Congressional Record: July 25, 2005 (Senate)
Page S8772-S8803                      

 
        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the 
Senate will resume consideration of S. 1042, which the clerk will 
report. 

[...]                   


                    Amendment No. 1557, as Modified

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed 
to modify my amendment No. 1557, which is at the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask the pending amendment be set aside, 
and I call up amendment No. 1557, which is at the desk. I ask the clerk 
continue the reading of the amendment because it is short and 
important.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain], for himself, Mr. 
     Warner, Mr. Graham, and Ms. Collins, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 1557, as modified:

       At the end of subtitle G of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1073. UNIFORM STANDARDS FOR THE INTERROGATION OF PERSONS 
                   UNDER THE DETENTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
                   DEFENSE.

       (a) Limitation on Interrogation Techniques.--
       (1) In general.--No person in the custody or under the 
     effective control of the Department of Defense or under 
     detention in a Department of Defense facility shall be 
     subject to any treatment or technique of interrogation not 
     authorized by and listed in the United States Army Field 
     Manual on Intelligence Interrogation.
       (2) Applicability.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to with 
     respect to any person in the custody or under the effective 
     control of the Department of Defense pursuant to a criminal 
     law or immigration law of the United States.

[[Page S8790]]

       (3) Construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall be 
     construed to affect the rights under the United States 
     Constitution of any person in the custody or under the 
     physical jurisdiction of the United States.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I asked that amendment be read because 
there may be various interpretations of what this amendment is and what 
it means. What it means to the sponsors--and I am grateful to my 
friend, Senator Warner, the distinguished chairman of the committee, 
and Senator Graham and others, including Senator Collins and others who 
have supported this. Basically, it says the U.S. Army Field Manual on 
Intelligence Interrogation shall be the document that governs 
interrogation of prisoners who are under Department of Defense custody.
  Some of us may like to see this expanded to treatment of prisoners 
who are under custody of different agencies of Government. This applies 
to the Department of Defense.
  Before I proceed further, I ask my friend from Virginia--as he knows, 
we have two amendments. One is this one which we have just read, and 
the other one concerning cruel and inhumane treatment, which we are 
sort of still working on. Is it the desire of the Chairman we take up 
both amendments at this time?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I suggest we take up the other one--you 
and I have discussed it--as soon as the other one is completed because 
I am a cosponsor on the one that is now pending.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thank the distinguished chairman. For the information 
of my colleagues, the second amendment, which would be before the 
Senate for consideration at a different time, basically says that cruel 
and inhumane treatment will not be inflicted upon any prisoner, and we 
would adhere to the Geneva Conventions as well as other international 
agreements concerning the treatment of prisoners.
  But on this issue it says this amendment would prohibit cruel and 
inhumane and degrading treatment of prisoners in the detention of the 
U.S. Government, and it is basically fairly straightforward and simple, 
as I read.
  The Army Field Manual and its various editions have served America 
well, through wars against both regular and irregular foes. The manual 
embodies the values Americans have embraced for generations while 
preserving the ability of our interrogators to extract critical 
intelligence from ruthless foes. Never has this been more important 
than today in the midst of the war on terror.
  I think we all agree to fight terrorism we must obtain intelligence. 
But we have to ensure that it is reliable and acquired in a way that is 
humane. To do otherwise not only offends our national morals but 
undermines our efforts to protect the Nation's security.
  Abuse of prisoners harms--harms, not helps--us in the war on terror 
because inevitably these abuses become public. When they do, the cruel 
actions of a few darken the reputation of our honorable country in the 
eyes of millions. Mistreatment of our prisoners also endangers U.S. 
servicemembers who might be captured by the enemy--if not in this war, 
then in the next.
  I want to emphasize to some of my friends who say that we should do 
anything that is necessary to extract intelligence, No. 1, torture 
doesn't work; No. 2, if extraneous or extraordinary actions have to be 
taken--and there may be cases, and we will get into this in the next 
amendment, where someone has information that it is believed poses an 
immediate threat to the United States--then I would suppose that it 
would be entirely appropriate, under law, that the President of the 
United States could make that judgment and take whatever actions are 
necessary. In the meantime, the Army Field Manual authorizes 
interrogation techniques that are proven effective in extracting 
lifesaving information from the most hardened prisoners. It also 
recognizes that torture and cruel treatment are ineffective methods 
because they induce prisoners to say what their interrogators want to 
hear, even if it is not true.
  It is consistent with our laws and, most importantly, our values. Our 
values are different from those of our enemies. When colleagues or 
others may come on this floor and say: Well, they do it, others do it, 
al-Qaida does it, other nations in the world do it, what differentiates 
us, the United States of America, from other countries is the fact that 
we do not. We do not abuse human rights. We do not do it. I would argue 
the pictures, terrible pictures from Abu Ghraib, harmed us--not only in 
the Arab world, which is an area of great concern but it also harmed us 
dramatically amongst friendly nations, the Europeans, many of our 
allies.
  Of course, they were appalled. Of course, we were all appalled. As we 
go through this later on, there were interesting exchanges between the 
civilian general counsel in the Pentagon and the military judge 
advocate general's--members of the judge advocate general, who were 
deeply concerned about regulations that were proposed for adoption, and 
exhibited very serious and fundamental concerns. For a short period of 
time, unfortunately, those objections by the uniform lawyers in the 
Pentagon were overruled, and we went through a period of time--thank 
God only a few months--where interrogation techniques were allowed 
which were then repealed, I am happy to say.

  Our friends in London and elsewhere find themselves confronting the 
same evil that we do. Preserving the common values we hold dear is more 
important than ever. We fight not just to preserve our lives and 
liberties but our morals, and we will never allow the terrorists to 
take those from us. In this war that we must win--that we will win--we 
should never fight evil with evil.
  As I said, the amendment I am offering would establish the Army Field 
Manual as the standard for interrogation of all detainees held in 
Department of Defense custody. The manual has been developed by the 
executive branch for its own uses, with a new edition written to take 
into account the needs of the war on terror for the new classified 
annexes due to be issued soon.
  The advantage of setting a standard for interrogation based on the 
field manual is to cut down on the significant level of confusion that 
still exists with respect to which interrogation techniques are 
allowed. Two weeks ago, the Committee on Armed Services held hearings, 
under the chairmanship of Senator Lindsey Graham, with a slew of high-
level Defense Department officials from regional commanders to judge 
advocate generals from the various branches to the Department's deputy 
general counsel.
  A chief topic of discussion was what specific interrogation 
techniques are permitted, in what environment, with which DOD 
detainees, by whom and when. The answers included a whole lot of 
confusion. We got a bunch of contradictory answers. Several: I would 
have to take a look at that. A few: Let me get back to you.
  Let's think about that for a second. If at the highest level of the 
Pentagon they do not know what exact techniques are allowed and what 
aren't, what is going on in the prisons? What is going on with the 
soldiers, the sergeant, the corporal, those who are supposed to do the 
actual interrogations? What we are trying to do is make sure there are 
clear and exact standards set for interrogation of prisoners which have 
held for other wars and are now being updated to take into 
consideration the kind of war that we are in.
  Confusion results in the kind of messes that once again could give 
America a black eye around the world. We need a clear, simple, and 
consistent standard. We will have it in the Army Field Manual on 
interrogation. That is not my opinion but that of many more 
distinguished military legal minds than mine.
  I received a letter recently from a group of people, 11 former high-
ranking military officers, including RADM John Hutson and RADM Don 
Guter, who each served as the Navy's top JAG, and Claudia Kennedy, who 
was Deputy Chief of Staff for Army Intelligence. These and other 
distinguished officers believe that the abuses took place in part 
because our soldiers received ambiguous instructions which, in some 
cases, authorized treatment that went beyond what the Field Manual 
allows and that had the Manual been followed across the board we could 
have avoided the prisoner abuse scandal.
  I am not sure we could have, Mr. President, but wouldn't any of us 
have done whatever we could to have prevented that?

[[Page S8791]]

  I ask unanimous consent this letter, dated July 22, 2005, be printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                    July 22, 2005.
       Dear Senator McCain: We strongly support your proposed 
     amendments to the Defense Department Authorization bill 
     concerning detainee policy, including requiring all 
     interrogations of detainees in DOD custody to conform to the 
     U.S. Army's Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation (FM 
     34-52), and prohibiting the use of torture and cruel, inhuman 
     and degrading treatment by any U.S. government agency.
       The abuse of prisoners hurts America's cause in the war on 
     terror, endangers U.S. service members who might be captured 
     by the enemy, and is anathema to the values Americans have 
     held dear for generations. For many years, those values have 
     been embodied in the Army Field Manual. The Manual applies 
     the wisdom and experience gained by military interrogators in 
     conflicts against both regular and irregular foes. It 
     authorizes techniques that have proven effective in 
     extracting life-saving information from the most hardened 
     enemy prisoners. It also recognizes that torture and cruel 
     treatment are ineffective methods, because they induce 
     prisoners to say what their interrogators want to hear, even 
     if it is not true, while bringing discredit upon the United 
     States.
       It is now apparent that the abuse of prisoners in Abu 
     Ghraib, Guantanamo and elsewhere took place in part because 
     our men and women in uniform were given ambiguous 
     instructions, which in some cases authorized treatment that 
     went beyond what was allowed by the Army Field Manual. 
     Administration officials confused matters further by 
     declaring that U.S. personnel are not bound by longstanding 
     prohibitions of cruel treatment when interrogating non-U.S. 
     citizens on foreign soil. As a result, we suddenly had one 
     set of rules for interrogating prisoners of war, and another 
     for ``enemy combatants;'' one set for Guantanamo, and another 
     for Iraq; one set for our military, and another for the CIA. 
     Our service members were denied clear guidance, and left to 
     take the blame when things went wrong. They deserve better 
     than that.
       The United States should have one standard for 
     interrogating enemy prisoners that is effective, lawful, and 
     humane. Fortunately, America already has the gold standard in 
     the Army Field Manual. Had the Manual been followed across 
     the board, we would have been spared the pain of the prisoner 
     abuse scandal. It should be followed consistently from now 
     on. And when agencies other than DOD detain and interrogate 
     prisoners, there should be no legal loopholes permitting 
     cruel or degrading treatment.
       The amendments proposed by Senator McCain would achieve 
     these goals while preserving our nation's ability to fight 
     the war on terror. They reflect the experience and highest 
     traditions of the United States military. We urge the 
     Congress to support this effort.
       General Joseph Hoar (Ret. USMC).
       Lieutenant General Robert G. Gard, Jr. (Ret. USA).
       Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy (Ret. USA).
       Major General Melvyn Montano (Ret. USAF Nat. Guard).
       Rear Admiral Don Guter (Ret. USN).
       Rear Admiral John D. Hutson (Ret. USN).
       Brigadier General David M. Brahms (Ret. USMC).
       Brigadier General James Cullen (Ret. USA).
       Brigadier General Evelyn P. Foote (Ret. USA).
       Brigadier General David R. Irvine (Ret. USA).
       Brigadier General Richard O'Meara (Ret. USA).
       Ambassador Douglas ``Pete'' Peterson.
       Former Vietnam POW Commander Frederick C. Baldock (Ret. 
     USN).
       Former Vietnam POW Commander Phillip N. Butler (Ret. USN).
                                  ____

