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112th Congress                                            Rept. 112-507
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                      Part 1

======================================================================

 
    TO AMEND THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 TO REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL 
 APPROVAL OF AGREEMENTS FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH FOREIGN 
                   COUNTRIES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

                                _______
                                

                  May 30, 2012.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                        [To accompany H.R. 1280]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the 
bill (H.R. 1280) to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to 
require congressional approval of agreements for peaceful 
nuclear cooperation with foreign countries, and for other 
purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon 
with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do 
pass.

                           TABLE OF CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
The Amendment....................................................     2
Background and Purpose...........................................     6
Hearings.........................................................    13
Committee Consideration and Votes................................    13
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................    14
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................    14
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................    14
Performance Goals and Objectives.................................    16
New Advisory Committees..........................................    16
Congressional Accountability Act.................................    16
Earmark Identification...........................................    16
Section-by-Section Analysis......................................    16
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............    20

                             The Amendment

    The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. REQUIREMENT FOR CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF AGREEMENTS FOR 
                    PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION.

  (a) Cooperation With Other Nations.--Section 123 of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) is amended--
          (1) in the matter preceding subsection a., by striking ``No 
        cooperation'' and inserting ``Subject to subsection f., no 
        cooperation'';
          (2) in subsection a.--
                  (A) in paragraph (3), by inserting ``or acquired from 
                any other source'' after ``pursuant to such agreement'' 
                each place it appears;
                  (B) in paragraph (4)--
                          (i) by striking ``or terminates or'' and 
                        inserting ``, terminates,''; and
                          (ii) by inserting ``, or violates or 
                        abrogates any provision contained within such 
                        agreement'' after ``IAEA safeguards'';
                  (C) in paragraph (6), by inserting ``or acquired from 
                any other source'' after ``agreement'' each place it 
                appears;
                  (D) in paragraph (8), by striking ``and'' at the end;
                  (E) in paragraph (9), by striking the period at the 
                end and inserting a semicolon; and
                  (F) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following 
                new paragraphs:
                  ``(10) a guaranty by the cooperating party that no 
                nationals of a third country shall be permitted access 
                to any reactor, related equipment, or sensitive 
                materials transferred under the agreement for 
                cooperation without the prior consent of the United 
                States; and
                  ``(11) a commitment to maintain and, in the case of a 
                country without such a legal regime in place, a 
                commitment to enact at the earliest possible date, and 
                in no case later than one year after the agreement 
                enters into force, a legal regime providing for 
                adequate protection from civil liability that will 
                allow for the participation of United States suppliers 
                in any effort by the country to develop civilian 
                nuclear power.'';
          (3) in the matter following paragraph (11) (as added by 
        paragraph (2)(F) of this subsection), by striking ``The 
        President may exempt a proposed agreement for cooperation'' and 
        all that follows through ``common defense and security.'';
          (4) in subsection c., by striking ``and'' at the end;
          (5) in subsection d.--
                  (A) in the first sentence--
                          (i) by striking ``not'' the first and second 
                        place it appears;
                          (ii) by inserting ``only'' after 
                        ``effective'' the first place it appears; and
                          (iii) by striking ``: Provided further,'' and 
                        all that follows through ``such agreement'' and 
                        inserting ``, unless the proposed agreement 
                        includes a requirement as part of the agreement 
                        for cooperation or other legally binding 
                        document that is considered part of the 
                        agreement that no enrichment or reprocessing 
                        activities, or acquisition or construction of 
                        facilities for such activities, will occur 
                        within the territory over which the cooperating 
                        party exercises sovereignty, in which case the 
                        agreement shall become effective unless the 
                        Congress adopts, and there is enacted, a joint 
                        resolution of disapproval (1) during such 
                        sixty-day period for a new agreement; or (2) 
                        during a period of 30 days of continuous 
                        session for a renewal agreement''; and
                  (B) by striking the final period and inserting ``; 
                and'';
          (6) by redesignating subsection e. as subsection f.;
          (7) by inserting immediately after subsection d. the 
        following new subsection:
          ``e. the cooperating party--
                  ``(1) has acceded to and is fully implementing the 
                provisions and guidelines of--
                          ``(A) the Convention on the Prohibition of 
                        the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 
                        Use of Chemical Weapons and on their 
                        Destruction (commonly known as the `Chemical 
                        Weapons Convention');
                          ``(B) the Convention on the Prohibition of 
                        the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
                        Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their 
                        Destruction (commonly known as the `Biological 
                        Weapons Convention'); and
                          ``(C) all other international agreements to 
                        which the United States is a party regarding 
                        the export of nuclear, chemical, biological, 
                        and advanced conventional weapons, including 
                        missiles and other delivery systems;
                  ``(2) has established and is fully implementing an 
                effective export control system, including fully 
                implementing the provisions and guidelines of United 
                Nations Security Council Resolution 1540;
                  ``(3) is in full compliance with all United Nations 
                conventions to which the United States is a party and 
                all Security Council resolutions regarding the 
                prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass 
                destruction, including--
                          ``(A) the Convention on the Physical 
                        Protection of Nuclear Material; and
                          ``(B) the United Nations International 
                        Convention for the Suppression of Acts of 
                        Nuclear Terrorism;
                  ``(4) is not a Destination of Diversion Concern under 
                section 303 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
                Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 
                111-195);
                  ``(5) is closely cooperating with the United States 
                to prevent state sponsors of terrorism (the term `state 
                sponsor of terrorism' means a country the government of 
                which has been determined by the Secretary of State, 
                for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export 
                Administration Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign 
                Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export 
                Control Act, or other provision of law, is a government 
                that has repeatedly provided support for acts of 
                international terrorism) from--
                          ``(A) acquiring or developing chemical, 
                        biological, or nuclear weapons or related 
                        technologies; or
                          ``(B) acquiring or developing destabilizing 
                        numbers and types of advanced conventional 
                        weapons, including ballistic missiles; and
                  ``(6) has signed, ratified, and is fully implementing 
                an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with 
                the International Atomic Energy Agency.''; and
          (8) by adding after subsection f. (as redesignated by 
        paragraph (6) of this subsection) the following new subsection:
          ``g. For purposes of this section--
                  ``(1) the term `new agreement' means an agreement for 
                cooperation with a country with respect to which the 
                United States has not, on or after the date of the 
                enactment of this subsection, entered into such an 
                agreement; and
                  ``(2) the term `renewal agreement' means an agreement 
                for cooperation with a country with respect to which 
                the United States has, before the date of the enactment 
                of this subsection, entered into such an agreement.''.
  (b) Subsequent Arrangements.--Section 131 a. (1) of such Act (42 
U.S.C. 2160 a.(1)) is amended--
          (1) in the second sentence, by striking ``security,'' and all 
        that follows through ``publication.'' and inserting 
        ``security.''; and
          (2) by inserting after the second sentence the following new 
        sentences: ``Such subsequent arrangement shall become effective 
        only if Congress enacts a joint resolution of approval 
        according to the procedures of sections 123 d. and 130 i. of 
        this Act. Any such nuclear proliferation assessment statement 
        shall be submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
        House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations 
        of the Senate not later than the 31st day of continuous session 
        after submission of the subsequent arrangement.''.

SEC. 2. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR 
                    WEAPONS.

  (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to 
oppose the withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (in this section referred to as the ``Treaty'') of any 
country that is a party to the Treaty and to use all political, 
economic, and diplomatic means at its disposal to deter, prevent, or 
reverse any such withdrawal from the Treaty.
  (b) Prohibition on Certain Assistance.--Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, no assistance (other than humanitarian assistance) 
under any provision of law may be provided to a country that has 
withdrawn from the Treaty on or after the date of the enactment of this 
Act.
  (c) Return of All United States-Origin Materials and Equipment.--The 
United States shall seek the return of any material, equipment, or 
components transferred under an agreement for civil nuclear cooperation 
that is in force pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) on or after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, and any special fissionable material produced through the use of 
such material, equipment, or components previously provided to a 
country that withdraws from the Treaty.

SEC. 3. REPORT ON COMPARABILITY OF NONPROLIFERATION CONDITIONS BY 
                    FOREIGN NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS.

  Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the President shall transmit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate a report on the extent to which each country that engages in 
civil nuclear exports (including power and research nuclear reactors) 
requires nuclear nonproliferation requirements as conditions for export 
comparable to those under this Act. Such report shall also--
          (1) detail the extent to which the exports of each such 
        country incorporate United States-origin components, 
        technology, or materials that require United States approval 
        for re-export;
          (2) detail the civil nuclear-related trade and investments in 
        the United States by any entity from each such country; and
          (3) list any United States grant, concessionary loan or loan 
        guarantee, or any other incentive or inducement to any such 
        country or entity related to nuclear exports or investments in 
        the United States.

