[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 155 (Wednesday, December 5, 2012)] [Senate] [Pages S7461-S7636] NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 On Tuesday, November 4, 2012, the Senate passed S. 3254, as follows: S. 3254 [...] SEC. 932. DEFENSE CLANDESTINE SERVICE. (a) Prohibition on Use of Funds for Additional Personnel.-- Amounts authorized to be appropriated by this Act for the Military Intelligence Program (MIP) may not be obligated or expended to provide for a number of personnel conducting or supporting human intelligence within the Department of Defense in excess of the number of such personnel as of April 20, 2012. (b) CAPE Report on Costs.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation of the Department of Defense shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an independent estimate of the costs of the Defense Clandestine Service, whether funded through the Military Intelligence Program or the National Intelligence Program, including an estimate of the costs over the period of the current future-years defense program and an estimate of the out year costs. (c) USDI Report on DCS.-- (1) Report required.--Not later than February 1, 2013, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the Defense Clandestine Service. (2) Elements.--The report under paragraph (1) shall include the following: (A) A detailed description of the location and schedule for current and anticipated deployments of case officers trained under the Field Tradecraft Course, whether overseas or domestically, and a certification whether or not such deployments can be accommodated and supported. (B) A statement of the objectives for the effective management of case officers trained under the Field Tradecraft Course for each of the Armed Forces, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the United States Special Operations Command, including objectives on numbers of tours requiring training in the Field Tradecraft Course and objectives for management of career tracks and case officer covers. (C) A statement of the manner in which each Armed Force, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the United States Special Operations Command will each achieve the objectives applicable thereto under subparagraph (B). (D) A copy of any memoranda of understanding or memoranda of agreement between the Department of Defense and other departments and agencies of the United States Government, or between components or elements of the Department of Defense, that are required to implement objectives for the Defense Clandestine Service. (d) Definitions.--In this section: (1) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (A) the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (2) The term ``future-years defense program'' means the future-years defense program under section 221 of title 10, United States Code. [...] Senate Report 112-173 Defense Clandestine Service (sec. 932) The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit the obligation of appropriated Military Intelligence Program (MIP) funds in fiscal year 2013 to exceed the number of personnel conducting or supporting human intelligence within the Department of Defense (DOD) as of April 20, 2012. This provision would also require the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) to provide an estimate of the total cost of the Defense Clandestine Service (DCS) to the congressional defense and intelligence committees. This cost estimate should look at the total costs of the DCS, including whether that cost is incurred in the MIP, in the National Intelligence Program, or in other non-intelligence funding for the Department of Defense (e.g. Major Force Program 11 funding for U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)). The estimate should include costs in the out years of the future-years defense program and beyond, especially those associated with closing existing personnel basing; creating new basing arrangements; and supporting overseas deployments. The provision also would require the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI) to provide a report to the congressional defense and intelligence committees by February 1, 2013, that provides or explains: where DOD case officers will be deployed or based and a schedule for those deployments; certification that the prospective locations can and will accommodate these deployments; the objectives established for each military service, USSOCOM, and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to improve career management for case officers, and the plans to achieve the objectives of the DCS; and any Memoranda of Agreement or Understanding necessary to implement planned reforms with other departments and agencies and between DOD components. The committee appreciates the fact that the USDI and the Director of the DIA, in initiating the DCS, intend to make reforms to the Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Service to correct longstanding problems. These problems include inefficient utilization of personnel trained at significant expense to conduct clandestine HUMINT; poor or non-existent career management for trained HUMINT personnel; cover challenges; and unproductive deployment locations. Multiple studies since the end of the Cold War document these deficiencies, and they led the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, chaired by two former Secretaries of Defense, to recommend transferring to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) all responsibilities for the clandestine recruitment of human sources, utilizing military personnel on detail from the DOD as necessary. The committee notes that President Bush authorized 50 percent growth in the CIA's case officer workforce, which followed significant growth under President Clinton. Since 9/11, DOD's case officer ranks have grown substantially as well. The committee is concerned that, despite this expansion and the winding down of two overseas conflicts that required large HUMINT resources, DOD believes that its needs are not being met. The committee concludes that DOD needs to demonstrate that it can improve the management of clandestine HUMINT before undertaking any further expansion. Furthermore, if DOD is able to utilize existing resources much more effectively, the case could be made that investment in this area could decline, rather than remain steady or grow, to assist the Department in managing its fiscal and personnel challenges.