[Congressional Record: June 21, 2011 (Senate)]
[Page S3976-S3977]


  Mr. DeMINT (for himself, Mr. Cornyn, Mr. Vitter, Ms. Ayotte, Mr. 
Barrasso, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Boozman, Mr. Burr, Mr. Chambliss, Mr. Coats, 
Mr. Coburn, Mr. Cochran, Mr. Crapo, Mr. Enzi, Mr. Grassley, Mr. Hatch, 
Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. Inhofe, Mr. Isakson, Mr. Johanns, Mr. Johnson of 
Wisconsin, Mr. Kirk, Mr. Lee, Mr. McConnell, Mr. Portman, Mr. Risch, 
Mr. Rubio, Mr. Sessions, Mr. Shelby, Mr. Thune, Mr. Wicker, Mr. 
Roberts, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Graham, and Mr. Alexander) submitted the 
following resolution; which was referred to the Select Committee on 

                              S. Res. 213

       Whereas since the attacks on September 11, 2001, the United 
     States intelligence community has gathered critical 
     information that has helped to prevent additional attacks on 
     United States soil;
       Whereas the Central Intelligence Agency (hereinafter 
     referred to as the ``CIA'') plays a vital role in United 
     States intelligence collection;
       Whereas the importance of the CIA's work was exemplified by 
     the successful operation against Usama bin Laden;
       Whereas, as authorized by the President and in accordance 
     with specific legal guidance provided by the Department of 
     Justice, the CIA lawfully detained and interrogated certain 
     high-value suspected terrorists;
       Whereas information obtained from high-value detainees who 
     had been detained and interrogated by the CIA was essential 
     in determining the organizational structure, key operatives, 
     modus operandi, and other relevant information on al-Qaeda 
       Whereas information obtained from high-value detainees who 
     had been detained and interrogated by the CIA was crucial to 
     tracking down Usama bin Laden;
       Whereas Michael Hayden, a former Director of the CIA, 
     wrote, ``Let the record show that when I was first briefed in 
     2007 about the brightening prospect of pursuing bin Laden 
     through his courier network, a crucial component of the 
     briefing was information provided by three CIA detainees, all 
     of whom had been subjected to some form of enhanced 
     interrogation. One of the most alerting pieces of evidence 
     was that two of the detainees who had routinely been 
     cooperative and truthful (after they had undergone enhanced 
     techniques) were atypically denying apparent factual data--a 
     maneuver taken as a good sign that the CIA was on to 
     something important. So that there is no ambiguity, let me be 
     doubly clear: It is nearly impossible for me to imagine any 
     operation like the May 2 assault on bin Laden's compound in 
     Abbottabad, Pakistan, that would

[[Page S3977]]

     not have made substantial use of the trove of information 
     derived from CIA detainees, including those on whom enhanced 
     techniques had been used.'';
       Whereas a May 30, 2005, Department of Justice memo stated, 
     ``In particular, the CIA believes that it would have been 
     unable to obtain critical information from numerous 
     detainees, including KSM [Khalid Sheikh Mohammed] and Abu 
     Zubaydah, without these enhanced techniques. . . . Indeed, 
     before the CIA used enhanced techniques in its interrogation 
     of KSM, KSM resisted giving any answers to questions about 
     future attacks, simply noting, `Soon, you will know.' '';
       Whereas according to such May 30, 2005, memo, Abu Zubaydah 
     explained the effect of enhanced techniques as, ``Brothers 
     who are captured and interrogated are permitted by Allah to 
     provide information when they believe they have reached the 
     limit of their ability to withhold it in the face of 
     psychological and physical hardships.'';
       Whereas such May 30, 2005, memo further indicates that 
     after using enhanced interrogation techniques, high-value 
     detainees became cooperative stating, ``since the use of 
     enhanced techniques, `KSM and Abu Zubaydah have been pivotal 
     sources because of their ability and willingness to provide 
     their analysis and speculation about the capabilities, 
     methodologies, and mindsets of terrorists.' '';
       Whereas mastermind of the attacks of September 11, 2001, 
     Khalid Sheikh Mohammed disclosed to CIA interrogators 
     information about a ``second wave'' plot using an East Asian 
     al-Qaeda group known as Jemmah Islamiyah to hijack and crash 
     an airliner into the Library Tower in Los Angeles;
       Whereas Khalid Sheikh Mohammed gave CIA interrogators 
     information that led to the capture of Riduan bin Isomuddin, 
     known as Hambali, the leader of the Indonesian terrorist 
     organization Jemaah Islamiyah;
       Whereas al-Qaeda senior operational planner Abu Zubaydah 
     and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed supplied important intelligence 
     about Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his terrorist network, aiding 
     United States operations against al-Qaeda in Iraq;
       Whereas in a May 2011 interview, Leon Panetta, the Director 
     of the CIA, in response to a direct question about enhanced 
     interrogation and the successful bin Laden operation, stated 
     that, ``Obviously there was some valuable information that 
     was derived through those kind of interrogations.'';
       Whereas, although the President issued an Executive Order 
     in January 2009 that effectively ended the CIA's 
     interrogation and detention program, the Administration has 
     yet to establish clear policies for the detention and 
     interrogation of suspected high-value detainees, particularly 
     those captured overseas by foreign governments;
       Whereas in 2009, the Attorney General launched a 
     preliminary review into whether Federal laws were violated in 
     connection with the interrogation of specific detainees, even 
     though career prosecutors had previously considered and 
     rejected filing criminal charges in those cases; and
       Whereas the preliminary review initiated by the Attorney 
     General will determine whether CIA employees involved in the 
     detention and interrogation of terrorists should be 
     prosecuted for alleged violations of Federal law: Now, 
     therefore, be it
       Resolved, That the Senate--
       (1) commends the professionals of the United States 
     intelligence community for their dedication;
       (2) expresses thanks to the employees of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency for their selfless service;
       (3) recognizes that continued investigation of employees of 
     the Central Intelligence Agency for their involvement in a 
     detention and interrogation program that helped to save lives 
     by averting terrorist attacks on the United States is 
     unwarranted and will likely have a chilling effect on the 
     critical work of their colleagues and other United States 
     national security professionals;
       (4) urges the President and the Attorney General to 
     immediately close the Department of Justice's ongoing 
     investigation, and decline future prosecution, of Central 
     Intelligence Agency employees for actions related to the 
     interrogation of detainees at overseas locations, including 
     the use of enhanced interrogation techniques on detained 
     terrorists at such locations; and
       (5) urges the President to develop and implement policies 
     allowing for the long-term detention and interrogation by the 
     intelligence community of high-value detainees, including 
     detainees who are captured overseas or are in the custody of 
     foreign countries.