SEC. 4. INITIATIVES AND NEGOTIATIONS RELATING TO AGREEMENTS FOR 
                    PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION.

  Subsection f. of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
U.S.C. 2153), as redesignated pursuant to section 1(a)(6) of this Act, 
is amended to read as follows:
          ``f. The President shall keep the Committee on Foreign 
        Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
        Foreign Relations of the Senate fully and currently informed of 
        any initiative or negotiations relating to a new or amended 
        agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to this 
        section prior to the President's announcement of such 
        initiative or negotiations. The President shall consult with 
        the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate concerning such initiative or negotiations beginning not 
        later than 15 calendar days after the initiation of any such 
        negotiations, or the receipt or transmission of a draft 
        agreement, whichever occurs first, and monthly thereafter until 
        such time as the negotiations are concluded.''.

SEC. 5. CONDUCT RESULTING IN TERMINATION OF NUCLEAR EXPORTS.

  Section 129 a. (2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2158) 
is amended--
          (1) in subparagraph (C), by inserting ``or'' after the 
        semicolon; and
          (2) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following new 
        subparagraph:
                  ``(D) been determined to be a `country of 
                proliferation concern' under section 1055(g)(2) of the 
                National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 
                (50 U.S.C. 2371(g)(2));''.

SEC. 6. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW PROCEDURES.

  Section 130 i. (1) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2159) 
is amended--
          (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (B) and (C) as 
        subparagraphs (C) and (D), respectively; and
          (2) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following new 
        subparagraph:
          ``(B) for an agreement for cooperation pursuant to section 
        123 of this Act, a joint resolution, the matter after the 
        resolving clause of which--
                  ``(i) is as follows: `That the Congress does favor 
                the proposed agreement for cooperation transmitted to 
                the Congress by the President on __________.'; and
                  ``(ii) includes, immediately after the language 
                specified in clause (i), any other provisions to 
                accompany such proposed agreement for cooperation.''.

SEC. 7. REQUIREMENT OF LIABILITY PROTECTION FOR UNITED STATES NUCLEAR 
                    SUPPLIERS.

  The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is amended by inserting after section 
134 (42 U.S.C. 2160d) the following new section:

``SEC. 135. REQUIREMENT OF LIABILITY PROTECTION FOR UNITED STATES 
                    NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS.

  ``The President may not issue a license for the export of nuclear 
material, facilities, components, or other goods, services, or 
technology to a country pursuant to an agreement that has entered into 
force after the date of the enactment of this section unless the 
President determines that such country has liability protection for 
United States nuclear suppliers that is equivalent to the liability 
protection specified under the Convention on Supplementary Compensation 
for Nuclear Damage.''.

SEC. 8. PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO STATE SPONSORS OF PROLIFERATION OF 
                    WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

  (a) Prohibition on Assistance.--The United States shall not provide 
any assistance under Public Law 87-195, Public Law 90-629, the Food for 
Peace Act, the Peace Corps Act, or the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 
to any country if the Secretary of State determines that the government 
of the country has repeatedly provided support for acts of 
proliferation of equipment, technology, or materials to support the 
design, acquisition, manufacture, or use of weapons of mass destruction 
or the acquisition or development of ballistic missiles to carry such 
weapons.
  (b) Publication of Determinations.--Each determination of the 
Secretary of State under subsection (a) shall be published in the 
Federal Register.
  (c) Rescission.--A determination of the Secretary of State under 
subsection (a) may not be rescinded unless the Secretary submits to the 
appropriate congressional committees--
          (1) before the proposed rescission would take effect, a 
        report certifying that--
                  (A) there has been a fundamental change in the 
                leadership and policies of the government of the 
                country concerned;
                  (B) the government is not supporting acts of 
                proliferation of equipment, technology, or materials to 
                support the design, acquisition, manufacture, or use of 
                weapons of mass destruction; and
                  (C) the government has provided assurances that it 
                will not support such acts in the future; or
          (2) at least 45 days before the proposed rescission would 
        take effect, a report justifying the rescission and certifying 
        that--
                  (A) the government of the country concerned has not 
                provided any support for acts of proliferation of 
                equipment, technology, or materials to support the 
                design, acquisition, manufacture, or use of weapons of 
                mass destruction during the preceding 24-month period; 
                and
                  (B) the government has provided assurances that it 
                will not support such acts of proliferation in the 
                future.
  (d) Waiver.--The President may waive the requirements of subsection 
(a) on a case-by-case basis if--
          (1) the President determines that national security interests 
        or humanitarian reasons justify a waiver of such requirements, 
        except that humanitarian reasons may not be used to justify the 
        waiver of such requirements to provide security assistance 
        under Public Law 87-195, Public Law 90-629, or the Export-
        Import Bank Act of 1945; and
          (2) at least 15 days before the waiver takes effect, the 
        President consults with the appropriate congressional 
        committees regarding the proposed waiver and submits to the 
        appropriate congressional committees a report containing--
                  (A) the name of the recipient country;
                  (B) a description of the national security interests 
                or humanitarian reasons that require the waiver;
                  (C) the type and amount of and the justification for 
                the assistance to be provided pursuant to the waiver; 
                and
                  (D) the period of time during which such waiver will 
                be effective.

SEC. 9. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AS A CRITERION FOR UNITED STATES 
                    ASSISTANCE.

  (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to 
ensure that each country that is a party to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should bring into force an Additional 
Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
  (b) Criterion for Assistance.--The United States shall, when 
considering the provision of assistance under Public Law 87-195 or 
Public Law 90-629 to a country that is a party to the Treaty on the 
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, take into consideration whether 
the proposed recipient has in force an Additional Protocol to its 
safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

SEC. 10. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

  It is the sense of Congress that the President should ensure that 
participation in international nuclear programs conducted by the United 
States is limited to the greatest extent practicable to governmental 
and nongovernmental participants from countries that have adopted 
nonproliferation provisions in their nuclear cooperation and nuclear 
export control policies comparable to the policies specified in section 
123 of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2153), as amended by this Act.

