XVIII. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY’S SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE ON IRAQI SUSPECT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION SITES WITH UNITED NATIONS INSPECTORS

A. Background

(U) In November 2002, the President issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-21 directing the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) to provide all necessary intelligence and support to United Nations (UN) weapons inspections in Iraq. On January 3, 2003, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) issued guidance to senior IC officials emphasizing that priority shall be given to collecting, analyzing, and producing intelligence on Iraqi weapons programs that is immediately shareable with inspection teams or that is necessary to ensure their safety and security.

(U) Starting in December 2002, Senator Carl Levin sent a series of requests to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) seeking detailed information on the extent to which the IC was sharing intelligence information on Iraqi suspect weapons of mass destruction sites with UN inspectors.

(U) In mid-February 2003, the DCI testified in open session before both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee that the CIA had shared all information of value it possessed on high-, and moderate-priority suspect sites with UN inspectors. Similar assertions were made by the DCI and the National Security Advisor in two March 6, 2003, letters sent to Senator Levin.

(U) At the Committee’s April 30, 2003, closed hearing, Senator Levin voiced concerns that the information the CIA had provided to him and the Committee on the subject was unresponsive, incomplete and inconsistent.

(U) Senator Levin’s primary concern was that unclassified written and oral statements made by the DCI to the effect that, by mid-February 2003, the U.S. had shared all information of value on high and moderate priority suspect sites with UN inspectors, were not accurate and contrary to a classified body of information obtained from the CIA.

(U) At the hearing, Chairman Pat Roberts and Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, joined by Senator John Warner, Chairman of the Senate Armed Service Committee,
echoed Senator Levin’s concerns. Chairman Roberts directed that the Committee staff, pursuant to the Committee’s oversight responsibilities, undertake a more in-depth review of how the CIA carried out its information-sharing responsibilities during the November 2002-March 2003 time frame:

Chairman Roberts: “... the numbers don’t add up. That’s why it’s caused great concern on my part and that of Senator Rockefeller and more especially Senator Warner and Senator Levin. If we could get that straightened out – and I’m going to make a suggestion that we have staff, Senator Levin, work with CIA to see if we cannot have a briefing, if not a hearing . . .” (SSCI Hearing, April 30, 2003)

(U) The Committee staff met with representatives of the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to discuss how and to what extent the U.S. Intelligence Community shared intelligence information on Iraqi suspect weapons of mass destruction (WMD) sites with UN inspectors. The Committee staff also traveled to the UN in New York City and interviewed Dr. Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), and Mr. Jim Corcoran, head of intelligence for UNMOVIC.

B. The Lead-up to Renewed Inspections

(U) The United States Government’s relationship with UN inspectors in Iraq goes back to 1991, when the Arms Control Intelligence Staff (ACIS) created an office called the Iraq Sanctions Monitoring Task Force. The task force included representation across the IC but was largely staffed from the CIA. The task force supported the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors through a routine exchange of information on suspected WMD sites until UN inspections in Iraq ended in 1998. Quarterly briefings between the IC and the UN continued, however, from 1998 to 2001.

(U) In September/October 2002, the DCI’s Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center (WNPAC) created a United States Government inspections support staff, numbering between 12-18 persons drawn from the CIA, National Security Agency (NSA), DIA and National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)67, to support the reconstituted UN inspections efforts in Iraq under UNMOVIC

67NIMA has recently been renamed the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).

According to CIA’s officials, UNMOVIC’s hiring was more diversified among member countries and, as a result, new inspectors faced a significant learning curve vice the corporate knowledge attained by UNSCOM inspectors in the late-1990s. The hiring of the new UNMOVIC inspectors also meant that it took time for the United States Government to establish security procedures and a level of trust with the officials.

In late October 2002, the United States Government brought security and communications network officials to its initial meeting with UN officials in New York City to advise UNMOVIC on security considerations and to get the measure of the organization as a whole. A procedure was established to use State Department officials at the UN to facilitate the passing of information from the United States Government to UNMOVIC. Also at this initial meeting, there was an exchange of programmatic information on what the UN was hoping to accomplish once the inspections in Iraq began.

C. The Sharing of Information – the “Pull” Side of the Exchange

UNMOVIC began requesting information on suspect sites from the United States Government through the State Department office at the UN Mission in November 2002. The UN’s “pull” of information was in the form of two requests: 1) a request for in-depth data on 33 sites that the UN considered priority sites for inspection; and 2) a lower priority request for line drawings (i.e., site orientation maps detailing building outlines and locations) on 245 sites from the UN’s historical files.