       General Joseph Hoar (Ret. USMC)--General Hoar served as 
     Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command. After the first 
     Gulf War, General Hoar led the effort to enforce the naval 
     embargo in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, and to enforce 
     the no-fly zone in the south of Iraq. He oversaw the 
     humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in Kenya and Somalia 
     and also supported operations in Rwanda, and the evacuation 
     of U.S. civilians from Yemen during the 1994 civil war. He 
     was the Deputy for Operations for the Marine Corps during the 
     Gulf War and served as General Norman Schwarzkopf's Chief of 
     Staff at Central Command. General Hoar currently runs a 
     consulting business in California.
       Lt. General Robert G. Gard, Jr. (Ret. USA)--General Gard is 
     a retired Lieutenant General who served in the United States 
     Army; his military assignments included combat service in 
     Korea and Vietnam. He is currently a consultant on 
     international security and president emeritus of the Monterey 
     Institute for International Studies.
       Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy (Ret. USA)--General 
     Kennedy is the first and only woman to achieve the rank of 
     three-star general in the United States Army. Kennedy served 
     as Deputy Chief of Staff for Army Intelligence, Commander of 
     the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, and as Commander of the 
     703d military intelligence brigade in Kunia, Hawaii.
       Major General Melvyn Montano (Ret. USAF Nat. Guard)--
     General Montano was the adjutant general in charge of the 
     National Guard in New Mexico from 1994 to 1999. He served in 
     Vietnam and was the first Hispanic Air National Guard officer 
     appointed as an adjutant general in the country.
       Rear Admiral Don Guter (Ret. USN)--Admiral Guter served as 
     the Navy's Judge Advocate General from 2000 to 2002. Admiral 
     Guter is currently CEO of Vinson Hall Corporation/Executive 
     Director of the Navy Marine Coast Guard Residence Foundation 
     in McLean, Virginia.
       Rear Admiral John D. Hutson (Ret. USN)--Admiral John D. 
     Hutson served as the Navy's Judge Advocate General from 1997 
     to 2000. Admiral Hutson now serves as President and Dean of 
     the Franklin Pierce Law Center in Concord, New Hampshire.
       Brigadier General David M. Brahms (Ret. USMC)--General 
     Brahms served in the Marine Corps from 1963-1988. He served 
     as the Marine Corps' senior legal adviser from 1983 until his 
     retirement in 1988. General Brahms currently practices law in 
     Carlsbad, California and sits on the board of directors of 
     the Judge Advocates Association.
       Brigadier General James Cullen (Ret. USA)--General Cullen 
     is a retired Brigadier General in the United States Army 
     Reserve Judge Advocate General's Corps and last served as the 
     Chief Judge (IMA) of the U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals. 
     He currently practices law in New York City.
       Brigadier General Evelyn P. Foote (Ret. USA)--General Foote 
     was Commanding General of Fort Belvoir in 1989. She was 
     recalled to active duty in 1996 to serve as Vice Chair of the 
     Secretary of the Army's Senior Review Panel on Sexual 
     Harassment. She is President of the Alliance for National 
     Defense, a non-profit organization.
       Brigadier General David R. Irvine (Ret. USA)--General 
     Irvine is a retired Army Reserve strategic intelligence 
     officer and taught prisoner interrogation and military law 
     for 18 years with the Sixth Army Intelligence School. He last 
     served as Deputy Commander for the 96th Regional Readiness 
     Command, and currently practices law in Salt Lake City, Utah.
       Brigadier General Richard O'Meara (Ret. USA)--Brigadier 
     General Richard O'Meara is a combat decorated veteran who 
     fought in Vietnam before earning his law degree and joining 
     the Army's Judge Advocate General Corps. He retired from the 
     Army Reserves in 2002 and now teaches courses on Human Rights 
     and History at Kean University and at Monmouth University.
       Ambassador Douglas ``Pete'' Peterson--Ambassador Peterson 
     served as the ambassador to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
     until 2001. Prior to his diplomatic posting, Ambassador 
     Peterson served three terms as a member of the United States 
     House of Representatives, representing the Second 
     Congressional District of Florida. He served 26 years in the 
     United States Air Force having served in worldwide 
     assignments as a fighter pilot and commander. He is a 
     distinguished combat veteran of the Vietnam War and was 
     incarcerated as a POW during that conflict for more than six 
     years. He completed his military service in 1981 and has 
     extensive experience in the private sector.
       Commander Frederick C. Baldock (Ret. USN)--Commander 
     Baldock was a Navy pilot and is a combat veteran of the 
     Vietnam War. His plane was shot down over North Vietnam in 
     1966, and he spent seven years in captivity as a POW.
       Commander Phillip N. Butler (Ret. USN)--Commander Butler 
     was a Navy pilot and is a combat veteran of the Vietnam War. 
     His plane was shot down over North Vietnam in 1965, and he 
     spent nearly eight years in captivity as a POW.

  Mr. McCAIN. I read from the letter:

       We strongly support your proposed amendments to the Defense 
     Department Authorization bill concerning detainee policy, 
     including requiring all interrogations of detainees in DOD 
     custody to conform to the U.S. Army's Field Manual on 
     Intelligence Interrogation (FM 34-52), and prohibiting the 
     use of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment by 
     any U.S. government agency.
       It is now apparent that the abuse of prisoners in Abu 
     Ghraib, Guantanamo and elsewhere took place in part because 
     our men and women in uniform were given ambiguous 
     instructions, which in some cases authorized treatment that 
     went beyond what was allowed by the Army Field Manual. 
     Administration officials confused matters further by 
     declaring that U.S. personnel are not bound by longstanding 
     prohibitions of cruel treatment when interrogating non-U.S. 
     citizens on foreign soil. As a result, we suddenly had one 
     set of rules for interrogating prisoners of war, and another 
     for ``enemy combatants;'' one set for Guantanamo, and another 
     for Iraq; one set for our military, and another for the CIA. 
     Our service members were denied clear guidance, and left to 
     take the blame when things went wrong. They deserve better 
     than that.
       The United States should have one standard for 
     interrogating enemy prisoners that is effective, lawful, and 
     humane. Fortunately, America already has the gold standard in 
     the Army Field Manual. Had the Manual been followed across 
     the board, we would have been spared the pain of the prisoner 
     abuse scandal. It should be followed consistently from now 
     on. And when agencies other than

[[Page S8792]]

     DOD detain and interrogate prisoners, there should be no 
     legal loopholes permitting cruel or degrading treatment.

  This is signed by GEN Joseph Hoar, LTG Robert Gard, LTG Claudia 
Kennedy, MG Melvyn Montano, RADM Don Guter, RADM John Hutson, BG David 
Brahms, BG James Cullen, BG Evelyn Foote, BG David Irvine, BG Richard 
O'Meara, et cetera, and all of these people, including General Hoar, 
served as Commander in Chief United States Central Command. These are 
very credible people. If we had chosen, we could have gotten many more 
signatories to this amendment.
  We are Americans. We hold ourselves to humane standards of treatment 
no matter how terribly evil or awful they may be. To do otherwise 
undermines our security, and it also undermines our greatness as a 
nation. We are not simply any other country. We stand for a lot more 
than that in the world: a moral mission, one of freedom and democracy 
and human rights at home and abroad.
  We are better than the terrorists, and we will win because we are 
better than they are. The enemy we fight has no respect for human life 
or human rights. They don't deserve our sympathy. But this is not about 
who they are--it is not about who they are. It is about who we are. 
These are values that distinguish us from our enemies.
  President Bush understands that the war on terror is ultimately a 
battle of ideas, a battle we will win by spreading and standing firmly 
for the values of decency, democracy, and the rule of law. I stand with 
him in this commitment. By applying to ourselves the basic standards we 
rightly preach to others, I believe we will only increase our 
effectiveness as the world's ultimate champion of liberty.
  I thank Senator Warner and Senator Graham and others who have shown 
an interest. Senator Warner has had a series of hearings for a long 
period of time. I believe we can do a great service for the military 
and for the country if we adopt this simple two-paragraph amendment 
that basically says that prisoners will be treated according to the 
Army Field Manual, which, by the way, is the tradition of treatment of 
prisoners for many wars.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I commend Senator McCain. I have been 
privileged to know him ever since I was Secretary of Navy in the 
closing years of the war in Vietnam. I know no military family that has 
served our Nation with greater distinction than the McCain family. This 
is a subject about which my dear friend has knowledge that none of us 
possess. I have absolute confidence they are doing the right thing.
  The two of us do have some technical differences of opinion. His 
amendment is predicated on the Army Field Manual which he mentioned is 
being revised. The current Army Field Manual basically dealt with 
State-sponsored conflict. I have every reason to believe that the 
follow-on manual, in due course, presumably in both classified and 
unclassified form, will be completed.


                           Amendment No. 1566

  There is another approach here. I ask unanimous consent, if it is 
agreeable, to set the McCain amendment aside temporarily and ask 
amendment 1566 be brought up.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. And in no way do I wish it to substitute for Senator 
McCain's amendment. This is a complicated subject.
  Essentially, my amendment simply says it will be the Secretary of 
Defense that will establish uniform standards and procedures for two 
separable subjects, detention and interrogation.
  While I have not had a chance to go through in detail the Army's 
Field Manual, I am not sure there is the emphasis placed on the 
detention rule in such a manner as equivalent to the detention and 
regulation that will be and is on the interrogation. Those responsible 
for detention are often quite different than those responsible for 
interrogation. If there is any mistreatment in the course of the 
detention, depending on the timing between such treatment and the 
follow-on interrogation, it seems to me we have a problem.
  Therefore, my amendment entrusts to the Secretary of Defense the task 
to put together basically all of the objectives as enunciated by my 
distinguished friend from Arizona.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia, [Mr. Warner], proposes an 
     amendment numbered 1566.