                         Background and Purpose

    Stopping Iran's aggressive pursuit of nuclear weapons has 
been one of the highest priorities for U.S. national security 
policy for more than a decade. As Iran has moved closer to 
achieving its goal, several other countries in the region have 
launched their own nuclear programs. Although each describes 
the intended use as entirely peaceful, namely for electricity 
generation, medicine, and research, it is clear that many of 
these efforts are in response to Iran's continued progress. 
Thus, the groundwork is being laid for the spread of a nuclear 
weapons capability from one unstable regime to another 
throughout the Middle East.
    Despite the clear dangers involved, the U.S. and other 
countries are inadvertently encouraging this development by 
promoting nuclear cooperation agreements which, in the view of 
the committee, contain insufficient safeguards to ensure that 
nuclear power and research activities supported by such 
agreements are entirely for peaceful purposes.
    The greatest threat stems from the spread of the capability 
to produce fissile material, either by enriching uranium or 
reprocessing spent fuel to extract unused uranium or plutonium 
(ENR). Unfortunately, fissile material can be used not only for 
peaceful purposes but also for nuclear and radiological 
weapons. Virtually any nuclear program, including one with an 
ENR component, can be described as being intended solely for 
peaceful purposes, but such programs are essentially identical 
to those needed for weapons development. Thus, the foundation 
for a nuclear weapons program can be built in full view of the 
world as long as a benign purpose is asserted, however 
fictional. This is the strategy that Iran has employed from the 
outset, supplementing its public activities with clandestine 
efforts which, when exposed, it maintains are actually devoted 
entirely to medicine, research, and the generation of 
electricity.
    Efforts by the U.S. and other responsible countries to stop 
Iran's nuclear program are undermined by the simultaneous 
promotion of nuclear programs throughout the Middle East, 
especially by nuclear cooperation agreements that do not 
contain guarantees that these countries will not follow in 
Iran's footsteps. Any future agreements should contain a 
provision that the cooperating country will not develop or 
acquire any uranium enrichment or spent-fuel reprocessing 
facilities, or engage in such activities, as a critical 
counterpoint to Iran. The United States, and indeed all nuclear 
suppliers, must be careful that they do not encourage, however 
inadvertently, the perception that Iran is merely exercising 
its ``right'' to have all aspects of a civil nuclear fuel 
cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing, regardless of its 
actual intended use.
    Each new nuclear program in the region expands the risk. 
Recent events have demonstrated that many regimes in the Middle 
East are unstable and that it is impossible to predict who may 
come to power should these fall. With that power would come the 
option to use any existing nuclear infrastructure to establish 
a military program. Given this alarming possibility, U.S. 
national interests argue strongly for stopping this trend, 
especially preventing the acquisition of an ENR capability by 
additional countries, regardless of any claimed purpose. But 
the U.S. has instead declared that preventing the acquisition 
of an ENR capability--and thus the option of its diversion to 
military uses--will no longer be a necessary condition in 
considering new nuclear cooperation agreements. Regardless of 
any assurances provided by opponents of adding sufficient 
safeguards in these agreements, we may in fact be helping to 
bring about an enormous geopolitical upheaval.
    That process is already underway. Turki al-Faisal, a high 
ranking Saudi prince and the former head of the Saudi 
intelligence service, openly stated in December 2011 that Saudi 
Arabia was considering producing nuclear weapons, largely in 
response to the threat from Iran. Despite these and similar 
assertions, the U.S. has entered into discussions and possibly 
negotiations for a nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi 
Arabia, which is unlikely to be required to permanently forego 
acquiring an ENR capability. Absent this guarantee, the U.S. 
may end up helping Saudi Arabia acquire nuclear facilities, 
material, and expertise that could be employed for either 
civilian or military use in the future.
Stopping Enrichment and Reprocessing
    Countries seeking nuclear weapons are constrained by 
extraordinary difficulties, their options being either to 
obtain them or their components from other countries or produce 
them indigenously. To date, no transfer of a functional nuclear 
device is known to have occurred, although China is reported to 
have provided Pakistan with nuclear weapons designs and related 
technologies. The composition of North Korea's transfer of 
nuclear-related items to Pakistan, Iran, and other countries 
has yet to be fully revealed.
    Regarding indigenous manufacture, the scale and complexity 
of the industrial infrastructure needed to produce all of the 
required elements, the highly advanced technology involved, and 
the enormous costs have presented insuperable obstacles to all 
but a handful of states. Countries such as North Korea and 
Pakistan which have developed their own capacity were able to 
do so only after securing much of the requisite technology, 
expertise, and industrial equipment from abroad. Had Iran been 
forced to rely solely on its own resources, it would not have 
been able to advance its nuclear program, civil or military, to 
anything approaching its current capabilities. Its progress has 
been made possible only by filling the many gaps through 
transfers from clandestine sources in Pakistan, North Korea, 
Russia, and other countries. Shutting off the sources of supply 
for these and other countries seeking nuclear weapons has long 
been a central objective of U.S. nonproliferation policy.
    Of these several challenges, the greatest is acquiring the 
capacity to produce fissile material through the ENR fuel 
cycle. A lesser, but related challenge is achieving a 
sufficiently high level of enrichment. The uranium used in 
civilian nuclear reactors to generate electricity is typically 
enriched to a level of 3-5%. That used for medical purposes or 
for research can reach as high as 20%. But weapons-grade 
material must be enriched to at least 90%. The first two can be 
purchased on the world market, but the latter cannot.
    Unfortunately, the infrastructure needed to produce 
weapons-grade fissile material is essentially the same as that 
used for peaceful purposes. A country seeking nuclear weapons 
can employ an ostensibly civilian program as camouflage for a 
clandestine military program. Under the guise of peaceful 
pursuits, most, if not all, of the infrastructure needed for 
ENR fuel cycle can be constructed in the open, thereby 
rendering detection of the purely military aspects far more 
difficult, if not impossible, especially in closed societies. 
The problem is made even more difficult if a country waits 
until its civilian program is fully established before 
embarking on a military counterpart.
    North Korea used this stratagem to develop its plutonium-
based nuclear device and is currently doing the same with 
uranium enrichment. Saddam Hussein's initial nuclear weapons 
program was cloaked by Iraq's civil nuclear power program, but 
Israel's destruction of the ostensibly peaceful reactor at 
Osirak in 1981 was a major blow to Saddam's military program. 
The far more massive effort he subsequently embarked upon was 
uncovered only as a result of his defeat in the 1991 Gulf War 
and the intensive search for weapons that followed that war. 
Syria's declared nuclear program had concealed a nuclear 
reactor secretly built by North Korea, but in 2007 that was 
also destroyed by an Israeli airstrike.
    Iran is following much the same course and has constructed 
a massive nuclear complex that it claims is solely for the 
purpose of generating electricity, as well as for medical use 
and research. Much of this has been done in full view of 
inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
during their visits to a number of identified facilities over 
several years, although several suspected clandestine sites 
have remained off limits. Nevertheless, successive revelations 
of secret nuclear facilities, such the Natanz and Fordow 
uranium enrichment facilities, as well as the IAEA's discovery 
of evidence that Iran has performed extensive work related to 
nuclear warheads, demonstrates that the primary purpose of 
Iran's nuclear program is military.
    Claims by countries that their efforts to acquire an ENR 
capability are solely for peaceful purposes are very difficult 
to justify for many reasons. The prohibitive costs and 
difficulties involved with enriching uranium or reprocessing 
plutonium ensure that there is little economic motivation for 
countries that are not already engaged in producing nuclear 
fuel to do so. As fissile material for civilian use is widely 
available on the world market from multiple sources, the 
rationale offered by Iran and other countries that they must 
produce their own fuel to prevent an interruption of supply 
cannot be supported. Further, the IAEA has established an 
international nuclear fuel bank specifically to address this 
potential problem. For these reasons, and because the 
infrastructure used to make fissile material for civilian use 
is in principle the same as that needed for weapons, efforts by 
countries to construct their own ENR capability is strong 
evidence that the actual intent is military.
The Inadequacy of the Nonproliferation Regime
    The most fundamental element of the global nonproliferation 
regime is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was 
concluded in 1968 and subsequently ratified by every country 
except India, Pakistan, and Israel (North Korea withdrew from 
the NPT in 2003). The treaty prohibits efforts to acquire 
nuclear weapons by countries other than those which possessed 
them at the time the treaty was opened for signature in 1968, 
namely the so-called ``nuclear weapon states'': the U.S.; the 
Soviet Union, of which Russia is the successor state; Great 
Britain; France; and China. The NPT allows countries to develop 
nuclear programs for peaceful purposes, but it requires these 
countries to adopt comprehensive safeguards for their nuclear 
facilities and undergo regular inspection by the IAEA to ensure 
that nothing is being diverted for military use.
    A major flaw in the treaty is its reliance on voluntary 
disclosure by the signatories. The discovery of Iraq's massive 
nuclear program in 1993 despite years of inspections by the 
IAEA prompted the IAEA to develop strengthened safeguards in 
1997 with what is known as the Additional Protocol (AP). By 
giving the IAEA far greater freedom to conduct intrusive 
inspections on demand, the AP greatly reduces the ability to 
hide clandestine nuclear operations. Unfortunately, the AP's 
adoption is not mandatory, and countries such as Iran and Syria 
have refused to implement it because it would make their 
nuclear weapons programs far harder to conceal.
    Despite these and other measures to strengthen the global 
nonproliferation regime, nuclear technology, expertise, 
materials, and equipment may still be available on the black 
market to countries engaged in developing a nuclear weapons 
capability, the most important example of which was the network 
established by Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. 
Until its operations were exposed in 2004, this network 
provided key nuclear elements to Iran, Libya, and other 
countries. North Korea has also clandestinely provided 
indispensable elements to Iran and other countries, including 
building a nuclear reactor in Syria. Shutting down these 
clandestine sources remains a high priority for the U.S. and 
other countries, but the existence and extent of other possible 
networks are unknown.
    Another reason the global nonproliferation regime remains 
inadequate to preventing the acquisition of the ENR fuel cycle 
is that many of the necessary components are openly and 
legitimately sold on the world market. The U.S. and other 
responsible countries have tried to restrict the commercial 
availability of many of the necessary inputs. The most 
important mechanism for doing so is the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(NSG) which was established in the aftermath of India's 
surprise detonation of a nuclear device in 1974. The NSG is 
made up of nuclear-exporting countries which adopt common 
guidelines to prevent items from being diverted by recipient 
countries to the construction of an ENR fuel cycle or for 
military purposes.
    These guidelines have been tightened over the years, most 
recently in June 2011, but they are voluntary and loosely 
interpreted by member states. The result is that commercial 
sales, ranging from nuclear fuel to complete reactors by 
countries such as France, Russia, Britain, and the U.S., have 
been only partially constrained. Given the projected hundreds 
of billions of dollars at stake as a result of the ``global 
renaissance'' of nuclear power, exporting countries are eager 
to maximize sales by their domestic companies, many of which 
are state-owned and subsidized, and are reluctant to add new 
safeguards to the existing international patchwork. The result 
is that limits on the initiation and development of nuclear 
programs around the world are determined more by a lack of 
financing than concerns about proliferation.
    The most vigorous suppliers seeking new outlets are French 
and Russian companies, but they are far from alone, as 
American, South Korean, and exporters from many other countries 
compete for markets. Not only are the French and Russian 
companies state-owned, but their governments are actively 
engaged in promoting nuclear sales. High-ranking officials, 
such as President Sarkozy of France, often openly act as 
salesmen for these firms when dealing with their counterparts.
    As one country after another, including India, North Korea, 
and Pakistan, among others, demonstrated that a civilian 
nuclear energy program could be a springboard to a military 
capability, the potential military uses of ``peaceful'' nuclear 
programs has become increasingly obvious. Nevertheless, 
commercial concerns continue to dominate the policies of many 
exporting countries.
The ``Gold Standard''
    In 2008, the Bush administration began negotiations with 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for a nuclear cooperation 
agreement to support the UAE's development of its planned 
massive nuclear energy program. Given the UAE's small 
population and economy, as well as its large reserves of 
hydrocarbons, many outside experts questioned the actual intent 
of this program and thus the emphasis placed by the UAE on an 
agreement with the U.S. when the requisite infrastructure could 
be purchased on the world market from other countries.
    The UAE clearly valued the prospective agreement as a 
public affirmation of strong U.S.-UAE ties in the face of an 
increasing threat from Iran, as well as a U.S. seal of approval 
for its stated ambition to become a major exporter of 
electricity to the region. The Bush and Obama administrations 
focused on the agreement's utility in advancing broader foreign 
policy goals, namely shoring up the U.S. strategic position in 
the Persian Gulf. In the end, this political purpose, coupled 
with commercial considerations, overrode the strong objections 
of those who feared that the agreement could encourage a 
further spread of nuclear programs in the region.
    The committee was skeptical of the agreement when initially 
briefed by the Bush administration, due in large part to the 
UAE's history of serving as a transshipment point for sensitive 
exports to Iran as a result of its rudimentary export control 
regime. The committee was also concerned that the 
administration had not asked the UAE to formalize in the 
agreement a prior public pledge not to enrich or reprocess. 
Ultimately, both the Bush administration and the UAE agreed to 
revise the agreement to include a provision to that effect, 
which was signed in January 2009. Due to continuing 
Congressional concern, the Obama administration sought a more 
explicit commitment and renegotiated the text to include a 
legally-binding obligation by the UAE not to enrich or 
reprocess. This revised agreement was signed, submitted to the 
Congress, and went into force in 2010. The formal no-ENR 
commitment it contained was dubbed by a Department of State 
spokesman as the ``gold standard'' for all future agreements.
    Subsequently, however, the application of this precedent 
was limited to countries in the Middle East. This approach 
apparently arose from concerns that a wider application of the 
``gold standard'' might have a potentially negative impact on 
commercial sales by the U.S. nuclear industry, which asserted 
that efforts to secure commitments from countries not to engage 
in ENR activities would place U.S. companies at a competitive 
disadvantage vis-a-vis their foreign competitors. However, 
there is no evidence to support this concern, and the committee 
believes that a serious effort to convince potential recipients 
of U.S. nuclear exports to adopt some form of the UAE example 
would have significant nonproliferation benefits without 
sacrificing legitimate commerce.
    This limited application was further narrowed in January 
2012 when the State Department formally informed the committee 
that the no-ENR policy would be optional apparently in every 
instance, presumably even in the Middle East.
    This change in policy threatens to undo the no-ENR 
condition in the agreement with the UAE. The ``Agreed Minute'' 
attached to the U.S.-UAE agreement states that ``the fields of 
cooperation, terms and conditions . . . shall be no less 
favorable in scope and effect than those which may be accorded, 
from time to time, to any other non-nuclear-weapon State in the 
Middle East in a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement.'' 
Thus, should the U.S. sign an agreement with another country in 
the region that does not contain a no-ENR commitment, the UAE 
will be liberated from this restriction entirely.
    At the same time, nuclear cooperation agreements have 
become increasingly valuable instruments for achieving U.S. 
foreign policy objectives. For example, a nuclear cooperation 
agreement with Russia was viewed by both the Bush and Obama 
administrations largely in terms of its potentially positive 
impact on relations between the two countries, namely as a U.S. 
concession of tangible value to be exchanged for Russian 
cooperation in other areas. That agreement eventually went into 
effect in 2011.
    The committee is concerned that nonproliferation provisions 
in future nuclear cooperation agreements may be subordinated to 
commercial and political considerations. The result would be to 
forgo a major opportunity to advance this country's fundamental 
national security interests that are threatened by the spread 
of nuclear weapons.
The Need for a Strengthened Congressional Role
    Any significant nuclear-related export for civil purposes--
e.g., power reactors, research reactors, related equipment, and 
reactor fuel--requires a nuclear cooperation agreement between 
the U.S. and the partner country to be in force, which sets the 
terms of the transfer and use of such equipment and material. 
These agreements are authorized by section 123 of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and are often referred to as 
``123 agreements.'' Section 123 sets nine nonproliferation 
conditions that each agreement must satisfy.\1\ If an agreement 
satisfies these conditions, the President may submit the 
agreement to Congress for a period of 90 days of ``continuous 
session,'' a period that can last six months or longer, 
depending on the Congressional calendar. The proposed agreement 
will go into force automatically unless Congress enacts a Joint 
Resolution of disapproval. Given that the President would 
presumably veto such a resolution, the effective requirement is 
a 2/3 vote by both chambers to override, an extraordinarily 
high barrier. If an agreement does not satisfy one or more of 
these conditions, the President has the option to formally 
exempt it from this statutory requirement, but that route 
requires Congress to enact a Joint Resolution of approval for 
the agreement to come into force.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\Section 123(a) lists nine criteria that an agreement must meet 
unless the President determines an exemption is necessary. These 
include guarantees that