The United States Government established a review process in response to the UN requests involving approximately ten to 25 persons depending on the type of site. The focus of the review process was on what information would be shared in response to the request and how it would be communicated to the UN. According to the United States Government officials, the site packages prepared in response to the request were not significantly altered during the clearance process that followed.

The United States Government could only identify the location of 31 of the 33 sites requested by the UN. In-depth, or “full,” site packages were provided to the UN on
13 of the 31 sites, with site-specific briefings also provided on five of these 13 packages. Line drawings only were provided on the remaining 18 sites.

Of the 245 site line drawings requested, the United States Government provided 42 before the exchange of information ended in March 2003. According to the United States Government officials, these line drawing packages were being produced at a rate of about one a day. According to UN officials, the United States Government's partial delivery of line drawings did not hinder UNMOVIC inspections.

D. The Sharing of Information – the “Push” Side of the Exchange

(U) Concurrent with its efforts to respond to the UN’s request for site information, the CIA began an internal review process in October 2002 to determine what information known about sites considered by the CIA to be top suspect sites should be shared with the UN. This untitled list of sites, set forth in a series of spreadsheets organized by WMD discipline, started small and eventually grew into what would later be called the IC Master Inspection List (IC MIL). Though, as detailed below, there are other IC lists pertaining to suspected Iraqi WMD sites, the IC MIL is the focus of this staff review.

(U) Three documents provided guidance on the Intelligence Community’s support for weapons inspections in Iraq: (a) an October 10, 2002, e-mail from the CIA to Intelligence Community officials initiating the inspections support process; (b) National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-21: Support for Inspections in Iraq, dated November 2002; and (c) the DCI’s January 3, 2003, memorandum designating the Director of WINPAC, as the executive agent responsible for coordinating and facilitating all intelligence activities in support of UNMOVIC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and forwarding the December 10, 2002, concept of operations for carrying out NSPD-21 Policy.

(U) The process of prioritizing suspect sites began with Intelligence Community officials representing each discipline area (i.e., biological weapons, chemical weapons, nuclear, etc.) being asked to identify the top ten priority sites for inspection. The IC MIL began with about 50-60 sites and ultimately grew to 148 top suspect sites.

(U) According to the CIA’s January 24, 2003, letter to Senator Levin, there were approximately 550 sites on the Intelligence Community’s suspect site list. The 148 sites identified on the IC MIL were considered the “top suspect sites for inspection purposes;
that is, inspectors are more likely to find something at those sites than other sites.” The 148 top suspect sites were further prioritized in the IC MIL as “high,” “medium,” and “low” priority: 37 were high priority, 68 were medium priority, and 54 were low priority. (Note: the sum of priority sites is 159 not 148 due to the multiple listing of some sites by type of WMD site. For example, one facility is double counted as both a medium priority biological weapons site and a medium priority chemical weapons site. In addition, according to the information provided by the CIA, nine sites on the IC MIL had no priority designation assigned to them.)

(U) The IC MIL prioritization process was based on which site was the best candidate for finding evidence of proscribed WMD activity, including where the Intelligence Community had recent actionable intelligence.

(II) According to the CIA officials, the UNMOVIC inspectors were overwhelmed quickly after beginning inspections in November 2002, and primarily conducted inventory inspections through December. The CIA officials were concerned about the ability of the UN to handle information from the IC MIL being “pushed” to them. As a result, the CIA timed the release of sensitive information to the UN so the inspectors could quickly inspect and avoid a lengthy delay between receipt of the information and subsequent inspection. The CIA noted that they had circumstantial evidence intelligence that the Iraqis had penetrated the UN inspections process and had received advance warning of some inspections.

(II) According to United States Government officials, the highest priority suspect sites were briefed to the UN first, followed by lower priority sites. However, the chronology of when the United States Government briefed site packages to the UN indicates that the order of briefings did not always follow this IC MIL high-medium-low priority progression. Certain suspect sites designated medium and low priority in the IC MIL were briefed to the UN before some high priority sites. Additionally, as detailed below, some high priority suspect sites were not briefed to the UN at all.

(II) It is important to note that the UN was receiving intelligence information from governments other than the United States. The UN estimates that 60% of all the intelligence information it received came from the United States Government, with the balance coming largely from foreign government services. UN officials told the Committee staff that although U.S. intelligence leads had run dry, the UN had
intelligence leads from other foreign intelligence services that had not been investigated when inspections were stopped.