  Mr. WARNER. I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendment be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

   (Purpose: To provide for uniform standards and procedures for the 
   interrogation of persons under the detention of the Department of 
                                Defense)

       At the end of subtitle G of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1073. UNIFORM STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES FOR TREATMENT OF 
                   PERSONS UNDER DETENTION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF 
                   DEFENSE.

       (a) Uniform Standards and Procedures Required.--The 
     Secretary of Defense shall establish uniform standards and 
     procedures for the detention and interrogation of persons in 
     the custody or under the control of the Department of 
     Defense.
       (b) Consistency With Law and Treaty Obligations.--The 
     standards and procedures established under subsection (a) 
     shall be consistent with United States law and international 
     treaty obligations.
       (c) Applicability.--
       (1) In general.--The standards and procedures established 
     under subsection (a) shall apply to all detention and 
     interrogation activities involving persons in the custody or 
     under the control of the Department of Defense, and to such 
     activities conducted within facilities controlled by the 
     Department of Defense, regardless of whether such activities 
     are conducted by Department of Defense personnel, Department 
     of Defense contractor personnel, or personnel or contractor 
     personnel of any other department, agency, or element of the 
     United States Government.
       (2) Exception.--The standards and procedures established 
     under subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to any 
     person in the custody or under the control of the Department 
     of Defense pursuant to a criminal law or immigration law of 
     the United States.
       (d) Construction.--Nothing in this section shall affect 
     such rights, if any, under the Constitution of the United 
     States of any person in the custody or under the control of 
     the Department of Defense.
       (e) Notice to Congress of Revision.--Not later than 60 days 
     before issuing any revision to the standards and procedures 
     established under subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense 
     shall notify, in writing, the congressional defense 
     committees of such revision.
       (f) Deadline.--The standards and procedures required by 
     subsection (a) shall be established not later than 60 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act.

  Mr. WARNER. There are considerable parallels between the two 
amendments, with the exception that the subject should be adjusted to 
the Secretary of Defense. He may well designate the Army Field Manual 
as his work product, but then I would need, under the amendment, the 
assurance that equal emphasis is put on the detention phase as well as 
the interrogation phase.
  Recent history has shown we must have uniform standards for detention 
and interrogation across the Department of Defense. We cannot have 
different standards for different theaters.
  Soldiers, as Senator McCain pointed out, have to be trained and well 
understand the rules and regulations as they relate to both detention 
and interrogation. That is the goal of the McCain amendment. I 
wholeheartedly support it. It is best to entrust the entire subject to 
the Secretary of Defense and hold him accountable, as opposed to the 
designation of the specific document which is in the process of being 
changed.


                    Amendment No. 1557, As Modified

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate return to 
consideration of the McCain amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Burr). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, seeing our other colleague, Senator 
Graham, I yield the floor. But I also see Senator McCain.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.


                           Amendment No. 1566

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I have a brief comment on the chairman's 
amendment. Leaving it in the hands of the Secretary of Defense is what 
caused the huge amount of problems we have today.
  I have here--in fact, thanks to the tenacity of the Senator from 
South Carolina--finally, after a year and a half, 2 years, the 
memoranda that were submitted by the uniformed JAGS when

[[Page S8793]]

the rules for the treatment of prisoners were set up the first time, I 
say to my friend from Virginia. They all objected to it. They were 
overruled by the Secretary of Defense and the general counsel.
  So now, if I understand it, the amendment of my dear friend from 
Virginia is going to return that to the Secretary of Defense. I urge 
him to read these memoranda which we finally got thanks to, again, the 
Senator from South Carolina: treating OEF detainees inconsistently with 
the Conventions; arguably lowers the bar for the treatment of U.S. POWs 
in future conflicts, even when nations agree with the President's 
status determination. Many would view the more extreme interrogation 
techniques as violative of international law, other treaties, or 
customary international law; perhaps violative of their own domestic 
law. This puts the interrogators and the chain of command at risk of 
criminal accusations abroad, either in foreign domestic courts or 
international fora, to include the ICC.
  I remind my colleagues, these are the memoranda that were sent to 
comment on the Secretary of Defense guidelines for interrogations of 
prisoners, which were overruled. And then, a couple months later, they 
were rescinded.
  So in all due respect, my friend from Virginia has a degree of 
confidence in the Secretary of Defense which, frankly, is not validated 
by what took place and many argue is one of the reasons why we had Abu 
Ghraib.
  So I thank my colleague and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I could reply to my good friend, you 
are absolutely right. And I know that chapter as you do and have 
studied it. But under the law, the Secretary of Defense is still the 
head of the Department, and as such I suppose he can alter the field 
manual of the Army and make it less in the present form and in the 
revised form in due course. But I think it is important we have a clear 
chain of authority and accountability. I look up the chain, and there 
are the laws established by the Secretary of Defense as opposed to 
those who might be involved in drawing up the Army Field Manual. I 
presume the Secretary of the Army is at the top of that pyramid.
  But that is the reason I put in this amendment. I say to my good 
friend from Arizona, I hope we can sort this out before final passage 
and possibly amend it. I will withdraw mine because I want you to take 
the lead in every respect on this important amendment.
  If I might add, I say to my friend from Arizona, there is another 
important amendment you needed to get completed.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thought my colleague wanted me to wait 
on the additional amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Well, whatever.
  Mr. McCAIN. But I will be glad to proceed. Why don't we let the 
Senator from South Carolina talk, and then maybe, if it is all right, I 
will offer the other amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Fine.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. McCAIN. I am glad to yield.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I have a unanimous consent request. I ask 
unanimous consent that I be added as a cosponsor to amendment No. 1557, 
which is the field manual amendment to which they have been referring.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, if I could be recognized just for 1 minute 
to comment on this amendment, and then I will yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first of all, I congratulate Senator 
McCain. I do not think there is anybody in this body who speaks with 
greater authority on the subject matter he has spoken to in this 
amendment. I commend him for the distinction he is making. It is a 
critical distinction. In addition to the fact that the field manual is 
there for everybody to see and has historic meaning, the difference 
between the McCain amendment and the one which was offered by the 
Senator from Virginia--another difference--is that the field manual is 
a public document. You can read what is in the field manual. The 
Secretary of Defense memoranda too often have been classified 
``unavailable.'' We have been spending sometimes months and years 
trying to just find out what is in those memoranda.
  So there is a very important difference between these two amendments 
in a number of regards. I very much believe that the first amendment, 
amendment No. 1557, is the way which is most consistent with our 
values. It makes it very clear, in public, what the authorities are and 
what the standards and criteria are. The contrast between that and 
something amorphous, which gives the Secretary of Defense a power he 
already has anyway, which is to issue regulations but to do so in 
secret and in a classified way, leads to more vagueness, more 
uncertainty, more conflict, more inability of Congress to perform 
oversight.
  So I commend the Senator from Arizona for this amendment. I believe 
the differences between these two amendments are significant.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I accept my good friend's critique, but I 
do point out, as the Army Field Manual is under revision, there will be 
both a classified and unclassified portion of that manual.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, if I could just comment briefly on that, at 
least with the unclassified portion, we have access to it, unlike the 
documents that are issued by the Secretary of Defense memoranda. They 
are classified, but they are also, too often, unavailable to Congress. 
They just use one excuse after another not to make those memoranda 
available to Congress. So there may be a classified version of the 
field manual, but at least Congress has access to that unclassified 
version.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am well aware of the efforts of my good 
friend from Michigan to get documents from the Department of Defense 
and his modest success and some lack of success.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from 
South Carolina such time as he deems necessary.
  Could the Chair advise us as to the amount of time remaining under 
the hour that I requested?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina has 20 
minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. That is the full time?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has 13 minutes. The 
Senator from Arizona has 3 minutes remaining.
  Mr. WARNER. Well, we will allocate the time among the three of us in 
an equitable way.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.


                    Amendment No. 1557, As Modified

  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I rise in support of Senator McCain's 
amendment. The point that Senator Warner is making, I fully understand. 
But I think we are at a crossroads in the war on terror. Guantanamo Bay 
has great potential to make us safer as a nation. But one of the 
problems we have experienced in this war is a problem of image. It is a 
new kind of enemy with a lot of nuances. But one thing we cannot do as 
a nation is forget who we are, what got us here for 200-something 
years. We can fight this enemy aggressively, no-holds-barred, go after 
them, and not lose who we are.
  Senator McCain is addressing one of the problems we have found crop 
up in different areas of the world when it comes to noncitizen foreign 
terrorists, and that is how you interrogate and stay within the 
boundaries of who you are as a people and not getting your own people 
in trouble by cutting corners.
  So the reason I am supporting his amendment--and we are not just 
saying: Secretary of Defense, come up with a solution here--is because, 
after a lot of thought and study, it is clear to me that the Army Field 
Manual gives you everything you need to aggressively interrogate and 
seek good intelligence from foreign noncitizen terrorists held at GTMO 
and any other place under DOD control.

[[Page S8794]]

  Mr. President, I would like to submit for the Record several memos 
that have just been recently declassified. They were requested on 
October 7 of last year by myself, Senator Levin, and Senator McCain. 
The first one is a 27 February 2003 memo from BG Kevin M. Sandkuhler, 
U.S. Marine Corps, Staff Judge Advocate to CMC. The next one is from MG 
Thomas J. Romig, U.S. Army, the Judge Advocate General, dated 3 March 
2003. The next is from MG Jack L. Rives, Deputy Judge Advocate General 
of the U.S. Air Force, dated 6 February 2003. The next is from RADM 
Michael F. Lohr, Judge Advocate General, U.S. Navy, dated 6 February 
2003. The next is Rear Admiral Lohr, dated 13 March 2002. And the final 
memo is from Major General Rives, Deputy Judge Advocate General, U.S. 
Air Force, dated 5 February 2003. I ask unanimous consent those 
memorandums be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                           Department of the Navy,


                               Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps,

                                Washington, DC, February 27, 2003.
     Memorandum for General Counsel of the Air Force
     Subject: Working Group Recommendations on Detainee 
         Interrogations

       1. In addition to comments we submitted 5 February, we 
     concur with the recommendations submitted by the Navy (TJAG 
     RADM Lohr), the Air Force (TJAG MGen Rives), and the Joint 
     Staff Legal Counsel's Office. Their recommendations dealt 
     with policy considerations, contention with the OLC opinion, 
     and foreign interpretations of GC IV (Civilians) and 
     customary international law, respectively.
       2. The common thread among our recommendations is concern 
     for servicemembers. OLC does not represent the services; 
     thus, understandably, concern for servicemembers is not 
     reflected in their opinion. Notably, their opinion is silent 
     on the UCMJ and foreign views of international law.
       3. We nonetheless recommend that the Working Group product 
     accurately portray the services' concerns that the 
     authorization of aggressive counter-resistance techniques by 
     servicemembers will adversely impact the following:
       a. Treatment of U.S. Servicemembers by Captors and 
     compliance with International Law.
       b. Criminal and Civil Liability of DOD Military and 
     Civilian Personnel in Domestic, Foreign, and International 
     Forums.
       c. U.S. and International Public Support and Respect of 
     U.S. Armed Forces.
       d. Pride, Discipline, and Self-Respect within the U.S. 
     Armed Forces.
       e. Human Intelligence Exploitation and Surrender of Foreign 
     Enemy Forces, and Cooperation and Support of Friendly 
     Nations.
                                              Kevin M. Sandkuhler,
             Brigadier General, USMC, Staff Judge Advocate to CMC.