       Gsafeguards on transferred nuclear material and 
      equipment continue in perpetuity;
       Gfull-scope International Atomic Energy Agency 
      (IAEA) safeguards are applied in non-nuclear weapon states;
       Gnothing transferred is used for any nuclear 
      explosive device or for any other military purpose, except 
      in the case of cooperation agreements with nuclear weapon 
      states, in which the United States has the right to demand 
      the return of transferred nuclear materials and equipment, 
      as well as any special nuclear material produced through 
      their use, if the cooperating state detonates a nuclear 
      explosive device or terminates or abrogates its IAEA 
      safeguards agreement;
       Gthere is no retransfer of material or classified 
      data without U.S. consent;
       Gphysical security on nuclear material is 
      maintained;
       Gthere is no enrichment or reprocessing by the 
      recipient state of transferred nuclear material or nuclear 
      material produced with materials or facilities transferred 
      pursuant to the agreement without prior approval;
       Gstorage for transferred plutonium and highly 
      enriched uranium is approved in advance by the United 
      States; and
       Gany material or facility produced or constructed 
      through use of special nuclear technology transferred under 
      the cooperation agreement is subject to all of the above 
      requirements.
    The relatively small role of Congress is the product of the 
Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, which was enacted at a time 
when nuclear power was commonly assumed to be a benign source 
of energy for the world. The U.S. being the leader in the 
relevant technology, civilian nuclear cooperation agreements 
with other countries were encouraged for commercial reasons, 
with relatively little consideration given to preventing 
proliferation. As such, Congress restricted itself to a largely 
passive role in their review and approval.
    Since that time, however, and despite the significant 
strengthening of the AEA by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 
1978, nuclear weapons programs have continued to proliferate. 
As noted previously, Saddam Hussein's massive program was 
uncovered in 1991, and fortunately destroyed, in the aftermath 
of the first Gulf War; North Korea has developed and tested 
nuclear weapons; Iran has illicitly constructed and is 
operating several uranium enrichment facilities supporting a 
barely concealed nuclear weapons program; Libya obtained, and 
subsequently surrendered, uranium enrichment equipment and 
weapons designs; and Syria constructed a covert nuclear reactor 
with the apparent assistance of North Korea, which was 
destroyed by an Israeli airstrike in 2007. In addition, the 
extensive black market network headed by A.Q. Khan of Pakistan 
had supplied uranium enrichment technology and equipment to 
North Korea, Iran, Libya, and possibly other countries. These 
developments have significantly changed the nature and scope of 
the threat posed by further proliferation, necessitating an 
updating and strengthening of U.S. nonproliferation policy, 
including U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements.
H.R. 1280
    To that end, H.R. 1280 and H.R. 1320 were introduced in 
2011 by Chairman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking Member Howard 
Berman, respectively, to update section 123 and other 
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act to address the increasing 
threat posed by the spread of enrichment and reprocessing 
capabilities. The legislation was also intended to enhance the 
role of Congress in nuclear trade in keeping with its 
constitutional authority to regulate commerce with foreign 
nations. On April 14, 2011, the committee marked up H.R. 1280, 
with amendments including several provisions from H.R. 1320, 
and passed it unanimously.
    H.R. 1280 amends the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to reinforce 
U.S. nonproliferation policy, especially by strengthening the 
role of Congress in reviewing and approving nuclear cooperation 
agreements proposed by the President. It accomplishes this 
through modest changes to the AEA, the most important being 
that new agreements with countries that do not possess ENR 
capabilities, but which refuse to provide guarantees that they 
will not seek to obtain them, cannot go into effect unless 
approved by Congress through a Joint Resolution. This provision 
does not prevent such agreements but instead allows Congress 
the opportunity to examine and weigh the broad range of 
relevant factors--foreign policy, political, commercial, and 
others--to ensure that proposed agreements meet fundamental 
U.S. interests and that these are not being sacrificed for 
commercial or political considerations. If a proposed nuclear 
cooperation agreement does contain such a commitment, the 
current procedure for Congressional consideration will remain 
the same, namely an automatic approval after 90 days of 
continuous session unless Congress passes a Joint Resolution of 
disapproval.
    H.R. 1280 also expands the requirements for countries 
seeking nuclear cooperation agreements with the U.S to include 
adherence to basic international and multinational 
nonproliferation agreements and conventions, implementation of 
an effective export control system, and cooperation with the 
U.S. to prevent state sponsors of terrorism from acquiring or 
developing chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons of mass 
destruction, among other measures. None of these conditions 
imposes an undue burden, and it is questionable why the U.S. 
would want to engage in nuclear cooperation with a country that 
did not already meet them.

