable, and many have measures to defeat missile defenses.

**Space and Counterspace**

Space is becoming an increasingly congested, competitive, and contested environment. The quantity and quality of foreign satellites on orbit is rapidly increasing and foreign countries are developing counters to the U.S. space advantage, including methods to disrupt or deny access to communications; position, navigation, and timing; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites.

**China**

Beijing is pursuing space efforts for military, economic and political objectives. China’s military operates satellites for communications, navigation, earth resources, weather, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance purposes, in addition to manned space and space exploration missions. Typically, China has emphasized the
domestic and international benefits of its space program. Internationally, China views the success of these capabilities as a contributor to its growing status and influence, but refrains from highlighting any specific military applicability.

Regarding its counterspace activities, China’s test of a ground-based anti-satellite missile in 2007 and the resulting debris generation in the atmosphere has been well publicized. If deployed, such a capability and the resultant orbital debris is a threat to all countries’ military, civilian, and commercial space assets to the peaceful usage of outer space. Non-kinetic counterspace solutions in development also include jammers.

Russia
Moscow recognizes the strategic value of space, and understands space as a force multiplier and views U.S. dependency on space for projection of military power as a vulnerability. Russia’s space sector has experienced a series of failures in recent years but is taking steps to correct quality control problems within its satellite and space launch vehicle industries. In the past year, Russia completed population of its GLONASS navigation satellite constellation and is making gradual improvements to its communications, ballistic missile launch detection, and intelligence-gathering satellites. The Russian military has a highly advanced space surveillance network, a prerequisite for counterspace operations, and is modernizing and expanding these systems. Russia has satellite jamming capabilities and is pursuing other counterspace capabilities.

Hard, Deep, Buried Targets/Underground Facilities
The use of underground facilities (UGFs) to conceal and protect critical military and other assets and functions is widespread and expanding. UGFs conceal and increase the survivability of weapons of mass destruction, strategic command and control, leadership protection and relocation, military research and development, military production and strategic military assets. A significant trend of concern is the basing of ballistic and cruise missiles and other systems designed for anti-access/area denial weapons directly within UGFs. In addition, Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea operate national-level military denial and deception programs. These four states are devoting increased resources, and particular attention, to improving the denial and deception tactics, techniques, and procedures, for their road-mobile missile and cruise missile forces.

REGIONAL THREATS

Middle East and North Africa
Egypt
The unrest following the July deposal of Mursi has been dealt with by the interim government through laws and tactics to quell dissent, sometimes violently. While the interim government promised an ambitious timetable for transition to an elected government, it has missed some of its own set deadlines. Countrywide protests by opposition groups have been overshadowed by terrorist violence, which is no longer limited to the Sinai. Growing popular opposition against military dominance in society threatens the cohesion of the political parties currently supporting the interim government. Frustration among Islamist political groups over changes to the constitution and their expulsion from political life and parts of civil society threatens to lead to radicalization. The new constitution was finalized by popular referendum with 98 percent approval and 38.6 percent participation, helped in part by changes to regulations to allow for easier voting, lack of free and fair environment in the run up to the elections, and the Muslim Brotherhood and majority of other opposition groups boycotting the vote. Cairo plans to begin the presidential election process in the spring and the parliamentary process in the summer.

Security in the Sinai Peninsula is particularly poor despite Egyptian security efforts there since fall of last year and domestic security elsewhere remains difficult. Increasingly lethal and brazen attacks on security and military forces in the Sinai persist even in areas garrisoned by large numbers of Egyptian forces. Terrorist networks retain their capabilities and are demonstrating their resilience despite increased Egyptian CT efforts, while exploiting security vacuums in parts of the Sinai.

Security forces elsewhere in Egypt face frequent public disobedience, as anti-interim government Islamists focus on low-level resistance, such as student disturbances at university campuses, and avoid other forms of popular protest likely to be forcibly broken up by authorities.
Syria

Three years into the conflict, Syria remains divided and neither the regime nor the opposition has a decisive advantage on the battlefield. The regime dominates central and western areas while the opposition remains dominant in northern and eastern areas. In late 2013, the regime acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and began dismantling its chemical weapons program. The first shipment of CW components left Syria in January and the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons is supporting the ongoing removal.

Assad’s inner circle and the Syrian military remain cohesive, but the military is stretched thin by constant operations. The regime’s strategy has been to encircle the villages and suburbs surrounding opposition-held areas, and then employ artillery bombardments and air strikes before conducting clearing operations. Although these tactics are not new, the regime has demonstrated an increased proficiency and professionalism in their execution compared to the past and has relied more on irregular troops such as militias and Hizballah fighters. This increased effectiveness probably is at least in part due to Iranian support, particularly in training, advising, and intelligence. Syria continues to rely on Russia for major maintenance and refurbishing of its helicopters and likely other heavy equipment after 2 years of heavy use.

Hizballah continues to provide training, advice, and extensive logistic support to the Syrian Government and its supporters. Hizballah has directly trained Syrian Government personnel inside Syria and has facilitated IRGC-QF training of some Syrian forces. Hizballah also has contributed troops to Syrian regime offensives, playing a substantial combat role in operations in Damascus, al-Quasyr, Qalamoun, and other areas within Syria. Iran also has actively supported the Syrian regime in its fight against the opposition.

The Syrian regime maintains the military advantage—particularly in firepower and air superiority, but struggles with an overall inability to decisively defeat the opposition. The opposition has thus far failed to translate their tactical gains in the rural areas of northern and eastern Syria into gains in southern or western Syria. Competition over resources and violent infighting has limited the opposition’s overall combat effectiveness. Ineffective distribution systems, weapons hoarding, and lack of a coherent and unified campaign plan has limited opposition success. Salafist and extremist groups are increasingly challenging Western-backed elements such as the Syrian Military Council (SMC). The competition between groups, and sometimes violence, distracts them from their fight against the regime.

Syria’s most prominent external political opposition group, the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC), struggles to gain internal legitimacy, and no group has been able to unite the diverse groups behind a strategy for replacing the regime. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are funding and arming Syrian rebels seeking to overthrow the Assad regime to weaken Iranian influence in the region and set the stage for a post-Assad Government friendly to their own interests. Saudi Arabia worries about empowered jihadists in Syria while Qatar supports some Islamist groups.

Prior to its accession to the CWC, we believe Syria maintained an advanced CW program and had a stockpile that included either complete or binary components of mustard, sarin, and VX along with weapons systems to deliver these agents. Syria has signed, but did not ratify the Biological Weapons (BW) Convention. Syria may be capable of limited agent production, however, we do not believe Syria has achieved a capability to use biological agents as effective mass-casualty weapons. We remain concerned about insurgents and terrorists attempting to acquire state WMD materials should security fail at CW sites in the wake of unrest or during movement to the coast. While Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles are currently under the control of the Syrian regime, Sunni terrorist groups including al-Qa’ida in Iraq/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (AQI/ISIL) and al-Nusrah Front have aspired to obtain WMD in the past.

Syria has several hundred SCUD-B, –C, and –D, and SS–21 SRBMs. Syria also has a domestic version of the Iranian Fateh-110 SRBM. All of Syria’s missiles are mobile and can reach much of Israel and large portions of Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey from launch sites well within the country. Damascus relies on foreign help, mainly from Iran, to advance its solid-propellant rocket and missile development and production capability. Syria’s liquid-propellant missile program also remains dependent on essential foreign equipment and assistance.

Iran

Tehran poses a major threat to U.S. interests through its regional ambitions, support to terrorist and militant groups, improving military capabilities and nuclear ambitions. Iran is active throughout the region and has increased its influence during the past 12 months in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Bahrain.
However, Iran has somewhat tempered its belligerent rhetoric since President Hasan Ruhani took office in August 2013. Ruhani’s international message of moderation and pragmatism is intended to support Tehran’s enduring objectives, which are to preserve the Supreme Leader’s rule, counter Western influence, and establish Iran as the dominant regional power. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei continues to dominate Iran’s power structure as both the political-spiritual guide and the commander in chief of the Armed Forces.

Iran has threatened to temporarily impede international ship traffic transiting through the Strait of Hormuz if it is attacked or in response to further sanctions on its oil exports. Additionally, Iran has threatened to launch missiles against U.S. targets and our regional allies in response to an attack. Tehran could also employ its terrorist surrogates. However, it is unlikely to initiate or intentionally provoke a conflict or launch a preemptive attack.

In Iraq, Iran works closely with Baghdad to maintain its influence and its access to Syria and Levant via air and ground transport. Iran continues to fund, train, and support Iraqi Shia groups to defend the Shia-led Government against the Sunni insurgency. Iran also threatens to launch missiles against U.S. targets and our regional allies in response to an attack. Tehran could also employ its terrorist surrogates. However, it is unlikely to initiate or intentionally provoke a conflict or launch a preemptive attack.

Iran is laboring to modernize its air and air defense forces under the weight of international sanctions. Each year, Iran unveils what it claims are state-of-the-art, Iranian-made systems, including SAMs, radars, unmanned aerial vehicles, and it did so again in 2013. It continues to seek an advanced long-range surface-to-air missile system. Iran can strike targets throughout the region and into Eastern Europe. In addition to its growing missile and rocket inventories, Iran is seeking to enhance lethality and effectiveness of existing systems with improvements in accuracy and warhead designs. Iran is developing the Khalij Fars, an anti-ship ballistic missile which could threaten maritime activity throughout the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s Simorgh space launch vehicle shows the country’s intent to develop intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology.

Iraq

Since the withdrawal of U.S. forces in December 2011, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have struggled to secure all of Iraq, maintaining security primarily in Shia majority areas. Tensions between Sunnis and Shia, and Arabs and Kurds, have persisted due to the government’s unwillingness to share power and the spillover effects from the crisis in Syria. Violence levels are rising and likely will continue in 2014 as long as the Shia-dominated Government avoids political accommodation and the conflict in Syria continues.

Iraqi Shia militant groups have largely refrained from attacks on U.S. interests and so far have initiated only limited operations against Sunni targets, despite rising AQI violence against Iraqi Shia and increasing demands for Shia militias to protect their communities. Shia militant groups have focused on building their popular base ahead of Iraq’s 2014 national elections. They also continue to send fighters to Syria to augment Iranian-led, pro-regime forces and have conducted attacks against the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) presence in Iraq. Despite their restraint in Iraq, Shia militants remain capable of violent action and they are preparing for violence to spill over from Syria.

The Iraqi Sunni population is increasingly distraught over its fortunes in Iraq. The government’s refusal to reform de-Baathification and anti-terror laws—a key Sunni demand-deepens Sunni alienation. Anti-government demonstrations in Iraq’s three major Sunni provinces have continued for a year. Recent violence in Ramadi and Fallujah in eastern Anbar Province sparked from Sunni perceptions that the Iraqi Government aggressively targeted Sunni civilians. The situation in both cities is fluid and control of different portions of the cities and their surrounding areas will likely change. Unilateral Iraqi military action to contain the violence, if conducted by predominantly Shia units, would only deepen the divide and could convince Sunnis to reject future participation in the government.

ISF have been unable to stem rising violence in part because they lack mature intelligence, logistics, and other capabilities, and still require substantial assistance
to integrate newly-acquired equipment. ISF have demonstrated the ability to put forces on the street, conduct static security of high-profile sites and events, and to operate checkpoints. However, these abilities have not enabled them to suppress AQI or other internal threats. ISF are increasingly challenged in Sunni majority and ethnically mixed areas of Iraq, especially Anbar and Ninewa Provinces. Iraqi military and police forces lack cohesion, are undermanned, and are poorly trained, equipped, and supplied. This leaves them vulnerable to terrorist attack, infiltration, and corruption.

The ISF is inadequately prepared to defend against external threats by land, air, or sea. Iraq’s ground forces have limited ability to conduct and sustain conventional military operations against a peer, and Iraq has few forces and capabilities to defend its airspace or coastal waters. Iraq has pursued numerous foreign military sales contracts to overcome equipment shortfalls and gaps in ISF capabilities. Iraq is diversifying its defense acquisitions with more Russian and other non-U.S. equipment. In November 2013, Iraq received an initial delivery of attack helicopters from arms deals with Russia worth over $4 billion that include air defense systems and other arms. The United States also completed delivery of C-130J transport aircraft and 30 armed reconnaissance helicopters in May 2013. In December 2013 Iraq concluded a $2.1 billion deal with South Korea for FA-50 combat-capable training aircraft. However, we expect it will take several years for Iraqi military strength and capabilities to improve substantially.

Yemen

The security situation throughout Yemen remains tenuous, with government security forces focused either on providing security in Sanaa or working to counter AQAP. Iranian meddling in Yemen’s domestic affairs, to include support to some armed Huthi groups in the north and some secessionists in the south, presents an additional security risk. Apolitical transition process, including efforts to reform the military, is ongoing but proceeding slowly. The National Dialogue Conference concluded in January, allowing forward movement on preparations for constitutional reform and national elections. Notwithstanding political progress, Yemen’s failing economy, dwindling water resources, and food insecurity will further complicate efforts.

Libya

Militias that won the revolution against the Qadhafi regime are now also threatening both the transition process and overall security. Militias present a challenge to internal stability despite Tripoli’s recent progress integrating some armed groups into its security forces. To counteract the militias’ power, Tripoli seeks international assistance to establish a General Purpose Force (GPF) and controlled security entity. Militias loyal to Federalists factions, Berbers, and other minority groups have also occupied oil facilities, decreasing Libya’s oil production from 1.4 million barrels per day to 250,000, and costing the Libyan Government over $7.5 billion in revenues. Mid-November 2013 incidents in Tripoli, Benghazi, and Darnah resulted in more than 40 civilian deaths. Public and government backlash forced militias to withdraw from these cities. These militia elements have withdrawn but have not disarmed, and will likely attempt to return to urban areas after pressure recedes. Other militias not involved in the incidents also remain.

Heavily armed militias will likely continue to threaten stability over the next year. GPF will not be capable of restoring security or central government authority for at least 1 to 2 years.

South Asia

Pakistan

The new government elected in May 2013 seeks to rebuild relations with the United States, including the resumption of the strategic dialogue process. Relations have improved, but anti-U.S. sentiment and criticism of Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States among the population remains high.

In 2013, the civilian government, Army, and the Supreme Court all transitioned to new leadership, which were the first leadership changes for these institutions in nearly 5 years. Nawaz Sharif was elected for his third-term as Prime Minister after his party won a simple majority in the May elections. General Raheel Sharif (no relation) was appointed Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff following the retirement of Gen (ret) Ashfaq Parvez Kayani in late November 2013. Justice Tassaduq Hussain Jillani became the Chief Justice of Pakistan’s Supreme Court in December, replacing Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry who retired due to age. Jillani will only hold the
position for 7 months and the media speculates he will be less of an activist than his predecessor.

The civilian government is focused on addressing Pakistan’s pressing economic issues as well as coordinating a counterterrorism strategy. However, its pursuit of treason charges against former President/Chief of Army Staff Musharraf risks civil-military tension as the case proceeds because it could tarnish the image of the Army and put other senior officers in jeopardy of prosecution.

Approximately one-third of Pakistan’s army and paramilitary forces are deployed in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KPP) to support combat operations at any given time. Over the past year, Pakistan conducted counterinsurgency operations targeting militants in the FATA and KPP which directly threaten Pakistan’s internal security. Despite some success disrupting Pakistan-focused militant activity, Pakistan’s counterinsurgency efforts continue to struggle. The Pakistan military has been engaged in some limited security operations in North Waziristan, although it is unclear when large scale operations will commence.

Tension with Kabul increased after Afghan and Pakistani military forces exchanged direct fire across the border in May 2013. However, the election of a new Pakistani Government has provided an opportunity for Islamabad to re-engage with Kabul in an effort to improve border cooperation and cross-border trade in line with the new government’s focus on improving Pakistan’s economy. Pakistan continues to release Taliban prisoners and has sought ways to support the Afghan peace process. However, longstanding issues including periodic cross-border shelling and the presence of militants on both sides of the border continue to foment distrust and impede broader cooperation.

Prime Minister Sharif has publicly emphasized his desire to improve relations with India since assuming office in June 2013. Several high profile meetings, including the first meeting between the Pakistani and Indian Directors General of Military Operations in 14 years, generated commitments to further dialogue. However, tensions over the Line of Control in Kashmir, delays in the prosecution of the alleged Mumbai attack planners in Pakistan, and domestic political constraints in both capitals will continue to hinder progress this year. A major terrorist attack against India linked to Pakistan would nullify prospects for improved relations and could escalate tensions.

India

In 2013, India continued its efforts to maintain its economic and military ties with important regional partners in East and Southeast Asia. India and Japan conducted their second bilateral naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal in December, and India and Vietnam increased their naval engagement in November. India also signed a trilateral agreement with the Maldives and Sri Lanka in 2013 aimed at improving maritime security cooperation.

