USA PATRIOT ACT ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ SEPTEMBER 22, 2009 __________ Serial No. 111-35 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 52-409«MDRV»«MDNM» WASHINGTON : 2010 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512 091800 Fax: (202) 512 092104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402 090001 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California LAMAR SMITH, Texas RICK BOUCHER, Virginia F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., JERROLD NADLER, New York Wisconsin ROBERT C. ``BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California ZOE LOFGREN, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California MAXINE WATERS, California DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia ROBERT WEXLER, Florida STEVE KING, Iowa STEVE COHEN, Tennessee TRENT FRANKS, Arizona HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas Georgia JIM JORDAN, Ohio PEDRO PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico TED POE, Texas MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois TOM ROONEY, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California GREGG HARPER, Mississippi TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York ADAM B. SCHIFF, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida DANIEL MAFFEI, New York Perry Apelbaum, Majority Staff Director and Chief Counsel Sean McLaughlin, Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel ------ Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties JERROLD NADLER, New York, Chairman MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., ROBERT C. ``BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia Wisconsin WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts TOM ROONEY, Florida HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., STEVE KING, Iowa Georgia TRENT FRANKS, Arizona TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan JIM JORDAN, Ohio STEVE COHEN, Tennessee BRAD SHERMAN, California SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas David Lachmann, Chief of Staff Paul B. Taylor, Minority Counsel C O N T E N T S ---------- SEPTEMBER 22, 2009 Page OPENING STATEMENTS The Honorable Jerrold Nadler, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties................ 1 The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State of Wisconsin, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties...................................................... 2 The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, and Member, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties.................................... 3 The Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary. 5 WITNESSES Mr. Todd M. Hinnen, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice Oral Testimony................................................. 7 Prepared Statement............................................. 9 Ms. Suzanne E. Spaulding, former Staff Director, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Oral Testimony................................................. 28 Prepared Statement............................................. 31 The Honorable Thomas B. Evans, Jr., a former Representative in Congress Oral Testimony................................................. 47 Prepared Statement............................................. 49 Mr. Kenneth L. Wainstein, former Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division, Department of Justice Oral Testimony................................................. 53 Prepared Statement............................................. 56 Mr. Michael German, Policy Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union Oral Testimony................................................. 62 Prepared Statement............................................. 64 APPENDIX Material Submitted for the Hearing Record........................ 113 USA PATRIOT ACT ---------- TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2009 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, DC. The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:15 a.m., in room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Jerrold Nadler (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representatives Nadler, Conyers, Johnson, Sensenbrenner, Rooney, King, Gohmert, and Smith. Staff Present: David Lachmann, Majority Subcommittee Chief of Staff; Stephanie Pell, Detailee (DOJ); Caroline Lynch, Minority Counsel; and Turner Letter, Staff for Ranking Member Sensenbrenner. Mr. Nadler. The hearing of the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties will come to order. We will begin with--I will recognize myself for an opening statement. Today's hearing gives the Members of the Committee the opportunity to review the USA PATRIOT Act, three provisions of which are scheduled to expire later this year. These three provisions--dealing with roving wiretap authority; expansion of definition of an agent of a foreign power to include so-called lone wolfs; and section 215, which allows the government to obtain business records using an order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, or FISA, Court--have aroused a great deal of controversy and concern. While some have argued that each of these authorities remain necessary tools in the fight against terrorism and that they must be extended without any modifications, others have counseled careful review and modification. Some have even urged that we allow some or all of these authorities to sunset. Additionally, I believe that we should not miss the opportunity to review the act in its entirety: to examine how it is working, where it has been successful, and where it may need improvement. For example, I have introduced for the last few years the National Security Letters Reform Act, which would make some vital improvements to the current law in order better to protect civil liberties while ensuring that NSLs remain a useful tool in national security investigations. And section 215 must be amended to conform to the changes we seek to make to the NSL provisions. I have long believed that civil liberties and national security need not be in conflict, and I hope to work with my colleagues to strike that balance in a responsible and effective manner. We have some outstanding witnesses today with a great deal of experience and knowledge in this area. I am especially pleased that the Administration has sent a witness to assist the Committee in its work and to explain the Administration's views. I would note that Mr. Hinnen's testimony states at the very outset, and I think it merits repeating, that the Administration is, quote, ``ready and willing to work with Members on any specific proposals we may have to craft legislation that both provides effective investigative authorities and protects privacy and civil liberties,'' close quote. Whatever disagreements we may have on any particular provision or approach, I want to note that this attitude is a refreshing break with recent practice. We take the Administration at its word, and I, for one, intend to hold it to that. I look forward to working with the Administration and with my colleagues to craft legislation that protects our national security and our fundamental values. I look forward to the testimony, and I thank our witnesses for being here today. I yield back. And I now recognize the distinguished Ranking Member of the Subcommittee for 5 minutes for an opening statement. Mr. Sensenbrenner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Two weeks ago, this country honored the 3,000 innocent people killed in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In 100 days, the tools to prevent another horrific attack on America will expire. While I appreciate the Chairman holding this hearing today, it is long overdue. Congress must reauthorize the expiring provisions of the PATRIOT Act before December 31st of this year, and the clock is ticking. In 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act was passed with wide bipartisan support. And in this Committee, I would remind the Members and everybody else that we spent a month considering it. We had two hearings, and we had a markup. In 2005, I again spearheaded the effort to reauthorize the PATRIOT Act. Recognizing the significance of the act to America's counterterrorism operations and the need for thorough oversight, this Committee held 9 Subcommittee hearings, 3 days of full Committee hearings, and completed its markup of the reauthorization all before the August recess--hardly a procedural rush job. I am deeply concerned that we are weeks away from adjourning this legislative session and we are now only beginning the process of reviewing the act. During a Senate confirmation hearing in January, Attorney General Holder said he wanted to examine the expiring provisions of the PATRIOT Act, talk to investigators and lawyers and get a sense of what has worked and what needs to be changed. In May, General Holder appeared before this Committee, and I asked him about the Department's position on reauthorizing the act. Again he said he needed to examine how the expiring provisions had been used and to gather more empirical information. He assured me that the Department would express its views with sufficient time to reauthorize the act. Just last week, the Obama administration finally made public its views on the three expiring provisions. I am dismayed as to why it took 9 months to assess just three measures, but I commend the Administration for recognizing the value of these important national security tools and rightly encouraging Congress to reauthorize each of them. The Administration has also promised to reject any changes to these or other PATRIOT Act provisions that would undermine their effectiveness. Of particular importance to me is the lone wolf provision, which closes a gap in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, that, if allowed to expire, could permit an individual terrorist to slip through the cracks and endanger thousands of innocent lives. When FISA was originally enacted in the 1970's, terrorists were believed to be members of an identified group. This is not the case today. Many modern-day terrorists may subscribe to a movement or certain beliefs, but they don't belong to or identify themselves with a specific terrorist group. Allowing the lone wolf provision to expire could impede our ability to gather intelligence about perhaps the most dangerous terrorists operating today. Section 206 of the PATRIOT Act authorizes the use of roving wiretaps for national security and intelligence investigations. The roving wiretap allows the government to use a single wiretap order to cover any communications device that the target uses or may use. Without roving wiretap authority, investigators would be forced to seek a new court order each time they need to change the location, phone, or computer that needs to be monitored. Director Mueller testified before the Committee in May that this provision has been used over 140 times and is exceptionally useful for facilitating FBI investigations. Section 215 of the act allows the FBI to apply to the FISA Court to issue orders granting the government access to any tangible items in foreign intelligence, international terrorism, or clandestine intelligence cases. The PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 significantly expanded the safeguards against potential abuse of section 215 authority, including additional congressional oversight, procedural protections, application requirements, and judicial review. According to Director Mueller, this provision has been used over 230 times. The terrorist threat did not end on September 11, 2001. Just last week, Federal authorities disrupted a potential al- Qaeda bombing plot that stretched from New York City to Denver and beyond. It is time for this Committee to act. We must not allow these critical counterintelligence tools to expire. And I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses and yield back the balance of my time. Mr. Nadler. Thank you. I must say, I wish I was as confident as the gentleman from Wisconsin that this session has only weeks to go. I now recognize the distinguished Chairman of the full Committee, Mr. Conyers, for an opening statement. Mr. Conyers. Thank you, Chairman Nadler. And I wanted to thank Jim Sensenbrenner for his recapitulation of those days in the Judiciary Committee, where so much happened. I also am pleased to see Tom Evans, our former colleague from Delaware, back on the Hill. Now, the PATRIOT Act is nearly 8 years old. After many hearings and multiple inspector general reports of the use and abuse of this law, and after much work by scholars in the field, we have learned that, since this law was rushed through Congress in the weeks after the 9/11 attack--we have to recall this with some specificity. The hearings that then-Chairman Sensenbrenner referred to were leading up to a bill that was sent to Rules Committee that never got out of Rules Committee. And that bill that the Chairman and me, the Ranking Member, worked on so carefully was unanimously reported out of the House Judiciary Committee-- record vote. And then the bill went to the Rules Committee. And then-Chairman Dreier, under Lord knows whose instructions, substituted that bill for another bill that we in Judiciary had never seen. And so we come here today now to consider what we do with those parts that are expiring. And so I wanted to make a couple ideas, give you a couple ideas about what might have happened if the bill that we debated and voted out--and Chairman Nadler was there; Ranking Member Lamar Smith was there. And the bill that we voted out required that targets of so- called roving wiretaps be identified in a FISA Court order to prevent the John Doe roving wiretaps that some experts and many commentators consider abusive. That was our bill--bipartisan, 100 percent. Another feature of that bill required extensive and robust oversight of the executive branch's use of surveillance powers, which might have headed off the 2004 crisis at the Department of Justice caused by then-President Bush's warrantless domestic surveillance program. Also in the bill was a requirement for extensive reporting and certification requirements, and created clear avenues for people affected by PATRIOT Act violations to claim redress, which may have eliminated, or certainly simplified, the extensive litigation about the PATRIOT abuses that continue to this day. And, finally, the current Administration has recommended reviewing these provisions that are expiring, and they have supported their simple extension. I disagree. And I want to hear some more detail about these, especially the infamous lone wolf statute, which has never been used and which there is some question as to whether it is necessary at all. Now, the Administration has stated that the protection of privacy and civil liberties is of deep and abiding concern. And they are willing to work on legislation that provides effective investigative authorities the power they need but, at the same time, protects the rights and civil liberties and privacy of the people that are under investigation. And so I think it is critical that every Member of this Committee has accepted this invitation to work with the Administration. So now is the time to consider improving the PATRIOT Act, not to simply extend the three expiring provisions, which is a point of view that is no less valid than any other. But, please, Judiciary Committee, let's consider what we have done, let's consider what was done to us, and let's consider where we go from here. And I thank you for your time, Chairman Nadler. Mr. Nadler. I thank the Chairman. I now recognize for an opening statement the distinguished Ranking Member of the full Committee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. America is fortunate not to have experienced a terrorist attack since 2001, but we must not be lulled into a false sense of security. The threat from terrorists and others who wish to kill Americans remains high. In the 8 years since the attacks of September 11, 2001, al- Qaeda and other terrorist organizations have continued their war against innocent civilians worldwide. In 2004, 191 people were killed