                                Hearings

    The full committee held a hearing on March 17, 2011, 
titled, ``The Global Nuclear Revival and U.S. Nonproliferation 
Policy.''

                   Committee Consideration and Votes

    On April 14, 2011, the Foreign Affairs Committee marked up 
the bill, H.R. 1280, pursuant to notice, in open session. 
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen offered an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute (Ros-Lehtinen 47) that, by unanimous consent, was 
considered base text.

         1) LRep. Sherman offered en bloc amendments regarding 
        adequate civil liability protections for U.S. suppliers 
        of civilian nuclear power efforts (Sherman 14) and the 
        sense of Congress that participation in U.S. 
        international nuclear programs should be limited to 
        participants that have adopted nonproliferation and 
        export control policies comparable to section 123 of 
        the Atomic Energy Act (Sherman 16); agreed to by voice 
        vote.
                  The Ros-Lehtinen substitute amendment (as 
                amended by Sherman 14 and 16) was agreed to by 
                a roll call vote of 34 ayes-0 noes.
                  Voting yes: Ros-Lehtinen, Smith (NJ), Burton, 
                Gallegly, Rohrabacher, Manzullo, Royce, Chabot, 
                Wilson (SC), Fortenberry, Poe, Bilirakis, 
                Schmidt, Johnson (OH), Rivera, Kelly, Griffin, 
                Duncan, Buerkle, Ellmers, Berman, Ackerman, 
                Sherman, Sires, Connolly, Deutch, Cardoza, 
                Chandler, Higgins, Schwartz, Wilson (FL), Bass, 
                Keating, Cicilline.

    H.R. 1280, as amended, was ordered favorably reported to 
the House, by voice vote.

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of House Rule XIII, the 
committee reports that the findings and recommendations of the 
committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) 
of House Rule X, are incorporated in the ``Background and 
Purpose'' portion of this report, above.

               New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of House Rule XIII, the 
committee adopts as its own the estimate of new budget 
authority, entitlement authority, and tax expenditures or 
revenues contained in the cost estimate prepared by the 
Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 
402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.

               Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                     Washington, DC, June 17, 2011.

Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Madam Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 1280, a bill to 
amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to require Congressional 
approval of agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation with 
foreign countries, and for other purposes.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Raymond Hall, 
who can be reached at 226-2840.
            Sincerely,
                                      Douglas W. Elmendorf.
Enclosure

cc:
        Honorable Howard L. Berman
        Ranking Member
H.R. 1280--A bill to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to require 
        Congressional approval of agreements for peaceful nuclear 
        cooperation with foreign countries, and for other purposes
    As amended by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 
April 14, 2011

    H.R. 1280 would amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 by 
adding new requirements for agreements for commercial nuclear 
exports negotiated under section 123 of that act. Such 
agreements are required for U.S. companies to export commercial 
nuclear materials, technologies, and services to foreign 
nations. The bill would require nations signing those 
agreements to forswear any future development of facilities for 
enriching or reprocessing nuclear materials. That requirement 
could lead to fewer agreements between the United States and 
foreign countries, but CBO estimates that it would have no 
significant effect on the budget.
    The bill also would increase Congressional reporting 
requirements related to negotiating section 123 agreements. 
Such requirements would have an insignificant effect on the 
budget, CBO estimates. Those costs would be subject to the 
availability of appropriated funds.
    Pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply because enacting the 
bill would not affect direct spending or revenues.
    H.R. 1280 would impose both intergovernmental and private-
sector mandates, as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 
(UMRA), on U.S. exporters of nuclear materials and other 
defense-related items sent as non-humanitarian assistance. 
Because of uncertainty about the future income from such 
exports, CBO cannot determine whether the aggregate cost of the 
private-sector mandates contained in the legislation would 
exceed the annual threshold established in UMRA ($142 million 
for private-sector mandates in 2011, adjusted annually for 
inflation). However, given the nature of the exports being 
restricted and the limited number of public entities affected, 
CBO estimates the aggregate cost of the mandates on the public 
sector would not exceed the annual threshold established in 
UMRA ($71 million for intergovernmental mandates in 2011, 
adjusted annually for inflation).
    The bill would prohibit U.S. suppliers from exporting some 
items and services that are sent as non-humanitarian assistance 
to any country that withdraws from the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Given the low 
historical rate of withdrawal from the NPT, it is unlikely that 
this mandate would be imposed. If, however, a country withdraws 
from the NPT, some private-sector entities could lose income. 
CBO cannot estimate the magnitude of such losses because the 
value of assistance and exports from private-sector entities 
varies greatly and the number of items exported as a form of 
assistance is unknown. CBO estimates that the cost of the 
mandate on state, local, and tribal governments would be small 
because assistance and exports from public entities--primarily 
colleges and universities--is far more limited.
    The bill also would impose a mandate on U.S. nuclear 
suppliers by prohibiting the export of nuclear materials and 
technologies to any country designated by the Director of the 
CIA as one of proliferation concern. Based on information from 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and historical data on the 
total value of U.S. nuclear exports and their distribution 
among importing countries, CBO expects that the forgone income 
from nuclear exports, if suspended, would probably be minimal 
for both public (including mostly universities) and private 
exporters.
    The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Raymond Hall 
(for the federal costs), J'nell Blanco (for the 
intergovernmental impact), and Marin Randall (for the private-
sector impact). This estimate was approved by Theresa Gullo, 
Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

                    Performance Goals and Objectives

    As explained more specifically in the ``Background and 
Purpose'' and ``Section-by-Section Analysis'' portions of this 
report, the principal goals of H.R. 1280 are to enhance the 
role of Congress in the review and approval of nuclear 
cooperation agreements and to add certain nonproliferation-
related conditions to the requirements for such agreements.

                        New Advisory Committees

    H.R. 1280 does not establish or authorize any new advisory 
committees.

                    Congressional Accountability Act

    H.R. 1280 does not relate to terms and conditions of 
employment or access to public services or accommodations, as 
described in section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional 
Accountability Act (P.L. 104-1).

                         Earmark Identification

    H.R. 1280 does not contain any congressional earmarks, 
limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in 
clauses 9(e), 9(f), and 9(g) of House Rule XXI.

                      Section-by-Section Analysis

Section 1. Requirement for Congressional Approval of Agreements for 
        Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation
    This section makes several changes to the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954 (AEA) to strengthen the existing nonproliferation 
conditions that any new nuclear cooperation agreement must meet 
in order to be submitted by the President for Congressional 
consideration. It also makes a change to the manner in which 
Congress considers such agreements.
    Section 123(a)(3) of the AEA forbids a cooperating country 
in a nuclear cooperation agreement from using any U.S.-exported 
equipment or material, or any byproduct material, in or for 
development of a nuclear explosive device. This section 
broadens this requirement to include any such material, 
equipment, or material acquired from any other source, foreign 
or domestic.
    Section 123 (a)(4) of the AEA requires that any proposed 
nuclear cooperation agreement confer upon the United States the 
``right of return'' of any U.S.-origin nuclear exported item or 
material, or byproduct material, if the cooperating country 
detonates a nuclear explosive device or terminates or abrogates 
an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards 
agreement. This section of H.R. 1280, as amended, expands the 
scope of this requirement to include the violation of any 
provision of its nuclear cooperation agreement with the United 
States.
    Section 123(a)(6) requires that any nuclear cooperation 
agreement must commit the cooperating country to maintain 
``adequate physical security'' regarding any nuclear material 
exported to that country by the U.S., or any byproduct nuclear 
material. This section of H.R. 1280, as amended, broadens the 
application of that commitment to extend to any nuclear 
material acquired from any other source other than the United 
States.
    This section adds two new requirements to those in section 
123 (a) of the AEA:

     La guaranty by the cooperating party that no 
nationals of a third country will be permitted access to any 
reactor, related equipment, or sensitive materials transferred 
under the agreement for cooperation without the prior consent 
of the United States; and

     La commitment to maintain and, in the case of a 
country without such a legal regime in place, a commitment to 
enact at the earliest possible date, and in no case later than 
one year after the agreement enters into force, a legal regime 
providing for adequate protection from civil liability that 
will allow for the participation of United States suppliers in 
any effort by the country to develop civilian nuclear power.''