New Delhi and Beijing continue to conduct military-to-military engagement and discuss their longstanding border dispute. The two countries signed a Border Defense Cooperation Agreement in October 2013 to reinforce existing procedures to prevent standoffs along their disputed border from escalating. The Indian Army and People’s Liberation Army also resumed ground exercises, conducting a counter-terrorism exercise in China during November, the first since 2008.

India seeks a moderate government in Afghanistan that will deny anti-Indian militant groups the use of its territory from which to launch attacks on India. New Delhi has pledged economic and development assistance and provides training to Afghan National Security Force personnel at military institutions in India. Indian and Afghan Special Forces conducted their first combined exercise in India in late December.

India is in the midst of a major military modernization effort—undertaken by all three military Services—to address problems with its aging equipment and to posture itself to defend against both Pakistan and China. Major acquisitions that occurred in 2013 included the delivery of a Russian-built aircraft carrier, a Talwar Class Frigate, additional Su-30MKI FLANKERs, U.S. built C-17s and P-81 maritime patrol aircraft, and the commissioning of India’s indigenously-built nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine. Military modernization is progressing slowly, however, because of India’s cumbersome procurement process, budget constraints, and a domestic defense industry that struggles to provide military equipment that meets service requirements.

Africa

Africa faces a myriad of security challenges that will require continued U.S. attention.
Somalia

Somalia saw limited progress on its political and security fronts in 2013, as internal divisions hobbled the new government’s development and international forces reached the limit of their ability to hold territory. Al-Shabaab having lost control of major cities, and the Federal Government made steps toward regional integration. Despite significant and public internal divisions in 2013, al-Shabaab continued to conduct attacks, often complex in nature, targeting AMISOM, Somali Government, and international targets in Somalia. Al-Shabaab-affiliated militants also continued to carry out attacks in Kenya, most prominently the late September attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. The recent authorization of additional troops for the African Union (AU) force will permit the resumption of offensive action against al-Shabaab in 2014, and the government will need to capitalize on those security gains. On a positive note, security measures adopted by international shipping companies, coupled with international naval patrols, have helped reduce piracy off the Horn of Africa to its lowest levels in 5 years; no vessels were hijacked in 2013. Within the Africa Horn region in Djibouti, where DOD has its largest footprint on the continent, there is concern regarding the increasing presence of foreign countries’ activities.

Central African Republic

A spike in violence in December 2013 in the Central African Republic prompted the expeditious deployment of international peacekeepers, who will struggle to secure the entire country in the absence of a reliable host nation security force. While the United States is not engaged in combat in the CAR, U.S. logistics operations in support of French and African Union forces also face potential threats. Despite the elimination of the M23 armed group in late 2013 in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, continued military operations alone will not solve the longstanding underlying causes of conflict, such as poverty, human rights violations, and the lack of government control. Moreover, the presence of Rwandan rebels whose leaders are dedicated to the overthrow of the Rwandan Government, probably will remain a destabilizing factor over the next year at least. Five years of sustained pursuit by Uganda’s military has reduced the Lord’s Resistance Army’s numbers and forced them to split up into smaller groups; however, the group still conducts hit-and-run resupply attacks on civilians.

Nigeria

Domestic instability, most notably from the terrorist group Boko Haram in the northeast, is a concern. Abuja’s offensive operations in 2013 against Boko Haram were initially successful in lowering the number of attacks, but, by September, the group had expanded its attack campaign and now conducts high-casualty attacks on a near-daily basis. Because Abuja is focusing its security services on a number of internal operations, its military is overstretched, eroding its ability to support external peacekeeping missions. Moreover, maritime crime increased significantly in the Gulf of Guinea in 2013, surpassing the number of attacks off the coast of Somalia for the first time since 2008. Criminal networks have expanded their range of operations and become adaptable and sophisticated, while regional states lack the maritime security capacity to secure shared waters, largely due to a lack of political will, equipment, maintenance capacity, training, and cooperation.

East Asia

China

The People’s liberation Army (PLA) is building a modern military capable of achieving success on a 21st century battlefield. The PLA is developing capabilities to protect China’s defined territorial integrity, which includes Taiwan and other land and maritime claims along around China’s periphery, preserve China’s political system and ensure sustainable economic and social development. Preparation for a Taiwan conflict with U.S. intervention remains the primary driver of the PLA’s evolving force structure, weapons development, operational planning and training. China has spent as much as $240 billion on military-related goods and services in 2013, in contrast to the $119.5 billion Beijing reported in its official military budget. This budget omits major categories, but it does show spending increases for domestic military production and programs to improve professionalism and the quality of life for military personnel.

Disputed territorial claims in the East and South China Seas remain potential flashpoints. The Chinese announcement in November 2013 that it was establishing an air identification zone (ADIZ) over portions of the East China Sea has increased tensions since this ADIZ overlaps with other preexisting ADIZ’s and covers territory administrated by Japan and the Republic of Korea. China’s announcement raised
tensions and increased the risk of incidents that could undermine peace, security, and prosperity in the region.

China’s ground force is seeking to restructure itself into a mechanized, modular force that can conduct joint operations anywhere along China’s borders. This effort is currently taking shape with an emphasis on building and outfitting brigades as the main operational unit and creating flexible Special Operations Forces, improved army aviation units, and C2 capabilities with improved networks providing real-time data transmissions within and between units.

China’s air force is transforming from a force oriented solely on territorial defense into one capable of both offshore offensive and defensive roles—including strike, air and missile defense, early warning, and reconnaissance. It is also seeking to improve its strategic projection by increasing its long-range transport and logistical capabilities. Modernization efforts include investing in stealth technology. China also continues negotiations with Russia for Su-35 fighter aircraft; however, a contract is unlikely to be signed until later this year, at the earliest.

The PLA navy is developing the JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine and JL–2 submarine-launched ballistic missile. We expect the navy will make their first nuclear deterrence patrols in 2014. It has also recently deployed for the first time a nuclear-powered attack submarine to the Indian Ocean. China is also continuing negotiations for the joint-design and production for a new advanced conventional submarine based on the Russian LADA-class. China’s investment in naval weapons primarily focuses on anti-air and anti-surface capabilities to achieve periodic and local sea and air superiority within the first island chain. China’s first aircraft carrier, commissioned in late 2012, will not reach its full potential until it acquires an operational fixed-wing air regiment over the next several years.

To modernize its nuclear missile force, China is also adding more survivable road-mobile systems and enhancing its silo-based systems. This new generation of missiles is intended to ensure the viability of China’s strategic deterrent by ensuring a second strike capability.

The military is also augmenting the over 1,200 conventional short-range ballistic missiles deployed opposite Taiwan with a limited but growing number of conventionally armed, medium-range ballistic missiles, including the DF–16, which will improve China’s ability to strike regional targets. China also continues to deploy growing numbers of the DF–210 anti-ship ballistic missile.

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK)

Pyongyang’s primary national objectives consist of preserving the current authority structure under the leadership of Kim Jong Un, improving the country’s dysfunctional struggling economy, and deterring foreign adversaries from taking actions which could threaten the regime. In early 2013, Kim Jong Un articulated a policy of simultaneously pursuing the production of nuclear weapons and the development of the national economy. Pyongyang is likely to maintain this course for the foreseeable future.

Kim Jong Un continues to exercise his authority in both senior Party and military positions, including First Secretary of the Korea Workers’ Party, Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army, and First Chairman of the National Defense Commission. Since becoming leader of North Korea, Kim Jong Un has replaced or reassigned a large number of many senior party and military officials, placing younger officials more closely associated with him in key assignments. Kim’s execution of his powerful uncle Chang Song-taek in December 2013 eliminated the most influential senior Party official remaining from his father’s era and sent a strong message to regime elites that the formation of factions or potential challenges to Kim Jong Un will not be tolerated.

After Chang’s execution, Pyongyang reiterated threats to attack South Korea for what it calls interference in its internal affairs. Although North Korea’s large, forward-positioned conventional forces are capable of launching an attack on South Korea, the North’s military suffers from logistics shortages, largely outdated equipment, and inadequate training. Pyongyang likely knows that an attempt to reunify the Korean Peninsula by force would fail, and that any major attack on the South would trigger a robust counterattack. Recent conventional military improvements have focused on developing the North’s defensive capabilities and ability to conduct limited-scale military provocations, especially near the demilitarized zone and along the disputed maritime boundary in the Yellow Sea.

The Korean People’s Army conducts the majority of its training during the winter training cycle, from December through March. North Korea is stressing increased realism in military training, but training still appears to do little more than maintain basic competencies. Because of its conventional military deficiencies, North Korea also has concentrated on improving its deterrence capabilities, especially its
nuclear technology and ballistic missile forces. The North conducted a nuclear test in February 2013, and in April announced its intention to ‘adjust and alter’ the use of its existing nuclear facilities, including the plutonium production reactor and uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon.

On the nuclear front, we assess that North Korea has followed through on its announcement by expanding the size of its Yongbyon enrichment facility and restarting the reactor that was previously used for plutonium production. The regime is pursuing a uranium enrichment capability for nuclear weapons development, and the restart and operation of its plutonium production reactor could provide the North with additional plutonium for nuclear weapons. It also seeks to develop longer-range ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons to the United States, and continues efforts to bring its KN08 road mobile ICBM, which it paraded in July 2013, to operational capacity. In December 2012, the North also used its Taepo-Dong-2 launch vehicle to put a satellite in orbit, thus demonstrating its capabilities for a number of long-range missile applicable technologies.

Russia

Russia continues to actively pursue its active foreign and defense policies, both along its periphery and elsewhere. In 2014, we expect Moscow will continue efforts to expand its influence in Eurasia by pushing its neighbors to increase cooperation with Russia and Russian-led organizations rather than the West, as Moscow recently did with Ukraine and Armenia. Russian leaders likely regard their support of Syria as a success and Moscow will continue to promote a negotiated resolution to the crisis, consider higher-profile defensive arms deliveries on a case-by-case basis, block efforts to gain U.N. authorization for military intervention, and insist that the Syrians themselves rather than external forces must determine any transition in power. Russian leadership further views the recent PS+1 agreement an opportunity to enhance bilateral relations with Tehran, although they will be wary of improvement in relations between Iran and the United States and European Union. Russia is ready to exploit any deterioration of relations between the United States and its allies and will move to offer support to such states.

Russia’s Afghanistan policy reflects an uneasy balance between Moscow’s wish for stability in Afghanistan and its desire to prevent any long-term U.S. military presence in Central Asia. With the drawdown of U.S. forces this year, Russia is increasingly worried about security threats flowing from Afghanistan. Russia maintains friendly ties with the Afghan Government, but only provides modest aid. However, Moscow views the Afghan National Security Forces as insufficiently trained to secure Afghanistan after the departure of ISAF forces in 2014. Russia believes that bordering Central Asian states will be vulnerable to a spillover of violence and expanded narcotics trafficking. Moscow probably wishes to seize upon the departure of coalition forces from Central Asia—most notably the forthcoming closure of the Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan—to reassert its influence in the region, particularly in the security sphere.

Russia’s 10-year rearmament plan is a top priority for the Armed Forces, but it faces funding and implementation risks owing in part to a potential decline in oil and gas revenues, spending inefficiencies, an aging industrial base, and corruption. Russia spent an announced $66 billion on its Armed Forces in 2013, and the current budget plan calls for a 12.9 percent inflation-adjusted increase in 2014.

We expect Russia’s military modernization will lead to a more agile and compact force capable of more modern forms of warfare. A future force will be smaller, but more capable of handling a range of contingencies on Russia’s periphery. We expect continued effort on improvement of joint operations capabilities and rearmament because of the high priority Russian leadership places on these portfolios. The general purpose forces will continue to acquire new equipment in the near-term, but deliveries will be small and largely consist of modernized Soviet-era weapons. Russia also has purchased select foreign systems, such as France’s Mistral amphibious assault ship, unmanned aerial vehicles from Israel, and Italian light armored vehicles. The first Mistral, purchased from France, was launched in France on 15 October 2013.

Russia will continue to maintain a robust and capable arsenal of strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future. To support this policy, the Russian Government is making strong investments in its nuclear weapon programs. Priorities for the strategic nuclear forces include force modernization and command and control facilities upgrades. Russia will field more road-mobile SS–27 Mod-2 ICBMs with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. It also will continue development of the RS–26 intercontinental ballistic missile, the Dolgorukiy ballistic missile submarine and SS–NX–32 Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile, and next-generation cruise missiles.
Latin America

Mexico

President Enrique Pena Nieto will continue to prioritize reducing homicide, kidnapping, and extortion rates as the central element of his security strategy. He will rely on large-scale military troop deployments to reduce high-profile violence involving drug trafficking organizations. The military remains the lead on these efforts as police professionalization progresses slowly. At the state and municipal levels, police face the challenges of ongoing elevated violence, corruption, limited budgets and lack of government oversight.

The Pena Nieto administration has had some security successes. In 1 year, the military has fulfilled more than half of its high value targeting objectives for its 6-year term, arresting or killing 71 drug traffickers of a list of 122 priority targets. Intentional homicides declined for the second consecutive year, continuing a trend which began under the previous administration, but reported kidnappings and extortion have increased. More recently, the Michoacan state government called on the Federal Government to address a growing conflict between vigilante or self-defense groups and traffickers, complicating the security picture for the administration, and potentially pulling resources from ongoing security operations elsewhere in the country.

Mexican cartels are expanding their presence throughout the Western Hemisphere and partner with other criminal groups in the region to transship and distribute cocaine. Mexico is already the principal transit country for U.S.-bound cocaine and the primary foreign supplier of methamphetamine, heroin, and marijuana to the United States. The networks of Mexico's nine principal drug trafficking organizations also extend to six of seven continents, with the Sinalon Cartel and Los Zetas having the farthest reach into these lucrative international markets. In addition to trafficking and distributing drugs, Mexican traffickers rely on organized crime syndicates and small criminal groups to launder money, obtain precursor chemicals for drug production in Mexico, and in some cases, produce drugs on their behalf.

Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala

The proliferation of drug trafficking groups and record-high violence will ensure these countries continue to employ the Armed Forces to combat drug trafficking and perform traditional law enforcement functions while ongoing police reforms attempt to bolster police capabilities. Guatemala also is plagued with drug traffickers throughout the country and has one of the highest murder rates in the world.

Colombia

The Defense Ministry is maintaining security operations against the FARC while Bogota conducts peace talks, which have become President Juan Manuel Santos’s focus prior to the May 2014 presidential election. Santos replaced his defense high command in August 2013 and the Defense Ministry implemented a revised counter-insurgency strategy—Sword of Honor II—in October. While the revised campaign seeks to emphasize civil action programs, kinetic operations will continue under Sword of Honor II.

Colombia's counterdrug performance is the strongest in the region, and potential cocaine production has decreased in recent years, but the country remains the leading producer of U.S.-bound cocaine.

Venezuela

Economic stress continues to build in Venezuela with inflation of 56 percent in 2013 and scarcity of basic consumer goods, but frustration with President Nicolas Maduro's policies and the economy has not led to widespread sustained protests and the military leadership supports him. High crime rates—some of the highest in the region—added an additional level of insecurity, requiring the deployment of law enforcement and military troops. President Maduro lacks the charisma and popularity enjoyed by late President Hugo Chavez. Historically, military support has been critical for any Venezuelan president's ability to maintain power and ensure stability, and Maduro has provided incentives to build military loyalty. He has announced pay increases, and plans to improve military housing and health benefits. The military continues to modernize and will receive additional Chinese and Russian equipment deliveries. Caracas took possession of two Chinese medium transport aircraft in November and Russian long-range surface-to-air missile systems in April 2013. Caracas also increasingly employs the military in domestic roles.
Cuba
President Raul Castro will manage his nation’s political, socioeconomic, and security force conditions to maintain regime viability and keep the likelihood of a mass migration to a minimum. While he will continue to implement economic reforms slowly and cautiously, Castro will adjust the pace as needed to assure his regime's continued grip on power. Cuban intelligence services, having proven very capable of penetrating key U.S. and DOD targets, remain the predominant counter-intelligence threat to the United States emanating from Latin America.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.
We’ll have a 7-minute first round.
Director, let me start with you and ask you a few questions about Afghanistan. Our ISAF joint commander, Lieutenant General Mark A. Milley, USA, said that in 95 percent plus of tactical firefights in which the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) engaged, that they held their ground and defeated the enemy, and noted that at no time did the ANSF during this past summer lose any urban area or population center. He added that not a single district center was overrun by the Taliban.
Do you agree with our military commanders in their assessment of the ANSF?
Mr. Clapper. Let me start and General Flynn can chime in. There’s no question that the ANA has enjoyed tactical success, particularly when they have had good leadership and had the enablers available to facilitate particularly a joint campaign. They are still beset by extensive desertion problems. Some 30,000 troops deserted last year out of an army of 185,000.
The other difficulty, of course, is the ANA has had great success tactically in their contacts with the Taliban; the difficulty has been holding something once it is cleared, particularly when it requires follow-up by the ANP.
General Flynn, do you want to add to that?
General Flynn. Mr. Chairman, I would just add that the ANSF, particularly the army but increasingly the ANP, have made, I would say, modest progress over the years. I think that they still—well, a couple of things. One, I think that there’s great uncertainty in their minds because of the lack of a signing of the BSA, to be very candid. I think that the enabling capabilities that they still lack, things like intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), counter-improvised explosive device (IED) expertise, technology, the airlift, and logistics, so the types of sustainment capabilities are things that they still require in order for them to have progress on the battlefield.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Director, if we announced that we were going to await the next president to seek the signature on the BSA, what would be the effect inside of Afghanistan?
Mr. Clapper. The effect already of the delay has been negative in terms of the impact on the economy, not to mention, I think, the psychological impact, particularly after the loya jirga last November approved going forth with a BSA. We’re already seeing negative trends in terms of the economy. The gross domestic product is dropping and, importantly, I think, an important statistic or factoid is the drop in the number of foreign businesses that are investing in Afghanistan.
Chairman Levin. Wouldn’t it just clear the air for us to say we’re going to await the next president?