in the Madrid train bombings. In 2005, 52 innocent civilians were killed when suicide bombers attacked the London subway. And last year, 164 people were killed in Mumbai by a Pakistan-based terrorist organization. Counterterrorism tools helped British and American authorities foil the 2006 plot to attack as many as 10 airplanes flying from Great Britain to the U.S. Two weeks ago, three of the plotters were convicted of planning to blow up passenger planes using liquid explosives. According to British prosecutors, if the terrorists had been successful, they would have killed thousands of innocent passengers. In 2007, Federal authorities thwarted two terrorist attempts on U.S. soil: a plot to kill U.S. soldiers at the Fort Dix Army base and a plot to bomb JFK International Airport by planting explosives around fuel tanks and a fuel pipeline. Again, surveillance and investigative techniques saved lives. Many of these plots would not have been thwarted, the terrorists would not have been convicted, and thousands of lives would not have been saved without the PATRIOT Act. The PATRIOT Act gives intelligence officials the ability to investigate terrorists and prevent attacks. We cannot afford to let these life-saving provisions expire. Last March, I introduced the Safe and Secure America Act of 2009 to extend for 10 years sections 206 and 215 of the U.S. PATRIOT Act and section 6001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which were scheduled to sunset on December 31st. For years the PATRIOT Act has been subject to misinformation, rumors, and innuendos about how intelligence officials can use its provisions. As Congress once again considers these provisions, we must ensure that the debate is about facts, not fiction. The expiring provisions we are considering today are designed to be used only by intelligence officials investigating terrorists and spies in cases involving national security. Despite allegations that the PATRIOT Act is unconstitutional, these provisions have been upheld in court and are similar to those used in criminal investigations. The PATRIOT Act simply applies the same provisions to intelligence gathering and national security investigations. The director of the FBI, Robert Mueller, in testimony before the House and Senate Judiciary Committees earlier this year, urged Congress to renew what he called ``exceptional intelligence-gathering tools.'' The Obama administration decided last week that it agrees with Director Mueller and finally called for reauthorization of the three expiring PATRIOT Act provisions. America is safe today not because terrorists and spies have given up trying to destroy us and our freedoms. Just this past week, three individuals with links to al-Qaeda were arrested in connection with a plot to set off bombs in New York City. America is safe today because the men and women of the intelligence community use the PATRIOT Act to protect us. The threat to America from terrorists, spies, and enemy countries will not sunset at the end of this year, and neither should America's anti-terrorism laws. The PATRIOT Act works exceedingly well. If the PATRIOT Act expires or is weakened, American lives will be put at risk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back. Mr. Nadler. Thank you. [Disturbance in the hearing room.] Mr. Nadler. If you insist on talking, you will be escorted from the room. Sit down, please. Escort him from the room, please. Do we have a Sergeant at Arms here? [Disturbance in the hearing room.] Mr. Nadler. In the interest of proceeding to our witnesses and mindful of our busy schedules, I ask that other Members submit their statements for the record. Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days to submit opening statements for inclusion in the record. Without objection, the Chair will be authorized to declare a recess of the hearing. We will now turn to our first panel of witnesses. As we ask questions of our witnesses, the Chair will recognize Members in the order of their seniority on the Subcommittee, alternating between majority and minority, provided that the Member is present when his or her turn arrives. Members who are not present when their turns begin will be recognized after the other Members have had the opportunity to ask their questions. The Chair reserves the right to accommodate a Member who is unavoidably late or only able to be with us for a short time. Our first panel consists of one witness. Todd Hinnen is the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for law and policy in the Department of Justice's National Security Division. Prior to rejoining the Justice Department, Mr. Hinnen was the chief counsel to then-Senator Joseph Biden, now Vice President, of course. Mr. Hinnen served from 2005 to 2007 as the director for combatting terrorism at the National Security Council, where his responsibilities included coordinating and directing the United States Government's response to terrorist finance and terrorist use of the Internet. Prior to serving on the NSC, Mr. Hinnen was a prosecutor in the Department of Justice's computer crimes section and a clerk for the Honorable Richard Tallman, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Mr. Hinnen is a graduate of Amherst College and Harvard Law School. Welcome. Your written statement in its entirety will be made part of the record. I would ask you to summarize your testimony in 5 minutes or less. To help you stay within that time, there is a timing light at your table. When 1 minute remains, the light will switch from green to yellow, and then red when the 5 minutes are up. Before we begin, it is customary for the Committee to swear in its witnesses. If you would please stand and raise your right hand to take the oath. [Witness sworn.] Mr. Nadler. Let the record reflect that the witness answered in the affirmative. We will now hear your statement, sir. Mr. Hinnen. Thank you. [Disturbance in the hearing room.] Mr. Nadler. The gentleman will be removed. The witness will proceed. TESTIMONY OF TODD M. HINNEN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Mr. Hinnen. Thank you. Chairman Nadler, Ranking Member Sensenbrenner, full Committee Chairman Conyers, full Committee Chairman Smith, and Members of the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, thank you for inviting me to speak to you today on behalf of the Justice Department about the three intelligence authorities scheduled to expire this December. My written testimony sets forth the affirmative case for renewal for each of these three important authorities. Mindful of the Subcommittee's time and of the importance of discussion, my remarks today will touch briefly on the importance of each authority. At the outset, it is important to recognize that these authorities exist as part of a broader statutory scheme, authorized by Congress and overseen by the FISA Court, that supports foreign intelligence collection and thereby protects national security. The lone wolf provision allows the government to conduct surveillance pursuant to a FISA Court order on a non-U.S. person if the government demonstrates probable cause that the individual is engaged in international terrorism activities or preparation therefor. Although this provision has never been used, it is essential to the government's ability to thwart an international terrorist plotting to attack the United States who has no established connection to a recognized terrorist organization, either because he has broken ties with such an organization or because he has been recruited and trained via information posted to the Internet. Analysis suggests that, as the international coalition dedicated to combatting terrorism puts increasing pressure on terrorist groups and safe havens diminish, individuals who share the destructive goals of these groups but have no formal connection to them will pose an increasing threat. The roving wiretap authority allows the government to maintain surveillance of a target who has been identified or specifically described and who attempts to thwart surveillance by rapidly changing cell phones or other facilities. The government must demonstrate probable cause that the target is an agent of a foreign power and that that target is using or will use the cell phone. The government must also make a specific showing that the target will attempt to thwart surveillance. And if the government uses a roving wiretap order, it must notify the court within 10 days of that use and demonstrate the specific facts that demonstrate that the target is using the new cell phone. This authority is critical to efforts to collect intelligence on and protect against terrorists and foreign intelligence officers who have received countersurveillance training--our most sophisticated adversaries. The government has sought and been granted the authority in an average of 22 cases per year. The government has had occasion to use that authority granted by the court far more seldom than that. The business records provision allows the government to obtain any tangible thing it demonstrates to the FISA Court is relevant to a counterterrorism or counterintelligence investigation. This provision is used to obtain critical information from the businesses unwittingly used by terrorists in their travel, plotting, preparation for, communication regarding, and execution of attacks. It also supports an important sensitive collection program, about which many Members of the Subcommittee or their staffs have been briefed. All applications of this authority are subject to FISA Court approval, minimization procedures, and robust oversight. Each of these authorities meets an important investigative need. The Department and the Administration are firmly committed to ensuring that they are used with due respect for the privacy and civil liberties of Americans. We welcome discussion with the Subcommittee directed toward ensuring that these authorities are renewed in a form that maintains their operational effectiveness and protects privacy and civil liberties. Finally, I would like to address national security letters. A number of bills have recently been introduced, on both sides of the Hill, that amend the five statutes governing this investigative authority. I appreciate the careful thought and hard work that went into those legislative proposals. The Department looks forward to engaging regarding them with Members of the Subcommittee. The Administration has not taken an official position on any particular provision on NSLs, so my ability to respond to questions regarding them today will be limited. I appreciate the Subcommittee's understanding in this regard and its recognition that today's hearing is only the beginning of a process of working closely together to create legislation that maintains the operational effectiveness of these important investigative tools and protects the privacy and civil liberties of Americans. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Hinnen follows:] Prepared Statement of Todd M. Hinnen
__________ Mr. Nadler. I thank the gentleman. I will begin the questions by recognizing myself for 5 minutes. Mr. Hinnen, with respect to the so-called lone wolf authority, since terrorism is obviously a crime, why do we need this provision? Why not use ordinary Article 3 warrants? What additional powers does this provision give beyond the normal Article 3 warrant, and why are those powers necessary? Mr. Hinnen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The distinction, I think, between Article 3 powers and FISA powers are the factors recognized by Congress when enacting FISA in the first place, the needs of the government in conducting intelligence investigations. Whereas when using Article 3 authorities you are investigating the violation of one of the criminal laws, in an intelligence investigation or a counterterrorism investigation the government is often not intending to investigate a violation of the criminal law and often doesn't have prosecution as its end goal. Mr. Nadler. Regardless, can you get a lone wolf warrant in a circumstance where you couldn't get an Article 3 warrant? Mr. Hinnen. I think it is the conditions under which you can get the authority that are important. The additional secrecy that it provides that protects an ongoing intelligence investigation---- Mr. Nadler. The additional secrecy? Aren't Article 3 warrants under seal? Mr. Hinnen. They may be under seal, but those orders are eventually unsealed, as are the applications that underlie them. And often the predicate facts that support the issuance of such an order are of sufficient sensitivity that the government does not want them---- Mr. Nadler. So if Article 3 warrants had the authority to keep certain things, what you are talking about, secret, then that would be an adequate substitute for that? Mr. Hinnen. I think still the important distinction between the requirement under FISA that the government demonstrate that the individual is an agent of a foreign power and the requirement under Title III that the government demonstrate---- Mr. Nadler. In the roving wiretap they don't have to demonstrate that--I am sorry, in the lone wolf they don't have to---- Mr. Hinnen. Under the lone wolf, the government still has to demonstrate that the target is an agent of a foreign power under the definitions in---- Mr. Nadler. So you are telling me it is harder to get because they have to demonstrate something that they don't have to demonstrate for an Article 3. So my question then is, assuming you took care of the problem of potentially unsealing records eventually, because you wanted to keep certain things secret, what advantage is there to the government, in terms of an investigation, aside from having to jump through additional hoops to get the warrant in the first place, which is not an advantage, to using this as opposed to an Article 3 warrant? Mr. Hinnen. Mr. Chairman, I didn't mean to imply that it was more difficult to get a FISA Court order, simply that the government had to make a different showing. Mr. Nadler. Fine. But let's assume--never mind that. Why is it to the government's advantage, other than the question of declassifying information eventually--let's assuming we amended that--what is the advantage of a roving wiretap as opposed to an Article 4 wiretap? Mr. Hinnen. That the showing that the government has to make in order to get a FISA wiretap is more closely tailored to an intelligence investigation, that it focuses on an agent of a foreign power rather than a violation of the criminal laws. Mr. Nadler. So you could get it under certain circumstances when you couldn't get an Article 3 wiretap? Mr. Hinnen. The government gets it by making a different showing. Mr. Nadler. And the facts are such that there are cases in which you could make the showing necessary for a roving wiretap but couldn't make the showing in the same case necessary for an Article 3 wiretap warrant? Mr. Hinnen. I believe that there is some overlap but not complete---- Mr. Nadler. I would ask then that you, after today--because I want to go to two other questions in the minute I have left-- give us specific information on how it would be advantageous to the government and, assuming we plug that secrecy problem, why Article 3 warrants wouldn't suffice. I mean, how does it really differ? The Administration has noted in its support for the reauthorization that it is willing to consider proposals to better protect privacy as well as efficacy. Given their position in the context of section 215 orders, would the Administration support returning to a standard that required specific facts showing that the records sought are related to a foreign power rather than the current ``relevant'' standard? And, if not, why not? Mr. Hinnen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is an interesting question, whether the Administration would support a return to this ``specific and articulable'' standard which existed before the PATRIOT Act, as opposed to the ``relevant'' standard. This, of course, is something that Congress changed in the original PATRIOT Act. The Administration has not taken an official position on this yet. I would say, sitting here today, that it is not entirely clear to me that there is a substantive difference between the ``specific and