    Section 123(d) of the AEA sets forth the procedures by 
which a proposed agreement for cooperation that has been 
submitted to the Congress is to be reviewed. This section of 
H.R. 1280, as amended, requires that a proposed agreement for 
civil nuclear cooperation that does not contain a legally-
binding commitment that the cooperating country will not engage 
in uranium enrichment or spent-fuel reprocessing activities 
(ENR), or acquire or construct facilities for such activities, 
anywhere in its territory, can come into effect only if 
Congress adopts, and there is enacted, a joint resolution of 
approval. If a proposed new agreement does contain such a 
commitment, it can go into effect after lying before Congress 
for 90 days of continuous session, unless the Congress adopts 
and enacts a joint resolution of disapproval during the last 60 
days of continuous session of such period. For the renewal of 
an existing agreement with a commitment to forgo ENR, Congress 
will have 30 days of continuous session to disapprove such 
agreement.
    This section also adds conditions that a cooperating party 
must meet in order to qualify for a nuclear cooperation 
agreement with the United States:

     Lthe cooperating party has acceded to and is fully 
implementing the provisions and guidelines of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention; the Biological Weapons Convention; and all 
other international agreements to which the United States is a 
party regarding the export of nuclear, chemical, biological, 
and advanced conventional weapons, including missiles and other 
delivery systems;

     Lhas established and is fully implementing an 
effective export control system, including fully implementing 
the provisions and guidelines of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1540;

     Lis in full compliance with all United Nations 
conventions to which the United States is a party and all 
Security Council resolutions regarding the prevention of the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including the 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and 
the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression 
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism;

     Lis not a Destination of Diversion Concern under 
section 303 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-
195);

     Lis closely cooperating with the United States to 
prevent state sponsors of terrorism from acquiring or 
developing chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or related 
technologies or acquiring or developing destabilizing numbers 
and types of advanced conventional weapons, including ballistic 
missiles; and

     Lhas signed, ratified, and is fully implementing 
an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the 
IAEA.

    This section also states that subsequent arrangements to 
existing nuclear cooperation agreements can become effective 
only if Congress enacts a joint resolution of approval 
according to the amended procedures noted above.
Section 2. Withdrawal from Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
        Weapons.
    This section states that it is the policy of the United 
States government to oppose the withdrawal by any signatory 
from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT) and to use all political, economic, and diplomatic means 
to deter, prevent, or reverse any such withdrawal. It prohibits 
U.S. assistance, other than humanitarian assistance, from being 
provided to any such country and requires the U.S. to seek the 
return of any material, equipment, or components transferred to 
the country under a nuclear cooperation agreement.
Section 3. Report on Comparability of Nonproliferation Conditions by 
        Foreign Nuclear Suppliers.
    This section requires the President to provide the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives 
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate within 180 
days after the enactment of this Act a report on the extent to 
which each country that engages in civil nuclear exports 
requires nuclear nonproliferation conditions comparable to 
those in this Act. The report must include information on U.S.-
origin components in each country's nuclear exports, 
investments in the U.S. by entities from those countries that 
are engaged in nuclear exports, and any U.S. grant, loan, or 
loan guarantee to such country or entity.
Section 4. Initiatives and Negotiations Relating to Agreements for 
        Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation.
    This provision amends subsection (f) of section 123 (as 
redesignated), to require the President to keep the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate fully and 
currently informed of any initiative or negotiations relating 
to a new or amended agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation 
prior to the President's announcement of such initiative or 
negotiations. The President is also required to consult with 
the committees concerning such initiative or negotiations 
beginning not later than 15 calendar days after the initiation 
of any such negotiations, or the receipt or transmission of a 
draft agreement, whichever occurs first, and monthly thereafter 
until such time as the negotiations are concluded.
Section 5. Conduct Resulting In Termination of Nuclear Exports.
    Section 5 amends section 129 a.(2) of the AEA to insert a 
new subparagraph (D) which prohibits the export of any U.S. 
nuclear materials, equipment, or sensitive nuclear technology 
to any nation or group of nations that has been determined by 
the President to be a `country of proliferation concern' under 
section 1055(g)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2010 (50 U.S.C. 2371(g)(2)).
Section 6. Congressional Review Procedures.
    This section amends section 130 i.(1) of the AEA to specify 
the language of the joint resolution of approval addressed in 
section 1 of this Act. This provision allows the Congress to 
add provisions to a joint resolution of approval, e.g., 
reports, conditions for the entry into force of the agreement 
or the granting of export licenses pursuant to such agreement, 
and other relevant provisions.
    The AEA allows Congress only two options: to approve or 
disapprove of a proposed nuclear cooperation agreement without 
amendment. H.R. 1280 retains this same set of options for new 
agreements that include a legally binding commitment to forgo 
acquiring an ENR capability. For agreements that do not have 
this ENR provision, H.R. 1280 would require that Congress 
affirmatively vote to approve such agreements, as well as 
provide the option to add conditions, e.g., a requirement for a 
Presidential certification regarding the nonproliferation 
behavior of the country before the agreement could come into 
force. By contrast, a similar requirement for the U.S.-China 
nuclear cooperation agreement required passage of separate 
legislation. Such conditions could facilitate approval of such 
agreements by addressing Congressional concerns regarding the 
agreement, such as the country's commitment to 
nonproliferation.
Section 7. Requirement of Liability Protection for United States 
        Nuclear Suppliers.
    This section amends the AEA to require that, prior to 
issuing a license for any nuclear export, the President must 
certify that a cooperating country has liability protection for 
United States nuclear suppliers equivalent to that of the 
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage.
Section 8. Prohibition on Assistance to State Sponsors of Proliferation 
        of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
    This section prohibits U.S. assistance to countries the 
governments of which have repeatedly engaged in or supported 
proliferation activities if the Secretary of State has issued a 
determination to that effect. This determination must be 
published in the Federal Register and cannot be rescinded 
unless the Secretary provides to the appropriate committees a 
report certifying that the government of that country is not 
engaged in or supporting proliferation activities and has 
provided assurances that it will not engage in such activities 
in the future or that the government has not engaged in 
proliferation activities in the previous 24 months. The 
President may waive this requirement if he determines that U.S. 
national security or humanitarian reason justify a waiver and 
provides to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
stating the reasons for the waiver and the type and amount of 
the proposed assistance.
Section 9. Additional Protocol as a Criterion for United States 
        Assistance.
    This section states that it is the policy of the U.S. to 
ensure that every signatory of the NPT should bring into force 
an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the 
IAEA. It also requires the U.S. to take this policy into 
account when considering providing assistance to any country.
Section 10. Sense of Congress.
    This section states that it is the sense of Congress that 
the President should ensure that participation in international 
nuclear programs conducted by the United States is limited to 
the greatest extent practicable to governmental and 
nongovernmental participants from countries that have adopted 
nonproliferation provisions in their nuclear cooperation and 
nuclear export control policies comparable to the policies 
specified in section 123 of the AEA as amended by this Act.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

    In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italics, existing law in which no change 
is proposed is shown in roman):