                      [SECRET/NOFORN] DECLASSIFIED

   Comments on Draft Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations

       1. Change p. 54, fifth paragraph, to read as follows (new 
     language italic):
       ([S/NF]U) Choice of interrogation techniques involves a 
     risk benefit analysis in each case, bounded by the limits of 
     DOD policy and law. When assessing whether to use exceptional 
     interrogation techniques, consideration should be given to 
     the possible adverse effects on U.S. Armed Forces culture and 
     self-image which suffered during the Vietnam conflict and at 
     other times due to perceived law of war violations. DOD 
     policy indoctrinated in the DOD Law of War Program in 1979 
     and subsequent service regulations, greatly restored the 
     culture and self-image of U.S. Armed Forces by establishing 
     high benchmarks of compliance with the principles and spirit 
     of the law of war and humane treatment of all persons in U.S. 
     Armed Forces custody. In addition, consideration should be 
     given to whether implementation of such techniques is likely 
     to result in adverse impacts for DOD personnel who are 
     captured or detained [become POWs,] including possible 
     perceptions by other nations that the United States is 
     lowering standards related to the treatment of prisoners and 
     other detainees, generally.
       2. Add to p. 68, a paragraph after the seventh paragraph 
     that reads:
       (U) Comprehensive protection is lacking for DOD personnel 
     who may be tried by other nations and/or international bodies 
     for violations of international law, such as violations of 
     the Geneva or Hague Conventions, the Additional Protocols, 
     the Torture Convention, the Rome Statute of the ICC, or the 
     Customary International Law of Human Rights. This risk has 
     the potential to impact future operations and overseas travel 
     of such personnel, both on and off duty.
                                  ____

         Department of the Army, Office of the Judge Advocate 
           General,
                                    Washington, DC, March 3, 2003.


   MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

     Subject: Draft Report and Recommendations of the Working 
         Group to Access the Legal, Policy and Operational Issues 
         Related to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. 
         Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism (U)

       1. (U) The purpose of this memorandum is to advise the 
     Department of Defense (DOD) General Counsel of a number of 
     serious concerns regarding the draft Report and 
     Recommendations of the Working Group to Access the Legal, 
     Policy and Operational Issues Related to Interrogation of 
     Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the War on 
     Terrorism (Final Report). These concerns center around the 
     potential Department of Defense (DOD) sanctioning of detainee 
     interrogation techniques that may appear to violate 
     international law, domestic law, or both.
       2. (U) The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), Department of 
     Justice (DOJ), provided DOD with its analysis of 
     international and domestic law as it relates to the 
     interrogation of detainees held by the United States 
     Government. This analysis was incorporated into the subject 
     draft Report and forms, almost exclusively, the legal 
     framework for the Report's Conclusions, Recommendations, and 
     PowerPoint spreadsheet analysis of the interrogation 
     techniques in issue. I am concerned with several pivotal 
     aspects of the OLC opinion.
       3. (U) While the OLC analysis speaks to a number of 
     defenses that could be raised on behalf of those who engage 
     in interrogation techniques later perceived to be illegal, 
     the ``bottom line'' defense proffered by OLC is an 
     exceptionally broad concept of ``necessity.'' This defense is 
     based upon the premise that any existing federal statutory 
     provision or international obligation is unconstitutional per 
     se, where it otherwise prohibits conduct viewed by the 
     President, acting in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, as 
     essential to his capacity to wage war. I question whether 
     this theory would ultimately prevail in either the U.S. 
     courts or in any international forum. If such a defense is 
     not available, soldiers ordered to use otherwise illegal 
     techniques run a substantial risk of criminal prosecution or 
     personal liability arising from a civil lawsuit.
       4. (U) The OLC opinion states further that customary 
     international law cannot bind the U.S. Executive Branch as it 
     is not part of the federal law. As such, any presidential 
     decision made in the context of the ongoing war on terrorism 
     constitutes a ``controlling'' Executive act; one that 
     immediately and automatically displaces any contrary 
     provision of customary international law. This view runs 
     contrary to the historic position taken by the United States 
     Government concerning such laws and, in our opinion, could 
     adversely impact DOD interests worldwide. On the one hand, 
     such a policy will open us to international criticism that 
     the ``U.S. is a law unto itself.'' On the other, 
     implementation of questionable techniques will very likely 
     establish a new baseline for acceptable practice in this 
     area, putting our service personnel at far greater risk and 
     vitiating many of the POW/detainee safeguards the U.S. has 
     worked hard to establish over the past five decades.
       5. (U) I recommend that the aggressive counter-resistance 
     interrogation techniques under consideration be vetted with 
     the Army intelligence community before a final decision on 
     their use is made. Some of these techniques do not comport 
     with Army doctrine as set forth in Field Manual (FM) 34-52 
     Intelligence Interrogation, and may be of questionable 
     practical value in obtaining reliable information from those 
     being interrogated.

                                              Thomas J. Romig,

                                         Major General, U.S. Army,
     The Judge Advocate General.
                                  ____

         Department of the Air Force, Office of the Judge Advocate 
           General,
                                 Washington, DC, February 6, 2003.


                         MEMORANDUM FOR SAF/GC

     From: AF/JA
     Subject: Comments on Draft Report and Recommendations of the 
         Working Group to Assess the Legal, Policy and Operational 
         Issues Relating to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the 
         U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism (U)

       1. (U) Please note that while I accept that the Department 
     of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel (DoJ/OLC), speaks for the 
     Executive Branch and that its legal opinions in this matter 
     are to be followed, I continue to maintain that DoJ/OLC's 
     opinions on several of the Working Group's issues are 
     contentious. Others may disagree with various portions of the 
     DoJ/OLC analysis. I believe we should recognize this fact and 
     therefore urge that certain factors should be prominently 
     provided to the DoD/GC before he makes a final recommendation 
     to the Secretary of Defense. I recommend the following 
     specific modifications to the draft report dated 4 February 
     2003:
       a. Page 2, add the following sentence to the end of 
     paragraph 2:
       It should be noted that several of the legal opinions 
     expressed herein are likely to be viewed as contentious 
     outside the Executive Branch, both domestically and 
     internationally.
       b. Page 54, change fourth full paragraph to read as 
     follows:
       (U) Choice of interrogation techniques involves a risk 
     benefit analysis in each case, bounded by the limits of DOD 
     policy and law. When assessing whether to use exceptional 
     interrogation techniques, consideration should be given to 
     the possible adverse effects on U.S. Armed Forces culture and 
     self-

[[Page S8795]]

     image, which suffered during the Vietnam conflict and at 
     other times due to perceived law of armed conflict 
     violations. DoD policy, indoctrined in the DoD Law of War 
     Program in 1979 and subsequent service regulations, greatly 
     restored the culture and self-image of U.S. Armed Forces by 
     establishing high benchmarks of compliance with the 
     principles and spirit of the law of war, and humane treatment 
     of all persons in U.S. Armed Forces custody. U.S. Armed 
     Forces are continuously trained to take the legal and moral 
     ``high-road'' in the conduct of our military operations 
     regardless of how others may operate. While the detainees' 
     status as unlawful belligerents may not entitle them to 
     protections of the Geneva Conventions, that is a legal 
     distinction that may be lost on the members of the armed 
     forces. Approving exceptional interrogation techniques may be 
     seen as giving official approval and legal sanction to the 
     application of interrogation techniques that U.S. Armed 
     Forces have heretofore been trained are unlawful. In 
     addition, consideration should be given to whether 
     implementation of such techniques is likely to result in 
     adverse impacts for DoD personnel who become POWs, 
     including possible perceptions by other nations that the 
     United States is lowering standards related to the 
     treatment of prisoners, generally.
       Alternatively, change the last paragraph on page 68, to 
     read as follows:
       (U) The cultural and self-image of the U.S. Armed Forces 
     suffered during the Vietnam conflict and at other times due 
     to perceived law of armed conflict violations. DoD policy, 
     indoctrinated in the DoD Law of War Program in 1979 and 
     subsequent service regulations, greatly restored the culture 
     and self-image of U.S. Armed Forces. U.S. Armed Forces are 
     continuously trained to take the legal and moral ``high-
     road'' in the conduct of our military operations regardless 
     of how others may operate. While the detainees' status as 
     unlawful belligerents may not entitle them to protections of 
     the Geneva Conventions, that is a legal distinction that may 
     be lost on the members of the armed forces. Approving 
     exceptional interrogation techniques may be seen as giving 
     official approval and legal sanction to the application of 
     interrogation techniques that U.S. Armed Forces have 
     heretofore been trained are unlawful. General use of 
     exceptional techniques (generally, having substantially 
     greater risk than those currently, routinely used by U.S. 
     Armed Forces interrogators), even though lawful, may create 
     uncertainty among interrogators regarding the appropriate 
     limits of interrogations, and may adversely affect the 
     cultural self-image of the U.S. armed forces.
       c. Page 68, add the following new paragraphs after the 
     sixth full paragraph:
       (U) Several of the exceptional techniques, on their face, 
     amount to violations of domestic criminal law and the UCMJ 
     (e.g., assault). Applying exceptional techniques places 
     interrogators and the chain of command at risk of criminal 
     accusations domestically. Although one or more of the 
     aforementioned defenses to these accusations may apply, it is 
     impossible to be certain that any of these defenses will be 
     successful as the judiciary may interpret the applicable law 
     differently from the interpretation provided herein.
       (U) Other nations are likely to view the exceptional 
     interrogation techniques as violative of international law 
     and perhaps violative of their own domestic law. This places 
     interrogators and the chain of command at risk of criminal 
     accusations abroad, either in foreign domestic courts or in 
     international fora, to include the ICC.
       d. Page 68, add the following new paragraphs after the 
     eighth full paragraph:
       (U) Employment of exceptional interrogation techniques may 
     have a negative effect on the treatment of U.S. POWs. Other 
     nations may disagree with the President's status 
     determination regarding Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) 
     detainees, concluding that the detainees are POWs entitled to 
     all of the protections of the Geneva Conventions. Treating 
     OEF detainees inconsistently with the Conventions arguably 
     ``lowers the bar'' for the treatment of U.S. POWs in future 
     conflicts. Even where nations agree with the President's 
     status determination, many may view the exceptional 
     techniques as violative of other law.
       2. (U) Should any information concerning the exceptional 
     techniques become public, it is likely to be exaggerated/
     distorted in both the U.S. and international media. This 
     could have a negative impact on international, and perhaps 
     even domestic, support for the war on terrorism. It could 
     likewise have a negative impact on public perception of the 
     U.S. military in general.

                                                Jack L. Rives,

                                              Major General, USAF,
     Deputy Judge Advocate General.
                                  ____

         Department of the Navy, Office of the Judge Advocate 
           General,
                                 Washington, DC, February 6, 2003.
     Subj: Working Group recommendations relating to interrogation 
         of detainees.

       1. Earlier today I provided to you a number of suggested 
     changes, additions, and deletions to the subject document.
       2. I would like to further recommend that the document make 
     very clear to decision-makers that its legal conclusions are 
     limited to arguably unique circumstances of this group of 
     detainees, i.e., unlawful combatants held ``outside'' the 
     United States. Because of these unique circumstances, the 
     U.S. Torture Statute, the Constitution, the Geneva 
     Conventions and customary international law do not apply, 
     thereby affording policy latitude that likely does not exist 
     in almost any other circumstance. (The UCMJ, however, does 
     apply to U.S. personnel conducting the interrogations.)
       3. Given this unique set of circumstances, I believe policy 
     considerations continue to loom very large. Should service 
     personnel be conducting the interrogations? How will this 
     affect their treatment when incarcerated abroad and our 
     ability to call others to account for their treatment? More 
     broadly, while we may have found a unique situation in GTMO 
     where the protections of the Geneva Conventions, U.S. 
     statutes, and even the Constitution do not apply, will the 
     American people find we have missed the forest for the trees 
     by condoning practices that, while technically legal, are 
     inconsistent with our most fundamental values? How would such 
     perceptions affect our ability to prosecute the Global War on 
     Terrorism?
       4. I accept the premise that this group of detainees is 
     different, and that lawyers should identify legal 
     distinctions where they exist. It must be conceded, however, 
     that we are preparing to treat these detainees very 
     differently than we treat any other group, and differently 
     than we permit our own people to be treated either at home or 
     abroad. At a minimum, I recommend that decision-makers be 
     made fully aware of the very narrow set of circumstances--
     factually and legally--upon which the policy rests. Moreover, 
     I recommend that we consider asking decision-makers directly: 
     is this the ``right thing'' for U.S. military personnel?

                                              Michael F. Lohr,

                                    Rear Admiral, JAGC, U.S. Navy,
     Judge Advocaate General.
                                  ____

         Department of the Navy, Office of the Judge Advocate 
           General,
                                   Washington, DC, March 13, 2002.


              MEMORANDUM FOR THE AIR FORCE GENERAL COUNSEL

     Subject: Comments on the 6 March 2003 Detainee Interrogation 
         Working Group Report

       1. My comments on subject report are provided below. These 
     comments incorporate and augment those submitted by my action 
     officer earlier this week. New comments are highlighted 
     within the previously submitted text.
       1. (U) Page 2, second paragraph: Add new penultimate 
     sentence to read, ``In addition this paper incorporates 
     significant portions of work product provided by the Office 
     of Legal Counsel, United States Department of Justice.'' In 
     the last sentence change ``by a Department . . .'' to ``by 
     the Department . . .'' Finally, add new footnote to reference 
     the OLC opinion to read ``Memorandum dated March xx, 2003., 
     Re: xxxxxxxxxx.
       Rationale: this WG paper contains large segments of DOJ 
     work product, rather than being ``informed'' by DOJ. We 
     believe the OLC opinion should be incorporated by reference 
     into the WG report.
       2. (U) Page 24, second paragraph, last sentence: delete.
       Rationale: this sentence is not true. There are domestic 
     limits on the President's power to interrogate prisoners. One 
     of them is Congress's advice and consent to the US 
     ratification to the Geneva Conventions that limit the 
     interrogation of POWs. The willingness of the Executive, and 
     of the Legislative Branch, to enforce those restrictions is a 
     different matter.
       3. (U) Page 24, footnote 20: delete or rewrite to read, 
     ``This is the stated view of the Department of Justice.''
       Rationale: Mr. Yoo clearly stated that he believes the 
     viability of these defenses is greatly enhanced by advance 
     Presidential direction in the matter. He specifically 
     recommended obtaining such direction in writing.
       4. (U) Page 26, first full paragraph, first sentence: 
     delete.
       Rationale: this statement is too broad. The similar 
     language used at the end of the following paragraph is more 
     accurate.
       5. (U) Page 29, second paragraph, fifth sentence: Rewrite 
     sentence to read, ``A leading scholarly commentator . . .'' 
     and later in the sentence change ``. . . section 2340 would 
     be justified under . . .'' to ``. . . section 2340 should be 
     justified under . . .''
       Rationale: There is only one article written by one person 
     cited. Also the quoted language from the commentator 
     indicates his view that torture should be permissible, not a 
     statement that international law allows such.
       6. (U) Page 29, second paragraph, last sentence: delete.
       Rationale: this conclusion is far too broad but the general 
     principle can be inferred from the discussion.
       7. (U) Page 31, para d, third sentence and penultimate 
     sentences: delete.
       Rationale: This analogy is inapt. There is nothing in law 
     enforcement that would authorize the use of torture or 
     excessive force against persons for intelligence gathering.
       8. (U) Page 41, second paragraph, penultimate sentence: 
     delete.
       Rationale: it is not clear what the meaning of the sentence 
     is.
       9. (U) Page 59, second paragraph: it is unclear if SECDEF 
     must approve exceptional techniques on a case-by-case basis, 
     or just approve their use generally.
       10. (U) Page 63, footnote 86. The text of this footnote 
     does not correspond to its citation

[[Page S8796]]

     in the paper. It appears that the current text of footnote 86 
     belongs as part of the discussion of API in the paragraph 
     above, or as part of the text of footnotes 83 or 84. Footnote 
     86 should detail the rationale for the Justice Department 
     determination that GCIV does not apply.
       11. (U) Page 67, technique 26: Add last sentence to read, 
     ``Members of the armed forces will not threaten the detainee 
     with the possible results of the transfer, but will instead 
     limit the threat to the fact of transfer to allow the 
     detainee to form their own conclusions about such a move.''
       Rationale: threatening the detainee with death or injury 
     (by the transfer) may be considered torture under 
     international law.
       12. (U) Page 72, second paragraph: in the last sentence 
     replace ``protections of the Geneva Conventions'' with 
     ``protections of the third Geneva Convention.''
       Rationale: clarity
       13. (U) Page 72, second paragraph: add new last sentence to 
     read: ``Under international law, the protections of the 
     fourth Geneva Convention may apply to the detainees.''
       Rationale: this view is shared by Chairman's Legal and all 
     the services.
       14. (U) Page 72, third paragraph: at the beginning add, 
     ``In those cases where the President has made a controlling 
     executive decision or action . . .''
       Rationale: this is the standard by which the President may 
     ``override'' CIL.
       15. (U) Page 73, sixth paragraph: Add new last sentence to 
     read, ``Presidential written directive to engage in these 
     techniques will enhance the successful assertion of the 
     potential defenses discussed in this paper.''
       Rationaie: much of the analysis in this paper is premised 
     on the authority of the President as delegated/directed, in 
     writing, to SECDEF and beyond. This point needs to be made 
     prominently.
       16. (U) Matrix Annex, Technique 33: delete.
       Rationale: It is not clear what the intent of this 
     technique is. If it loses its effectiveness after the first 
     or second use, it appears to be little more than a gratuitous 
     assault. Other methods are equally useful in getting/
     maintaining the attention of the detainee. It also has the 
     potential to be applied differently by different individuals.
       17. (U) Page 75, first paragraph, in the discussion re 
     technique 36: Rewrite 3rd to last and penultimate sentences 
     to read, ``The working group believes use of technique 36 
     would constitute torture under international and U.S. law 
     and, accordingly, should not be utilized. In the event SECDEF 
     decides to authorize this technique, the working group 
     believes armed forces personnel should not participate as 
     interrogators as they are subject to UCMJ jurisdiction at all 
     times.''
       This is a correct statement of the positions of the 
     services party to the working group, who all believe this 
     technique constitutes torture under both domestic and 
     international law.
       18. Thank you for the opportunity to comment. My action 
     officer in this matter is CDR Steve Gallotta.

                                              Michael F. Lohr,

                                    Rear Admiral, JAGC, U.S. Navy,
     Judge Advocate General.
                                  ____

         Department of the Air Force, Office of the Judge Advocate 
           General,
                                 Washington, DC, February 5, 2003.


                         memorandum for saf/gc

     From: AF/JA
     Subject: Final Report and Recommendations of the Working 
         Group to Assess the Legal, Policy and Operational Issues 
         Relating to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. 
         Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism (U)

       1. (U) In drafting the subject report and recommendations, 
     the legal opinions of the Department of Justice, Office of 
     Legal Counsel (DoJ/OLC), were relied on almost exclusively. 
     Although the opinions of DoJ/OLC are to be given a great deal 
     of weight within the Executive Branch, their positions on 
     several of the Working Group's issues are contentious. As our 
     discussion demonstrate, others within and outside the 
     Executive Branch are likely to disagree. The report and 
     recommendations caveat that it only applies to ``strategic 
     interrogations'' of ``unlawful combatants'' at locations 
     outside the United States. Although worded to permit maximum 
     flexibility and legal interpretation, I believe other factors 
     need to be provided to the DoD/GC before he makes a final 
     recommendation to the Secretary of Defense.
       2. (U) Several of the more extreme interrogation 
     techniques, on their face, amount to violations of domestic 
     criminal law and the UCMJ (e.g., assault). Applying the more 
     extreme techniques during the interrogation of detainees 
     places the interrogators and the chain of command at risk of 
     criminal accusations domestically. Although a wide range of 
     defenses to these accusations theoretically apply, it is 
     impossible to be certain that any defense will be successful 
     at trial; our domestic courts may well disagree with DoJ/
     OLC's interpretation of the law. Further, while the current 
     administration is not likely to pursue prosecution, it is 
     impossible to predict how future administrations will view 
     the use of such techniques.
       3. (U) Additionally, other nations are unlikely to agree 
     with DoJ/OLC's interpretation of the law in some instances. 
     Other nations may disagree with the President's status 
     determination regarding the Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) 
     detainees; they may conclude that the detainees are POWs 
     entitled to all of the protections of the Geneva Conventions. 
     Treating OEF detainees inconsistently with the Conventions 
     arguably ``lowers the bar'' for the treatment of U.S. POWs in 
     future conflicts. Even where nations agree with the 
     President's status determination, many would view the more 
     extreme interrogation techniques as violative of other 
     international law (other treaties or customary international 
     law) and perhaps violative of their own domestic law. This 
     puts the interrogators and the chain of command at risk of 
     criminal accusations abroad, either in foreign domestic 
     courts or in international fora, to include the ICC.
       4. (U) Should any information regarding the use of the more 
     extreme interrogation techniques become public, it is likely 
     to be exaggerated/distorted in both the U.S. and 
     international media. This could have a negative impact on 
     international, and perhaps even domestic, support for the war 
     on terrorism. Moreover, it could have a negative impact on 
     public perception of the U.S. military in general.
       5. (U) Finally, the use of the more extreme interrogation 
     techniques simply is not how the U.S. armed forces have 
     operated in recent history. We have taken the legal and moral 
     ``high-road'' in the conduct of our military operations 
     regardless of how others may operate. Our forces are trained 
     in this legal and moral mindset beginning the day they enter 
     active duty. It should be noted that law of armed conflict 
     and code of conduct training have been mandated by Congress 
     and emphasized since the Viet Nam conflict when our POWs were 
     subjected to torture by their captors. We need to consider 
     the overall impact of approving extreme interrogation 
     techniques as giving official approval and legal sanction to 
     the application of interrogation techniques that U.S. forces 
     have consistently been trained are unlawful.

                                                Jack L. Rives,

                                              Major General, USAF,
                                    Deputy Judge Advocate General.

  Mr. GRAHAM. Now, over time, we are going to learn more about what 
these memos tell us, but basically these memos are telling us that the 
proposed interrogation techniques dealing with the war on terror, 
suggested by the Department of Justice, sent over to Department of 
Defense, were such a deviation from the normal way of doing business 
that it would get our own people in trouble. It was such a deviation 
from the normal way of doing business that we would lose the moral high 
ground in fighting the war on terror.
  General Rives sums up:

       Finally, the use of the more extreme interrogation 
     techniques simply is not how the U.S. armed forces have 
     operated in recent history. We have taken the legal and moral 
     ``high-road'' in the conduct of our military operations 
     regardless of how others may operate. Our forces are trained 
     in this legal and moral mindset beginning the day they enter 
     active duty. It should be noted that [the] law of armed 
     conflict and code of conduct training have been mandated by 
     Congress and emphasized since the Viet Nam conflict when our 
     POWs were subjected to torture by their captors. We need to 
     consider the overall impact of approving extreme 
     interrogation techniques as giving official approval and 
     legal sanction to the application of interrogation techniques 
     that U.S. forces have consistently been trained are unlawful.

  He talks about a slippery slope that we are about to embark on that 
will result in some of our own people being subject to being court-
martialed because the Uniform Code of Military Justice has many 
provisions dictating how you will treat someone who is in your custody 
as a detainee. And they were trying to tell the Department of Justice 
and the Department of Defense civilian lawyers: Do not go down this 
road. You are going to bite off more problems than it is worth.
  Admiral Lohr says that some of the techniques would violate the 
torture statute. I will read in more detail later what these memos are 
telling us the rules of the road are. But these are not from the ACLU. 
These are not from people who are soft on terrorism, who want to coddle 
foreign terrorists. These are all professional military lawyers who 
have dedicated their lives, with 20-plus year careers, to serving the 
men and women in uniform and protecting their Nation. They were giving 
a warning shot across the bow of the policymakers that there are 
certain corners you cannot afford to cut because you will wind up 
meeting yourself.
  What Senator McCain is trying to do is build upon their advice by 
putting in

[[Page S8797]]

place an interrogation technique that this country can be proud of, 
that we all will understand, and that can be implemented to make us 
safer without having a black eye throughout the world.
  I asked the question--when I went to GTMO with the chairman about a 
week or 2 ago--to all the interrogators there: Is there anything 
lacking in the Army Field Manual that would inhibit your ability to get 
good intelligence? And they said no. I asked: Could you live with the 
Army Field Manual as your guide and do your job? They said yes.
  The reason the Army Field Manual is a good source is because it has 
been part of who we are for years. People are trained on it. What was 
happening is, the Department of Justice, understandably, after 
September 11, wanted to come up with the most aggressive techniques 
possible to deal with foreign terrorists. But the JAGS are telling us 
you cannot look at this one event in isolation. You have to understand 
what we have been standing for for 60 years and what the law actually 
says. The DOJ's interpretation of the torture statute from a lawyer's 
point of view was absurd. And the JAGS were telling the policymakers: 
If you go down this road, you are going to get your own people in 
trouble. You are on a slippery slope. You are going to lose the moral 
high ground. This was 2003. And they were absolutely right.
  To Secretary Rumsfeld's credit, when he heard about the working group 
having problems with the DOJ's suggested interpretations of 
``interrogation,'' he reconvened and the techniques changed. But as 
Senator McCain has said very well, we need to bring certainty to this 
process of interrogating foreign terrorists to make sure we can get 
good, reliable information. We can do it in a way that people 
understand, our troops will not get in trouble, and we can show the 
world we are truly a rule-of-law nation.
  There is nothing inconsistent with interrogating people to get good 
information to protect our country and using the Army Field Manual. 
What has got us in trouble is when we try to make it up as we go, when 
we forget who we are, when we will not listen to people who have worn 
the uniform, who are in uniform, telling us: Do not go down this road, 
our people are trained to do it one way, you are confusing the heck out 
of them.
  What have we learned in the last 2 years? If you know what the rules 
are about interrogating anybody, come tell me because I can't figure it 
out. I have spent 20 years as an Air Force lawyer myself. There is much 
confusion, and confusion in war is dangerous. Anyone who misunderstands 
what we are doing here in terms of our view of terrorists is playing 
politics. No one supporting this amendment wants a foreign noncitizen 
terrorist not to be aggressively detained, prosecuted, if appropriate, 
and interrogated to make our country safer. We can prosecute, we can 
detain, and we can interrogate aggressively, but we have to have rules 
that our people can understand and don't deviate from who we are as a 
Nation. That is why I am supporting this amendment.
  Everyone who works at GTMO dealing with the 500 foreign noncitizen 
terrorist suspects, enemy combatants, has told me, because I asked the 
question, if you use the Army Field Manual, we have everything within 
that manual we need to do the job right. If you use the Army Field 
Manual, we will be back in a good place with the law. We will be back 
in a place where our people can understand what is going on. We will 
again capture the moral high ground which is the ultimate way to win 
this war.
  There is no downside to this. The upside is huge. We are able to get 
good information, not get our people in trouble, and have a better 
image in the world. That is why I am supporting this amendment.
  I have included these memos for the record. It would serve every 
Senator well to spend 5 or 10 minutes reading through them because 
these people were telling us in 2003, if you go down this road, the 
road we chose initially, you are going to get everybody involved in 
trouble. That is exactly what happened.
  I yield the floor.


                    Amendment No. 1556, As Modified

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I have amendment No. 1556 at the desk. I 
ask unanimous consent for its modification.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is so 
modified.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, is it the desire that I call up 1556 at 
this time?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes, Mr. President, I suggest that we have amended the 
present one which is referred to as the Army Field Manual, and I am a 
cosponsor on that. Now there is a second amendment. I submitted to the 
Senator a suggestion, I believe that is----
  Mr. McCAIN. It is modified.
  Mr. WARNER. Let's bring that up now and have that pending.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment 
No. 1556 be considered at this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. SESSIONS. Reserving the right to object, I know the discussion 
has been going on about the field manual issue. Is the Senator now 
going to that amendment or are we leaving that amendment? I would like 
to at least make a few remarks about that subject.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the field manual amendment has been laid 
aside for the moment. This goes to a second amendment which is----
  Mr. SESSIONS. Was there a unanimous consent request made for that?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair heard a unanimous consent request to 
move to a new amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. That is correct.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. And the Chair asked if there was objection. 
Did the Senator from Alabama object?
  Mr. SESSIONS. I object at this point because I don't understand what 
we are doing. I want to be able to speak on the amendment dealing with 
the field manual.
  Mr. WARNER. I believe the Senator has just come on the floor. We have 
been on this now for about 45 minutes covering the parameter of the 
issues that would be brought up. I respect his desire to speak. We will 
try to accommodate you at any point. I would urge that we allow the 
Senator from Arizona to perfect this amendment and then in due course 
he will speak to it. I will speak to it, and we will lay it aside. And 
we will find the time for the distinguished Senator from Alabama to 
speak.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Well, everybody has spoken for it. Nobody has spoken 
against it.
  Mr. McCAIN. Could I ask, maybe we could take a maximum of 5 minutes, 
3 or 4 minutes on this amendment, for which I had unanimous consent, 
and then go back to allow the Senator from Alabama to speak.
  Mr. WARNER. That is correct.
  Mr. SESSIONS. That would be fine. If I could have 10 minutes, if I 
could share a few thoughts on the previous amendment in the next 10 
minutes, I would be happy.
  Mr. WARNER. We definitely will make that happen. But I want to 
inquire of the Senator from South Carolina, you also have a third 
amendment. I am not sure of the status. You have it at the desk. You 
have spoken to it.
  Mr. GRAHAM. I would like at this time to submit it to the desk if I 
may.
  Mr. McCAIN. I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to propose this 
amendment, the Senator from Alabama be allowed to speak for 10 minutes, 
the amendment be set aside, and the Senator from South Carolina be 
allowed to propose his amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think that is a very orderly manner in 
which to accommodate. Then the Senator from Alabama--let's get the time 
remaining and I will yield some of my time to the Senator from Alabama.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The motion on the floor right now is to call 
up, as I understand it, amendment No. 1556 by the Senator from Arizona 
as modified.
  Mr. McCAIN. As modified.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Ms. STABENOW. Reserving the right to object, I don't intend to 
object, I understand we are working out some amendments. I also have an 
amendment I would like to offer. I wanted to raise, as the agreement is 
being put together, that I have the opportunity to do that.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I will assure you, working with the 
distinguished Senator from Michigan, we

[[Page S8798]]

will arrange--he has time immediately following the 1 hour being 
divided between three Senators and now a fourth. I want to make sure we 
have the time remaining to satisfy the needs of the Senator from 
Alabama. We now are proceeding on the second McCain amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to reporting amendment No. 
1556 by the Senator from Arizona?
  Mr. McCAIN. As modified.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. As modified. Without objection, it is so 
ordered. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 1556, as modified.

  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle G of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1073. PROHIBITION ON CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING 
                   TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT OF PERSONS UNDER 
                   CUSTODY OR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES 
                   GOVERNMENT.

       (a) In General.--No individual in the custody or under the 
     physical control of the United States Government, regardless 
     of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to 
     cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.
       (b) Presidential Waiver.--(1) The President may waive the 
     prohibition in subsection (a), on a case-by-case basis, if 
     the President--
       (A) determines that the waiver is required for a military 
     or national security necessity; and
       (B) submits the appropriate committees of Congress timely 
     notice of the exercise of the waiver.
       (2) The authority of the President under paragraph (1) may 
     not be delegated.
       (c) Construction.--Nothing in this section shall not be 
     construed to impose any geographical limitation on the 
     applicability of the prohibition against cruel, inhuman, or 
     degrading treatment or punishment under this section.
       (d) Limitation on Supersedure.--The provisions of this 
     section shall not be superseded, except by a provision of law 
     enacted after the date of the enactment of this Act which 
     specifically repeals, modifies, or supersedes the provisions 
     of this section.
       (e) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
       (A) the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations and 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations and 
     the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
     of Representatives.
       (2) The term ``cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
     punishment'' means the cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment 
     or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
     Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, as 
     defined in the United States Reservations, Declarations and 
     Understandings to the United Nations Convention Against 
     Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
     Treatment or Punishment done at New York, December 10, 1984.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we would like to have the Senator from 
Arizona take such time as he desires to explain this. I wish to be 
added as a cosponsor to this amendment. Then we will yield the floor to 
the Senator from Alabama to speak for up to 10 minutes on the subjects 
of these three amendments. Then the balance of the time will be 
accorded to the Senator from South Carolina to bring forth his 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will notify the Senators that the 
Chair is still working under the original previous order of an hour 
equally divided, 20 minutes to the Senator from South Carolina, 20 
minutes to the Senator from Virginia, and 20 minutes to the Senator 
from Arizona.
  Mr. WARNER. That is correct. Would the Chair advise of the three 
Senators in the original order, what is the time remaining for each.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona has 2 minutes 
remaining. The Senator from Virginia has 9 minutes remaining.
  Mr. WARNER. I can't hear the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has 9 minutes 
remaining. The Senator from South Carolina has 2 minutes--10 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. WARNER. I yield from my 9 minutes such time as the Senator from 
Arizona may need.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, with all due respect to the chairman, I 
don't think that is going to quite work because the Senator from 
Alabama needs 10 minutes. And if you are using your 9 and I only have 
2, that doesn't get it done. I ask unanimous consent that I have 3 
minutes to discuss my amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. That is an additional 3 minutes. I ask unanimous consent 
that following that, the Senator from Alabama be recognized for 10 
minutes in addition to the unanimous consent agreement, and then the 
Senator from South Carolina be allowed to propose his amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on this 
amendment and the previous amendment, No. 1557.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request to ask for 
the yeas and nays on two amendments at this time?
  Without objection, it is in order to so request.
  Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator 
Warner, Senator Lindsey Graham, and Senator Collins be added as 
cosponsors. I believe we are still scheduled for a vote at 5:30.
  Mr. President, this amendment would prohibit cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment of persons in the detention of the U.S. Government. 
The amendment doesn't sound like anything new. That is because it 
isn't. The prohibition has been a longstanding principle in both law 
and policy in the United States. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights adopted in 1948 states simply that: No one shall be subject to 
torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the U.S. 
is a signatory, is the same. The Binding Convention Against Torture, 
negotiated by the Reagan administration, ratified by the Senate, 
prohibits cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. On last year's DOD 
authorization bill, the Senate passed a bipartisan amendment 
reaffirming that no detainee in U.S. custody can be subject to torture 
or cruel treatment as the U.S. has long defined these terms. All of 
this seems to be common sense and in accordance with longstanding 
American values.
  I will be glad to explain that amendment more if anyone wants. In the 
meantime, I know the Senator from Alabama is waiting.
  I yield back the remainder of my time on this amendment. I ask 
unanimous consent we return at this time to amendment No. 1557, 
according to the previous unanimous consent agreement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
Senator from Alabama is recognized for 10 minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. If the Senator will withhold, I want to endorse the 
McCain amendment. Essentially what he is doing is codifying what is 
policy now. I think it is of such importance that it would require this 
bill to do so.
  I yield the floor.


                           Amendment No. 1557

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama is recognized for 10 
minutes.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I will share a little bit of the history 
of what has happened, as I recall it. I am sorry, I just got back from 
Alabama and was not able to participate earlier in the debate. We have 
had maybe 29 hearings involving prisoner abuse. That is a lot of 
hearings. I serve on the Judiciary and Armed Services Committees. 
Probably 20 of those have been in those 2 committees of which I have 
been a member and tried to participate as much as I could in each one 
of them. I remember that the U.S. military announced they had problems 
in Abu Ghraib with prisoner abuse. They indicated they were conducting 
an investigation of it. Members of the Senate, like dogs that chase a 
car down the road, sometimes I thought they thought they were making 
the car go because they were chasing it.
  The military commenced, on its own accord, an investigation that has 
culminated in the conviction of a number of people who have gone to 
jail for rather substantial periods of time for

[[Page S8799]]

violating the policies of the Department of Defense and the laws of war 
on those prisoners in Abu Ghraib. It took place on a midnight shift and 
was not justified. It was beyond the law, and they have been punished 
for it. That has been morphed into allegations about what happened at 
Guantanamo.
  We apprehended 17,000 prisoners in Afghanistan and Iraq. We brought 
700 to Guantanamo. There are only 500 left. Some of those are the worst 
of the worst. Allegations were made that they were being abused. A 
thorough investigation has been conducted of that. Once again, we had a 
committee hearing to rehear the report. General Schmidt said there were 
24,000 investigations. He found three areas in which he felt things had 
gone awry at Guantanamo. All happened right quickly after 9/11, not 
going on now, because I was there at Guantanamo Friday a week ago and 
they absolutely assured us, Senator Graham and others who were with us, 
Chairman Warner, that nothing like that is going on today.
  But what were the three complaints? Mr. Khatani, the 20th hijacker, 
he found, had been abused cumulatively, three different things 
happened. He was interrogated for 20 hours. He was made to listen to 
loud music. And at certain times he had been put in shackles. The 
general found that was not torture under the definition of torture. It 
was not inhuman. But together, they violated the standards the U.S. 
military adheres to, and he felt that was in error.
  One individual was screaming loudly repeatedly and would not stop. 
Someone said he should be stopped. They found some duct tape, and 
Americans, I guess, are good with that. They put it around his mouth. 
He took it off, and they did it again. He took it off, and they did it 
again. So they put it all the way around his head. He felt that was an 
abuse. A woman interviewer-interrogator, perhaps losing her temper, or 
whatever, issued a threat to one of the prisoners and their family. 
There were 3 out of 24,000 matters in Guantanamo.
  So, first, I reject the idea that this Defense Department and our 
Army and our military is out of control, is confused about what their 
powers and duties and responsibilities are. I reject that. I don't 
believe that is accurate.
  Now, the field manual is good. We had a number of witnesses before 
the committee. In one of the many hearings, General Taguba and several 
others, when asked, or they just volunteered that the current rules of 
interrogation under the field manual aren't appropriately applicable to 
all the kinds of new threats we face today and the kind of prisoners we 
deal with today. These prisoners today are not under the Geneva 
Conventions and aren't prisoners of war. They are unlawful combatants. 
They sneak into countries. They don't wear a uniform. They don't carry 
their arms openly. They make bombs. They direct them not at military 
targets but at men, women, and children who are going about their 
peaceful business. So it is indisputable that the Geneva Conventions 
don't apply to them.
  We have a statute in this country that prohibits torture of anybody 
in our control, and that statute stands firm and clear, and that is 
certainly a basis for a criminal prosecution for anybody who goes too 
far in interrogating witnesses.
  Now, you are limited in what you can do when you interrogate a 
prisoner of war. We are told to give only name, rank, and serial 
number, and others have similar instructions from their countries. You 
are limited as to how much you can interrogate them and how much you 
can expect them to say. These people are not prisoners of war. They are 
terrorists, unlawful combatants, determined to savage the peaceful 
people of Spain and their railroad, the people of London, or the people 
of New York City. Thank God that because we have been aggressive and 
been after them and obtained intelligence from interviews and 
interrogation and techniques within the rules of warfare, we have been 
able to prevent another attack on this country--Lord be praised--for 
almost 4 years now. It can happen again at any time.
  I am proud of what our men and women are doing. I was at one of the 
committee hearings when a young lieutenant commander in the Navy 
testified that the prosecutor blocked him from interviewing a witness. 
He told him what to do. He told him he could only plead guilty.
  I said: Sir, you are a lieutenant commander in the U.S. Navy--I was 
in a JAG officer slot. Unlike Senator Graham, I was not trained at the 
JAG officer school. But I had some training in it and taught the laws 
of warfare to our soldiers in the Army Reserve. At any rate, this guy 
said he was ordered by the prosecutor.
  I said: I never heard of a defense counsel saying a prosecutor could 
order them around.
  He said: Well, he told me I could not see the prisoner.
  I said: You could not see the prisoner?
  He said: Except at limited times.
  It was out of this that he came up with this bizarre allegation that 
he was somehow defending the terrorist. He was given a letter, and he 
said he could only represent him to plead guilty. The letter that 
appointed him to defend the guy said he was to represent him in all 
categories. I was disappointed in the quality of his complaints. I 
don't think they held up to be nearly what he was saying publicly. 
Whatever got into people's craw about how these matters were handled is 
a bit out of whack.
  Let's say this: The field manual is the manual that controls our 
handling of a lot of things in the Army, including interrogation. But 
the President of the United States is Commander in Chief of the 
military, and these kinds of prisoners, as the witnesses told us in 
committee, were not contemplated when the field manual was written. 
Different techniques could be legitimate against them that would not be 
legitimate against lawful combatants--the kinds of people we have seen 
so many times in the history of warfare. It is a weird thing. We should 
not treat them inhumanely. It is an order of the President that we 
cannot. We cannot torture them. We have a criminal statute that defines 
that and says you cannot do it. You can go to jail if you do.
  I ask unanimous consent for 2 more minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I wonder if 
we can line up some time at this point. I will not object, but after he 
is recognized, I believe then the majority has additional time for 
another amendment going up to what time?
  Mr. WARNER. We are operating under an original 1-hour agreement that 
was modified to give 10 minutes to the Senator from Alabama. I think 
under the original 1 hour the Senator from Virginia has time and the 
Senator from South Carolina has time. Would I be correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. The Senator from 
Virginia has 9 minutes remaining. The Senator from South Carolina has 
10 minutes remaining. We still show the Senator from Arizona, Mr. 
McCain, with 2 minutes remaining.
  The Chair also notifies Senators that under the previous order, at 5 
o'clock, the Senate is to go to 30 minutes of debate on the Americans 
with Disabilities resolution.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that is followed by a vote, is my 
understanding.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, it is scheduled for 5:30.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that immediately 
following the completion of those three time periods on the Republican 
side, I be allocated 10 minutes on this side, which I will provide 
equally between the junior Senator from Michigan, the Senator from 
Washington, and myself, so that four amendments can be introduced and 
laid aside.
  Mr. WARNER. Reserving the right to object, and I do not wish to 
object, it seems to me that reality dictates that in 6 minutes we will 
go on the ADA; am I correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. In effect, the Senator from South Carolina, unless he 
wants to take the 6 minutes and put his amendment in, we would have to 
come back to it at the conclusion of the ADA. Would that be acceptable?

  Mr. GRAHAM. I don't want to stop Senator Sessions from finishing. I 
can come back.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The unanimous consent request right now is 2 
additional minutes for the Senator from Alabama.

[[Page S8800]]

  Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, we have not had any time 
prior to the ADA matter, and it was intended that we have some time. 
There is a prepared UC that would perhaps assist us, which has been 
handed to us. I wonder if the manager will read this.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that 
notwithstanding the previous order, the Senate resume consideration of 
S. 207 at 5:15 today, with 15 minutes to debate under the control of 
Senator Harkin. I further ask that following the use or yielding back 
of the time, the Senate proceed to a rollcall vote on the resolution as 
under the previous order.
  Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, I ask that that be modified 
to allow 10 minutes between 5:15 and 5:30 to be granted to this side 
for the introduction of those amendments. They will be introduced, with 
a minute on each, and then set aside.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I believe that will accommodate our 
distinguished colleague from South Carolina to introduce his amendment 
beginning now, concluding at 5:10, at which time the Chair will 
recognize the junior Senator from Michigan for a period not to exceed 5 
minutes.
  Mr. LEVIN. No.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, can we include my 2 minutes?
  Mr. LEVIN. The junior Senator from Michigan, 2 minutes; the Senator 
from Washington, 2 minutes; and me for 1 minute.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator modify the unanimous consent 
request?
  Mr. WARNER. I do so to accommodate Senator Levin. We have 2 minutes 
now for the Senator from Alabama to complete his remarks before the 
Chair recognizes the Senator from South Carolina; is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request by the 
Senator from Alabama?
  Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, does that include the UC 
which the Senator from Virginia read?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The separate unanimous consent request of the 
Senator from Virginia would incorporate that. There is one request for 
2 additional minutes for the Senator from Alabama; 9 minutes for the 
Senator from Virginia--
  Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, the Democratic leader is 
going to want 2 minutes prior to the vote on leadership time, or prior 
to 5:15. You all figure it out.
  Mr. WARNER. We certainly want to accommodate the Democratic leader. 
The Senator from South Carolina indicated that perhaps he would like to 
take up his amendment following the vote, giving him then such time as 
he requires, and giving the Senator from Michigan such time as he may 
require. So perhaps let us allocate the remaining time between now and 
5:15 between the Senator from Alabama, the two colleagues on that side, 
and the distinguished Democratic leader.
  Mr. GRAHAM. That is acceptable to me.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, following the completion of the rollcall 
vote, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from South Carolina be 
recognized.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the Chair understands the now-modified 
unanimous consent request, it is a request that the Senator from 
Alabama be recognized for 2 additional minutes, the time between that 
and 5:15 would be the Senator from Michigan, and at 5:15, under the 
previous order, the Senate would consider the Americans with 
Disabilities resolution, followed by a vote at 5:30, followed by the 
Senator from South Carolina being recognized to offer his amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that is correct.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. GRAHAM. Reserving the right to object, I would like to be able to 
state some general areas of agreement and disagreement concerning 
Senator Sessions' statement. Is that possible when I introduce my 
amendment?
  Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if the Senator will yield. We need only 7\1/2\ 
minutes before 5:15. I wonder if the chairman will agree to this: After 
Senator Sessions, go to the Senator from South Carolina for 5 minutes, 
and then come to me.
  Mr. WARNER. That is acceptable.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Alabama is recognized for 2 minutes.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I will try to conclude and sum this up.
  This country was attacked by a very dangerous group of people. I 
certainly respect my colleagues' concern and commitment that our 
prisoners be treated humanely and consistent with the rules of war. I 
have also said that the rules of the Geneva Conventions do not apply to 
these unlawful combatants. The field manual is an Army Department of 
Defense document that sets the rules for our conduct. But the DOD can 
alter that.
  As I understand what this amendment would do, it would make the field 
manual, with regard to the section involving interrogation and 
intelligence, the equivalent of law; that before the Army or Department 
of Defense could make any changes in those field manuals, somebody 
would have to offer legislation in the House and the Senate, which 
would be subject to a filibuster and maybe we could fix it and maybe we 
could not. It becomes force of law. I think that is a mistake.

  Finally, alterations in procedure by which these prisoners or 
detainees were handled was done with review by the Department of 
Justice. We had Attorney General Gonzales, when he was White House 
counsel and Attorney General, testify about how it came about and all 
the legal research that went into it. We had the Department of Defense 
leadership discuss this. They reviewed it. The generals reviewed the 
heightened techniques personally, individually, and carefully on a 
case-by-case basis, and they recommended this general at Guantanamo, 
Miller, be disciplined because these combination of events exceeded 
what was proper. It was overruled later, but that is how seriously they 
take this.
  I don't think this is the way to fix this situation. Some prisoners 
need to be handled differently than others. We should not bind by law 
what the field manual states.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired. Under the 
unanimous consent agreement, the Senator from South Carolina is 
recognized.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I would like to build on what Senator 
Sessions said. If this amendment did the things suggested, I would 
support it. One, the Army Field Manual is being revised, as we speak, 
with two groups in mind--lawful combatants and unlawful combatants. The 
amendment says that the Army Field Manual be the guide in whatever form 
it is in. It does not lock in this version. They are going to have a 
version part of it classified so our enemy does not have a chance to 
prepare for interrogation techniques that deal with lawful combatants 
and unlawful combatants.
  The reason we are doing that is because what the JAGs told us over 2 
years ago. The common thread among our recommendations is concern for 
servicemembers.
  If we put people on the line in this war in terror, we want to give 
them everything they need as far as equipment. If we put people on the 
line in terms of handling detainees, we want to give them everything 
they need, the tools to get good information, but what we do not want 
to do is put our own people at risk.
  We are trying to armor all our vehicles. What we are trying to do 
with the people who are holding these terrorists and interrogating them 
is not getting them in trouble. The Office of Legal Counsel, on 27 
February 2003, from a Marine general, not exactly the ACLU, said:

       The common thread among our recommendations is concern for 
     our service members. The Office of Legal Counsel does not 
     represent the services, thus understandably concern for 
     service members does not reflect in their opinion. Notably, 
     their opinion is violent on the foreign views of 
     international law.

  This is what the judge advocate general of the Army said:

       I recommend the aggressive counterresistant interrogation 
     techniques under consideration be vetted with the Army 
     intelligence community before a final decision on their use 
     is made. Some of these techniques do not comport with Army 
     doctrine as set forth in the Field Manual, FM 34-52, 
     intelligence interrogation, and may be of questionable 
     practical value in obtaining reliable information of those 
     being interrogated.

  What we are trying to do is have a guide our troops can understand 
with

[[Page S8801]]

two parts--one for lawful combatants and one for unlawful enemy 
combatants. We will know what the rules of the road will be. We are 
putting congressional approval on those rules.
  We have had the White House, Congress, and eventually the courts 
saying you can aggressively interrogate prisoners not covered by the 
Geneva Conventions. We have been all over the board for the last couple 
of years. We are trying to bring it together in symmetry where the 
military can write the rules. They know better than I do. I am not 
saying I am an expert on interrogations. They are going to write the 
rules the way they need to be written, and Congress is going to say you 
are good to go.
  These JAGs were telling us you have confused concepts, so we are 
trying to do away with that confusion to make it stronger, not weaker, 
to make us better at gathering intelligence and avoid the problems we 
have had in the last 2 years.
  I think it is a very smart thing to do. I look forward to trying to 
help change it if it needs to be changed, but nobody is locking the 
military into a set of rules that does not allow them to aggressively 
get what they need to make us safe. We are trying to provide the 
military and all those in charge of detainees clear guidance so they 
will have the flexibility they need and we will not get our people in 
trouble. That is what we have been working on for 2 years. We are at a 
point where we can actually accomplish something that will be good for 
this country, good for the military, and help win this war on terror. 
Part of this war is about image.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, I yield.
  Mr. SESSIONS. It did say ``not authorized in the field manual.'' But 
the Senator from South Carolina interprets that to mean that the 
military could amend it at any point in time.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Absolutely.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I think that is more acceptable, but even then the 
policies in the field manual should reflect the executive branch, it 
seems to me, being able to use extraordinary events and extraordinary 
circumstances.
  Mr. GRAHAM. And it will be. There will be a section that is specific 
for unlawful enemy combatants. That is not a traditional way to deal 
with them versus POWs.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I thank the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Michigan has the time remaining up to 5:15 p.m. under his control.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to my colleague from 
Michigan.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.


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