articulable'' standard and the ``relevant'' standard. If there is, in fact, not, then I would suggest that settled expectations militate in favor---- Mr. Nadler. Clearly, if there is no difference, it doesn't matter. But everybody seems to have said for the last 10 years that there is a big difference. Mr. Hinnen. If, in fact, there is a difference, I think the presumption would be against change. Mr. Nadler. Say it again? I am sorry. Mr. Hinnen. The presumption would be against change, against returning---- Mr. Nadler. Because? Mr. Hinnen. In part because Congress recently made the change to the relevance factor; in part because a practice has developed around the current standard; and in part because Congress has added additional safeguards, including judicial review of orders, in 2006. Mr. Nadler. Well, again, I would simply say this, and then my time will have expired: Saying that we shouldn't change something because Congress did it is never a good argument, because we are always changing something. I would ask you, again, after today, to supply us, if you think we shouldn't change that, with specific reasons other than ``we are already doing it this way,'' but specific reasons and illustrations of how that would affect intelligence gathering and why it would not be a good idea to change it. Mr. Hinnen. Certainly. Mr. Nadler. Thank you. My time has expired. I now recognize the distinguished Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Mr. Sensenbrenner. Mr. Sensenbrenner. Thanks very much, Mr. Hinnen. You are a breath of fresh air. And I would say that, in many cases, you have vindicated many of the assertions that I made, both as the author of the PATRIOT Act in 2001 as well as the author of the PATRIOT Act reauthorization, which was signed by the President in March of 2006. The PATRIOT Act has been extensively litigated, and, in most cases, it has been held constitutional. Where there has been the biggest problems is relative to the national security letters issue. And I would point out that if you look at the legislative history behind national security letters, that was not one of the expanded powers given to law enforcement by the PATRIOT Act, but was merely changing the position of another statute that was authored by one of the PATRIOT Act's biggest critics, Senator Leahy of Vermont, from one part of the criminal code to the other. And I can say that the reauthorization put significant additional civil-liberties protections into the use of national security letters that were not there in the original Leahy-Kastenmeier legislation of 1986. Now, you know, all of that being said, given the debate over the PATRIOT Act, could you kind of give somewhat of an argument over why the Administration has come down in favor of extending the three expiring provisions of the PATRIOT Act without amendment? Mr. Hinnen. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member. Just to clarify, the Administration's position is to reauthorize the three expiring provisions. And the Administration has indicated that it is open to discussion of amendments so long as those amendments both maintain the operational effectiveness of the authorities and protect privacy and civil liberties. And I think the reason that has been the position of the Administration is because we recognize the need to strike this continuing balance between effective intelligence investigative authorities on the one hand and the privacy and civil liberties of Americans on the other. And we are anxious to work collaboratively with Congress to strike that balance. Mr. Sensenbrenner. Will the Administration put the heat on Congress? Because I fear what would happen if December 31st comes and goes and the three expiring provisions effectively do expire. What would be the consequence of Congress letting this slip through the cracks, in your opinion? Mr. Hinnen. As I mentioned in my opening statement, Mr. Ranking Member, we feel that these are very important investigative authorities and that it would be very unfortunate to allow them to lapse. The Administration firmly supports renewal before December 31 so that there is no gap in the investigative capabilities of the government. Mr. Sensenbrenner. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. Nadler. I thank the gentleman. I now recognize for 5 minutes the distinguished Chairman of the full Committee, Mr. Conyers. Mr. Conyers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr. Hinnen. Is this the first time you have testified before Judiciary? Mr. Hinnen. Yes, it is. Mr. Conyers. How long have you been in the Department of Justice? Mr. Hinnen. Since January 21, 2009, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Conyers. January 21. You know, you sound like a lot of people from DOJ that have come over here before, and yet you have only been there a few months. Do you think that is a good thing or a bad thing? No, okay, you don't have to respond to that. Let me ask you something. Do you know how many times the PATRIOT Act has been challenged in the Federal courts? Mr. Hinnen. I have not counted, Mr. Chairman. I know that various provisions of it have been challenged a number of times. Mr. Conyers. Uh-huh. How about five? Mr. Hinnen. I will take the Chairman's word for it. Mr. Conyers. All right. Thank you. Now, I refer now to something I think you know about. The inspector general described an incident in which the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court refused to issue a 215 order because the request intruded on first amendment rights. Do you remember that case? Mr. Hinnen. With due respect, Mr. Chairman, unless we are discussing one of the declassified opinions of the FISA Court, that is not something I am at liberty to discuss here in this setting. Mr. Conyers. You are not at liberty to discuss it? It has been in the newspapers. We are discussing it. I have had a secret clearance before you, longer than you. Mr. Hinnen. I can readily believe that, Mr. Chairman. However, the fact that it has been published in the newspapers does not mean that it has been declassified and does not mean that it is appropriate for discussion in an open hearing here today. Mr. Conyers. Well, just a minute. Let me turn to the chief of staff of the House Judiciary Committee. Well, would you say that the inspector general, who oversights intelligence, can refer to matters like this and have them published and made public without violating secrecy requirements? Mr. Hinnen. When the inspector general for the Department of Justice or another part of the intelligence community desires to make part of a report public, he works closely with the intelligence community to ensure that the information is appropriately declassified before it is publicly released. Mr. Conyers. Well, the inspector general has had it redacted. Are you questioning the inspector general's knowledge of the law since January 21---- Mr. Hinnen. Certainly not. Mr. Conyers [continuing]. Of 2009? Mr. Hinnen. Certainly not, Mr. Chairman. Merely proceeding out of an abundance of caution in light of the fact that inspectors general often issue both classified and unclassified versions of reports. And I don't have---- Mr. Conyers. Well, have you ever seen the unclassified version of the inspector general's criticism of the fact that these orders were being issued and he refused to let it--you never heard of this ever happening before? There were several cases--there were several instances in the same case which this occurred. Mr. Hinnen. I am familiar with the inspector general's report on 215 orders and familiar with the fact that the business records provision, like other parts of FISA, contain express protections for first amendment rights. Mr. Conyers. Okay. Now, what about the FBI? How do you consider their ability to handle classified, unclassified, and redacted information? Pretty good? Mr. Hinnen. I think the FBI---- Mr. Conyers. Okay. The FBI went and issued a national security letter for the same information, and the inspector general described it as ``inappropriate.'' And I consider it much worse than that. Here is the problem. It is very simple. What the court, the intelligence court, and what the inspector general were complaining about is that you could get around the court's refusal to issue an order in a terrorist investigation by merely going to the FBI, getting around them, and they issue a national security letter for the very same information. Problem: That means that the court and the inspector general found that there was an abuse of process in handling this terrorist investigation. And I am going to have my staff supply you or your staff with all of this information, all of which is public. Mr. Hinnen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now that I am clear on which reports we are referring to, if you will give me a moment to respond. Mr. Conyers. All right. Mr. Hinnen. In 2007, the inspector general published its first report on national security letters, which found some sloppy record-keeping and administrative errors by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in part because of the Byzantine nature and interaction of the five governing statutes. In 2008, the inspector general issued a follow-up report that indicated that many of those issues had been fixed and provided recommendations for the government to make further improvements. Since that time, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has put into place a new data subsystem governing NSLs that prevents many of the administrative errors and ensures much of the record-keeping that the inspector general found was in error in the 2007 report. In addition, the National Security Division, where I work, has increased its oversight efforts and now does national security reviews of FBI field offices on an annual basis. And, of course, Congress and the inspector general maintain their oversight authority. Mr. Conyers. Well, I am glad your memory has been refreshed. That is wonderful. What we have here are a whole series of problems. This is just one case that we have been discussing all this time. There are great privacy problems. Have you ever examined, in the course of your official duties, the American Civil Liberties Union's comments about our discussion about privacy? Mr. Hinnen. I am certainly familiar with many of their comments and with their testimony today, yes. Mr. Conyers. And do you find any serious disagreements with any parts of it? Mr. Hinnen. I do find myself in disagreement with some parts of their testimony, yes, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Conyers. And some parts you find agreement with? Mr. Hinnen. Certainly. Mr. Conyers. If I could indulge the Chairman's generosity for sufficient time---- Mr. Nadler. Without objection. Mr. Conyers [continuing]. To just identify the parts that you find yourself in agreement with and the parts that you may not be so enthusiastic about. Mr. Hinnen. With due respect, Mr. Chairman, you have asked me about the ACLU's positions in general. I would---- Mr. Conyers. No, not in general. No. Mr. Hinnen. With respect to these provisions and with respect to the PATRIOT Act. Mr. Conyers. Yes. Mr. Hinnen. I would note that their testimony on that subject today is 35 single-spaced pages. I would be happy to--I simply don't think that the Committee has---- Mr. Conyers. No, I wouldn't want to do that. But, well, let's use numbers. Let's indicate to me how many things you agree with in that 35 single-spaced closed printing that you found agreement with and how many issues that you found some disagreement with. Mr. Hinnen. Mr. Chairman, I didn't investigate the testimony with a mind to try and determine what percentage I agreed with and what I didn't. Mr. Conyers. Probably not. I can understand that. Mr. Hinnen. The best that I can say is that I agree with some parts of it and disagree with others. Mr. Conyers. Uh-huh. And how will we find out which parts you agreed with and which parts you didn't? Mr. Hinnen. Hopefully, Mr. Chairman, through the dialogue that the Subcommittee is embarking upon today---- Mr. Conyers. Well, how about you sending us a memo identifying it in some detail, or as much or as little as you want since I will write you back if we need more? Mr. Hinnen. I would be happy to take that back to the Department, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Conyers. Well, I am going to take it back to the Department with you. And thank you very much for your testimony. Mr. Hinnen. Thank you for your questions. Mr. Nadler. Thank you. The gentleman from Florida is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Rooney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hinnen, I also started my current employment in January, so hopefully this question is fairly simple. Last week, Senator Feingold introduced legislation that, amongst other things, repeals Title VIII of FISA, which provided civil liability protections to telecommunication carriers who assisted the government following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a provision that President Obama voted for. To your knowledge, does the Administration support this proposal? Mr. Hinnen. Congressman Rooney, the Administration has taken no official position on this or any other provision of Senator Feingold's bill. As you noted in your question, the President did vote for the FISA Amendments Act as a Senator, and DOJ has defended the immunity provision in litigation. So, without forecasting an official position, as the President has suggested, it may be more productive to look forward to meet the challenges still before us than to reopen debates resolved in the past. Mr. Rooney. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Nadler. Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman from Georgia for 5 minutes. Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I think this issue clearly draws a distinction between the two basic philosophies that the Supreme Court would use in solving the case. Would it be a strict construction kind of analysis, or would it be by chance the acknowledgment that the Constitution is a living and breathing document and has to be interpreted in accordance with the realities of the time? And so it would be interesting to see how the United States Supreme Court handles this, whether or not it will be a strict construction or whether or not we will have Supreme Court justices legislating from the bench, as they like to call it. But, at any rate, the issue on roving wiretaps enables the government to target persons rather than places. And ``places'' is the term used in the fourth amendment. Search warrants must, quote, ``particularly describe the place to be searched,'' end quote. Are there any other provisions of the United States Constitution or the Bill of Rights upon which the Administration would depend on for justifying the extension of the act with respect to roving wiretaps? Mr. Hinnen. If I understand the question correctly, the Administration feels that the roving surveillance authority is fully constitutional. Although the fourth amendment text speaks specifically of places, the Supreme Court has recognized, going back to the Katz decision in which an individual using a telephone booth was found to be protected by the fourth amendment, that the fourth amendment protects persons as well as places. And so, I think it is against that constitutional backdrop that consideration of the roving authority has to be undertaken. Having said that, I think that the provision readily meets constitutional scrutiny. Mr. Johnson. Well, have there been any court decisions that have extended the definition, if you will, of place to be searched to be described in particularity? Mr. Hinnen. I think the fourth amendment jurisprudence has applied the fourth amendment in a wide variety of places and contexts. Mr. Johnson. Has it ever extended that particular provision of the fourth amendment? Mr. Hinnen. I am not sure I understand how---- Mr. Johnson. In other words, have there been any cases where the issue was whether or not an extension of--this is not a very artfully posed question. In other words, we have the fourth amendment that says search warrants must, quote, ``particularly describe the place to be searched.'' Have there been any court rulings that you know of which have extended the plain intent of the Founders in that situation? Mr. Hinnen. I think I understand, and I apologize. I think my answers have been inartful. The FISA Court in the past has recognized that, given the specific needs of intelligence investigations, a probable-cause showing with respect to the fact that the individual is an agent of a foreign power is sufficient, regardless of the place to be searched or that kind of thing. In the roving authority, it is important that the government has to demonstrate to the court probable cause that the identified or specifically described individual is an agent of a foreign power. And I think it is that provision, together with the probable cause requirement that the government show that the cell phone or facility will be used by that target, that renders the roving authority constitutional. In other words, it is the specific description or identification of the target that renders it constitutional. Mr. Johnson. One last question, if I may, Mr. Chairman. Does the roving wiretap provision of the PATRIOT Act, does it allow U.S. citizens to be subject thereto? Mr. Hinnen. The statutory definition that roving relies upon refers to both parts of the ``foreign power'' definition in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. So it can apply, if the other conditions of the statute are met, to a United States person who has demonstrated to be acting on or behalf of a foreign power; it can also apply in a circumstance where the target is a non-U.S. person but meets one of the other statutory definitions. Mr. Johnson. And who would determine whether or not there is probable cause--that would be the standard that would apply--probable cause to believe that a United States citizen was cooperating or being a tool of a foreign power or terrorist organization? Mr. Hinnen. The FISA Court--under the 1978 legislation that Congress passed, the FISA Court would exercise independent oversight of the government's showing with respect to whether there is probable cause that an individual is an agent of a foreign power. Mr. Johnson. And that would take place before or after the wiretap, if you will, were instituted? Mr. Hinnen. With respect to the fact that the individual is an agent of a foreign power, that probable-cause showing is made before the wiretap order is granted by the court. Mr. Johnson. Say that again? Mr. Hinnen. With respect to the probable-cause requirement that the individual targeted is an agent of a foreign power, that determination is made by the FISA Court before surveillance is authorized. Mr. Johnson. Is that just limited to U.S. citizens, or does it also have to be shown by probable cause with respect to a non-U.S. citizen? Mr. Hinnen. That is with respect to any target of surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. And I should drop a footnote to that and mention that there is emergency authority provided by the statute pursuant to which the Attorney General can begin surveillance and demonstrate probable cause within 7 days afterwards. But, in the vast majority of cases, in the standard FISA case, the government must always demonstrate probable cause to the FISA Court before surveillance begins that the individual is an agent of a foreign power. Mr. Johnson. Thank you, sir. Mr. Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired. I now recognize the gentleman from Iowa. Mr. King. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I am plenty happy with the latitude given my friend, Mr. Johnson, because he doesn't have to speak as quickly as I have to in the environment that I originate in. Neither would it be the case for the New Yorkers, who can get it out pretty quickly as well. Mr. Nadler. Nobody speaks as quickly as the gentleman from Massachusetts. Mr. King. That is well made. And I thank the witness for his testimony here. And I just ask if you are familiar with the case that has unfolded in New York, the plot against Grand Central Terminal, and the transfer of information and people from Denver to New York, the communications that are the background of that, and if the gentleman can advise this Committee as to whether the PATRIOT Act was utilized in any of that investigation. Mr. Hinnen. Thank you for the question. I am familiar, obviously, with the case. As we have discussed today, and as the Supreme Court, the FISA Court, and Congress have repeatedly emphasized, secrecy is often critical to the success of national security investigations. And it is unfortunate when those investigations are jeopardized by a leak, as was the case, and has resulted in those articles. I am afraid that, because the authorities used to investigate that case or that may have been used to investigate that case are authorities before the FISA Court, I am not at liberty to discuss them in an open hearing here today. Mr. King. Would you care to reclarify that statement, ``was or may have been used''? Mr. Hinnen. May have been used, yes. Mr. King. I thought you might want to reiterate---- Mr. Hinnen. Thank you, Congressman. Mr. King [continuing]. That, Mr. Hinnen. And nothing prevents me from speculating or speaking in terms of hypotheticals. And I will just ask you to go to wherever your limit is, and we will accept that. As I read the news on this particular case, and I can only contemplate as to what might have happened if the case hadn't been broken, and that then we can imagine that there may have been an attack that took place already or one that was unfolding that we would have no knowledge of that could have detonated one or more devices at Grand Central Terminal or around the various locations in New York City. I am very grateful that there have been a significant number of plots that have been, that have been broken open on the part of our security personnel all the way across the spectrum of our law enforcement from top to bottom, and sometimes we got lucky when we got a regular American citizen that weighed in on it, that little tip was handled well, we have been safe for a long time. But if one were to try to imagine a case that would have similarities to this one, or maybe one that you can testify on, can you paint a scenario by which we would have not have been able to gather the data necessary to break a terrorist plot without the PATRIOT Act? Mr. Hinnen. If I understand the question correctly, yes, I think there are circumstances that are not difficult to imagine, some of which I referred to in my opening testimony in which the absence of any of the three investigative authorities that are up for renewal this year would hamper the government's ability to effectively investigate an imminent plot. Mr. King. Let me pose the question this way, as I listened to Chairman Conyers talk about it and ask you to go on record as to parts of the report that you agree and the ones you disagree with, is it possible for you to present to this Committee as a matter of a formal request, a list of the plots that have been broken since the PATRIOT Act was passed and the successes of the PATRIOT Act, and then, point to the sections in the code that were utilized among those that are not currently under investigation so that you could divulge that information in a public fashion? As this Committee weighs the idea of reauthorizing the PATRIOT Act, I would think that we should be able to weigh the successes of the PATRIOT Act, as well as be able to point to the calamities that might have taken place had we not had the PATRIOT Act? Would that be possible, Mr. Hinnen? Mr. Hinnen. I certainly think that something along those lines would be possible and I'll take that request back to the Department.* --------------------------------------------------------------------------- *The expiring USA PATRIOT Act provisions are all Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) tools designed to collect foreign intelligence information and as such are not commonly used to build criminal cases. If information obtained through FISA is used in a criminal proceeding, it is acknowledged and handled under the rules of discovery and statutory requirements. However, because the protection of sources and methods is paramount, any specific surveillance techniques (such as roving wire taps) used to obtain such information would not ordinarily be revealed. See generally 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1806. Thus, even if there were cases where these techniques were used, such techniques would not have been publicly disclosed and the Department cannot provide unclassified examples. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mr. King. I expect that given their interest in this reauthorization, that they'll be eager to provide that information. And without belaboring the point, but watching the clock, I would just, I would point out that as I sit here and listen to the cross examination and the discussion that's taken place, I can't help but think what if this hearing were taking place in the middle of smoke and dust coming out of the ground at Grand Central Terminal? Wouldn't there be an entirely different tone to this discussion today? If the PATRIOT Act has saved at this point hypothetically but uncountable American lives. We have been able to avoid a domestic attack of any significant success in the United States since September 11, 2001, and so I'd just ask when you contemplate if they had been successful, how the tone of this discussion might have changed. Mr. Hinnen. Well, I would hope, Congressman, that the tone of the discussion would be careful and deliberative and designed to ensure that the intelligence investigative authorities that resulted were effective and gave intelligence officers the tools that they need to do their jobs, while, at the same time, protecting American's privacy and civil liberties. So I hope that, although we would all have reason to grieve or mourn if that were the case, that the tone of the debate and the substance of the debate would be very similar to the one that we are having right now, and that I expect the other witnesses will have when they have an opportunity to testify as well. Mr. King. And then in conclusion, and I thank the witness. I'd just point out that because we don't have a calamity to discuss this, we need to make sure that we evaluate it within the light of what might have happened. I urge that consideration to the panel. And I would thank the witness and yield back the balance of my time. Mr. Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired. I thank the gentleman, and I thank the witness. We look forward to your providing us with the information that you have said you would. I thank you. We will now proceed with our second panel. And I would ask the witnesses to take their places. In the interest of time, I will introduce them while they are taking their seats. Suzanne Spaulding is currently a principal in Bingham Consulting Group and of counsel to Bingham McCutchen, where she advises clients on issues related to national security. Ms. Spaulding was Democratic Staff Director for the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. She had started working on terrorism and other national security issues 20 years earlier in 1983 as Senior Counsel, and later Legislative Director for Senator Arlen Specter. After 6 years at the Central Intelligence Agency where she was Assistant General Counsel and the Legal Adviser to the Director of Central Intelligence's Nonproliferation Center, she returned to the Hill as general counsel for the Select Committee on Intelligence. She served as the executive director of two Congressionally-mandated commissions: The National Commission on Terrorism, chaired by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III, and the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, chaired by former Secretary of Defense and CIA Director John Deutch. She advised both the Advisory Panel to assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Gilmore Commission, and President George W. Bush's Commission on the Intelligence of the United States regarding weapons of mass destruction, the Robb/Silberman commission. She is currently a member of the CSIS Commission on cybersecurity for the 44th presidency. In 2002, she was appointed by then-Virginia Governor Mark Warner to the Secure Commonwealth Panel established after the attacks of September 11 to advise the governor and the legislature regarding preparedness and response issues in the Commonwealth of Virginia. She received her undergraduate and law degrees from the University of Virginia. Tom Evans represented Delaware in the House of Representatives from 1977 to 1983. He served as co-Chairman and operating head of the Republican National Committee, Deputy Chairman of the Republican National Finance Committee and the Republican National Committeemen from Delaware. He was also Chairman of the Congressional Steering Committee of the Reagan for President Committee, served on the executive committee of the Reagan Bush campaign and was vice chairman of the congressional campaign committee with responsibility for White House liaison. Tom Evans also served as a member of an informal group known as the Reagan kitchen cabinet that directly and regularly advised the President on a broad range of issues. In Congress he was a Member of the House Banking Committee and the Merchant Marines and Fisheries Committee. He has a BA and an LLD from the University of Virginia. Ken Wainstein, and I hope I pronounced that correctly, is a partner in O'Melveny's Washington, D.C. Office and a member of the White Collar Defense and Corporate Investigations Practice. He focuses his practice on handling civil and criminal trials and corporate internal investigations. Mr. Wainstein spent 19 years in the Department of Justice, from 1989 to 2001. He served as Assistant U.S. attorney in both the Southern district of New York and the District of Columbia. In 2001, Mr. Wainstein was appointed director of the executive office for U.S. attorneys. The next year, Mr. Wainstein joined the Federal Bureau of Investigation to serve as general counsel and later as Chief of Staff to Director Robert S. Mueller. Two years later he was appointed and later confirmed as U.S. Attorney for the District of Colombia. In 2006, he became the first Assistant Attorney General forNationaal security at the Justice Department. In 2008, Mr. Wainstein was named President Bush's homeland security adviser, with a portfolio covering the coordination of the Nation's counterterrorism, homeland security, infrastructure protection and disaster response and recovery efforts. He has a BA from the University of Virginia and a JD from the University of California at Berkeley. Mike German is a policy counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union's Washington legislative office. Prior to joining the ACLU, Mr. German served 16 years as a special agent with the FBI, where he specialized in domestic terrorism and covert operations. Mr. German served as an adjunct professor for law enforcement and terrorism at the National Defense University and is senior fellow of globalsecurity.org. He has a BA in Philosophy from Wake Forest University and a JD from Northwestern University law school. I am pleased to welcome all of you. Your written statements will be made part of the record in their entirety. I would ask each of you to summarize your testimony in 5 minutes or less. To help you stay within that time, there is a timing light at your table. When 1 minute remains the light will switch from green to yellow and then red when the 5 minutes are up. Before we begin, it is customary for the Committee to swear in its witnesses. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Nadler. Let the record reflect that the witnesses answered in the affirmative. You may be seated. Our first witness is Susan Spaulding who is recognized for 5 minutes. TESTIMONY OF SUZANNE E. SPAULDING, FORMER STAFF DIRECTOR, HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE Ms. Spaulding. Thank you, Subcommittee Chairman Nadler, full Committee Chairman Conyers, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing on the USA PATRIOT Act and related provisions. Earlier this month, we marked another anniversary of the attacks of September 11. In the 8 years since that indelible manifestation of the terrorist threat, we've come to better understand that respect for the Constitution and the rule of law is a source of strength and can be a powerful antidote to the twisted lure of the terrorist's narrative. In fact, after spending 20 years working terrorism and national security issues for the government, I am convinced that this approach is essential to defeating the terrorist threat. Given this national security imperative, Congress should use this opportunity to more broadly examine ways to improve our overall domestic intelligence framework, including a comprehensive review of the FISA, National Security Letters, attorney general guidelines and applicable criminal investigative authorities, and I would encourage the Administration to do the same. This morning, however, I will focus on the sunsetting provisions that are the focus of this hearing. Sections 215 and 206 both have corollaries in the criminal code. Unfortunately, important safeguards were lost in the translation as these moved into the intelligence context. Section 206, for example, was intended to make available in intelligence surveillance the roving wire tap authority that criminal investigators had. This was an essential update. However, there are specific safeguards in the criminal title three provisions that were not carried over to FISA, requirements that provided significant safeguards designed to protect fourth amendment rights of innocent people. Their absence in section 206 increases the likelihood of mistakes and the possibility of misuse. In addition, in the criminal context where the focus is on successful prosecution, the exclusionary rule serves as an essential deterrent against abuse, one that is largely absent in intelligence investigations where prosecution may not be the primary goal. This highlights the care that must be taken when importing criminal authorities into the intelligence context and why it may be necessary to include more vigorous standards or safeguards, and I have suggested some in my written testimony. Similarly, section 215, governing orders for tangible things, attempted to mimic the use of grand jury or administrative subpoenas in the criminal context. However, criminal subpoenas require some criminal nexus. FISA's section 215 does not. Moreover, the PATRIOT Act amendments broadened this authority well beyond business records to allow these orders to be used to obtain any tangible things from any person. This could include an order compelling you to hand over your personal notes, your daughter's diary or your computer, things to which the fourth amendment clearly applies. Again, in my written testimony I have tried to suggest ways to tighten the safe guards for section 215 without impairing the national security value of this provision. In the interest of time, however, I will move to the lone wolf provision. Four years ago, I urged Congress to let this provision sunset and I reiterate that plea today. The Administration admits that the lone wolf authority has never been used, but pleads for its continuation just in case. The problem is that this unnecessary provision comes at a significant cost, the cost of undermining the policy and constitutional justification for the entire FISA statute, a statute that is an extremely important tool for intelligence investigations. The legislative history in court cases before and after the enactment of FISA, including two cases from the FISA court itself make clear that this extraordinary departure from the normal fourth amendment warrant standards is justified only by the unique complications inherent in investigating foreign powers and their agents. Unfortunately, instead of repealing or fixing the lone wolf provision, Congress expanded it by adding a person engaged in the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There's no requirement that this person even knows that they are contributing to proliferation. A non U.S. person working for an American company whose involved in completely legal sales of dual use goods that unbeknownst to her are being sold to a front company for use in the development of chemical weapons, for example, could be considered to be engaged in the proliferation of WMD and thereby have all of her communications intercepted and home secretly searched by the U.S. Government. As the former legal adviser for Intelligence Community's nonproliferation center and executive director of a congressionally mandated WMD Commission, I fully understand the imperative to stop the spread of these dangerous technologies. However, there are many tools available to investigate these activities without permitting the most intrusive techniques to be used against people who are unwittingly involved and whose activity is perfectly legal. Let me close by commending the Committee for its commitment to ensuring that the government has all appropriate and necessary tools at its disposal in this vitally important effort to counter today's threats, and that these authorities are crafted and implemented in a way that meets our strategic goals as well as our tactical needs. With a new Administration that provokes less fear of the misuse of authority, it may be tempting to be less insistent upon statutory safeguards. On the contrary, this is precisely the time to seize the opportunity to work with the Administration to institutionalize appropriate safeguards in ways that will mitigate the prospect of abuse by future Administrations or by this Administration in the aftermath of an event. Thank you very much. Mr. Nadler. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Ms. Spaulding follows:] Prepared Statement of Suzanne E. Spaulding
__________ Mr. Nadler. Congressman Evans, you are recognized for 5 minutes. TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE THOMAS B. EVANS, JR., A FORMER REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS Mr. Evans. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me today. It's a pleasure to be here. It's always good to be back, and it's good to see my friend, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers. And ladies and gentlemen of the Committee, it's a privilege to---- Mr. Nadler. Could you pull the mike a little closer, please. Mr. Evans. I still have 5 minutes? Mr. Nadler. Yes, we're resetting the clock as we speak. Mr. Evans. Well, anyway, it a privilege to be here. I'm delighted to be invited. I'm delighted to see my friend, the Chairman of the Committee, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers. And I'm honored to represent the Liberty and Security Committee of the Constitution Project today. You have my previously prepared statement, and attached to it is the Liberty and Security Committee's statement on reforming the PATRIOT Act. One word about the makeup of our Committee. It is truly bipartisan, bipartisan in nature. We address issues, not as Republicans or Democrats, but we need more of that, I think, in this country and here in Washington. Our membership is broad based, and it includes a number of former U.S. attorneys, some distinguished judges, former judges, professors of law, a few deans of law schools, even a publisher, Mr. Conyers, who is a publisher of the Detroit Free Press, Mr. Lawrence. And I might add, foundation chairman and senior members of the Administration. And I also want you to know that there are a number of conservative Republicans. I am a moderate Republican, but there are a number of conservative Republicans on this Committee, including, several who were Members of this body, constitutional scholars both. In the wake of the terrible tragedy it's been pointed out of the September 11, 2001, our Nation clearly needed to mobilize in order to respond with a new and powerful counter- terrorism strategy. However, our bipartisan committee believes that there was an over reaction, an over reaction in the super heated fear surrounding Washington and our country at that time, and we should strive never to let our fears lead us to over reaction. And whenever we grant powers to the executive branch of government, we must incorporate proper safeguards to protect individual rights and ensure proper oversight. That's why I am especially heartened to see this Committee exercising its oversight responsibility which is such a critically important element in our system of checks and balances. The members of the Liberty and Security Committee of the Constitution project have all joined together in the statement on reforming the PATRIOT Act which is attached to my statement for the record. Broadly speaking, we are urging the Congress to initiate some important changes if you proceed with the reauthorization of three provisions that are sunsetted in the PATRIOT Act. Briefly, we believe the business records or library records provision provides largely unchecked powers. We believe they should be tightened, and the inclusion of a gag order should be limited to 30 days. The lone wolf provision permits the government to use the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act for the surveillance of a non U.S. person with no ties to any group or entity. And that's important to remember. Suspects would still be subject to surveillance and search under traditional and well established standards of criminal conduct. The roving wiretap provision concerns us because innocent civilians may become inadvertent targets of surveillance. Two provisions, not scheduled to be sunsetted, are the ideological exclusion provision and the national security letter provision, section 505 of the PATRIOT Act. Let me focus for a minute on the NSLs. That provision does not even require a court order, and creates even greater potential for serious abuse. Section 505 enabled agents to seek information without any demonstrated factual basis, and it vastly expanded the types of financial institutions that can receive demands through an NSL letter, to include such businesses as travel agencies, real estate firms, insurance companies, automobile dealers. Unfortunately, and sadly, these overly broad powers did not just create the potential for abuse. You pointed those out, Mr. Chairman. Audits by the Inspector General released in 2007 and 2008 have revealed numerous actual abuses in the issuance of NSLs. Let me be clear. The Liberty and Security Committee believes that the FBI should have the tools necessary to protect our citizens. And let me say from a personal standpoint, I strongly believe that. My son could have died. My oldest son could have died in the attack on 9/11. But we strongly believe we need to protect the liberties of Americans. The integrity of our Constitution is critically important. We believe we've struck the proper balance in our recommendations. And I sincerely hope you will consider them carefully as you move forward. Thank you again for asking me to be here. Mr. Nadler. I thank the gentleman. [The prepared statement of Mr. Evans follows:] Prepared Statement of the Honorable Thomas B. Evans, Jr.
__________ Mr. Nadler. Mr. Wainstein, you are recognized for 5 minutes. TESTIMONY OF KENNETH L. WAINSTEIN, FORMER ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Mr. Wainstein. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Chairman Nadler, Chairman Conyers, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for holding this important hearing and thank you for soliciting our views about the PATRIOT Act. My name is Ken Wainstein. I am a partner at the law firm of O'Melveny & Myers. But prior to my leaving government in January of this year, I served in a variety of positions and had the honor to work alongside the fine men and women who defend our country day in and day out. I also had the honor to participate along with my co-panelists in what has been I think a very constructive national discussion over the past 8 years over the limits of government investigative powers in this country's fight against international terrorism. Today, I want to discuss the three provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that are scheduled to expire at the end of this year and explain my position that all three of these authorities are important to our national security and should be reauthorized. The PATRIOT Act was originally passed within 45 days after 9/11 in response to the tragic attacks of that day. In 2005, Congress, to its enduring credit, undertook a lengthy process of carefully scrutinizing each and every provision of that statute, a process that resulted in the reauthorization act that provided significant new safeguards for many of the original provisions. The authorities in the PATRIOT Act are now woven into the fabric of our counterterrorism operations and have now become a critical part of our defenses against what President Obama has aptly described as al-Qaeda's quote, far reaching network of violence and hatred. And this is particularly true of the three provisions that are subject to reauthorization this year. The first authority I'd like to address is the roving wiretap authority in section 206 which allows agents to maintain continuous surveillance of a target as that target moves from one communication device to another, which is standard trade craft for many surveillance conscious terrorists and spies. This is an absolutely critical investigative tool, especially given the proliferation of inexpensive cell phones, calling cards and other innovations that make it easy to dodge surveillance by rotating communication devices. While law enforcement personnel investigating regular crimes have had this authority since 1986, national security agents trying to prevent terrorist attacks only received it in 2001. While some have raised privacy concerns about this authority, a fair review of section 206 shows that Congress incorporated a number of safeguards to ensure its judicious and responsible use. This new provision did nothing to affect the touchstone government burden of demonstrating probable cause that a target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Second, the statute ensures that the FISA court will closely monitor and receive reports from the government regarding any roving surveillance. And finally, the statute specifies that the government can use this authority only if the government can show specific facts demonstrating that a target is taking action such as switching cell phones that thwart the government's ability to conduct surveillance. Given these requirements, given these safeguards and given the clear operational need to surveil terrorists and spies as they rotate their phones and communications devices, there is a very strong case for reauthorizing this authority. Section 215 authorizes the FISA court to issue orders for the production of records that law enforcement prosecutors have historically been able to acquire through grand jury subpoenas. Prior to the enactment of section 215, our national security personnel were hamstrung in their effort to obtain business records because the operative statute at the time required a higher showing of proof and limited those orders to only certainly types of businesses. Section 215 addressed these weaknesses by adopting a regular relevance standard for the issuance of the order and expanding the reach of the authority to any entity or any business. And like the roving wiretap authority, Congress built into this provision a number of safeguards that made section 215 orders significantly more protective of civil liberties than the grand jury subpoenas that are issued every day around this country by Federal and State prosecutors. Unlike grand jury subpoenas that a prosecutor can issue on his or own, a 215 order must be approved by a court. Unlike subpoenas, section 215 specifically bars issuance of an order if the investigation is focused only on someone's first amendment activities. And unlike grand jury subpoenas, section 215 requires regular reporting to Congress and imposes a higher standard for particularly sensitive records like library records. With these safeguards in place, there is absolutely no reason to return to the days when it was easier for prosecutors to secure records in a simple assault prosecution than for national security investigators to obtain records to help defend our country against terrorist attacks. Lastly, the lone wolf provision. That allows the government to conduct surveillance on a non U.S. person who engages in international terrorism without demonstrating his affiliation to a particular international terrorist organization. As Ranking Member Sensenbrenner indicated, back in 1978 when this statute was passed the contemplated terrorist target was a member of an organization like the Red Brigades. Today our terrorist adversary or our main adversary is al-Qaeda which is a network of like minded terrorists around the world whose membership shifts and fluctuates with changing alliances. Given this increasing fluidity in the organization and membership of our adversaries, there is greater likelihood today that we will encounter a foreign terrorist and not be able to identify that person's terrorist organization. And to ensure the government can surveil that person, the lone wolf provision is absolutely critical to make sure that we can keep an eye on that person and prevent that person from undertaking a terrorist attack. Although, as was reported, the lone wolf provision has not been used, given the threat posed by foreign terrorists regardless of affiliation and the obvious need to keep them under surveillance, there is an ample case for maintaining this authority for the day when the government may need to use it. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to discuss the sunsetting PATRIOT Act provisions and the reasons for my belief that they should all be reauthorized. [The prepared statement of Mr. Wainstein follows:] Prepared Statement of Kenneth L. Wainstein
__________ Mr. Nadler. I thank you. And I now recognize Mr. German for 5 minutes. TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL GERMAN, POLICY COUNSEL, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION Mr. German. Chairman Nadler, Chairman Conyers, Ranking Member Sensenbrenner, thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union as Congress revisits the USA PATRIOT Act. The PATRIOT Act vastly and unconstitutionally expanded the government's authority to pry into people's private lives with little or no evidence of wrongdoing, violating the fourth amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures and first amendment protections against free speech and association. Worse, it allows this expanded spying to take place in secret, with few protections to ensure these powers are not abused, and little opportunity for Congress determine whether these authorities are doing anything to make America safer. The three expiring provisions give Congress the opportunity, as the Department of Justice's September 14 letter suggested, to carefully examine how these expired authorities, expanded authorities impact American's privacy. We urge Congress to broaden its review to include all post- 9/11 domestic intelligence programs, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act amendments and the new Attorney General guidelines for FBI domestic operations, and rescind, repeal or modify any provisions that are unused, ineffective or prone to abuse. When several PATRIOT Act provisions came up for renewal in 2005 there was little in the public record for Congress to evaluate. Today Congress is not completely in the dark. Inspector general audits ordered in the PATRIOT Act reauthorization revealed significant abuse of National Security Letters, and courts have found several PATRIOT Act provisions unconstitutional, including NSL gag orders, certain material support provisions, ideological exclusion provisions, and the FISA significant purpose test. There is also evidence that the government abused even the broadly expanded wire tapping authorities that Congress approved under the FISA Amendments Act. Congress needs to address all of these provisions and, indeed, this work is beginning. The ACLU fully supports both the National Security Letter Reform Act of 2009, sponsored by Chairman Nadler, and the Justice Act, a comprehensive reform bill introduced by Senators Russ Feingold and Richard Durbin last week. They should be acted upon promptly. Regarding the expiring provisions, the government's arguments for extending these authorities without amendment are simply unpersuasive. Unlike its criminal law counterpart, the John Doe roving wire tape provision of the PATRIOT Act authorizes the government to obtain secret FISA court orders to intercept communications without naming the target or making sure the wiretaps intercept only the targets communications. The government offers no explanation for why the roving wiretap authorities the FBI has used successfully in criminal cases since 1986, which better protect the rights of innocent persons, are insufficient for national security cases. This provision should be narrowed to bring it in line with the criminal wiretap authorities or be allowed to expire. As for the lone wolf provision, which authorizes government agencies to obtain secret surveillance orders against individuals who are not connected to international terrorist group or foreign nation, we now know it has never been used. The government justified this provision by imagining a hypothetical international terrorist who operates independently of any foreign power or terrorist organization, but there is little evidence to suggest this imaginary figure exists. This provision is overbroad and unnecessary, and should be allowed to expire. The third expiring provision, section 215 or the library records provision is also rarely used. Only 13 section 215 applications were made in 2008. But that doesn't mean there isn't abuse. The IG reported that in 2006 the FBI twice asked the FISA Court for a section 215 order seeking tangible things as part of a counterterrorism case. The Court denied the request both times because ``the facts were too thin and the request implicated the target's first amendment rights.'' Rather than re-evaluating the underlying investigation based on the court's first amendment concerns, the FBI circumvented the court's oversight and pursued the investigation using national security letters that were predicated on the same information contained in the section 215 application. This incident reveals the danger of looking at these separate authorities piecemeal. Narrowing one authority might simply lead to abuse of another. There have been many significant changes to our national security laws over the past 8 years, and addressing the excesses of the PATRIOT Act without examining the larger surveillance picture may not be enough to rein in an abusive intelligence gathering regime. Congress should conduct a comprehensive examination of all the laws, regulations and guidelines that prevent government surveillance of Americans without suspicion of wrongdoing. The American Civil Liberties Union encourages Congress to exercise its oversight powers fully, to restore effective checks on these executive branch surveillance powers, and to prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures of private information without probable cause based on particularized suspicion. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. German follows:] Prepared Statement of Michael German
__________ Mr. Nadler. I thank the witnesses. I will recognize myself to begin the questioning for 5 minutes. Mr. German, will you restate briefly, you said that section 206, roving wiretaps, had broader authority and less safeguards than the criminal roving wiretaps. And what was the specific one you cited? Mr. German. That it doesn't compel the identification of the person or require the government to determine that the person is actually using the communication device. Mr. Nadler. And therefore it can be used pretty widely. Mr. Wainstein, why should not the section 206 contain that protection or that requirement that's in the criminal version of the roving wiretaps? Mr. Wainstein. Well, as to the authorization to issue an order based on a description as opposed to the identity of the person, that particular issue, that's just, that's a recognition of the reality of what we're dealing with when we're dealing with people, foreign spies and terrorists. These are people who we often don't know the name of. Mr. Nadler. And you don't have the same situation in the criminal context? Mr. Wainstein. Less frequently. It's less frequently a problem because sometimes we do have people who come in--let's take it outside the context of foreign terrorism, foreign espionage, which are crimes, and look at drug trafficking. Yeah. Sometimes there are people whose names we don't know. But in the foreign intelligence context, the people who come in here who are spies and operatives of foreign intelligence services go to great lengths to hide their identities. So we often will not know. But we'll know darn sure that they are a-- -- Mr. Nadler. In other words, you'll know his appearance but you won't know his name? Mr. Wainstein. Well, we'll have watched him. We'll have seen him with physical surveillance. We might have gotten a pen register and seen that he's got contacts with other people who are known operatives. And keep in mind, we can only get the FISA court order if we show sufficient specificity in our description of the person to satisfy the court. Mr. Nadler. Okay. Mr. German, why would you disagree with that? Mr. German. Well, I don't think there's been a sufficient showing. I mean, I would love for government to publish how this authority has actually been used and then we can have a debate based on the facts. Mr. Nadler. Ms. Spaulding, you alluded to the same thing in your testimony. Could you comment on this little dialogue here? Ms. Spaulding. Yeah. I am sympathetic with the challenges that the government might face in knowing the name of the target of the surveillance. I think then that it is very important that the statute explicitly require that this target be identified with sufficient specificity to eliminate or significantly reduce the risk that the wrong person is going to be targeted. And the risk is enhanced when you come to a roving wiretap where you're changing facilities and instruments that you're tapping. So to require great specificity in the description of the target, and also a showing by the government that there are reasonable grounds to believe that that particular individual is going to be proximate to and using that instruments, becomes very important. Mr. Nadler. And the great specificity would be the same as or similar to what we have in the criminal code? Ms. Spaulding. It would be similar to. But, again, I'm comfortable with having the government not knowing the name of the target if they are able to describe that individual with sufficient specificity. Mr. Nadler. Thank you. Now, Ms. Spaulding, you noted in your written statement that Congress should consider requiring the government to set forth in the initial application the grounds upon which it believes the disclosure of a section 215 order would be harmful. Why do you believe that this consideration is important? And when you answer the question, talk also about the NSL, with a similar question. Mr. Evans. Can you ask that question again? I don't have a hearing aid with me. Mr. Nadler. I'm sorry. I said I asked--Ms. Spaulding had said in her testimony that it is important that we should consider requiring the government to set forth in the initial application the grounds upon which it believes the disclosure of a section 215 order would be harmful; in other words, why do we need the gag order? I am asking Ms. Spaulding, why do you believe that this consideration is important. And when you answer the question, comment on the NSL context as well as the section 215 context, please. Ms. Spaulding. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it's important for a number of reasons. And it is particularly relevant in the section 215 and NSL letters when they are delivered to third party record holders, when it's delivered to a business asking for the records of a third party, of another individual, because they really have very little incentive to challenge the gag order, to challenge the underlying order itself or to challenge the gag order. It is not in their best interest to have it publicized that they are handing over to the government customer information. And so putting the burden on the recipient of the order to challenge that requirement not to disclose really dramatically reduces the likelihood that it's going to be challenged and, in fact, with regard to challenging underlying orders, the Department of Justice letter acknowledges that no recipient, no business recipient of a 215 request has ever challenged the order, which I think is pretty compelling evidence---- Mr. Nadler. So the whole debate that we had last time during the reauthorization of the grounds for challenge might be a little irrelevant? Ms. Spaulding. And the Second Circuit recently ruled in the context of national security letters that, in fact, putting the burden on the recipient as opposed to on the government raises some real serious constitutional issues. Mr. Nadler. Thank you. I just have one more question. Mr. German, the 2008 IG report on the FBI's use of section 215 orders noted that the FBI issued national security letters, and the Chairman alluded to this, after the FISA court denied requests for section 215 orders to get the same information. The FISA court said this implicates first amendment concerns. You can't get the order so they just went and issued NSLs to themselves. The Court based its denial on first amendment concerns. In your opinion, as a former FBI agent, do you believe the FBI is using NSLs to evade the requirements of section 215 orders, especially given the relative low number of section 215 orders that are issued in contrast to the very large number of NSLs; and if so, what should we do about this problem? Mr. German. I don't know if I can say in the context of my experience as a FBI agent because I didn't work with that---- Mr. Nadler. In the context of all your experience. Mr. German. But certainly, the facts that were related in that Inspector General report reflected that there was a great concern about the first amendment violations that were occurring in this request for documents. So the fact that the FBI continued and ignored the Court's advice, I think, does show abuse and, you know, clearly the report details considerable abuse of national security letters. Mr. Nadler. But that also would show, would it not, that if the FISA court refused to grant a 215 order because it said the facts implicated first amendment concerns that should prohibit it, the NSLs should also not have been issued because of the same first amendment concerns, but that there was no check on the power of the FBI to make sure of that. Mr. German. Exactly right, that there was no outside check allowed the abuse to happen. Mr. Nadler. My last question. Mr. Wainstein, how should we fix that? In other words, how do we ensure that FBI or the Justice Department, which doesn't have to go to court to get an NSL order, that the proper safeguards are there so that you can't implicate the first amendment the way the Court said you couldn't do it in the 215? Mr. Wainstein. Well, I think you'd have to take a sort of broader view of it first. This is not the only administrative subpoena authority out there. There are 300 some administrative subpoena authorities on the criminal side used every day every minute of every day around this country by Federal authorities, and they have different requirements but essentially the same idea, that they're issued directly by the Agency to people who possess third party records. So this is not an anomaly here. The NSLs are not an anomaly. They're actually a tried and true part of the tool kit that law enforcement and intel have used for years. Secondly, keep in mind this is one incident that was highlighted by this IG report that otherwise--there was one other, but this is the one that sort of got the most attention, that looked at, you know, a lot of activity and they found this one concern. I don't believe that this is symptomatic of a broader problem that the FBI is going out to try to subvert the first amendment. Keep in mind, these are different investigative authorities. 215 has a different standard it has to meet. The FISA court found that the information was thin and didn't want to issue the order and said that they thought it might--I can't remember the language but the investigation might be based on first amendment activities. I'm quite confident that the general counsel's office did not just lightly blow off the FISA court opinion; that they did go back and look at this and decide that under the different standards for NSLs that it was appropriate. Mr. Nadler. Thank you. My time is well expired. I will now recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin. Mr. Sensenbrenner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm very curious at the fact that most of the discussion of the questions and answers has been on national security letters. And I want to make it clear, again, that national security letter authority was not one of the expanded authorities given to law enforcement by the PATRIOT Act. The national security letter law was passed in 1986, 15 years before the PATRIOT Act, under legislation sponsored by Senator Leahy of Vermont. And much of the adverse legal decisions on this entire issue have been relative to the Leahy national security letter law, rather than the Sensenbrenner PATRIOT Act. And I do take a little bit of a pride of authorship in the fact that with the Sensenbrenner PATRIOT Act, 15 of the 17 expanded law enforcement provisions either went unchallenged as to their constitutionality in almost 8 years, or in one case, there was a constitutional challenge that was withdrawn. The two sections of the PATRIOT Act that were held unconstitutional in the Mayfield case by the District Court of Oregon, which is currently on appeal, involved whether FISA orders violated fourth amendment. And there is a string of cases from other courts that have reached the opposite conclusion that FISA orders do not violate the fourth amendment. And I think the Supreme Court is going to end up deciding that issue definitively when the case gets up there. So all of this hyperbole that the PATRIOT Act has been a blatantly unconstitutional enactment of Congress that tramples on civil rights is simply not born out by the litigation that has occurred in the almost 8 years that the PATRIOT Act has been law. And I really would admonish people, both in this room and out of this room, to look at the fact that 15 of those 17 expanded authorities of law enforcement, nobody has bothered to challenge. Now, if it isn't unconstitutional, and it's working, then really, I don't think that we should break something that doesn't need fixing. And I'm afraid that that's where we're at. So I would like to, at this time, ask unanimous consent to include in the record a lengthy letter from Robert F. Turner, Associate Director of the Center for National Security Law at the University of Virginia law school that talks about the three expiring provisions of the PATRIOT Act, which is what we ought to be talking about here, none of which have been even challenged. Mr. Nadler. Without objection. Mr. Sensenbrenner. I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. Nadler. I thank the gentleman. I now recognize the distinguished Chairman of the full Committee, the gentleman from Michigan. Mr. Conyers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend all of our witnesses here today, including Mr. Wainstein, who's been very forthcoming. And I want to commend former Chairman Sensenbrenner too. He mentioned the Sensenbrenner PATRIOT Act. Of course, I mentioned the Sensenbrenner/Conyers PATRIOT Act that got doused in the Rules Committee. That was a very mysterious activity in which nobody ever found out--there were no fingerprints on the new bill, that the Sensenbrenner PATRIOT Act, which I suppose Mr. Sensenbrenner wrote that night and got it up there, because nobody ever saw it in the Judiciary Committee. But it's one of those mysteries in the legislative process that have not been fully examined. And maybe some day we'll get a Judiciary Committee Chairman or maybe even a constitutional Subcommittee Chairman that will step up to the plate and find out how a several hundred page bill could be substituted for another in the middle of the night. The Rules Committee was meeting after midnight when this was acted upon. And I only digress to show you that there's been bipartisanship on the Judiciary Committee. There are very few important bills in which every Republican and every Democrat votes in its favor, and that's what happened to the Sensenbrenner/Conyers. But then whatever else happened to it is one of those problems that need further investigation. Now, the witnesses have raised, I think I stopped counting at about 11, there are a number of small problems that need to be cleared up about reissuing the three provisions that have an expiration date. Now, I set that aside from the reconsideration of the rest of the PATRIOT Act that doesn't have any expiration date. And I'm sure our Chairman is going to be--has got a fix or a feel for that. I will yield to him if he wants to tell me what it is. But I go along with him. Mr. Nadler. Well, we're going to be looking at all the sections of the PATRIOT Act as we look at this. We're going to use the opportunity provided by the expiration of these three sections to look at all the other sections as well as section 505 which is the national security letter, which although as Mr. Sensenbrenner said, did predate the PATRIOT Act, was considerably amended by the PATRIOT Act. Mr. Conyers. Could I ask the witnesses what further, after having heard each others' testimony here, what else would you add to any of each others' comments or what would you want this Committee to know about everything--here is our former colleague heading a bipartisan committee. Here is probably the most experienced lawyer on the intelligence law before the Committee. We have the American Civil Liberties Union, which has participated in more privacy cases, civil liberties cases, civil rights cases than anybody else. And also a distinguished member of the Bar who has some very profound experience himself. What do each of you think about--I don't want to put it this way--each others' testimony? Mr. Evans. I think it's a great thing to have this oversight responsibility that you've accepted on this Committee. And I would like to make one point, and that is the challenges, the limited number of challenges to the various provisions. It would take, if you're an innocent person, it would take a very courageous man or woman to make that challenge because of the image that's created. And so I think that's the reason there have not been more challenges. Mr. Conyers. Also, the bill they'd get from their lawyers too would be another preventive, would dissuade a lot of people. You know, taking on the United States government is not something that you can walk into any law office and say, well, I think they're totally wrong here. I'm innocent. Or at least-- and I want to handle that, and I can tell you what the average law firm would say. And I want to have Mr. Wainstein comment on that. They would say, do you have about $150,000 to continue this conversation? What about it Wainstein? You're a partner, full fledged. Mr. Wainstein. We're just looking for a righteous case, sir. That's all. Give us a righteous case. That's all we want. Mr. Conyers. Well, I know your law firm is good on pro bono work. But when you get one of these walking into the office and you decide to take it, without consideration of the legal cost that may be incurred, it's a pretty heavy duty. Mr. German? Mr. German. You know, as I mentioned in my testimony, one of the problems with these authorities is that they are exercised in secret. And I think having more facts in the debate would be very helpful to everybody, especially members of the public in trying to understand the arguments on both sides. And I commend the Department of Justice for their letter where they actually revealed the number of times these authorities were use. But I think how they are used and when they are used is also very important. And you know, obviously there is a need to protect some national security interests. But I think the excessive secrecy is really harming the public debate on this issue. Mr. Nadler. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Iowa is recognized. Mr. King. Mr. Chairman, I thank the witnesses. This has been interesting testimony, interesting dialogue. And I was unaware of the Sensenbrenner/Conyers bill until I heard the testimony here. And I would trust that that came out of a very serious effort to try to provide safety and security for the American people in the immediate aftermath of September 11. And I listened to the Chairman's lament that that bill didn't arrive to the floor in the same condition that it left his oversight. I understand the sentiment, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Conyers. Would the gentleman, distinguished gentleman from Iowa yield? Mr. King. Of course I'd yield to the Chairman. Mr. Conyers. This was before your time, sir. You weren't even here. Mr. King. And that would be why I don't remember it. Mr. Conyers. Well, apparently. Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now I don't feel so badly for not being completely tuned in to the history. It, however, did trigger my memory of how the bankruptcy cram down bill came out of the Committee with the King amendment and didn't arrive at the floor with the King amendment on it. So I thought it would be useful to bring the subject up so we could both be refreshed on the history of this Judiciary Committee, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Nadler. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. King. I'd yield. Mr. Nadler. I'd point out that whatever the merits of that situation, that was one amendment. We held in this Committee, I think, 5 days of markup on the PATRIOT Act and achieved unanimity, with many amendments from both sides of the aisle being approved, not on party line votes. We achieved a unanimous vote. And then the bill just disappeared, completely disappeared, and we had a new, several 100-page bill. The PATRIOT Act we have today was a new, several 100-page bill that appeared fresh from the head of Zeus or the Rules Committee, and voted on literally the next day, hot from the printer that nobody had a chance to read. That was unfortunate. Mr. King. Reclaiming my time, and perhaps even resetting the clock, I would wonder if maybe the Chairman of the Subcommittee and the full Committee might wish to join me in my endeavor to move the Rules Committee to the floor of the full House, because the business of this Congress takes place up there in the hole in the wall rather than in front of the light of the public eye. Anybody care to respond to that while we are having this dialogue? Mr. Nadler. I will simply respond by saying I am not sure what you mean by move the Rules Committee to the floor of the House, and it is not before this Committee anyway, but we should certainly discuss it, whatever it is. Mr. King. I appreciate that response. And maybe we could just move the light of day up to the hole in the wall. And now I will turn my attention to the panel who is here to testify and enlighten all of us, and by the way, everybody that is watching these proceedings. And I am curious, as we look back on the history, and I would direct my first question to Mr. German, I am curious about the position of the ACLU during that period of history in the immediate aftermath of September 11, as the bill that was crafted in this Committee and the long markup that was had and the one that came to the floor, did you have a position on the overall base bill, on the amendments, and a position on the bill as it came to the floor for a vote in support or opposition, Mr. German? Mr. German. And I also wasn't at the ACLU then, I was in the FBI then. So my recollection maybe isn't perfect. But I understand that they did offer statements that are in the record urging that there be caution and moderation in responding, and trying to discover the facts before legislating. Mr. King. But perhaps not in opposition to the PATRIOT Act as it came to the floor for final passage? Mr. Nadler. Would the gentleman yield? Mr. King. I would yield. Mr. Nadler. I don't remember what the ACLU said about the bill that came out of this Committee, but they were most certainly in opposition to the bill on the floor. Mr. King. On the floor. Mr. Nadler. Yes. Mr. King. Thank you. I appreciate that clarification. Those little tumblers of analyzing history are helpful to me. And the discussion that we have on the reauthorization of these three particular sections of the PATRIOT Act that I would ask Mr. German, have you or your organization been involved in drafting alternative legislation that you have put together that is useful for this Committee to be aware of? Mr. German. Have we been involved in--we have been offering suggestions, yes. Mr. King. Conceptually or specific language? Mr. German. I am sure over time specific language often. Mr. King. Well, thanks for that clarification, too. That is not a zone that I work in very much. I didn't have a feel for that. Do you have examples of individuals whose constitutional rights have been, you believe, violated under any of the three sections that we are considering reauthorizing? Mr. German. No, because we don't know who they have been used against. Mr. King. And even though some of them are bound to confidentiality, doesn't it happen, from time to time, that people will breach that confidentiality if they believe that their constitutional rights have been breached? Mr. German. I am not sure they would know that these--the FISA authorities usually don't alert the target of their surveillance. Mr. King. Let me submit that we have had as a subject of the various Subcommittees of this Judiciary Committee subjects who were before us anonymously because of certain allegations that were made about their history. And I am going to keep them anonymous, so I won't define them any further. And it would strike me that if there were some significant constitutional violations that it would take individuals to bring those kind of cases, we could go beyond the hypothetical and then just simply deal with a defined personality, whether it be an individual or not. Why don't I hear about that? Why don't I hear about even a hypothetical individual beyond the generalities that we have discussed here? Why isn't it more specific if there are constitutional rights that are at play here? Mr. German. Well, any use of an unconstitutional authority is an abuse. It is unconstitutional. Mr. King. But a person has to have standing. Mr. German. Because the person doesn't know. And nobody in the public knows. Only the government knows who these authorities are being used against. Mr. King. Then how, if no one knows, aren't we back to if a tree falls in the forest? Mr. German. Well, when it revolves around the constitutional rights of Americans. I think we have to make sure that we are protecting those rights. And that is the obligation, is to protect the Constitution and the rights of Americans. Mr. King. One of those obligations---- Mr. Nadler. Would the gentleman yield for a second? Mr. King. I would yield. Mr. Nadler. Just to clarify, I think what is being said is that if you are being wiretapped unconstitutionally, without any proper evidence, et cetera, you won't know about that, and therefore you can't bring the case. And it may be that nobody knows about it, but still your rights are being violated. Mr. King. And I understand that explanation. I just don't quite accept how, if constitutional rights have been violated and no one knows it, if there has actually been an effect of a violation if it can't be identified. And I will take you off this hypothetical path, and I would turn then to Mr. Wainstein. Are you aware of any individuals whose rights have been violated? And are you aware of cases that have been resolved and American people that have been protected because of the utilization of the PATRIOT Act? And I will just leave that there and open the question to your response. Mr. Wainstein. Well, sure, the PATRIOT Act has been tremendously helpful, and Director Mueller has testified on countless occasions how it has really---- Mr. King. And within these three sections, if you could. Mr. Wainstein. Within these three sections I know that it has been used, I watched it--two of the three sections, one has not been used but two of the provisions, I watched them get used, watched how the information was then integrated into the investigation, how important it was. And without getting into specifics, I mean, you can see just the roving wiretap, you can see how critical that is. Because nowadays, you know, you can get cell phones for pennies almost, throw them away, and start a new one an hour later. And if the government has to go back to the FISA court with a 70-page document every time someone throws away a cell phone, they are going to be stymied in their ability to surveil somebody. So that just on its face it is clear how critical that is both in criminal investigations as well as---- Mr. King. But isn't there a constitutional distinction between a roving wiretap and the previous FISA law that was designed for land lines? A constitutional distinction? Mr. Wainstein. Well, there is constitutional debate over whether that is constitutional, but the courts that have looked at the roving wiretap authority in the criminal context have found it constitutional. Mr. King. That is my point next. I thank the gentleman and the witnesses and appreciate the dialogue, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Mr. Nadler. Thank you. The gentleman from Georgia is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If the appropriate Committee were to look at the proceedings of the Rules Committee and decide to require that those Committee meetings be held on the floor of the House, as has been suggested, I believe the number one, smoking gun piece of evidence would be the Sensenbrenner PATRIOT Act bill, the 700-page one. That is an intriguing issue as to how that occurred. That is one of the big mysteries of our time. Kind of like the beginning of the earth and how big is the solar system, or are there any other solar systems, you know, those kinds of things. But let me ask this question. With respect to section 215, wherein the FISA order can also require or contain a gag order, how long does the gag order last? Is there any limits on how long it lasts or the scope of the gag order? Mr. Wainstein. Sir, I am not sure if that question is to me, but---- Mr. Johnson. Sure. Mr. Wainstein.--I will take a crack at it. There is a nondisclosure order that comes along with a 215 order, similar to the NSL context. And it does say that the person who receives that order is not to disclose it to anybody else. But then there are exceptions. You are allowed to disclose the fact of the order to your attorney if you are seeking counsel from a lawyer. You are allowed to disclose to somebody, you know, if you are a bank and you need to go to a clerk to try get assistance to get records the government wants, you can disclose the fact of the order to that person. But then you are allowed to challenge it. There is also a process that was put in place and was carefully crafted in the context of the FISA reauthorization--I am sorry, PATRIOT Act reauthorization back in 2005, 2006, Congress put in place an elaborate mechanism for challenging not only the validity of the order itself as to whether the 215 order is oppressive or otherwise unlawful---- Mr. Johnson. Let me stop you here. And I appreciate those answers. Does the Act itself put any limitations on the length of time that the gag order would be in effect? Assuming there would be no challenge by the third party to it? Mr. Wainstein. A recipient can challenge it after a year. So after it is in place for a year a person who has received the order---- Mr. Johnson. If he or she or it does not challenge it, then it just goes on for year after year after year? Mr. Wainstein. You know, I believe that is the case. I am not aware of it expiring at any time. Mr. Johnson. And what happens if a FISA order is not responded to by the third party, a third party from whom tangible evidence, if you will, tangible things has been requested from? Suppose they just turn their nose up--suppose it was, let's say, the ACLU and, you know, the ACLU receives a FISA order. So first of all, they would be on the hook if they did not challenge it for an indefinite time. And secondly, what would happen if they decided to not respond or refused to turn over some information based on, say, a privilege? What would happen there? Mr. Evans. That is why our Liberty and Security Committee, that is a bipartisan group--by the way all of us act on a pro bono basis, and I do everything on a pro bono basis, but we believe that there should be some reasonable limitation, like 30 days, so that you could then go out publicly and talk about it. But I go back to what the Chairman had initially said and what I had added, you know, you got to have awful deep pockets these days to bring challenges. Mr. Johnson. Suppose there is a non-deep pocketed third party from whom tangible documentation has been ordered under a FISA order, and that third party decides to violate the gag order? What happens in that kind of scenario? Mr. Evans. I would refer to the former Assistant Attorney General. Mr. Wainstein. These orders can be enforced. They are orders of the Court. So if you defy the order---- Mr. Johnson. Would they be enforced in the secret FISA court? Mr. Wainstein. For the 215 orders, yes. In the NSL context or grand jury subpoena context, it would be a regular district court. That is my understanding. Mr. Johnson. So it is possible a person can be locked up secretly for violating the FISA order. It can be an indefinite detention, if you will. Mr. Wainstein. You know, I am not sure about that, sir. The FISA statute, as amended by the PATRIOT Act reauthorization, lays out a process by which you can challenge, you as a recipient can challenge that FISA court order. You go to court and you challenge it and say I don't think I should have to turn these being documents over, and here are the reasons. And if it is, as you said, a privilege, and it is a legitimate privilege, then the court would I think say okay, fine, you have got a privilege and craft a resolution. But if you do not have a basis for challenging the subpoena or the 215 order other than the fact that you just don't want to turn the documents over, it is a legitimate court order and the court has the authority to enforce it, just as with---- Mr. Johnson. Can you appeal that FISA order ruling by the FISA court? Mr. Wainstein. Yes. You can appeal FISA court rulings to the FISA Court of Review. Mr. Johnson. Who would it be appealed to? Mr. Wainstein. It is a court, an appellate court that issues opinions. It is I think three judges sit, I believe, on each hearing. And I think it has only issued two opinions, right? But it would be appealed to them. So you do have the full process. Mr. Johnson. Thank you, sir. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Nadler. Thank you. And finally, the gentleman from Texas. Mr. Gohmert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the panelists and your input. It is a tough issue. And it was back apparently when it first passed as a bill. And then 5 years ago when we took it up, I was one of the, I guess, couple of people on the day that we passed out of Committee on the Republican side that was adamant about the need for sunsets so we would have people come in and talk to us about how these powers had been used. The one provision regarding cell phones, and you make great points, how do you use conventional methods when we have throwaway cell phones? Those were never anticipated in the original methods of pursuing the bad guys. And in looking at the September 21 story about, the headline here is Terror Probe Prompts Mass Transit Warning, but I see the word cell phones mentioned a number of times in the story. Do we know if any of the powers granted under the PATRIOT Act were utilized in bringing to light this alleged terror plot? Anybody know? Mr. Wainstein. I don't believe there has been a reference in the press to any specific tools. Mr. Gohmert. That were used. Mr. Wainstein. Not that I have seen. Mr. Gohmert. Okay. Ms. Spaulding. And in fact, the earlier witness, Mr. Hinnen from the Justice Department, was careful with his words not to suggest whether they were or were not. Mr. Gohmert. Okay. I will wait to read how we did that in The New York Times. I am wondering, in the last year there was information that came out about a wiretap conversation with one of our Members, Jane Harman. Was that wiretapped under this provision of the PATRIOT Act? Does anybody know? I am just curious. Apparently I take it by your silence nobody knows. I see the need there, and it being critical to proper law enforcement. And it was apparently such an important tool to us not being attacked again during the Bush administration. But coming forward to the NSLs, you know, in the PATRIOT Act, the power was expanded to allow field offices to make NSL requests as opposed to the FBI headquarters. I think at the time the PATRIOT Act passed, most of us here on this Committee were not aware of just how profound the effect of Director Mueller's 5- year up or out policy would be and had been that we have lost thousands of years of experience because of that. Policy basically being if you are in charge, in a supervisory position for 5 years in the field, then you have to either move to headquarters here in Washington or take a demotion or get out. So 5-year up or out. So I am wondering, in view of Director Mueller's policy, having lost thousands and thousands of years of experience, and recalling Director Mueller saying after the vast abuses of the NSLs came to light saying that he took responsibility for not having the experience and training in the field to properly monitor those NSLs, if maybe we should pull back the NSL authority to the FBI headquarters, where the Director has pulled so much of the remaining experience. I just know that when this passed, that was not really an issue on the radar screen. But it does seem to make sense that that could be a reason there were so many abuses reported by the inspector general. You just didn't have the experience. You know, some office is going from 25 years experience in charge to six, good people all, but experience does make a difference. So I would be interested in comments from our panelists on that issue, as to whether that might be something we need to look at as far as pulling the power back to FBI headquarters. I would really like to hear from everybody, if you have got a comment. Ms. Spaulding. Congressman, I think that is a very interesting suggestion. And clearly, since the inspector general came out with its report, the FBI has tightened its procedures and has taken steps to try to ensure that they reduce the number of mistaken uses and abuses of national security letters. But I think---- Mr. Gohmert. I think I recall the Director saying we wouldn't find any evidence in the rest of the offices of that kind of abuse. Ms. Spaulding. Another possibility that you might consider is enhancing the role of the National Security Division at the Department of Justice in terms of oversight and managing the national security letter process. Mr. Evans. I think it is a very important issue that should quite appropriately be addressed. Mr. Wainstein. If I can, Congressman Gohmert, I don't know the quote you referenced just now about how Director Mueller said you would not find those abuses in any field offices. Mr. Gohmert. After it came to light, he said they had done a full audit of all the other offices that the IG had not had a chance to inspect, and we wouldn't find abuses like that again. Mr. Wainstein. They did do a full audit. And actually, I was in the National Security Division at the time, and it was a huge deployment of people. They went out and audited all the field offices. And they found the incidence of mistakes which was basically consistent with the incidence level that Glenn Fine had found, the IG report had found. Mr. Gohmert. Right. Mr. Wainstein. But I think what he might have been referring to, I am guessing here, but the exigent letters, which were sort of the more abusive aspect of it. He might have been saying that was probably not something that migrated out to the field offices, because that was, I believe, primarily in headquarters. That might have been what he was talking about. The mistakes, though, were found in the field offices as well. My concern about your suggestion that maybe we pull the NSL authorizing authority back to FBI headquarters is that it would reduce--really it would add cumbersome bureaucratic requirements to getting an NSL out. And in the course of a fast moving threat investigation, you need to be able to get records quickly. And just the extra time and complication of having to go to FBI headquarters to get their approval would slow things down and could, you know, in the wrong situation be the difference between catching a terrorist and not catching a terrorist. I believe that the sort of better way of doing it is, as Suzanne said, make sure that you have the necessary systems in place and the oversight. I think you heard from Mr. Hinnen earlier, and as Ms. Spaulding said, you know, since the Glenn Fine report, a lot of procedures have been put in place both in the FBI as well as in the National Security Division to make sure those kind of problems don't arise again. And it is sort of interesting, as a side line, you look at let's say the SEC right now in the aftermath of what happened last fall and the questions about how they should change their operations. What is one of the first things that has come to the fore is suggestions to delegate the authority to take certain investigative steps lower down, to make the investigators more nimble, to be able to build cases more quickly. Same kind of thing that we saw in the FBI. And that is the natural reaction when you have an overly complicated system in place. Mr. Gohmert. All right. An example of the SEC, is that how Goldman Sachs was able to have their biggest profit in the second quarter, and someone supposedly overseeing that is also on their board, but our Treasury Secretary gave him a waiver, I believe, of that conflict? Mr. Nadler. The gentleman, I think that is a little afield. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Gohmert. Could I have the last panelist comment on that? Mr. Nadler. Mr. German, you can respond briefly. Mr. German. Thank you. I agree that stronger internal oversight mechanisms are very important. But I would also argue that outside oversight is critical. And the strongest internal oversight mechanisms aren't going to be as effective as outside oversight. Mr. Gohmert. By outside what do you mean? Mr. German. By this body, where it is applicable by the courts, whether that is the FISA court or the criminal courts. But also, I think the problem with the national security letters is that the scope was so broad, that that allowed the records of innocent people to be collected, and that was perfectly legal. And that is really where I believe the abuse-- -- Mr. Gohmert. With the Chairman's indulgence, do you have a recommendation for how that broad scope could be tightened up? Mr. German. Sure. To bring it back into the pre-PATRIOT Act authority where you are using it against a suspected agent of a foreign power or a member of a terrorist group rather than just against, as the IG found, people two and three times removed from the subject of the investigation. Mr. Nadler. And that would be by restoring the language of particularity? Mr. German. Right. Mr. Gohmert. Okay. Thank you. Mr. Nadler. I thank you. I thank all the witnesses. Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days to submit to the Chair additional written questions for the witnesses, which we will forward and ask the witnesses to respond as promptly as they can so that their answers may be made part of the record. Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days to submit any additional materials for inclusion in the record. Again, I thank the witnesses. And with that, this hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 1:35 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] A P P E N D I X ---------- Material Submitted for the Hearing Record