                       ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954

TITLE I--ATOMIC ENERGY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 11--INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    Sec. 123. Cooperation With Other Nations.--[No cooperation] 
Subject to subsection f., no cooperation with any nation, group 
of nations or regional defense organization pursuant to section 
53, 54 a., 57, 64, 82, 91, 103, 104, or 144 shall be undertaken 
until--
                    a. the proposed agreement for cooperation 
                has been submitted to the President, which 
                proposed arrangement shall include the terms, 
                conditions, duration, nature, and scope of the 
                cooperation; and shall include the following 
                requirements:
                            (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                            (3) except in the case of those 
                        agreements for cooperation arranged 
                        pursuant to subsection 91 c., a 
                        guaranty by the cooperating party that 
                        no nuclear materials and equipment or 
                        sensitive nuclear technology to be 
                        transferred pursuant to such agreement 
                        or acquired from any other source, and 
                        no special nuclear material produced 
                        through the use of any nuclear 
                        materials and equipment or sensitive 
                        nuclear technology transferred pursuant 
                        to such agreement or acquired from any 
                        other source, will be used for any 
                        nuclear explosive device, or for 
                        research on or development of any 
                        nuclear explosive device, or for any 
                        other military purpose;
                            (4) except in the case of those 
                        agreements for cooperation arranged 
                        pursuant to subsection 91 c. and 
                        agreements for cooperation with 
                        nuclear-weapon states, a stipulation 
                        that the United States shall have the 
                        right to require the return of any 
                        nuclear materials and equipment 
                        transferred pursuant thereto and any 
                        special nuclear material produced 
                        through the use thereof if the 
                        cooperating party detonates a nuclear 
                        explosive device [or terminates or], 
                        terminates, abrogates an agreement 
                        providing for IAEA safeguards, or 
                        violates or abrogates any provision 
                        contained within such agreement;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                            (6) a guaranty by the cooperating 
                        party that adequate physical security 
                        will be maintained with respect to any 
                        nuclear material transferred pursuant 
                        to such agreement or acquired from any 
                        other source and with respect to any 
                        special nuclear material used in or 
                        produced through the use of any 
                        material, production facility, or 
                        utilization facility transferred 
                        pursuant to such agreement or acquired 
                        from any other source;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                            (8) except in the case of 
                        agreements for cooperation arranged 
                        pursuant to subsection 91 c., 144 b. 
                        144 c., or 144 d., a guaranty by the 
                        cooperating party that no plutonium, no 
                        uranium 233, and no uranium enriched to 
                        greater than twenty percent in the 
                        isotope 235, transferred pursuant to 
                        the agreement for cooperation, or 
                        recovered from any source or special 
                        nuclear material so transferred or from 
                        any source or special nuclear material 
                        used in any production facility or 
                        utilization facility transferred 
                        pursuant to the agreement for 
                        cooperation, will be stored in any 
                        facility that has not been approved in 
                        advance by the United States; [and]
                            (9) except in the case of 
                        agreements for cooperation arranged 
                        pursuant to subsection 91 c., 144 b., 
                        144 c., or 144 d., a guaranty by the 
                        cooperating party that any special 
                        nuclear material, production facility, 
                        or utilization facility produced or 
                        constructed under the jurisdiction of 
                        the cooperating party by or through the 
                        use of any sensitive nuclear technology 
                        transferred pursuant to such agreement 
                        for cooperation will be subject to all 
                        the requirements specified in this 
                        subsection[.];
                    (10) a guaranty by the cooperating party 
                that no nationals of a third country shall be 
                permitted access to any reactor, related 
                equipment, or sensitive materials transferred 
                under the agreement for cooperation without the 
                prior consent of the United States; and
                    (11) a commitment to maintain and, in the 
                case of a country without such a legal regime 
                in place, a commitment to enact at the earliest 
                possible date, and in no case later than one 
                year after the agreement enters into force, a 
                legal regime providing for adequate protection 
                from civil liability that will allow for the 
                participation of United States suppliers in any 
                effort by the country to develop civilian 
                nuclear power.
[The President may exempt a proposed agreement for cooperation 
(except an agreement arranged pursuant to subsection 91 c., 144 
b., 144 c., or 144 d.) from any of the requirements of the 
foregoing sentence if he determines that inclusion of any such 
requirement would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement 
of United States non-proliferation objectives or otherwise 
jeopardize the common defense and security.] Except in the case 
of those agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to 
subsection 91 c., 144 b., 144 c., or 144 d., any proposed 
agreement for cooperation shall be negotiated by the Secretary 
of State, with the technical assistance and concurrence of the 
Secretary of Energy; and after consultation with the Commission 
shall be submitted to the President jointly by the Secretary of 
State and the Secretary of Energy accompanied by the views and 
recommendations of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Secretary of 
State shall also provide to the President an unclassified 
Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (A) which shall 
analyze the consistency of the text of the proposed agreement 
for cooperation with all the requirements of this Act, with 
specific attention to whether the proposed agreement is 
consistent with each of the criteria set forth in this 
subsection, and (B) regarding the adequacy of the safeguards 
and other control mechanisms and the peaceful use assurances 
contained in the agreement for cooperation to ensure that any 
assistance furnished thereunder will not be used to further any 
military or nuclear explosive purpose. Each Nuclear 
Proliferation Assessment Statement prepared pursuant to this 
Act shall be accompanied by a classified annex, prepared in 
consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, 
summarizing relevant classified information. In the case of 
those agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to 
subsection 91 c., 144 b., 144 c., or 144 d., any proposed 
agreement for cooperation shall be submitted to the President 
by the Secretary of Energy or, in the case of those agreements 
for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91 c., 144 b., 
or 144 d. which are to be implemented by the Department of 
Defense, by the Secretary of Defense;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                    c. the proposed agreement for cooperation 
                (if not an agreement subject to subsection d.) 
                together with the approval and determination of 
                the President, has been submitted to the 
                Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
                Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
                Relations of the Senate for a period of thirty 
                days of continuous session (as defined in 
                subsection 130 g.): Provided, however, That 
                these committees, after having received such 
                agreement for cooperation, may by resolution in 
                writing waive the conditions of all or any 
                portion of such thirty-day period; [and]
                    d. the proposed agreement for cooperation 
                (if arranged pursuant to subsection 91 c., 144 
                b., 144 c., or 144 d., or if entailing 
                implementation of section 53, 54 a., 103, or 
                104 in relation to a reactor that may be 
                capable of producing more than five thermal 
                megawatts or special nuclear material for use 
                in connection therewith) has been submitted to 
                the Congress, together with the approval and 
                determination of the President, for a period of 
                sixty days of continuous session (as defined in 
                subsection 130 g. of this Act) and referred to 
                the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
                Relations of the Senate, and in addition, in 
                the case of a proposed agreement for 
                cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91 
                c., 144 b., 144 c., or 144 d., the Committee on 
                Armed Services of the House of Representatives 
                and the Committee on Armed Services of the 
                Senate, but such proposed agreement for 
                cooperation shall [not] become effective only 
                if during such sixty-day period the Congress 
                adopts, and there is enacted, a joint 
                resolution stating in substance that the 
                Congress does [not] favor the proposed 
                agreement for cooperation: Provided, That the 
                sixty-day period shall not begin until a 
                Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement 
                prepared by the Secretary of State, and any 
                annexes thereto, when required by subsection 
                123 a., have been submitted to the Congress[: 
                Provided further, That an agreement for 
                cooperation exempted by the President pursuant 
                to subsection a. from any requirement contained 
                in that subsection, or an agreement exempted 
                pursuant to section 104(a)(1) of the Henry J. 
                Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy 
                Cooperation Act of 2006, shall not become 
                effective unless the Congress adopts, and there 
                is enacted, a joint resolution stating that the 
                Congress does favor such agreement], unless the 
                proposed agreement includes a requirement as 
                part of the agreement for cooperation or other 
                legally binding document that is considered 
                part of the agreement that no enrichment or 
                reprocessing activities, or acquisition or 
                construction of facilities for such activities, 
                will occur within the territory over which the 
                cooperating party exercises sovereignty, in 
                which case the agreement shall become effective 
                unless the Congress adopts, and there is 
                enacted, a joint resolution of disapproval (1) 
                during such sixty-day period for a new 
                agreement; or (2) during a period of 30 days of 
                continuous session for a renewal agreement. 
                During the sixty-day period the Committee on 
                Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives 
                and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate shall each hold hearings on the proposed 
                agreement for cooperation and submit a report 
                to their respective bodies recommending whether 
                it should be approved or disapproved. Any such 
                proposed agreement for cooperation shall be 
                considered pursuant to the procedures set forth 
                in section 130 i. of this Act.
            Following submission of a proposed agreement for 
        cooperation (except an agreement for cooperation 
        arranged pursuant to subsection 91 c., 144 b., 144 c., 
        or 144 d.) to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
        House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
        Relations of the Senate, the Nuclear Regulatory 
        Commission, the Department of State, the Department of 
        Energy, and the Department of Defense shall, upon the 
        request of either of those committees, promptly furnish 
        to those committees their views as to whether the 
        safeguards and other controls contained therein provide 
        an adequate framework to ensure that any exports as 
        contemplated by such agreement will not be inimical to 
        or constitute an unreasonable risk to the common 
        defense and security.
    If, after the date of enactment of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978, the Congress fails to disapprove a 
proposed agreement for cooperation which exempts the recipient 
nation from the requirement set forth in subsection 123 a. (2), 
such failure to act shall constitute a failure to adopt a 
resolution of disapproval pursuant to subsection 128 b. (3) for 
purposes of the Commission's consideration of applications and 
requests under section 126 a. (2) and there shall be no 
congressional review pursuant to section 128 of any subsequent 
license or authorization with respect to that state until the 
first such license or authorization which is issued after 
twelve months from the elapse of the sixty-day period in which 
the agreement for cooperation in question is reviewed by the 
Congress[.]; and
            e. the cooperating party--
                    (1) has acceded to and is fully 
                implementing the provisions and guidelines of--
                            (A) the Convention on the 
                        Prohibition of the Development, 
                        Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
                        Chemical Weapons and on their 
                        Destruction (commonly known as the 
                        ``Chemical Weapons Convention'');
                            (B) the Convention on the 
                        Prohibition of the Development, 
                        Production and Stockpiling of 
                        Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and 
                        on their Destruction (commonly known as 
                        the ``Biological Weapons Convention''); 
                        and
                            (C) all other international 
                        agreements to which the United States 
                        is a party regarding the export of 
                        nuclear, chemical, biological, and 
                        advanced conventional weapons, 
                        including missiles and other delivery 
                        systems;
                    (2) has established and is fully 
                implementing an effective export control 
                system, including fully implementing the 
                provisions and guidelines of United Nations 
                Security Council Resolution 1540;
                    (3) is in full compliance with all United 
                Nations conventions to which the United States 
                is a party and all Security Council resolutions 
                regarding the prevention of the proliferation 
                of weapons of mass destruction, including--
                            (A) the Convention on the Physical 
                        Protection of Nuclear Material; and
                            (B) the United Nations 
                        International Convention for the 
                        Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
                        Terrorism;
                    (4) is not a Destination of Diversion 
                Concern under section 303 of the Comprehensive 
                Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
                Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-195);
                    (5) is closely cooperating with the United 
                States to prevent state sponsors of terrorism 
                (the term ``state sponsor of terrorism'' means 
                a country the government of which has been 
                determined by the Secretary of State, for 
                purposes of section 6(j) of the Export 
                Administration Act of 1979, section 620A of the 
                Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of 
                the Arms Export Control Act, or other provision 
                of law, is a government that has repeatedly 
                provided support for acts of international 
                terrorism) from--
                            (A) acquiring or developing 
                        chemical, biological, or nuclear 
                        weapons or related technologies; or
                            (B) acquiring or developing 
                        destabilizing numbers and types of 
                        advanced conventional weapons, 
                        including ballistic missiles; and
                    (6) has signed, ratified, and is fully 
                implementing an Additional Protocol to its 
                safeguards agreement with the International 
                Atomic Energy Agency.
                    [e. The President shall keep the Committee 
                on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
                Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
                Relations of the Senate fully and currently 
                informed of any initiative or negotiations 
                relating to a new or amended agreement for 
                peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to this 
                section (except an agreement arranged pursuant 
                to section 91 c., 144 b., 144 c., or 144 d., or 
                an amendment thereto).]
            f. The President shall keep the Committee on 
        Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the 
        Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate fully and 
        currently informed of any initiative or negotiations 
        relating to a new or amended agreement for peaceful 
        nuclear cooperation pursuant to this section prior to 
        the President's announcement of such initiative or 
        negotiations. The President shall consult with the 
        Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations 
        of the Senate concerning such initiative or 
        negotiations beginning not later than 15 calendar days 
        after the initiation of any such negotiations, or the 
        receipt or transmission of a draft agreement, whichever 
        occurs first, and monthly thereafter until such time as 
        the negotiations are concluded.
            g. For purposes of this section--
                    (1) the term ``new agreement'' means an 
                agreement for cooperation with a country with 
                respect to which the United States has not, on 
                or after the date of the enactment of this 
                subsection, entered into such an agreement; and
                    (2) the term ``renewal agreement'' means an 
                agreement for cooperation with a country with 
                respect to which the United States has, before 
                the date of the enactment of this subsection, 
                entered into such an agreement.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Sec. 129. Conduct Resulting in Termination of Nuclear 
Exports.--
    a. No nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear 
technology shall be exported to--
            (1) * * *
            (2) any nation or group of nations that is found by 
        the President to have, at any time after the effective 
        date of this section,
                    (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                    (C) entered into an agreement after the 
                date of enactment of this section for the 
                transfer of reprocessing equipment, materials, 
                or technology to the sovereign control of a 
                non-nuclear-weapon state except in connection 
                with an international fuel cycle evaluation in 
                which the United States is a participant or 
                pursuant to a subsequent international 
                agreement or understanding to which the United 
                States subscribes; or
                    (D) been determined to be a ``country of 
                proliferation concern'' under section 
                1055(g)(2) of the National Defense 
                Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (50 
                U.S.C. 2371(g)(2));
unless the President determines that cessation of such exports 
would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United 
States non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the 
common defense and security: Provided, That prior to the 
effective date of any such determination, the President's 
determination, together with a report containing the reasons 
for his determination, shall be submitted to the Congress and 
referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate for a period of sixty days of continuous session (as 
defined in subsection 130 g. of this Act), but any such 
determination shall not become effective if during such sixty-
day period the Congress adopts, and there is enacted, a joint 
resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the 
determination. Any such determination shall be considered 
pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 130 of this Act 
for the consideration of Presidential submissions.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Sec. 130. Congressional Review Procedures.--
    a. * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    i.(1) For the purposes of this subsection, the term ``joint 
resolution'' means--
            (A) * * *
            (B) for an agreement for cooperation pursuant to 
        section 123 of this Act, a joint resolution, the matter 
        after the resolving clause of which--
                    (i) is as follows: ``That the Congress does 
                favor the proposed agreement for cooperation 
                transmitted to the Congress by the President on 
                __________.''; and
                    (ii) includes, immediately after the 
                language specified in clause (i), any other 
                provisions to accompany such proposed agreement 
                for cooperation.
            [(B)] (C) for a determination under section 129 of 
        this Act, a joint resolution, the matter after the 
        resolving clause of which is as follows: ``That the 
        Congress does not favor the determination transmitted 
        to the Congress by the President on _____.'', or
            [(C)] (D) for a subsequent arrangement under 
        section 201 of the United States-India Nuclear 
        Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement 
        Act, a joint resolution, the matter after the resolving 
        clause of which is as follows: ``That the Congress does 
        not favor the subsequent arrangement to the Agreement 
        for Cooperation Between the Government of the United 
        States of America and the Government of India 
        Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy that was 
        transmitted to Congress by the President on September 
        10, 2008.'',