Mr. Clapper. Obviously, it takes two to sign this. It’s my own view, not necessarily company policy, is that I don’t believe President Karzai is going to sign it.

Chairman Levin. Wouldn’t it be clearing the air just to say we’re going to await the next president, to eliminate the uncertainty?

Mr. Clapper. That’s a policy call, sir. That’s not intelligence. I don’t know what the decision will be as to what——

Chairman Levin. Or what the effect will be? Do you have an assessment as to what the effect would be inside Afghanistan if we just made that declaration?

Mr. Clapper. The declaration of what?

Chairman Levin. That we’re going to wait for the next president to sign the BSA.

Mr. Clapper. I suppose it could have a salutary effect, if we said that.

Chairman Levin. Now, in terms of Iran, if the joint plan that’s been agreed to is successfully implemented, would its terms and conditions diminish Iran’s nuclear capacity compared to where Iran would otherwise be in 6 months without that JPA?

Mr. Clapper. It would, particularly since it rolls back the enrichment of the 20 percent highly enriched uranium. It puts curbs on the heavy water facility at Arak and, most importantly, it imposes very intrusive surveillance and observation carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). But yes, it would help to set back the program some.

Chairman Levin. Director, in December, in a letter to Senators Feinstein, Johnson, and myself, you said that the IC has reached the judgment, “that new sanctions would undermine the prospects for a successful comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran.” Could you explain?

Mr. Clapper. We think at this point, given the impacts of the sanctions that have been imposed already, which have been quite substantial in terms of the contraction of the Iranian economy, unemployment, inflation, et cetera, and the availability to them of getting access to their foreign reserves, have been quite substantial. I think our assessment would be that further sanctions at this point would probably be counterproductive.

But it’s important to remember that the Iranians understand our government and how we operate, and so in my view, the implicit threat of additional sanctions is more than sufficient.

Chairman Levin. All right. Then finally, relative to Syria, what impact would a more robust program of training and equipping vetted members of the moderate Syrian opposition have on the ongoing conflict? Could it put additional pressure on Assad?

Mr. Clapper. It could help. To the extent that we can put through and train more people that are vetted, that would probably be helpful.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Senator Inhofe.

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I had six things I was going to ask, but I think Director Clapper answered two of them in a lot of detail. I want to mention some-
thing else about Snowden, the tide of war, and then, of course, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), and then one other question about Iran.

First of all, I thought you covered it very well, Director Clapper, in terms of what Snowden has done. The disturbing thing is, and we hear from an awful lot of people, they treat him as if he's a hero. I look at him more as a traitor. I would like to get from each one of you, that probably you'd agree that he's perpetrated the single greatest compromise of classified information in American history. Then second, have each one of you respond that—I believe that the vast majority of the 1.7 million documents that were stolen have nothing to do with the NSA or surveillance programs and if disclosed or placed in the hands of adversaries, will undermine our ability to defend our Homeland. Just something so that people will understand that the vast majority of this stuff really has nothing to do with the rights that people are concerned about under the NSA.

Mr. Clapper. Yes, sir. As I indicated in my oral statement, the revelations have gone way, way beyond the concerns about the so-called domestic surveillance programs. To quantify this, it's a very small portion of the totality of what he's looked at. The 1.77 million is simply an assessment of what he looked at. We don't actually know what he actually took and what he's provided to his accomplices. But that's why I said in my statement that potentially this is by far the most damaging set of intelligence revelations in the Nation's history.

Senator Inhofe. General Flynn, do you agree with that?

General Flynn. Yes, Senator, I absolutely agree. The majority of what he took, without going into the details of the types of capabilities or components, have nothing to do with NSA.

Senator Inhofe. Back when AFRICOM was started, I was most interested in that and it was good that we did it. However, setting it up so that they don't have control over their own assets comes back to haunt us, I feel, quite often.

Put that chart up, if you would please, over there.

[The information referred to follows:]
Senator INHOFE. If you look and see how much is going on right now in Northern Africa and the fact that they are dependent upon U.S. European Command (EUCOM) for their resources. I just got back from Africa, from EUCOM headquarters, and from that general area. I would like to have you comment as to your concern. In Africa headquarters, I was briefed that only 12 percent of all the requests of ISR are being met, due to the lack of resources. I'd like to have you give me your assessment as to the resources that are there, the assessments that have been made that only 12 percent of the concerns are being met or being addressed. Because my concern is that it's being budget-driven as opposed to risk-driven. What are your thoughts about AFRICOM right now and the resources they have? Of course, you mentioned, General Flynn, in this time of the budget restraint. That's my concern, that this is all budget-driven. Comments on that?

Mr. CLAPPER. Sir, I can comment on certainly the threat that we see evolving in Africa. The map is quite suggestive of that. In both what's called the Sahel and then the Maghreb along the northern coast of Africa, we see a proliferation of either al Qaeda or al Qaeda wannabes or other terrorists who profess violence. Of course, it's kind of a perfect storm of conditions there, with large ungoverned areas, porous borders. The place is awash in weapons, primarily from Libya, and you have either unwilling or incapable security services able to go after these people.

For the most part, they don't pose a direct threat to the Homeland now, but they certainly could in the future.

As far as AFRICOM is concerned, I'll defer to General Flynn, but just to say it is clearly an economy of force operation. I think the AFRICOM Commander, General David M. Rodriguez, has done a
superb job in marshalling the resources he does have, particularly in monitoring the situation in South Sudan.

One other point I’d mention, since the President of France is visiting here, is that the French have capability in that part of the world from their history and they have great access, and have laid out a strategy in which they want to pursue terrorism. Of course, I think they would look to us for support and we’re certainly going to try to do all we can to assist them, particularly with respect to intelligence.

General FLYNN. First, I appreciate your asking the question. I think that that map is very telling in terms of the threats that we face in AFRICOM. I think for viewers, one of the things to point out, where that number “8” is at the top there, which is on the coast of Algeria, down to the Gulf of Nigeria where the number “10” is, that distance is about the distance from New York to Los Angeles. So the scale of what we’re talking about in AFRICOM and Africa as a continent is just huge.

I think in terms of what AFRICOM is trying to do is they are working very hard to build African capacity where they can, basically partnering with the African nations to be able to build capacity bilaterally and then via coalitions. One of the capabilities that is a shortcoming, a major shortcoming, and we appreciate all the help from Congress on this, is the need for ISR capabilities, not just the capabilities that fly, but also the human intelligence and other aspects of ISR.

Then, I think, as the Director just highlighted, the reliance on other partners, particularly European partners that do support many of these operations that are going on in Africa, that reliance is really critical for us.

Senator INHOFE. My time is about expired, but I want to get an answer from each one of you. I keep hearing these things that different people in the administration are saying that al Qaeda is on the run, on the path to defeat. If you look at this chart up here, it depicts that al Qaeda and its allies have a presence and are now operating. To me it’s just the opposite of that.

Just yes or no, each one of you: Is al Qaeda on the run and on the path to defeat?

Mr. CLAPPER. No, it is morphing and franchising itself, and not only here, but in other areas of the world.

General FLYNN. They are not.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

Senator Reed.

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen.

General Flynn, could you briefly give us an update on the Defense Clandestine Service (DCS), including its purpose and how it relates to other agencies and organizations?

General FLYNN. Thanks for asking the question, Senator. The purpose is to provide human intelligence collection capability for defense and national requirements, principally for defense requirements. I would just say that in three areas we have seen significant improvement, and that is our field presence, which we have expanded our footprint overseas primarily. The second area is
building stronger partnerships, not only with allies and other nations, but also with our Services and with especially U.S. Special Operations Command, and, of course, our great partner, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in this endeavor.

The last area, which is really part of instilling discipline into this whole system, we have seen a modest increase in our productivity in terms of reporting and just production from these capabilities that we have put out there over the last year.

Senator Reed. Thank you.

General Clapper, can you comment on the DCS from the perspective of its integration with other elements, since you’re sitting at sort of the apex of the collection activities and other activities?

Mr. Clapper. Sir, you’re speaking specifically of the DCS?

Senator Reed. How you view it.

Mr. Clapper. I am a big supporter of it. I’m a former Director of the DIA and actually stood up the initial Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Service when we combined strategic and HUMINT in DIA in the early 1990s. So, to me, this initiative is about taking this to the next level. It represents professionalization and greater partnering with the CIA’s National Clandestine Service (NCS). I’m a big proponent of it. I think it is a unique capability. Particularly the uniformed officers provide a unique service to the national IC that no one else can do.

Senator Reed. Thank you, General.

General, turning to Syria, you stated that there are possibly 7,500 foreign fighters, which raises multiple issues, but two I want to concentrate on. First is stemming the flow of foreign fighters into the country, and perhaps just as importantly or maybe more importantly, tracking them as they exfiltrate from the country.

Can you comment on both points, and also how, particularly with respect to tracking them as they leave the country, you are sharing this information with all of the relevant agencies—Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Transportation Security Administration, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et cetera—so that we don’t find ourselves——

Mr. Clapper. Yes, sir. That estimate, by the way, is probably conservative. Those are the ones we can actually account for. There are probably more.

This is a huge issue in Europe with our allies and they share information on this with us and we share with them on this. That’s the critical element in terms of sharing. They are very concerned about it.

Part of the problem—I can be more specific in a closed environment—is, in some cases, lax rules about terrorists as they transit through intermediate countries. That’s about all I can say in open session. We’re trying to work that agenda as well.

But, absolutely, sir, particularly those who may have, even if they’re aspirational, designs on not only potential attacks in Europe, but attacks here. We are sharing information. I think Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Jeh Johnson, spoke to this very issue recently.

Senator Reed. Just to be sure I’m clear, there is a conscious, deliberate effort to identify all these foreign fighters in Syria now and
to be prepared, through cooperation with our agencies and other
countries, to follow them if they come out? Is that fair?
Mr. CLAPPER. Yes, sir, as best we can.
Senator REED. Thank you.
Let me ask you another question. You commented about Mr.
Snowden. Is it your sense that some of the vast amounts of infor-
mation that he has collected could reveal agents, units, and sources
that we have?
Mr. CLAPPER. Yes, sir.
Senator REED. Thank you.
Mr. CLAPPER. Both assets and those of our own people that are
undercover.
Senator REED. General Flynn, you spoke about WMD, which is
critical. Generally, are these chemical weapons or biological weap-
ons? Is that what you’re talking about, because WMD also——
General FLYNN. Yes, mainly chemical and biological capabilities.
Senator REED. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator McCain.
Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the wit-
tesses.
Director Clapper, you say in your statement: “President Assad
remains unwilling to negotiate himself out of power.” Does that
mean that you believe the prospects of anything meaningful coming
out of Geneva and now Geneva 3, or whatever it is, are minimal?
Mr. CLAPPER. Sir, I’d say my expectations and I think the IC’s
expectations about the outcome of Geneva 2 have been pretty mod-
est. Hopefully, what they’ve been talking about, to the extent that
they’ll talk to each other, is humanitarian issues. But in terms of
a long-term political solution, I think that’s problematic.
Senator MCCAIN. The premise of Geneva 1 was the transition of
Bashar Assad from power and that is very unlikely, certainly given
the circumstances on the ground.
Mr. CLAPPER. It takes two parties to have a negotiation. I think
the Syrian regime position is that’s not negotiable for them.
Senator MCCAIN. The map that Senator Inhofe pointed out, I
think that map would have looked dramatically different in Janu-
ary 2009 than it does today.
But going back to Syria, have you seen the horrific pictures that
have been—I’m sure you have—revealed recently of the docu-
mented examples of torture and murder? Have you seen those doc-
uments?
Mr. CLAPPER. Yes, sir. They’re terrible. When you consider the
humanitarian disaster, in addition to the 2.5 million refugees, the
6.5 or 7 million that are internally displaced, the 134,000-plus peo-
ple who have been killed, it is an apocalyptic disaster.
Senator MCCAIN. Do you believe those documents are authentic?
Mr. CLAPPER. As best we know, yes, sir.
Senator MCCAIN. It’s your professional opinion that they are au-
thentic?
Mr. CLAPPER. I believe they are. I have no reason to doubt their
authenticity and it would be difficult for something of that mag-
nitude to have been fabricated.
Senator McCain. Thank you.

The situation, as I quote from your statement, is that: “The regime and many insurgents believe they can achieve victory, given their respective capabilities.” In other words, the next 6 months will be basically status quo, in your written statement?

Mr. Clapper. Sir, I think what we’re facing right now is a prolonged stalemate, where the regime doesn’t have the staying power to hold onto areas they clear and, with the external support to the oppositionists, they will continue to be a thorn in the side for the regime.

Senator McCain. So the statement of the President of the United States that it’s not a matter of whether, but when, Assad will leave power, is no longer operative, nor the testimony before this committee by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then-Secretary of Defense Panetta that, “The departure of Bashar Assad is inevitable.”

Would you agree that the situation was dramatically changed on the battlefield when 5,000 Hezbollah came in, the Iranian revolutionary government, and the increased weapons supplies from Russia? Would you agree that they basically had a significant effect on the battlefield?

Mr. Clapper. I was one of those—in fact, I think I may have said it here last year, that at the time, at some point Assad’s days are numbered; we just don’t know the number. But what has made a huge difference, of course, has been the external support from Russia, Iran, and its surrogate Hezbollah.

Senator McCain. Syria and Iraq have become an al Qaeda training ground and transit point back and forth for al Qaeda and al Qaeda-affiliated groups?

Mr. Clapper. Correct. It’s a very porous border there.

Senator McCain. Really, when you look at Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, even Kurdistan, this is to a large degree a regional conflict, would you agree?

Mr. Clapper. It certainly has regional implications, absolutely.

Senator McCain. 7,000 foreign nationals would want to return some day to their own country.

Mr. Clapper. That’s the going presumption.

Senator McCain. The 26,000 who are there are extremists that, as you point out, who would like to attack to the United States of America. In your words, intentions.

Mr. Clapper. Well, not all 26,000, necessarily. By the way, that is the high end for the extremists. But, for example, Al-Nusra Front has long professed a desire to ultimately attack the Homeland.

Senator McCain. The longer this goes on, really, and the more foreign fighters that go in, et cetera, et cetera, the more likely there is a greater and greater threat actually to the United States of America; would you agree?

Mr. Clapper. I would.

Senator McCain. Could you tell me in your mind what are some of the options that we could examine in order to change this stalemate on the battlefield, basically, as you’ve described it, and I agree with?
Mr. Clapper. Sir, there are some things we could do that, at least in my domain, are probably best left to closed session. But there are some things we could do. I'm not sure we can dramatically increase our assistance, but at least on my front, which is the intelligence area, there are some things we could do.

Senator McCain. I thank you, and I understand why. But there are additional measures we could take that we haven't taken; is that true?

Mr. Clapper. I'm sure there are, but it's not my place to speak to those.

Senator McCain. I understand that.

Finally, I guess as my time runs out, it's a little difficult for a Syrian mother to differentiate whether her child has been killed by a chemical weapon or starved to death or by a conventional weapon; would you agree?

Mr. Clapper. Absolutely, yes, sir.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director Clapper and General Flynn, thank you for your service and I thank the people of your organizations for their service as well. As I ask these questions, if the answers should be in a closed session, I'm sure you will let me know.

One of the things that we worry about, obviously there are cyber attacks, but physical attacks. What I always think is, what keeps me up at night when I think about what can happen next? I wonder what your greatest fear is as to a physical attack here in our country?

Mr. Clapper. You're speaking of a kinetic attack against the country?

Senator Donnelly. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clapper. I would worry more, frankly, about cyber attacks and the potential damage that could cause if it were on a large-scale basis. Fortunately, the nation-state entities that have that capability probably have lesser intention to do so, whereas the non-state entities that have less benign intentions don't have the capability. That's kind of the mode we're in right now.

That's why I'm very concerned about the up-and-comers, if you will, not the first line, which of course means China and Russia, but the others that have more malign intent towards us, as they acquire greater capability.

Senator Donnelly. General?

General Flynn. I just would answer it by really two things. On the cyber side, I think an attack against our critical infrastructure that would have potential damaging effects, our transportation, health care, clearly financial, is an area that we have to pay very, very close attention to, and our energy sector.

On the kinetic side, there's a range of things that keep me up at night. When you see these Mumbai-style attacks, what happened in the mall in Nairobi, what happened during the Boston Marathon, those are the kinds of things that we have to continue to work together in the IC to make sure that we're working as seamlessly as possible to share everything that we have, not only
within the defense side and the national side, but also on the Federal, State, local, and tribal level. I think that that’s really an important aspect of what we’re trying to do in the IC, is to work on integration of our intelligence system.

Senator DONNELLY. That’s where I wanted to go next, the integration, because I think back to 2001 and I think of things that, when put together, here is a pilot school and people are being trained there. How good is the coordination today in terms of all the different organizations talking to one another to say, look, we have something that looks a little off here, but we want to put it out to everybody else to see what you think.

Mr. CLAPPER. Sir, I was around then in the IC and I would tell you that I think it’s vastly improved. I think emblematic of that particularly has been the integration of the FBI into the IC. That’s made a huge difference in terms of penetrating what had been this firewall for many years between foreign and domestic.

The standup of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has facilitated that as well, as they engage with the State, local, and tribal entities. I think there’s been a lot of improvement, but this is a journey and not a fixed end point.

Senator DONNELLY. In regards to the Snowden damage, when we look at that—I just saw a report, and I don’t know how accurate it was, where they said he used simple software to pull this off. I guess the fear is—and you certainly hope there is not a next Snowden—but what steps are being taken or how are we making sure that when we put all this effort in that somebody with a couple of different software packages or their innate talent cannot do this again?

Mr. CLAPPER. Sir, of course, in Mr. Snowden’s case it was a perfect storm for him since he was a systems administrator and a highly skilled, technically skilled IT professional. He knew exactly what he was doing, and it was his job as a system administrator to range across a lot of databases, and he was pretty skilled at staying below the radar so what he was doing wasn’t visible.

Had he been at Fort Meade proper, at NSA headquarters, the likelihood is he would have been detected a great deal sooner. So we are deploying with the NSA, and the rest of the IC, a lot of things in terms of two-man control and tightening up discipline on the privileged users and who has access. We are going to proliferate deployment of auditing and monitoring capabilities to enhance our insider threat detection. We’re going to need to change our security clearance process to a system of continuous evaluation.

That all said, though, there are no mousetraps that can guarantee that we’ll never have another Edward Snowden. Our whole system is based on personal trust. We’ve had historically, unfortunately, egregious violations of that personal trust. We have them right now and we’ll have them in the future. But our job is to ensure that we can detect sooner and consequently deter revelations of this magnitude.

Senator DONNELLY. Finally, you talked about organizations and materials they have that could cause incredible damage, whether it’s a portion of WMD or they have these chemicals here, those chemicals there. It’s not always government; it is shadow organiza-
tions and others. In terms of tracking them, do we have a pretty good idea where these groups are located?

Second, you mentioned that these attacks are just as likely in Europe as they would be here. Possibly you look at the situation in Chechnya, that Russia is also a potential. Are we working with these other governments even when they're not the most friendly to us, number one? Number two, are we tracking these groups on a constant basis?

Mr. Clapper. We track them as best we can. This is a very tough intelligence problem. This is particularly daunting with respect to biological weapons since there are so many dual applications where it's not readily evident that something is being done for nefarious purposes.

The other thing that helps us a bit, as we've seen in Syria, is that without the required expertise and the industrial infrastructure capability it's pretty hard for these groups to do much with them. But this is something that we watch very carefully.

Yes, we attempt to cooperate as broadly as we can with all foreign partners, to include the Russians, who have—I think their level of cooperation has improved as time has gone on here and now that we're into the Sochi Olympics, particularly with respect to external threats.

Senator Donnelly. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.

Senator Chambliss.

Senator Chambliss. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, we often forget that the men and women that serve under you are putting their lives in harm's way every single day and, in spite of all the difficulties that we face that you've alluded to, we can never forget the fact that those men and women have done an outstanding job over the last several decades, but particularly as you back from September 11 forward they've done an amazing job of collecting intelligence and providing it to your customers to ensure that America has not sustained another major attack. So please express to them our appreciation for their great work.

Director Clapper, one country that has been a valued partner for so many years that it's gotten lost in the shuffle of what's been going on in the Middle East particularly and in Africa over the last several weeks and months is Egypt. Egypt has been a strong ally for so many years, a great partner in the IC as well as otherwise. We've had military operations as well as intelligence operations with Egypt for decades.

Now there's a lot of turmoil over there. When President Mubarak was ousted, the administration quickly threw him under the bus and embraced the Muslim Brotherhood, who came into power. There's been no change in the position of the administration that I'm aware of on that. Even if there has been, I can tell you, having just returned from another trip to the Middle East, as well as having conversations with other allies from the Middle East over the last few days and weeks, there is a strong perception in that part of the world that the United States is still embracing the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly in Egypt, from a political standpoint.
With all of the opportunity for training in the Africa region, particularly Libya and Syria and other countries that are not far away from Egypt, give us your assessment as to the security condition of Egypt today, particularly as they move into elections, and where are we headed there?

Mr. CLAPPER. Senator Chambliss, first, thank you very much for your commentary about the work of the men and women of the IC. We certainly will convey that. I think you’re quite right to highlight the importance of Egypt just from the standpoint of its prominence from a population standpoint, if nothing else. It is a centerpiece in the Mideast, a very strategic ally because of access to the Suez Canal and the peace treaty with Israel. You can go on as to why Egypt is so critically important.

The security situation there is something we’re watching and are very concerned about, particularly in the Sinai, and the emergence of a group called Ansar Bayt al-Magdis, which is a terrorist group that is an al Qaeda wannabe, that has attacked the Egyptian military in the Sinai, and, of course, poses a threat to Israel. There are other groups—Muhammad Jamal, some of whom were involved in the Benghazi attack, and other groups in Egypt that we’re very concerned about.

That said, what we have attempted to do—and John Brennan, because of his long familiarity with that area of the world, has, I think, led this effort for the IC—is reach out to the Egyptian security services and sustain our important relationship with them, despite all the vagaries of policy, to sustain a strong intelligence partnership.

Senator CHAMBLISS. General Flynn, I was also in Afghanistan on that same trip and the feeling of our military, our diplomatic corps, and our IC is exactly the same when it comes to the future of Afghanistan, and that is there is just an uncertainty out there that’s been created by the fact that no decision’s been made by the administration on what sort of force structure will remain in place in Afghanistan to ensure that the gains that we’ve made over the years are going to remain in place and that there will be security provided for both the diplomatic as well as the IC going forward, which is critical to ensure that those gains are maintained.

In looking at the elections that are forthcoming and taking into consideration Karzai, who I think is off the charts now, and his statement that he’s not going to sign the BSA, when you look at the candidates who are up for election—and I know there’s a significant number of them, but they can be narrowed down to serious candidates—it’s my understanding that all of those have either publicly or privately said they intend to sign the BSA.

What’s keeping us now from going ahead and making a decision based on the fact that we know the BSA will ultimately be signed? Why shouldn’t we go ahead and clear up that uncertainty that exists with American assets on the ground in Afghanistan?

General FLYNN. That’s clearly a policy issue, Senator, in terms of what the final decision’s going to be by the President. I would say, because I would echo what we’ve already discussed, the level of uncertainty, the potential loss of confidence by the people of Afghanistan, by the ANSF, is a real problem. The loya jirga that was already held late last year confirmed that the people of Afghani-
stan want this BSA signed. President Karzai has stated what he's stated.

I would just say that for the long term we just need to make sure that we also keep in mind the international community's commitment to this effort as we go forward.

Mr. CLAPPER. Among the 11 candidates, sir, they haven't coalesced around a lesser number. All 11 are hanging in there and at least publicly to this point President Karzai has not indicated a favorite. What that sets up, of course, is the election and then probably after that, one or more runoffs of some sort, to actually come up with an elected president.

Then you have to wonder, well, will the first act be to sign a BSA? So this could be a very prolonged process.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.

Senator King.

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

A couple of introductory comments. I'd like to echo Senator Chambliss' comment to both of you. Senator Levin and I went to the Middle East in the summer and my wife asked me my overall impression when I got back and I said: My biggest single impression is the quality of people we have working for us in the IC, in the military, in the State Department; and, frankly, we haven't been treating them all that well recently, with shutdowns and furloughs and pay freezes.

I know it's sort of hollow to say we appreciate it, but we're not keeping up with what we ought to be doing. I just want you to convey that there are people that realize sometimes I think we're getting better service than we deserve, frankly, and I wanted to make that statement.

The second is, I've been coming to these hearings now for a little over a year. In every single one that I've been in, the alarm bells about a cyber attack have been sounded. I remember one of the witnesses said that our number one threat was a cyber attack; the next Pearl Harbor would be cyber, et cetera, et cetera. Yet, we in Congress, haven't done anything.

In 2012, there was a major cyber bill that didn't pass. This isn't a criticism of anybody individually, but I'm getting frustrated that this institution isn't moving on what we are told is the most serious threat that we're facing. There is some motion and discussion going on, but I for one would like to see that accelerated, because you both have pointed out that this is a major threat and is something we need to deal with.

First question. According to a Reuters story on the 12th of January, there is significant difference in the intelligence assessment of the civilian agencies and the military about the future of Afghanistan after 2014. Since you guys represent those two elements, are there differences, and if so, to the extent you can tell us in an open hearing, what are they? I understand one side is a little more—not a little more—a lot more pessimistic than the other. Mr. Clapper?

Mr. CLAPPER. First, thank you for your commentary about our people.
Just a brief word on the cyber legislation. I think it’s clear we recently recognized we need a partnership with the civilian sector as, if nothing else, a first line of warning.

Ever since we’ve done National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) on Afghanistan, starting in 2007, I think we, the IC, has always been probably occupying the half of the glass that’s empty and others, normally DOD, have occupied the half of the glass that’s full. So there is, I think, some difference.

I think we in the IC, though, are pretty firm about what the future of Afghanistan holds. I will tell you, the most important factor in influencing that future is the sustained external support for Afghanistan and the Afghan Government in order to sustain the army, which is improving.

In our last NIE, I think, there is an instructive annex, Annex B, which speaks to the Russian history, and it does illustrate—we can argue about the comparison between the Russians and us and what the Afghan people think of them, but in the end it is that external support that is going to have the most influence on the future of Afghanistan.

Senator King. That was going to be my second question. Just to be clear, you’re talking about long-term fiscal support. How about any troop presence?

Mr. Clapper. There is a debate about the importance, I suppose. To the extent that we can sustain an advise, train, and assist kind of mission, that will certainly facilitate the Afghan Government and ensure its future.

Senator King. Let’s just turn to Iran for a minute. President Rouhani presents a different face. In your professional opinion, is this a difference in kind or just cosmetics?

Mr. Clapper. I think it’s probably substantive, but again, the Supreme Leader is still the Supreme Leader. Rouhani and the Supreme Leader have known each other for over 30 years, and have worked together before, so I do think the Supreme Leader does have faith and confidence in Rouhani.

But if he doesn’t produce, and if there isn’t some indication of improvement in the Iranian economy, because to the long-term viability of the regime will be threatened. I believe it’s genuine, but it’s pragmatic.

Senator King. Does our IC have a role to play in verifying whether the Iranians are living up to the commitments made in the original agreement?

Mr. Clapper. Yes, we do.

Senator King. Do you think it’s possible for us to have realistic verification?

Mr. Clapper. I do, because of the extensive additional surveillance authorities that will be given to the IAEA.

Senator King. A final question. General Flynn, I’m sorry; I don’t mean to be ignoring you.

But, Director Clapper, you talked about Edward Snowden and the difference between a whistleblower and a person that’s done harm to this country. Would you expand on why he is not a whistleblower or a hero?

Mr. Clapper. I’m only speaking to it from my standpoint and I’ve tried to stay out of the debate about his legal status and all that
sort of thing. All I can speak to is potentially the tremendous damage that he has done, which goes way beyond his concerns about so-called domestic surveillance.

Senator KING. Damage, you mean in terms of damage to our ability to gain information that might be important.

Mr. CLAPPER. The compromise of sources, methods, and importantly, tradecraft, and the jeopardy that has been placed at many of our valued overseas partners.

Senator KING. General Flynn, one quick final question on Afghanistan. Do you feel it’s going to be necessary not only to have monetary support, but some kind of troop presence in Afghanistan, in order to maintain the gains that the country has made in this effort?

General FLYNN. Senator, in my judgment, I do. I believe we need that.

Senator KING. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator King.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just got off the phone to General Dunford about a major issue affecting our forces in Afghanistan. If I could, I’d like to read his statement and explain the issue a bit and not have it taken out of my time, if that’s possible.

Chairman LEVIN. Let’s take this a step at a time, why don’t we.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay.
Chairman LEVIN. We’ll see if there’s any objection. I don’t, maybe others will.

Senator GRAHAM. Let me just read the statement from General Dunford. This was just given to me just about 5 minutes ago:

“U.S. Forces Afghanistan has learned that 65 dangerous individuals from a group of 88 detainees under dispute have been ordered released from the Afghan National Detention Facility at Parwan. The United States on several occasions provided extensive information and evidence on each of the 88 detainees to the Afghan Review Board, to the Afghan National Director of Security, and to the Attorney General’s Office.

“This release violates agreements between the United States and Afghanistan. We have made clear our judgment that these individuals should be prosecuted under Afghan law. We requested that cases be carefully reviewed, but the evidence against them was never seriously considered, including the Attorney General, given the short time since the decision was made to transfer these cases to the Afghan legal system.

“The release of 65 detainees is a legitimate force protection concern for the lives of both coalition troops and ANSF. The primary weapon of choice for these individuals is the IED, widely recognized as the primary cause of civilian casualties in Afghanistan. The release of these detainees is a major step backward for the rule of law in Afghanistan. Some previously released individuals have already returned to the fight and this subsequent release will
allow dangerous insurgents back to Afghan cities and villages."

I want to lend my support to this statement, Mr. Chairman. I've been working on this issue for quite a while. 88 detainees are the subject of this dispute. Our forces have evaluated these people as very dangerous to the Afghan people and to coalition forces. We've only requested that they go through the Afghan legal system. President Karzai has basically sidestepped his own rule of law. He's ordered the attorney general to take these files over and the immediate release of 65 detainees without ever going through the Afghan legal system, which has had about a 70 percent conviction rate.

We just lost two members of the unit I worked with as a reservist who were providing mentoring at the main prison in Afghanistan.

I will be introducing a resolution condemning this action by President Karzai. I will be urging my colleagues to cut all developmental aid off to Afghanistan as a response until after the next election.

I want my colleagues to know that General Dunford has done a wonderful job trying to protect our forces and he finds this release an offense to those who have fought to detain these people, an affront to those who've died at their hands. Of the 88 individuals in question, over 60 coalition forces have died as a result of the actions of these 88, and I consider this a major step backward in our relationship. I don't know what I would tell a member of a coalition force that was killed by one of these 65 if that did happen, and I hope and pray it does not. But the likelihood is great.

I would end with this thought: President Karzai, in my view, is singlehandedly destroying this relationship, that his erratic behavior, that his outrageous statements you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, are doing great damage, and I want the people of Afghanistan to know that I yearn for a supportive relationship, political, militarily, and economically, but actions like this make it very hard for an American politician to do business as usual in Afghanistan.

General Flynn, you were over there dealing with this issue when I saw you in your last tour. I just want to let the folks who are in charge of maintaining security over these detainees and all the people in charge of catching these guys that this is an affront to them and their work effort and it will not go unnoticed by Congress. I look forward to developing a bipartisan plan to push back as hard as possible. The release is supposed to happen Thursday.

Chairman Levin. Thank you for bird-dogging this issue.

Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Now, back to the topic at hand. Director Clapper, General Flynn, do we have the legal authority under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) to initiate strikes against Al-Nusra in Syria and Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya?

Mr. Clapper. Sir, you're getting into a legal area here that I would want to ask about. I don't want to give an unequivocal answer to that.

Senator Graham. But I want to reassert what you've told this committee and the Nation last week and this week, that the growing presence of Al-Nusra, a safe haven in Syria now attached to
Iraq, is presenting a direct threat to the Homeland. Is that still your estimate?

Mr. CLAPPER. It’s a little more nascent than that, but I think if I had to have a yes or no answer to that, I’d say yes.

Senator GRAHAM. General Flynn, do you agree with that?

General FLYNN. I think without some type of what I would just describe as counterterrorism pressure, we are looking at a growing sanctuary for terrorist groups to thrive from.

Senator GRAHAM. They have as a desire to drive us out of the Mideast, is that correct, these groups?

Mr. CLAPPER. Absolutely. They would like to have their own Islamic emirate.

Senator GRAHAM. So whether it’s core al Qaeda or an al Qaeda affiliate, the goal is the same, no matter what the name may be, is to drive the United States out of the Mideast and create an Islamic caliphate throughout the region. Is that the goal of all these organizations? Yes?

Mr. CLAPPER. Yes.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Attempts against the Homeland have been generated by organizations other than core al Qaeda, is that correct?

Mr. CLAPPER. Yes, that’s the case.

Senator GRAHAM. Now, you talk about the perfect storm—sequestration, diminished NSA capability, an emboldened enemy, a region on fire. Is that a fair summary of what you think the perfect storm may be?

Mr. CLAPPER. Yes, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Of those things that we control, it seems like budgeting is one of the things we can control here in Congress. Do you agree with that, both of you?

Mr. CLAPPER. Yes, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Can you give me a good reason why the U.S. Congress would be diminishing your ability to defend this Nation, given the threats you’ve described?

Mr. CLAPPER. I hate to go where angels fear to tread here and I’m certainly not going to be critical of Congress. But we do the best we can with the resources we’re given.

Senator GRAHAM. Let’s put it this way. If sequestration is fully implemented in year 10, how much more risk will we assume in terms of the Nation?

Mr. CLAPPER. Substantial. I can’t quantify that, but every year we cut resources and we have less capacity and less capability, we are by definition assuming more risk.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with that, General Flynn?

General FLYNN. I absolutely agree with it.

Senator GRAHAM. Is the word “substantial” a good word or should it be stronger?

Mr. CLAPPER. I think “substantial” is a good adjective.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with that, General Flynn?

General FLYNN. I do.

Senator GRAHAM. Now, when it comes to the Russians, this recent release of a conversation between two of our diplomats, do you think the Russians intercepted that phone call?
Mr. Clapper. We don’t know. They would certainly be on the potential list of suspects.

Senator Graham. Is it fair to say the Russians are probably spying on our diplomats?

Mr. Clapper. I think that’s a fair assumption, yes, sir.

Senator Graham. Let’s go to Iran. If the final agreement reached between the United States and all the parties in question allows the Iranians an enrichment capability so they continue to enrich uranium, what’s the likelihood that Sunni Arab nations would want the same kind of enrichment capability?

Mr. Clapper. I think that’s certainly a possibility. I don’t know. It would be an individual case-by-case judgment, but that’s certainly a possibility.

Senator Graham. I just got back from the Munich Security Conference and every Sunni Arab leader I talked to said: “We would ask for the same thing they have.”

We told the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that you could have a nuclear power program, but you can’t enrich. Are you familiar with that?

Mr. Clapper. Sorry, sir?

Senator Graham. We told the UAE that we would support a peaceful nuclear power plant, power program, but would deny them the ability to enrich uranium. Are you familiar with that?

Mr. Clapper. I am not.

Senator Graham. We just told one of our best allies they can’t enrich.

If you had to list in order the countries that you fear having a nuclear weapon, where would you put Iran?

Mr. Clapper. Pretty high.

Senator Graham. Do you agree with me, whatever nuclear capability they possess could lead to an arms race in the Mideast?

Mr. Clapper. Sir, I think it would be very dependent on safeguards and the limitations of their program. That’s kind of a hypothetical question.

Senator Graham. Have you talked to the Sunni Arab nations about whether or not they would claim the right to enrich if we give it to Iran?

Mr. Clapper. I’m sorry, sir?

Senator Graham. Have you talked to any Sunni Arab leaders about whether or not their nation would claim a right to enrich uranium if the Iranians were given that?

Mr. Clapper. I have not had such a discussion, no.

Senator Graham. Would you please have that conversation and report back to us in some appropriate form?

Chairman Levin. Senator Graham, was the answer yes to that?

Senator Graham. He said no.

Mr. Clapper. I have not had the conversation, Senator, that you suggest.

Chairman Levin. The last question, which will have to be the last question in this round.

Senator Graham. Thank you.

Chairman Levin. The question was: Would you talk with them and report back to us?

Mr. Clapper. Yes, I will, when I can.
Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator.
Senator GRAHAM. Thank you.
Chairman LEVIN. Senator Shaheen.
Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would just like to add a modification to my colleague’s comment about the 123 Agreement that we have negotiated with the UAE, because, in fact, it was the UAE that voluntarily offered not to enrich as part of that agreement. So, it’s a minor difference, but I think an important one in this context.

[Additional information follows:]

Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, “Cooperation with Other Nations”, establishes an agreement for cooperation as a prerequisite for nuclear deals between the United States and any other nation. Such an agreement is called a “123 Agreement.” The U.S.-UAR Agreement for Peaceful Civilian Nuclear Energy Cooperation is a 123 Agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation between the United States of America and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which entered into force on December 17, 2009, and enables the UAE to receive nuclear know-how, materials, and equipment from the United States. As part of the agreement, the UAE committed to forgo domestic uranium enrichment and reprocessing of spent fuel, as well as sign the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol which institutes a more stringent inspections regime on the UAE’s nuclear activities.

Senator SHAHEEN. Director Clapper, I want to follow up a little bit on Senator Donnelly’s questions about the impact from Edward Snowden’s leaks and what the Agency is doing to address that. You commented that you’re in the process of changing the clearance process for individuals. Can you describe a little more about what that means and when that’s going to be completed? It has been I think over a year since Snowden defected, so I would hope that we could have a process in place.

Mr. CLAPPER. The system we use today is, of course, people—and I’m speaking now of the TS-SCI level clearances, although it applies as well. You get an initial clearance and then at some period after that—it’s supposed to be 5 years—a periodic reinvestigation is done to update the currency of that person’s clearance.

What we need is—and this is, I think, pretty much recognized—a system of continuous evaluation, where when someone is in the system and they’re cleared initially, then we have a way of monitoring their behavior, both their electronic behavior on the job as well as off the job, to see if there is a potential clearance issue.

So our plan within the IC is to declare initial operational capability, which is about six or seven data streams, by this September and what we are calling fully operational capability by September 2016, which is pretty ambitious. This is not something we can do for free. It’s going to require resources.

In the meantime, we can’t stop. We have to continue with the current system. So this is a major undertaking which is going to be costly. But we’re committed to it because the current system, as we’ve seen all too unfortunately, is not as effective as it needs to be.

Senator SHAHEEN. Are you going to be sharing that change in process with other agencies that might have similar concerns about a potential Edward Snowden in the future?

Mr. CLAPPER. This applies across the government. I am most concerned, obviously, most directly with the IC, but it applies across the government, because it also applies in a SECRET context, since
there are many SECRET clearances throughout the rest of the government.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you.

There have been several news reports the last week about Syria’s failure to meet deadlines that were negotiated as part of the agreement to reduce their chemical weapons. Do you think that this is a deliberate effort on the part of Syria to slow-walk getting rid of its weapons? Can you talk about the role that Russia is playing in what’s happening right now?

Mr. Clapper. That’s a very good question. It’s something we monitor as carefully as we can. Given the fluid situation in Syria, it is a little hard to discern what is a genuine security concern, which, of course, could also be used to slow-roll. Certainly it’s in the regime’s interest to stretch out this process as long as possible because in a way it serves to implicitly legitimize Assad.

I think it is in Russia’s best interest because they view this as a diplomatic achievement on their part to have brokered this agreement, so I think they will continue to press the regime to move, either destroy them in place or to move them out of the country.

Senator Shaheen. Do we have any knowledge that Russia is continuing to put pressure on Syria to do that?

Mr. Clapper. Yes, we do.

Senator Shaheen. But they’re not responding, obviously.

Mr. Clapper. The Syrians will claim, as they do to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, that they have genuine security concerns. They want specifically to have some jackets, I’ll call them armor jackets, around containers that contain not just the components, but the mixture. They are concerned about that. It’s hard to argue with that, given the security situation internal to Syria.

Senator Shaheen. Are there other actions that the international community or the United States could be taking that would encourage more rapid compliance by the Syrians?

Mr. Clapper. That’s not intelligence’s call, but I think the big thing would be continued attention and diplomacy to insist that they keep at it.

Senator Shaheen. There have also been reports in the news about the evacuation of refugees from Homs, some of the final folks who are still there, who have been suffering under the siege there, and the firing on those refugees despite an agreement to allow them to be evacuated. Do we know who’s doing the attacks on those refugees?

Mr. Clapper. I’ll have to check on that. I don’t know that we have that level of fidelity that we could say exactly who was doing that.

[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]

Senator Shaheen. I would hope that we are taking whatever action we can, recognizing that this is a policy position and not something you’re going to comment on. But I would hope that we are taking whatever action we can to aggressively go after those people who are firing on the unarmed refugees and the United Nations (U.N.) people who are trying to evacuate them. It is just more than
a tragic situation, and the international community is standing by while people are being slaughtered.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.

Senator Ayotte.

Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the witnesses for being here and for your service to our country.

I wanted to ask about recent reports that Ali Mohamed Ali, a Somali pirate, there’s been a failed prosecution of that case in United States courts, where he potentially will be released. It really raises the question that I think that I’ve asked you about in particular in the past, Director Clapper, in terms of our detention program.

One of the questions it raises—the President said last May that he would like to get to the point where we repeal the AUMF.

So here’s the question: What happens in terms of detaining dangerous individuals, let’s say members of al Qaeda, if we repeal the AUMF and close Guantanamo? Where do we detain these individuals? If we’re in a situation where one of those individuals is acquitted in a U.S. court, a member of al Qaeda, what’s our option if we’ve repealed the AUMF and we no longer have Guantanamo?

I see this as a real, very big safety question for the United States. Have you thought through that?

Mr. Clapper. No, I haven’t. I’ll have to think about your question, because that’s a hypothetical circumstance that I’d have to think through and do some research, particularly with my general counsel.

Senator Ayotte. Do you think it’s advisable that we at this point, given the footprint we’ve seen for al Qaeda, are in a position where we can repeal the AUMF?

Mr. Clapper. Again, ma’am, I’d have to think that through as to what—if, again, a hypothetical situation, if the AUMF is repealed and just what would be done as a substitute or replacement for it. Just off the top of my head, I don’t know.

Senator Ayotte. This is a pretty big question, I think, for us as a country.

So here’s another question I’d like an answer from both of you on. It’s a question I’ve raised before. If tomorrow we are able to capture Ahmad Al-Zawahiri, where do we put him?

Mr. Clapper. I’m sorry. Your question was?

Senator Ayotte. So if we capture the current head of al Qaeda, Al-Zawahiri, tonight, where does he get detained? Would it not be important to interrogate him, and could you identify a length on how long you would need to interrogate the head of al Qaeda?

Mr. Clapper. Again, a hypothetical question and——

Senator Ayotte. I think it’s a fair question for the American people. If we capture the head of al Qaeda tomorrow, where would we put him? What would we do to interrogate him? Where would we interrogate him? Do we have a place to interrogate him? Do we have a plan?

Mr. Clapper. It would be very situational dependent. So I am very reluctant to posit a hypothetical response to that, because as I sit here, I don’t know. Clearly, though, there would be some arrangement made—and we’ve done this in the past—where we
would have an opportunity to interrogate him for intelligence purposes.

Senator Ayotte. General Flynn, how important would it be to interrogate Zawahiri if we capture him tomorrow?

General Flynn. It would be extremely important.

Senator Ayotte. Do we know how long it would take us? In other words, would we want to put a time limit on that interrogation?

General Flynn. We would not. Obviously, we would not. Every interrogation is different and some take a little bit longer than others. Obviously, in a case like Zawahiri, it would be a very important one.

Mr. Clapper. In our case, the longer the better.

Senator Ayotte. The longer the better. So we don't know yet exactly what the plan is, if we capture him tomorrow, where we would put him? I see that as a huge problem on a very important issue, unless either of you are able to tell me what the plan would be. [Pause.]

I guess the answer is no.

Mr. Clapper. Again, I cannot speculate on a hypothetical issue like that, as important as that is, and that's all it would be.

Senator Ayotte. I would also like to ask both of you about a New York Times report I saw on January 29, 2014. It said that: “the United States says Russia tested a missile despite treaty.” The article goes on to say that: “American officials believe Russia began conducting flight tests of the missile as early as 2008.” And it says that: “The United States has concerns that Russia has tested a new ground-launched cruise missile that may violate the landmark 1987 arms control accord between our two countries, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.”

Director Clapper, does the United States have any intelligence about this potential Russian violation of the INF? Have we had that since 2008?

Mr. Clapper. I'm happy to discuss that with you in closed session.

Senator Ayotte. Thank you.

I'd also like an answer in closed session that if we knew as the U.S. Senate was debating the New START treaty as late as 2010, whether we believed there was a Russian treaty violation, and whether anyone in the Senate was informed about Russia's potential violation of the INF while the New START treaty was being debated? So I would like to take that in a classified setting.

Mr. Clapper. We take very seriously our obligation to brief Congress and Congress was informed, and we have an audit trail of that. Again, I think this would be best left to a closed discussion.

Senator Ayotte. I appreciate that.

With regard to Iran, when we went to the Munich security conference, the foreign minister for UAE not only did we talk about the right of enrichment, but essentially what he said is that the hotel rooms in Teheran are filled with businessmen waiting to do business with Iran. What do you know about efforts being made right now to try to do business with Iran? In other words, how would you assess the strength of the sanctions right now and is there a concern that many are lining up to do business with Iran?
Mr. CLAPPER. It’s true that there are businessmen who see potential to do business with and in Iran. I know there have been efforts made through government-to-government contacts to try to forestall that.

Senator AYOTTE. There have been efforts made to forestall it, but is there a sense out there that the sanctions are unraveling? Because that’s what we heard from many people that we talked to.

Mr. CLAPPER. There may be a sensing of it. I think what we try to watch in the IC is the actual performance of the Iranian economy. So far, we haven’t seen it but that’s something to watch.

Senator AYOTTE. You have not seen the sanctions unraveling yet?

Mr. CLAPPER. I wouldn’t say that, no.

Senator AYOTTE. I know my time is up, but I would like to take those questions in a classified setting with regard to Russian treaty violations.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.

Senator Blumenthal.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to follow up, first of all, by thanking both of you and the very courageous men and women who serve with you and who often are unappreciated because what they do, obviously, is in secret, but risk their lives and, as Senator Chambliss said, put their lives on the line every day. I would just say very often what we focus on is more the failures rather than the successes, because the successes are unseen and therefore unappreciated, a little bit like the baseball player who misses a pitch in the third inning, hits five home runs, and is told by his manager, you missed that pitch in the third inning, despite the fact that they won the game.

Obviously, we need to keep our eye on the results of the game, not to compare what you’re doing in any way to a sporting event because it’s the most serious business in the world. But we need to appreciate the successful work that you did, that you do.

All that said, with great appreciation, I want to follow up on some of the questions that have been asked before regarding the techniques used by Edward Snowden, which were reported, I think, recently, for example, in the New York Times, the very rudimentary kinds of software and web crawler, also known as a spider, that enabled him to scrape data out of these systems.

I was struck, in fact, I found staggering the report of how relatively simple and easy it seemed to be from that report for him to accomplish what he did.

Let me ask you, first of all, do you take serious issue with any of what was in that report of February 8 of the New York Times, an article written by David Sanger and Eric Schmitt?

Mr. CLAPPER. No, Senator Blumenthal, I don’t. It’s probably accurate. I think the thought is that once someone is inside the tent, so to speak, that they’re considered trustworthy. That wasn’t the case here.

The other thing is that throughout the IC we’ve had a lot of pressure put on us to ensure that analysts are able to talk to one another, are able to collaborate, are able to have access to the information they need to do their jobs. So NSA has created an environment where analysts and others at NSA have ready access to the
information they need or that they can refer to in order to help them do their job.

Again, that plays to the perfect storm I spoke of earlier, where Snowden as a skilled technician, as an IT system administrator, was aware of that and also aware of the safeguards, such as they were, that were built into the system and he took advantage of them.

Senator Blumenthal. Would you agree that the focus has been on protecting against outside threats to infiltration or invasion and less so on the insider threat?

Mr. Clapper. Exactly.

Senator Blumenthal. A lot of the measures that you've mentioned here in response to previous questions were put in the future tense, what needs to be done, what will be done. It has been a year now since the Snowden breach of trust, as you put it, and perhaps with tremendous damage, certainly with tremendous damage to our Nation. What has been done so far to protect against that insider threat?

Mr. Clapper. Immediately, what has been done, of course, is some remedial actions in terms of two-person control access to databases, and much tighter control and monitoring of privileged users, as we call them. A lot has been done with that in the immediate aftermath, just kind of closing the barn door.

Senator Blumenthal. Does more need to be done in your view?

Mr. Clapper. Absolutely. What we ultimately need to go to is a system we've started a couple years ago, a project called IC ITE [Information Technology Enterprise], which is the ITE for the entire community, taking advantage of cloud computing and the necessary security enhancements. The basic mantra of this is: "Tag the data, tag the people," so that you can monitor where the data is and who has access to it on a real-time basis.

Senator Blumenthal. Why hasn't that measure been adopted already?

Mr. Clapper. It is, sir, but this is a big undertaking because it involves a single ITE for the whole IC. We've been working at this for 2 years, but it takes time to do this and this is laid out over a 4- or 5-year period. Again, it's something we had started before the Snowden revelations.

Senator Blumenthal. I'm speaking perhaps simplistically and unfairly, but I would comment respectfully that the immense and imminent threat posed by this kind of insider breach of trust would warrant even quicker implementation of such measures. If resources are the issue, as it may be, certainly I'd want to know that, as would other members of the committee, and anything we can do to assist you.

Mr. Clapper. I appreciate that very much, sir. Yes, Congress can help us.

[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator Blumenthal. Let me switch gears if I may a little bit, to an issue that hasn't been mentioned at all. That is the threat of increased naval strength on the part of China, and in particular its expansion of naval capability in building additional submarines
with ballistic capability. You mention it somewhat obliquely in your testimony, Director Clapper. Could you please give us an assessment of your view of the threat of Chinese naval capability, in particular submarine capability and the threat to the Homeland that it may represent?

Mr. Clapper. Across the board, the Chinese have embarked on a very impressive military modernization program across all realms. Much of this seems to be predicated on an assessment of our strength, including our naval strength, our bases in the Pacific, our Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities, et cetera. So across the board, it is impressive whether it’s their missiles, their missile systems, be they intermediate-range, medium-range, or Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), or going to more survivability, which includes a submarine component.

They’ve been very committed to this, very serious about it. I’m happy to go into more details in a closed session.

Senator Blumenthal. I was going to suggest, since my time has expired and since I suspect the facts ought to be explored in a classified setting, that we take an opportunity to do so. I want to thank you for your testimony, both of you. I’m sorry, General Flynn, I didn’t ask any questions of you, but I appreciate your being here as well, and thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.

We’re going to need a classified session at some point, but not today. Senator Ayotte had questions, Senator Blumenthal now has questions that need to be answered. Another colleague had also earlier today asked questions that needed a classified response. So rather than to try to piecemeal this—and this would be somewhat of a change from what I told Senator Ayotte—we’ll just have to arrange later on this week or next some time where you can come over, and I’ll notify everybody on the committee and then tell them what the subjects of the classified meeting are so that everybody can come to that meeting if they choose. I think that’s the only practical way to do it now.

Senator Lee.

Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for joining us today.

Director Clapper, you said in a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) hearing in January that one of the extremist groups operating in Syria, the Al-Nusra Front, has aspirations for attacks on the United States. I was wondering if you could elaborate a little bit on this and tell us whether or to what degree Al-Nusra has the capability or is close to developing the capability of attacking the United States?

Mr. Clapper. This has been a tenet of theirs ever since they formed up, ultimately planning for and attempting to execute an attack on the Homeland. I think right now this is more aspirational than operational. We have seen evidence of the emergence of training camps, for example, that have familiar signatures from Afghanistan days.

Probably of greater concern, as I mentioned in my opening statement, are some al Qaeda veterans from the Afghanistan-Pakistan
area, a small nucleus of them who have also moved to Syria, which has served as a magnet for many of these extremists. They do harbor designs on—and this is separate from Al-Nusra—harbor designs for attacks in Europe and the Homeland.

Senator Lee. There are other groups there that potentially present a threat to us?

Mr. Clapper. Yes.

Senator Lee. What proportion of the rebel fighters in the Syrian conflict would you and others in the IC characterize as extremist? What level of influence do you think they have on the entire group?

Mr. Clapper. All together the number of opposition fighters is somewhere in the neighborhood of from a low range of 75,000 to 80,000, maybe to 110,000, 115,000, and somewhere in the neighborhood of between 20,000 and maybe up to a top range of 26,000 that we regard as extremists. They are disproportionately influential because they are among the most effective fighters on the battlefield.

Senator Lee. So would you say that there is a significant relationship, then, between the Al-Nusra Front, especially when you add in other extremist elements, and what many people refer to as the more moderate, the more moderate elements of the rebel forces in Syria?

So the question is, is there a significant relationship then between the extremist elements and what we’re calling the moderate elements?

Mr. Clapper. There are agreements of convenience, I would say. Oftentimes, these groups which are quite fluid, by the way—may apparently disagree ideologically, but will, if it’s convenient for them in the tactical context, agree to work together.

Senator Lee. Sure.

Mr. Clapper. Of course, we’ve had the falling out now with the ISIL, where they are fighting other oppositionist groups.

Senator Lee. But given this relationship of convenience, as you describe it, there is, I assume, frequent coordinating going on, sharing of information, perhaps sharing of equipment that goes on between extremist elements and moderate elements?

Mr. Clapper. That’s hard to say, sir. This is a very fluid thing. There are some 1,500 or 1,600 of these various groups, various fighting groups, and they align themselves and realign themselves constantly. It’s very hard to make generalized statements about that.

Senator Lee. Warehouses of items provided as assistance to moderate rebels were seized by some Islamist groups in December. Was Al-Nusra involved in that seizure?

Mr. Clapper. I’ll have to research to see which groups were involved in that warehouse seizure. I don’t know off the top of my head.

[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator Lee. To your knowledge, is there anything that was seized in connection with that raid in December that has subsequently been used by Al-Nusra or by any of the other extremist groups?

Mr. Clapper. We don’t know. I can’t say, sir.
Senator LEE. Iranian nuclear capabilities and the ongoing nuclear negotiations are obviously of enormous interest to this committee and to Congress. I'd like to focus on a different aspect of that which hasn't received quite as much attention, Iran's development of a delivery system that would be capable of threatening potentially the United States or our forces abroad. General Flynn, if I could ask you, what's the U.S. Government's assessment of the Iranian ICBM program's development and its capabilities?

General FLYNN. I think, as stated by the chairman in his opening statement where he talked about our assessment being in the 2015 timeframe, given the development that we see, that's accurate. So by about 2015.

Mr. CLAPPER. That's the ability to test one.

Senator LEE. The ability to test one. So in order to test one you'd have to have something that's potentially functioning.

Is the Iranian Government receiving assistance from any other country in connection with their development of their ICBM, in connection with their ICBM program?

Mr. CLAPPER. Not currently, we don't believe so.

Senator LEE. When you say “not currently,” does that mean you anticipate that they might be?

Mr. CLAPPER. No, just I was alluding to the history, the on again, off again relationship between Iran and North Korea.

Senator LEE. Okay. Last December, Afghanistan agreed to negotiate a cooperation pact with Iran for long-term political, security, economic, cultural cooperation, regional peace, and security. The Treasury Department recently designated four Iranian Quds Force members to its list of global terrorists for their support of terrorism and intelligence activities against Afghanistan.

What's your assessment, Director Clapper, of the relationship between the Governments of Afghanistan and Iran, separately the relationship between the Taliban and Iran, and the influence of Iran on the country?

Mr. CLAPPER. The Iranians would clearly like to have as much influence as possible in Afghanistan, particularly with the forthcoming changes. They have not been particularly successful. They've had border disagreements. There have been firings across the border. It's a less than warm relationship, but that's not to say that the Iranians aren't trying to reach out. They recently posted a very astute diplomat in Kabul to try to ingratiate with the Afghans. But long-term, there's some suspicion there and lack of trust.

Senator LEE. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lee.

Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Gentlemen, thank you for your public service.

You stated that 2015 is the period at which it is expected that Iran could be ready to test an ICBM. Is it true that there is additional time that would be needed for Iran to achieve the integration of a nuclear weapon onto an ICBM?

Mr. CLAPPER. Yes, sir, Senator Nelson, that's quite right. What we're speaking of here is simply a missile system that could potentially have ICBM-class range. That's not to say anything about
their actually mating it with a nuclear weapon. That’s another problem.

They’ve worked on two classes, both a solid and a liquid class, and, of course, they’ve done some work on their space launch vehicle that would, of course, have application here from the standpoint of thrust and distance.

Senator NELSON. Can you say in this setting or hold it until the closed setting, the timing that it would take for the integration, were they to have a nuclear weapon, onto an ICBM?

Mr. CLAPPER. Sir, that depends on a lot of factors and there are a lot of variables there that are probably best explored in a closed session.

Senator NELSON. I look forward to that.

It is—you tell me if this is correct—the administration’s policy that they are exploring shifting the use of drones, unmanned aerial vehicle strikes, from CIA to DOD. Is that an accurate statement?

Mr. CLAPPER. Yes, sir, it is. Again, that would also be best left to a closed session.

Senator NELSON. I just want to state at the outset that my opinion is that that is a mistake, and I think that what I consider to be a mistake I will ask with this question: One of the avowed reasons, so stated, is that by it being within the DOD it would not be covert; it would be overt, and therefore when the enemy says that we killed so many innocent civilians, which is usually not accurate by any stretch of the imagination, that we would be able to publicly state that.

Is that one of the justifications for the policy?

Mr. CLAPPER. Yes, sir. It’s awkward discussing this in public. I wouldn’t characterize that as the primary reason.

Senator NELSON. Okay. I’ll just state in closing that the enemy is going to state that anyway, and I think that the drone policy that this government has had has been exceptionally precise and that all of these accusations ad infinitum by those that are opposed to the interests of the United States about how many civilian casualties occur from these strikes, it is this Senator’s opinion that that is not accurate.

Let me ask you, since you testified earlier that DOD is setting up this DCS, tell me, do you worry about the two clandestine services getting in each other’s way?

Mr. CLAPPER. I do not, sir. I think actually just the opposite will accrue from this. This will help to promote more integration between the two services. This has been a longstanding arrangement and I think under the tenets of what’s intended with the DCS that it will actually serve to promote greater integration with the NCS.

Senator NELSON. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I would like to explore that further in the classified setting. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Very good. We have a list now of five or six items that we’ll ask you to comment on in a classified meeting which we will schedule. It will not come today after this meeting. It will come at a later date.

Thank you, Senator Nelson.

Senator Fischer.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. My thanks also to those who work with you in the valuable mission that you have. Director Clapper and General Flynn, I'd like to follow up a little bit on my various colleagues who have spoken about the nuclear capabilities of Iran and the direction that they seem to be headed. But I'd like to put a different flavor on that. Can you tell me what the reaction was of our allies in the Gulf, the Sunni Gulf monarchies, and also the Israeli Government, with regards to the November deal that we came about with the country of Iran?

Mr. Clapper. I think it's fair to say that many of them were not comfortable with this, and were, in fact, unhappy with it.

Senator Fischer. General?

General Flynn. I think it just raises the level of tension in a region that already has enough tension.

Senator Fischer. Do they believe that this interim deal is going to slow Iran's progress in any way?

Mr. Clapper. You're speaking about these other governments?

Senator Fischer. Exactly.

Mr. Clapper. I think they generally have concerns about whether it will or not.

Senator Fischer. Would you agree with that, General?

General Flynn. Yes, I do.

Senator Fischer. What does your intelligence tell you and how do you believe these nations are going to react if they believe that Iran is very close to obtaining and delivering a nuclear weapon?

Mr. Clapper. If that point were reached—and they're not near that point as we sit here today—obviously, that would be of great concern to all of us. So, obviously, the objective here is to forestall that.

Senator Fischer. Right. But do you have any intelligence that would give you an inclination on how those countries would react?

Mr. Clapper. As I said, if Iran actually obtained a nuclear weapon or were on the brink of obtaining one, I think they would go to general quarters and be quite alarmed about it.

Senator Fischer. Thank you.

Also, Director—we're going to pivot to the Chinese and the Russians now. In your testimony before the SSCI, you highlighted the Chinese military modernization. Are they modernizing their nuclear forces as well?

Mr. Clapper. Yes, they are.

Senator Fischer. I understand that the Russians are investing heavily in modernizing their nuclear forces; is that correct?

Mr. Clapper. Yes, it is.

Senator Fischer. Why? Do you have any idea why these two countries are doing that?

Mr. Clapper. In the case of the Russians, this is the foundation of their claim to great power status. So whatever other deficiencies they may have in their military, they are going to sustain a modern intercontinental nuclear strike capability.

In the case of the Chinese, it is a much smaller capability which they view as more defensive. Since it is smaller, they don't feel they're players in an arms control environment. They've professed no first use. So their perspective is different, but it's just part of
their overall campaign to modernize their military across the board.

Senator Fischer. Are either of these countries elevating the role that nuclear weapons would play within their total arsenal that they have?

Mr. Clapper. In the case of the Russians, actually I think it's probably less predominant, if that's what your question is, than say during the Cold War. It's a much smaller force than they had during the Cold War. So in that sense, and given in the case of the Russians their attempts to modernize their conventional forces, I'd say it's less prevalent than it was.

Senator Fischer. I have an article here that says that reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategy is a U.S. objective, while Russia is pursuing new concepts and capabilities for expanding the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategy. This is from the National Intelligence Council's Report on Global Trends for 2030 and it came out in 2012. Do you disagree, then, with that report with regards to their assessment of what the Russians are doing?

Mr. Clapper. No.

Senator Fischer. I thought I misunderstood you, though.

Mr. Clapper. I was just comparing historically to the Cold War. They are always going to emphasize this. This will always be an aspect of their overall national power.

Senator Fischer. Would you say they're expanding with regards to that nuclear power? Are they changing the way that they would perhaps use their nuclear weapons in the future?

Mr. Clapper. That would probably be best left to a closed session.

Senator Fischer. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I have some issues here that I need to go over as well.

If I could conclude quickly here with the issue of U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) and the NSA. There is value in linking the two together. Do you support the decision by the President not to split the NSA and CYBERCOM, for both of you gentlemen?

Mr. Clapper. I do support it. When I was in my former job as Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence at DOD, I was a proponent for the dual hat arrangement. I also raised it in the current context, only to ask whether it would help from an optics standpoint to split NSA from CYBERCOM.

But I think of all the quite compelling reasons for keeping them together are still germane, and the President came to that conclusion on his own.

Senator Fischer. Not just the optics, but also the costs. Would there be increased cost in your estimation if the two were split?

Mr. Clapper. There could be, but the greater complication would be actually effecting such a divorce, because in the cyber domain there is so much integration and there's so much more efficiency that accrues from having them united as one. Ultimately, though, I think the decision as to whether to exploit or attack, that I felt 3 or 4 years ago and I still feel that way, that the best person to make that judgment is the Director of NSA and CYBERCOM as one and not have them as competitive entities.

Senator Fischer. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Fischer.

Senator Manchin.

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank both of you again for your service and to the men and women who serve with you, to the families who support both the military and the civilian side. It's a tremendous undertaking that you have and I appreciate it very much. The people in West Virginia appreciate you.

That being said, what we're going through since I've been here for 3½ years—I've had briefings on cyber security and what it could do to us, the water and the grid system and our food supply and all that. We're going through a really difficult time in West Virginia right now with water. It just shows me what could happen, and we need some assistance now to build some confidence back in. We didn't have an alternative intake system. We didn't have a backup system. We had to continue to run the water plant even though it ingested the chemical MCHM. With that being said, we've lost the confidence of the people of West Virginia to where they believe the water is safe to drink. We have no official in the Federal Government or State government that will say it's safe. They say it's appropriate, they use all different words, I'm sure because of legal ramifications. But we just didn't—so many things we haven't tested.

With that being said, I think ours is a wakeup call. Thank God we had no deaths and we had no serious injuries right now. But it's a wakeup call, and I would ask all of you to look very carefully at how we best control this around the country and help other States in avoiding what we're going through now, and hopefully you can assist us in getting back to normality, if you will. We're going to come back bigger and better and stronger. We have to, to build confidence in the system right now, because we have people that are still very much concerned and they're not using the water back to normal usage, especially expectant mothers, small children, and the elderly.

With all that being said, I agree with General Alexander, the outgoing Director of CYBERCOM, his statement last year that the National Guard could play a huge role in cyber. He stated: “The Guard provides additional capacity and an ability to work with the States. Much like the Guard complements the Active-Duty Forces today, the Guard can assist the Department of Homeland Security in defense of the Nation.”

They're ideally suited for cyber warfare. As a former governor and commander in chief of our National Guard, I know the capability they have, the capacity and the ability. They're on the front line of defense for every one of our States. Every governor will tell you that. They're located in every State. They're not limited to a few military bases.

I just want to know from both of you what we can do to assist that, if you believe that's the direction we should go for cyber to help secure our States and our vital necessities that we all depend on.

Mr. Clapper. Sir, first, you made a comment about water and your characterization of what happened in your State as a wakeup
call. I couldn’t agree with you more. We increasingly see this as a national security issue overseas. It can easily be the source of conflict between countries. A case in point is the Grand Renaissance Dam that Ethiopia is building and the impact that could have on Egypt, just a case in point.

On the Guard and Reserve role with cyber, I think this is another case where they can play a huge role, as they do now with ISR, for example. If Admiral Rogers is confirmed for the position of Director of NSA and CYBERCOM commander, I think he will continue the same emphasis and the same support that General Alexander has had for that.

Senator Manchin. From the IC, does the IC director embrace the Guard? Would you support that position that the Guard would play a front line of defense in cyber on the Homeland here?

Mr. Clapper. Yes, sir. That’s a little bit far removed from where I sit now, but from prior incumbencies I certainly agree with that.

Senator Manchin. It makes all the sense in the world from us sitting here watching who do we go to for the front line. It would be helpful—General Flynn?

General Flynn. I would just add, Senator, that the vital necessity for the Guard and our Reserve, especially in the intelligence aspects of what they do, and especially as it relates to the critical infrastructure in all of our States, it’s an understatement to say that they’re vital.

Senator Manchin. Sometimes the thought process at DOD on incorporating them into the full active range as they have been, sometimes runs with strong headwinds, if you will. I think we’re getting past that now, but we really need this.

We look for your help also in our State of West Virginia on trying to get back to normal. If there’s anything that you could do, we would appreciate it.

Let me just continue on, if I may. The Wall Street Journal widely reported an attack on a California power station. An unidentified individual covertly cut the telephone lines from an underground location and within 30 minutes 17 giant power transformers were shut out with high-powered sniper rifles.

No one’s been arrested or charged with this attack. I’m sure that we’re pursuing that very heavily, correct?

Mr. Clapper. The FBI and the State and local officials definitely are, yes, sir.

Senator Manchin. Of the three, are you most concerned about our grid, our food supply, or our water supply?

Mr. Clapper. That’s a kind of Hobbesian choice, since potentially all of them are at risk. But probably the thing that would have the most impact quickly would be a substantial attack on our power grid. The incident in California is also a wakeup call and very instructive.

Senator Manchin. General Flynn, if I may. The resurgence of AQI’s Anbar Province has led Prime Minister Maliki to threaten an attack on Fallujah, which is currently under militant control, I believe. Portions of Iraq such as Fallujah and Ramadi have been cordoned off, with the Iraqi Army setting up security checkpoints on blocking off the roads. Iraq seems to be facing well-trained and
well-funded militants of al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

How imminent of a threat does the resurgence of al Qaeda affiliates pose for the regional stability there?

General FLYNN. I think it’s increasingly a concern that we’re going to have to pay very close attention to, not only inside of Iraq, but for the whole region, as you’re highlighting. The scale of what they are involved in right now, particularly the al Qaeda element in Iraq, and just the level of destruction that they’re having, the level of killing that they’re doing inside of that country is terrible.

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you. My time is up.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Manchin.

Senator Cruz.

Senator CRUZ. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director Clapper, General Flynn, I want to thank both of you for being here and thank you for your service, helping protect our Nation. I want to also thank the men and women, both military and civilian, that serve with you both.

There are a number of topics I’d like to discuss and I’d like to start, Director Clapper, by focusing on al Qaeda. You said previously: “Sustained counterterrorism pressure, key organizational setbacks, and the emergence of other power centers of the global violent extremist movement have put core al Qaeda on a downward trajectory since 2008.” I wanted to ask you, what, in your view, is the definition of “core al Qaeda”?

Mr. CLAPPER. My definition of “core al Qaeda” is the leadership group that has been essentially in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan. That is precisely what is meant by that, and clearly they have been profoundly degraded, but not eliminated by any stretch. So that area, in my view, remains the ideological center for al Qaeda, but not the operational center any longer.

Senator CRUZ. What is the value of that distinction? Are other radical Islamic terrorist groups any less dangerous to Americans than what the administration is defining as core al Qaeda?

Mr. CLAPPER. I think an organization like al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) poses a much greater sort of tactical near-term operational threat to the Homeland than does the ideological center of core al Qaeda in the FATA in Pakistan.

Senator CRUZ. Given the recent revelation in the Washington Post that the leader of the Ansar Al-Sharia branch in Derna, Libya, is the terrorist Abu Sufian Al-Kumu, who is a former detainee at Guantanamo Bay and trained in an Osama bin Laden camp in Yemen, and was, in fact, on al Qaeda’s payroll, shouldn’t his group also be considered part of core al Qaeda?

Mr. CLAPPER. They’re not. Of course, with core al Qaeda, the central leadership picks and chooses who among the wannabes is actually knighted or, if you will, so designated as an al Qaeda organization. So there are a lot of these organizations that profess extremism, and have in some cases the same goals, but they are not actually a part of al Qaeda. Another one is the Muhammed Jamal organization in Egypt, a violent organization, but not yet a part of al Qaeda formally, to the extent that that has meaning.
Senator Cruz. So the determination of core al Qaeda, who is making that? Because it would seem to me the characteristics of training with al Qaeda, being on their payroll, and past allegiance——

Mr. Clapper. Zawahiri probably is, as the ideological leader, if you had to pick somebody, is in charge of that. Of course, he recently essentially excommunicated AQI, or ISIL, as it’s known. He is the designee for deciding who is and who isn’t al Qaeda.

Senator Cruz. I was troubled by some recently declassified testimony that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey gave to the House Armed Services Committee, in which, when General Dempsey was asked about the ability of the military to target the terrorists who attacked us in Benghazi, General Dempsey’s response was that those individuals were not participants or in leadership of core al Qaeda and therefore were not under the authorization for use of military force, and so the military didn’t have the ability to target those individuals.

Do you agree with that assessment?

Mr. Clapper. We have targeted them in an intelligence sense, and DOD and CIA participate in tracking these people. I don’t know about the legalities of whether we could actually shoot at them.

Senator Cruz. Given that these terrorists are professing allegiance to al Qaeda, at least portions of them are led by Kumu and others with ties directly to bin Laden, and given that they murdered four Americans, does it make sense that we should be in any way restrained in going after them and bringing them to justice?

Mr. Clapper. Sir, who we can go after in terms of capturing or killing is not an intelligence call. Our view is if they are terrorists of any stripe we are going to do our best to collect as much intelligence on them as we possibly can.

Senator Cruz. General Flynn, do you have a view on this same question?

General Flynn. I agree with the Director. The only thing I would add along your line of questioning is that we also have to look at the ideology that exists within these groups. They share an ideology and I would add that to the definition of core. It’s not just the senior leadership in al Qaeda, in Pakistan; it’s also this shared ideology that many of these extremist groups have. I think that’s something that we have to consider as we look at every single one of them.

Senator Cruz. Would you consider the Ansar Al-Sharia branch sharing that ideology?

General Flynn. I would.

Senator Cruz. One final topic I wanted to address, which is Iran.

There was some discussion recently, Director Clapper, I’m very concerned that the JPA we’re going down with Iran is making the same mistakes that the United States made with respect to North Korea and indeed is being negotiated by many of the very same people, and by relaxing the sanctions against North Korea we allowed the funds to fly to North Korea, which in turn allowed them to develop nuclear weapons.

Is there any reason we should expect different results in Iran than this same policy achieved in North Korea?
Mr. CLAPPER. I’m not here to critique U.S. policy. I will just say that I don’t know how it will come out in Iran. We, for our part, are very committed to ensuring that we monitor compliance with whatever agreements that are forged.

Senator CRUZ. I would note you said that you didn’t want to critique U.S. policy, but is there any reason to believe that the outcome in Iran would be any different from North Korea as a substantive matter?

Mr. CLAPPER. Iran is a completely different country than North Korea. So, yes, the outcome could be different.

Senator CRUZ. But do the differences make it more or less likely that they would comply? Or, phrased differently—and I’m at the end of my time, so this will be my last question. Phrased differently, in your view if Iran were to succeed in acquiring a nuclear weapon, what do you view as the likelihood that they would use that nuclear weapon to murder innocent people?

Mr. CLAPPER. First of all, they are not near to acquiring a nuclear weapon and would be even farther from it assuming these negotiations pan out. But as to your question, that’s an imponderable, sir. I can’t answer it.

Senator CRUZ. I will say I think the odds are unacceptably high and this current path is exceedingly dangerous for our national security.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Cruz.

Senator VITTER. Thank you both for your service.

Director Clapper, I wanted to follow up on some of the same issues regarding Iran and specifically our capability of knowing for sure if they’re cheating, if they’re not living by any obligations. You testified here today on the negative impacts of sequester on the IC. In addition, we have a lot of examples before those budget circumstances, before sequester, of not knowing what was going on in other countries real time, of not fully appreciating what North Korea was doing in the past, of not knowing that Qadafi had chemical weapons before his downfall and we got in there—I think you’ve testified specifically about that—if not knowing today—we’ve talked about whether Russia’s violating some of our agreements with them, like the INF—if not knowing everything going on in Syria in real time.

Is our capability in Iran qualitatively better than all those other places pre-sequester and pre-budget impacts?

Mr. CLAPPER. I would call it comparable, and I’d be happy to discuss in more detail what our actual intelligence capabilities are against Iran in a closed session.

Senator VITTER. That reinforces my question. If they’re comparable, and given the past track record of not knowing precisely what was going on in those places until well after the fact, how can you state that we’re certain that our IC is capable of detecting if Iran doesn’t meet its agreements and starts moving forward on a nuclear weapon?

Mr. CLAPPER. All of that insight is not dependent on the IC. It is also heavily dependent on the authorities for more intrusive ob-
ervation and surveillance by the IAEA. Under the provisions of
the JPA they will have very intrusive insight into Iran. So that
would make a big difference to me. If we didn't have that, that
would make a major difference.

Senator Vitter. But for that to be foolproof you have to know ex-
actly where to look and exactly what questions to ask; would that
be correct? Certainly those provisions in Iran with IC capabili-
ties——

Mr. Clapper. I didn't understand the question, sir. I'm sorry.

Senator Vitter. Certainly all of that's related, the work of the
IC and those provisions?

Mr. Clapper. Yes, it is, and I'd prefer to discuss that relation-
ship in closed session.

Senator Vitter. Okay. Let me just underscore my concern, par-
ticularly given the history in North Korea, Syria, Russia right now,
Libya, and plenty of other places.

A final question on Iran. I think you've testified today that cyber
is your single biggest concern. Does that equation change if Iran
gets a nuclear weapon?

Mr. Clapper. Assad in Syria?

Senator Vitter. Cyber.

Mr. Clapper. Oh, cyber.

Senator Vitter. Cyber.

Mr. Clapper. The question is, sir? I'm sorry.

Senator Vitter. Does that statement, does that rank as your
most serious concern, does that change if Iran gets a nuclear weap-
on?

Mr. Clapper. I'd have to rethink that, I guess, if that were to
happen.

Senator Vitter. Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Vitter.

Let's have a three-question second round for starters, and if we
need more than that we'll have a third round.

First on Iran. What's the IC's assessment of the nature and ex-
tent of Iranian influence within the Maliki Government in Iraq?

Mr. Clapper. There is some influence. There's also some
standoffishness, I guess that is what I'd call it. But clearly it is in
Iran's best interest to have a friendly, cooperative Shia-led govern-
mant in Iraq. So the Iranians will exert influence in any number
of ways.

Chairman Levin. Has it been growing, would you say?

Mr. Clapper. I think it's level to what it has been for a couple
years.

Chairman Levin. Now, there's been a number of articles written
about business people from various countries knocking on the door
in Iran, and the administration made it pretty clear the other day
that we're going to enforce our current sanctions, as they always
said they would, during this negotiation period. Providing they're
knocking on the door, but the door is locked tight so that there's
no leakage during this negotiation period, wouldn't the fact that
there's a lot of interest in the outside business community to come
into Iran put some additional pressure on Iran to negotiate a set-
tlement which we would find acceptable?
Mr. Clapper. Absolutely, I think it would be an attraction, and that probably supports the Rouhani camp, if you will, those who are interested in trying to change the economy and improve it in Iran. That would, I think, be an argument or a debate point for them against the hardliners.

Chairman Levin. I want to switch you to Pakistan. This has to do with the financial network that supports the Haqqani network. I assume that the IC tracks the Haqqani financial network and the banks and the businesses which support that Haqqani network. Why haven’t we been able to shut down that financial support?

Mr. Clapper. Sir, it would probably be best to discuss that in a closed session.

Chairman Levin. Okay, we’ll add that to the list.

Senator Graham.

Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Flynn, do you share the concerns expressed by General Dunford today in his statement about the release of these detainees at Parwan Prison?

General Flynn. I do.

Senator Graham. You served a tour of duty in Afghanistan, is that correct?

General Flynn. I served three.

Senator Graham. Three, okay. Dealing really quite frankly with this very issue, detainees and the threats they presented?

General Flynn. I’m sorry, Senator?

Senator Graham. You had familiarity with the detainees?

General Flynn. Absolutely, yes, absolutely.

Senator Graham. Okay, thank you.

Mr. Clapper, I appreciate your candor and your service to our country. President Rouhani has tweeted that 117 delegations have visited Iran seeking to do business in the future. Do you know if that’s accurate or not?

Mr. Clapper. I do not.

Senator Graham. Could you do an assessment to the committee, in whatever appropriate fashion, as to whether or not our European allies and other countries throughout the world are now engaging Iran more aggressively in terms of business opportunities?

Mr. Clapper. Yes, we will.

[The information referred to follows:

[Deleted.]

Senator Graham. Because I take a different view than my good friend Senator Levin. I believe that the smart money is that the sanctions are pretty much over and everybody’s trying to get in line to do business with Iran, and that we’re losing our leverage. But that’s just my opinion.

But I would ask you this question to reinforce again. If the Iranians are allowed to enrich uranium as a final deal, could you please let us know, in whatever appropriate forum, the effect that might have on the Middle East in terms of spreading proliferation of nuclear weapons capability and whether or not the Sunni Arab countries will follow suit? Could you get that pretty quickly?

Mr. Clapper. We’ll try to provide a written assessment of that, which I think would be classified.
Senator GRAHAM. In 1 minute, if, in fact, enrichment of uranium spread throughout the Mideast, even under the color of peaceful nuclear power program purposes, would you agree with me that that would be a very bad scenario for the national security of the United States and Israel, if nations throughout the Mideast turned to enriching uranium?

Mr. CLAPPER. Yes, particularly if it were for other than peaceful purposes, obviously.

Senator GRAHAM. The point is, do you think the Iranians were trying to build a bomb before we got involved?

Mr. CLAPPER. They had not made the determination to go to that step. They certainly have approached this from a threshold capability, whether it's reactors, enrichment, or the delivery capability. So for the Iranians, the decision is a political one, not a technical one. They certainly have the expertise now if they so chose.

Senator GRAHAM. They have the expertise if they so chose. How long would it take them if they made that decision?

Mr. CLAPPER. That depends on a lot of factors, which are best discussed in closed session.

Senator GRAHAM. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham.

Gentlemen, we appreciate your testimony, your service. I join in a number of colleagues who've also asked you to express to the men and women with whom you work our appreciation for their service and the families that support all of you.

We'll be in touch about a closed meeting. We will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

NORTH KOREA

1. Senator LEVIN. Director Clapper and General Flynn, a year ago North Korea was engaged in a spate of provocative behavior. It had conducted its third nuclear weapon test, launched a satellite that demonstrated improved long-range missile technologies, and conducted cyber attacks against South Korea. What progress has North Korea made in the last year on its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities?

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]

General FLYNN. [Deleted.]

2. Senator LEVIN. Director Clapper and General Flynn, since North Korea has never tested its road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), do you assess that it would not have confidence in the operational performance of that missile?

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]

General FLYNN. [Deleted.]

3. Senator LEVIN. Director Clapper and General Flynn, do you assess that North Korea would still have to conduct additional development and testing before it has confidence in an operational nuclear warhead capability for an ICBM?

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]

General FLYNN. [Deleted.]

4. Senator LEVIN. Director Clapper and General Flynn, how sophisticated are North Korea's cyber capabilities and how have they developed in the last year?
5. Senator Levin. Director Clapper and General Flynn, should we be concerned that North Korea will begin engaging in similar cyber activities as China, including military espionage, against the United States?

Director Clapper. [Deleted.]

General Flynn. [Deleted.]

CHINA

6. Senator Levin. Director Clapper, in your written testimony, in the context of China’s role in maritime territorial disputes and China’s efforts to expand its regional control, you stated that “Beijing is pursuing a new type of major power relations with Washington, but China is simultaneously working at least indirectly to counterbalance U.S. influence. Within East Asia, Beijing seeks to fuel doubts about the sustainability of the U.S. rebalance and Washington’s willingness to support its allies and partners in the region.” How has China worked to undermine the perception that Washington is committed to the Asia-Pacific rebalance?

Director Clapper. [Deleted.]

7. Senator Levin. Director Clapper, has sequestration and budget limitations played a role in undermining the perception of a present and engaged United States in the region?

Director Clapper. [Deleted.]

8. Senator Levin. Director Clapper, has China successfully undermined any of the partner building engagements that the United States has pursued in the region?

Director Clapper. [Deleted.]

9. Senator Levin. Director Clapper, most of the maritime issues with China have focused on territorial disputes in the East China and South China seas. The Indian Ocean poses similar challenges and threats; however, very little attention is paid to this important part of the region. What are some specific examples of the logistical support arrangements that China is pursuing in the Indian Ocean region and with which countries?

Director Clapper. [Deleted.]

10. Senator Levin. Director Clapper, should we be similarly concerned about anti-access/area-denial activities by China in the Indian Ocean, especially given the PLA Navy’s recent exercises through the Lombok Strait?

Director Clapper. [Deleted.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TIM KAINE

AFGHANISTAN

11. Senator Kaine. Director Clapper and General Flynn, reports have emerged describing secret talks between President Karzai and Taliban leaders. U.S. efforts at initiating such negotiations stalled in the fall of 2013 when the Taliban presented numerous preconditions to negotiations including the release of certain Taliban prisoners from Guantanamo. What is the Intelligence Community’s (IC) assessment of these talks and their potential for success?

Director Clapper. [Deleted.]

General Flynn. [Deleted.]

12. Senator Kaine. Director Clapper and General Flynn, does the pursuit of a parallel track of negotiations with the Taliban serve as a hedge for President Karzai and contribute to his reluctance to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA)?

Director Clapper. [Deleted.]

General Flynn. [Deleted.]

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

13. Senator Kaine. Director Clapper, the underpinning of our relationship with allied nations is trust. Following the recommendations of the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, the President said he will
not monitor leaders of friends and allies unless there is a compelling national security purpose. My question is about our work with allied intelligence agencies. What damage, if any, has the disclosure of National Security Agency surveillance programs been to that mutual trust, and how has it impacted relationships with allied intelligence services to gather information about mutual threats?

Director Clapper. [Deleted.]

14. Senator Kaine. Director Clapper, the IC has many tools at its disposal to report, collect, and analyze information. The President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies recommended significant reforms to one of those tools, the bulk collection of telephony metadata pursuant to section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. Please detail if, and how, the section 215 program has been effective in warning us against terrorist threats?

Director Clapper. [Deleted.]

15. Senator Kaine. Director Clapper, is maintaining the section 215 program in its current form essential to our national security?

Director Clapper. [Deleted.]

16. Senator Kaine. Director Clapper, do you believe there are alternatives to bulk data collection that would be more specific to targeting intelligence collection, while also protecting the privacy and civil liberties of citizens?

Director Clapper. [Deleted.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

IRAN

17. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, recently in the Senate you testified that the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) regarding Iran’s nuclear program would have a real impact on the progress of Iran’s nuclear capability. Yet, it is also the assessment of the IC that Iran already has the “scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons.” What is the current state of Iran’s weaponization program?

Director Clapper. [Deleted.]

18. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, does Iran have the technical capability to produce a nuclear weapon if it decides to do so today or 6 months from now?

Director Clapper. [Deleted.]

19. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, what do you mean precisely when you say that the JPA will have a real impact on the progress of Iran’s nuclear capability?

Director Clapper. [Deleted.]

20. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, does the JPA simply slow progress that otherwise would have been made, or do you see some real reversal in the Iranian program?

Director Clapper. [Deleted.]

21. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, some outside experts, including Gregory Jones of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security, have estimated that Iran could produce sufficient weapons grade uranium for the core of a weapon in less than 2 months if it decided to do so. Does this timeframe generally conform with the IC’s assessment?

Director Clapper. [Deleted.]

22. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, you also testified as it relates to Iran’s nuclear program that: “the key thing we’re interested in and most concerned about is the more highly enriched uranium—the 20 percent enriched uranium.” Given the advancements in Iran’s centrifuge program, including the installation of new advanced centrifuges, isn’t it true that Iran could enrich uranium to weapons grade by starting at 3 percent, in only slightly more time than if it had started at 20 percent?

Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
IRAN AND VERIFICATION

23. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, in 2003, Iran, while in negotiations with the EU–3, agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment program. We all know how that turned out. Iran suspended enrichment for a short period, but other elements of its nuclear program accelerated. President Rouhani was then Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator and later famously bragged about deceiving the Europeans. How confident is the IC that it would know if Iran was not fully complying with the terms of the current JPA?  
Directo r Clapper. [Deleted.]

24. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, will you commit to immediately notify this committee of any suspected violation of the agreement by the Iranians?  
Directo r Clapper. [Deleted.]

25. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, if Iran is able to prevail in its view that it retains the right to research on advanced centrifuges, will Iran be able to accelerate progress towards a nuclear weapons capability?  
Directo r Clapper. [Deleted.]

IRAN AND SANCTIONS

26. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, would you agree that economic sanctions imposed by the United States played a major role in driving Iran to the negotiating table and agreeing to the JPA?  
Directo r Clapper. [Deleted.]

27. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, is Iran negotiating in large part because it desperately needs sanctions relief? If so, what is the basis for your assessment (apart from the public statements made by Iranian leaders) that the passage of new sanctions, whose implementation is delayed to allow negotiations to proceed, would cause Iran to leave the talks?  
Directo r Clapper. [Deleted.]

28. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, what would Iran gain if it left the talks? Wouldn’t it still be in desperate need of sanctions relief?  
Directo r Clapper. [Deleted.]

IRAN AND A CREDIBLE MILITARY THREAT

29. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, has the IC assessed the impact of the failure of the United States to take military action in Syria on the credibility of our threat to use force to stop Iran’s nuclear program?  
Directo r Clapper. [Deleted.]

30. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, do Iran’s leaders believe that if negotiations fail, the United States will use military force to stop their nuclear quest?  
Directo r Clapper. [Deleted.]

IRAN AND SANCTIONS RELIEF

31. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, what impact has the JPA had on the Iranian economy?  
Directo r Clapper. [Deleted.]

32. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, what is your assessment of the willingness of foreign actors to violate the current sanctions regime in order to gain a preferred position with Iran?  
Directo r Clapper. [Deleted.]

33. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, did anyone in the IC conduct an assessment of the impact sanctions relief provided to Iran under the JPA would have on the Iranian economy, and if so, what did that assessment conclude?  
Directo r Clapper. [Deleted.]
34. Senator WICKER. Director Clapper, what is the state of Iranian support for terrorism?
Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]

35. Senator WICKER. Director Clapper, since the election of President Rouhani or the implementation of the JPA, has the IC seen any change in Iranian support for terrorism, including to Hizballah?
Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]

36. Senator WICKER. Director Clapper, what is the state of Iranian aid to Syria and the Assad regime?
Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]

37. Senator WICKER. Director Clapper, in the last year, has any change been observed in Iran’s gross human rights violation and the repression of its own people?
Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]

38. Senator WICKER. Director Clapper, what do you make of the increased hangings of Iranian citizens?
Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]

39. Senator WICKER. Director Clapper and General Flynn, does Iran continue to advance its ballistic missile program?
Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]
General FLYNN. [Deleted.]

SYRIA AND FOREIGN FIGHTERS

40. Senator WICKER. Director Clapper, your testimony recently in the Senate on Syria was extremely alarming. By your estimates, there are 26,000 extremists fighting in Syria and 7,000 foreign fighters. You raised concern that you’re now seeing the appearance of training complexes in Syria to train people to go back to their countries to conduct terrorist attacks. To me this sounds a lot like Afghanistan all over again. How concerned should we be that, maybe not next year, but over the next decade or more, terrorists trained in Syria are going to carry out attacks directly against America or our allies, including Israel?
Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]

RUSSIAN SUPPORT FOR THE ASSAD REGIME

41. Senator WICKER. General Flynn, what is the status of Russian military support for the Assad regime?
General FLYNN. [Deleted.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

RUSSIAN TREATY COMPLIANCE

42. Senator AYOTTE. Director Clapper and General Flynn, has the U.S. IC known about the potential Russian violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty since 2008?
Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]
General FLYNN. [Deleted.]

43. Senator AYOTTE. Director Clapper and General Flynn, did the President or his senior advisors know about this potential treaty violation before the President signed the New START treaty in April?
Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]
General FLYNN. [Deleted.]

44. Senator AYOTTE. Director Clapper, have you known about this potential violation since you became the Director of National Intelligence in August 2010?
Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]
45. Senator AYOTTE. Director Clapper, when and in what form did the IC or the administration inform the Senate regarding potential Russian violations of the INF Treaty?

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]

46. Senator AYOTTE. Director Clapper, did such a notification occur when the Senate was considering ratifying New START in late 2010?

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]

47. Senator AYOTTE. Director Clapper, has the United States fully informed our European allies regarding the potential Russian violation of the INF Treaty?

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]

ROLE OF IRANIAN SANCTIONS

48. Senator AYOTTE. Director Clapper, what has been the primary motivation leading the Iranians to make modest concessions on its nuclear program in the interim agreement?

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]

49. Senator AYOTTE. Director Clapper, you stated in your written testimony that, “Iran’s perceived need for economic relief has led it to make concessions on its nuclear program . . . Do you therefore agree that the sanctions regime is one of the primary reasons the Iranians are at the negotiating table?

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]

50. Senator AYOTTE. Director Clapper, you also wrote that, “Iran wants to improve its nuclear and missile capabilities while avoiding severe repercussions—such as a military strike or regime-threatening sanctions.” Based on this assessment, would you agree that an ideal outcome from the Iranian perspective would be one that eliminated or reduced the impact of sanctions and the threat of a military strike—while permitting them to continue development of their nuclear and missile capabilities?

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]

51. Senator AYOTTE. Director Clapper, do you assess that continued sanctions and the threat of additional sanctions will play an important role in encouraging the Iranians to honor their commitments and make the difficult concessions necessary for a final agreement?

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]

IRAN’S INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS

52. Senator AYOTTE. Director Clapper, when you testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee last year, you stated, “the Iranians are pursuing development of two systems that potentially could have intercontinental capability . . . the belief is about the first time they’d be ready to do that would be as early as 2015.” Has Iran continued to pursue the development of systems with intercontinental capability since your testimony early last year?

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]

53. Senator AYOTTE. Director Clapper, do you still believe that Iran could have an ICBM as early as next year that could strike the United States?

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]

54. Senator AYOTTE. Director Clapper, in your testimony you state that, “Iran would choose a ballistic missile as its preferred method of delivering nuclear weapons . . . ” Why do you believe that?

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]

55. Senator AYOTTE. Director Clapper, why do you believe Iran has “the means and motivation to develop longer-range missiles, including an ICBM”?

Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]
IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

56. Senator Ayotte. Director Clapper, in your written testimony you state that, “Iran has made progress in a number of areas—including uranium enrichment, nuclear reactors, and ballistic missiles—from which it could draw if it decided to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons.” You also state that, “Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons.” If the Iranian leadership decided to make a sprint toward a nuclear weapon capability, how long do you assess that would take?

Director Clapper. [Deleted.]

57. Senator Ayotte. Director Clapper, according to an October 2013 report from the Institute for Science and International Security that was co-authored by David Albright, Iran possessed the ability to achieve nuclear break-out in just over 1 month (1.3 to 2.6 months) with the low enriched uranium stockpile it had as of last August. Is that assessment consistent with your own?

Director Clapper. [Deleted.]

58. Senator Ayotte. Director Clapper, if Iran has mastered the technology to build a missile-deliverable nuclear weapon and the only thing standing between them and this capability is a political decision by the Supreme Leader, what do you assess are the primary factors impacting the Iranian leadership’s political calculus?

Director Clapper. [Deleted.]

59. Senator Ayotte. Director Clapper, is it conceivable that Iran could have both a nuclear weapon and an ICBM to deliver that weapon to the United States in the next few years?

Director Clapper. [Deleted.]

UNPREDICTABILITY OF FUTURE CONFLICTS

60. Senator Ayotte. Director Clapper and General Flynn, over the course of your long careers, is this the most uncertain national security environment you have seen?

Director Clapper. [Deleted.]

General Flynn. [Deleted.]

61. Senator Ayotte. Director Clapper, do you place high confidence in our ability to predict what kind of conflicts the United States will have to engage in going forward to protect our national security?

Director Clapper. [Deleted.]

RUSSIAN DELIVERY OF S–300 ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES

62. Senator Ayotte. General Flynn, have the Russians delivered any S–300 anti-aircraft missiles to the Assad regime in Syria?

General Flynn. [Deleted.]

CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT OF A FIFTH GENERATION FIGHTER

63. Senator Ayotte. General Flynn, last year in your prepared statement for the Senate Armed Services Committee, you said that China tested a fifth generation fighter prototype in 2011 and rolled out and tested a smaller fifth generation fighter in 2012. Were there any significant developments in 2013?

General Flynn. [Deleted.]

64. Senator Ayotte. General Flynn, what is your assessment of the Russian fifth generation fighter program?

General Flynn. [Deleted.]

65. Senator Ayotte. General Flynn, do these Chinese and Russian fifth generation fighters present a potential challenge to U.S. air superiority if we do not move forward with our own fifth generation fighter program?

General Flynn. [Deleted.]
NORTH KOREAN THREAT TO MAINLAND UNITED STATES

66. Senator Ayotte. Director Clapper and General Flynn, does North Korea currently possess an ICBM that can strike the United States (Hawaii and Alaska)?
   Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]
   General FLYNN. [Deleted.]

67. Senator Ayotte. Director Clapper and General Flynn, does North Korea have the ability to strike Los Angeles?
   Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]
   General FLYNN. [Deleted.]

68. Senator Ayotte. Director Clapper and General Flynn, when do you expect North Korea will have that capability, if they do not have it now?
   Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]
   General FLYNN. [Deleted.]

THREAT TO HOMELAND FROM EXTREMISTS IN SYRIA

69. Senator Ayotte. Director Clapper, you testified at the House Intelligence Committee that, “The strength of the insurgency in Syria is now estimated at somewhere between 75,000 or 80,000 or up to 110,000 to 115,000 insurgents, who are organized into more than 1,500 groups of widely varying political leanings.” You went on to testify that, “Complicating this further are the 7,500 or so foreign fighters from some 50 countries who have gravitated to Syria.” Are there American extremists fighting in Syria?
   Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]

70. Senator Ayotte. Director Clapper, have some of these individuals returned to the United States?
   Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]

71. Senator Ayotte. Director Clapper, on February 7, Jeh Johnson, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, stated that the civil war in Syria has become a matter of U.S. Homeland security over concerns about a small number of Americans who have gone to fight with Syrian rebels and returned home. How concerned should we be that those extremists may try to commit terrorist attacks on U.S. soil again?
   Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]

DEPARTURE OF ASSAD

72. Senator Ayotte. Director Clapper, in your written testimony you state that, “President Assad remains unwilling to negotiate himself out of power,” and “... plans to win a new 7-year term ...” in the upcoming elections that are to occur this year. What would be necessary to create a tipping point in Syria that would result in the fall of Assad?
   Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]

VULNERABILITY OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO INSIDER THREATS

73. Senator Ayotte. Director Clapper and General Flynn, according to a February 9, 2014, New York Times article, Edward Snowden “gained access to roughly 1.7 million of the country’s most highly classified documents ... [using] inexpensive and widely available software.” Is that accurate?
   Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]
   General FLYNN. [Deleted.]

74. Senator Ayotte. Director Clapper and General Flynn, can you provide any more details?
   Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]
   General FLYNN. [Deleted.]

75. Senator Ayotte. Director Clapper and General Flynn, how vulnerable is the IC to insider attacks like this?
   Director CLAPPER. [Deleted.]
   General FLYNN. [Deleted.]
76. Senator Ayotte. Director Clapper and General Flynn, how could something like this have happened nearly 3 years after the WikiLeaks disclosures?
   Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
   General Flynn. [Deleted.]

77. Senator Ayotte. Director Clapper and General Flynn, what has been learned from the Snowden debacle and how are you implementing what you have learned?
   Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
   General Flynn. [Deleted.]

78. Senator Ayotte. Director Clapper and General Flynn, do we have sufficient oversight over IC contractors?
   Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
   General Flynn. [Deleted.]