By the time UN inspections were halted in early March 2003, the United States Government had briefed 52 site packages to the UN inspectors. An additional 15 lower priority site packages, labeled by the United States Government as “low-tier sites,” were passed to the UN but not briefed, bringing the total of site packages the United States Government took from its internal prioritized list of 148 sites and “pushed” to the UN to 67. However, as noted below, the 15 “lower tier sites” included a mixture of high, medium and low sites.

These 67 IC MIL site packages were briefed to the UN as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 31,</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 6,</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 10,</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 3,</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 21,</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 3,</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 11,</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No date provided</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At some point in February 2003, according to the United States Government officials, UNMOVIC told the United States Government that the UN inspectors in Iraq were overwhelmed and that the United States Government should stop sending site information. The request was made orally by the UNMOVIC head of intelligence, who confirmed this account but could not recall when in February he made the request of United States Government officials. Neither United States Government officials nor the
UNMOVIC head of intelligence recalled when or if a request was made by UNMOVIC for the information-sharing to be renewed. As noted above, the United States Government forwarded nine site briefing packages to the UN in March in addition to the five it provided in late February.

E. Information Shared Compared to the Intelligence Community’s Master Inspection List

A comparison of the 67 site packages against the IC MIL’s three priority rankings show that the United States Government shared site packages on:

- 20 of the 37 IC MIL high priority sites;
- 25 of the 68 IC MIL medium priority sites; and
- 13 of the 54 IC MIL low priority sites.

Nine site packages provided to the UN on Iraqi underground facilities were late additions to the IC MIL and as a result not given a priority designation.

According to United States Government officials, the United States Government shared information with the UN by three means:

- the UN request for site information – the “pull” of information (13 site packages, of which five were briefed to the UN by the United States Government, and 60 line drawing packages);
- the IC MIL site packages – the “push” of information (67 total sites); and
- the oral and written exchange of information during discussions between United States Government and UN officials, much of which preceded the establishment of UNMOVIC in 2002. (CIA officials gave the Committee staff a list of dates when materials were briefed to the UN but did not provide the necessary documentation to allow the staff to verify the substance of the information exchanged by this means.)
(U) Information on the IC MIL sites was shared with the UN as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IC MIL Priority (# sites)</th>
<th>IC MIL Briefing</th>
<th>UN Requested</th>
<th>Information Exchange</th>
<th>No Sharing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High (37)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med. (68)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (54)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underground Facilities (9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note: the sum of priority sites is 159 not 148 due to the multiple listing of some sites by type of WMD site.)

(1) Of the 44 sites on the 148-site IC MIL where the IC states no information was shared with the UN – four high, 17 medium, and 23 low priority top suspect sites – the IC provided a number of explanations as to why an exchange did not occur. In a May 8, 2003, chart prepared in response to Senator Levin’s information requests, the following explanations were provided by the CIA as to why information was not shared with the UN on these 44 priority sites:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># of Priority Sites</th>
<th>Reason for not sharing information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High 2 Med. 8 Low 7</td>
<td>“Historical site(^{68}) well known to UNMOVIC. No new actionable intelligence”/ “No new information to brief.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 0 4 = 4</td>
<td>“Historical site, the present use of this facility is unknown.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 2 0 = 3</td>
<td>“New site disclosed by Iraq in 7 December CAFCD [Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Declaration]”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 0 3 = 3</td>
<td>“Site previously briefed. No new actionable intelligence.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 0 2 = 2</td>
<td>“No new, actionable intelligence”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{68}\) Site revisited by UNMOVIC many times over the years.

- 411 -
1 0 0 = 1 "Not briefed due to cultural sensitivities."
    [This site is a graveyard and the CIA felt the UN inspectors
    would not want to exhume corpses.]
0 1 0 = 1 "Unlocated facility within large presidential compound."
0 1 0 = 1 "Location not yet identified."
0 1 0 = 1 "IAEA has independent information on site. No new
    actionable intelligence."
0 1 0 = 1 "UNMOVIC inspected this site before we were able to
    brief."
0 1 0 = 1 "No activity noted since 2000."
0 1 0 = 1 "Historical supervisory role for aircraft used in early UAV
    development."
0 1 0 = 1 [No explanation was provided by the CIA on this site.]
0 0 1 = 1 "Site of interest, but no new, actionable intelligence."
0 0 1 = 1 "Full site package on [redacted], now
    occupying this site, provided to UNMOVIC."
0 0 1 = 1 "Possible chemical site of unknown purpose. Possibly
    [redacted] visited by IAEA in Dec 02."
0 0 1 = 1 "This is a mining facility, no new actionable intelligence."
0 0 1 = 1 "Subset of [redacted] High Explosive (HE) Test Facility."
0 0 1 = 1 "Historical interest; Test stand is derelict."
F. Multiple Intelligence Community Lists

There are no fewer than five Intelligence Community lists dealing with Iraqi sites related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) activity. Not until early May 2003, over four months after Senator Levin began asking the CIA for detailed information about how and to what extent the Intelligence Community was sharing intelligence information with UN inspectors, did the CIA provide a full and detailed explanation of these multiple lists. The definition and site information contained below was provided to the Committee staff on May 9, 2003:

- **Iraq WMD Program Collection Support Brief (CSB) (527 sites):** A comprehensive reference guide for collectors. The CSB is a field reference for collectors that provides a baseline tool.

- **The Committee received the CSB in December 2002. In that version of the CSB, a total of 146 sites were designated “high” (81 sites) or “moderate” (65 sites).**

- **WMD Master Site List (WMSL) (578 sites as of April 1, 2003):** Developed by the U.S. Central Command to support military operational planning and coordinated within the Intelligence Community, the WMSL identifies the totality of sites that are suspected of having possible associations to nuclear, biological, or chemical warfare and delivery systems. One of the contributing lists for the WMSL was the CSB, so there is significant duplication between these two lists.

(U) Sites on the WMSL are assigned one of five priority designations, defined as follows:
• Priority 1 (55 sites) – “Best candidate sites to locate nuclear, biological, chemical, radiological weapons, agents, related materials, delivery systems, or evidence of their production and/or storage.”

• Priority 2 (55 sites) – “Sites likely to be associated with proscribed WMD and ballistic missile activity.”

• Priority 3 (132 sites) – “Sites that previously supported WMD/delivery programs or show evidence of ongoing support.”

• Priority 4 (179 sites) – “Sites with possible capability to support WMD or delivery system programs, to include dual-use sites.”

• Priority 5 (157 sites) – “Historical WMD sites considered inactive or unlikely to currently be assisting WMD or missile programs.”

(U) Of the 578 sites on the WMSL, 110 are either Priority 1 or Priority 2 sites. The existence of the WMSL was first disclosed to Senator Levin April 3, 2003, in response to his letter to the DIA about a March 30, 2003, newspaper article referencing the existence of the list. In his April 3, 2003, letter forwarding the WMSL to Senator Levin, DIA Director Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby stated that the 110 Priority 1 and Priority 2 sites “are considered by the IC to be the primary Iraqi sites with the highest probability of locating evidence of WMD programs and activities.”

• (U) Iraq Master Site List (IMSL) (943 sites): The IMSL is an omnibus DIA list of Iraqi sites related to WMD programs and delivery systems, counterterrorism targets, prisons or prisoner of war camps, and regime issues (including leadership and archives) to guide detailed sensitive site exploitation during Phase IV (stability operations) of Operation Iraqi Freedom. All WMSL sites were incorporated into the IMSL on April 16, 2003. Priority 1 and Priority 2 WMSL sites were given an overall priority of 1, while lower exploitation priority numbers were increased by one, to conform to the definitions in the IMSL.

• (U) Intelligence Community Master Inspection List (IC MIL) (148 sites): The IC MIL is a compilation of WMD sites of concern at which the Intelligence Community considered inspectors would be more likely to find evidence of a proscribed program or activity. These sites were grouped into high, medium and low value sites, depending on the Intelligence Community’s assessment of recent
activities suggesting ongoing WMD association or other intelligence information that the sites were worth inspecting. As noted above, the 148 sites were designated as high, medium, or low priority.

(U) While the CIA's January 24, 2003, letter to Senator Levin mentions that the CIA considered 150 sites to be "top suspect sites for inspection purposes," the existence of the IC MIL was not disclosed to Senator Levin until the CIA's April 24, 2003, letter. An actual copy of the list was subsequently provided to Senator Levin and the Committee staff on May 7, 2003.

- (U) List of Sites Briefed to UN Inspectors (67 sites): Those sites where the Intelligence Community had information it believed either was not known by UNMOVIC or the IAEA, or would provide the inspectors value-added, actionable intelligence.

(U) Senator Levin requested this list of sites from the CIA on January 13, 2003, and was denied. After numerous appeals, the CIA eventually acquiesced and provided the list to Senator Levin on January 29, 2003, and updated it periodically until the sharing of information with the UN ceased in March.

G. Statements Made by Administration Officials about the Sharing of Information

(U) During the time when the CIA was sharing information on suspected WMD sites with the UN (i.e. December 31, 2002 - March 11, 2003), unclassified written and oral statements were made by DCI Tenet and other Administration officials on the extent to which the Intelligence Community had shared information with inspection officials:

- (U) Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Open Hearing – February 11, 2003

**Senator Levin:** "My question to you is: When will we be completing the sharing of information with the U.N. inspectors?"

**Director Tenet:** "Sir, we have given the U.N. inspectors and UNMOVIC every site that we have that is of high or moderate value, where there is proven intelligence to lead to a potential outcome – every site we have."

**Director Tenet:** "... All I can tell you is we have given them everything we have and provided every site at our disposal, and we cooperate with our foreign
colleagues to give them – we have held nothing back from sites that we believe, based on credible intelligence, could be fruitful for these inspections.”

Senator Levin: “I just must tell you that is news. That is a very different statement than we have received before.”

Director Tenet: “Sir, I was briefed last night, and I think we owe you an apology. I don’t know that you have gotten the full flavor of this. But in going through this last night, I can tell you with confidence that we have given them every site.”

Senate Armed Services Committee Open Hearing – February 12, 2003

Director Tenet: “We, the American intelligence community, have had an intelligence exchange with the United Nations on Iraq and WMD in sensitive sites for over ten years... There is, therefore, a very strong common understanding of sites of potential interest to inspectors, whether they were UNSCOM inspectors or UNMOVIC inspectors or IAEA inspectors.”

“... When the inspections began, we drew up a list of suspect sites which we believe may have a continuing association with Iraq’s WMD programs. The list is dynamic. It changes according to available intelligence or other information we receive. Of this set number of suspect sites, we identified a specific number as being highest interest, highest value or moderate value because of recent activities suggesting ongoing WMD association or other intelligence information that we received. As I said yesterday, we have briefed all of these high value and moderate value sites to UNMOVIC and IAEA.”

“Of the remaining sites of lower interest on this suspect site list, I had my analysts review all of them last night to see what we had shared with UNSCOM, with UNMOVIC, and with IAEA. We identified a handful, one handful of sites which may not have been known to the UNSCOM inspectors that we will pass to them. Now, the important thing to note is, in addition, we continue to provide additional site information to UNSCOM [sic] either in response to their questions on a daily basis, because they have their own site list.”
“... my direction to our community and our people was that quote, ‘flood the zone.’ To work with these people on a daily basis to do everything that we can to assist their inspection process...”

- Statement for the Record, Letter from DCI Tenet to Senator John Warner – March 6, 2003

“When the current round of inspections began, the Intelligence Community assembled several lists of suspect sites, which we combined into a common list in early January. This list consisted of high, moderate and low value sites, depending on our assessment of recent activities suggesting ongoing WMD association or other intelligence information that the sites were worth inspecting. We have now provided detailed information on all of the high value and moderate value sites to UNMOVIC and the IAEA.”

- Letter from Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to Senator Carl Levin – March 6, 2003

“In terms of U.S. intelligence support specifically, it has been substantial. United Nations inspectors have been briefed on every high or medium priority weapons of mass destruction, missile, and UAV-related site the U.S. Intelligence Community has identified. Our bottom line is that, when we believe there is any real probability of finding prohibited material or activity, we provide the relevant information to the U.N. inspectors and offer to assist them in using it.”

H. The Intelligence Community’s Sharing of Intelligence on Iraqi Suspect Weapons of Mass Destruction Sites with United Nations Inspectors Conclusions

(U) Conclusion 112. The Intelligence Community had limited actionable intelligence on suspect Iraqi weapons of mass destruction sites.
(U) Conclusion 113. The Central Intelligence Agency fulfilled the intent of the Administration’s policy on the sharing of intelligence information.

(U) Conclusion 114. Public pronouncements by Administration officials that the Central Intelligence Agency had shared information on all high and moderate priority suspect sites with United Nations inspectors were factually incorrect.
(U) Conclusion 115. The rationale used by the Central Intelligence Agency for deciding what information to share with the United Nations was inherently subjective, inconsistently applied, and not well-documented.
(U) Conclusion 117. The information the Central Intelligence Agency provided to Senator Levin in reply to his letters on the sharing of intelligence information with the United Nations was, in some cases, unresponsive, incomplete and inconsistent.