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Sec. 131. Subsequent Arrangements.--
    a.(1) Prior to entering into any proposed subsequent 
arrangement under an agreement for cooperation (other than an 
agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91 
c., 144 b., or 144 c. of this Act), the Secretary of Energy 
shall obtain the concurrence of the Secretary of State and 
shall consult with the Commission, and the Secretary of 
Defense: Provided, That the Secretary of State shall have the 
leading role in any negotiations of a policy nature pertaining 
to any proposed subsequent arrangement regarding arrangements 
for the storage or disposition of irradiated fuel elements or 
approvals for the transfer, for which prior approval is 
required under an agreement for cooperation, by a recipient of 
source or special nuclear material, production or utilization 
facilities, or nuclear technology. Notice of any proposed 
subsequent arrangement shall be published in the Federal 
Register, together with the written determination of the 
Secretary of Energy that such arrangement will not be inimical 
to the common defense and [security, and such proposed 
subsequent arrangement shall not take effect before fifteen 
days after publication.] security. Such subsequent arrangement 
shall become effective only if Congress enacts a joint 
resolution of approval according to the procedures of sections 
123 d. and 130 i. of this Act. Any such nuclear proliferation 
assessment statement shall be submitted to the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate not later than the 
31st day of continuous session after submission of the 
subsequent arrangement. Whenever the Secretary of State is 
required to prepare a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment 
Statement pursuant to paragraph (2) of this subsection, notice 
of the proposed subsequent arrangement which is the subject of 
the requirement to prepare a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment 
Statement shall not be published until after the receipt by the 
Secretary of Energy of such Statement or the expiration of the 
time authorized by subsection c. for the preparation of such 
Statement, whichever occurs first.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 135. REQUIREMENT OF LIABILITY PROTECTION FOR UNITED STATES NUCLEAR 
                    SUPPLIERS.

    The President may not issue a license for the export of 
nuclear material, facilities, components, or other goods, 
services, or technology to a country pursuant to an agreement 
that has entered into force after the date of the enactment of 
this section unless the President determines that such country 
has liability protection for United States nuclear suppliers 
that is equivalent to the liability protection specified under 
the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *